Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, and Brysen Winthrop of the Institute for the Study of War;
Alexis Turek and Alex Chou of the American Enterprise Institute
Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Nicholas Carl of the American Enterprise Institute
Data Cutoff: July 16, 2025
The China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.
Taiwan continued its yearly Han Kuang military exercises through July 18, introducing new exercises and systems reflective of President William Lai Ching-te’s effort to improve Taiwanese defensive capabilities and resilience against PRC aggression. The offshore Taiwanese islands of Penghu, Matsu, and Kinmen all hosted drills, reflecting the key role that these islands would play in a cross-strait conflict. Taiwanese infantry and armor participated in an amphibious landing drill on Penghu on July 15.[1] A PLA capture of Penghu would likely allow the PLA to use it as a staging ground for further offensive operations against the Taiwanese mainland.[2] Exercises on Matsu simulated a PRC attack beginning with harassment by drones and fishing boats and escalating into a PLA attempt to seize the island.[3] Taiwanese forces drilling in Kinmen deployed over 30 armored vehicles and fired over 30,000 rounds.[4] A July 15 drill featured a simulated amphibious attack on Kinmen Bridge, a sea bridge connecting Kinmen’s main island to Lesser Kinmen.[5] Drills on Taiwan’s main island focused on sites deemed at-risk in the event of a PRC attack. Taiwanese forces simulated a PRC incursion around the Tamsui River in New Taipei on July 12.[6] The Tamsui River connects the Taiwan Strait to Taipei and has been an area of concern for Taiwanese officials following the apprehension of PRC nationals illegally transiting into the Tamsui. [7]
The 2025 Han Kuang exercises highlight the Lai administration’s increasing emphasis on the importance of societal resilience and urban infrastructure in a cross-strait conflict. Taiwanese officials incorporated existing infrastructure and systems into the drills.[8] Taiwanese forces practiced using Taipei’s Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) metro system to transport Javelin missiles and food across the capital on July 14.[9] Taiwan held sweeping air-raid and evacuation drills encompassing numerous major cities between July 15-18.[10] Taiwan has also taken steps to inoculate its citizens against potential disinformation campaigns, a critical element of PRC coercion. Taiwanese defense officials warned against misinformation about the drills and said that they believed the PRC would be watching Han Kuang closely.[11]
US-made systems played a key role in the Han Kuang exercises. Taiwan deployed US-made Stingers, Patriots, and High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) during drills, the latter for the first time. Drills involving Stingers focused on low-altitude defense during an amphibious landing scenario.[12] Taiwan also deployed US-made Abrams tanks at the Hsinchu military base.[13] Taiwan is expected to receive a second batch of HIMARS in 2026.[14] Taiwan also simulated escorting US supply ships into the Port of Hualien, although US ships did not participate in this exercise. The Taipei Times cited anonymous officials who said that the United States could feasibly resupply Hualien “with minimal risk” in a wartime scenario.[15]
PRC Defense Ministry spokesperson Jiang Bin criticized US arms sales to Taiwan in a July 14 press conference and accused Taiwan of making “war provocations.”[16] Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesperson Chen Binhua delivered similar criticisms of the Han Kuang exercises on July 9 and accused Taiwanese authorities of “separatism” and efforts to “incite cross-strait confrontation.”[17] The PRC will likely maintain such framing as a means of criticizing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) officials and denigrating Taiwan’s self-defense efforts.
