Christina Harward, Anna Harvey, Daria Novikov, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter
July 8, 2025, 5:15 pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on July 8. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the July 9 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
US President Donald Trump announced on July 7 that the United States would resume weapons deliveries to Ukraine as discussions about provisions of additional air defense systems and interceptors are reportedly ongoing. Trump stated on July 7 that the United States will send more weapons to Ukraine to help Ukraine defend itself.[1] Trump stated that the United States is "going to see if [it] can make some [Patriot interceptors] available." Politico reported that two sources stated that shipments of US military aid to Ukraine could resume over the "coming weeks."[2] Chief Pentagon Spokesperson Sean Parnell stated on July 7 that Trump directed the US Department of Defense (DoD) to send additional defensive weapons to Ukraine to ensure that Ukraine can defend itself while the United States works to secure a "lasting peace."[3] Axios reported on July 8 that sources stated that Trump told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that he wants to help Ukraine's air defenses and promised to immediately send 10 Patriot interceptors and help to find other means of supply.[4] Axios' sources reportedly stated that Trump suggested that Germany should sell one of its Patriot batteries to Ukraine and that the United States and Europe would split the costs of the purchase. Axios reported that US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has identified Patriot batteries in Germany and Greece that the US could finance and send to Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that US-provided Patriot systems and interceptors are critical for Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian long-range overnight strikes, particularly against Russian ballistic missiles.[5]
The
Kremlin continues to leverage Russian Security Council Deputy
Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's aggressive rhetoric to undermine support
for US military aid to Ukraine, likely as part of a top-down, concerted
Kremlin informational effort. Medvedev responded on July 8 on
his Russian- and English-language channels to US President Donald
Trump's statements about resuming weapons supplies to Ukraine, claiming
that Russia should continue "business as usual."[6]
Medvedev claimed that Russia will "push forward" to achieve its war
goals and "reclaim [its] land." Medvedev's July 8 statements aim to
present Western military aid to Ukraine as futile in the face of an
alleged inevitable Russian victory. The West should not disregard all of
Medvedev's statements as hyperbole or fringe, however. Russian
President Vladimir Putin often leverages Medvedev to amplify
inflammatory rhetoric designed to stoke panic and fear among Western
decision-makers and discourage aid to Ukraine.[7]
Medvedev's statements are part of a wider Kremlin reflexive control
campaign against the West. Medvedev's provocative and at times
threatening statements are very likely part of a top-down, concerted
Kremlin informational strategy. Putin would be able to censor Medvedev's
statements should Putin choose to do so, especially considering the
coordination within the Kremlin on official statements and the Kremlin's
overall grip on the Russian information space, internet, and media.
Medvedev's continued use of his platform to make aggressive statements
that specifically target the United States and Europe suggests that the
Kremlin is approving and encouraging this effort. Medvedev's aggressive
statements serve a specific purpose for Putin, as they push the West to
see Putin's statements as more moderate and rational by comparison and
open space for Putin to make greater demands or larger threats.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast amidst a series of ongoing counterattacks. Geolocated footage published on July 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern and northeastern Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[8] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on July 7 that Ukrainian forces advanced between Kindrativka and Kostyantynivka (north of Kindrativka) and east of Oleksiivka (east of Kindrativka) and entered Novomykolaivka (northeast of Oleksiivka).[9] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 8 that Ukrainian forces entered Kindrativka from the northwest and Oleksiivka from the northeast.[10] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized central and northern Kindrativka and have cut off Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) along the C-191502 Novomykolaivka-Volodymyrivka road. The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command deployed elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) to Kindrativka to support Russian personnel retreating from the settlement. The milblogger claimed that the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) is fighting to establish a foothold south of Oleksiivka, but that recent Ukrainian advances are complicating this effort.
Russian
advances in northern Sumy Oblast slowed between late May and early June
2025, and Ukrainian forces began counterattacking and regaining
territory in mid-June. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on
June 14 that Ukrainian forces retook Andriivka (southeast of
Kindrativka), and Ukrainian forces advanced in other areas of northern
Sumy Oblast throughout late June 2025.[11]
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on July
8 that fighting remains intense in the North Slobozhansk (Kursk and
northern Sumy oblasts) direction and that Ukrainian forces are restoring
positions in this direction and maintaining positions in Kursk and
Belgorod oblasts.[12]
The Russian military command redeployed some drone and elite naval
infantry units from the Kursk and Sumy directions to other
higher-priority sectors of the frontline in Donetsk Oblast in May and
June 2025, and the command may further deprioritize the offensive in
northern Sumy Oblast if Ukrainian forces continue to complicate further
Russian advances.[13]
Russia could also reinforce its frontline units in northern Sumy Oblast
in the near future in order to continue advancing toward Sumy City,
however.
