UA-69458566-1

Friday, August 20, 2021

Regional Actors Eye Threats and Opportunities in Taliban Takeover

Authors: Emily Estelle, Mason Clark, Nicholas Carl, Kita Fitzpatrick, Matthew McInnis, Trey Sprouse, Virginia Wang, and Ezgi Yazici

Contributors: Rahma Bayrakdar, Doga Unlu, Kursat Gok, David Patkin, and Kathryn Tyson

This analysis is co-published by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute.

Key Takeaway: The Taliban’s swift seizure of Kabul has altered key regional states’ calculus toward Afghanistan. Russia, China, Iran, and Turkey are weighing how to take advantage of the United States’ hurried withdrawal while mitigating the new terrorist threats and refugee waves from Afghanistan that will likely follow. All four states will likely recognize the Taliban as the official government of Afghanistan in the coming months. The Taliban’s victory also presents an opportunity for al Qaeda and other Salafi-jihadi groups to expand their havens in Afghanistan and intensify ongoing efforts to inspire terror attacks in the West capitalizing on the 20th anniversary of the September 11th attacks.

Russia

Kremlin messaging on Afghanistan since August 15 has praised the Taliban’s claimed “peaceful” takeover of Kabul, while Russian forces in Central Asia have responded with military exercises. Zamir Kabulov, the Kremlin’s special representative on Afghanistan, stated on August 16 that the Kremlin “prepared the ground ahead of time” to work with “the new government of Afghanistan” and claimed the Taliban seized Kabul “peacefully.”[1] The Kremlin is officially predicating official recognition of the Taliban on the Taliban’s ability to prevent jihadist attacks in Central Asia and meet unstated good governance requirements. The Kremlin has previously called on the Taliban to “prevent the spread of tensions” beyond Afghanistan’s borders during meetings in Moscow in early July.[2] Kabulov stated that Russia does not see “a single direct threat to our allies in Central Asia” from the Taliban itself, but noted that regime change can create “a niche for other international terrorist organizations” on August 16.[3] Russian and partner forces are additionally increasing the frequency of joint military exercises and are preparing for a Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) exercise in the coming months. Approximately 1,000 troops at Russia’s 201st Military Base in Tajikistan began snap exercises on August 17 that are ongoing as of publication.[4] The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) announced on August 16 that it will hold an exercise designated “Cobalt-2021” in Tajikistan “in the coming months” but did not specify a date or participants.[5]

The Kremlin will likely officially recognize the Taliban and will expand Russian basing and military operations in Central Asia to combat potential jihadist forces. The Taliban is unlikely to completely control Afghanistan’s borders to meet Russia’s demand, and jihadist groups and criminal networks are highly likely to proliferate in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and other Central Asian states. The Kremlin will likely accept a level of insecurity in the region above what the United States and its allies would accept and recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. The Kremlin may additionally seek to secure economic concessions such as access to mineral resources from the Taliban in exchange for recognition. The Kremlin will additionally prioritize preventing potentially destabilizing refugee flows from Afghanistan. The Russian military has prepared for several years for the potential of a renewed jihadist threat to Central Asia following a US withdrawal from Afghanistan.[6] Russian military deployments in Central Asia are in large part responses to this legitimate threat. However, additional Russian basing and further military cooperation with Central Asian states will support the Kremlin’s campaign to integrate the militaries of the former Soviet Union under Russian structures and improve Russian force projection capabilities in the region.

China

China has accepted the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan after high-level talks between Chinese and Taliban representatives. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Taliban co-founder Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar and other Taliban leaders in Tianjin, China on July 28 to discuss the Afghan peace process.[7] Wang recognized the Taliban as an “important military and political force in Afghanistan,” while Baradar pledged the Taliban will not allow any groups to use Afghan territory to launch attacks against China.[8] Beijing acknowledged “major changes in the situation in Afghanistan” two days after Taliban forces seized control of Kabul, but has not closed the Chinese Embassy or endorsed a Taliban-controlled government.[9] Chinese leaders likely harbor concerns over the potential spillover effects of Taliban rule for Islamist militant activity in the region, which may include terrorist attacks against China. A possible suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive (SVBIED) attack on July 14, allegedly carried out by the Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan (TTiP), killed nine Chinese nationals working on the Dasu Dam, a hydroelectric gravity dam project in Pakistan that is part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).[10] Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi claimed the TTiP was operating out of Afghan territory with approval from Afghan and Indian security agencies.[11]

China will likely treat the Taliban as Afghanistan’s de-facto government for the foreseeable future. US intelligence reports said that Beijing was preparing to officially recognize the Taliban once the group defeated Afghan forces, but Chinese officials have not publicly indicated such intentions.[12] China’s top priority in Afghanistan is protecting Chinese citizens, investments, and territory from terrorist attacks. Beijing will likely continue pressuring Taliban leaders to cut ties with other insurgent networks, particularly the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, which seeks to establish a Uyghur state in Xinjiang. China may offer the Taliban infrastructure investments in exchange for the protection of Chinese nationals in the region and to establish significant political leverage over a Taliban-controlled government.[13] Secondarily, Chinese leaders are looking to increase economic connections with Afghanistan and expand access to the country’s natural resources, including rare earth metals, copper, and oil reserves.[14] China won exclusive rights to the Mes Aynak mine in Logar Province in 2007, but the Afghan civil war has delayed extraction of the mine’s estimated $50 billion copper deposit.[15] Separately, China may be planning to build a 280-km-long expressway between Peshawar and Kabul that extends the CPEC into Afghanistan.[16]

Iran

The Iranian regime has celebrated the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and is supporting a peaceful transition of power that includes the Taliban. President Ebrahim Raisi lauded the American “military defeat” and called for a national Afghan agreement to achieve stability.[17] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif backed a transition plan drafted by former Afghan President Hamid Karzai and expressed Iran’s readiness to facilitate peace talks.[18] Tehran has hosted intra-Afghan dialogues previously—most recently to establish a ceasefire on July 7.[19] The regime is also hosting Afghan warlord and anti-Taliban leader Mohammad Ismail Khan, who fled Afghanistan on August 15.[20] Khan previously fled the Taliban to Iran in the late 1990s before returning to Afghanistan to resume the fight.

Iran will likely recognize the Taliban government in the months ahead if Iranian leaders conclude that they can cooperate with the group. Tehran seeks to work with the Taliban and other international actors to achieve its strategic objectives in Afghanistan. The Iranian objectives include:

  • Avoiding conflict with the Taliban
  • Neutralizing any Salafi-jihadi threat to Iran from Afghanistan
  • Supporting transnational infrastructure projects that connect Iran to central Asia and China
  • Defending Shi’a Afghans

Iranian state-run media has whitewashed the Taliban’s image and framed the group as increasingly moderate in recent months, likely to prepare for improved relations.[21] Iranian authorities have also engaged with their Indian, Chinese, Russian, and Turkish counterparts on Afghanistan since early July.[22]

Tehran has contingency plans to contest Taliban influence if relations deteriorate and cooperation cannot guarantee Iranian interests. Iran’s armed forces have militarized the border region, expanded security cooperation with Tajikistan, and may have mobilized their Afghan proxy, the Fatemiyoun Division, to defend Iranian interests if needed.[23]

Turkey

Turkey rapidly adapted to the changes in Kabul and is now offering assistance to the Taliban to maintain and expand the Turkish presence in Afghanistan. Turkey and the United States had previously been negotiating a now-outdated plan for Turkish troops in Afghanistan to secure the Kabul International Airport and to retain international access to the capital.  Instead, Turkey is now offering  ”technical and security assistance” to help the new Taliban government stabilize Afghanistan, including securing the airport for the Taliban government.[24] The Turkish Armed Forces unit in Kabul has around 500 Turkish and 120 Azerbaijani forces located at the Kabul International Airport and currently supports the US evacuation mission.[25] Top Turkish officials and Taliban members have confirmed Pakistan-facilitated talks between Ankara and the Taliban, including a potential upcoming meeting between Turkish President Erdogan and the Taliban leadership.[26] The Taliban had previously called for the withdrawal of Turkish troops previously but its position on the Turkish offer is unknown since it captured Kabul on August 15.[27] Turkey has not publicly coordinated with Russia or China on the subject but may seek to deconflict or coordinate if it remains in Afghanistan.