At least four China Coast Guard (CCG) ships operated in the restricted waters of Taiwan's Pratas Island during the Han Kuang exercises, mirroring tactics used around Kinmen. Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) reported that it intercepted two CCG ships that separately entered Pratas’ restricted waters on July 9 and 11. One ship, CCG 3101, turned off its Automatic Identification System (AIS) in waters west of Pratas between July 7-11, according to data from Starboard Maritime Intelligence. The ship was likely going “dark” to conduct its patrol around Pratas. The other ship, CCG 5303, sailed in a straight line through Pratas’ restricted waters on July 10 without stopping.[18] Starboard data showed that a third ship called CCG 607 may have approached Pratas Island on July 11 and turned its AIS off until July 16, but the CGA did not mention it in its reports. The CGA reported that two more ships, CCG 3103 and 3105, jointly patrolled within Pratas’ restricted waters the night of July 16 with their AIS turned off.[19] The CGA did not rule out that the CCG was trying to consume Taiwan’s law enforcement energy during the Han Kuang exercises. The unusually high number of CCG ships around Pratas in one week supports this explanation.
The CCG’s “dark” patrols around Pratas appear to be a new trend in line with normalized CCG incursions around Taiwan’s outlying Kinmen Islands since 2024. The recent Pratas patrols coincided with CCG patrols into Kinmen’s restricted waters on July 10 and 11.[20] Turning off AIS is likely meant to impede Taiwan’s ability to monitor and respond to CCG incursions and avoid international attention on the PRC’s coercive activities. The CCG previously conducted six consecutive patrols that fully circled Pratas with AIS turned on between May 28 and July 2, as well as earlier incursions that followed different patterns.[21]
The CCG’s experimentation with different tactics and gradual normalization of patrols around Pratas closely resembles the progression of the “Kinmen model” in 2024. The “Kinmen model” is a concept introduced in PRC state media in May 2024 that refers to normalizing CCG “law enforcement” patrols around Taiwan’s outlying islands, starting with Kinmen, to assert PRC legal jurisdiction there and erode Taiwan’s control of those waters. [22] The model would ostensibly be justified in the name of protecting PRC fishermen, but could set conditions for a future quarantine or seizure of the islands from Taiwan.
PRC Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi attended the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Plus Foreign Ministers Meetings, taking advantage of favorable geopolitical conditions to further the PRC’s regional agenda. The China-ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting took place in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, from July 10 to 11.[23] Wang met with his counterparts from Southeast Asia, the United States, and Russia, among others. Wang’s statements following these meetings included rhetoric about the importance of increased trade and cooperation within international organizations, reflecting the PRC’s desire for increased influence over ASEAN states and at least tacit alignment on geopolitical issues.[24] Statements from ASEAN foreign ministers lacked references to points of contention, such as the South China Sea, which have been evident in previous high-level engagements between the PRC and ASEAN.[25] ASEAN rhetoric and the stated interest in economic engagement with the PRC are likely driven by US tariffs and a perceived lack of US interest in Southeast Asia. ASEAN states have increasingly looked to the United States and other countries as an alternative to the PRC amid growing PRC influence in the region. The PRC has characterized the United States’ economic and foreign policy decisions under the Trump administration as “destabilizing” to the global economy.[26] ASEAN states may be less likely to challenge PRC aggression and coercion now than in previous years due to fear of further worsening their economic situation. ASEAN states may currently view the PRC as a more reliable economic partner than the United States, which could result in closer PRC-ASEAN alignment.
Key Takeaways
- Taiwan: Taiwan continued its annual Han Kuang military exercises, emphasizing the defense of offshore islands, using new US-made systems, and preparing civilian infrastructure for conflict. The exercise reflects the Lai administration’s effort to improve Taiwanese defensive power and resilience against PRC aggression.
- Taiwan: The CCG has continued sailing vessels into the restricted waters of the Taiwanese Pratas Island, mirroring the CCG harassment around Kinmen Island. The PRC has normalized such harassment around Kinmen Island, likely to test Taiwanese response protocols and thresholds and degrade Taiwanese threat awareness.
- PRC: PRC Foreign Affairs Minister Wang attended a series of high-level ASEAN meetings and delivered speeches that promoted PRC narratives. ASEAN member states may be more receptive to PRC overtures given uncertainty regarding the US role in Southeast Asia, especially economically.
