UA-69458566-1

Monday, February 28, 2022

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 28, 2022

  

Mason Clark, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko

February 28, 3:30pm EST

The Russian military is reorganizing its military efforts in an attempt to remedy poor planning and execution based on erroneous assumptions about Ukrainians’ will and ability to resist.  Russian operations around Kyiv remain limited as logistics and reinforcements arrive but will likely resume in greater strength in the next 24 hours. Ukrainian military leaders say that they have used the pause to strengthen Kyiv’s defenses and prepare to defend their capital in depth. The Ukrainian military likely cannot prevent Russian forces from enveloping or encircling Kyiv if the Russians send enough combat power to do so, but likely can make Russian efforts to gain control of the city itself extremely costly and possibly unsuccessful.

The Russian military has begun using area-attack weapons in the city of Kharkiv, dramatically increasing the damage to civilian infrastructure and the number of civilian casualties it is causing. It is using tube- and rocket artillery against Kharkiv, and unconfirmed reports indicate that it is also using thermobaric weapons, which can have devastating effects, especially on civilian targets. Ukrainian resistance in and around Kharkiv remains determined, but it is unclear how long Ukrainian defenders can hold if Russia sustains or increases attacks of this variety coupled with ground attacks supported by arriving Russian reinforcements.

Russian advances in southern Ukraine remain slower than they had been in the initial days of the war, possibly due to Russian efforts to concentrate sufficient combat power to conduct decisive operations against Mariupol and, possibly, Zaporizhia. 

The next major phase of Russian offensive operations will likely begin within the next 24 hours and play out over the ensuing 48-72 hours.

Ukrainian resistance remains remarkably effective and Russian operations, especially on the Kyiv axis, have been poorly coordinated and executed, leading to significant Russian failures on that axis and at Kharkiv. Russian forces remain much larger and more capable than Ukraine’s conventional military, however, and Russian advances in southern Ukraine threaten to unhinge the defense of Kyiv and northeastern Ukraine if they continue unchecked.

Key Takeaways

  • Russia deployed additional heavy forces and artillery that it has so far failed to employ in assaults on Kyiv to the city’s western approach on February 27-28. Russian forces will likely launch a renewed assault on western Kyiv on March 1.
  • Russian forces began using heavy artillery against central Kharkiv on February 28, indicating a dangerous inflection in Russian operations as the Kremlin chooses to use air and artillery assets it has held in reserve to date.
  • Russian forces resumed limited advances in northeastern Ukraine on February 28 after an operational pause on February 26-27.
  • Russian and proxy forces resumed assaults on Ukrainian forces defending Mariupol from the east and deployed additional artillery and anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) assets to the Mariupol front line on February 28. Russian forces may attempt a renewed assault on Mariupol in the coming days.
  • Russian forces increasingly targeted Ukrainian airfields and logistics centers on February 28, particularly in western Ukraine. Russia likely seeks to ground the Ukrainian air force and interdict the ability of Western states to resupply the Ukrainian military.
  • Russian and Belarusian forces may be preparing for an additional line of advance from Belarus into western Ukraine.
  • Russian successes in southern Ukraine are the most dangerous and threaten to unhinge Ukraine’s successful defenses and rearguard actions to the north and northeast.
  • Russian troops are facing growing morale and logistics issues, predictable consequences of the poor planning, coordination, and execution of attacks along Ukraine’s northern border.




Russian forces increasingly targeted Ukrainian airfields and logistics centers on February 28, particularly in western Ukraine. Russia likely seeks to ground the Ukrainian air force and interdict the ability of Western states to resupply the Ukrainian military. The Ukrainian General staff reported that Russian airstrikes increasingly concentrated on military and civilian airfields and air-defense assets on February 28.[1] Russian forces conducted thirty missile strikes and four airstrikes from 11:00 am local time February 27 to 11:00 am February 28.[2] US intelligence officials reported that Russia has fired 380 missiles, predominantly short-range ballistic missiles, since February 24.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian air assets are increasingly targeting Ukraine from Belarusian airspace, though no Belarusian assets have launched operations as of now.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense falsely claimed to have secured air supremacy over Ukraine on February 28.[5] Russian forces have still not secured air superiority five days into the invasion but likely seek to do so in coming days through increased strikes on Ukrainian air assets.[6] Western military aid to the Ukrainian air force, including EU plans announced on February 27 to send fighter jets to Ukraine, will be crucial in preventing Russian forces from achieving air superiority.[7] Russian forces likely seek to interdict US and European aid shipments through western Ukraine.

Russian ground forces are advancing on four primary axes, discussed in turn below:

  1. Kyiv;
  2. Northeast front;
  3. Donbas and Mariupol; and
  4. Crimea-Kherson.

1)      Kyiv axis: Russia deployed additional heavy forces and artillery it has so far failed to employ in assaults on the city to the western approach to Kyiv on February 27-28. Russian forces will likely launch a renewed assault on western Kyiv on March 1. Attacks by Russian light forces on the outskirts of the city failed to make progress on February 28. Ukrainian forces are unlikely to capitulate.

