Tuesday, October 30, 2018

Russia in Review: The Gerasimov Doctrine Is Here To Stay

Russia in Review is a weekly intelligence summary (INTSUM) produced by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). This ISW INTSUM series sheds light on key trends and developments related to the Russian government’s objectives and its efforts to secure them. Receive future Russia in Review INTSUM products via-email by signing up for the ISW mailing list.

Special Topic Update: Russian Military Doctrine and Lessons Learned in Syria and Ukraine

Authors: Mason Clark and Catherine Harris with Jennifer Cafarella

Key Takeaway: The U.S. and NATO are preparing for the wrong type of war with Russia. The Russian Armed Forces has determined that hybrid warfare will characterize future conflict and is actively preparing for that future. NATO in turn remains excessively focused on the conventional threat. Russia is developing its military doctrine for hybrid warfare through discourse among high-ranking military officers in military journals based on their experience in conflicts abroad, namely Syria and Ukraine. The pattern of these discussions is similar to the discourse that shaped military thought and development in the Soviet Union. These doctrinal changes will shape and guide the Kremlin’s broader effort to modernize the Russian Armed Forces in support of its strategic objective to rebuild the global power of a revisionist Russia.

Russia is learning lessons for future wars from its combat experience in Syria and Ukraine. Russia has experienced both successes and failures in its invasion of Eastern Ukraine and its intervention in the Syrian Civil War. Its high-level military discourse seeks to understand these lessons. Russian military publications currently emphasize the need to apply lessons learned from both conflicts in order to adapt to the changing nature of future conflicts. Russian officers are specifically highlighting current gaps in modernization priorities and seeking to rewrite components of military doctrine accordingly. The lessons taken from their involvement in Ukraine include the importance of information campaigns and special operations actions as well as the effective use of poorly-equipped proxy forces.[1] The lessons derived from their campaign in Syria include the importance of coalition-building and management, the need to create a unified information space to streamline decision-making, the effective use of air and naval assets in support of proxy ground forces, and the refinement of tactics to combat militant groups.[2]

These lessons are not always rooted in reality. Some clearly come from the officers' perceptions of events on the ground while others simply reflect the authors' transposition of desired points onto the battlefields of Syria and Ukraine. ISW's Russia Team has not undertaken to verify the validity of these claimed experiences because perceptions are what matter in the shaping of military intellectual discourse. The Russian Armed Forces will likely alter its modernization, training, and deployment of forces in the future based on these perceptions and writings regardless of their accuracy or adherence to events on the ground. 

The Russian Armed Forces is working through significant doctrinal changes in high-level military publications based on its combat experiences abroad. Both Russia and the Soviet Union have historically worked through major doctrinal issues in military journals before implementing results at the institutional level. Current discourse in prominent military journals such as Voennaya Mysl’ and Voyenno-promyshlennyy Kur'yer (VPK) reflects the understanding that Russia should shift its modernization priorities to prepare for unconventional “hybrid” warfare. Russian officers note that “new forms and ways of achieving political and strategic goals have been found by initiating local wars [and] conflicts; political, economic, [and] information pressure; and subversive actions within the opposing state” and Russia must therefore develop the capabilities and structures to bolster these non-military operations.[3] 

Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov articulated this requirement in 2013 in an article entitled “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight” - referred to by some as the Gerasimov Doctrine.[4] The West’s preoccupation with the conventional military threat posed by Russia has led some to push back against the notion of a coherent Gerasimov Doctrine.[5] But Russian officers of all ranks do not doubt either its existence or its dominance. Russia’s operations in Ukraine and Syria put Gerasimov’s ideas into practice. Major Russian military journals are now incorporating insight from these conflicts in order to inform future planning for the unconventional and hybrid conflicts discussed by Gerasimov. These articles are part of a clear effort to drive the doctrine deep into the institutional thought of the Russian Armed Forces, which would likely shape its development for years to come. The Gerasimov Doctrine is here to stay.

Russia’s effort to reform its military doctrine is a key component of the Kremlin’s objective to modernize the Russian Armed Forces. Russian President Vladimir Putin has prioritized large-scale military reform after the exposure of significant shortcomings in the Russo-Georgian War in 2008. Russia has pushed forward structural and doctrinal changes in addition to hardware modernization as part of its strategic objective to expand and strengthen the Russian Armed Forces. Some of these changes emphasize the integration of military and non-military bodies to achieve political and strategic objectives. Other changes involve the development of new capabilities and doctrine to address the growing prominence of electronic and information warfare; new technological developments that increase pace of warfare; and the preeminence of long-range standoff systems such as cruise missiles.[6] 

The U.S. and NATO are preparing to fight and win the wrong type of war against Russia. The U.S. aims to modernize and expand its military capabilities in the event of a large-scale conventional conflict with Russia as stated by the 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy. The lessons learned being debated by the Russian Armed Forces suggest that Russia does not intend to fight this type of war against the U.S. or NATO. Russia instead is attempting to offset - rather than match - the capabilities of the U.S. and NATO. The West should expect Russia to bring to bear significant non-military capabilities supported by conventional military force in future conflicts. The U.S. and NATO must reorient their modernization priorities to confront this developing form of unconventional warfare and counter a revisionist Russia that is actively attempting to fracture NATO. 

ISW will publish future products that analyze the specific lessons learned by Russia in Syria and Ukraine, and identify the consequent requirements moving forward for U.S. and NATO.

[1] [“Friction and Turbulence in Hybrid War,”] A.A. Bartosh, Voennaya Mysl’, January 2018,; [“Features of Tactical Intelligence in a Hybrid War,”] Yu. A. Popkov, Voennaya Mysl’, August 2017,; [“Lessons from Coalition Wars in Interpreting Western Military Theory,”] S. L. Pechurov and A. N. Sidorin, Voennaya Mysl’, April 2017,
[2] [“To the Question of Domination in Aerospace,”] A. V. Rudenko, O. V. Milenin, and A. V. Bykadorov, Voennaya Mysl’, March 2017,; [“Features of Tactical Intelligence in a Hybrid War,”] Yu. A. Popkov, Voennaya Mysl’, August 2017,; [“Lessons from Coalition Wars in Interpreting Western Military Theory,”] S. L. Pechurov and A. N. Sidorin, Voennaya Mysl’, April 2017,; [“An Adaptive Approach to the Use of Forces and Means to Combat Terrorists from the Experience of Armed Conflicts Outside of Russia,”] A. V. Vdovin, Voennaya Mysl’, May 2018,
[3] [“Evolution of the Essence and Content of the Concept of "War" in the 21st Century,”] S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, Voennaya Mysl’, January 2017,
[4] [“The Value of Science Is in the Foresight,”] Valery Gerasimov, VPK, March 5, 2016, https://vpk-news(.)ru/sites/default/files/pdf/VPK_08_476.pdf.
[5] “I’m Sorry for Creating the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine,” Mark Galeotti, March 5, 2018, Foreign Policy,
[6] [“Evolution of the Essence and Content of the Concept of "War" in the 21st Century,”] S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, Voennaya Mysl’, January 2017,

Friday, October 26, 2018

Syria Situation Report: October 11 - 24, 2018

By ISW's Syria Team and Syria Direct

This graphic marks the latest installment of the Syria Situation Report (SITREP) Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and Syria Direct. The map depicts significant developments in the war in Syria during the period October 11 - October 24, 2018.

Click image to enlarge.

Russia in Review: October 18 - 25, 2018

Russia in Review is a weekly intelligence summary (INTSUM) produced by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). This ISW INTSUM series sheds light on key trends and developments related to the Russian government’s objectives and its efforts to secure them. Receive future Russia in Review INTSUM products via-email by signing up for the ISW mailing list.

Reporting Period: October 18 - 25, 2018

Author: Jack Ulses

Forecast: Russia is attempting to undermine Western efforts to constrain the Kremlin. Moscow may exploit proposals to modernize the Kosovo Security Force to fuel regional ethnic tensions and call for the removal of the NATO Mission in Kosovo. The Kremlin is also setting conditions to evade Western sanctions in Egypt and may export this model to other emerging markets such as Vietnam and Indonesia.

