UA-69458566-1

Saturday, September 24, 2022

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 24

 Karolina Hird, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 24, 9 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s declarations about which categories of Russian males will be exempted from partial mobilization may not reflect Russian President Vladimir Putin’s intentions or orders. A Russian media insider claimed on September 24 that officials of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reprimanded military commissars in person for negligence in carrying out mobilization and sending out summonses in “excess,” and contrary to the explicit MoD guidance regarding exemptions for age, disability, or other limiting factors.[1]  Another Russian source claimed that certain heads of federal subjects acknowledged that they have mobilized citizens who are technically ineligible.[2]

Responsibility for the partial mobilization appears to be divided and complex, possibly contributing to confusion, disorganization, and violations of Shoigu’s commitments regarding exemptions. The mobilization decree specifies that Russian federal subjects are responsible for executing the mobilization while the MoD sets quotas and deadlines for filling them.[3]  A Russian milblogger, in fact, criticized the governor of Russia’s Belgorod Oblast for not being an active participant in the mobilization process and noted that the mobilization decree places the onus of carrying out mobilization orders on the heads of federal subjects and not on military commissars.[4]  Military commissars likely work for the heads of federal subjects, however, rather than directly for the MoD, making both responsible for mobilization and creating a possible gap between them and the Defense Ministry.

The military commissars are generally acting as if they had received orders to prioritize getting bodies to training centers over adhering to Shoigu’s guidelines, and the seemingly confused chains of responsibility for executing the mobilization decree may be responsible for the divergence between Shoigu’s statements and commissars’ actions. Shoigu emphatically reiterated on September 21 that mobilization is partial and will only rely on those already in the reserve and with combat experience and military experience, but military commissars failed to adhere to Shoigu’s guidance, practically from the onset of the mobilization order.[5] Continued reports of military commissars conducting chaotic distribution of mobilization summonses indicate that they feel significant pressure to carry out mobilization as quickly as possible. Ukrainian sources reported that Russian authorities are immediately mobilizing individuals in occupied areas of Ukraine after “rewarding” them with Russian passports for participating in sham referenda rather than waiting until annexation makes the mobilization of eligible males in Russian-occupied areas legal under Russian law.  This haste suggests that military commissars feel pressure to expedite mobilization which is not reflected in Shoigu’s statements.[6] The MoD is evidently not in full control of mobilization, raising questions about which Russian males actually will be mobilized and how effective the mobilized force will be.[7]

Positions held by senior Russian military leadership are continuing to change hands, suggesting that Russian President Vladimir Putin is continuing to see systemic problems as the result of the personal failings of senior subordinates. The Russian MoD reported on September 24 that Colonel-General Mikhail Mizintsev has been appointed Deputy Defense Minister and will oversee logistics for the Russian Armed Forces, replacing Army General Dmitry Bulgakov.[8] Mizintsev previously acted as head of the Russian National Defense Control Center and served during Russian operations in Syria, notably commanding troops on the operational-tactical level during the encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Mariupol.[9] The replacement of individual senior leaders is very unlikely to fix fundamental structural problems in the Russian military. It reflects Putin’s personality-driven approach to leadership and relative disdain for system-building—both factors that contributed to the overall failures of the Russian military in this war.

Russian forces may be preparing to forcibly mobilize Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) to fight for Russia, which would constitute a violation of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War.  Russian state media reported on September 24 that Ukrainian POWs detained at the Olenivka prison camp orally “requested” Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) authorities to allow them to fight in the DNR’s volunteer “Bohdan Khmelnitsky” Cossack Battalion. [10] If Russian or Russian proxy forces coerced Ukrainian POWs into combat, it would be a violation of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, which stipulates that “no prisoner of war may at any time be sent to or detained in areas where he may be exposed to the fire of the combat zone” and shall not “be employed on labour which is of an unhealthy or dangerous nature.”[11]

Key Takeaways

  • Local military commissars are carrying out mobilization orders in a way that suggests a possible disconnect between Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu’s guidelines for partial mobilization and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s demands for haste.
  • Russian President Vladimir Putin is likely continuing to address systemic issues in Russian senior command by replacing individual senior subordinates.
  • Russia may be preparing to forcibly mobilize Ukrainian prisoners of war in what may constitute a violation of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War.
  • Ukrainian forces likely continued to make gains along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border and northwest of Lyman.
  • Ukrainian military officials indicated that the continued Ukrainian interdiction campaign in southern Ukraine is degrading Russian combat capabilities.
  • Russian sources identified three locations where Ukrainian troops conducted ground operations in Kherson Oblast- northern Kherson Oblast, western Kherson Oblast near the Inhulets River, and northwest of Kherson City near the Mykolaiv-Kherson Oblast border.
  • Russian forces conducted ground attacks around Bakhmut, Donetsk City, and in western Donetsk Oblast.
  • Russian authorities continue to coerce residents of occupied Ukrainian territory into voting in sham referenda.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Southern and Eastern Ukraine
  • Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Vovchansk-Kupyansk-Izyum-Lyman Line)