If the Taliban is amenable, Turkey can carve out a unique role as the only NATO country with a significant presence in Afghanistan. If the Taliban allows Turkish troops or diplomats to remain in Afghanistan, Turkey can gain outsized influence in arranging the NATO countries’ access to the country. Moreover, Ankara has made positive comments about the Taliban’s “moderate” statements and publicized its informal talks with Pakistan and the Taliban—likely to justify its relations with the Taliban to the Turkish public.[28] The Turkish government may also help the Taliban gain some diplomatic recognition abroad to jumpstart its governing functions, to Turkish officials - a goal also articulated by President Erdogan on August 18.[29] Erdogan added that Turkey’s role in Afghanistan could be similar to its security and military role in supporting Libya’s stabilization. Turkey will additionally prioritize maintaining its longstanding economic ties to Afghanistan while filling the vacuum in the country’s security, reconstruction, and political needs. However, the Turkish public’s disapproval of a permanent military presence in Afghanistan may lead Turkey to prioritize political and diplomatic roles in shaping the new Afghanistan.[30]

Salafi-Jihadi Groups

Al Qaeda supporters are lauding the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda affiliates and associates, as well as pro–al Qaeda online outlets and commentators, have largely celebrated the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan as a victory for global jihad.[31] The collapse of the Afghan government now serves as proof of concept for al Qaeda affiliates that have already been praising the Taliban and mirroring its approach, elements of which align with al Qaeda’s strategic guidance.[32] Al Qaeda’s Mali affiliate, Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM), has pursued negotiations with the Malian government to push French forces to withdraw from the country.[33] Al Shabaab, al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, draws parallels between the Taliban’s victory over NATO in Afghanistan and its own campaign against NATO member Turkey.[34]

The responses of Islamic State supporters underscore the preexisting animosity between the Islamic State and the Taliban. Islamic State supporters have reacted negatively to the Taliban’s promise that it will not discriminate against Shi’a Afghans.[35] The Islamic State’s branch in Afghanistan competes with the Taliban and has continued claiming attacks in the past week to signal its relevance.[36]

Salafi-jihadi groups will expand their havens in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. The Taliban has sustained a close, if complex, relationship with al Qaeda—including hosting its leaders—and will likely continue to do so.[37] Intelligence officials have begun to warn that foreign fighters will mobilize to Afghanistan.[38] The Islamic State’s Khorasan Province may also attract more recruits as it seeks to challenge the Taliban and capitalize on reduced counterterrorism pressure.

Al Qaeda affiliates outside Afghanistan may become energized and attempt to capitalize on the withdrawal of foreign forces. Several al Qaeda affiliates in Africa and the Middle East are waging long-running insurgencies that aim to expel foreign forces and topple national governments. Al Shabaab in Somalia is one group that is likely to mimic the Taliban’s trajectory. The group has already benefited from the withdrawal of US forces and a significant reduction in US airstrikes in 2021.[39] The withdrawal of African Union peacekeeping forces, which are seeking to draw down, could catalyze an al Shabaab advance on Mogadishu, particularly if political divisions continue to undermine the country’s security forces.[40]

The Taliban’s victory may amplify ongoing efforts by Salafi-jihadi groups to inspire terror attacks in the West, joining efforts by al Qaeda to capitalize on the upcoming 20th anniversary of the September 11th attacks.[41]

 


[1] https://tass dot ru/politika/12140187.

[2] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-july-7-%E2%80%93-july-20-2021.

[3] https://tass dot ru/politika/12140187.

[4] https://lenta dot ru/news/2021/08/17/uchenia/.

[5] https://regnum dot ru/news/polit/3345406.html; https://www.interfax dot ru/world/784715.

[6] vpknews dot ru/articles/42857.

[7] https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-meets-with-taliban-stepping-up-as-u-s-exits-afghanistan-11627492777

[8] https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1895706.shtml

[9] https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1900050.shtml

[10] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-foreign-min-says-bus-attack-that-killed-9-chinese-workers-was-suicide-2021-08-12/

https://edition.cnn.com/2021/08/12/asia/china-pakistan-india-afghanistan-intl-hnk/index.html

https://www.google.com/maps/place/Dasu+Hydropower+Project,+Wapda/@35.3010338,73.1588783,11.54z/data=!4m9!1m2!2m1!1sdasu+hydropower+project!3m5!1s0x38dd9a612aa60da3:0xc9bb74148a7b08ab!8m2!3d35.2996432!4d73.2026013!15sChdkYXN1IGh5ZHJvcG93ZXIgcHJvamVjdFoZIhdkYXN1IGh5ZHJvcG93ZXIgcHJvamVjdJIBFXdhdGVyX3V0aWxpdHlfY29tcGFueZoBI0NoWkRTVWhOTUc5blMwVkpRMEZuU1VSTmRsOWhMV1JuRUFF?hl=en-US

[11] https://edition.cnn.com/2021/08/12/asia/china-pakistan-india-afghanistan-intl-hnk/index.html

[12] https://www.usnews.com/news/world-report/articles/2021-08-12/china-prepared-to-recognize-taliban-if-kabul-falls-sources-say-undermining-us-threats

[13] https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3140399/china-welcome-friend-reconstruction-afghanistan-taliban

[14] https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1890707.shtml

[15] https://www.arabnews.com/node/1863386/amp

https://chinadialogue.net/en/business/10577-project-to-exploit-afghanistan-s-giant-copper-deposit-languishes/

 

[16] https://www.thedailybeast.com/china-has-a-big-plan-for-post-us-afghanistan-and-its-worth-billions

[17] http://www.president dot ir/fa/130611

[18] https://twitter.com/JZarif/status/1426934665215152133

[19] https://www.farsnews dot ir/news/14000416000013

[20] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1400/05/24/2555100

[21] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1400/04/18/2535308; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1400/04/04/2527533

[22] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1400041611932; https://jamejamonline dot ir/fa/news/1332454; http://www.alef dot ir/news/4000429047.html; https://www.president dot ir/fa/122262

[23] https://www.yjc dot news/fa/news/7812259; https://www.yjc dot news/fa/news/7825886; https://dolat dot ir/detail/365091; http://jepress dot ir/?newsid=261676

[24] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-talks-with-all-afghan-parties-welcomes-talibans-messages-minister-2021-08-17/

https://www.reuters.com/article/afghanistan-conflict-turkey-airport/erdogan-says-turkey-still-aims-to-maintain-kabul-airport-security-idUSS8N2NK04Y

[25] https://twitter.com/wwwmodgovaz/status/1427569591002308613

https://twitter.com/COIN_V2/status/1428093082877272064?s=20

[26] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/afghanistan-turkey-taliban-wants-to-meet-erdogan

https://www.dailysabah dot com/politics/diplomacy/erdogan-says-he-could-meet-with-leader-of-taliban

[27] https://ahvalnews.com/turkey-afghanistan/taliban-calls-turkey-withdraw-military-afghanistan?amp

[28] https://www.dailysabah. Dot om/politics/diplomacy/taliban-remarks-moderate-we-aim-to-run-kabul-airport-erdogan

https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/08/turkey-welcomes-positive-messages-taliban

[29] https://twitter.com/abdbozkurt/status/1428431044102037509?s=21; https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/afghanistan-turkey-kabul-airport-exploring-troops-taliban

 

[30] https://www dot hurriyetdailynews.com/chp-urges-government-to-withdraw-troops-from-afghanistan-167114

[31] https://www.bbc.com/hausa/rahotanni-58233530; https://twitter.com/Minalami/status/1427553339433234486; https://twitter.com/Rita_Katz/status/1427366120873463811

[32] SITE Intelligence Group, “JNIM Leader Discusses Perceived French Military Failure and Taliban Success, Calls on Lone Wolves to Strike Enemies,” August 10, 2021, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com

[33] https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/africa-file/africa-file-salafi-jihadi-groups-celebrate-attacks-in-tanzania-and-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-prisoner-exchange-in-mali

[34] SITE Intelligence Group, “Shabaab Says U.S. Defeat in Afghanistan is Fate Turkey Awaits in Somalia, August 17, 2021, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com

[35] https://www.npr.org/2021/08/18/1028780816/transcript-taliban-spokesman-suhail-shaheen-interview

[36] https://twitter.com/Natsecjeff/status/1426655101721235456

[37] https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/al-qaeda-global-tracker/al-qaeda-expands-its-presence-in-afghanistan;  https://mwi.usma.edu/untying-the-gordian-knot-why-the-taliban-is-unlikely-to-break-ties-with-al-qaeda/

[38] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/us-counterterrrorism-surveillance-afghanistan/2021/08/16/d27433ee-feaa-11eb-825d-01701f9ded64_story.html

[39] https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/15/us/politics/pentagon-troops-somalia.html

[40] https://www.voanews.com/africa/somalia-rejects-au-ideas-scaling-back-peacekeepers;