The Kremlin may attempt to marginalize NATO as a security guarantor in Kosovo. The Kosovo Parliament approved draft legislation on October 18 to expand the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) from 2,500 to 8,000 personnel.[1] The body is expected to vote on the final reading of the bill in the near term.[2] Legislators have not offered any clear reasons for its passage at this time but the measure may have gained urgency amidst recent interference by ethnic Serbs and Russia in the Balkans. The legislation has regardless inflamed ethnic tensions in Kosovo. Serbia reportedly pressured ethnic Kosovar Serbs to resign from the KSF following the initial proposed expansion in June 2018.[3] The Kremlin is well-positioned to exploit these tensions to destabilize the wider Balkans. Russia could attempt to link the KSF to ongoing nationalist movements among ethnic Albanians in order to encourage recruitment for paramilitary groups of ethnic Serbs such as the Serbian Honor.[4] The KSF’s expansion could also embolden newly-elected Bosnian Serb President Milorad Dodik to call for a similar reinforcement of the Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Tensions over the measure could also spoil negotiations over a land-swap agreement between Serbia and Kosovo. Russia could ultimately use the potential for ethnic tensions linked to the successful expansion of the KSF as a justification to call for the removal of the NATO Mission in Kosovo.[5]

The Kremlin is setting conditions to evade Western sanctions in Egypt. Russia announced that construction has begun on an exclusive industrial zone located on the Suez Canal prior to the recent visit of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to Moscow.[6] The Kremlin has sought to increase its influence in Egypt in order to secure access to strategic basing on the Mediterranean Sea and undermine U.S. influence in North Africa. Russia could use the new industrial zone as a vector to evade sanctions from the West. The Russian Export Center (REC) - a state-run joint stock company that supports overseas exports by Russia - will manage the industrial zone.[7] The REC has previously supported businesses sanctioned by the West.[8] The Kremlin could use this new zone to facilitate trade in non-dollar currencies and mitigate the financial impact of future sanctions. The Kremlin could also use the zone to obfuscate its ownership of large maritime shipments and potentially assist other malign actors in sanctions evasion. Russia may consider exporting this model if successful to other global emerging markets such as Vietnam and Indonesia.[9] The Kremlin can use these developments to set conditions to pursue an aggressive foreign policy even less constrained by the potential financial impact of sanctions by the West.

[1] Muhamer Pajaziti, “Kosovo: Parliamentary debates on the creation of the army expected to start,” Ibna, October 16, 2018, www.balkaneu(.)com/kosovo-parliamentary-debates-on-the-creation-of-the-army-expected-to-start/; Die Morina, “Kosovo President Warns Govt Over its Army Plans,” Balkan Insight, September 13, 2018, www.balkaninsight(.)com/en/article/kosovo-govt-approves-the-expand-of-competences-for-its-security-force-09-13-2018.
[2] [“Committee meeting: Committee on Internal Affairs, Security and Oversight of the Kosovo Security Force,”] Republic of Kosovo Assembly, October 23, 2018, www.kuvendikosoves(.)org/?cid=1,159,7664; Die Morina, “Kosovo Security Force competences to expand with newly-passed laws,” Prishtina Insight, October 10, 2018, https://prishtinainsight(.)com/kosovo-security-force-competences-to-expand-with-newly-passed-laws/.
[3] Dia Morina, “Belgrade 'Pressured' Serbs to Quit Kosovo Security Force,” Balkan Insight, September 19, 2018, www.balkaninsight(.)com/en/article/belgrade-pushed-kosovo-serb-ksf-members-to-resign-report-finds-09-19-2018; “KSF Serb members quit after pressure from Belgrade,” Gazetta Express, July 2, 2018, www.gazetaexpress(.)com /en/news/ksf-serb-members-quit-after-pressure-from-belgrade-174292.
[4] “Serbia puts military on high alert over incident involving ‘Kosovo special forces’,” RT, September 29, 2018, www.rt(.)com/news/439920-serbia-troops-high-alert/.
[5] Mira Kankaras Trklja, [“NATO kicks the last knife in Kosovo, Serbia is preparing the answer,”] Sputnik, October 19, 2018, https://rs.sputniknews(.)com/analize/201810191117553714-kosovo-vojska-amerika-/.
[6] “Construction of Russian Industrial Zone in Egypt Underway – Lavrov,” Sputnik, October 13, 2018, https://sputniknews(.)com/middleeast/201810131068848232-russia-egypt-lavrov-industrial-zone-creation/.
[7] [“On signing the Agreement between the Government Russian Federation and the Arab Government Of the Republic of Egypt on the creation and maintenance of conditions activities of the Russian industrial zone in the economic zone of the Suez Canal Arab Republic of Egypt,”] Russian Trade Ministry, April 30, 2018, http://static.government(.)ru/media/files/fCiWsxJxLCkTzNJXUIwQ0QODxut4RDv8.pdf; [“On approval by the Russian Party of the draft Agreement between the governments of Russia and Egypt on the creation and maintenance of conditions for the activities of the Russian industrial zone in the Suez Canal Economic Zone,”] Russian Trade Ministry, March 3, 2018, http://government(.)ru/docs/32536/.
[8] Tarek Bazza, “Russia’s Gazprom, Novatek Show Interest in Morocco’s Natural Gas,” Morocco World News, October 9, 2018, www.moroccoworldnews(.)com/2018/10/254868/russias-gazprom-novatek-show-interest-in-moroccos-natural-gas/.
[9] “Russia plans to launch four industrial zones abroad in 6 years,” TASS, September 12, 2018, http://tass(.)com/economy/1021304.

Thursday, October 18, 2018

The Kremlin's Campaign in Africa

By Nataliya Bugayova with Jack Ulses and Chase Johnson

Key Takeaway: The Kremlin is expanding its outreach and influence in Africa. Russia is boosting its military sales and economic cooperation across Africa, entering the continent’s emerging nuclear energy market and expanding its access to mineral resources and sites for naval basing. The expansion in outreach followed a tour of five states in Africa by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in March 2018. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov, Russian National Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, and the heads of a number of state-owned enterprises are leading the push by Russia into Africa. Although Russia’s ambitions are primarily economic at this time, the Kremlin is adept at converting economic leverage into political gains. The U.S. should closely monitor these developments due to the growing strategic importance of Africa, the expansion into Africa by China, and the broader campaign by the Kremlin to undermine the U.S. globally.

This initial assessment examines the Kremlin’s objectives in Africa, the timing and the focus of its activities, and their implications for the U.S

The Kremlin is pursuing economic objectives with geostrategic implications in Africa. Russia primarily seeks access to resources, new markets, shipping routes, and additional naval basing in Africa. These efforts fit within its goal to establish a new multipolar world order. The Kremlin aims to counterbalance both the U.S. and China in Africa. It also likely aims to keep pace with other regional actors investing in Africa including Turkey and the Gulf States. Russia also intends to generate influence over powerbrokers that it can convert into political gains, including support from the African voting bloc in the United Nations.

The Kremlin’s campaign in Africa is driven by both opportunity and necessity. Russia likely perceives a ripe opportunity in Africa amidst a drawdown in economic support by the U.S. and Europe. The Kremlin nonetheless cannot compete with the volume of foreign aid from the U.S. or investment from China. Russia is instead focusing on its comparative advantage in certain sectors valued by local powerbrokers including energy, mineral resource exploitation, and weapons as well as growth markets in agriculture, nuclear energy, and hydrology.[1] The Kremlin could use these potential revenue streams to mitigate the negative economic effects of sanctions and diversify away from its long-term dependence on oil. Russia is managing its expansion into Africa by leveraging relationships, networks, and expertise dating to the former Soviet Union. It is also exploiting its increased influence and infrastructure in the Middle East and North Africa.