Ukrainian forces likely continued to make localized gains along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border on September 24. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian assault detachments occupied the settlements of Hrianykivka and Horobivka in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast (about 70km east of Chuhuiv).[12] Russian sources additionally indicated that Ukrainian forces are continuing positional battles further south along the Oskil River near Kupyansk.[13] These Russian claims are consistent with a statement made by the Ukrainian General Staff that Ukrainian troops repelled a Russian attack on Petropavlivka, 7km east of Kupyansk, which indicates that Ukrainian forces have made further gains east of Kupyansk.[14] Geolocated combat footage posted on September 23 showing Ukrainian forces destroying a Russian tank just east of Petropavlivka supports this assessment.[15]  

Voice of America reported that recent rainfall has slowed Ukrainian attempts to advance further east of positions along the Oskil River because muddy cross-country terrain makes it difficult to effectively transport heavy weapons and equipment.[16] The recent weather patterns in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast may explain why recent Ukrainian advances near the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border have largely been along existing roadways to the east, which allows Ukrainian troops to threaten Russian positions without having to risk traversing muddy terrain under Russian artillery fire. To the extent that Ukrainian advances are confined to roadways, however, the limited effective Russian forces in the area are more able to concentrate to slow their advances. The fact that Ukrainian forces continue to make gains nevertheless suggests that Russian troops on this axis are weak and vulnerable.

Ukrainian troops also likely continued offensive operations around Lyman on September 24. A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian troops took control of Nove (18km due north of Lyman) and are continuing to push south of Lyman from the Ridkodub-Nove line.[17] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian troops also took control of half of Novoselivka, 10km northwest of Lyman.[18] Russian forces identified the Russian defenders of Lyman to BARS-13 and BARS-16 detachments (the latter of which is known as the Kuban” detachment), which are sub-battalion formations comprised of Russian reservists from the Russian Special Combat Army Reserve.[19]

Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)

Ukrainian military officials maintained operational silence regarding Ukrainian ground maneuvers in Kherson Oblast on September 24 but reiterated that the current Ukrainian interdiction campaign in southern Ukraine is continuing to have tangible impacts on Russian capabilities on this axis. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command noted that Russian units are attempting to rotate units and conduct limited ground maneuvers in unspecified areas and are setting up new defensive lines that are further removed from the current frontline.[20] These statements suggest that Russian forces are trying to restore and preserve current combat capabilities by rotating likely exhausted units and moving further back into rear areas in the face of continued Ukrainian strikes on Russian concentration areas. Unit rotation suggests that the Russians will be unable to add additional forces to this axis since it implies removing exhausted units likely on a one-for-one basis with relatively fresher units.

Social media footage provides visual evidence that corroborates both Ukrainian and Russian claims of strikes comprising the continued Ukrainian interdiction campaign in Kherson Oblast. Residents of Nova Kakhovka (60km east of Kherson City) reported explosions on September 23 to 24, which corroborates Russian and Ukrainian claims that Ukrainian strikes hit Nova Kakhovka and the nearby Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant and Bersylav district.[21] Footage from Kherson City shows damage to the Antonivskyi Bridge following consistent Ukrainian strikes on the bridge and other Russian transportation assets and concentration areas in the Kherson City area.[22] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions south of the Dnipro River in the Henichesk area (about 170km southeast of Kherson City and 40 km north of Crimea), which is consistent with a statement made by Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command that Ukrainian forces hit a Russian control point near Henichesk.[23]

Russian sources identified three locations where Ukrainian troops conducted active ground operations in Kherson Oblast on September 23 and 24—northern Kherson Oblast, western Kherson Oblast near the Inhulets River, and northwest of Kherson City near the Kherson-Mykolaiv Oblast border. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian troops are preparing to push south of Novovoznesenske (about 16km south of the Dnipropetrovsk-Kherson Oblast border) and are pulling forces to Osokorivka (25km northeast of Novovoznesenske) to continue efforts to push southwards.[24] Russian sources additionally claimed that Ukrainian troops are continuing to fight in northern Kherson Oblast near Olhyne and Arkhanhelske.[25] Russian sources additionally claimed that Ukrainian troops are fighting in western Kherson near the Inhulets River and continuing positional battles near Sukhyi Stavok.[26] Russian milbloggers additionally indicated that Ukrainian troops are continuing ground maneuvers and positional battles northwest of Kherson City in the Posad-Pokrovske area and pulling reserves from Mykolaiv City to reinforce positions along the Mykolaiv-Kherson Oblast border.[27]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian troops continued ground attacks in Donetsk Oblast on September 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks northeast of Bakhmut near Soledar and Bakhmutske, and south of Bakhmut near Odradivka, Kurdyumivka, Zaitseve, and Mayorsk.[28] Russian sources claimed that Wagner Group fighters are attacking Ukrainian fortifications in Zaitseve (8km southeast of Bakhmut) and that Wagner detachments are fighting within Bakhmut itself, although ISW cannot independently confirm these claims.[29] Russian forces also continued routine ground assaults along the western outskirts of Donetsk City and attempted attacks on Kamyanka, Avdiivka, Opytne, and Nevelske.[30] Russian sources claimed that the 5th Brigade of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) repelled a Ukrainian assault on Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City).[31] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported that Russian troops conducted a limited ground assault on Novomykhailivka, about 25km southwest of Donetsk City.[32] Russian forces otherwise continued routine shelling throughout Donetsk Oblast and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.[33]  