[41] https://smnewsnet.com/archives/494646/u-s-homeland-security-warns-of-heightened-threat-of-violence-and-terrorism/ 

 

 

Thursday, August 19, 2021

Russia in Review: August 4 – August 17, 2021

Russia Cements Military Presence in Central Asia and Sets Conditions to Recognize the Taliban as Afghanistan’s Government

By Mason Clark

Kremlin messaging on Afghanistan since August 15 has balanced praise for the Taliban’s supposedly “peaceful” takeover of Kabul with cautious rhetoric about officially recognizing the Taliban, which is still formally designated as a terrorist organization in Russia. Zamir Kabulov, the Kremlin’s special representative for Afghanistan, stated on August 16 that the Kremlin “prepared the ground ahead of time” to work with “the new government of Afghanistan.”[1] Kabulov said that Russia has retained its embassy in Kabul with security cooperation from the Taliban and praised the Taliban for taking over security in the capital “absolutely peacefully.”[2]

The Kremlin is officially predicating recognition of the Taliban on the Taliban’s ability to prevent jihadist attacks in Central Asia and, to a lesser extent, meet unstated good-governance requirementsThe Kremlin previously called on the Taliban to “prevent the spread of tensions” beyond Afghanistan’s borders during meetings in Moscow in early July.[3] Kabulov said Russia does not see “a single direct threat to our allies in Central Asia” from the Taliban itself but noted on August 16 that regime change can create “a niche for other international terrorist organizations.”[4] The Kremlin has additionally paid lip service to requiring the Taliban to meet undefined standards of governance but will likely focus on security concerns. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Russia is in no hurry to recognize the Taliban but also claimed that the Taliban has expressed the desire to have a government “with other political forces” and continue the functions of the Afghan state.[5] Kabulov said that Russia will likely remove the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations if the Taliban “continues to behave peacefully.”[6] Russian rhetoric suggests that Moscow is seeking unspecified concessions from the Taliban before recognizing it. Those concessions will likely go beyond assurances about containing terrorism and good governance.

Russian and partner forces are increasing the frequency of joint military exercises in Central Asia and are preparing for a Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) exercise in the coming months. Russian and partner forces conducted several major exercises in August prior to the fall of Kabul. Over 2,500 Russian, Tajik, and Uzbek troops conducted joint exercises to practice preventing militants from crossing the border at a training ground in the Khatlon region of Tajikistan, approximately 20 kilometers from the Afghan border, from August 5-10.[7] Roughly 1,500 Russian and Uzbek troops conducted concurrent joint exercises in Uzbekistan from August 2-7.[8] Russian and partner forces announced several additional exercises following the fall of Kabul on August 15. Approximately 1,000 troops at Russia’s 201st Military Base in Tajikistan began snap exercises on August 17 that are ongoing as of August 19.[9] The Kazakh military raised its state of readiness and began readiness checks on August 16 and notified reservists of possible deployment, following Tajikistan’s previous mobilization on July 22.[10] The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) announced on August 16 that it will hold an exercise designated “Cobalt-2021” in Tajikistan “in the coming months” but did not specify a date or the participants.[11] The Kremlin-dominated CSTO has previously declined Tajik requests for military deployments to the border with Afghanistan. The Kremlin maintains that Russian and partner forces are sufficient to secure the border with Afghanistan but retains the option to deploy the CSTO’s rapid reaction force if needed.[12] The Kremlin likely seeks to secure bilateral ties and direct Russian basing in Central Asian states, rather than immediately leverage the multinational CSTO force.

The Kremlin will likely officially recognize the Taliban and will expand Russian basing and military operations in Central Asia to combat potential jihadist threats. Russia’s demands incentivize the Taliban to prevent third-party jihadist groups from attacking neighboring states. However, the Taliban is unlikely to completely control Afghanistan’s borders, and jihadist groups and criminal networks are highly likely to proliferate in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and other Central Asian states. The Kremlin will likely accept a level of insecurity in the region above what the United States and its allies would normally tolerate and recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. The Kremlin may additionally seek to secure economic concessions such as access to mineral resources from the Taliban in exchange for recognition. The Kremlin will also prioritize preventing potentially destabilizing refugee flows from Afghanistan. The Russian military has prepared for several years for the potential of a renewed jihadist threat to Central Asia following a US withdrawal from Afghanistan.[13] Russian military deployments in Central Asia are in large part responses to this legitimate threat. However, additional Russian basing and further military cooperation with Central Asian states will support the Kremlin’s campaign to integrate the militaries of the former Soviet Union under Russian structures and improve Russian force-projection capabilities.

 


  1. All four of Russia’s military districts conducted concurrent international military exercises in early August, demonstrating the Russian military’s increasing operational capacity. Russian forces held three exercises with Chinese, Laotian, and Indian forces August 1-13. Approximately 13,000 Russian and Chinese troops participated in the joint Russian-Chinese strategic exercise “Interaction 2021” in the Ningxia Hui region of northwestern China from August 9-13.[14] The Russian and Chinese defense ministers observed the joint conventional operations by Russian and Chinese motorized infantry and aviation units.[15] Russian and Laotian forces held the joint “Laros-2021” exercise in the Primorsky region of eastern Russia from August 11-19.[16] Five hundred personnel from both states practiced counterterror operations in the second iteration of the Laros exercise since 2019, which the Kremlin intends as a regular joint exercise. Finally, Russian and Indian forces held a similar joint “Indra-2021” exercise in the Volgograd region of southern Russia from August 1-13.[17] Five hundred personnel practiced counterterror operations and exchanged best practices from prior operations. The Russian military’s ability to conduct major international exercises in the Southern and Eastern Military Districts concurrent with large-scale exercises in Central Asia commanded by the Central Military District and preparations in the Western Military District for the Zapad-2021 exercises demonstrate its increasing readiness and operational flexibility. The Kremlin is additionally successfully advancing its campaign to secure international security partnerships to offset the limits of Russia’s growing but limited military footprint.[18]
  2. Russian forces deployed to Belarus for the Zapad-2021 exercises in early August that could become part of a permanent military presence in that country. Russia deployed the 60th Command Brigade of the 1st Guards Tank Army to Belarus on August 4.[19] The 60th Communication Brigade is the command and control (C2) element of Russia’s 1st Guards Tank Army – the premier conventional unit of the Russian Army.[20] The deployment of this C2 element to Belarus indicates the likely participation of the 1st Guards Tank Army in Zapad-2021. The 60th Communications Brigade could additionally serve as the primary C2 element of a permanent Russian deployment to Belarus following Zapad, as previously forecasted by ISW.[21] Several additional Russian and Belarusian units deployed to their designated training grounds for Russia’s Zapad-2021 exercise since ISW’s previous publication on Zapad preparations on August 5.[22] Elements of the Belarusian 19th Motor Rifle Brigade deployed to an unspecified training ground in western Russia on August 11 and conducted preparatory exercises with Russian forces on August 17.[23] Elements of the Belarusian 60th Communications Regiment additionally deployed to Russia’s Mulino training ground on August 16. The Belarusian 6th and 11th Motor Rifle Brigades, unspecified logistics units, and several air force and air defense units held exercises to prepare for Zapad in Belarus August 3-12.[24]
  3. Russia’s ruling United Russia party is leveraging individually popular Russians to reverse the party’s declining approval ahead of Russian Duma (parliament) elections scheduled for September 17-19. The top five candidates on United Russia’s parliamentary list participated in the opening of a new United Russia headquarters in Moscow on August 9 and billed themselves as “Putin’s Team.”[25] The top five candidates are Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu, Moscow hospital chief Denis Protsenko, presidential science and education coordinator Elena Shmeleva, and Children’s Rights Commissioner Anna Kuznetsova. The five participants gave speeches claiming United Russia is essential to success in their respective policy areas. The five candidates are almost certain to decline their parliamentary seats, which will be filled by United Russia candidates lower on the party list. United Russia is likely attempting to leverage approval of key public figures and link support for United Russia as a party to support for Putin to bolster its own popularity ahead of Duma elections scheduled for September 17-19. United Russia held only a 30 percent approval rating as of the most recent state-run polls in June 2021 – compared to a 62 percent approval rating for President Putin.[26] United Russia currently holds 54 percent of seats in Russia’s parliament, and the Kremlin will likely need to heavily falsify results, despite a coordinated Kremlin campaign to sideline potential opposition throughout 2021.
  4. The Baltic states enacted border restrictions to slow the Belarusian campaign to traffic refugees into the EU. The Belarusian government has transported refugees, primarily from Iraq, to the borders of Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland in an effort to destabilize its neighbors and reverse EU sanctions enacted on Belarus since June 2021 in response to the Belarusian government’s forcible detention of journalist Roman Protasevich.[27] Latvia announced a state of emergency in its regions bordering Belarus on August 10, and Lithuania announced a program on August 13 to give migrants trafficked from Belarus 300 euros and a flight to their home countries.[28] Lithuanian border guards have filmed Belarusian border guards driving migrants to the border, dismantling border fences, and entering Lithuanian territory to escort migrants.[29] Self-proclaimed Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko tacitly admitted to the campaign on August 9, denying Belarus is “blackmailing” Europe with illegal immigration but stating that Belarus is reacting to EU sanctions “according to its capabilities” in response to a reporter’s question on Belarusian support for the migrants.[30] The Iraqi government indefinitely suspended all flights to Belarus on August 6 following pressure from EU officials.[31] Lukashenko’s efforts are unlikely to coerce the EU to remove its sanctions but may destabilize Poland and the Baltic states and lead to political strife.
  5. Belarus announces a socio-economic development program for 2021-2025 that contains several concessions to Russia. Belarus’ official socio-economic development program for 2021-2025, published on August 4, states that Belarus’ “main vector” of economic growth should be with Russia within the framework of the Union State, a Kremlin-preferred supranational structure that Putin seeks to leverage to secure control over several aspects of the Belarusian state.[32] The document states Belarus’ main criteria for further integration with the Union State are ensuring equal economic conditions between Russia and Belarus, equal energy usage, joint access to markets, and Belarusian control of financial instruments. The document also emphasizes developing economic relations with the Eurasian Economic Union and the Commonwealth of Independent States. The document additionally singles out China as a key country to develop ties with. The Kremlin likely pressured Belarus over the past year to include Union State integration as a key priority. In the wake of EU sanctions on Belarus and reduced trade with Western Europe, Belarus can no longer see European states as viable economic partners and will be increasingly reliant on Russian economic support. However, Lukashenko will likely continue his efforts to delay economic integration with Russia and will seek to diversify Belarus’ economy with China and other states to reduce his dependence on Russia.[33]