The Kremlin is pursuing several simultaneous lines of effort in Africa:

1. The Kremlin is attempting to secure military basing in Africa. Russia holds a long-standing goal to secure additional strategic basing as warned by ISW in March 2017.[2] The Kremlin seeks basing in Africa in order secure access to key trade routes and further project its military and economic power. The Kremlin may ultimately intend to contest access to maritime chokepoints in the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandab Strait. Russia announced plans to build a naval logistics center in Eritrea on August 31.[3] The facility would overlook major shipping routes through the Red Sea. The Russian Foreign Ministry is now pushing for sanctions relief for Eritrea in a likely bid to facilitate its operations in the country and encourage further concessions to Moscow.[4] Russia similarly discussed building a naval supply center in Sudan as recently as June 2018.[5] The Kremlin may also be pursuing a naval base in Somaliland on the Horn of Africa.[6] Moreover, a Russian Defense Ministry source stated in July 2018 that Russian PMCs were being used as security for a Russian base under construction in Burundi.[7] In North Africa, Russia likely holds basing aspirations in Egypt and Libya.[8] The Kremlin could ultimately intend to use former bases in Eastern Libya as part of a bid to control migrant routes to Europe.[9]

2. The Kremlin is trying to capture the emerging nuclear energy market in Africa. Russia can use nuclear energy deals to market a wide range of related services including engineer training, fuel provision, and sales of defensive radar systems to protect key infrastructure.[10] Russia holds a competitive advantage in these fields relative to the U.S. and Europe.[11] Russia is also likely trying to preempt further expansion in the global nuclear energy sector by China.[12] Russia if successful could gain significant leverage over local governments via its role in nuclear energy provision similar to its influence over energy in the Baltics and Eastern Europe. [13]

Rosatom - the state-owned nuclear energy corporation of Russia - approached at least a dozen countries in Africa in 2018. Nigeria confirmed plans for the development of a nuclear power plant by Rosatom in July 2018.[14] Russia has also started initial talks on nuclear energy with Angola.[15] The Kremlin signed memorandums of understanding on atomic energy cooperation with Sudan, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2018 following similar deals with Uganda and Morocco in 2017.[16] Russia already holds deals to finance and build nuclear power plants in Egypt, Turkey, and Hungary.[17]

Russia is also setting conditions for future deals by establishing Nuclear Science and Technology Centers to promote nuclear energy and train workers throughout Africa. Rosatom showcased a planned nuclear research facility at a major trade show in Zambia in August 2018.[18] Russia plans to establish a similar center in Ethiopia.[19] Rosatom similarly held a nuclear power workshop for youth in Kenya in July 2018.[20]

3. The Kremlin is expanding its security cooperation in Africa. Russia signed agreements on military cooperation with Guinea, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Madagascar, and the Central African Republic in 2018.[21] These framework agreements allow for the exchange of counterterrorism resources as well as the training of servicemen from Africa in Russia. Russia and Mozambique agreed to boost their counterterrorism cooperation in March 2018.[22] Russia and the Southern African Development Community signed a memo on military technical cooperation on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in August 2018.[23]

The Kremlin also pursued additional military sales in Africa in 2018. Russia National Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov both stressed that Russia would like to expand its military cooperation with Algeria – one of the largest buyers of weapons from Russia in Africa - in 2018.[24] The Russia Defense Ministry provided small arms, ammunition, and instructors to the Central African Republic in early 2018. Russia will supply armaments and military training to the DRC[25]. Lavrov later met with Rwandan President Paul Kagame to discuss the delivery of air defense systems to Rwanda in June 2018.[26] Russia reportedly continues to supply weapons to a number of countries across Africa including Egypt, South Africa, Algeria, Mali, and Angola.[27]

4. The Kremlin is pursuing greater access to natural resources in Africa. Russia is currently prioritizing exploration for hydrocarbons and rare minerals in Africa. The Kremlin likely views resource extraction as more cost-effective in Africa than remote regions of Russia. Rosgeologia - a state-owned geological exploration company - signed an agreement with Sudan regarding natural gas in the Red Sea in July 2018.[28] Rosgeologia also signed deals with Madagascar and Algeria in 2018.[29] Gabon offered additional exploration rights to Russian oil company Zarubezhneft in 2018.[30] Mozambique is planning a similar deal on natural gas exploration with Russian oil company Rosneft.[31] Rosneft signed a deal with Libya’s National Oil Corporation in 2017.[32] Russia and Zimbabwe discussed cooperation in the diamond sector including a multi-billion joint project on platinum in March 2018.[33] Russian diamond company Alrosa secured a controlling stake in the largest diamond deposit in Angola in 2017.[34] Russian mining company Nordgold plans to expand its operations in Burkina Faso.[35] Rosatom is also attempting to obtain licenses for uranium exploration in Namibia.[36]

5. Russia is using Private Military Contractors (PMCs) to advance its campaign in Africa. Russian PMCs are training local security forces and supporting the push for mineral resources in Africa. The Russian Embassy in Sudan confirmed the presence of Russian PMCs in Sudan in July 2018.[37] Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir confirmed that "specialists" from Russia hold long-term training contracts for the Sudanese Armed Forces.[38] Russian PMCs likely also use Sudan as a staging area for operations in the Central African Republic (CAR). Russia has confirmed that at least 175 Russians - mostly “civilians” - are deployed to train local security forces in the CAR.[39] These trainers include fighters from the Russian Wagner PMC Group operating in Ukraine, Syria, and Africa.[40] Russia reportedly transfers these fighters from Syria to the CAR via Sudan.[41] The PMCs likely provide protection for resource extraction efforts by Russia. Russia holds concessions to explore for natural resources in the CAR as of March 2018.[42] The Kremlin is reportedly working to establish gold mines and explore for diamonds in the CAR.[43] The PMCs are also acting as political brokers to arrange negotiations between different factions in the CAR on behalf of Russia.[44] The Kremlin leverages PMCs in its global campaigns given their flexibility and the deniability provided to Russia.

6. Russia is expanding exports of its agricultural products to Africa. Russia is trying to enter wheat markets in Algeria, Libya, and Morocco.[45] Algeria - which predominantly imports wheat from France - will accept its first trial shipment of wheat from Russia in 2018.[46] Morocco will also remove its wheat tariff by the end of 2018 as a result of a request from Russia.[47] Russia has already established itself as a major source of imported wheat in Egypt. Russia holds a competitive advantage in wheat due to its lower operating costs.[48]

Results and Implications

The Kremlin has thus far experienced varying degrees of success in Africa. Russia has undoubtedly made significant advances in Africa. However, some of its recent efforts have stumbled. For example, the Kremlin failed to secure a major nuclear energy deal in South Africa that had been agreed upon by Russian President Vladimir Putin and former South African President Jacob Zuma.[49] South Africa withdrew from the deal due to perceived corruption under Zuma. Putin has attempted to resume the talks with no success thus far.[50] Russia is trying to pursue nuclear cooperation with Uganda. China will, however, help Uganda build its nuclear power plants. Russia’s basing aspirations in Africa are also advancing at a very slow pace.[51] Russia has not yet secured its desired naval basing in Egypt, Libya, or Sudan.

The U.S. should watch and be prepared to counterbalance outreach by the Kremlin in Africa. The U.S. has sufficient strategic interests at stake to remain committed to Africa.[52] The Kremlin’s campaign in Africa ultimately supports its grand strategic objective to weaken the U.S. globally and establish a multi-polar world order. Russia could gain strategic positioning on two strategic maritime chokepoints - the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. The Kremlin’s actions also have long-term implications for the efficacy of coercive measures such as sanctions and diplomatic pressure on Russia. The Kremlin’s campaign in Africa could ultimately alleviate these pressures to some degree by diversifying its revenue streams and expanding its diplomatic support at the UN. Its economic engagement in Africa will raise the political cost and complexity of potential future sanctions by the West on Russia. There is also a substantial potential for illicit exploitation of natural resources given the generally-weak governance in Africa. The U.S. holds an explicit obligation to care about such exploitation per the Dodd-Frank Act Section 1502, in which the U.S. Congress expressed an interest in protecting against mineral resource exploitation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and other states in Africa. The U.S. also holds an interest in stemming the human rights abuses resulting from the sale of weapons by Russia to hostile regimes in Africa. The Kremlin’s backing of these regime also stands to worsen popular grievances and set favorable conditions for Salafi-Jihadist groups in Africa.[53]