  • Russia deployed substantial additional forces to its offensive along the western bank of the Dnipro River on February 27-28. Maxar Technologies satellite imagery (see Appendix A below) captured an 11-mile-long Russian convoy approaching Antonov airport, about 17 miles from downtown Kyiv, at 11:00 am local time on February 28. Social media users observed additional Russian forces moving through southern Belarus on February 28.[8] Russian logistics columns were additionally spotted in southeastern Belarus, likely to support Russian attacks on eastern Kyiv.[9] Russian forces will likely attempt a renewed assault on western Kyiv with supporting artillery on March 1.
  • Russian light forces continued unsuccessful attacks on Kyiv the night of February 27-28.[10] The Ukrainian General Staff reported Ukrainian forces have established a  “dense and multilevel system of defense of the capital” on February 28.[11] Ukrainian forces likely successfully took advantage of the time granted by Russia’s operational pause February 26-27 to reinforce defenses in the city.
  • Russian forces are likely continuing attempts to infiltrate the city. Ukrainian forces reported Russian troops attempted to use three captured ambulances to infiltrate Ukrainian lines in Kyiv on February 27.[12] UK media outlet the Times reported on February 28 that more than 400 Russian mercenaries are currently operating in Kyiv under orders to kill Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, prompting Ukrainian forces to implement a strict curfew on February 26.[13] ISW cannot confirm this report, though it would track with Russia’s likely efforts to decapitate the Ukrainian government.
  • Ukrainian forces continue to successfully defend against Russian efforts to encircle Kyiv west of the city, repulsing an attack on Irpin the night of February 27 and possibly temporarily recapturing Hostomel airport from Russian forces.[14]

2)      Northeast axis: Russian forces began using heavy artillery against central Kharkiv on February 28, indicating a dangerous inflection in Russian operations as the Kremlin chooses to use fire assets it has held in reserve to date. Russian forces additionally resumed limited advances in northeastern Ukraine on February 28 after an operational pause on February 26-27. Ukrainian forces continue to delay and inflict losses on the Russian advance but will likely not be able to halt further advances if the Kremlin commits additional reserves.

  • Russian forces used close air support and heavy artillery, including unconfirmed reports of thermobaric artillery, in assaults on Kharkiv on February 28. Russian Su-34 fighter bombers conducted strikes in Kharkiv on February 28, and Russian forces will likely increase their use of close air support in the coming days.[15] Russian Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and traditional tube artillery began striking central Kharkiv on February 27-28, inflicting numerous civilian casualties.[16]
  • The Russian use of heavy artillery against urban areas indicates a dangerous new phase in Russian operations. ISW previously warned that Russian forces would likely need to increase their use of air and artillery assets to overcome heavier-than-expected Ukrainian resistance but that Russia refrained from doing so to limit the informational and diplomatic effects of causing heavy Ukrainian civilian casualties and to avoid creating rubble and other obstacles-to-movement into and through Ukrainian cities. Russian forces will likely be able to overcome Ukrainian defenses in Kharkiv (and in Kyiv, if they choose to apply similar firepower there) while inflicting heavy civilian casualties and doing massive property damage.
  • Russian forces resumed offensive operations in northeastern Ukraine, between Chernihiv and Sumy, on February 28.[17] Ukrainian forces claimed to halt attacks by Russian forces out of Khomutovka (in Kursk Oblast, Russia) towards Hlukhiv and Baturyn, west of Sumy.[18] Russian forces have not previously attacked this sector of northeastern Ukraine and likely seek alternate routes through to-date strong Ukrainian defenses. Elements of Russia’s 14th Army Corps of the Northern Fleet and 47th Tank Division of the 1st Guards Tank Army are operating along this axis.[19]
  • Ukrainian forces also repulsed attacks on eastern Kyiv in Baturyn, from the direction of Chernihiv, on February 28.[20]

3)      Donbas axis: Russian and proxy forces resumed assaults on Ukrainian forces defending Mariupol from the east and deployed additional artillery and anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) assets to the Mariupol front line on February 28. Russian forces may attempt a renewed assault on Mariupol in the coming days. Russian forces likely intend to pin Ukrainian forces in place on the line of contact to enable Russian forces breaking out of Crimea to isolate them. The Russians may be content to leave them there while concentrating on capturing Kyiv and imposing a new government on Ukraine. They may alternatively seek to encircle and destroy them or force them to surrender.

  • Russian forces advancing on Mariupol from the west continued assembling in Berdyansk on February 28 but did not make any major assaults.[21] Russia may be halting these forces to instead prioritize the other two Russian advances out of Crimea toward Zaporizhia and Mykolayiv. They may, on the other hand, be waiting until they have concentrated enough combat power in this region before launching a full attack.  Additionally, several videos of Ukrainian citizens in Berdyansk interdicting and harassing Russian forces circulated on Ukrainian social media on February 28.[22]
  • Russian proxies in the 1st and 2nd Army Corps (the Ukrainian designations for the Russian-controlled military forces of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, respectively) conducted assaults along the line of contact in Donbas, supported by Russian artillery.[23] Proxy forces reportedly captured Hranitne, northeast of Mariupol, on February 28.[24] Ukrainian forces remain largely in place on the line of contact in Donbas. Russian forces likely seek to achieve a larger envelopment using forces breaking out from Crimea and currently advancing on Mariupol from the west.
  • Ukrainian forces reported capturing a Russian sniper from the 102nd  Motor Rifle Regiment of the 150th Motor Rifle Division in Donbas on February 28.[25] If confirmed, this indicates at least elements of the previously uncommitted Russian 8th Combined Arms Army are active in Donbas.
  • Russian forces additionally deployed additional MLRS, thermobaric artillery, and ATGM assets toward Mariupol in Donetsk Oblast on February 28.[26] Russian forces may attempt an assault on Mariupol from the east in the coming days.

4)      Crimea axis: Russian forces continued limited advances on two axes out of Crimea—north toward Zaprozhia and west toward Mykolayiv, reaching the outskirts of Mykolayiv on February 28. Russia may struggle to fully supply both axes of advance and may be forced to choose which advance to prioritize.

  • Russian forces continued to advance north toward Zaprozhia on February 28 but have not yet entered the city. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed to capture the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant, approximately 50km southwest of the city, on February 28.[27] Russian forces in Melitopol likely deployed north to attack Zaporizhia on February 28.[28] ISW cannot confirm the extent of Russian advances toward Zaporizhia on February 28.
  • The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops launched an assault on Mykolayiv at 11:00 am local time on February 28.[29] ISW cannot confirm the extent of Russian advances west of the Dnipro River, though Russian forces have likely encircled Kherson.