 

Contributors to this Report: Mason Clark, George Barros, Will Baumgardner, Catherine Hodgson, Rachel Kenny, and Matthew Sparks


[1] ["Kabulov said that Russia does not see Threats to Central Asia from the Taliban,"] TASS, August 21, 2021, https://tass dot ru/politika/12140187.

[2] Maria Tsvetkova, “Russia in Contact with Taliban via Embassy in Kabul – Diplomat," Reuters, August 16, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/russia-will-evacuate-some-embassy-staff-afghanistan-official-2021-08-16/.

[3] Mason Clark and Rachel Kenny, “Russia in Review July 7 – July 20, 2021,” Institute for the Study of War, July 22, 2021, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-july-7-%E2%80%93-uly-20-2021.

[4] ["Kabulov said that Russia does not see Threats to Central Asia from the Taliban,"] TASS, August 21, 2021, https://tass dot ru/politika/12140187

[5] Yegor Levin, [“The Five-week-long Joint Exercises of Russia and Uzbekistan Started at the Termez Mountain Training Ground,”] TV Zvezda, August 2, 2021, https://tvzvezda dot ru/news/20218171514-KWuu6.html.

[6] Ignat Bakin, [“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Discussed the Procedure for Excluding the Taliban from the list of Terrorist Groups,”] Znak, August 17, 2021, https://www.znak dot com/2021-08-17/v_mid_rf_rasskazali_o_procedure_isklyucheniya_talibana_iz_spiska_terroristov.

[7] [“Russian Soldiers Began the Active Phase of Exercises on the Border with Afghanistan,”] Interfax, August 10, 2021, https://www.interfax dot ru/world/783393; [“Major Military Exercises are Taking Place in Tajikistan with the Participation of Russia,”] Radio Svoboda, August 5, 2021, https://www.svoboda.org/a/v-tadzhikistane-prohodyat-krupnye-voennye-ucheniya-s-uchastie-rossii/31394942.html.

[8] Yegor Levin, [“The Five-week-long Joint Exercises of Russia and Uzbekistan started at the Termez Mountain Training Ground,”] TV Zvezda, August 2, 2021, https://tvzvezda dot ru/news/202182842-ApygI.html.

[9] [“Russia Began Military Exercises in Tajikistan,”] Lenta, August 17, 2021, https://lenta dot ru/news/2021/08/17/uchenia/.

[10] Mason Clark, “Russia in Review: July 21 - August 3, 2021,” Institute for the Study of War, August 5, 2021, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-july-21-august-3-2021; [“Russia Starts Military Exercises in Tajikistan,”] Lenta, August 17, 2021, https://lenta dot ru/news/2021/08/17/uchenia/. 

[11] [“CSTO to Provide Assistance to Tajikistan in Case of Threat from Afghanistan,”] Regnum, August 16, 2021, https://regnum dot ru/news/polit/3345406.html; [“The CSTO will Hold Exercises near the Tajik-Afghan Border in the Coming Months,”] Interfax, August 16, 2021, https://www.interfax dot ru/world/784715.

[12] Mason Clark and Rachel Kenny, “Russia in Review July 7 – July 20, 2021,” Institute for the Study of War, July 22, 2021, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-july-7-%E2%80%93-july-20-2021; Mason Clark, “Russia in Review: July 21 - August 3, 2021,” Institute for the Study of War, August 5, 2021, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-july-21-august-3-2021.

[13] Alexander Lapin, [“Afghanistan Again?”] VPK, May 28, 2018, vpknews dot ru/articles/42857.

[14] “Servicemen of the Russian Military Contingent in Preparation for the SIBU/Interaction 2021 Joint Russian-Chinese Strategic Exercise Fire from the Weapons of PLA Wheeled Armored Vehicles,” Russian Ministry of Defense, August 9, 2021, https://eng dot mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12376242@egNews.

[15] “Servicemen of the Russian Military Contingent in Preparation for the SIBU/Interaction 2021 Joint Russian-Chinese Strategic Exercise Fire from the Weapons of PLA Wheeled Armored Vehicles,” Russian Ministry of Defense, August 9, 2021, https://eng dot mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12376242@egNews; "Chinese, Russian Militaries Hold Drills in Northwest China,” ABC News, August 10, 2021, https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/chinese-russian-militaries-hold-drills-northwest-china-79373635; [“Sergei Shoigu Observes the Joint Exercises of the Russian Federation and PRC in China,”] Russian Gazette, August 13, 2021, https://rg dot ru/2021/08/13/sergej-shojgu-v-kitae-nabliudaet-za-sovmestnymi-ucheniiami-rf-i-knr.html.

[16] [“The Joint Russian-Laotian Exercise “Laros-2021” began in Primorsky Krai,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, August 11, 2021, https://function dot mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12376645@egNews.

[17] [“The XII Joint Russian-Indian Exercise "Indra-2021" is Being Held in Volgograd,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, August 4, 2021, https://function dot mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12375474@egNews; Andrey Arkadiev, [“Russian-Indian Exercise "Indra-2021" Ended Near Volgograd,”] TV Zvezda, August 12, 2021, https://tvzvezda dot ru/news/20218121416-obY9Z.html.

[18] Nataliya Bugayova, “Putin’s Offset: The Kremlin’s Geopolitical Adaptations Since 2014,” Institute for the Study of War, September 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Putin%27s%20Offset%20The%20Kremlin%27s%20Geopolitical%20Adaptations%20Since%202014.pdf.

[19] The Belarusian military did not report the name of the unit and the Russian military has not acknowledged the brigade’s deployment. However, the Belarusian Ministry of Defense reported the arrival of a unit commanded by “Alexander Gorlov” with accompanying photos on August 4. Alexander Gorlov commanded the 60th Communications Brigade as of July 29, 2021 and participated in preparations for Zapad throughout 2021, so it is highly likely his unit has deployed to Belarus. [“Welcome!”] Belarusian Military Information Agency, August 3, 2021, https://www.vayar dot mil.by/news/137210/;  [“ZVO Signalmen Worked out a Training Alert in Preparation for the SSU ‘Zapad-2021’,”] Izvestia, June 29, 2021, https://iz dot ru/1185587/2021-06-29/sviazisty-zvo-otrabotali-uchebnuiu-trevogu-v-ramkakh-podgotovki-k-ssu-zapad-2021.

[20] Catherine Harris, “Russia’s Military Posture: Ground Forces Order of Battle,” Institute for the Study of War, March 2018, http://www.understandingwar.org/report/russias-military-posture.