[1] “Rosatom signs contract for small scale hydro facility in the Republic of South Africa,” Rosatom, January 29, 2018, www.rosatom(.)ru/en/press-centre/news/rosatom-signs-contract-for-small-scale-hydro-facility-in-the-republic-of-south-africa.
[2] Genevieve Casagrande, “Russia moves to supplant U.S. role,” Institute for the Study of War, March 22, 2017,
[3] “Russia In Talks With Eritrea To Set Up 'Logistics Center' On Red Sea Coast,” RFERL, September 1, 2018,
[4] “Russia-Eritrea Relations Grow with Planned Logistics Center,” VOA, September 2, 2018,
[5] “Russia, Sudan are discussing naval supply centre, not military base: diplomat,” Sudan Tribune, June 9, 2018, www(.); [“The Russian Navy negotiates to create a logistics center in Sudan,”] Sputnik, September 6, 2018, mundo(.); [“Russian Ambassador appreciates prospects for building a naval base in Sudan,”] RIA Novosti, September 6, 2018, www.ria(.)ru/world/20180609/1522412113.html.
[6] Ciaran McGrath, “Putin flexes muscles with plans for new African base - with chilling echoes of Suez,” Express, April 18, 2018,
[7] [“Fighters of PMC "Wagner" began training at the cottage Prigogine,”] Meduza, July 6, 2018, https://meduza(.)io/feature/2018/07/06/boytsy-chvk-vagner-nachinali-trenirovki-na-dache-prigozhina ; [“In Syria, a new Russian PMC began to fight,”] TV Rain, July 5, 2018, https://tvrain(.)ru/news/patriot-467148/?from=rss.
[8] Emily Estelle, “A Strategy for Success in Libya,” Critical Threats Project, November 2017,
[9] Tom Newton, “Putin Troops in Libya,” The Sun, October 8, 2018,
[10] “Russia to supply radar for protecting nuclear power plant in Pakistan,” TASS, August 30, 2018, www.tass(.)com/defense/1019325.
[11] “The world relies on Russia to build its nuclear power plants,” The Economist, August 2, 2018,
[12] “China to help Uganda build nuclear power plants,” Reuters, May 17, 2018,
[13] Alissa de Carbonnel and Andrius Sytas, “Baltic States to decouple power grids from Russia, link to EU by 2025,” Reuters, June 28, 2018,
[14] Darrell Proctor, “Russia Will Help Nigeria Develop Nuclear Plant,” Power Mag, July 1, 2018,
[15] “Russia discusses African nuclear power prospects,” World Nuclear News, March 8, 2018,
[16] “Press release on Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov’s meeting with Uganda's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Henry Oryem Okello,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, May 22, 2018, www.mid(.)ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3230839; “Uganda, Russia enter economic, scientific deal,” Edge, May 26, 2018, https://edge(.)ug/2018/05/26/ uganda-russia-enter-economic-scientific-deal/; [“Rosatom and the Sudan Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Electricity Sign a number of cooperation documents,”] Rosatom, May 16, 2018, https://rosatom(.)ru/journalist/news/rosatom-i-ministerstvo-vodnykh-resursov-irrigatsii-i-elektroenergetiki-sudana-podpisali-ryad-dokumen/; “Russia and Rwanda sign a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy,” Rosatom, June 22, 2018, www.rosatom(.)ru/en/press-centre/news/russia-and-rwanda-signed-a-memorandum-of-understanding-on-cooperation-in-the-field-of-peaceful-uses-/; “Russia and Uganda sign a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy,” Rosatom, June 19, 2017, http://www.rosatom(.)ru/en/press-centre/news/russia-and-uganda-sign-a-memorandum-of-understanding-on-cooperation-in-peaceful-uses-of-atomic-energ/; [“Morocco and Rosatom have signed a cooperation agreement on the peaceful atom,”] TASS, October 11, 2017, www.tass(.)ru/ekonomika/4636660; “Russia and Congo to cooperate in nuclear power,” World Nuclear News, February 14, 2018,; “Russia, Rwanda establish nuclear energy ties,” World Nuclear News, June 27, 2018,
[17] “Hungary and Russia sign agreement on Paks nuclear power plant,” Daily News Hungary, January 14, 2014, https://dailynewshungary(.)com/hungary-and-russia-sign-agreement-on-paks-nuclear-power-plant; “Russia discusses African nuclear power prospects,” World Nuclear News, March 8, 2018,; Nataliya Bugayova and Jack Ulses, “The Kremlin's Campaign in Egypt,” Institute for the Study of War, June 20, 2018,; “Turkey grants Rosatom construction license for first unit of Akkuyu nuclear plant,” Reuters, April 2, 2018,
[18] “Zambia Center for Nuclear Science and Technology premiered at the largest Zambia trade show,” Rosatom, September 30, 2018, www.rosatom(.)ru/en/press-centre/news/zambia-center-for-nuclear-science-and-technology-premiered-at-the-largest-zambia-trade-show/.
[19] “Russia plans to build nuclear facility for Ethiopia,” Borkena, March 4, 2018, www.borkena(.)com/ 2018/03/04/russia-nuclear-facility-ethiopia-mof/.
[20] “Rosatom to host online nuclear power workshop for Kenyan youth,” Biztech Africa, July 7, 2018,
[21] [“Russia has signed an agreement on military cooperation with Burundi,”] RIA Novosti, August 23, 2018, https://ria(.)ru/defense_safety/20180823/1527113792.html; “Russia and Burundi signed an agreement on military cooperation,” Teller Report, August 23, 2018, http://tellerreport(.)com/news/--russia-and-burundi-signed-an-agreement-on-military-cooperation-.Sk0bTjhUQ.html; “Russia and Guinea signs intergovernmental agreement of military cooperation,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation,; Daria Mikhalina, [“Russia signed an agreement on military cooperation with Burkina Faso,”] TV Zvezda, August 21, 2018, https://tvzvezda(.)ru/news/forces/content/201808211416-b0cl.htm; “Russia, Madagascar sign agreement on military cooperation,” TASS, October 5, 2018, www.tass(.)com/defense/1024770; “Russia Signs Military Cooperation Deal With Central African Republic,” RFE/RL, August 22, 2018,
[22] Borges Nhamire, “Russia Boosts Military Cooperation With Mozambique After Attacks,” Bloomberg, March 7, 2018,
[23] “Russia boosts military-technical cooperation with southern African countries,” TASS, July 27, 2018, http://tass(.)com/politics/1015066.
[24] [“More confidence: Patrushev in Algeria discussed the joint struggle against terrorism,”], January 1, 2018, https://rg(.)ru/2018/01/31/patrushev-v-alzhire-obsudil-sovmestnuiu-borbu-s-terrorizmom.html; [“Russia intends to develop military-technical cooperation with Algeria,”] TASS, February 19, 2018, https://tass(.)ru/politika/4971531; “Algeria has bought half of the Russian weapons sold in Africa,” Middle East Monitor, July 20, 2018, www.middleeastmonitor(.)com/20180720-algeria-has-bought-half-of-the-russian-weapons-sold-in-africa.
[25] “Russia builds military ties with Africa,” DW, June 1, 2018,
[26] “Rwanda Wants Russia to Sign Deal on Air Defense Systems ASAP – Ambassador,” Sputnik, March 9, 2018, https://sputniknews(.)com/africa/201809031067705026-rwanda-deal-defence/.
[27] Andrew McGregor, “Defense or Domination? Building Algerian Power with Russian Arms,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, September 5, 2018,
[28] [“Rosgeologiya will start exploration on the Sudan shelf in 2019,”] RIA Novosti, November 9, 2018, https://ria(.)ru/economy/20180911/1528257947.html; [“Rosgeology will explore and develop a block on the Red Sea shelf,”] Rosegeology, July 23, 2018, www.rosgeo(.)com/ru/content/rosgeologiya-provedet-razvedku-i-osvoenie-bloka-na-shelfe-krasnogo-morya; “Rosgeologia signs exploration contract with Sudan to explore the Red Sea,” Interfax, July 25, 2018, http://interfaxenergy(.)com/gasdaily/article/31888/ rosgeologia-signs-exploration-contract-with-sudan-to-explore-the-red-sea.
[29] [“Russia and Madagascar will cooperate in the field of mineral exploration,”] RT, May 24, 2018, https://russian.rt(.)com/business/news/516378-rossiya-madagaskar-pmef; [“Russia will cooperate with Madagascar in mineral exploration,”] TASS, May 24, 2018, https://tass(.)ru/pmef-2018/articles/5229718; “Rosgeo steps up cooperation with Algeria,” Rosgeology, July 11, 2018, www.rosgeo(.)com/en/content/ rosgeo-steps-cooperation-algeria.
[30] [“Gabon offers "Zarubezhneft" new fields,”] Tekno Blog, October 16, 2018, https://teknoblog(.)ru/2018/07/15/91030; [“Putin declared that Russia and Gabon can work together on a settlement in the CAR,”] TASS, July 14, 2018, https://tass(.)ru/politika/5374075.
[31] “Mozambique plans to sign gas agreement with Rosneft, ExxonMobil by yearend – Minister Pacheco in Russia,” Club of Mozambique, May 29, 2018, https://clubofmozambique(.)com/news/mozambique-plans-to-sign-gas-agreement-with-rosneft-exxonmobil-by-yearend-minister-pacheco-in-russia/.
[32] Aidan Lewis, “Russia's Rosneft, Libya's NOC sign oil offtake deal,” Reuters, February 21, 2017,
[33] MacDonald Dzirutwe, “Russia seeks military cooperation, diamond, platinum projects in Zimbabwe,” Reuters, March 8, 2018,
[34] “Russia's Alrosa secures stake in Angola's largest diamond deposit,” Reuters, May 23, 2017,
[35] “Nordgold plans to rapidly advance exploration at Burkina Faso mine,” Mining Weekly, May 20, 2018, www.miningweekly(.)com/article/nordgold-plans-to-rapidly-advance-exploration-at-burkina-faso-mine-2018-07-20.
[36] “Russia and Argentina may invest $250 mln in development of uranium deposits,” TASS, January 23, 2018, http://tass(.)com/economy/986523.
[37] “Meeting with President of Sudan Omar al-Bashir,” President of Russia, July 14, 2018, http://en. kremlin(.)ru/events/president/news/57998; [“Putin and Bashir underlined success in military-technical cooperation,”] Facebook, July 16, 2018, www.facebook(.)com/Rusembsudan/posts/2077291532513195
[38] [“Putin and Bashir underlined success in military-technical cooperation,”]; “Meeting with President of Sudan Omar al-Bashir,” President of Russia, July 14, 2018, http://en.kremlin(.)ru/events/president/ news/57998.
[39] “Russian sings military deal with the Central African Republic: agencies,” Reuters, August 21, 2018,
[40] Neil Hauer, “Russia’s Favorite Mercenaries,” The Atlantic, August 27, 2018,
[41] “Russian presence in Central African Republic,” Conflict Intelligence Team, April 23, 2018, https(://)
[42] [“Answer by the Deputy Director of the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation A. A. Kozhin to the media question about the development of cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Central African Republic,”] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, March 22, 2018, www.mid(.)ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3136399.
[43] “Moscow sets its sights on the gold and diamonds,” Africa Intelligence, July 18, 2018, www.africaintelligence(.)com/lce/business-circles/2018/07/18/moscow-sets-its-sights-on-the-gold-and-diamonds,108317475-art; “Death, Diamonds and Russia’s Africa Project,” Bloomberg, August 4, 2018,
[44] “Russia, Sudan foster deal among Central African Republic militia,” Daily Nation, August 30, 2018, www.nation(.); Jack Losh and Owen Mathews, “Battle for Africa: Russia pushes into ‘Free Country For the Taking’ in Attempt to Rival the West,” Newsweek, August 9, 2018,
[45] “Libya Seeks 1 Mln Tonnes of Russian Wheat, Animal Feed for $700Mln – Minister,” Sputnik, September 30, 2018, https://sputniknews(.)com/africa/201809301068473659-libya-russia-wheat-animal-feed/; “Libya initials agreement for supplying Russian wheat,” The Libya Observer, October 1, 2018, www.libyaobserver(.)ly/inbrief/libya-initials-agreement-supplying-russian-wheat; “Libya to import $700 million worth wheat from Russia,” Libyan Express, October 1, 2018, www.libyanexpress(.)com/libya-to-import-700-million-worth-wheat-from-russia/; [“Morocco abolishes duty on import of Russian wheat,”] Agroxxi, October 5, 2018, www.agroxxi(.)ru/mirovye-agronovosti/marokko-otmenit-poshlinu-na-vvoz-rossiiskoi-pshenicy.html; [“Russia and Morocco discuss economic and technical cooperation,”] Rambler, October 5, 2018, https://news.rambler(.)ru/other/40966053-rossiya-i-marokko-obsudili-ekonomicheskoe-i-tehnicheskoe-sotrudnichestvo/; [“Russia is able to press the US in the market for the supply of grain in Morocco,”] Dairy News, October 5, 2018, www.dairynews(.)ru/news/-rossiya-sposobna-potesnit-ssha-na-rynke-postavok-.html; [“Bloomberg: Russian wheat entering the Algerian market threatens France with a ‘catastrophe’,”] RT, October 3, 2018, https://russian.rt(.)com/inotv/2018-10-03/Bloomberg-vihod-rossijskoj-pshenici-nax; “World crop briefs: Russia makes wheat pitch to Algeria,” Alberta Farmer Express, October 2, 2018, www.albertafarmexpress(.)ca/daily/world-crop-briefs-russia-makes-wheat-pitch-to-algeria; “Algeria is interested in the supplies of Russian wheat,” TASS, September 28, 2018, http://tass(.)com/economy/1023535; “Russia challenges France's grip on Algeria's wheat market,” AgriCensus, October 1, 2018, www.agricensus(.)com/Article/Russia-challenges-France-s-grip-on-Algeria-s-wheat-market-3484.html.
[46] Agnieszka de Sousa and Anatoly Medetsky, “Europe Has Most to Lose from Russia's Expanding Wheat Empire,” Bloomberg, October 2, 2018,
[47] [“Morocco abolishes duty on import of Russian wheat,”] Dairy News, October 4, 2018, www.dairynews(.)ru/news/marokko-otmenit-poshlinu-na-vvoz-rossiyskoy-psheni.html; “Russia asks Morocco to cut wheat import tax to 30% by year end,” UkrAgroConult, September 18, 2018, www.blackseagrain(.)net/novosti/russia-asks-morocco-to-cut-wheat-import-tax-to-30-by-year-end.
[48] James Marson, “Struggling U.S. Farmers Worry About a Resurgent Russia,” Wall Street Journal, September 23, 2018,
[49] Lynsey Chutel, “How two South African women stopped Zuma and Putin’s $76 billion Russian nuclear deal,” Quartz Africa, April 25, 2018, https://qz(.)com/africa/1260877/how-two-south-african-women-stopped-zuma-and-putins-76-billion-nuclear-deal/.
[50] Alexander Winning, “Russia's Putin raises nuclear deal at Ramaphosa meeting during BRICS,” Reuters, July 30, 2018,
[51] “China to help Uganda build nuclear power plants,” Reuters, May 17, 2018,
[52] Emily Estelle, “America Ignores Africa to Its Peril,” The National Interest, July 23, 2018,
[53] Emily Estelle, “A Strategy for Success in Libya,” Critical Threats Project, November 2017,