Russia continues to expand its domestic
drone production capacity amid the ever-growing role of tactical drones
in frontline combat operations and Russia's increasingly large nightly
long-range strike packages against Ukraine. Russian Prime
Minister Mikhail Mishustin claimed on July 8 that Russia has already
more than tripled its planned overall drone production volumes for 2025.[14]
Mishustin credited this increase to state financial support for drone
producers and innovators, including civilian companies. Ukraine-based
open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight stated on
July 8 that Russian forces have launched 28,743 total Shahed variant
drones (Shahed-136/131 and Geran 2) since the beginning of the
full-scale invasion and that Russian forces launched 10 percent of this
total (2,736 drones) in June 2025 alone.[15]
Frontelligence Insight assessed that Russia produced an average of 60.5
Geran drones per day, or roughly 1,850 drones per month, between
February and April 2025. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr
Syrskyi stated on July 8 that Russian forces launched 1.6 times more
missiles and drones against Ukraine in June 2025 than in May 2025.[16]
Increased Russian long-range drone production is enabling Russia's
increasingly large nightly strikes against Ukraine and has also enabled
Russian forces to integrate Gerans into strikes against frontline
Ukrainian positions.[17]
Russian forces are continuing to integrate drones into frontline combat
operations to strike frontline and near rear Ukrainian positions and to
interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in tandem
with Russian MLRS and artillery systems.
Ongoing Russian cooperation with Chinese companies is facilitating Russia's increasing domestic drone production. Documents analyzed by Bloomberg, including
memos from Russian drone manufacturer Aero-HIT and unspecified Russian
officials between late 2022 and June 2025, indicate that the Russian
defense industrial base (DIB) has cooperated with Chinese companies to
increase Russia's drone manufacturing capacity and subvert Western
sanctions for drone components since the start of Russia’s war against
Ukraine in February 2022.[18] Bloomberg reported
that a Russian delegation visiting China in May 2023 established a
joint venture with a Chinese university to form the Aero-HIT drone
production facility in Khabarovsk, Khabarovsk Krai. Bloomberg reported
that Aero-HIT submitted a 7.1-billion-ruble (roughly $90 million)
funding request to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in June 2025,
which stated that Aero-HIT has partnered with Chinese engineers since
early 2023. Aero-HIT memos reviewed by Bloomberg state that Aero-HIT's plant can produce up to 10,000 drones per month in 2025 and plans for further production increases. Bloomberg reported
that Aero-HIT's relationship with Chinese engineers is crucial to
Aero-HIT's ability to manufacture at scale its “Veles” first-person view
(FPV) drone, which Russian forces have used significantly in Kherson
Oblast.[19]
Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy "Flash"
Beskrestnov stated on July 7 that Ukrainian forces recently observed a
new type of Chinese wi-fi router on Chinese radio modems installed on
Russian “Gerber” drones.[20] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported to Radio Svoboda
on July 7 that 60 to 65 percent of the components in Russian-produced
Geran-type drones (the Russian analogue of the Iranian Shahed drone) are
of Chinese origin.[21]
Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported on July 4 that Ukrainian
investigators discovered components manufactured at the Chinese Suzhou
Ecod Precision Manufacturing Company in Russian Geran-type drones
recovered in Kyiv City.[22]
Russian
milblogger complaints suggest that the Russian military command is
struggling to supply frontline units with drones despite increased drone
production, possibly indicating how Russia's centralization and
bureaucracy are degrading the effectiveness of Russian drone operations
and slowing the Russian innovation cycle. A Russian milblogger
and former Storm-Z instructor claimed on July 8 that the Russian
military command is prioritizing drone supplies to several specialized
drone units and that the standards for equipping regular drone units are
far below the units' actual needs.[23]
Another Russian milblogger complained that the Russian military command
is creating a small number of specialized drone units with unlimited
support instead of creating drone units in all regiments and brigades.[24]
The milblogger claimed that the specialized drone units produce
results, but that the other units are left severely under resourced. The
milblogger claimed that the Russian military command supplies only 20
drones per month to non-specialized units and that these units have to
instead rely on volunteer drone supplies.[25]
Another milblogger complained that the Russian military has warehouses
full of drones but that only "elite" units receive these supplies.[26]
Russia's Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, to which
the Russian MoD reportedly prioritizes supplies and staffing, appears to
be Russia's effort to selectively reorganize and centralize unmanned
systems detachments and assets.[27]
ISW continues to assess that the Russian MoD is attempting to replicate
Ukraine's drone programs via Russia's Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) and
Rubikon Center, but that Russia's tendency towards centralization and
bureaucratic ineptitude is leading to obstacles in this process.[28]
Key Takeaways:
- US President Donald Trump announced on July 7 that the United States would resume weapons deliveries to Ukraine as discussions about provisions of additional air defense systems and interceptors are reportedly ongoing.
