By Blane Wallace (ISW Syria Team) and Nada Atieh (Syria Direct)
Click image below to enlarge. Download the PDF here.
Thursday, April 30, 2020
Wednesday, April 29, 2020
Russia in Review: Kremlin Misdirection Continues amid COVID and Peace Processes
Authors: Mason
Clark, Nataliya Bugayova, and George Barros
Key Takeaway: The
Kremlin continues to exploit COVID-19 to advance its key campaigns. The Kremlin
is trying to exploit two peace processes in the United Nations and Ukraine to
lift sanctions on Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin is also making
lasting changes to Russia’s security services in response to the COVID-19
pandemic, unbinding the police authority and empowering the Ministry of
Defense both diplomatically and as an increasingly normalized domestic actor.
The Kremlin has not lost sight of its key objectives during the COVID-19 pandemic
and will continue its malign actions.
The Kremlin is
preparing to exploit an upcoming meeting of the United Nations Security Council’s
permanent members – the P5 – to attempt to lift sanctions on Russia and its
allies. The virtual meeting of the P5 will likely occur
in early May.[1]
French President Emmanuel Macron has called for the P5 to endorse a “global
ceasefire” during the COVID-19 crisis. Macron stated on April 15 that he has
secured the agreement of the US, UK, and China and hopes to convince Putin to
join.[2]
Putin will
attempt to exploit Macron’s peace framework to achieve his own objectives. The
Kremlin has not committed to Macron’s proposal thus far, stating Russian
diplomats must “work” on the proposal before joining it.[3] Putin will likely attempt
to secure a benefit to Russia before agreeing to Macron’s proposal. None of the other P5 states placed conditions
on their support for the ceasefire. Macron is asking Putin for support, despite
Putin being the aggressor in many of the conflicts to be covered by the global
ceasefire. Putin has actively courted Macron on several issues and held numerous
calls with him over the past year.[4]
Putin’s
desired compensation for his support will likely focus on sanctions mitigation.
The Kremlin is framing Western sanctions
as a crime during COVID-19 to support its long-standing objective of removing
Western sanctions on Russia without reversing the malign activity that led to them.[5] The Kremlin conducted an outreach
campaign on sanctions removal to every member of the P5 in mid-April.[6] The Kremlin will likely
attempt to equate sanctions with conflict by convincing Macron to include
sanctions removal in his ceasefire resolution. The US will likely veto any resolution
that includes sanctions removal. ISW previously forecasted Putin would intentionally
provoke the US into vetoing a COVID-19-related resolution in the UNSC to secure
a rhetorical victory.[7] This attempt to provoke a
US veto is also likely intended to further split Macron from the US by forcing
the US to veto one of Macron’s key efforts. Putin may alternatively demand Macron’s
support on other ongoing talks in exchange for not pushing the sanctions issue.
The West must not fall for the Kremlin’s likely attempt to blame the West for
the collapse of a ceasefire agreement due to Russian asks not being met.
Putin will attempt
to advance a Kremlin-favorable peace process in Ukraine as he tries to lift sanctions. The foreign ministers of the Normandy Four –
Ukraine, Russia, Germany, and France – will hold a video conference to discuss
the Ukrainian peace process on April 30.[8]
During the
virtual meeting, the Kremlin will likely try to secure further Ukrainian
concessions. Russia and Ukraine agreed in December to conduct an all-for-all
prisoner exchange and withdraw forces from three new disengagement areas in
Donbas, with the goal of disengagement from these sites by the end of March
2020.[9] Ukraine also agreed to
make a public joint statement with Russia that it is “necessary” to incorporate
the Steinmeier Formula, a Kremlin-favorable interpretation of the Minsk
agreements, into Ukrainian law.[10]
Ukraine did
not implement this disengagement by March 2020 due to continued Russian
pressure. Kremlin-controlled proxies attacked two of the three Ukrainian
withdrawal zones in January and February, despite the Kremlin’s posturing as a
peacemaker.[11]
Ukraine has not adopted the Steinmeier Formula in part due to resistance from
Ukrainian civil society.[12] The formula, which the
Kremlin manipulated Zelensky’s government into last year, carries long-term
risks for Ukrainian sovereignty that ISW has previously described.[13] The December 2019
agreement additionally does not stipulate any timeline for incorporating the
Steinmeier Formula.
The Kremlin is
falsely framing that Ukraine has stalled the peace process. The Kremlin will continue
pressuring Ukraine into concessions using prisoner exchanges as a bargaining
chip.[14] Kremlin spokesman Dmitri
Peskov stated on April 28 Ukraine has not yet completed its “homework” by
implementing the December 2019 agreements, ignoring that the Kremlin had not
implemented its own side of the agreements. Lavrov claimed that the peace talks
in their current form “do not make sense” due to Ukrainian policy positions.[15] The Kremlin may attempt to reboot the stalled process
to create a joint “advisory council” – a body Ukraine and Russia discussed on
March 11 that would facilitate direct Ukrainian talks with Kremlin-controlled
proxies for the first time in the war and advance the Kremlin’s objective of legitimizing
its aggression in Ukraine.[16]
The current
situation presents both risk and opportunity for Ukraine. Ukraine should recognize
that the COVID-19 pandemic and oil price collapse have weakened the Kremlin’s
power to extract its desired concessions. These circumstances provide Ukraine
more room to maneuver in the short term. Ukraine and the West should recognize
that Putin is driving toward a deal with the West on multiple fronts while simultaneously
pursuing the Kremlin’s campaign against Ukraine. Ukraine and the West should be
careful not to mistake Putin’s posturing as a constructive international partner
and peacemaker in Ukraine as a change in Putin’s intent or strategic objectives.