Friday, October 12, 2018

Syria Situation Report: September 23 - October 10, 2018

By ISW's Syria Team and Syria Direct

This graphic marks the latest installment of the Syria Situation Report (SITREP) Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and Syria Direct. The map depicts significant developments in the war in Syria during the period September 23 - October 10, 2018.

Click image to enlarge.

Thursday, October 11, 2018

Russia in Review: October 4 - 11, 2018

Russia in Review is a weekly intelligence summary (INTSUM) produced by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). This ISW INTSUM series sheds light on key trends and developments related to the Russian government’s objectives and its efforts to secure them. Receive future Russia in Review INTSUM products via-email by signing up for the ISW mailing list.

Reporting Period: October 4 - 11, 2018 (The previous Russia in Review INTSUM is available here.)

Authors: Jack Ulses and Catherine Harris

Forecast: The Kremlin will use subversive political lines of effort over the near-term to destabilize the Balkans and Eastern Europe. Russia likely identifies a growing opportunity to expand its influence in the Balkans after federal elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina led to an outcome amenable to the Kremlin. This interference risks exacerbating ethnic tensions that could break down the tenuous stability of the Balkans. Russia may also be setting conditions to integrate the separatist region of Transnistria in Moldova through its interference in the 2019 Moldovan Parliamentary Elections. This development would allow Russia to obstruct further integration of Moldova into the West and increase its military threat to Western Ukraine.

Russia is acting to undermine Western-led peace settlements in the Balkans in order to block Balkan integration into the EU and NATO. Pro-Russian Bosnian Serb nationalist Milorad Dodik won election as the President of the Bosnian Serb Republika Srpska on October 6. The Kremlin will likely provide diplomatic support to Dodik and his calls for the secession of the Republika Srpska from Bosnia-Herzegovina - a demand which would undermine the 1995 Dayton Accords. The Kremlin will also likely work with Dodik to secure favorable energy and diplomatic deals in Bosnia at the expense of the EU. Russia could use the election results to increase its military cooperation - including training - with the Republika Srpska and ultimately establish a footprint in Bosnia-Herzegovina through Serbia. Russia is conducting similar influence-building operations across the Balkans. Russia supports actors in both Greece and Macedonia that oppose a referendum to change the name of Macedonia. The vote would remove the last obstacle to the accession of Macedonia into NATO. The Kremlin’s efforts to block further expansion by NATO in Southern Europe risk fueling still-precarious nationalist and ethnic tensions across the Balkans.

The Kremlin is setting conditions to federalize the disputed region of Transnistria following elections in Moldova in February 2019. Russian President Vladimir Putin has taken recent steps to restart negotiations over Transnistria in Moldova.[1] Putin appointed Dmitry Kozak - the author of a failed plan to federalize Transnistria in 2003 - as the Special Envoy for Economic Relations with Moldova in July 2018. Kozak is a close ally to Putin and previously served as his de facto representative in several high-priority assignments critical to the Kremlin.[2] His appointment suggests that the Kremlin may intend to relaunch negotiations over the federalization of Transnistria.