- The Kremlin continues to leverage Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's aggressive rhetoric to undermine support for US military aid to Ukraine, likely as part of a top-down, concerted Kremlin informational effort.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast amidst a series of ongoing counterattacks.
- Russia continues to expand its domestic drone production capacity amid the ever-growing role of tactical drones in frontline combat operations and Russia's increasingly large nightly long-range strike packages against Ukraine.
- Ongoing Russian cooperation with Chinese companies is facilitating Russia's increasing domestic drone production.
- Russian milblogger complaints suggest that the Russian military command is struggling to supply frontline units with drones despite increased drone production, possibly indicating how Russia's centralization and bureaucracy are degrading the effectiveness of Russian drone operations and slowing the Russian innovation cycle.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk.
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 8.
Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 7 and 8.[29]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked from
Ryzhivka (near the international border in Ukraine) toward Tetkino.[30]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th
VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions along the
international border near Tetkino.[31]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
(Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine
along the international border and approach to within tube artillery
range of Sumy City)
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.
See topline text for reported of assessed Ukrainian advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on July 8 that Russian forces retook Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City).[32]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south and east
of Bezsalivka and northwest of Mala Korchakivka (north of Sumy City).[33]
Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of northern Sumy Oblast on July 7 and 8.[34]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the "Granita" Detachment of the Russian 155th
Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating in the
Sumy direction.[35]
Elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and the
Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly operating near Kindrativka (north
of Sumy City).[36]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 8 but did not advance.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced within Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[37]
Russian
forces attacked north of Kharkiv City toward Lyptsi, northeast of
Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Zelene, and further northeast of Kharkiv
City along the international border toward Dehtyarne on July 7 and 8.[38]
Ukrainian
Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn
reported on July 8 that Russian forces increased the frequency of their
assaults in northern Kharkiv Oblast, conducting 19 assaults on July 7
and 24 assaults on July 6 as compared to a daily average of five to
seven assaults in June 2025.[39]
Shamshyn stated that Ukrainian drone operators are repelling ongoing
Russian attempts to seize positions in the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant on
the north (right) bank of the Vovcha River, including nightly Russian
infantry attacks of one to two personnel in anti-thermal imaging
ponchos.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 8 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near
Holubivka, along the P-79 Kupyansk-Velykyi Burluk highway near Radkivka
(both north of Kupyansk), and north and east of Stepova Novoselivka
(southeast of Kupyansk).[40]
Russian
forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe and Kamyanka
and toward Novovasylivka; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and toward
Kutkivka and Ambarne (along the international border); northwest of
Kupyansk toward Lozova Druha; west of Kupyansk near Myrne and Sobolivka;
east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near
Stepova Novoselivka and Hlushkivka on July 7 and 8.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kolisnykivka and Tabayevka (southeast of Kupyansk).[42]
Ukrainian
Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn
stated on July 8 that Russian forces have intensified their attacks near
Milove (north of Kupyansk near the international border) since July 7
and are crossing the international border and leveraging artillery and
drone support to strike Ukrainian positions.[43]
Shamshyn also stated that Ukrainian forces recently stopped Russian
advances toward Ambarne (south of Milove) and Hatne (southeast of
Ambarne). An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk
direction stated that Russian forces have begun leveraging unmanned
ground vehicles (UGVs) for remote mining, logistical operations, and
evacuations and are continuing to attack in contested “gray” areas in
groups of one to two personnel.[44]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th
Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are
reportedly operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[45]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 8 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and southeast of Borova toward Olhivka on July 7 and 8.[46]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on July 8 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Hlushchenkove (north of Lyman).[47]
Russian
forces attacked northwest of Lyman toward Shandryholove; north of Lyman
near Karpivka, Ridkodub, Hlushchenkove, Zelena Dolyna, and Novyi Myr;
and east of Lyman near Torske and in the Serebryanske forest area on
July 7 and 8.[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Ridkodub.[49]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 8 but did not advance.