Public
discontent with the Kremlin’s COVID-19 response highlights additional
weaknesses in Putin’s system. Approximately
2000 people protested self-quarantine orders in Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia, on
April 20.[17]
The protesters demanded authorities reopen work, remove the quarantine, and
called on the regional governor to resign. Riot police arrested 39 protesters.
The Kremlin decried the protests as illegal and opened criminal investigations
against the protesters. Russians in several cities additionally began a series
of “online protests” on April 20, utilizing Yandex.Maps – a popular service
equivalent to Google Maps – to leave comments near government buildings calling
for better services and the end of quarantine.[18] As with physical
protests, Russian authorities swiftly moved to delete negative messages, particularly
those focused on federal government buildings including the Kremlin. An
increase in available time, and a lack of risk compared to confronting riot
police, will likely drive increased numbers of Russians to online forms of
resistance, though the Kremlin’s recently strengthened censorship apparatus
will likely minimize the impact of digital protest.[19] The Kremlin will
successfully suppress future protests but will likely face increasing public
discontent, impeding centralized framing of an effective response to the virus.
The Kremlin is
responding to COVID-19 by empowering its security services, including both law
enforcement and expanding the role of the military. The Russian government allocated 2.66 billion rubles
(approximately $360 million) to the Ministry of Defense and other security
services to fight COVID-19 on April 13.[20] The Kremlin is
additionally preparing legislation to further empower Russian law enforcement
by providing expanded immunity from prosecution and expanding their search and
seizure powers – implicitly preparing to shield police following anticipated human
rights abuses.[21]
Putin likely perceives a need to intensify his societal control mechanisms
as economic and COVID-19 pressures mount. Putin additionally likely seeks to
secure the loyalty of police and security officers by legally shielding them as
public discontent increases.
The Kremlin is
empowering the Ministry of Defense (MoD) as a humanitarian and non-military
actor, an expanded role that will likely continue beyond the COVID-19 crisis.
Russian Defense Minister Shoigu announced the mobilization of 30,000 military
personnel in 17 newly formed military medical units to combat COVID-19
domestically on April 24.[22] The Kremlin continues to leverage the MoD to act as a humanitarian
actor internationally despite facing medical
supply shortages in Russia. The Kremlin sent medical personnel and
medical equipment to its allies and partners in Serbia, Moldova, Serbia-affiliated
Bosnian political entity Republika Srpska, and Russian proxy republic Abkhazia
throughout April.[23]
The MoD previously shipped personnel and medical supplies to Italy and the
United States in March.[24]
The Kremlin has not employed the military in similar global public relations campaigns
during past crises, instead relying on state run but non-government partners to
leverage soft power. For example, the Kremlin relied on projects funded through
Rusal, a Russian aluminum company, to combat Ebola in Africa.[25]
The Kremlin will likely further leverage the MoD to support non-military lines
of effort. The MoD’s responsibilities will increasingly encompass non-military
efforts, both domestically and internationally as a tool of diplomatic
outreach.
The Kremlin’s
priorities and reactions during the COVID-19 crisis will have long-term
effects. The Kremlin continues to attempt to exploit the global
health crisis to advance its long-term objective of lifting sanctions without
reversing the Kremlin’s original malign behavior. The Kremlin will likely
leverage ties with Macron to advance its narratives but is unlikely to successfully
link sanctions relief to a global ceasefire – potentially undermining the
ceasefire in the process. The Kremlin is similarly attempting to quietly advance
its preferred Ukrainian peace process despite worsening Russian economic and diplomatic
problems. Finally, Putin’s further empowerment of internal security services
and his expansion of the role of the MoD to new diplomatic and internal
situations will remain past the COVID-19 crisis, further limiting Russian
freedoms and expanding the role of the MoD in Kremlin policy.
[1] “No
Exact Date for UN P5 Online Summit Yet – Kremlin,” TASS, April 23, 2020, https://tass((.))com/politics/1148721.
[2] “Russia
to Announce its Stance on Global Ceasefire due to COVID-19 Pandemic Soon —
Kremlin,” TASS, April 16, 2020, https://tass((.))com/politics/1145687; “France’s
Macron Says he Hopes to Secure Putin Backing for UN Truce Plea,” Reuters, April
14, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-truce-macron/frances-macron-says-he-hopes-to-secure-putin-backing-for-un-truce-plea-idUSKCN21X0EE.
[3] Pierre
Bairin and Emma Reynolds, “France's President Says US and China Back a World
Truce -- and he Thinks Putin will 'Definitely Agree,'” CNN, April 15, 2020,
https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/15/world/macron-world-truce-putin-intl/index.html.