Kozak organized the inaugural Moldova-Russia Economic Forum on September 26. He also opened discussions on negotiated settlement plans with leaders from both Transnistria and Moldova.[3] Russia is simultaneously acting to fracture and delegitimize opposition parties that support the EU ahead of February 2019 Moldovan Parliamentary Elections in order to install a majority government that supports a negotiated settlement and eventual federalization for Transnistria.[4] The Kremlin likely intends to use federalization to ultimately integrate Transnistria - which it effectively controls through a contingent of Russian Armed Forces - into official government structures in Moldova. Russia could thereby gain a more stable mechanism to reinforce or resupply its landlocked forces in Transnistria as well as greater freedom of action to threaten the vital port city of Odessa in Southern Ukraine. This development would further divide the resources and attention of the Government of Ukraine in its conflict with Russia in Eastern Ukraine.

[1] Madalin Necsutu, “Moscow Plots Revival of Federal Scenario for Moldova,” Balkan Insight, October 2, 2018, http://www.balkaninsight(.)com/en/article/moscow-plots-revival-of-federal-scenario-for-moldova-09-28-2018; [“Kozak: MREF will allow to bring the relations of the two countries to a new growth trajectory,”] Sputnik, September 21, 2018, https://ru.sputnik(.)md/economics/20180921/22026180/kozak-zajavlenie-moldova-russia-otnoshenija.html; [“Representation of Rossotrudnichestvo in the Republic of Moldova received support in Transnistria,”] Sputnik, September 10, 2018, https://ru.sputnik(.)md/society/20181009/22384359/ rossotrudnicestvo-pridnestrovie-podderzhka.html.
[2] “From Olympics to Crimea, Putin Loyalist Kozak Entrusted With Kremlin Mega-Projects,” Moscow Times, March 28, 2014, https://themoscowtimes(.)com/news/from-olympics-to-crimea-putin-loyalist-kozak-entrusted-with-kremlin-mega-projects-33409; [“Moscow and a possible federalization plan for Moldova,”] G4, October 7, 2018, https://www.g4media(.)ro/moscova-si-un-posibil-plan-de-federalizare-a-moldovei.html.
[3] [“Russia is ready to restore relations with Moldova, Kozak said,”] Ria Novosti, September 26, 2018, https://ria(.)ru/world/20180926/1529385600.html.
[4] [“Moldovan Parliament did not reach consensus on amendments to the European Integration Constitution,”] TASS, October 9, 2018, https://tass(.)ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/5652895.

Wednesday, October 3, 2018

Russia in Review: September 26 - October 3, 2018

Russia in Review is a weekly intelligence summary (INTSUM) produced by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). This ISW INTSUM series sheds light on key trends and developments related to the Russian government’s objectives and its efforts to secure them. Receive future Russia in Review INTSUM products via-email by signing up for the ISW mailing list.

Reporting Period: September 26 - October 3, 2018 (The previous Russia in Review INTSUM is available here.)

Authors: Jack Ulses and Catherine Harris with Scott DesMarais and the ISW Research Team

Key Takeaway: Russia is leveraging limited military expansion in multiple theaters to reduce the geopolitical influence of the West. The Kremlin is setting conditions to bolster its security role in Afghanistan as a low-cost means to undermine the U.S. and NATO. Russia may also leverage the deployment of advanced military hardware in the Arctic to secure new trade routes and deter expansion in the area by the West and China. Russia continues to block access to economic resources in the Sea of Azov to Ukraine and could further intensify its threat of military escalation to delegitimize the current Ukrainian Government.

Russia is using the threat of deteriorating security in Afghanistan to expand its footprint in Central Asia. Russia has intensified its rhetoric and engagement surrounding the terrorist threat in Central Asia.[1] The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) - a regional cooperation organization in the Former Soviet Union led by Russia - announced that it will conduct several large-scale counter-terrorism drills in late 2018.[2] China, India, Iran, and Afghanistan also agreed to create a joint terrorist database using data from the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).[3] The Kremlin likely fears that Salafi-Jihadist groups will exploit safe havens in Afghanistan to threaten Central Asia as well as Russia. The Kremlin has blamed the lack of stability on the U.S. in Afghanistan. Russia is attempting to broker peace talks between the Afghan Government and the Taliban in order to sideline the U.S. and NATO. The Kremlin is nonetheless unlikely to push for an imminent full withdrawal of the U.S. from Afghanistan. Russia does not possess the military capacity to replace the U.S. and NATO in Afghanistan. Russia instead will likely provide increased diplomatic and military support to both the Afghan Government and the Taliban in order to incentivize participation in a peace process led by the Kremlin. Russia could thereby both bolster its own international standing as a legitimate peace broker and undermine the long-term presence of the U.S. in Afghanistan.

Russia may be forced to reconsider its relatively limited military investments in the Arctic. The Kremlin is pursuing military expansion to open trade routes and bolster its sphere of influence in the Arctic. The Russian Defense Ministry deployed Bastion Coastal Defense Missile Systems to the 99th Tactic Arctic Group on Kotelny Island in a likely effort to bolster the capabilities of Russia’s Northern Fleet.[4] Russia nonetheless currently lacks the resources to deter long-term expansion into the Arctic by the West and China. The Kremlin decreased its budget allocations for infrastructure in the Arctic from $209 billion to $12 billion in 2018 - 2020.[5] Rival powers have meanwhile expanded their operations in the Arctic. The United Kingdom will send 800 Royal Marines to conduct regular cold weather training in Norway. China recently began production of its first icebreaker (expected to be operational in 2019) and has outlined a policy objective to turn the Arctic into a Polar ‘Silk Road’.[6] The Kremlin will therefore likely be forced to recalculate its military investments in the Arctic. The Kremlin could use potential increased maritime commerce to justify military expansion in the area. A Danish shipping vessel recently completed a trial voyage through the Northern Sea, which will likely prompt other companies to consider low-cost trade routes through the Arctic. The Kremlin may also attempt to secure investment from other regional actors in order to block access to investment opportunities in the Arctic. Russia could also increase the rapid reaction or advanced hardware capabilities of its own military forces in the Arctic in order to threaten - or at minimum deter – further expansion in the region by the U.S., NATO, and China.

Russia likely will not be deterred from further aggression in Eastern Ukraine despite a military buildup by Ukraine in the Sea of Azov. Ukraine is bolstering its military presence near the Sea of Azov to counter recent aggression by Russia. Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko announced that Ukraine will open a new naval base in Berdyansk in Eastern Ukraine while the U.S. agreed to supply two patrol boat cutters to the Ukrainian Navy.[7] The Ukrainian Defense Ministry also recently conducted a series of coastal exercises to enhance interoperability between the Ukrainian Navy and Ukrainian Ground Forces.[8] These developments will likely not successfully deter Russia from blocking access to the Sea of Azov. Russia continues to intimidate local populations in the area in a likely bid to block shipping and commerce by Ukraine via Mariupol. The Kremlin will likely continue to block access to the area in order to strain local coastal communities and posture for the threat of military escalation in Eastern Ukraine. The Kremlin likely calculates that sustained economic pressure will ultimately delegitimize the Ukrainian Government and lead to favorable results for Russia in the March 2019 Ukrainian Presidential Elections.