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks west of Hulyaipole on September 24 and continued routine strikes in Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts.[34] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian troops launched Kh-31 missiles at port infrastructure in Ochakiv, Mykolaiv Oblast, and continued rocket strikes on Zaporizhzhia City and Mykolaiv City.[35] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command stated that Russian forces shelled the coast of the Kakhovske Reservoir near Chervonohryhorivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (just across the water from Enerhodar).[36] This strike is a likely continuation of a recent Russian campaign to target Ukrainian hydrotechnical assets, which the UK Ministry of Defense assessed is unlikely to significantly impact Ukrainian operations due to the distance between these hydrotechnical assets and frontline combat zones.[37] Geolocated social media footage confirmed the location of an Iranian Shahed-136 drone attack on Odesa on September 23.[38]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin’s “partial mobilization” continues to hastily press thousands of men across Russia into military service but remains unlikely to generate effective combat power.[39] Russian sources state that some mobilized men will receive 1-2 months of training.[40] Others may receive even less. Mobilization has drafted men in their upper 50s with serious medical conditions to fight in Ukraine.[41] Social media videos posted on September 24 show mobilized personnel receiving badly maintained and rusted small arms unfit for service.[42] Social media videos of mobilized men show they have low morale and are undisciplined and unruly.[43] Russian civilians continued protests against military mobilization and conducted arson attacks against polling stations in Russia on September 24.[44]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

Russian occupation forces continue coercively conducting sham referenda in occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson Oblasts on September 24.[45] The Kremlin presented a few “international observers” it managed to attract to occupied Ukraine (including Stefan Schaller - the managing director of German energy company Energie Waldeck-Frankenberg GmbH) in an effort to imbue the referenda with a thin veneer of legitimacy.[46] Armed Russian occupation forces continue harassing Ukrainian citizens by going door-to-door to collect referenda votes.[47] Russian occupation forces are reportedly counting dead persons’ votes in the referendum in Alchevsk, Luhansk Oblast.[48] Ukrainian partisans are reportedly providing Ukrainian forces with targeting information for referenda voting stations despite increased security in occupied territories.[49]  

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update. 


[1] https://t.me/readovkanews/42440

[2] https://t.me/readovkanews/42447

[3] https://telegra.ph/Intervyu-Ministra-oborony-Rossijskoj-Federacii-generala-armii-SKSHojgu-09-21; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/69391

[4] https://t.me/notes_veterans/5208; https://t.me/notes_veterans/5209

[5] https://telegra dot ph/Intervyu-Ministra-oborony-Rossijskoj-Federacii-generala-armii-SKSHojgu-09-21

[6] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/5963; https://t.me/spravdi/17823

[7] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/69391

[8] https://t.me/mod_russia/20148; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2022/09/24/u-rosijskij-armiyi-prodovzhuyutsya-kadrovi-chystky/; https://tass dot com/defense/1512695; https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-minister-bulgakov-removed/32049316.html; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/5581014; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/5258163

[9] https://t.me/mod_russia/20148; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2022/09/24/u-rosijskij-armiyi-prodovzhuyutsya-kadrovi-chystky/; https://tass dot com/defense/1512695; https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-minister-bulgakov-removed/32049316.html; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/5581014; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/5258163; https://t.me/milchronicles/1136

[10] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/15856985; https://antikor.com dot ua/ru/articles/576579-v_dnr_formirujut_kazachij_bataljon_iz_ukrainskih_plennyh_i_zastavljajut_ih_uchastvovatj_v_referendume; https://t.me/stranaua/65962

[11] https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/geneva-convention-relative-treatment-prisoners-war

[12] https://t.me/rybar/39307

[13] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/40770; https://t.me/rybar/39307

[14]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iPZsZcdMHJ6vS6fau718zQWqBKrYwrxt1f1T6uusHrqxmaNRgSXWqaLAZjmWRzWCl

[15]https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1573236241197420544

[16] https://www.voanews.com/a/6761749.html

[17] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/9525; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1573508563544285186; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1573508563544285186 

[18] https://t.me/epoddubny/12505; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1573508563544285186; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1573508563544285186; https://t.me/epoddubny/12505; https://t.me/milchronicles/1138

[19] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/explainer-on-russian-conscription-reserve-and-mobilization

[20] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=388369026832581; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=5923613451006837

[21] https://t.me/hueviyherson/26415; https://t.me/hueviyherson/26385; https://t.me/hueviyherson/26383; https://t.me/msgazdiev/1078; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/40772; https://t.me/zalpalyanytsya/1674; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=388369026832581

[22] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1573548223691722754; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1573548406655565826; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/11777; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/40781; https://t.me/milinfolive/90922

[23] https://t.me/wargonzo/8439; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=5923613451006837

[24] https://t.me/rybar/39314

[25] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/40770

[26] https://t.me/rybar/39306; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/40770

[27] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/40770; https://t.me/rybar/39304

[28]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TgrWbCPzyjuJb8vQ7ZugBZRdMeWPgyQkJAujxTbTMHiZFuqjrwMJuCz5S9KELKiMl

[29] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/40770; https://t.me/wargonzo/8439

[30]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TgrWbCPzyjuJb8vQ7ZugBZRdMeWPgyQkJAujxTbTMHiZFuqjrwMJuCz5S9KELKiMl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iPZsZcdMHJ6vS6fau718zQWqBKrYwrxt1f1T6uusHrqxmaNRgSXWqaLAZjmWRzWCl

[31] ****GRAPHIC**** https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/40770; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/6331