[21] George Barros, “Russia in Review: Russia Opens Permanent Training Center in Belarus and Sets Conditions for Permanent Military Basing,” Institute for the Study of War, April 8, 2021, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-russia-opens-permanent-training-center-belarus-and-sets-conditions.

[22] Mason Clark, “Russia in Review July 21 – August 3, 2021,” Institute for the Study of War, August 5, 2021, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-july-21-august-3-2021.

[23] [“Towards Zapad-2021,"] Belarusian Military Information Agency, August 11, 2021, https://vayar dot mil dot by/news/137380/; [“On the Eve of the Exercises,”] Belarusian Military Information Agency, August 17, 2021, https://vayar dot mil.by/news/137930/.

[24]  [“Air Defense Warriors are Learning,”] Belarusian Military Information Agency, August 4, 2021, https://vayar.mil dot by/news/137233/; [“Zapad-2021: Guards are Getting Ready,”] Belarusian Military Information Agency, August 9, 2021, https://vayar.mil dot by/news/137335/; [“Logistics is a Continuous Process,”] Belarusian Military Information Agency, August 12, 2021, https://vayar.mil dot by/news/137411/.

[25] Anton Zheleznyakov, ["Shoigu, Lavrov and Karelin Launched the Work of the Headquarters of Public Support for United Russia,"] Moscow Komsomolets, August 10, 2021, https://www.mk dot ru/politics/2021/08/10/shoygu-lavrov-i-karelin-dali-start-rabote-shtaba-obshhestvennoy-podderzhki-edinoy-rossii.html.

[26] Evan Gershkovich, “Putin Promises Russians Billions in Spending Ahead of Polls,” The Moscow Times, June 19, 2021, https://www.themoscowtimes dot com/2021/06/19/putin-promises-russians-billions-in-spending-ahead-of-polls-a74268.

[27] Jon Henley, Andrew Roth, “Latvia and Lithuania Act to Counter Migrants Crossing Belarus Border,” The Guardian, August 10, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/10/latvia-and-lithuania-act-to-counter-migrants-crossing-belarus-border.

[28]  [“Latvia has Declared an Emergency Regime on the Border with Belarus due to the Situation with Migrants,”] Mediazona, August 10, 2021, https://mediazona dot by/news/2021/08/10/latvia2; Eugene Lutsenko, [“The First Illegal Migrant from Iraq has Left Lithuania under the New Program. He was Bought Tickets and Given 300 Euros,”] Hromadske, August 13, 2021, https://hromadske dot ua/posts/z-litvi-za-novoyu-programoyu-viletiv-pershij-nelegalnij-migrant-z-iraku-jomu-kupili-kvitki-ta-dali-300-yevro.

[29] Tadeusz Giczan, Twitter, August 3, 2021, https://twitter.com/TadeuszGiczan/status/1422464824546635806?s=20; Lithuanian State Border Security Office, Facebook, August 17, 2021, https://www.facebook.com/pasienislt/posts/2849743705280341.

[30] Jon Henley, Andrew Roth, “Latvia and Lithuania Act to Counter Migrants Crossing Belarus Border,” The Guardian, August 10, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/10/latvia-and-lithuania-act-to-counter-migrants-crossing-belarus-border.

[31] Iraqi Civil Aviation Authority, Twitter, August 6, 2021, https://twitter.com/Iraqi_Civil/status/1423713519158145032?s=20.

[32] [“On the Approval of the Program of Socio-economic Development of the Republic of Belarus for 2021-2025,”] Belarusian Government, July 29, 2021, https://pravo dot by/document/?guid=12551&p0=P32100292&p1=1.

[33] [“Meeting with Senior Officials of Council of Ministers,”] President of the Republic of Belarus, August 17, 2021, https://president.gov dot by/en/events/soveshchanie-s-rukovodstvom-soveta-ministrov-1629192881.

 

 

Tuesday, August 17, 2021

Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) Demonstrates New Capabilities in First-Ever Strategic Exercise

By Catherine Hodgson, Will Baumgardner, and Mason Clark

The Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) demonstrated new capabilities and readiness during its first-ever operational-strategic exercise from July 12 to 30.[1] Rosgvardia conducted Zaslon-2021 as a nationwide exercise and readiness check of its full spectrum of capabilities, not a localized exercise as it originally claimed. Rosgvardia falsely announced in early July that Zaslon-2021, its first strategic exercise since its establishment in 2016, would occur only in the Central, Volga, and Southern federal districts and support preparations for the Russian military’s upcoming Zapad-2021 exercise.[2] Zaslon-2021 instead occurred simultaneously in every Russian federal district except the North Caucasian. Rosgvardia conducted four large-scale exercises involving all Rosgvardia units in the announced Central, Volga, and Southern districts, supported by unannounced small-scale exercises across Russia. Twenty-three of Zaslon’s component exercises occurred in the announced districts, while 42 exercises occurred in other, unannounced districts across Russia.

The Kremlin uses Rosgvardia as an internal security force to combat terrorism and claimed Western-backed “color revolutions.” Russian President Vladimir Putin created Rosgvardia by decree in 2016 by reorganizing existing units from Russia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). Rosgvardia’s official mission is to ensure public order and guard against terrorist attacks, and likely numbers between 200,000 and 400,000 troops.[3] Putin created Rosgvardia as a politically loyal force to suppress internal dissent and combat allegedly Western-backed protests—what the Kremlin calls “color revolutions.” Rosgvardia is commanded by Putin’s former bodyguard, Viktor Zolotov, and reports directly to Putin instead of the Interior or Defense Ministries. Rosgvardia’s responsibilities go far beyond its official mandate, however, and Rosgvardia has previously deployed to several theaters including Crimea, Syria, and Belarus.[4]

The component exercises of Zaslon-2021 primarily practiced cooperation between elements of Russia’s security services in counterterror and anti-crime operations. Three types of Rosgvardia forces participated in Zaslon-2021—regular Rosgvardia troops, Special Rapid Response Units (SOBR), and Special Purpose Mobile Units (OMON)—in addition to supporting units from local police and the Russian military. Standard Rosgvardia forces have capabilities comparable to military police units and are responsible for protecting state facilities and cargo, aiding border authorities, preventing arms trafficking, and working in the field of public security.[5] SOBR and OMON are specialized detachments within Rosgvardia. SOBR units specialize in counterterrorism, anti-organized crime, and urban warfare operations.[6] OMON units are riot police forces intended to counter protests and were instrumental in the Kremlin’s crackdown on protests and enforcement of COVID-19 response measures in 2020.[7] Other units supporting Zaslon-2021 included local police, border guards, and specialized Ministry of Defense personnel.

Rosgvardia demonstrated conventional military capabilities on par with regular Russian motor rifle units in four major exercises in the Central, Southern, and Volga federal districts. The majority of the individual exercises in Zaslon-2021 were small-scale and primarily focused on domestic scenarios such as locating and neutralizing small groups of enemies in buildings, rescuing hostages, and combating natural and man-made disasters. However, the four centerpiece exercises in the pre-announced districts were markedly larger and more complex. Rosgvardia’s press service announced that the July 29 exercise in the Southern federal district involved 4,000 troops, and the other three exercises involved “all Rosgvardia units” in the Central or Volga districts. Rosgvardia demonstrated capabilities comparable to frontline Russian military units in these exercises by using artillery, rotary-wing aircraft, air defense systems, UAV support, and electronic warfare systems in conventional combat operations.

Rosgvardia’s demonstrated capabilities during Zaslon-2021 indicate that Putin likely intends Rosgvardia to have combat capabilities comparable to those of the regular Russian military, requiring increased analysis from the United States and its allies. Rosgvardia units will likely participate in the Russian military’s Zapad-2021 exercise in Russia and Belarus in September, providing Rosgvardia with experience coordinating large-scale operations with the Russian military. The Kremlin may increasingly leverage Rosgvardia as a politically loyal anti-terror and anti-protest force across the former Soviet Union, not only domestically. Rosgvardia’s development of capabilities analogous to conventional Russian motor rifle units may additionally free up the Russian military for international operations—enabling Rosgvardia to maintain garrison and border security positions currently held by Russian military units. The scale of the concurrent unannounced exercises Rosgvardia conducted as part of Zaslon-2021 additionally demonstrates Rosgvardia’s increasing capabilities as a domestic security force. Putin may be improving the capabilities and readiness of Rosgvardia ahead of the September 2021 State Duma elections or in anticipation of future protests amid his declining public support. The expansion of Rosgvardia at the expense of Russia’s other security structures, and apparent duplication of many capabilities possessed by the Russian military, may lead to infighting and dissent among the Kremlin’s security services. The United States and its allies should increase their monitoring of Rosgvardia and apply the attention to its exercises and development typically applied to the Russian military as the Kremlin further prioritizes this relatively new force.