Russian and Belarusian forces may be preparing for an additional line of advance from Belarus into Western Ukraine. The Belarusian 38th Air Assault Brigade deployed to Kobryn, near Brest in southwestern Belarus, on February 28.[30] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 28 that there is a high likelihood of Belarusian forces joining Russian operations.[31] ISW previously reported a Russian armored column assembling in Stolin, Belarus, on February 25 to support a possible advance into Rivne Oblast in western Ukraine.[32] Russian forces have not launched a ground attack as of this publication. A Russian offensive in western Ukraine would likely seek to cut Ukraine off from ground shipments of Western aid through Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary. However, Belarusian airborne forces would likely face similar difficulties to previous, failed, Russian airborne operations against Kyiv if they attempted airdrops.

Immediate Items to Watch

  • Russian forces advancing north and east from Crimea threaten to cut off Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine if Kyiv does not withdraw them in the coming days.
  • Russian forces began using artillery against residential areas in Kharkiv on February 28, likely signaling a dangerous new phase of Russian operations.
  • Russian forces face growing morale and supply issues but will likely be able to overcome these handicaps.
  • Russian forces continue to refrain from using their likely full spectrum of air and missile capabilities. The Ukrainian air force also remains active. Russian operations will likely steadily wear down Ukrainian air capabilities and eventually take the Ukrainian air force out of the fight.
  • Russia has sufficient conventional military power to reinforce each of its current axes of advance and overpower the conventional Ukrainian forces defending them.

Appendix A – Satelite Imagery

Satellite image ©2022 Maxar Technologies.



Satellite image ©2022 Maxar Technologies.



Satellite image ©2022 Maxar Technologies.



Satellite image ©2022 Maxar Technologies.




Satellite image ©2022 Maxar Technologies.


[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/261189039527515.

[2] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/261400946172991.

[3] https://twitter.com/JackDetsch/status/1498322785180995586?s=20&t=nzhdZrM77YggarMaCuP_dA.

[4] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/261400946172991.

[5] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XN24My3vFeg.

[6] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/261400946172991.

[7] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news-2022-02-26/card/zjCJ5iME2keSkxfiaIpr; https://www.axios.com/eu-weapons-ukraine-russia-invasion-331bfcbc-5193-47b0-8afb-03f194d95619.html.

[8] https://twitter.com/gfusfus/status/1497989547203842051.

[9] https://twitter.com/MotolkoHelp/status/1498226217941671936; https://twitter.com/MotolkoHelp/status/1498270383262343171.

[10] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/261156522864100;

[11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/261034776209608.

[12] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/260936159552803.

[13] https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/volodymyr-zelensky-russian-mercenaries-ordered-to-kill-ukraine-president-cvcksh79d.

[14] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/261034776209608; https://twitter.com/defencehq/status/1498191541675958273?s=21.

[15] https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1498220414300045319; https://twitter.com/CITeam_en/status/1498284750850740228; https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1498304259447828481.

[16] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=672925393899103; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/26093615955280;  https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/261453089501110; https://twitter.com/olliecarroll/status/1498264116871507971; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1498270787081547777.

[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/261400946172991.

[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/261400946172991.

[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/261400946172991; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1498181728921436163?cxt=HHwWhoC-lYiWzsopAAAA.

[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/261400946172991; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1498318233946161155.

[21] https://twitter.com/COUPSURE/status/1497989234476699655https://twitter.com/nigroeneveld/status/1498072845607444484;

[22] https://twitter.com/ArmedForcesUkr/status/1498298228802007042?s=20&t=F3QRgHEoM9-x5TGbj6bwrwhttps://twitter.com/PVB40/status/1498300930613207049?s=20&t=F3QRgHEoM9-x5TGbj6bwrw.

[23] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/261400946172991.

[24] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1498298575339638784?s=20&t=F3QRgHEoM9-x5TGbj6bwrw.

[25] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1498256738562318337; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1498174702107381760.

[26] https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1498255416203087872https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1498265765811834884; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1498219680242311171?cxt=HHwWhoC9xY-338opAAAA ; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1498254707420241921

[27] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/13892671.

[28] https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1498301907202457600?cxt=HHwWgIC-ka7phMspAAAA.

[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/261400946172991.

[30] https://twitter.com/COUPSURE/status/1498250818306420740.

[31] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/261400946172991.

[32] https://twitter.com/konrad_muzyka/status/1497115295512776711; https://twitter.com/MotolkoHelp/status/1497108720953835543.

 

Sunday, February 27, 2022

Ukraine Conflict Update 10

Institute for the Study of War, Russia Team 

February 27, 2022

ISW published its most recent Russian campaign assessment at 4pm, February 27.

This daily synthetic product covers key events related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine.

Key Takeaways February 27
  • Russian President Vladimir Putin put Russia’s nuclear and strategic missile forces, described as “deterrence forces,” on their highest alert status in response to “aggressive statements in the West” on February 27.
  • Russian forces likely conducted an operational pause on the Kyiv axis on February 26-27 to deploy additional supplies and forces forward. Russian forces will likely resume offensive operations against Kyiv in the next 24 hours.
  • Russian forces largely conducted an operational pause on their current broad front of advance between Chernihiv and Kharkiv. Ukrainian forces continue to delay and inflict losses on the Russian advance but will likely not be able to halt further advances if the Kremlin commits additional reserves.
  • Russian forces entered the city of Kharkiv for the first time on February 27 but remain unlikely to take the city without the use of heavier firepower.
  • Russian forces have encircled Mariupol from the west and began initial assaults on the city. Russian forces have not made any major territorial gains from the east in Donbas after four days of fighting. Russian forces likely intend to pin Ukrainian forces in place on the line of contact to enable Russian forces breaking out of Crimea to isolate them.
  • Russian forces continued to advance north from Crimea towards Zaprozhia and, in conjunction with Russian advances on Mariupol, threaten to isolate Ukrainian forces on the line of contact in Donbas if they do not withdraw.
  • Russian forces failed to seize Kherson after Ukrainian counterattacks reclaimed it on February 26. An unknown concentration of Russian forces remains on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River and threatens Mikolayiv, however.
  • Russian successes in southern Ukraine are the most dangerous and threaten to unhinge Ukraine’s successful defenses and rearguard actions to the north and northeast.
  • The Belarusian government is setting information and legal conditions to justify a Belarusian offensive against Ukraine and the imminent deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus as of February 27.
  • US and allied sanctions against Russian banking will likely crush Russian foreign currency reserves, depleting the value of the ruble and risking Russian hyperinflation.
  • The European Union announced direct military aid to Ukraine for the first time in EU history on February 27.
  • Germany announced a dramatic reorientation of its foreign policy to mitigate the threat that Russia poses to Germany and its allies. Germany will prioritize military spending and energy independence despite short-term economic costs.