[32]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iPZsZcdMHJ6vS6fau718zQWqBKrYwrxt1f1T6uusHrqxmaNRgSXWqaLAZjmWRzWCl

[33]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iPZsZcdMHJ6vS6fau718zQWqBKrYwrxt1f1T6uusHrqxmaNRgSXWqaLAZjmWRzWCl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TgrWbCPzyjuJb8vQ7ZugBZRdMeWPgyQkJAujxTbTMHiZFuqjrwMJuCz5S9KELKiMl; https://t.me/milchronicles/1137; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/13178; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/13204; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/13214; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/13217

[34] https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/13178; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/13204; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/13214; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/13217; https://t.me/starukhofficial/3827; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/13184; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=5923613451006837

[35] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=5923613451006837; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TgrWbCPzyjuJb8vQ7ZugBZRdMeWPgyQkJAujxTbTMHiZFuqjrwMJuCz5S9KELKiMl; https://t.me/starukhofficial/3827; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/13184

[36] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=5923613451006837

[37] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1573552903821959168

[38] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1573414912092966912; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1573349379406270464

[39] https://t.me/mod_russia/20147; https://t.me/mod_russia/20137; https://t.me/mod_russia/20135; https://t.me/rybar/39309; https://vologda-poisk dot ru/news/sobytia/cherepovets-otpravit-pervuyu-partiyu-rezervistov-uzhe-zavtra; https://docs.google.com/document/d/e/2PACX-1vSrWUbYL784BVXYa3a2sbDeVCK2rosa-cVdWL8bgoTMJtW1Lzsr52c0dY2yKc_qZiSrRDNFSU4zkC-I/pub; https://twitter.com/CITeam_en/status/1573658686203068417; https://twitter.com/CITeam_ru/status/1573383442728980482; https://te.legra dot ph/Svodka-po-mobilizacii-v-RF-za-22-23-sentyabrya-09-23

[40] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/2869

[41] https://t.me/readovkanews/42421; https://t.me/bazabazon/13418

[42]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ApHVlXTzE5g&ab_channel=%D0%86%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%84%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%85%D1%96%D0%BD

[43] https://twitter.com/EuromaidanPR/status/1573626547960889344; https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1573664285624094720; https://twitter.com/ignis_fatum/status/1573699647859789828; https://twitter.com/Georgin17111550/status/1573718202797985795; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iPZsZcdMHJ6vS6fau718zQWqBKrYwrxt1f1T6uusHrqxmaNRgSXWqaLAZjmWRzWCl; https://t.me/rybar/39301; https://t.me/rybar/39287; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/9526; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1573381780601974784; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/26955; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1573653348322103299; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1573674983380979714; https://twitter.com/MilitaryEmpire/status/1573645558505476096; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/11818

[44] https://t.me/bazabazon/13397; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1573664558379679746; https://t.me/lygaoper/21741 ; https://twitter.com/JakeCordell/status/1573647765082628096; https://twitter.com/khpg/status/1573755773657702401

[45] https://twitter.com/Vladimi03721352/status/1573615008096948224; https://twitter.com/loogunda/status/1573666231273635842

[46] https://t.me/razvozhaev/1096; https://t.me/Stremousov_Kirill/380, https://t.me/Stremousov_Kirill/378; https://t.me/Stremousov_Kirill/375; https://t.me/rlz_the_kraken/52804; https://www.facebook.com/ewf.nordhessen/posts/pfbid04bcUALd1euApKiaj65VUyqY9o15TLGAcVU7TdfxDz2jXMTTzPNiwnuctENFyswPtl?__cft__[0]=AZXJDZqk0IC2zOMYTGWzsqfEgIuC5PfPxkQwoiYoyErhVNsXM9uB82KeQ9tiq_fajmLrgw1Fir-CFcVNMDEnaIguu4f6qIsicvLEaryAAKX1leaiSKSzsMxWCJP0_B1qKAG4RoqUTz9lNCC2J7-dFlDGcDSxd1Lzk-6osk9Ztpm4E2I_kU-GJ1MvdVztPSxqh_sncdQsmtDzEKaz3iAcpdxh&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://www.hna dot de/lokales/frankenberg/ewf-geschaeftsfuehrer-stefan-schaller-als-wahlbeobachter-bei-scheinreferendum-in-der-ukraine-91809239.html; https://www.tylaz dot net/2022/09/24/the-director-of-a-german-public-energy-company-invited-and-paid-by-russia-to-observe-the-annexation-referendum-4/

[47] https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1573440555572514823; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1573392246816243713; https://twitter.com/Flash_news_ua/status/1573287407709048832

[48] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/09/24/na-luganshhyni-na-psevdoreferendumi-golosuyut-navit-mertvi/; https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1573440555572514823; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1573392246816243713; https://twitter.com/Flash_news_ua/status/1573287407709048832

[49]https://www.facebook.com/ouvKakhovka/posts/pfbid0Lh93WGpKgGAEnqeayCQi3fgk4ZsohZsQXUPhhkzx2pxLj5UEFKhcnaxG41AQR5L6l

 

Friday, September 23, 2022

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 23

 Kateryna Stepanenko, Katherine Lawlor, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 23, 10:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