What to Watch For

The Kremlin may retaliate against domestic opposition parties following the September 2018 Russian Regional Elections. Russian President Vladimir Putin directly endorsed several candidates from his political party - United Russia - in an effort to secure their victory in the September 2018 Russian Regional Elections. These candidates nonetheless lost several key races to domestic opposition parties. The Kremlin also reportedly failed in efforts to bribe several opposition candidates to withdraw from the election in exchange for government positions.[9] Putin may therefore systematically punish political parties that won local elections against United Russia. The Kremlin may deny opposition parties the right to run in future elections in Russia. Putin may also interfere in remaining runoff elections scheduled for December 2018 in order to ensure victory for new candidates from United Russia.
[1] [“Russian Foreign Ministry: IG is preparing to escalate the political situation in Central Asia,”] TASS, September 30, 2018, https://tass(.)ru/politika/5621031
[2] [“Russia and six countries of the CIS began large-scale military aviation exercises,”] RBC, September 27, 2018, https://www.rbc(.)ru/politics/27/09/2018/5bac6f789a794770fa0bd642; [“In the CIS until the end of the year will be four major military exercises,”] MK.RU, September 26, 2018,
[3] “Afghanistan, Iran, China back creating terrorist database shared with Russia,” The Nation, September 27, 2018,; [“Four countries supported the creation of a common database of terrorists with Russia,”] RT, September 26, 2018, https://russian.rt(.)com/world/news/558173-baza-dannyh-terrorizm; [“Dossier terrorists,”] RG.RU, September 26, 2018, https://rg(.)ru/2018/09/26/patrushev-zaiavil-ob-opasnosti-povtoreniia-v-afganistane-sirijskogo-scenariia.html
[4] [“The Northern Fleet completes the next Arctic campaign,”] MK.RU, October 1, 2018, https://murmansk(.) social/2018/10/01/severnyy-flot-zavershaet-ocherednoy-arkticheskiy-pokhod.html; [“Russia develops "Bastion" in the Arctic,”] YTPO.PY, September 25, 2018, https://utro(.)ru/army/2018/09/25/1375055.shtml
[5] [“The government is thinking about reducing the cost of the Arctic 17 times,”] RBC, June 30, 2017, https://www. rbc(.)ru/business/30/06/2017/59550a479a794700f2cca257?from=center_4
[6] [“China launched the first self-produced icebreaker,”] RIA Novosti, September 10, 2018, https://ria(.)ru/economy/ 20180910/1528169823.html; “China’s Arctic Policy,” The State Council: The People’s Republic of China, January 26, 2018,
[7] “Ukraine creating naval base in Sea of Azov – Poroshenko,” UNIAN, September 23, 2018, https://www. unian(.)info/politics/10271577-ukraine-creating-naval-base-in-sea-of-azov-poroshenko.html
[8] “Ukraine conducts exercises on the coast of the Azov Sea,” UA Wire, September 27, 2018, https://uawire(.)org/ ukraine-conducted-exercises-on-the-coast-of-the-azov-sea#; “Ukrainian Navy conducts exercises in the Black and Azov Seas,” UA Wire, September 30, 2018, https://uawire(.)org/ukrainian-navy-conducted-exercises-in-the-black-and-azov-seas
[9] [“The main beneficiary of the gubernatorial election was the Liberal Democratic Party,”] Vedomosti, September 24, 2018, https://www.vedomosti(.)ru/politics/articles/2018/09/24/781849-glavnim-benefitsiarom-gubernatorskih-okazalas

Tuesday, October 2, 2018

ISIS's Second Resurgence

By Brandon Wallace and Jennifer Cafarella

Key Takeaway: The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is reconstituting a capable insurgent force in Iraq and Syria despite efforts to prevent its recovery by the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition. The U.S. Department of Defense stated in August 2018 that ISIS retains nearly 30,000 fighters across Iraq and Syria and is “more capable” than Al-Qaeda in Iraq - ISIS’s predecessor - at its peak in 2006 - 2007. ISIS is waging an effective campaign to reestablish durable support zones while raising funds and rebuilding command-and-control over its remnant forces. On its current trajectory, ISIS could regain sufficient strength to mount a renewed insurgency that once again threatens to overmatch local security forces in both Iraq and Syria. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is issuing a map update depicting ISIS’s current operating areas based on an analysis of its activity from January 1, 2018 to October 1, 2018.

Note: This map depicts ISIS’s operating areas in Iraq and Syria as of October 1, 2018. The graphic presents an assessment of ISIS’s control, support, and attack zones based on openly available reporting from January 1, 2018 to October 1, 2018. ISW’s rigorous methodology conforms to the doctrinal definitions used by the U.S. Armed Forces. Control zones are areas in which ISIS controls and governs civilian populations. Support zones are areas in which ISIS retains the ability to conduct logistics and administrative support functions. Attack zones are areas in which ISIS conducts kinetic attacks against civilians, infrastructure, and local security forces. ISW will publish updates to this assessment as appropriate.

The U.S. Anti-ISIS Campaign has not eliminated the global threat posed by ISIS despite largely accomplishing its stated objectives in Iraq and Syria. The campaign aimed to destroy ISIS’s physical caliphate and “drive down [its] capability” to the point where local forces could maintain security with limited international support. In Iraq, the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition accomplished this mission by April 2018 after finishing the last urban clearing operations in Anbar Province in Western Iraq. The Coalition scaled down its operations to a Building Partner Capacity (BPC) effort aimed at enabling Iraqis to “independently manage” a continued insurgency by ISIS. In Syria, the U.S. and its local partner forces are now attacking a final ISIS territorial stronghold near the Syrian-Iraqi border. ISIS has nonetheless already restructured its operations to return to a regional insurgency. The Pentagon stated in August 2018 that ISIS retains nearly 30,000 fighters across Iraq and Syria and is “more capable” than Al-Qaeda in Iraq - ISIS’s predecessor - at its peak in 2006 - 2007. ISIS is now waging an effective campaign to reestablish durable support zones while raising funds and rebuilding command-and-control over its remnant forces. On its current trajectory, ISIS could regain sufficient strength to mount a renewed insurgency that once again threatens to overmatch local security forces in both Iraq and Syria despite support from the Coalition.

Detecting ISIS’s Reconstitution

ISIS is finding new sources of revenue and rebuilding command-and-control over its scattered remnant forces in order to prepare for a future large-scale insurgency in both Iraq and Syria.

Revenue Generation

ISIS was able to smuggle as much as $400 million out of Iraq and reinvest it into legitimate businesses across the wider Middle East. It also continues to engage in lucrative criminal activity including extortion, smuggling, theft, and money laundering. ISW has observed multiple additional indicators of efforts by ISIS to generate additional revenue, including:
  • Syrian Al-Qaeda affiliate Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) accused ISIS of taking hostages and extorting their families for sums worth tens of thousands of dollars in Northern Syria. 
  • The U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition has interdicted large caches of drugs including Captagon and other amphetamines being trafficked by ISIS in Southern Syria. 
  • ISIS reportedly stole an unspecified quantity of drugs during a raid on a healthcare facility near Kirkuk in Iraq in mid-September 2018. ISIS could intend to sell these drugs for a profit. Alternatively, it may be restocking provisions for injured fighters ahead of future operations. 
ISW cannot assess the full scale of revenue being generated through these and other efforts by ISIS. Revenue generation is nonetheless a requirement for any military force to scale up its combat operations. 


ISIS can only wage an effective insurgency if it maintains command-and-control over its estimated tens of thousands of remaining fighters. The U.S. Anti-ISIS Campaign has forced some of ISIS’s cells to go to ground and it is unclear how many fighters its senior leaders can directly command. ISIS Emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi released an audio message on August 22 calling for his followers to “wage attack after attack” and “unite and organize” against their opponents. ISIS similarly appealed in publications in March - April 2018 for the activation of sleeper cells. These messages suggest that ISIS deliberately embedded operatives to conduct future attacks in recaptured areas across Iraq and Syria. The public orders nonetheless signal that ISIS may lack control mechanisms to issue direct commands to its forces. ISW has observed at least four indicators that ISIS is reconstituting an operational-level command structure in Iraq and Syria as of October 1.
  • ISIS announced the formation of two new wilayats (provinces) for Iraq and Syria on July 20. ISW assesses that these new structures are operational-level headquarters responsible for directing ISIS’s military campaign and bureaucratic functions across Iraq and Syria. ISIS retains a roughly equal combat force in each country. The U.S. Department of Defense estimated in August 2018 that ISIS commands 15,500 to 17,000 fighters in Iraq and 14,000 fighters in Syria. 
  • Iraq conducted an airstrike targeting a reported ISIS “operations command” at an unidentified location in Syria on August 16. Iraqi officials reported that the strike disrupted a planned suicide vest (SVEST) attack in Iraq. If true, ISIS continues to coordinate cross-border operations despite efforts by the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition to secure the Syrian-Iraqi border. The strike may have damaged this command element and thereby disrupted ISIS’s reconstitution. 
  • ISIS’s official media outlets have implemented a new format of attack claims aligned with the new wilayats announced by ISIS on July 20. Previous claims had preserved the provincial command structure in place prior to the loss of ISIS’s de facto capitals in Mosul and Ar-Raqqa City. This standardization of communications guidelines indicates a centrally-controlled media campaign across Iraq and Syria. A parallel military command that reports and authorizes the release of content typically accompanies this type of media effort. The standardization of attack claims also allows ISIS to more effectively measure the progression of its own campaigns. 
  • ISIS launched a new weekly report on its military activities on August 2. The report details attack statistics in Iraq and Syria as well as Afghanistan-Pakistan, Egypt, Nigeria, Somalia, and the Philippines. This detailed product is similar to the annual reports released by ISIS during its resurgence after the U.S withdrew from Iraq in 2011. It demonstrates that ISIS remains capable of tracking its campaigns across Iraq and Syria as well as its most active wilayats abroad. 