Cross-Strait Relations
Taiwan
The passage of a Kuomintang (KMT)-backed special budget may bolster the party’s popularity ahead of recall votes against KMT legislators. Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (LY) passed a KMT-backed special budget on July 11.[27] The bill adds approximately 18.5 billion US dollars to the budget, including 5.1 billion dollars for “national security resilience.”[28]
The DPP-controlled Executive Yuan created the original version of the special budget, which the KMT amended and passed on April 24.[29] The KMT originally opposed the appropriation of funds for national security but ultimately incorporated the measures from the DPP’s version.[30] The Ministry of National Defense announced on July 3 that it would direct the funds toward leasing new satellites, building drones, and integrating radar systems into a universal imaging platform.[31] The ministry stated that these funds would also support Taiwan’s ability to respond to threats.[32]
The KMT’s passage of the supplemental budget, including defense spending, may increase the likelihood that its legislators will survive the upcoming mass recall elections. Taiwan will hold recall elections against 31 KMT lawmakers on July 26 and August 23.[33] The recall movement has argued that the KMT is impeding Taiwan’s ability to resist CCP coercion, and some recall organizers openly accused the KMT of being a CCP “puppet.”[34] Recent polling data suggests that the perception that the KMT is “pro-CCP” is one of its vulnerabilities, and the same perception has driven a group of traditionally pro-KMT military veterans to campaign in favor of the recalls on July 15.[35] KMT Vice Chairman Andrew Hsia reaffirmed the KMT’s continued support for a cross-strait policy based on the concept of “One China” and the 1992 Consensus on July 10, however.[36]
China
The New York Times reported that the PRC has been conducting extensive seabed mapping near Taiwan and Guam since 2023, which could enable submarine operations and undersea countermeasures in a future conflict. This report aligns with previous Coalition Defense of Taiwan (CDOT)-ISW analysis concerning the potential for PRC seabed mapping to facilitate submarine navigation. PRC research ships significantly expanded their bathymetric survey operations off Taiwan's east coast in 2024. At least six PRC research ships conducted systematic seabed mapping operations using precise grid and parallel line patterns throughout 2024. This marked a substantial increase from the one PRC research ship observed in the area in 2023. These ships mapped the waters off Taiwan's coast and approached Taiwan's 12-nautical-mile territorial boundary but did not cross into territorial waters.[37] The Xiang Yang Hong 05, Xiang Yang Hong 06, and other PRC research ships also conducted extensive surveys in 2024 and 2025 immediately east and west of the US Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) around Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands. One such survey has been ongoing east of Guam since June 2025. Transponder data from Starboard Maritime Intelligence confirmed the ships’ paths. Guam hosts a US air base and naval base that would very likely play a key role in defending Taiwan from a PRC invasion.
The PRC’s bathymetric surveys around Taiwan and Guam may facilitate submarine operations and naval warfare.[38] Some PRC research ships are equipped with advanced sonar equipment, deep-sea sampling technology, and unmanned submarines.[39] PRC universities have published reports on the viability of Pacific Ocean features, such as the Kuroshio current, for submarine tactics.[40] The Kuroshio current’s strong speeds and distinct thermal layers, as well as other oceanic conditions the PRC is surveying, would provide tactical advantages for underwater navigation and concealment. PRC research ships are primarily operated by civilian government agencies and universities, allowing them to conduct operations in foreign exclusive economic zones with reduced scrutiny.[41]
CDOT-ISW previously reported similar PRC bathymetric survey operations at both ends of the Luzon Strait/Bashi Channel between Taiwan and the Philippines in April and May 2025.[42] The Bashi Channel is a strategic waterway that the PRC will likely seek to control in a blockade or invasion of Taiwan.