 


 

The following is a list of the component exercises of Zaslon-2021. The centerpiece exercises of Zaslon-2021, carried out by the Rosgvardia forces of entire Russian federal districts, are listed first. Supporting tactical exercises are divided by parent federal district and day.

Centerpiece Exercises:

Central Federal District

23 July

  • Central District Rosgvardia Units, including the Sofrinskaya Brigade and the Moscow Division for Protection of Public Order, practiced driving armored vehicles, organizing communications in the field, and conducting reconnaissance at the Ashukino training center near Moscow. The units deployed mortars and an anti-aircraft unit in order to destroy an illegal armed formation, and also practiced equipment decontamination.[8]

29 July

  • All units of the Central District Rosgvardia practiced searching for and neutralizing armed criminals in various operational conditions in the Moscow and Vladimir regions. Special Forces Unit “Peresvet” and Central District SOBR drilled marching "many kilometers" to the exercise site and firing mortars. Moscow District SOBR Unit "Bulat" worked with the Sofrinskaya operational brigade to assault a building and ensure the safety of hostages.[9]

Volga Federal District

28 July

  • All units of the Saratov Rosgvardia, Volga District Rosgvardia, and Russian MoD personnel together suppressed a terrorist attack on a water transport facility in the Saratov region. The units then deployed to block escape routes and neutralized a terrorist group.[10]

Southern Federal District

29 July

  • Head of Rosgvardia Viktor Zolotov attended drills at which 4,000 Rosgvardia SOBR and OMON troops deployed Mi-26, Mi-24, and Mi-8 helicopters and mortars to neutralize criminals who had seized an artillery arms depot at the Kadamovsky training center in Rostov. The troops also deployed UAVs, armored vehicles, and over 700 other pieces of equipment during the exercises.[11]

Component Exercises:

Central Federal District

20 July

  • Deputy Rosgvardia commander Viktor Strigunov oversaw complex special exercises by Rosgvardia’s 604th Red Banner Special Purpose Center "Vityaz" to destroy a simulated terrorist group. Exercise participants conducted a parachute landing with sniper cover, used drones to locate terrorists, neutralized a terrorist group in a high-rise building, and evacuated from the exercise by helicopter at the Novsky training center near Moscow.[12]

21 July

  • Central District Special Forces Unit "Peresvet" and Moscow District Rosgvardia SOBR “Bulat” unit officers searched for and neutralized bandit groups, protected state facilities, and held tactical shooting exercises at the Elektrosal training center near Moscow.[13]

Northwestern Federal District

17 July

  • Murmansk region Rosgvardia SOBR neutralized members of an illegal armed group that seized a building.[14]

21 July

  • Arkhangelsk region Rosgvardia SOBR repelled an attack on a convoy.[15]

22 July

  • Pskov region Rosgvardia SOBR checked households for suspects while OMON units established a blockade of a village.[16]

27 July

  • Murmansk region Rosgvardia OMON unit "Medved" detained terrorists traveling by car.[17]

26 July

  • Komi Republic Directorate Rosgvardia SOBR units and officers, and OMON personnel, repelled down the facade of a building and arrested criminals.[18]

29 July

  • Pskov Directorate Rosgvardia SOBR and OMON units detained a terrorist traveling by vehicle.[19]
  • Unspecified regional OMON units blocked off an area while SOBR forces stormed a building seized by terrorists in the Vologda region.[20]

30 July

  • Karelia region Rosgvardia OMON units intercepted terrorists in a moving vehicle, chased fleeing terrorists into the woods, and neutralized them.[21]
  • St. Petersburg Directorate Rosgvadia, Leningrad region Rosgvardia, and North-West District Rosgvardia units participated in unspecified exercises in the Northwestern region.[22]

Southern Federal District

26 July

  • Kalmykia Rosgvardia SOBR Unit "Krechet" and OMON units neutralized armed criminals hiding in an industrial building in Elista, Kalmykia region.[23]

Volga Federal District

22 July

  • A Nizhny Novgorod region Rosgvardia Special Medical Detachment (MOSN) marched from Blashikha to Bogorodsk, assembled a field hospital, and responded to a man-made disaster in the Bogorodsky district of the Nizhny Novgorod region.[24]

26 July

  • Samara region Rosgvardia OMON units and local law enforcement seized a hijacked ship at the Saratov reservoir.[25]
  • Mordovia region Rosgvardia SOBR units escorted military cargo and fought off an assault.[26]

27 July

  • Volgograd region Rosgvardia SOBR Unit "Vector" and OMON units marched from a point of deployment to an exercise location and detained enemies that had seized a building in Gorodischche village, Volgograd region.[27]
  • Tartarstan region Rosgvardia SOBR and OMON units seized a building taken by terrorists and defused a bomb.[28]

28 July

  • Kirov region Rosgvardia specialists in radiation, chemical, and biological protection developed a process for conducting degassing, decontamination, and the disinfection of equipment. The specialists increased unit coherence and discussed methods to reduce fallout from hazardous facilities.[29]
  • Tatarstan region Rosgvardia SOBR and OMON units neutralized an explosive device, conducted air reconnaissance, and stormed a hideout of armed bandits.[30]
  • Nizhny Novgorod region Rosgvardia SOBR, OMON, and OMON explosive specialists participated in a dynamic exercise. The OMON and SOBR repelled an attack on a road checkpoint and utilized drones to locate and neutralize an armed group. The OMON explosive specialists then located and destroyed an IED.[31]
  • Nizhny Novgorod Rosgvardia units protected a state facility.[32]

29 July

  • Rosgvardia Volga tactical forces utilized drones for reconnaissance and assaulted bandits hiding in a forest in the Penza region.[33]
  • Unspecified regional SOBR and OMON units used armored vehicles to neutralize armed bandits in the forest and a building in the Mary El region.[34]
  • Perm region Rosgvardia SOBR and OMON units neutralized armed criminals in a building and freed hostages.[35]

30 July

  • Ulyanovsk region Rosgvardia units stormed a building and ensured the safety of hostages. Engineering specialists with service dogs located dangerous objects.[36]
  • Samara region Rosgvardia OMON units repelled an armed attack on a convoy with humanitarian supplies at the OMON special tactical exercises base in Togliatti, Samara region. SOBR units used a UAV to identify fleeing terrorists and detained them. SOBR Unit "Omega" detained armed criminals who had seized a bus with passengers.[37]
  • Kirov region Rosgvardia personnel and OMON and SOBR officers practiced coordination while storming a building.[38]
  • Mordovian Directorate Rosgvardia SOBR and OMON stormed a building and neutralized armed criminals. SOBR units used a UAV to identify the intruders, and OMON units blocked off the building while SOBR units stormed it.[39]

Ural Federal District

21 July

  • Ural District Rosgvardia SOBR searched for and eliminated a bandit group in Novouralsk.[40]

22 July

  • A Ural District Special-Purpose Aviation Detachment used UAVs for reconnaissance, identified intruders in protected facilities, located poachers, and searched for missing persons.[41]

26 July

  • Ural region Rosgvardia units participated in a combat mission, a reconnaissance mission, and a de-mining activity.[42]

30 July

  • Ural District Rosgvardia SOBR units used UAVs, artillery, and armored vehicles to locate criminals in a forest, respond to their gunfire, and neutralize them. The units also practiced storming a building.[43]
  • Chelyabinsk region Rosgvardia SOBR Unit "Krechet" and OMON units detained armed criminals that had seized hostages in a weapons store. The units practiced battle formations, providing cover fire, and using snipers.[44]

Siberian Federal District

23 July

  • Kemerovo region Rosgvardia SOBR and OMON units and the special forces unit “Kuzbass” detained armed criminals during a hostage situation and evacuated a wounded soldier.[45]
  • Novosibirsk region Rosgvardia SOBR and OMON units repelled an attack on a checkpoint and neutralized armed criminals on a bus at the Gorny training center.[46]

24 July

  • Irkutsk region Rosgvardia units conducted an emergency flood response exercise in the city of Angarsk, Irkutsk region.[47]

26 July

  • Altai region Rosgvardia SOBR, OMON, and UAV operation units, alongside personnel of the Ministry of Emergency Situations for the Altai directorate, cordoned off the city of Rubtsovsk and manned checkpoints to control the movement of people to prevent the spread of an epidemic.[48]
  • Komi region Rosgvardia SOBR units seized a building taken by armed criminals at the Sokolovka airport.[49]