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near
Hryhorivka and Serebryanka and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka on July 7
and 8.[50]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 8 indicates that
Russian forces recently advanced east of Bila Hora (south of Chasiv
Yar).[51]
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself; north of
Chasiv Yar toward Markove; west of Chasiv Yar toward Mykolaivka; and
south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky, Bila Hora, and Predtechyne on July 7
and 8.[52]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported that Russian forces are attacking in small infantry groups, occasionally on motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs).[53] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are increasingly using drones in order to cut off Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) and that Russian forces are constantly conducting guided glide bomb strikes against Chasiv Yar, Kostyantynivka (southwest of Chasiv Yar), Druzhkivka (west of Chasiv Yar), and Kramatorsk (northwest of Chasiv Yar). A Russian milblogger said that claims about Russian advances in Mykolaivka are premature.[54]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 7 indicates that
Russian forces recently marginally advanced northwest of Dyliivka
(north of Toretsk).[55]
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced
northwest of Yablunivka and southwest of Popiv Yar (both northwest of
Toretsk).[56]
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of
Toretsk near Dyliivka; and northwest of Toretsk near Yablunivka,
Oleksandro-Kalynove, Poltavka, and Popiv Yar and toward Katerynivka and
Pleshchiivka on July 7 and 8.[57]
A
servicemember in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction
reported that Russian forces have not been able to seize Toretsk
despite fighting for the settlement for almost a year.[58]
The servicemember stated that the summer 2025 Russian offensive is
focusing on seizing Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk and that Russian forces
are trying to envelop the settlements to avoid costly frontal assaults.
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th
Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are
reportedly operating near Yablunivka.[59]
Russian forces continued assaults in the Pokrovsk direction on July 8 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in
southern Novoekonomichne (east of Pokrovsk) and west of Razine
(northeast of Pokrovsk).[60] Another Russian milblogger denied previous Russian claims that Russian forces seized Koptieve (northeast of Pokrovsk).[61]
Russian
forces continued assaults near Pokrovsk; northeast of Pokrovsk near
Myrne, Malynivka, and Razine; east of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne and
Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near
Shevchenko, Novoukrainka, and Zvirove; and southwest of Pokrovsk near
Udachne on July 7 and 8.[62]
A
Ukrainian intelligence officer of a special forces unit operating in
the Pokrovsk direction reported on July 8 that Russian forces are
equipping well-trained infantry with increasingly advanced anti-drone
camouflage technology, including thermal cloaks that Ukrainian infrared
imaging has a difficult time detecting.[63]
The officer also reported that Russian forces have increased their use
of drones in the Pokrovsk direction in order to interrupt Ukrainian
logistics and that Russian forces are setting drone ambushes against
Ukrainian vehicles along GLOCs.
Order of Battle: Elements
of the Russian 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military
District [CMD]) and the "Typhoon" Detachment of the 506th Motorized
Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD) are
reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[64]
Russian forces continued assaults in the Novopavlivka direction on July 8 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 36th
Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are
advancing toward Andriivka-Klevtsove (formerly Iskra, southwest of
Novopavlivka) and that elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade
(36th CAA, EMD) are advancing toward and into northeastern Myrne
(southeast of Andriivka-Klevtsove).[65]
Additional Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces operating
south of Novopavlivka also advanced southwest of Tovste, west and
northwest of Piddubne, and west of Komar.[66]
Russian
forces continued assaults toward Novopavlivka; northeast of
Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near
Kotlyarivka and Horikhove; southeast of Novopavlivka near Oleksiivka and
Zelenyi Kut; south of Novopavlivka near Zaporizhzhia, Piddubne, Yalta,
Komar, and Fedorivka; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Myrne,
Andriivka-Klevtsove, and Vozkresenka on July 7 and 8.[67]
Russian forces continued assaults in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 8 but did not advance.