Northeast Asia
Japan
The PRC issued a strong protest against Japan’s Defense White Paper 2025, due to its characterization of PLA activities. The Japanese Ministry of Defense (MOD) submitted its annual Defense White Paper to the Prime Minister’s Cabinet on July 15. The MOD expressed strong concerns over PLA activities throughout the Indo-Pacific and PRC attempts to unilaterally change the status quo, which “could seriously impact Japan’s security.”[43] The report listed specific PLA activities that present unprecedented and significant strategic challenges, to which Japan should respond comprehensively and in cooperation with allies and partners. This list included intrusions into Japanese airspace, increased military cooperation between the PRC and Russia, and activities within and beyond the first island chain. The MOD also assessed that the PRC seeks to create a fait accompli in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea through increasing military and grey zone activities.
PRC spokesperson Lin Jian criticized the White Paper for spreading incorrect ideas about PRC behavior and the “China threat.” [44] Lin added that the Taiwan question is the PRC’s “internal affair,” and stressed that PLA activities are legitimate, justified, and consistent with international law. Lin further suggested that Japan was “talking up” regional tensions to justify its military buildup. The PRC Ministry of National Defense (MND) spokesperson Jiang Bin echoed Lin’s statement. Jiang further criticized Japan of undermining the post-war international order by walking away from its Pacifist Constitution, including raising Japan’s defense budget, loosening restrictions on arms exports, and suggesting revisions to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.[45]
Japan protested dangerous PLA aircraft maneuvers for the second time in a month. Japan’s MOD reported that PLA JH-7 fighter-bombers made two “unusual approaches” near the Japan Air Self-Defense Force’s (JASDF) YS-11EB electronic intelligence aircraft on July 9 and 10.[46] The YS-11EBs were conducting surveillance operations over the international waters of the East China Sea when the PLA aircraft came within 60 meters of the JASDF aircraft. Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Takehiro Funakoshi expressed Japan’s “serious concerns” to PRC Ambassador to Japan Wu Jianghao.[47] Funakoshi urged the PRC to halt these activities to prevent provoking accidental collisions. Japan also filed a complaint with the PRC over PLA J-15 fighter jets’ dangerous maneuvers near a Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force P-3C patrol aircraft in June 2025.[48]
PRC MND spokesperson Jiang Bin defended the PLA’s actions, claiming that the JH-7s were simply “verifying, identifying, following, and monitoring” the JASDF aircraft that were flying within the air defense identification zone (ADIZ) that the PRC established in 2013.[49] Jiang further accused the JASDF of “entering the PRC’s East China Sea ADIZ multiple times for close reconnaissance,” and attributed Japan’s close reconnaissance operations as the root cause of maritime and air collision risks.
North Korea
The PRC and North Korea held two high-profile and highly publicized commemorations of their mutual defense treaty, indicating a strengthening of relations between the two states. The PRC Embassy in Pyongyang celebrated the 64th anniversary of the signing of their mutual defense treaty on July 9.[50] North Korean state media reported that several high-level North Korean officials, including Vice Chairman of the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) Kang Yun Sok, Vice Department Director of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea Pak Myong Ho, and the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Ri Chang Sik, were all in attendance.[51] The previous year’s celebration included only a lower-ranking official as its main representative, in stark contrast to the 2025 list of attendees. North Korea hosted a similar commemoration in Beijing on July 10.[52] Vice Chairman of the PRC National People’s Congress Wang Dongming was the celebration’s guest of honor, reflecting the elevated status of attendees at the previous day’s event.[53] PRC official coverage of the event was far more detailed than its coverage of the previous year’s celebration, likely intended to convey the increased level of importance for North Korean-PRC alignment.
PRC-North Korean ties could be returning to 2023 levels of coordination, based on the extent of participation and coverage of these events. North Korean-PRC trade has increased 27 percent since 2024, according to official PRC customs data.[54] The PRC likely seeks to maintain its economic influence over North Korea, which has lessened somewhat as North Korea-Russia relations have deepened.