Key Events February 26, 5pm EST – February 27, 5pm EST

Military events:

The Russian military has likely recognized that its initial expectations that limited Russian attacks would cause the collapse of Ukrainian resistance have failed and is recalibrating accordingly. The Russian military is moving additional combat resources toward Ukraine and establishing more reliable and effective logistics arrangements to support what is likely a larger, harder, and more protracted conflict than it had originally prepared for. The tide of the war could change rapidly in Russia’s favor if the Russian military has correctly identified its failings and addresses them promptly, given the overwhelming advantage in net combat power Moscow that enjoys. Ukrainian morale and combat effectiveness remain extremely high, however, and Russian forces confront the challenge of likely intense urban warfare in the coming days.

Russian forces largely conducted an operational pause on February 26-27 but will likely resume offensive operations and begin using greater air and artillery support in the coming days. Russian airborne and special forces troops are engaged in urban warfare in northwestern Kyiv, but Russian mechanized forces are not yet in the capital. Russian forces conducted limited attacks on the direct approaches to Kyiv on both banks of the Dnipro River, but largely paused offensive operations in northeastern Ukraine. Russian forces likely paused to recalibrate their – to date largely unsuccessful – approach to offensive operations in northern Ukraine and deploy additional reinforcements and air assets to the front lines.


Russian ground forces are advancing on four primary axes, discussed in turn below:

  1.  Kyiv Axis: Russian forces likely conducted an operational pause on the Kyiv axis on February 26-27 to deploy additional supplies and forces forward. Russian forces will likely resume offensive operations against Kyiv in the next 24 hours. Russian forces committed additional reserves to fighting west of Kyiv. Russian troops have not yet committed heavy armor and artillery forces to fighting in Kyiv and will likely need to do so to take the city. Ukrainian forces are unlikely to capitulate.
  2. Northeast Axis: Russian forces largely conducted an operational pause on their current broad front of advance between Chernihiv and Kharkiv. Russian forces entered the city of Kharkiv for the first time on February 27 but remain unlikely to take the city without the use of heavier firepower. Ukrainian forces continue to delay and inflict losses on the Russian advance but will likely be unable to halt further advances if the Kremlin commits additional reserves. Russian forces in northeast Ukraine have been halted on a line roughly running down the P67 highway since roughly 11am local time on February 26.[1] Russian forces in northeast Ukraine continue to face morale and supply issues, likely due to poor planning and ad hoc command structures, as ISW previously forecasted.[2]
  3. Donbas Axis: Russian forces have encircled Mariupol from the west and began initial assaults on the city. Russian forces have not made any major territorial gains from the east in Donbas after four days of fighting. Russian forces likely intend to pin Ukrainian forces in place on the line of contact to enable Russian forces breaking out of Crimea to isolate them. The Russians may be content to leave them there while concentrating on capturing Kyiv and imposing a new government on Ukraine. They may alternatively seek to encircle and destroy them or force them to surrender.
  4. Crimea Axis: Russian forces continued to advance north towards Zaprozhia and threaten to isolate Ukrainian forces on the line of contact in Donbas if they do not withdraw. Russian forces failed to seize Kherson after Ukrainian counterattacks reclaimed it on February 26. An unknown concentration of Russian forces remains on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River and threatens Mikolayiv, however.

Russian Activity

Russian President Vladimir Putin put Russia’s nuclear and strategic missile forces, described as “deterrence forces, on their highest alert status in response to “aggressive statements in the West” on February 27.[3]
 Putin’s announcement followed a meeting with Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and Chief of Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov wherein Putin cited “illegitimate sanctions” and aggressive NATO statements against Russia as motivating factors for his decision.[4] White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki accused Putin of "manufacturing threats that don’t exist in order to justify further aggression.”[5] US Ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield called the move "totally unacceptable” and accused Putin of using "whatever tools he can to intimidate Ukrainians and the world.”[6] 

Russian and Ukrainian delegations agreed on February 27 to negotiate “without preconditions” on Russia’s war against Ukraine in Gomel, Belarus, on February 28.[7] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky agreed with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko that Ukrainian and Russian delegations would meet on the condition that Belarus will ground all planes, helicopters, and missiles before the Ukrainian delegation’s arrival in Gomel.[8] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky stated the parties “can achieve a constructive result by the end of the day” while Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov stated that Moscow does not plan to suspend Russia’s military operation during the negotiations.[9] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba stated Ukraine will “hear what Russia has to say” but will not “give up one inch of Ukrainian territory.”[10] Russian State Duma Committee on International Affairs Head Leonid Slutsky emphasized on February 27 that Russia must find a “constructive approach” with the Ukrainian delegation in Belarus. Slutsky also threatened that Ukraine will bear responsibility of unspecified "further events" if negotiations fail.[11] US Ambassador to the United Nations Linda-Thomas Greenfield stated the US “will look forward“ to the negotiations' outcome on February 27.[12]

Kremlin-sponsored media claimed Russian President Vladimir Putin has a “historic responsibility” to reunite Russia and Ukraine on February 26-27. Russian state news agency RIA Novosti published and retracted an essay on February 26 claiming “Ukraine has returned to Russia” and resolved the “national humiliation” that Russia suffered when Ukraine left the Soviet Union.[13] The essay claimed that Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus jointly operate in a new world order, where the Russian bloc challenges the West. RIA Novosti retracted the essay one minute after publishing, indicating it was likely prewritten ahead of an anticipated swift Russian victory and was published accidentally.[14] Russian television amplified the possibility of “NATO-Russia war” in reports about Putin putting nuclear and strategic missile forces on alert.[15] Prominent Russian Propagandist Dmitry Kiseyov said that thousands of Russian nuclear missiles can completely wipe out the US and NATO because “no one needs the world without Russia in it.”[16] Russian media is justifying the Kremlin’s failure to gain control over Ukraine by claiming that Ukrainian ”nationalists” are escalating aggression against the Russian Armed Forces and civilians, while Ukrainian military forces massively surrender. 