Russian
forces continued assaults northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko
and Vilne Pole and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka, Zelene
Pole, and Novopil on July 7 and 8.[68]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
(Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas
against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of
Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Hulyaipole direction on July 8 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on July 7 and 8.[69]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th
Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 64th
Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA) are reportedly operating near
Malynivka.[70]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast on July 8 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 108th
and 247th airborne (VDV) regiments (both of the 7th VDV Division)
advanced in western, eastern, and central Kamyanske (southwest of
Orikhiv) and raised a flag in the settlement.[71] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized the settlement.[72]
Russian
forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv toward Mala Tokmachka and
southwest of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky, Stepove, and Kamyanske on July 7
and 8.[73]
A
deputy commander for a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Zaporizhia
direction reported on July 7 that Russian forces are attacking in groups
of three to four soldiers, usually without equipment but sometimes with
motorcycles and buggies.[74]
The deputy commander stated that the intensity of Russian assaults is
currently the highest since the start of the full-scale invasion in
February 2022 and that Russian forces will conduct assaults throughout
the summer in order to reach the Mariupol highway and seize Orikhiv,
Kamyanske, and then Komyshuvakha.
Order of Battle: Drone
operators of the Russian “Nemets” group of the 291st Motorized Rifle
Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military
District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[75]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on July 8.
The
“Atesh” Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group reported on July 8 that
the Russian Navy has moved practically all Russian Navy vessels out of
Streletskaya Bay in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea and that the remaining
Russian Navy vessels in the bay are either moving or in hiding.[76]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian BARS-33 “Vasily Margelov” volunteer
detachment are reportedly operating in Kherson Oblast.[77]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian
forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine
on the night of July 7 and 8. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that
Russian forces launched four S-300/400 air defense missiles from Kursk
Oblast and 54 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and
Oryol cities and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[78]
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 26
drones and that 8 were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic
warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes
damaged civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv and Mykolaiv oblasts and
caused civilian casualties.[79]
Ukraine’s
Ground Forces Spokesperson Vitaly Sarantsev reported on July 8 that
Russian strikes may cause Ukrainian military recruitment centers to
change to a remote format or disperse in order to protect the lives of
staff and visitors.[80]
The Vinnytsia Oblast Military Recruitment Center reported on July 7
that Ukrainian military recruitment centers in the oblast are suspending
in-office services due to Russia's targeted strikes against the centers
but that ongoing force generation efforts will continue.[81]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Belarusian
Foreign Minister Maxim Ryzhenkov stated on July 7 that Belarus intends
to become a full member of BRICS after taking part as a partner for the
first time at the BRICS summit on July 6 and 7 in Rio de Janeiro.[82]
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/07/ukraine-aid-weapons-shipments-00441828 ; https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/trump-told-zelensky-he-wasnt-responsible-for-weapons-holdup-f684444b ; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/trump-says-us-will-send-more-weapons-ukraine-2025-07-08/; https://suspilne dot media/1061033-tramp-zaaviv-so-ssa-nadislut-ukraini-bilse-zbroi/
[2] https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/07/ukraine-aid-weapons-shipments-00441828
[3] https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4236261/statement-by-chief-pentagon-spokesman-sean-parnell-on-ukraine-military-aid/