[4] George
Barros, “Russia in Review: The Kremlin Faces Setbacks in the Balkans,”
Institute for the Study of War, April 23, 2020,
http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/04/russia-in-review-kremlin-faces-setbacks.html;
Nataliya Bugayova, Mason Clark, and George Barros, “Russia in review: Putin
Accelerates Ukraine Campaign Amid Converging Crises,” Institute for the Study
of War, March 24, 2020,
http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-putin-accelerates-ukraine-campaign-amid-converging-crises;
George Barros and Nataliya Bugayova, “Europe Cedes Opportunity in
Russia-Ukraine Energy Deal,” Institute for the Study of War, January 30, 2020, http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/01/europe-cedes-opportunity-in-russia.html.
[5] Mason
Clark with Aleksei Zimnitca and Nataliya Bugayova, “Russia in Review: Kremlin
Attempts to Exploit COVID-19 Crisis to Remove Sanctions on Russia and its
Partners,” Institute for the Study of War, April 3, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-kremlin-attempts-exploit-covid-19-crisis-remove-sanctions-russia-and-its.
[6]
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Vershinin spoke with Chinese Deputy
Foreign Minister Zhang Hanhui on COVID-19 and UNSC coordination on April 22;
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov held a phone call with US Secretary of
State Mike Pompeo on the UNSC on April 17; Putin held a phone call with Chinese
President Xi Xinping on the UNSC on April 17; and Putin and Macron held a phone
call on COVID-19 and sanctions on April 17. [“About the Telephone Conversation
Between Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov and US Secretary of State Pompeo,”]
Russian MFA, April 17, 2020,
https://www.mid((.))ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4101182;
[“Telephone Conversation with President of the People's Republic of China Xi
Jinping,”] Kremlin, April 16, 2020,
http://kremlin((.))ru/events/president/news/63209;
http://kremlin((.))ru/events/president/news/63211; [“About the Telephone
Conversation of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Morgulov with
the Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the People's Republic of
China in Russia Zhang Hanhui,”] Russian MFA, April 24, 2020,
https://www.mid((.))ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4105259.
[7]
Mason Clark with Aleksei Zimnitca and Nataliya Bugayova, “Russia in Review:
Kremlin Attempts to Exploit COVID-19 Crisis to Remove Sanctions on Russia and
its Partners,” Institute for the Study of War, April 3, 2020,
http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-kremlin-attempts-exploit-covid-19-crisis-remove-sanctions-russia-and-its.
[8] “Normandy-format
Meeting to be Held via Video Conference on April 30 – Foreign Ministry,” Ukrinform,
April 23, 2020,
https://www.ukrinform((.))net/rubric-polytics/3011305-normandyformat-meeting-to-be-held-via-video-conferencing-on-april-30-foreign-ministry.html.
[9] Ukraine
withdrew forces from the first three pilot disengagement sites in Stanitsa Luhanksa
in July 2019, Zolote in November 2019, and Petrivske in November 2019. George
Barros with Nataliya Bugayova, “Russia in Review: The Kremlin's Fake
De-escalation in Donbas,” Institute for the Study of War, February 24, 2020, https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/02/russia-in-review-kremlins-fake-de.html; “Overall Agreed Conclusions of the Paris Summit in
the Normandy Format of December 9, 2019,” President of Ukraine, December 10,
2019, https://www.president.gov((.))ua/en/news/zagalni-uzgodzheni-visnovki-parizkogo-samitu-v-normandskomu-58797.
[10] “Overall
Agreed Conclusions of the Paris Summit in the Normandy Format of December 9,
2019,” President of Ukraine, December 10, 2019, https://www.president.gov((.))ua/en/news/zagalni-uzgodzheni-visnovki-parizkogo-samitu-v-normandskomu-58797.
[11] George
Barros with Nataliya Bugayova, “Russia in Review: The Kremlin's Fake
De-escalation in Donbas,” Institute for the Study of War, February 24, 2020,
http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-kremlins-fake-de-escalation-donbas.
[12] Nataliya
Bugayova, “Russia in Review: Putin Advances in Ukraine and Its Neighboring
States,” Institute for the Study of War, October 15, 2019, https://www.iswresearch.org/2019/10/russia-in-review-putin-advances-in.html.
[13]
Nataliya Bugayova with George Barros, “The Perils of Talks on Russia’s War in
Ukraine,” Institute for the Study of War, December 7, 2019, http://www.iswresearch.org/2019/12/the-perils-of-talks-on-russias-war-in.html.
[14] [“Peskov:
‘Homework’ for a New Meeting of Leaders of the "Normandy Format" has
Not Yet Been Done,”] TASS, April 28, 2020,
https://tass((.))ru/politika/8352079.
[15]
[“Lavrov Said the Summit of the "Normandy Four" So Far Does Not Make
Sense Because of the Position of Kyiv,”] TASS, April 27, 2020,
https://tass((.))ru/politika/8342955.