Russian oligarchs openly called on the Kremlin to end Russia’s war in Ukraine for the first time on February 27 as Russian protests continued to grow despite intensifying crackdowns. Russian Alfa-Bank co-owner Mikhail Fridman and Russian industrialist Oleg Deripaska became the first two Russian oligarchs to openly call on the Kremlin to end the war in Ukraine on February 27.[17] Thousands of Russian citizens continued holding countrywide protests against Russia’s war in Ukraine, with Russian authorities detaining over 2,000 Russian protesters from 48 different demonstrations across Russia on February 27 alone.[18] The Kremlin will likely intensify crackdowns against anti-war protesters. Russia’s Prosecutor General threatened high treason charges against any Russians who provide “assistance to a foreign state" during the Russia’s "special operation" in Ukraine on February 27.[19] 

Belarusian Activity

The Belarusian government is setting information conditions to justify a Belarusian offensive against Ukraine and the imminent deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus as of February 27.
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko said on February 27 that he would ask Russian President Vladimir Putin to deploy nuclear weapons in Belarus if the United States or NATO deployed nuclear missiles to Poland and Lithuania.[20] Lukashenko‘s official press pool claimed Lukashenko and Putin agreed to deploy "weapons that neither the Poles nor the Lithuanians would want to fight” - likely implying nuclear weapons - to Belarus on February 27.[21] Lukashenko slandered Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as “little Napoleon” and implied current Russian operations in Ukraine is just the first phase of Russian aggression.[22] Lukashenko accused Ukrainians of planning terrorist attacks against Belarus and threatened a “special operation” in Ukraine but claimed there are no Belarusian soldiers, armor, or vehicles in Ukraine as of February 27.[23] Lukashenko said that Belarus will not betray Russia by “allowing attacks” by western states against Belarus.[24] Lukashenko admitted that Russian soldiers in Belarusian territory fired two or three rockets at Chernobyl around 23:00 on February 23, but claimed that he did not give the order to fire and that the strikes were a response to alleged Ukrainian provocations.[25] Lukashenko claimed that Belarusian troops along the southern border with Ukraine are protecting against Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group penetrations.[26] Meanwhile, a Belarusian Commander of the Brest Air Assault Brigade, Valery Sakhashchik, called on Belarusian servicemembers sitting in the woods near Ukrainian border to refuse to fight in Ukraine.[27] Sakhaschchik stated that Belarus will lose its dignity for generations to come fighting in a war against a country that has never harmed Belarusian sovereignty.

Belarus adopted a new constitution on February 27, likely granting Russia more direct military control over Belarus.[28] Russian and Belarusian media reporting on the referendum was abnormally sparse on February 27. Belarusian citizens protested against Russia’s war in Ukraine at multiple referendum polling places across Belarus on February 27.[29] Official Belarusian sources have not confirmed whether the constitution adopted on February 27 is the same one that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko proposed on December 27, 2021.[30] The December 27 proposed constitution advanced the Kremlin’s campaign to deepen Russian control over Belarus by removing the constitution’s clause about Belarus being a “neutral” state and a nuclear-weapons-free zone. Lukashenko offered to host Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus in November 2021 and repeated similar offers on February 27, 2022. The Kremlin may have leveraged its military pressure in Belarus to extract an even more Kremlin-preferable constitution that cements Kremlin control over Belarus’ government.


Ukrainian Activity

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced Ukraine is creating a volunteer-based International Legion of Territorial Defense of Ukraine to capitalize on the success of civilian forces in slowing the advance of Russian troops and organize international volunteers on February 27.[31]
The New York Times reported that “due to strong resistance of the civilian population, units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard, and the National Police, [Russian] attempts to take control of large cities were unsuccessful.”[32] The Washington Post reported that civilian defense forces apprehended and detained a Russian armored vehicle in Sumy.[33] The New York Times reported that civilians in Dnipro worked to provide a military hospital with water and clothes and manufactured Molotov cocktails and firebombs to support the Ukrainian Armed Forces.


US Activity

  • US and allied sanctions against Russian banking will likely crush Russian foreign currency reserves, depleting the value of the ruble and risking Russian hyperinflation.
  • The United States, Canada, and European allies removed select Russian banks from the SWIFT global financial network and agreed to additional measures that could significantly increase economic pressure on Russia on February 26. Those measures included freezing Russian Central Bank assets that could otherwise be used to mitigate the effect of sanctions on Russia’s economy.[34]
  • Russian citizens are searching for hard currency, particularly dollars, in anticipation of hyperinflation caused by US and allied sanctions. The Financial Times reported that many Russian banks in Moscow ran out of cash on February 27, the first day after the United States and its allies announced sanctions against Russia’s Central Bank.[35]
  • Japan announced it will join Western states in limiting Russian access to SWIFT on February 27.[36] The United States commended Japan’s decision and emphasized the unity of the G7 states in sanctioning Russia.[37]
  • The European Commission announced on February 27 that it will ban Belarusian exports to the EU due to Belarusian participation in and support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Sanctioned products include mineral fuels, tobacco, wood and timber, cement, iron and steel.[38]
  • The US Treasury Department is in the early stages of considering sanctions against Russian cryptocurrency usage. Sanctions against Russian holders of cryptocurrencies would be unprecedented and difficult for the United States to enforce, but could limit Russia’s ability to monetize its energy production capabilities to mitigate US and allied sanctions.[39]
  • The US Ambassador to the United Nations told CNN that sanctions on Russia’s energy sector are not off the table but that the United States will work to limit the impact of its sanctions on the US economy.[40]
  • Norway announced on February 27 that it would divest its sovereign wealth fund from any Russian assets.[41]
  • British Petroleum (BP) announced on February 27 that it would divest itself from its $14 billion stake in the Russian state-owned oil company Rosneft. The UK government likely pressured BP to divorce itself from Rosneft; BP’s 19.75% stake in Rosneft made up more than half of BP’s oil reserves.[42]