[4] https://www.axios.com/2025/07/08/trump-patriot-missiles-ukraine-germany
[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070425
[6] https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/597 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/324380 ; https://t.me/medvedev_telegramE/86
[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025
[8] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1942490660411462048; https://t.me/operator_ak12/10855; https://x.com/p6060083/status/1942559366730916141; https://t.me/dva_majors/74930; https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1942484583984828591
[9] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2849 ; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid0A7jRrrnCFWvDj3b7ydJDRaqHAy69L3B5x5dLPycjwXPYabx1FSb4hKHVFV1S8uezl
[10] https://t.me/severnnyi/4519
[11] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2025
[12] https://t.me/osirskiy/1219
[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061425; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2025;
[14] https://ria dot ru/20250708/bespilotniki-2027912145.html?chat_room_id=2027912145
[15] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1942596877347696848
[16] https://www.facebook.com/CinCAFofUkraine/posts/pfbid02M42M9y2AdcVwh9BTuCeQu5szKDAWno3fTPaSUjDrTETK5Jg4Qvitj52wgmLWD2Y6l?rdid=aX7Kez9Co7dM5v7Q#
[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062725
[18] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-07-08/china-s-suppliers-key-for-russian-drones-in-war-against-ukraine-documents-show
[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-7-2024; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2404
[20] https://t.me/serhii_flash/5869; https://www.facebook.com/Serhii.Flash/posts/pfbid028qaWLVhG8unh1yWHpihCs1BHfsZfGiofYm1ibpeeeGL27xQGNt1zhZaeuz52SA1Xl?__cft__[0]=AZWWs3dfDmrWAHmNgs7pL2qrwf1dj231zsN6hV_yNCy5tTVncStQ6DqOBb7-rVMNvgH2tzAwHzb0QFeCnUDF4jrlq6icAmh1BaulDexurXKZvUolbfE4kC_91A7iDFnDY2-7rWziWGkpZbX68y-h3m7ZiYCmmiY1SyVWZdyp9nTjpvH4SIzbfX9z5V0K2EoWLZuNjntdKrpqlVdYIOicuAIR&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2025; https://www.radiosvoboda dot org/a/kytays%CA%B9ka-elektronika-u-shakhedakh-syahaye-65-hur/33464954.html ; https://suspilne dot media/1060397-kitajska-elektronika-vitisnae-zahidnu-z-rosijskih-droniv-gur/
[22] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2025
[23] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2672
[24] https://t.me/vault8pro/52775; https://t.me/philologist_zov/2667
[25] https://t.me/vault8pro/52778; https://t.me/philologist_zov/2671; https://t.me/vault8pro/52777; https://t.me/philologist_zov/2669
[26] https://t.me/filatovcorr/5389; https://t.me/philologist_zov/2668
[27] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112924 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-efforts-centralize-drone-units-may-degrade-russian-drone-operations
[28] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2025
[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cM2hCVWx7rLbRuNShMCPMkiih7zyRMFFW4ZbhNZsJ3KUNUyFtQda5Mmx2XEXgdZ1l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dqXJunNHxN3vKxi4R7zcgdcyeUK233mgpNJ3bDTUfJKLk5hMgneUT14uwJYHfo3nl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HJb3TgF3gNjGQoDzSGY5ygsUAQ8xN9YNcftNzK7ZWwLjt7fMbnopqnBEQXYFm7oml
[30] https://t.me/dva_majors/74910; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30962; https://t.me/severnnyi/4519
[31] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95341
[32] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30962 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74910
[33] https://t.me/severnnyi/4519 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30962; https://t.me/wargonzo/27748; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171704
[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cM2hCVWx7rLbRuNShMCPMkiih7zyRMFFW4ZbhNZsJ3KUNUyFtQda5Mmx2XEXgdZ1l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dqXJunNHxN3vKxi4R7zcgdcyeUK233mgpNJ3bDTUfJKLk5hMgneUT14uwJYHfo3nl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HJb3TgF3gNjGQoDzSGY5ygsUAQ8xN9YNcftNzK7ZWwLjt7fMbnopqnBEQXYFm7oml
[35] https://t.me/dva_majors/74908
[36] https://t.me/dva_majors/74907; https://t.me/dva_majors/74926 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74930; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38271 ; https://x.com/p6060083/status/1942559366730916141; https://t.me/dva_majors/74930; https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1942484583984828591
[37] https://t.me/severnnyi/4519