[16] Nataliya
Bugayova, Mason Clark, and George Barros, “Russia in Review: Putin Accelerates
Ukraine Campaign Amid Converging Crises,” Institute for the Study of War, March
24, 2020,
http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-putin-accelerates-ukraine-campaign-amid-converging-crises.
[17] [“Rally
Against Self-Isolation in Vladikiavkaz,”] Media Zone, April 22, 2020,
https://zona((.))media/chronicle/vladikavkaz; [“In Vladikavkaz Opened a Case of
Violence Against Police During a Protest,”] Interfax, April 22, 2020,
https://www.interfax((.))ru/russia/705458; [“In Vladikavkaz, Hundreds of People
Came Out to Protest,”] Svoboda, April 20, 2020, https://www.svoboda.org/a/30565781.html.
[18] Daria
Kozlova, [“’We Want to Eat, There is No Work!’”] Novaya Gazeta, April 20, 2020,
https://novayagazeta((.))ru/articles/2020/04/20/85010-hotim-est-raboty-net.
[19] Mason
Clark, “Russia in Review: Kremlin Tests Authoritarian Societal Control Measures
during COVID-19 Crisis,” Institute for the Study of War, April 13, 2020, http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/04/russia-in-review-kremlin-tests.html.
[20] The
Ministry of Defense received the largest portion of the money, with 2.3 billion
rubles. Other agencies receiving funding include the Russian National Guard,
the FSB, and Russia’s Penitentiary Service. [“Order of the Government of the
Russian Federation of 04.13.2020 No. 1006-r,”] Official Internet Portal of
Legal Information of the Russian Government, April 14, 2020,
http://publication.pravo.gov((.))ru/Document/View/0001202004140032.
[21] [“Government
Intends to Expand Police Powers,”] The Bell, April 22, 2020;
https://thebell.io/pravitelstvo-namereno-rasshirit-polnomochiya-politsii/;
[“Police Officers were Offered Permission to Open Cars and Cordon Off
Housing,”] Interfax, April 22, 2020, https://www.interfax((.))ru/russia/705418.
[22] [“Shoigu
Announced Vorobyov’s Request to Help Fight the Virus in the Moscow Region,”]
RBK, April 24, 2020,
https://www.rbc((.))ru/society/24/04/2020/5ea2e0609a7947b3fa0a6d1b.
[23] [“The
Russian Aerospace Forces Completed the Operation to Transfer to the Republic of
Serbia Russian Military Specialists, the Necessary Equipment and Machinery to
Assist Serbia,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, April 4, 2020,
https://function.mil((.))ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12285128@egNews; “Russian Aid Delivery to Republika Srpska
Complete,” TASS, April 10, 2020, https://tass((.))com/society/1142823;
[“Russia Sent the Military to Abkhazia to Combat COVID-19 at the Request of the
Acting President,”] Sputnik Abkhazia, April 17, 2020, https://sputnik-abkhazia((.))ru/coronavirus/20200417/1029925325/Rossiya-napravila-voennykh-v-Abkhaziyu-dlya-borby-s-COVID-19-po-zaprosu-io-prezidenta.html;
“Russian Defense Ministry Delivers Chinese aid to Moldova to Help Fight
Coronavirus,” TASS, April 19, 2020, https://tass((.))com/russia/1146927; “At
the Request of the Moldovan Side, the Russian Ministry of Defense Carried Out
an Operation to Transfer Medical Equipment by the Military Transport Aviation
of the Russian Aerospace Forces,” Russian Ministry of Defense, April 20, 2020,
http://eng.mil((.))ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12287612@egNews.
[24] Mason
Clark with Aleksei Zimnitca and Nataliya Bugayova, “Russia in Review: Kremlin
Attempts to Exploit COVID-19 Crisis to Remove Sanctions on Russia and its
Partners,” Institute for the Study of War, April 3, 2020,
http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-kremlin-attempts-exploit-covid-19-crisis-remove-sanctions-russia-and-its.
[25] Nataliya
Bugayova, Mason Clark, Michaela Walker, Andre Briere, Anthony Yanchuk, and
George Barros, “The Kremlin’s Inroads After the Africa Summit,” Institute for
the Study of War, November 8, 2019,
http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlins-inroads-after-africa-summit.
Friday, April 24, 2020
Iraq Situation Report: April 15-21, 2020
By Katherine Lawlor and Brandon Wallace
Key Takeaway: Iraq’s political elites are conditioning their support for Prime Minister (PM)-designate Mustafa al-Kadhimi on the composition of his cabinet. The widening rift between Kadhimi and Iran-backed blocs has led Kadhimi to preserve the traditional system of ethno-sectarian quota filling, to marginalize protester demands, and to step up his comments about the “unjustified foreign [US] presence” in an attempt to mend ties. Behind the scenes, the US and Iran have continued their competition to influence Iraq’s future. Members of several Iranian proxy militias took over two areas in Baghdad’s fortified Green Zone near both the PM’s office and the US Embassy, placing additional pressure on Kadhimi to conform with Iranian political objectives as he rebuilds his cabinet. Meanwhile, the United States has announced a $26 million aid package to help address COVID-19 in Iraq and successfully exerted pressure on the Iraqi government to reduce its dependence on Iranian energy imports.