27 July

  • Tuva Directorate Rosgvardia SOBR and OMON units and non-departmental guards prevented the spread of anthrax in a town.[50]
  • Tomsk region Rosgvardia SOBR and OMON units neutralized members of an illegal armed group, detained criminals in a hostage situation, detained a sabotage and reconnaissance group, seized a bus, and freed hostages.[51]

28 July

  • Kuzbass Directorate Rosgvardia SOBR and OMON units stormed a building, coordinated action between law enforcement officers, neutralized criminals, and blocked and searched the premises.[52]
  • Omsk region Rosgvardia SOBR and OMON units detained criminals and rescued hostages.[53]
  • Tomsk region Ministry of Emergencies personnel conducted wildfire mitigation and wildfire response.[54]
  • Altai region Rosgvardia SOBR and OMON units neutralized armed criminals.[55]

29 July

  • Tyumen region Rosgvardia and SOBR forces stormed a building and neutralized an armed target.[56]
  • Siberian District Rosgvardia SOBR and OMON units marched to a mission location and detained criminals in a variety of situations in the Krasnoyarsk region. SOBR officers practiced tactical medicine.[57]
  • Krasnoyarsk region Rosgvardia units evacuated citizens from an unspecified emergency, established a safety zone, and confiscated unregistered weapons in Abakan, Krasnoyarsk region.[58]
  • Novosibirsk Directorate Rosgvardia SOBR units deployed to the exercise location via armored car and freed hostages from an administrative building.[59]
  • Omsk region Directorate Rosgvardia SOBR and OMON units detained criminals hiding in a village.[60]
  • Irkutsk region Rosgvardia's Special mobile detachment and an Irkutsk Aviation squadron established a blockade around enemies and located and neutralized bandits hiding in the forest.[61]

30 July

  • Siberian District Rosgvardia Unit "Seversky" neutralized armed criminals and deployed a mine detection dog to check the area for explosives in the Tomsk region.[62]
  • Khaty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug-Ugra Directorate Rosgvardia OMON blocked off a building while SOBR units stormed a bank building seized by three armed criminals.[63]

Far Eastern Federal District

29 July

  • Khabarovsk region Rosgvardia SOBR and OMON, servicemen of the "Typhoon" special-purpose detachment, and Eastern District Rosgvardia Battalion troops neutralized enemy sabotage groups. SOBR units repelled an attack on a motor vehicle convoy, and "Typhoon" forces located and neutralized an enemy sabotage group.[64]
  • Primorsky region Rosgvardia OMON units blocked off and eliminated members of an armed group while SOBR units detained intruders in a building.[65]
  • Sakha (Yakutia) Directorate Rosgvardia SOBR detained an enemy holding a hostage in the Yakutia region while OMON blocked off the area.[66]

30 July

  • Buryatia Republic Rosgvardia Directorate SOBR Unit "Bars" and OMON Unit "Krechet" found and neutralized criminal groups in mountainous, wooded, and urban conditions.[67]
  • Jewish Autonomous region Rosgvardia units neutralized terrorists.[68]
  • Kamchatka region Rosgvardia OMON units blocked off an area while SOBR stormed a building and neutralized a terrorist who had taken a hostage.[69]
  • Sakhalin region Rosgvardia SOBR and OMON officers cordoned off areas and eliminated terrorists. The units detected and arrested armed criminals in confined spaces.[70]
  • Amur region Rosgvardia SOBR units repelled an attack on a convoy and neutralized enemies while OMON units blocked off the area.[71]
  • Magadan region Rosgvardia SOBR and OMON units conducted tactical exercises and detected and eliminated armed terrorists in a wooded area.[72]



[1] “Operational-strategic exercise” is a Russian term for a large military exercise occurring in multiple locations, combining staff exercises with field deployments. The term has previously been used to identify the Russian military’s major annual exercises. Zaslon-2021 is Rosgvardia’s first use of the term.

[2] Mason Clark and Rachel Kenny, “Russia in Review: July 7 – July 20, 2021,” Institute for the Study of War, July 22, 2021, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-july-7-%E2%80%93-july-20-2021.

[3] Colonel Jason P. Gresh, “Rosgvardia: Hurtling Towards Confrontation,” CSIS, September 21, 2020, https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/rosgvardiya-hurtling-towards-confrontation.

[4] [“About 10 Thousand Combat Missions have been Completed by Rosgvardia Officers in Syria since 2018,”] TASS, March, 24, 2021https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/10981847; George Barros, “Belarus Warning Update: Belarus Confirms Plans to Purchas Advanced Air Defense Systems from Russia,” Institute for the Study of War, January 14, 2021, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-belarus-confirms-plans-purchase-advanced-air-defense-systems.

[5] “Putin Submits Bill on National Guard Troops to State Duma,” TASS, April 6, 2016, https://tass dot com/politics/867586.

[6] Role overlap between OMON and SOBR in the armed-response role continues to this day; however, SOBR is considered to be better trained, equipped and specialized for it. OMON is seen more often responding to riots and mass civil unrest rather than armed incidents, although they are capable of responding to such. Charlie Gao, “SOBR: Inside Russia’s Super Special Forces,” National Interest, June 10, 2021, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/sobr-inside-russias-super-special-forces-unit-187430.

[7] [“On Guard of Health: Rosgvardia Entered the Fight Against Coronavirus,”] Regnum, April 14, 2020, https://regnum.ru/news/2916499.html.

[8] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-ramkax-uchenij-zaslon2021-rosgvardejcy-v-podmoskove-proveli-kompleksnuyu-trenirovku

[9] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-centralnom-okruge-rosgvardii-proxodit-zaklyuchitelnaya-faza-uchenij-zaslon--2021

[10] https://rosguard.gov dot ru/ru/news/article/v-saratove-i--saratovskoj-oblasti-voennosluzhashhie-i-sotrudniki-rosgvardii-prinimayut-uchastie-v-operativnostrategicheskom-uchenii-zaslon--2021

[11] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/general-armii-viktor-zolotov-ocenil-dejstviya-voennosluzhashhix-i-sotrudnikov-vedomstva-v-xode-zavershayushhego-etapa-operativnostrategicheskogo-ucheniya-zaslon2021

[12] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/generalpolkovnik-viktor-strigunov-vysoko-ocenil-dejstviya-podrazdelenij-rosgvardii-v-xode-trenirovki-po-unichtozheniyu-uslovnoj-terroristicheskoj-gruppy-v-ramkax-ucheniya-zaslon2021        

[13] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/specnaz-rosgvardii-provel-kompleksnuyu-trenirovku-v-podmoskove-v-ramkax-ucheniya-zaslon--2021

[14] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/nejtralizaciyu-terroristov-otrabotali-rosgvardejcy-v-murmanskoj-oblasti -v-xode-takticheskogo-epizoda-ucheniya-zaslon-2021

[15] https://rosguard.gov dot ru/ru/news/article/v-arxangelske-bojcy-sobr-provodyat-trenirovki-v-ramkax-operativnostrategicheskogo-ucheniya-rosgvardii-zaslon-2021--foto-video

[16] https://rosguard.gov dot ru/ru/news/article/sotrudniki-specpodrazdelenij-rosgvardii-v-pskovskoj-oblasti-otrabotali-dejstviya-po-nejtralizacii-terroristov

[17] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/murmanskoj-oblasti-specnaz-rosgvardii-provodit-trenirovki-v-ramkax-operativnostrategicheskogo-ucheniya-vedomstva-zaslon2021

[18] https://www.bnkomi dot ru/data/news/131526/

[19] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-ramkax-operativnostrategicheskogo-ucheniya-zaslon--2021-pskovskie-rosgvardejcy-proveli-trenirovku

[20] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-vologodskoj-oblasti-v-xode-operativnostrategicheskogo-ucheniya-zaslon2021-sotrudniki-rosgvardii-otrabotali-dejstviya-po-unichtozheniyu-uslovnoj-gruppy-terroristov

[21] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-karelii-sotrudniki-specpodrazdeleniya-rosgvardii-otrabotali-dejstviya-po-nejtralizacii-uslovnyx-terroristov

[22] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/rosgvardejcy-sanktpeterburga-prinyali-uchastie-vo-vserossijskix-ucheniyax-zaslon--2021

[23] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/rosgvardiya-vypolnila-zadachi-takticheskogo-epizoda-ucheniya-zaslon-2021-v-kalmykii

[24] https://rosguard.gov dot ru/ru/news/article/rosgvardiya-prodemonstrirovala-rabotu-medicinskogo-specnaza

[25] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-samare-sotrudniki-omon-proveli-sovmestnuyu-trenirovku-po-obespecheniyu-bezopasnosti-sudoxodstva