[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cM2hCVWx7rLbRuNShMCPMkiih7zyRMFFW4ZbhNZsJ3KUNUyFtQda5Mmx2XEXgdZ1l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dqXJunNHxN3vKxi4R7zcgdcyeUK233mgpNJ3bDTUfJKLk5hMgneUT14uwJYHfo3nl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HJb3TgF3gNjGQoDzSGY5ygsUAQ8xN9YNcftNzK7ZWwLjt7fMbnopqnBEQXYFm7oml; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13561; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13352
[39] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/4012766-rosijska-pihota-peretnula-derzkordon-u-rajoni-milovogo-na-harkivsini-sili-oboroni-vidbili-ataku.html
[40] https://t.me/rybar/71986; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30942
[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cM2hCVWx7rLbRuNShMCPMkiih7zyRMFFW4ZbhNZsJ3KUNUyFtQda5Mmx2XEXgdZ1l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dqXJunNHxN3vKxi4R7zcgdcyeUK233mgpNJ3bDTUfJKLk5hMgneUT14uwJYHfo3nl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HJb3TgF3gNjGQoDzSGY5ygsUAQ8xN9YNcftNzK7ZWwLjt7fMbnopqnBEQXYFm7oml; https://t.me/rybar/71986; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30942; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13352
[42] https://t.me/rybar/71986
[43] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/4012766-rosijska-pihota-peretnula-derzkordon-u-rajoni-milovogo-na-harkivsini-sili-oboroni-vidbili-ataku.html
[44] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/08/prosochytysya-po-siromu-i-prodavyty-pozycziyi-poblyzu-kupyanska-rosiyany-vykorystovuyut-nazemnyh-robotiv/
[45] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171694
[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cM2hCVWx7rLbRuNShMCPMkiih7zyRMFFW4ZbhNZsJ3KUNUyFtQda5Mmx2XEXgdZ1l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dqXJunNHxN3vKxi4R7zcgdcyeUK233mgpNJ3bDTUfJKLk5hMgneUT14uwJYHfo3nl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HJb3TgF3gNjGQoDzSGY5ygsUAQ8xN9YNcftNzK7ZWwLjt7fMbnopqnBEQXYFm7oml
[47] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38264
[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cM2hCVWx7rLbRuNShMCPMkiih7zyRMFFW4ZbhNZsJ3KUNUyFtQda5Mmx2XEXgdZ1l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dqXJunNHxN3vKxi4R7zcgdcyeUK233mgpNJ3bDTUfJKLk5hMgneUT14uwJYHfo3nl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HJb3TgF3gNjGQoDzSGY5ygsUAQ8xN9YNcftNzK7ZWwLjt7fMbnopqnBEQXYFm7oml; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13352
[49] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38264
[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cM2hCVWx7rLbRuNShMCPMkiih7zyRMFFW4ZbhNZsJ3KUNUyFtQda5Mmx2XEXgdZ1l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dqXJunNHxN3vKxi4R7zcgdcyeUK233mgpNJ3bDTUfJKLk5hMgneUT14uwJYHfo3nl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HJb3TgF3gNjGQoDzSGY5ygsUAQ8xN9YNcftNzK7ZWwLjt7fMbnopqnBEQXYFm7oml
[51] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1942476724270153819; https://t.me/Radisnyi_93/198; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1942476897314599048 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9538
[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cM2hCVWx7rLbRuNShMCPMkiih7zyRMFFW4ZbhNZsJ3KUNUyFtQda5Mmx2XEXgdZ1l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dqXJunNHxN3vKxi4R7zcgdcyeUK233mgpNJ3bDTUfJKLk5hMgneUT14uwJYHfo3nl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HJb3TgF3gNjGQoDzSGY5ygsUAQ8xN9YNcftNzK7ZWwLjt7fMbnopqnBEQXYFm7oml; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13352; https://t.me/wargonzo/27748
[53] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1061349-misto-akogo-vze-nema-ale-e-pozicii-vijska-rf-narosuut-kilkist-bezpilotnikiv-u-rajoni-casovogo-aru/
[54] https://t.me/wargonzo/27748
[55] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1942473499890602286; https://t.me/The_life_of_Predova/4789
[56] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38280 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30975
[57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cM2hCVWx7rLbRuNShMCPMkiih7zyRMFFW4ZbhNZsJ3KUNUyFtQda5Mmx2XEXgdZ1l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dqXJunNHxN3vKxi4R7zcgdcyeUK233mgpNJ3bDTUfJKLk5hMgneUT14uwJYHfo3nl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HJb3TgF3gNjGQoDzSGY5ygsUAQ8xN9YNcftNzK7ZWwLjt7fMbnopqnBEQXYFm7oml; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13352
[58] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1061231-na-toreckomu-napramku-ukrainski-bijci-fiksuut-zmensenna-aktivnosti-vazkoi-tehniki-rf-dani-12-i-brigadi-azov/
[59] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38280
[60] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30975
[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38251
[62] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cM2hCVWx7rLbRuNShMCPMkiih7zyRMFFW4ZbhNZsJ3KUNUyFtQda5Mmx2XEXgdZ1l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dqXJunNHxN3vKxi4R7zcgdcyeUK233mgpNJ3bDTUfJKLk5hMgneUT14uwJYHfo3nl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HJb3TgF3gNjGQoDzSGY5ygsUAQ8xN9YNcftNzK7ZWwLjt7fMbnopqnBEQXYFm7oml