Thursday, April 23, 2020
Russia in Review: The Kremlin Faces Setbacks in the Balkans
By George Barros
Russia in Review is a weekly intelligence summary (INTSUM) produced by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). This ISW INTSUM series sheds light on key trends and developments related to the Russian government’s objectives and its efforts to secure them. Receive future Russia in Review INTSUM products via-email by signing up for the ISW mailing list.
Key Takeaway: The Kremlin is losing initiative and influence in several Balkan states. North Macedonia joined NATO despite Russia’s efforts to prevent it. Russia’s strategic partner Serbia is increasingly vocal about its aspirations to join the EU. Balkan states are curbing the influence of Russian energy and the Russian Orthodox Church in their countries. The Kremlin is attempting to counteract these potential influence losses by exploiting its connections to Serbia’s defense establishment to prevent Serbia from deepening ties with the EU. The West should keep the Kremlin on the defensive in Europe by supporting ongoing EU and NATO efforts to integrate the Western Balkans.
The Kremlin is facing setbacks in the Balkans due to the West’s intensified outreach and limits to Russia’s value proposition. Halting the expansion of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the Balkans is a major Russian strategic objective. Serbia-Kosovo normalization talks might resume and could open a path to Serbia’s EU accession. The Kremlin likely has overestimated the extent to which it can curb Serbia’s European aspirations. Montenegro threatens to reduce the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church, a key vector for Russian soft power influence. An EU ruling in March limited the Kremlin’s energy leverage over Bulgaria. In late March, North Macedonia joined NATO despite strong Kremlin resistance.[1]
The EU intensified its outreach to the Balkans in recent months. The European Commission proposed a new enlargement procedure for the Western Balkans, calling the region their “top priority,” on February 5.[2] An enlargement procedure is a plan for an EU candidate country to meet the necessary criteria for EU membership. The EU intensified outreach to Serbia after struggling to restart normalization talks between Kosovo and Serbia since 2018.[3] The talks stalled when Kosovo imposed a 100-percent tariff on Serbian goods in response to Serbia blocking Kosovo’s bid to join Interpol in November 2018.[4] Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo and normalization of relations between the two countries are preconditions for both Serbia and Kosovo’s EU accession processes.[5]
French President Emmanuel Macron pledged “unconditional support” for Serbia’s pursuit of its “European path” in a call with Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic on April 2.[6] Macron also reversed his opposition to EU expansion in Albania and North Macedonia in February, when he said France is open to both countries beginning EU accession talks.[7] The change in Macron’s rhetoric likely indicates consolidating political consensus in the EU on expanding into the Balkans. The EU planned a Western Balkans summit in Zagreb for May 2020, but the COVID-19 pandemic forced the bloc to postpone it.[8]
President Vucic is responding positively to the EU’s outreach, and Kosovo might be setting conditions to renew talks. Vucic said in January that the Serbian people “don’t see a real alternative” to joining the EU.[9] Vucic met with Kosovo’s president and top US officials in Washington, DC, in March – representing progress in Serbia and Kosovo’s stalled dialogue.[10] Vucic called for “compromise” on Kosovo resulting in “guarantees for a much better future” during his US trip, likely referencing EU membership guarantees in exchange for recognizing Kosovo.[11] Vucic expressed support for the EU’s new enlargement procedure on February 6.[12] Vucic is doubling down on his pro-European rhetoric after balancing between Europe and Russia for several years.[13] Vucic may be setting expectations for the Serbian people for a deal in which Serbia recognizes Kosovo in exchange for EU membership guarantees.
Kosovo might be setting conditions to renew normalization talks with Serbia. Kosovo lifted its 100-percent tariff on Serbian goods – a major impediment to Kosovo and Serbia’s normalization talks – on April 1.[14] However, Kosovo’s outgoing interim prime minister, Albin Kurti, threatened to reimpose the tariffs unless Serbia delivered reciprocal concessions by June 15.[15] That said, Kurti’s threat to reinstate the tariff may be hollow; he lost a vote of no confidence on March 25 and may not be prime minister when the June 15 deadline passes.[16] Kurti likely agreed to completely remove the tariff only after he failed his vote of no confidence in an attempt to expand his political leverage inside Kosovo. Kosovar President Hashim Thaçi is attempting to remove Kurti and is likely supportive of removing the tariff and resuming talks with Serbia.[17] US officials pressured Kurti for refusing to completely remove Kosovo’s tariff against Serbia in February.[18]
Vucic is likely trying to extract major political concessions from Kosovo and the EU during Serbia’s accession process. Serbian officials expressed discontent with Kosovo’s tariff removal because the lifting came with additional demands from Kurti.[19] Serbian officials likely understand that Kosovo may not reimpose the tariff on June 15 due to Western political pressure and uncertainty about Kurti’s tenure as interim prime minister and may refuse to make concessions as a result. Regardless of the outcome of Serbia and Kosovo’s political maneuverings, the COVID-19 pandemic will likely stall progress on the countries’ normalization talks.
The Kremlin is mitigating a potential loss of influence in Serbia by increasing its outreach there.