The Russian mobilization system is struggling to execute the task Russian President Vladimir Putin set and will likely fail to produce mobilized reserve forces even of the low quality that Putin’s plans would have generated unless the Kremlin can rapidly fix fundamental and systemic problems. Putin and Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu announced that the Russian Armed Forces would mobilize combat-ready reservists to quickly stabilize the frontlines and regain the initiative on the battlefield.[1] Milblogger and social media reports, however, show that Russian military recruitment centers, enlistment officials, and local administrations are mobilizing men who do not meet the Kremlin’s stated criteria, especially Shoigu’s promise that mobilization would prioritize men with “combat experience.” Russian opposition outlets and Telegram channels leaked information suggesting that the Kremlin aims to complete this partial mobilization by November 10 and that the Kremlin is seeking to mobilize 1.2 million men instead of the publicly announced 300,000.[2] ISW cannot verify these reports, but significant available information suggests that this mobilization campaign (the first in post-Soviet Russia) is overwhelming an ineffective and unmotivated bureaucratic system and could fail to generate the much-needed combat-ready reserve force in a short time or at all.

Russian pro-war milbloggers and social media users are raising concerns about unlawful mobilization practices and showcasing many serious Russian mobilization problems on the second day of the mobilization effort. Russian milbloggers reported receiving numerous complaints from social media users that older men, students, employees of military industries, and civilians with no prior military experience are receiving illegal mobilization notices.[3] Shoigu and other officials have repeatedly stated that these categories of individuals would be exempt from this partial mobilization. Other sources reported that Russians are mobilizing airport and airline employees and workers from other industries.[4] The Russian government FAQ portal also indicated that local mobilization-enforcing officials may mobilize part-time students, despite the Kremlin’s declaration that no students will undergo mobilization.[5] 

Some milbloggers noted that Russian enlistment personnel are assigning men with prior military service to very different specializations from those in which they served, while other sources recounted instances of military recruitment centers mobilizing men with chronic illnesses.[6]

The quality of Russian bureaucrats and military trainers are also raising fears among the Russian pro-war crowd that the partial mobilization effort may not succeed. Milbloggers noted that employees of the military enlistment centers are unmotivated and underpaid, reducing their enthusiasm to adhere to the envisioned mobilization plan. Milbloggers also pleaded with officers and commanders in charge of preparing mobilized men for war to train them before deployment.[7]

Challenges and errors in the first days of executing a large-scale and demanding partial mobilization in the midst of a failing war are not necessarily surprising, although they suggest that the Russian military mobilization infrastructure was not better prepared for a major war than the Russian armed forces themselves. It is nevertheless conceivable that the Russian Ministry of Defense will address some of the worst problems and get the mobilization effort on track. It is also possible, moreover, that much of the partial mobilization is proceeding more or less as planned and that social media and the milblogger community are highlighting problems that are serious but not necessarily pervasive. Some of the reports suggest, however, that regional mobilization officials have been given quotas to fill and received pressure to fill them in ways that are more likely to cause errors than to reward adherence to the stated principles and the needs of an effective, combat-ready reserve force.

Divergences from the mobilization decree and from Putin’s and Shoigu’s statements about the categories of men who are exempt from mobilization are also causing anger and mistrust toward Russian federal subjects and the Kremlin itself. Some social media footage already shows mobilized men fighting with enlistment officers, arguing with mobilization representatives, and refusing to serve under unlawful orders.[8] Some milbloggers claimed that some of the discontented men who have been wrongfully mobilized would have accepted their fate if they had actually met the mobilization criterium.[9] The Kremlin is thus committing unmotivated and potentially angry men to war with the task of regaining the initiative in an offensive war in a foreign land on a battlefield far from home.

The highly nationalist and pro-war milblogger community is calling on the Kremlin to address these mobilization issues rapidly, but the Kremlin is unlikely to be able to meet their demands. Russian milbloggers express cautious optimism that partial mobilization will reinforce degraded combat units and allow Russian forces to advance in Donetsk Oblast, but are concerned that the Kremlin’s failures to enforce mobilization according to the law and stated policies will create political unrest.[10] One milblogger stated that the Kremlin’s poor handling of the partial mobilization is giving rise to “separatist movements” and opposition media.[11] Another milblogger noted that the Kremlin’s failure to fix mobilization practices within the military recruitment centers may shatter Russians‘ trust in the military-political leadership.[12] A failed or badly flawed partial mobilization campaign may risk further alienation of the Russian nationalist crowd that has been supportive of the war and mobilization.

Disparate mobilization processes across different regions may exacerbate social tensions in Russia already raised by perceived inequalities in the creation of volunteer battalions. Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov stated in a live TV broadcast that the Republic of Chechnya will not conduct mobilization because the Republic has already exceeded an unspecified force generation plan by 254 percent.[13] Kadyrov added that Chechnya has already deployed 20,000 servicemen to war since February 24. Kadyrov threatened to mobilize any protesters in Chechnya and send them to the front, however. Kadyrov then seemingly modified his statements by encouraging those opposing mobilization to respect Russian sovereignty instead of using the constitution to avoid service.[14] Kadyrov’s initial statement, addressed to the Chechen public, may be an attempt to both address and discourage criticism of mobilization, the war, and himself within the Chechen community. Kadyrov’s statement could also be a worrisome indicator for the Kremlin—if one of the war’s most vociferous and aggressive advocates feels the need to refuse to mobilize his people, at least publicly, that could indicate that even Kadyrov senses the popular resentment the partial mobilization will cause and possibly even fears it.