[63] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/08/trishky-golosno-trishky-pobolily-golovy-poblyzu-pokrovska-vorog-namagayetsya-vysikaty-logistyku-zasidkamy-droniv/
[64] https://t.me/Andrafanaslive/14684 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38281
[65] https://t.me/voin_dv/15880 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171664 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74910
[66] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171704 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171664 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38234
[67] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cM2hCVWx7rLbRuNShMCPMkiih7zyRMFFW4ZbhNZsJ3KUNUyFtQda5Mmx2XEXgdZ1l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dqXJunNHxN3vKxi4R7zcgdcyeUK233mgpNJ3bDTUfJKLk5hMgneUT14uwJYHfo3nl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HJb3TgF3gNjGQoDzSGY5ygsUAQ8xN9YNcftNzK7ZWwLjt7fMbnopqnBEQXYFm7oml ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95339 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27748
[68] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cM2hCVWx7rLbRuNShMCPMkiih7zyRMFFW4ZbhNZsJ3KUNUyFtQda5Mmx2XEXgdZ1l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dqXJunNHxN3vKxi4R7zcgdcyeUK233mgpNJ3bDTUfJKLk5hMgneUT14uwJYHfo3nl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HJb3TgF3gNjGQoDzSGY5ygsUAQ8xN9YNcftNzK7ZWwLjt7fMbnopqnBEQXYFm7oml
[69] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dqXJunNHxN3vKxi4R7zcgdcyeUK233mgpNJ3bDTUfJKLk5hMgneUT14uwJYHfo3nl ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0BfcYDMr1pPzRhowq1kezxjP5kFo2dD38MdH3EwxJgt4koN5HFBfFkWMK4DyWCUzVl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HJb3TgF3gNjGQoDzSGY5ygsUAQ8xN9YNcftNzK7ZWwLjt7fMbnopqnBEQXYFm7oml; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13352
[70] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38253; https://t.me/voin_dv/15880; https://t.me/voin_dv/15889
[71] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30971 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74943; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95397; https://t.me/wargonzo/27748; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38250; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38273; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171719; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171731; https://t.me/rusich_army/24588; https://t.me/rusich_army/24589; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65734
[72] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95397; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38273; https://t.me/rusich_army/24588; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65734
[73] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dqXJunNHxN3vKxi4R7zcgdcyeUK233mgpNJ3bDTUfJKLk5hMgneUT14uwJYHfo3nl ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0BfcYDMr1pPzRhowq1kezxjP5kFo2dD38MdH3EwxJgt4koN5HFBfFkWMK4DyWCUzVl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0HJb3TgF3gNjGQoDzSGY5ygsUAQ8xN9YNcftNzK7ZWwLjt7fMbnopqnBEQXYFm7oml; https://t.me/dva_majors/74910
[74] https://espreso dot tv/viyna-z-rosiyeyu-za-tri-roki-takogo-ne-bulo-na-zaporizkomu-napryamku-komandir-batalyonu-65-i-ombr
[75] https://t.me/dva_majors/74936
[76] https://t.me/atesh_ua/7351
[77] https://t.me/tavria_kherson/56635; https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/8342
[78] https://t.me/kpszsu/37924
[79] https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/23914; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/08/ataka-bezpilotnykiv-na-harkiv-zagynula-zhinka-ponad-80-postrazhdalyh/; https://t.me/synegubov/15582; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0BfcYDMr1pPzRhowq1kezxjP5kFo2dD38MdH3EwxJgt4koN5HFBfFkWMK4DyWCUzVl; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/15155; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/08/na-mykolayivshhyni-pozhezhi-pislya-atak-droniv-poraneno-cholovika/
[80] https://suspilne dot media/1061071-ataki-rf-na-tck-u-suhoputnih-vijskah-zaavili-pro-mozlivi-zmini-u-formati-roboti-tck-ta-sp/; https://youtu.be/Gwv_we0tun8?feature=shared
[81] https://www.facebook.com/Vinobltck/posts/pfbid0CYHYxvmEuMbdLVzRRiDBFy9VKzA7CfUgj2ZaxBzNvDtJdJCogFrycrDkS6iTumXCl?__cft__[0]=AZVzgvj8XU56Dz1Zls429ZVhTwdAGQP_Lj-LUg2CmyPR-PmVPKOE6VjI4InJTbDZaecTAsHPQKfrJOh7GK5YiurcRaLvg9_vOZozYKYSibhRWsf2o3ke5ldGXkg_2csEBsJXDMDDRoS-t29u51ev4J5yW3Id-8b0KvNztWPAeoGNUg&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://t.me/dva_majors/74902
[82] https://belta dot by/politics/view/strategicheskaja-platforma-buduschego-ryzhenkov-zajavil-o-stremlenii-belarusi-k-polnopravnomu-725020-2025/