The Kremlin’s objectives in the Balkans include maintaining influence in Serbia and non-recognition of Kosovo. The Kremlin describes NATO’s 1999 military intervention in Serbia and the subsequent creation of Kosovo as a classic example of an “illegal NATO intervention.”[20] The Kremlin opposes EU and NATO expansion into Serbia. Serbia and Kosovo’s mutual recognition would open a pathway for Serbia’s EU accession, eroding Kremlin influence in the Balkans. Russia also seeks to maintain its cultural influence in Serbia and the reach of the Russian Orthodox Church.
The Kremlin increased its military outreach to Serbia as the EU increased engagement with Serbia. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu met with Serbian Defense Minister Aleksandar Vulin in Serbia on February 17.[21] A Russian shipment of Pantsir-S1 air defense systems arrived in Serbia on February 24.[22] The Kremlin is likely trying to cultivate new and reinforce existing human connections and institutional links in Serbia’s defense establishment to consolidate opposition to future talks with Kosovo and Serbia’s integration with the West. The Kremlin may exploit its influence among Serbian defense officials to set conditions for political and military resistance against the expansion of Western structures in Serbia.[23] The Kremlin has been carrying out a campaign to expand its influence in Serbia at all levels, including the military, economy, and infrastructure spheres – a campaign ISW analyzed in detail.[24]
The Kremlin is exploiting the COVID-19 pandemic to increase its influence in Serbia and the Republika Srpska – as the Kremlin likely previously did in Italy and the United States. The Russian Air Force sent at least 87 military specialists with military and medical equipment to Serbia on April 3-4.[25] The Kremlin sent military cargo planes with medical supplies and military experts to the Republika Srpska – the political entity for Serbs within Bosnia – on April 10.[26] Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik thanked the Kremlin for its assistance.[27] The Kremlin may also be using counter-COVID-19 measures as a pretext to deploy military units to collect intelligence on Serbia and Europe, as Russian military intelligence likely did when the Kremlin deployed Russian military assets and “humanitarian aid” to Italy and the United States in March.[28]
The EU forced the Kremlin to cut energy prices for Bulgaria. Russian state-owned gas operator Gazprom cut gas prices to Bulgaria by 40 percent to comply with a European Commission antitrust ruling on March 3.[34] Bulgaria is the latest of eight European states, including the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia, to agree on gas price cuts with Gazprom under the European Commission’s ruling.[35] The Kremlin regularly seeks energy deals that place other countries at a disadvantage, though it typically casts these deals as fair trades or even concessions by Russia. For example, the West allowed the Kremlin to secure a deal with Ukraine in December 2019 that eroded Ukraine’s long-term energy leverage against Russia.[36] In contrast, Western intervention, specifically by the European Commission, cost the Kremlin leverage over Bulgaria and reduced Russian revenue. Furthermore, Bulgaria, like other European actors, is diversifying its gas imports, eroding a key point of Russian leverage.[37]
Implications and Recommendations:
The Kremlin likely overestimated its ability to curb Serbia’s European aspirations. The Kremlin will leverage its instruments of influence in Serbia, such as Serbia’s defense establishment, in an attempt to spoil the normalization talks between Serbia and Kosovo. The COVID-19 pandemic will likely slow Serbia and Kosovo’s normalizations talks and support the Kremlin’s efforts. The Kremlin will likely continue to exploit the COVID-19 pandemic to intensify these shaping operations. The United States should support the EU and NATO’s efforts to integrate the Western Balkans. The United States should set conditions to advance talks between Kosovo and Serbia with the end goal of securing Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo. The EU should reschedule its postponed EU-Western Balkans summit to advance the EU accession of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia.
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[1] Tsvetelia Tsolova, “UPDATE 2-Bulgaria Agrees Deal to Cut Price of Russian Gas Imports by 40%,” Reuters, March 3, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/bulgaria-russia-gas-prices/update-2-bulgaria-agrees-deal-to-cut-price-of-russian-gas-imports-by-40-idUSL8N2AW22T ; “North Macedonia joins NATO as 30th Ally,” NATO Press Center, March 27, 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_174589.htm.
[2] “A More Credible, Dynamic, Predictable and Political EU Accession Process - Commission Lays Out its Proposals,” European Commission Press Center, February 5, 2020. https://ec.europa(.)eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_181.
[3] Michaela Walker, Andrea Snyder, Darina Regio, and Nataliya Bugayova, “Russia in Review: Balkans Campaign Update” Institute for the Study of War, May 9, 2019, https://www.iswresearch.org/2019/05/russia-in-review-balkans-campaign-update.html.
[4] Plator Gashi, Eve-anne Travers and Filip Rudic, “Kosovo’s Bid to Join Interpol Fails,” Balkan Insight, November 20, 2018, https://balkaninsight(.)com/2018/11/20/kosovo-s-bid-to-join-interpol-fails-11-20-2018/ ; “Kosovo Slaps 100 Percent Tariffs On Serbia, Bosnia To 'Defend Vital Interest,'” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 21, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/kosovo-slaps-100-percent-tariffs-on-serbia-bosnia-to-defend-vital-interest-/29613285.html.