NATO and EU Activity

  • The European Union announced it will directly provide military aid to Ukraine for the first time in EU history on February 27. Australia, Spain, Romania, Poland, and Denmark also announced additional military aid to Ukraine on February 27.
  • European Union Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that the EU will ban all Russian aircraft from EU airspace, finance weapons donations to Ukraine, expand sanctions on Belarus, and ban Russian state-funded broadcasters Russia Today and Sputnik on February 27.[43] Von der Leyen’s announcement marks the first time the EU will finance the purchase and delivery of military equipment to a country under attack. EU Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell stated EU members will provide Ukraine with fighter jets.[44] Some European countries which operate older jet fighters used by Ukraine are reportedly considering providing them directly to Ukraine.
  • Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison announced that Australia will work with NATO to help supply lethal weapons to Ukraine.[45]
  • The Ukrainian Armed Forces stated that Australia is providing Ukraine with unspecified “military assistance” on February 27.[46]
  • Spain sent military equipment, including personal protective gear, to Ukraine on February 27.[47]
  • The Romanian government announced on February 27 that it will send ammunition and military equipment to Ukraine and expressed Romania’s readiness to receive wounded Ukrainian soldiers.[48]
  • Polish National Defense Deputy Minister Marcin Ociepa announced that a convoy carrying unspecified ammunition arrived in Ukraine on February 27.[49]
  • The Ukrainian Armed Forces announced that the Ukrainian Air Forces received a “large batch” of air-to-air missiles from an unspecified western country on February 27.[50]
  • Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu called Russia’s invasion of Ukraine a war on February 27, thereby allowing Turkey to block certain warships involved in conflict from the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits under the 1936 Montreux Convention.[51] Banning warships from the straits would inhibit Russian access to the Black Sea. Ukraine asked Turkey to deny passage to Russian vessels on February 24.[52] The closure is symbolically important for Turkey‘s relationship with Ukraine but is unlikely to limit Russian naval capabilities in the Black Sea, as much of Russia’s naval capabilites are already concentrated in the region.
  • Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen announced Denmark will donate 2,700 anti-tank weapons to Ukraine on February 27.[53]
  • US Democratic Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer stated the Biden administration will ask Congress for $6.4 billion dollars in economic and military aid for Ukraine.[54]
  • Finnish Defense Minister Antti Kaikkonen stated Finland is considering directly sending weapons to Ukraine on February 27. Finland does not historically export weapons to war zones.[55]

The European Union, Canada, and the United Kingdom have banned all Russian-owned, registered, and controlled aircraft from their airspace as of February 27.[56] Russia may ban all EU-based airlines from its airspace in coming days, further harming its domestic economy and currency supplies in coming months.

  • Many EU states, including the UK, Norway, Iceland, and North Macedonia announced flight restrictions prior to the comprehensive EU announcement.[57]
  • Russian President Vladimir Putin responded with counter-restrictions against participating countries’ airlines on February 24 and 25.[58]
Other International Organization Activity

N/A

Individual Western Allies’ Activity

  • Germany is reorienting its foreign policy to prioritize defense spending, European security interests, and energy independence despite potentially high economic costs to Germany. German politicians expressed broad political support for this fundamental reorientation of German foreign policy, which will prioritize mitigating the threat Russia poses to Germany and its allies.
  • German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced Germany would immediately invest $113 billion into its military on February 27.[59] This new investment fund is equivalent to almost 200% of current annual German military spending. Scholz called the construction of new ships tanks, aircraft, and armed drones a top priority for Germany. Scholz stated the new military equipment will be built in Europe in partnership with other European countries, particularly France.[60]
  • Scholz pledged to increase Germany‘s contribution to reinforcing NATO’s eastern flank in Lithuania, Slovakia and Romania.[61] Scholz stated Germany has increased its number of troops deployed in Lithuania and expanded an air policing mission in Romania. Scholz stated he plans to set up a new task force in Slovakia and use the German navy to assist with policing in the Mediterranean and the Baltics. He stated that the German Airforce is prepared to defend the airspace of Eastern European countries that border Russia.
  • Scholz pledged to raise annual Germany military spending to over 2% of GDP.[62] This additional military spending is separate from the $113 billion investment fund.
  • Germany plans to build two Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) ports in Brunsbuttel and Wilhelmshaven, northern Germany, and to create a strategic natural gas reserve, limiting long-term German reliance on Russian energy imports. Scholz stated that Germany’s energy policy must consider not only the economy and climate, but also security concerns.[63]
  • Scholz’ shift secured broad non-partisan support among German politicians. Social Democratic Party (SPD) Parliamentary bloc Chairman Rolf Mutzenich and CDU leader Friedrich Merz expressed support for increased defense spending.[64] Finance Minister and German Liberal Democratic Party (FDP) member Christian Lidner called increased military spending “an investment in [Germany’s] freedom.”[65]