Key Takeaways

  • Russian partial mobilization efforts are suffering from serious and systemic problems in their first days, generating popular resentment and setting conditions to produce a mobilized reserve force incapable of accomplishing the tasks Russian President Vladimir Putin has set for it.
  • Protests, attacks against recruiting centers, and vandalism have occurred across Russia in the first 48 hours after the announcement of partial mobilization.
  • Ukrainian forces continued to advance north and northwest of Lyman.
  • Ukrainian forces continued their interdiction campaign in Kherson Oblast and maintained operational silence regarding Ukrainian progress on the axis.
  • Russian forces continued to launch unsuccessful assaults near Bakhmut and northwest of Donetsk City.
  • Ukrainian forces reportedly shot down an Iranian-made Mohajer-6 drone in an unspecified area of the Black Sea, likely near Odesa.
  • Russian occupation authorities began the voting period for their sham annexation referenda on September 23 with overt coercion and falsified turnout numbers.
  • Russian occupation authorities remained on high alert to prevent partisan attacks against sham election workers, polling stations, and government facilities. 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Southern and Eastern Ukraine
  • Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Vovchansk-Kupyansk-Izyum-Lyman Line)

Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces continued to repel Russian effort to regain lost positions around eastern Kupyansk on September 23.[15] Ukrainian officials also reported that Russian forces again unsuccessfully targeted a dam over the Pechenihy Reservoir likely in an effort to flood the Siverskyi Donets River and disrupt Ukrainian logistics on its eastern bank.[16]

Ukrainian forces continued to advance north and northwest of Lyman. Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian forces have driven into the rear of Russian positions in Lyman from the north, after reportedly breaking through Russian defenses around Karpivka and Ridkodub (about 22km northwest of Lyman).[17] Another milblogger noted that there are no communications with a Russian BARS-13 reservist detachment that was occupying a defensive position near Drobysheve (7km west of Lyman).[18]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian strikes wounded the commander of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division of the 20th Combined Arms Army of the Western Military District (WMD), Major General Oleg Tsokov in Svatove (about 37km east of the new frontline in Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast).[19] The 144th Division is based in western Russia near the Belarusian border. Its losses in Luhansk Oblast, along with those of the 1st Guards Tank Army of the WMD, confirm that Russia continues to expend some of its premier forces that had been responsible for defending Russian borders against a NATO attack as well as threatening NATO.

Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)

Ukrainian military officials maintained their operational silence regarding Ukrainian ground attacks in Kherson Oblast but noted that Russian forces continued efforts to restore lost positions and fired along the entire line of contact on September 23. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on September 23 that Russian forces continued to organize their defense of occupied Ukrainian territories and are using aerial reconnaissance to search for opportunities to regain Ukrainian-held positions.[20]

Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported continued Ukrainian interdiction efforts against Russian positions in Kherson Oblast on September 22-23. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces conducted seven airstrikes against Russian forces and anti-aircraft assets on September 23 and conducted 99 fire missions.[21] Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed two command posts in Henichensk (just north of the Crimean Peninsula) and Kakhovka Raions. Social media users reported explosions on September 22 and 23 in Nova Kakhovka.[22] Ukrainian forces maintained fire control over the Kakhovka Bridge over the Dnipro River.[23] Social media footage published on September 23 depicted additional Ukrainian artillery strikes on a Russian warehouse and damaging a Russian armored vehicle near Liubymivka, 80km northeast of Nova Kakhovka.[24] A Kherson-based Ukrainian source reported on September 22 that Ukrainian forces likely targeted unspecified Russian military positions in Chornobaivka, just north of Kherson City.[25] A Russian milblogger confirmed reports of Ukrainian Tochka-U missile fire into Kherson Oblast.[26]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces conducted routine shelling and rocket artillery strikes along the front lines around Bakhmut and Donetsk City on September 23 according to the Ukrainian General Staff.[27]  Russian forces conducted failed ground assaults on September 23 on Zaitseve and Maryorsk in the Bakhmut area and around Novomykhailivka, Avdiivka, Opytne, and Kamianka in the Donetsk City area.[28]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces are continuing to use Iranian-made drones to strike Ukrainian forces and cities in southern Ukraine. Ukrainian forces reportedly shot down an Iranian-made Mohajer-6 in an unspecified part of the Black Sea, likely near Odesa, on September 23.[29] That attack marks the first time ISW has observed a Mohajer-6 in Ukraine.[30] Russian forces have previously used Shahed-136 kamikaze drones in Ukraine.[31] Odesa City officials reported that Russian forces conducted a drone attack on an administrative building in Odesa on September 23, likely using a Shahed-136.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that the attack targeted the Ukrainian Navy Headquarters.[33] Ukrainian forces also reportedly shot down two Shahid-136 drones over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[34]

Russian occupation officials claimed that Ukrainian forces broke through Russian defenses in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian-appointed Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed on September 23 that a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group broke through Russian defenses near Polohy and traveled toward Rozivka, likely along the N08 highway, in off-road vehicles.[35] The Zaporizhia Occupation Administration announced a 500,000-ruble reward for information leading to the capture of the “saboteurs.”[36] ISW cannot independently confirm these reports.