[5] “Remarks by Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi at the Joint Press Point with Aleksandar Vučić, President of Serbia,” European Commission Press Center, February 6, 2020, https://ec.europa(.)eu/commission/commissioners/2019-2024/varhelyi/announcements/remarks-commissioner-oliver-varhelyi-joint-press-point-aleksandar-vucic-president-serbia_en.
[6] “Telephone Conversation with the President of the Republic of France,” The President of the Republic of Serbia Press Center, April 2, 2020, https://www.predsednik(.)rs/en/press-center/press-releases/telephone-conversation-with-the-president-of-the-republic-of-france.
[7] John Irish and Robin Emmott, “Macron Opens Door to North Macedonia, Albania EU Accession Talks,” Reuters, February 15, 2020, https://www.reuters(.)com/article/us-germany-security-macron-balkans/macron-opens-door-to-north-macedonia-albania-eu-accession-talks-idUSKBN2090DM.
[8] “EU-Western Balkans Summit in Zagreb Postponed, New Date Possible in June,” European Western Balkans, April 8, 2020, https://europeanwesternbalkans(.)com/2020/04/08/eu-western-balkans-summit-in-zagreb-postponed-new-date-possible-in-june/.
[9] “Serbia Committed to Joining European Union, says President Aleksandar Vučić,” Euronews, January 23, 2020, https://www.euronews(.)com/2020/01/23/serbia-committed-to-joining-european-union-says-president-aleksandar-vucic.
[10] “Vucic, Thaci Hold Meeting in Washington,” Independent Balkan News Agency, March 3, 2020, https://balkaneu(.)com/vucic-thaci-hold-meeting-in-the-us/ ; Dagmar Skrpec, “Playing the Field in Serbia: Aleksandar Vucic’s Dance between Russia and the West,” Foreign Affairs, September 11, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/serbia/2015-09-11/playing-field-serbia.
[11] Amy Mackinnon and Robbie Gramer, “Vucic: Most Serbs Prefer a ‘Frozen Conflict’ with Kosovo,” Foreign Policy, March 4, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/04/serbian-president-aleksandar-vucic-interview-frozen-conflict-kosovo/.
[12] “Serbia's Vucic Backs Changes To EU Accession Process,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 6, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-s-vucic-backs-changes-to-eu-accession-process/30421003.html.
[13] Aleksandar Vasovic, Ivana Sekularac, “Serbia's Vucic Confirms Domination with Presidential Win,” Reuters, April 1, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-serbia-election/serbias-vucic-confirms-domination-with-presidential-win-idUSKBN1733VI ; Dagmar Skrpec, “Playing the Field in Serbia: Aleksandar Vucic’s Dance between Russia and the West,” Foreign Affairs, September 11, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/serbia/2015-09-11/playing-field-serbia.
[14] “Kosovo Lifts All Tariffs on Serbian, Bosnian Goods,” DW, April 1, 2020, https://www.dw(.)com/en/kosovo-lifts-all-tariffs-on-serbian-bosnian-goods/a-52975561.
[15] Llazar Semini, “Kosovo Lifts 100% Tariff on Serb, Bosnian Goods,” Associated Press, March 31, 2020, https://apnews.com/bc2a6ce8674ab51d18fe7c5496b898cd.
[16] Xhorxhina Bami, “No-Confidence Vote Topples Kurti Govt in Kosovo,” Balkan Insight, March 25, 2020, https://balkaninsight(.)com/2020/03/25/no-confidence-vote-topples-kurti-govt-in-kosovo/ ; Xhorxhina Bami, “Kosovo President Presses Leaders Over Unity Govt,” Balkan Insight, April 1, 2020, https://balkaninsight(.)com/2020/04/01/kosovo-president-presses-leaders-over-national-unity-govt/.
[16] “Kosovo Lifts 100 Percent Tariff On Serbia; Belgrade Calls It 'Fake News,'” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 1, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/kosovo-lifts-serbia-tariffs-belgrade/30521305.html ; Xhorxhina Bami, “No-Confidence Vote Topples Kurti Govt in Kosovo,” Balkan Insight, March 25, 2020, https://balkaninsight(.)com/2020/03/25/no-confidence-vote-topples-kurti-govt-in-kosovo/ ; Xhorxhina Bami, “Kosovo President Presses Leaders Over Unity Govt,” Balkan Insight, April 1, 2020, https://balkaninsight(.)com/2020/04/01/kosovo-president-presses-leaders-over-national-unity-govt/.
[16] “Kosovo Lifts 100 Percent Tariff On Serbia; Belgrade Calls It 'Fake News,'” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 1, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/kosovo-lifts-serbia-tariffs-belgrade/30521305.html.