[26] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-mordovii-rosgvardejcy-otrabotali-soprovozhdenie-voinskogo-gruza-v-xode--ucheniya-zaslon2021

[27] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/rosgvardejcy-vypolnili-zadachi-takticheskogo-epizoda-ucheniya-zaslon--2021-v-volgograde

[28] https://kazved dot ru/news/my_tatarstan/27-07-2021/v-kazani-boytsy-rosgvardii-proshli-ucheniya-zaslon-2021-po-osvobozhdeniyu-zdaniya-ot-banditov-5831702

[29] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-xode-uchenij-zaslon2021-kirovskie-rosgvardejcy-v-polevyx-usloviyax-otrabotali-normativy-rxb-zashhity

[30] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/sotrudniki-specpodrazdelenij%C2%A0-rosgvardii%C2%A0-v-kazani-otrabotali-prakticheskie-dejstviya-v-sootvetstvii-s-zamyslom-ucheniya-zaslon2021

[31] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-nizhegorodskoj-oblasti-sotrudniki-specpodrazdelenij-rosgvardii-otrabotali-likvidaciyu-nezakonnyx-vooruzhennyx-formirovanij-v-ramkax-uchenij-zaslon2021

[32] https://rosguard.gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-nizhegorodskoj-oblasti-v-ramkax-ucheniya-zaslon2021-rosgvardejcy-vzyali-pod-oxranu-vazhnyj-gosudarstvennyj-obekt

[33] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/aktivnaya-faza-ucheniya-rosgvardii-zaslon2021-proxodit-v-penzenskoj-oblasti

[34] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-marij-el-s-sotrudnikami-i-voennosluzhashhimi-rosgvardii-provodyatsya-trenirovki-v-ramkax-operativnostrategicheskogo-ucheniya-zaslon--2021

[35] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/sotrudniki-upravleniya-rosgvardii-po-permskomu-krayu-vypolnili-zadachi-takticheskogo-epizoda-ucheniya-zaslon--2021

[36] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-ulyanovske-specpodrazdeleniya-rosgvardii-uspeshno-otrabotali-prakticheskie-zanyatiya-v-ramkax-operativnostrategicheskogo-ucheniya-zaslon2021

[37] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-samarskoj-oblasti-podrazdeleniya-rosgvardii-zavershili-boevoe-slazhivanie-v-ramkax-operativnostrategicheskogo-ucheniya-zaslon2021

[38] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-kirovskoj-oblasti-specnaz-rosgvardii-provel-trenirovku-v-ramkax-operativnostrategicheskogo-ucheniya-zaslon2021

[39] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-mordovii--specnaz-rosgvardii-obezvredil-uslovnyx-prestupnikov

[40] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/specnaz-uralskogo-okruga-v-ramkax-masshtabnogo-operativnostrategicheskogo-ucheniya-rosgvardii-likvidiroval-bandgruppu

[41] https://rosguard.gov dot ru/ru/news/article/podrazdeleniya-uralskogo-okruga-rosgvardii-vypolnili-ryad-zadach-v-ramkax-operativnostrategicheskogo-ucheniya-zaslon-2021

[42] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/podrazdeleniya%C2%A0-uralskogo-okruga-rosgvardii-v-ramkax-operativnostrategicheskogo-ucheniya-zaslon2021-otrabotali-boevoe-slazhivanie

[43] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/specnaz-uralskogo-okruga-na-ucheniyax-rosgvardii-likvidiroval-vooruzhennuyu-gruppu-prestupnikov

[44] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-chelyabinske-bojcy-specpodrazdelenij-rosgvardii-prinyali-uchastie-v-prakticheskom-zanyatii-v-ramkax-operativnostrategicheskogo-ucheniya-zaslon--2021

[45] https://rosguard.gov dot ru/ru/news/article/aktivnaya-faza-ucheniya-rosgvardii-zaslon2021-proxodit-v-kuzbasse

[46] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/novosibirskie-specpodrazdeleniya-rosgvardii-vypolnili-ryad-zadach-v-ramkax-operativnostrategicheskogo-ucheniya-zaslon--2021

[47] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-irkutskoj-oblasti-sotrudniki-rosgvardii-prinyali-uchastie-v-ucheniyax-po-likvidacii-posledstvij-chrezvychajnyx-situacij

[48] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-ramkax-operativnostrategicheskogo-ucheniya-zaslon--2021-v-altajskom-krae-proshli-sovmestnye-ucheniya-podrazdelenij-rosgvardii-i-mchs

[49] https://www.bnkomi dot ru/data/news/131526/

[50] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-ramkax-ucheniya-zaslon--2021-rosgvardiya-provela-kompleksnuyu-trenirovku--v-tuve

[51] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-tomske-specpodrazdeleniya-rosgvardii-vypolnili-ryad-zadach-v-ramkax-operativnostrategicheskogo-ucheniya-zaslon2021

[52] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-kuzbasse-specnaz-rosgvardii-obezvredil-uslovnyx-prestupnikov-ukryvshixsya-v-zdanii

[53] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-omske-proxodit-aktivnaya-faza-ucheniya-rosgvardii-zaslon2021

[54] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-tomskoj-oblasti-sotrudniki-i-voennosluzhashhie-rosgvardii-prinyali-uchastie-v-uchenii-po-likvidacii-posledstvij-chrezvychajnoj-situacii

[55] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/aktivnaya-faza-ucheniya-rosgvardii-zaslon2021-proxodit-v-altajskom-krae

[56] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-tyumeni-v-ramkax-ucheniya-zaslon2021-rosgvardejcy-otrabotali-zaderzhanie-vooruzhnnogo-prestupnika

[57] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-ramkax-masshtabnogo-ucheniya-zaslon--2021-v-podrazdeleniyax-rosgvardii-po-krasnoyarskomu-krayu-proxodyat-prakticheskie-zanyatiya

[58] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-ramkax-masshtabnogo-ucheniya-zaslon--2021-v-podrazdeleniyax-rosgvardii-po-krasnoyarskomu-krayu-proxodyat-prakticheskie-zanyatiya

[59] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-novosibirske-sobr-rosgvardii-obezvredil-uslovnyx-prestupnikov-v-ramkax-operativnostrategicheskogo-ucheniya-zaslon2021

[60] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/sotrudniki-specpodrazdelenij-rosgvardii-otrabotali-sovmestnye-dejstviya-po-zaderzhaniyu-opasnyx-prestupnikov-v-naselennom-punkte

[61] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-ramkax-operativnostrategicheskogo-ucheniya-zaslon2021-rosgvardejcy-iz-irkutskoj-oblasti-likvidirovali-uslovnuyu-bandgruppu

[62] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-tomskoj-oblasti-v-ramkax-ucheniya-zaslon2021-voennosluzhashhie-rosgvardii-otrabotali-dejstviya-po-poisku-i-likvidacii-bandgruppy

[63] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-xode-operativnostrategicheskogo-ucheniya-zaslon--2021-podrazdeleniya-rosgvardii-otrabotali-prakticheskie-dejstviya-po-nejtralizacii-vooruzhennyx-prestupnikov-v-stolice-yugry

[64] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-xabarovske-rosgvardejcy-prinimayut-uchastie-v-operativnostrategicheskom-uchenii-zaslon2021

[65] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-primore-proxodyat-trenirovki-v-ramkax-operativnostrategicheskogo-ucheniya-rosgvardii-zaslon--2021

[66] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-yakutii-proxodyat-trenirovki-v-ramkax-operativnostrategicheskogo-ucheniya-rosgvardii-zaslon2021

[67] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-buryatii-specpodrazdeleniya-respublikanskogo-upravleniya-rosgvardii-vypolnili-zadachi-v-ramkax-ucheniya-zaslon--2021

[68] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/lichnyj-sostav-upravleniya-rosgvardii-po-evrejskoj-avtonomnoj-oblasti-prinyal-uchastie-v-operativnostrategicheskom-uchenii-zaslon2021

[69] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/na-kamchatke-proshli-trenirovki-v-ramkax-operativnostrategicheskogo-ucheniya-rosgvardii-zaslon--2021

[70] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/saxalinskie-rosgvardejcy-prinyali-uchastie-v-operativnostrategicheskom-uchenii-zaslon-2021

[71] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-amurskoj-oblasti-proxodyat-trenirovki-v-ramkax-operativnostrategicheskogo-ucheniya-rosgvardii-zaslon--2021

[72] https://rosguard dot gov.ru/ru/news/article/v-magadane-rosgvardejcy-prinyali-uchastie-v-operativnostrategicheskix-ucheniyax-zaslon2021