Other International Activity

  • Ukrainian refugee flows increased on February 27 as several international states sent humanitarian aid shipments. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi announced that 368,000 Ukrainians fled Ukraine as of February 27.[66] Approximately 300,000 have sought refuge in EU member states.[67]
  • European Union Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson warned EU members to expect millions of Ukrainian refugees on February 27.[68]
  • Likely Russian cyber actors attacked a Ukrainian border control station with data-wiping software on February 25, slowing Ukrainian refugee flows into Romania. The Ukrainian government’s cyber service expects similar attacks in the future, which will exacerbate backlogs at border stations already struggling to process refugees leaving Ukraine.[69]
  • The US Agency for International Development and the US Department of State announced additional humanitarian assistance for Ukraine totaling $54 million on February 27.[70]
  • The World Health Organization warned of looming medical oxygen supply shortages in Ukraine on February 27.[71]
  • Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida announced that Japan will extend $100 million in emergency humanitarian aid to Ukraine.[72]
  • Spain dispatched a cargo plane carrying medical equipment to Ukraine on February 26.[73]
  • Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett announced that Israeli will send 100 tons of humanitarian aid to Ukraine on February 27.[74]
  • Romanian Government Spokesperson Dan Kerbunaru announced that Romania will supply fuel and medical equipment exceeding $3.3 million to Ukraine on February 27.[75]Hungary, Poland, and Austria are running daily evacuation trains to and from Chop, Ukraine as of February 27. [76]
  • Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Ukraine filed a complaint against Russia to the International Court of Justice for manipulating the term “genocide” to justify its aggression against Ukraine on February 27. Zelensky requested the court to immediately order Russia to halt its invasion and said that he expected trials to start next week.[77]

 



The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation's ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve US strategic objectives.

 



[1] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-ukraine-warning-update-russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26.

[2]https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine%20Invasion%20Forecast%20Series%20Part%202%20ISW%20CT%20December%202021.pdf.

[3] https://tass dot ru/politika/13885447

[4] https://www.svoboda.org/a/putin-prikazal-perevesti-yadernye-sily-rossii-v-osobyy-rezhim-dezhurstva/31726383.html

[5] https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/27/politics/russia-nuclear-high-alert-white-house-reaction/index.html

[6] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-linda-thomas-greenfield-un-ambassador-face-the-nation-02-27-2022/

[7] https://t dot me/OP_UA/5732; https://www ot pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2022/02/27/7326499/; https://www dot interfax.ru/world/824950; https://tass dot ru/politika/13882589; https://t dot me/OP_UA/5732; https://www ot pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2022/02/27/7326499/; https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/02/27/world/russia-ukraine-war/ukraine-russia-talks-zelensky-putin.

[8] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/27/russia-ukraine-war-kyiv-news/.

[9] https://tass dot ru/politika/13882589; https://iz dot ru/1297901/ekaterina-postnikova/soitis-s-mirom-kak-rf-i-ukraina-pytalis-nachat-peregovory.

[10] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/27/russia-ukraine-war-kyiv-news/#link-ITSR63443VGP3GPKV3RUAXXL64.

[11] https://tass dot ru/politika/13884939; https://tass dot ru/politika/13882917.

[12] https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-news-02-27-22/h_ab3e46c6334e80e24c9f8dd1689e98d7.

[13] https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2022/02/27/bp-russia-rosneft-ukraine/..

[14] https://www.ft.com/content/24ee9fcb-0ee5-4487-9185-0bc12b6fde0c..

[15] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MXpzq0kkpfo.

[16] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dDxVDIXp6a8.

[17] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/war-dividing-russian-ukrainian-brothers-billionaire-fridman-says-2022-02-27/.

[18] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/police-detain-more-than-900-people-anti-war-protests-across-russia-monitoring-2022-02-27/; https://hromadske dot ua/posts/odin-z-najbagatshih-rosijskih-oligarhiv-fridman-vistupiv-proti-vijni-z-ukrayinoyu-financial-times; https://www.ft.com/content/9b3ab6bb-f782-43fb-8afc-42d937147463; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/police-detain-more-than-900-people-anti-war-protests-across-russia-monitoring-2022-02-27/;  https://tvrain dot ru/news/genprokuratura_prigrozila_rossijanam_delami_o_gosizmene_za_pomosch_inostrannym_gosudarstvam-548779/?from=rss; https://meduza dot io/news/2022/02/27/genprokuratura-poobeschala-proverit-na-gosizmenu-kazhdyy-fakt-okazaniya-pomoschi-inostrannomu-gosudarstvu-vo-vremya-spetsoperatsii ; https://twitter.com/pevchikh/status/1498017564877901828.

[19] https://tvrain dot ru/news/genprokuratura_prigrozila_rossijanam_delami_o_gosizmene_za_pomosch_inostrannym_gosudarstvam-548779/?from=rss; https://meduza dot io/news/2022/02/27/genprokuratura-poobeschala-proverit-na-gosizmenu-kazhdyy-fakt-okazaniya-pomoschi-inostrannomu-gosudarstvu-vo-vremya-spetsoperatsii.

[20] https://reform dot by/299699-lukashenko-dogovorilsja-s-putinym-o-razmeshhenii-vooruzhenija-v-belarusi; https://ria dot ru/20220227/belorussiya-1775364384.html

[21] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/13882283.

[22] https://president dot gov.by/ru/events/golosovanie-na-respublikanskom-referendume-po-izmeneniyam-i-dopolneniyam-v-konstituciyu-belarusi

[23] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/13881835; https://www dot pravda.com.ua/news/2022/02/27/7326433/

[24] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/13882045

[25] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/13882757; https://www dot pravda.com.ua/news/2022/02/27/7326433/

[26] https://reform dot by/299822-minoborony-vs-belarusi-ne-uchastvujut-v-operacii-na-donbasse

[27] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dPXaqboaMEg.