South Korea
The United States, South Korea, and Japan held the first Trilateral Chiefs of Defense meeting of the Lee Jae-myung administration on July 11. Official statements left out any reference to the PRC or Taiwan, which could represent South Korea’s desire to distance itself from US-Japan efforts to counter the PRC.[55] South Korean government officials confirmed that references to the PRC and Taiwan were deliberately left out of the joint statement, but stated that such concerns were still covered under the joint statement’s reference to “peace and stability within the region.”[56] The 2024 joint statement, released while the conservative Yoon Suk-yeol administration was in power in Seoul, explicitly decried the PRC’s “aggressive, dangerous behavior” in the South China Sea and the importance of maintaining “peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.”[57] Similar sentiments were also made in Japan-United States-South Korea trilateral statements in 2023.[58] The decision to omit references to the PRC and Taiwan could illustrate a South Korean rhetorical shift and possibly indicate major shifts in South Korean defense priorities. South Korean President Lee Jae-myung made clear his desire to avoid involvement in a conflict in Taiwan and pursue a more “pragmatic” foreign policy that could increase ties between Seoul and Beijing.[59] South Korean Defense Minister nominee Ahn Gyu-back stated on July 15 his desire to complete the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) from the United States to South Korea.[60] OPCON transfer would allow South Korea to command combined US-South Korean forces during wartime.[61] OPCON transfer and other major changes in South Korean defense posture have not yet been reflected in Lee’s policies. These policy changes, coupled with existing rhetorical changes, would further indicate a growing divergence in South Korean and US foreign policy priorities, which could potentially harm the United States’ ability to counter PRC aggression in the Indo-Pacific.
Southeast Asia
Philippines
The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) intercepted two PLA Navy (PLAN) warships patrolling within the Philippine exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The PRC is enforcing its “Nine-Dash Line” boundary claims in defiance of a 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling, which Beijing rejects. The PCG flagship Teresa Magbanua tailed the PLAN surveillance ship Tianwangxing and the CCG ship 4203 on July 11 as they traced the PRC-claimed “Nine-Dash Line” east of the disputed Scarborough Shoal. The PLAN destroyer Guilin joined the other ships partway through their journey and conducted helicopter landing drills, according to PCG spokesperson for the West Philippine Sea Jay Tarriela. Tarriela said that the warships ignored the PCG’s communications, while the CCG ship replied to say that the PRC has sovereignty and jurisdiction over the waters.[62] Scarborough Shoal is an uninhabited atoll that the PRC seized from the Philippines in 2012 and has controlled with CCG ships ever since. It has been a frequent site of PRC-Philippines confrontations. Beijing is increasingly using the CCG and naval ships to patrol and surveil its Nine-Dash Line boundary claim that surrounds nearly the entire South China, not just around specific islands.[63] It has also significantly increased CCG presence around Scarborough Shoal since 2024.[64] The primacy of the CCG in this effort is intended to give the impression that the PRC’s activities are normal law enforcement operations within PRC waters, rather than military coercion against other countries.
The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) issued a statement on July 12, the ninth anniversary of the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling, explaining its opposition to the ruling and the Philippine comments commemorating it.[65] The ruling, which resulted from a Philippines-filed suit to challenge Beijing’s expansive claims in the South China Sea, determined that the PRC’s Nine-Dash Line and “historic claims” to land and resources in the South China Sea have no legal basis.[66] The MFA reiterated its position that the ruling is an “illegal, invalid, and non-binding piece of paper” because the PRC did not agree to participate in the arbitration and because the ruling was allegedly inconsistent with international maritime law. [67] It stressed that it was committed to implementing the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, however, and negotiating a binding Code of Conduct for the South China Sea with ASEAN.
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[66] https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Issue%20Brief_South%20China%20Sea%20Arbitration%20Ruling%20What%20Happened%20and%20What%27s%20Next071216.pdf
[67] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/wjbzhd/202507/t20250711_11669705.shtml ; https://www.pna.gov dot ph/articles/1254088