ISIS’s Operating Areas

ISIS is waging an effective campaign to reestablish durable support zones across Iraq and deny the rehabilitation of communities liberated by the U.S. Anti-ISIS Campaign. ISIS retains a small control zone where it continues to govern a local population north of Baiji in Northern Iraq.[1] It also retains established support zones in areas south of Kirkuk City including Daquq, Hawija, Riyadh, and Rashad Districts as well as rural areas around Lake Hamrin in the Diyala River Valley. ISIS possesses the ability to move freely across this terrain at night and is actively waging attacks to expand its freedom of movement during the day. Its activities have thus far been limited to small arms attacks, targeted assassinations, and suicide vests (SVESTs). ISIS is steadily scaling up the rate of these attacks, conducting as many as four assassinations per week across Northern and Central Iraq. This violence has expelled civilians from small villages in Diyala and Kirkuk Provinces.[2] ISIS also retains a durable support zone in the Hamrin Mountains, where it appears to base some of its leadership. Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) regularly claim to kill senior militants during clearing operations in the area.[3] In Baghdad, ISIS’s attack pattern indicates that it is likely reconstituting support and logistical networks throughout the Baghdad Belts, replicating its safe havens in 2006 - 2007. ISIS has not yet returned to the systematic use of vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs), which were a hallmark of its resurgence in 2011 - 2013. ISIS may cross this threshold soon. The Iraqi Ministry of Interior claimed to disrupt an ISIS VBIED cell north of Baghdad on September 6.[4]

ISIS has also established a support zone along the Iraqi-Iranian border that it is using to project capability into Iran. ISIS remnants (including Kurdish Salafi-Jihadist group Ansar al-Islam) have maintained a support zone in the Halabja Mountains in Iraqi Kurdistan since late 2016. Ansar al-Islam pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2014 but remained a distinct unit within its command structure. ISIS fighters from Ansar al-Islam conducted the major spectacular attack in Tehran during Ramadan in June 2017. A similar cell later deployed into Iran and clashed with the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in January 2018. A senior leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) Peshmerga stated in February 2018 that Ansar al-Islam is leveraging its cross-border links and local knowledge to facilitate infiltration into Iran.[5] ISIS is expanding its support base in Iraqi Kurdistan beyond the Halabja Mountains. Local Kurdish forces have detained numerous alleged cells in Sulaymaniyah Province in Northern Iraq since January 2018.[6]


ISIS is also reconstituting as an insurgent force across Syria. ISIS has lost all its territorial control in Syria except a twenty-kilometer-long stretch of terrain along the Euphrates River in Eastern Syria near the Syrian-Iraqi border. The area is currently under attack by the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition. ISIS is nonetheless reconstituting in areas nominally under the control of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. ISIS negotiated evacuation deals from Damascus and the Golan Heights to relocate its forces to the Syrian Desert east of Damascus in May - July 2018. ISIS has exploited its underground tunnel networks in order to regroup and launch local counter-attacks in this area against both the Russo-Iranian Coalition and the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition. ISIS is also infiltrating Al-Qaeda’s areas of operations in Northern Syria in order to gain access to logistics routes through Turkey. It may also intend to tap into flows of Al-Qaeda-aligned foreign fighters. ISIS has also demonstrated that it retains the ability to mount attacks in areas held by the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) including Ar-Raqqa City, Hasaka City, and Qamishli. ISIS is likely regenerating support networks across its former territorial holdings in Northern and Eastern Syria.

Future of the Anti-ISIS Campaign

ISIS’s resurgence will likely accelerate as the Anti-ISIS Campaign falls down the priority list of the Government of Iraq. Iraq shifted its focus towards Iraqi Kurdistan in October 2017 after the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) held a contested independence referendum in September 2017, triggering a military response from both Iraq and Iran in the contested city of Kirkuk. The subsequent military standoff between the Government of Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan disrupted operations against ISIS and created opportunities for ISIS to expand in the Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs) with Iraqi Kurdistan.

Iraq’s May 2018 Parliamentary Elections and subsequent political developments have further disrupted the ability of the Government of Iraq to prioritize the Anti-ISIS Campaign. A growing protest movement in Southern Iraq divided the government and disrupted clearing operations against ISIS. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi redeployed part of the elite Iraqi Counterterrorism Services (CTS) to secure government installations in Southern Iraq on July 13.[7] The CTS is the preeminent force against ISIS in Iraq and works closely with the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition. Abadi similarly redeployed part of the Iraqi Emergency Response Division from the DIBs to Southern Iraq on September 9, further degrading security in Northern Iraq.[8]

The U.S. risks finding its options against ISIS in Iraq further constrained by the outcome of the ongoing government formation process in Baghdad. Iran is making a concerted effort to shape a Government of Iraq that is hostile to the U.S. and could demand a full withdraw of the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition. The U.S. is meanwhile using its economic leverage - and threats to revoke bilateral military support - in order to block powerful proxies of Iran from occupying key positions in the Government of Iraq. The outcome of this showdown remains unclear but it could lead to a violent confrontation between rival powerbrokers that would provide new openings for ISIS. The U.S. and its allies must take action to set the political conditions necessary to sustain a long-term campaign against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. ISIS otherwise threatens to return yet again in a form even more dangerous and more capable than its rise to global prominence in 2014.

[1] [“Successive Clearing Operations in Five Provinces After Monitoring the Movements of ISIS,”] Al-Mada Press, September 26, 2018, http://almadapaper(.)net/Details/213471/%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%91%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%B7-%D9%85%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%82%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-5-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%B1%D8%B5%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%91%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4.
[2] [“Source Reveals the Displacement of Families from South of Kirkuk,”] Sot al-Iraq, June 20, 2018, https://www.sotaliraq(.)com/2018/06/20/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%AD-%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8-%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%88%D9%83/; [“Kurdish Lawmaker: 200 Kurdish Families Displaced from Villages of Daquq District Because of ISIS,”] Sumaria, June 26, 2018, https://www.alsumaria(.)tv/news/240307/%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A8-%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D9%86%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%AD-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%89-%D9%82%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%88%D9%82-%D8%A8%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A8/ar.
[3] [“Popular Mobilization Announces the Killing of an ISIS Leader Northeast of Diyala,”] Sumaria, June 15, 2018, https://www.alsumaria(.)tv/news/239447/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84-%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D9%80%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84/ar; [“Death of a Senior Commander for ISIS in Clashes with Iraqi Forces in the North of the Country,”] The New Arab, June 26, 2018,
[4] [“Source: Interior Intelligence Thwarted Plan to Revive ‘Wilayat Baghdad’ of ISIS,”] Al-Ghad Press, September 6, 2018, https://www.alghadpress(.)com/news/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82/173347/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%A8%D8%B7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%B7%D8%A7-%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%88.
[5] [“ISIS Fails in Declaration of ‘Wilayat Halabja’ and Reveals Its Hideouts in Sulaymaniyah,”] Sot al-Iraq, February 5, 2018, https://www.sotaliraq(.)com/2018/02/05/%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%8A%D9%81%D8%B4%D9%84-%D8%A8%D8%A5%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%AC%D8%A9-%D9%88%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D9%85%D8%AE/.
[6] [“Asayish Official: ISIS Militants That Clashed with Iranian Forces Entered Iran Through Borders of Kurdistan,”] Sumaria, January 27, 2018, https://www.alsumaria(.)tv/news/228070/%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A4%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%A8%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%8A/ar; [“Sulaymaniyah...The Arrest of Two Groups of Terrorists Before the Implementation of Their Plans in the Kurdistan Region,”] Rudaw, January 8, 2018, http://www.rudaw(.)net/arabic/kurdistan/080120186.
[7] [“Basra Police to Mirbad: Incoming Forces Will Protect Facilities and Their Movement Under the Order of Abadi Exclusively,”] Mirbad, July 14, 2018, http://www.almirbad(.)com/news/view.aspx?cdate=14072018&id=41fdb375-61bd-4121-8283-81cb054e4446.
[8] [“Emergency Response Announces the Deployment of Their Formations in Basra to Protect Vital Centers,”] Mirbad, September 14, 2018, http://www.almirbad(.)com/news/view.aspx?cdate=14092018&id=9b320244-1d0d-4ff7-805c-a7b2b2e50d94.