Russian forces continued strikes on Zaporizhia City on September 22-23. Rogov posted footage on September 22 of Russian rockets striking Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and military facilities overnight.[37] Rogov claimed that Ukrainian air defenses damaged civilian buildings by shooting down the rockets. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian rocket attacks struck a Ukrainian military enlistment office and a factory in Zaporizhia City on September 23.[38] Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Administration Head Oleksandr Starukh also reported that Russian forces hit civilian infrastructure in Zaporizhia City.[39]

Russian forces continued routine shelling of Nikopol, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and Mykolaiv City, Mykolaiv Oblast on September 23. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command and local Ukrainian officials reported on September 23 that Russian forces shelled Nikopol and Marhanets, damaging civilian residences and electrical lines.[40]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Ukrainian counteroffensives are likely continuing to attrit and grind down Russian forces even as the Kremlin’s partial mobilization attempts to backfill new personnel to degraded Russian units. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 23 that the Russian military delivered the bodies of 105 deceased Russian servicemembers to a military hospital in Rostov-on-Don and reported that preparations are underway for the receipt of 200 additional bodies in the near future.[41]



Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

Russian occupation authorities began the voting period for their sham annexation referenda on September 23 with overt coercion and falsified turnout numbers. Ukrainian sources reported that members of the occupation “election commissions” went door-to-door in occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts accompanied by armed men.[42] Voters who turned up at polling stations did not have access to private voting booths; armed occupation forces reportedly showed voters which boxes to check and did not check identification at polling sites.[43] Occupation authorities reportedly stopped people on the streets to force them to vote.[44] The Ukrainian head of the Luhansk Military Administration, Serhiy Haidai, reported that armed men threatened to break into apartment buildings that refused them entrance and told voters who offered identification that ”we already know you.”[45] Haidai reported that occupation authorities are recording the names of those who vote no on the referendum, indicating that Russian authorities are likely preparing to retaliate against uncooperative Ukrainian civilians.[46]

Russian occupation authorities remained on high alert to prevent partisan attacks against sham election workers, polling stations, and government facilities.  The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported that forces from Rosgavardia, the Russian military police, as well as the Russian Ministry of Emergencies are tasked with the “protection” of annexation referenda measures.[47] Russian occupation authorities in Luhansk Oblast reported that forces from the LNR Interior Ministry, the Russian Internal Affairs Ministry, and Rosgvardia implemented unspecified ”organizational and practical measures” to protect public order and civilian safety during the referendum, including the protection of election commission personnel ”outside the polling stations.”[48] The Russian Ministry of Defense stated on September 23 that sappers from the International Mine Action Center have begun inspecting polling stations and nearby areas in Luhansk for explosives, referring to these as ”anti-terrorist measures.”[49]  The Russian head of the “We Are Together With Russia” movement, a likely Kremlin-directed attempt to demonstrate grassroots support for the sham referenda, reported a “terrorist” attack near a residential building in central Melitopol on September 23, likely describing a partisan attempt to disrupt the sham referendum there.[50]

Russian milbloggers already set information conditions to explain away any reported low turnout. One milblogger reported on September 23 that occupation administrations in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts have not maintained the telephone lines meant to inform residents in Ukraine and Russia about where polling stations are located.[51] The milblogger claimed that no employees answered the phone at informational call centers and that many residents in Ukraine and Russia cannot vote because they do not know where the polling stations are located. Russian milbloggers may use this misleading narrative to justify low turnout or coercive door-to-door “polling” of residents.

Russian media will likely distribute false turnout numbers each day of the sham referendum to maintain a thin veneer of legitimacy. A Russian reporter claimed that 15.3% of voters in Kherson Oblast, 22% of voters in Luhansk Oblast, 20.5% in Zaporizhia Oblast, and 23.6% in Donetsk Oblast turned out to vote on September 23.[52] He did not clarify whether these percentages refer to all eligible voters in each oblast, or only in occupied areas. Russian occupation authorities may have specific quotas of paper ballots to meet for informational purposes, but the results of these sham referenda are pre-determined and will wildly overstate turnout and support for Russian occupation.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 


[1] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21

[2] https://twitter.com/The_Lookout_N/status/1573304908979355648?s=20&t=g74oiWK9kuuTLIX7otmz8g
https://twitter.com/meduza_en/status/1573304231573987330; https://meduza dot io/news/2022/09/23/v-eti-tri-prisesta-dolzhny-vse-muzhiki-byt-tam-dozhd-rasskazal-o-treh-volnah-mobilizatsii; https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/09/23/russia-to-conscript-up-to-1-2-million-people; https://meduza dot io/feature/2022/09/23/istochnik-meduzy-v-armiyu-sobirayutsya-prizvat-1-2-milliona-chelovek

[3] https://t.me/rybar/39237; https://t.me/rybar/39263; https://t.me/rybar/39264; https://t.me/rybar/39267; https://t.me/kommunist/9801; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/11389; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/18027; https://t.me/epoddubny/12489; https://t.me/brussinf/5014

[4] https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2022/09/phosagro-lists-106-employees-fight-ukraine; https://meduza.io/en/news/2022/09/23/russian-airline-employees-summoned-less-than-a-day-after-mobilization-declared

[5] https://meduza dot io/news/2022/09/23/studentov-zaochnikov-mogut-mobilizovat-po-resheniyu-prizyvnoy-komissii

[6] https://t.me/rybar/39267; https://t.me/kommunist/9801; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/11389; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/18027; https://t.me/epoddubny/12489; https://twitter.com/francis_scarr/status/1573250936566325248