[28] https://president.gov dot by/ru/events/golosovanie-na-respublikanskom-referendume-po-izmeneniyam-i-dopolneniyam-v-konstituciyu-belarusi; https://reform dot by/299655-referendum-nachalsja-v-belarusi; https://meduza dot io/news/2022/02/27/v-belarusi-prohodit-osnovnoy-den-golosovaniya-po-izmeneniyu-konstitutsii

[29] https://www dot pravda.com.ua/news/2022/02/27/7326504/; https://tvrain dot ru/teleshow/here_and_now/eto_volna_massovyh_protestov-548793/?from=rss; https://reform dot by/299944-v-belarusi-zaderzhano-bolee-400-chelovek-pravozashhitniki

[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-december-1-2021-%E2%80%93-january-11-2022

[31] https://www dot pravda.com.ua/news/2022/02/27/7326386/; https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/02/27/world/russia-ukraine-war/ukraine-says-it-has-slowed-russias-advance-with-the-help-of-volunteers.

[32] https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/02/27/world/russia-ukraine-war/ukraine-says-it-has-slowed-russias-advance-with-the-help-of-volunteers.

[33] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/26/ukraine-russia-militias/.

[34] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-update-9https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2022/02/27/background-press-call-by-a-senior-administration-official-on-imposing-additional-severe-costs-on-russia/.

[35] https://www.ft.com/content/0bd34bcd-52d9-4cff-9f81-33069a1851a3.

[36] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/27/russia-ukraine-war-kyiv-news/#link-7HN2RLANEJGWTGP6UORSHIDSNM; https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/japan-joins-us-others-excluding-russia-swift-system-2022-02-27/

[37] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/02/27/statement-by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-on-japans-announcement-to-hold-russia-accountable/

[38] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-close-airspace-russia-curb-media-target-belarus-2022-02-27/

[39] https://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-bitcoin-and-other-cryptocurrencies-could-be-part-of-future-sanctions-11645902740

[40] https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-news-02-27-22/h_b6b23d3fa5b6477fec0ffc3ed8829657

[41] https://money.usnews.com/investing/news/articles/2022-02-27/norway-says-its-sovereign-fund-will-divest-from-russia.

[42] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/27/russia-ukraine-war-kyiv-news/#link-EBIS4CSARREQHN265QNJNFGFY4https://www.ft.com/content/8b4968fa-40d8-40ae-b2f9-f12cd8b23f9c.

[43] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news-2022-02-26/card/RsvTAr5xRh7kjDaPA0QJ

[44] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news-2022-02-26/card/zjCJ5iME2keSkxfiaIpr

https://www.axios.com/eu-weapons-ukraine-russia-invasion-331bfcbc-5193-47b0-8afb-03f194d95619.html

[45] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/27/russia-ukraine-war-kyiv-news/#link-CTKI34SCLFAMFLOOSQ466OARGI\

[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/260627959583623

[47] https://twitter.com/desdelamoncloa/status/1497909440695181313?s=20&t=1z1HLTkizZkmj3It1AxYsg

[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/260579752921777

[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/260543262925426

[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/260524692927283

[51] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-overseeing-passage-black-sea-calls-russian-invasion-war-2022-02-27/

[52] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news/card/ukraine-calls-on-turkey-to-bar-russian-warships-from-black-sea-cdVRccZWuQ5tpeAK8WZYhttps://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-update-9.

[53] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/denmark-donate-2700-anti-tank-weapons-ukraine-2022-02-27/

[54] https://www.reuters.com/world/us/biden-administration-push-congress-64-billion-aid-ukraine-schumer-2022-02-27/

[55] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/finland-sends-defence-material-ukraine-considers-sending-weapons-2022-02-27/

[56] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60539303https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/canada-shut-its-airspace-russian-operators-immediately-2022-02-27/

[58] https://www.euronews.com/travel/2022/02/27/russia-closes-airspace-to-planes-from-several-eu-countries

[59] https://www.wsj.com/articles/germany-to-raise-defense-spending-above-2-of-gdp-11645959425

[60] https://www.dw.com/en/german-chancellor-holds-speech-on-russian-invasion-of-ukraine/av-60934505

[61] https://twitter.com/thorstenbenner/status/1497879551585648641

[62] https://www.dw.com/en/german-chancellor-holds-speech-on-russian-invasion-of-ukraine/av-60934505.

[63] https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-to-build-two-lng-terminals-quickly-to-reduce-energy-dependency-on-russia/

[64] https://twitter.com/thorstenbenner/status/1497902250009804803

[65] https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-to-ramp-up-defense-spending-in-response-to-russias-war-on-ukraine/

[66] https://twitter.com/FilippoGrandi/status/1497912426876092420?s=20&t=S1CPofXW7D0DA-A-BgXFSQ

[67] https://twitter.com/FilippoGrandi/status/1497912426876092420?s=20&t=S1CPofXW7D0DA-A-BgXFSQ; https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-news-02-27-22/h_0cab958dc1d852874dd3243011b14784

[68] https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-news-02-27-22/h_0cab958dc1d852874dd3243011b14784

[69] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/27/russia-ukraine-war-kyiv-news/#link-NSLSBOPPDRENLDRUTD6ZGIMRIQ

[70] https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-announces-additional-humanitarian-assistance-for-the-people-of-ukraine/

[71] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/27/russia-ukraine-war-kyiv-news/#link-5BOJKHITGZCGPCIAB3VN6GN4YI

[72] https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/japan-joins-us-others-excluding-russia-swift-system-2022-02-27/

[73] https://twitter.com/desdelamoncloa/status/1497909440695181313?s=20&t=1z1HLTkizZkmj3It1AxYsghttps://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/02/27/world/russia-ukraine-war

[74] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-sends-aid-ukraine-pm-stays-quiet-possible-mediation-role-2022-02-27/

[75] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/260579752921777

[76] https://hromadske dot ua/posts/ukrzaliznicya-do-avstriyi-ugorshini-abo-polshi-mozhna-viyihati-zalizniceyu-yaksho-ye-biometrichnij-pasport; https://t dot me/UkrzalInfo/1190

[77] https://twitter.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1497885721931268103