[7] https://t.me/rybar/39240

[8]https://meduza dot io/video/2022/09/23/rot-zakroyte-chto-vy-orete-vse-igrushki-zakonchilis; https://www dot fontanka.ru/2022/09/23/71680199/; https://twitter.com/ABarbashin/status/1573258049657225216; https://t.me/sibirmedia/22709; https://ufa1 dot ru/text/gorod/2022/09/23/71679011/

[9] https://t.me/rybar/39237; https://t.me/rybar/39263; https://t.me/rybar/39264; https://t.me/rybar/39267; https://t.me/kommunist/9801; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/11389; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/18027; https://t.me/epoddubny/12489; https://t.me/brussinf/5014

[10] https://t.me/sashakots/35835; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1573294099830296577  

[11] https://t.me/pezdicide/2134

[12] https://t.me/rybar/39237; https://t.me/rybar/39263; https://t.me/rybar/39264

[13] https://www dot kavkazr.com/a/v-chechne-mobilizatsiya-provoditjsya-ne-budet-kadyrov/32046850.html

[14] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/2866; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/18065; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/64909

[15] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GHhP8EVUDrXSgvSHxfgtrBYcKfBPG5jFGvZVdzeeGVWHhuJrRPzMqTDn4fe3XGy9l; https://t.me/synegubov/4303 ; https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1573007660064329728?s=20&t=g74oiWK9kuuTLIX7otmz8g; https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1573360678143942657?s=20&t=k0t6lp8yl9-qIMKVs6hjvA

[16] https://t.me/synegubov/4303

[17] https://twitter.com/SanderRegter/status/1573278994501406722?s=20&t=g74oiWK9kuuTLIX7otmz8g; https://t.me/wargonzo/8424

[18] https://t.me/notes_veterans/5164

[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02evwut6HCS7XMVSUwydTpsbdwDp9zVVFgErVi9qpxVaE1QvqX8S6g3EitJUiPg16Ml

[20] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1275490683222956

[21] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1275490683222956; https://t.me/hueviyherson/26349

[22] https://t.me/hueviyherson/26337

[23] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1275490683222956; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1573337036131803137?s=20&t=k0t6lp8yl9-qIMKVs6hjvA

[24] https://twitter.com/Blue_Sauron/status/1573225016992432128?s=20&t=7R34ff_2ZsWo2ZUcoS0IIA; https://twitter.com/5urpher/status/1573335947458093056?s=20&t=7R34ff_2ZsWo2ZUcoS0IIA

[25] https://t.me/hueviyherson/26341 

[26] https://t.me/rybar/39229

[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GHhP8EVUDrXSgvSHxfgtrBYcKfBPG5jFGvZVdzeeGVWHhuJrRPzMqTDn4fe3XGy9l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02evwut6HCS7XMVSUwydTpsbdwDp9zVVFgErVi9qpxVaE1QvqX8S6g3EitJUiPg16Ml

[28] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GHhP8EVUDrXSgvSHxfgtrBYcKfBPG5jFGvZVdzeeGVWHhuJrRPzMqTDn4fe3XGy9l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02evwut6HCS7XMVSUwydTpsbdwDp9zVVFgErVi9qpxVaE1QvqX8S6g3EitJUiPg16Ml; https://t.me/wargonzo/8424. 

[29] https://twitter.com/war_noir/status/1573365546149634049?s=21; https://twitter.com/trbrtc/status/1573371174884880384

[30] https://twitter.com/war_noir/status/1573365546149634049?s=21; https://twitter.com/trbrtc/status/1573371174884880384

[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20September%2013.pdf

[32] https://t.me/odesacityofficial/11046 ; https://t.me/odessa_typical/18946; https://t.me/milchronicles/1131

[33] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/64908

[34] https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1573330122173808643?s=20&t=k0t6lp8yl9-qIMKVs6hjvA; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/18060

[35] https://t.me/vrogov/5098

[36] https://t.me/readovkanews/42365

[37] https://t.me/vrogov/5083

[38] https://t.me/rybar/39232

[39] https://t.me/starukhofficial/3823  

[40] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1275490683222956; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/1933

[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02evwut6HCS7XMVSUwydTpsbdwDp9zVVFgErVi9qpxVaE1QvqX8S6g3EitJUiPg16Ml

[42] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/599; https://t.me/Medianova/5461 

[43] https://www.facebook.com/100003342535443/videos/1430425547448688/; https://t.me/Medianova/5461 ; https://www.facebook.com/100003342535443/videos/1099269754311728/; https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1573242079848939522?s=20&t=Q8UjXgLPuByIL9rJ9PlTng

[44] https://sprotyv dot mod dot gov dot ua/2022/09/23/rosiyany-pochaly-svoye-volevyyavlennya-ozbroyenni-okupanty-opytuyut-meshkancziv-za-misczem-prozhyvannya/ ; https://t.me/mariupolrada/11123 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/3066

[45] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/5943

[46] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/5943

[47] https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/13169

[48] https://t.me/mvdlnr_official/1673

[49] ttps://t.me/mod_russia/20112; https://t.me/miroshnik_r/8865

[50] https://t.me/vrogov/5092

[51] https://t.me/rybar/39241

[52] https://t.me/epoddubny/12499; https://t.me/epoddubny/12498; https://t.me/epoddubny/12497;