[17] Xhorxhina Bami, “Thaci Push for Unity Government in Kosovo Deemed Futile,” Balkan Insight, March 30, 2020 https://balkaninsight(.)com/2020/03/30/thaci-push-for-unity-government-in-kosovo-deemed-futile/ ; Xhorxhina Bami, “Policy Rift Widens Between Kosovo President and PM,” Balkan Insight, March 10, 2020, https://balkaninsight(.)com/2020/03/10/policy-rift-widens-between-kosovo-president-and-pm/ ; “Thaci Urges Kosovo’s Lawmakers To Consider Western Ties When Talking Tariffs,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 1, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/thaci-urges-kosovo-s-lawmakers-to-consider-western-ties-when-talking-tariffs/29746136.html ; “Clash of Thaçi and Kurti Over Tariffs Continues,” European Western Balkans, March 12, 2020, https://europeanwesternbalkans(.)com/2020/03/12/clash-of-thaci-and-kurti-over-tariffs-continues/.
[18] “U.S. Envoy Calls Kosovo's Decision To Partially Lift Serbian Import Tariffs A 'Serious Mistake,'” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 28, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/u-s-envoy-calls-kosovo-s-decision-to-partially-lift-serbian-import-tariffs-a-serious-mistake-/30459227.html.
[19] “Kosovo Lifts 100 Percent Tariff On Serbia; Belgrade Calls It 'Fake News,'” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 1, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/kosovo-lifts-serbia-tariffs-belgrade/30521305.html.
[20] NATO’s 2011 military intervention in Libya is another of the Kremlin’s examples of “illegal NATO intervention.” [“Statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry Concerning the Anniversary of NATO’s Aggression Against the Union of the Republic of Yugoslavia,”] Russian Foreign Ministry, March 27, 2001, https://www.mid(.)ru/ru/maps/rs/-/asset_publisher/GLz7aPgDnSfP/content/id/587216 ; [“‘An Absolute Violation of International Law’: How NATO’s Bombing of Yugoslavia Changed the World,”] RT, March 24, 2019, https://russian.rt(.)com/world/article/614701-nato-yugoslavia-bombardirovki.
[21] Dusan Stojanovic, “Russian Defense Minister Visits Serbia Amid Balkan Tensions,” ABC News, February 17, 2020, https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/russian-defense-minister-visits-serbia-amid-balkan-tensions-69031454.
[22] “Serbia Receives Delivery Of Russian Antiaircraft Systems Despite U.S. Sanction Threats,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 24, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-receives-delivery-russian-antiaircraft-systems-despite-u-s-sanction-threats/30450693.html.
[23] Nataliya Bugayova and Anthony Yanchuk, “Russia in Review: The Kremlin's Block in the Balkans,” Institute for the Study of War, December 17, 2019, https://www.iswresearch.org/2019/12/russia-in-review-kremlins-block-in.html.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Lina Davydova, [“Virologists and Therapists: A Colonel of the Medical Service Spoke about the Specialists who Arrived in Serbia,”] Tv Zvezda, April 4, 2020, https://tvzvezda(.)ru/news/forces/content/20204493-RR9HX.html ; “All 11 Il-76 Aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces with Military Epidemiologists Arrived in Serbia,” Newsfront, April 4, 2020, https://en.news-front(.)info/2020/04/04/all-11-il-76-aircraft-of-the-russian-aerospace-forces-with-military-epidemiologists-arrived-in-serbia/ ; “The 11th Plane with Russian Aid Arrives in Serbia,” Oculus News, April 5, 2020, https://www.ocnal(.)com/2020/04/the-11th-plane-with-russian-aid-arrives.html.
[26] “Russian Aid Delivery to Republika Srpska Complete,” TASS, April 10, 2020, https://tass(.)com/society/1142823.
[27] “Three Russian planes has Delivered Aid to Republika Srpska,” Russian Aviation, April 10, 2020, https://www.ruaviation(.)com/news/2020/4/10/14942/?h ; “Russian Aid Delivery to Republika Srpska Complete,” TASS, April 10, 2020, https://tass(.)com/society/1142823 ; [“A Russian Plane with Medical Aid arrived in the Republika Srpska,”] EurAsia Daily, April 10, 2020, https://eadaily(.)com/ru/news/2020/04/10/v-respubliku-serbskuyu-pribyl-rossiyskiy-samolet-s-medicinskoy-pomoshchyu.
[28] John Follain, Alessandro Speciale, and Stepan Kravchenko, “Italy Questions Russians Over Their Goodwill Virus Gestures,” Bloomberg, April 3, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-03/italy-questions-russians-over-their-goodwill-virus-gestures ; Jennifer Hansler and Kylie Atwood, “Russian Coronavirus Aid Delivery to US Prompts Confusion and Criticism,” CNN, April 2, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/02/politics/russia-medical-supplies-us-propaganda/index.html
[29] The law requires Montenegrin religious communities to prove they owned their property before 1918, when the Kingdom of Montenegro joined the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. If religious communities cannot prove ownership, the state will take over ownership of their property. Samir Kajosevic, “Montenegro President Warns Party Members to Avoid Church Protests,” Balkan Insight, February 5, 2020, https://balkaninsight(.)com/2020/02/05/montenegro-president-warns-party-members-to-avoid-church-protests/ ; Andy Heil, “Montenegro's Not-So-Merry Legal Challenge To The Serbian Orthodox Church Riles Society,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, December 29, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/montenegro-s-not-so-merry-legal-challenge-to-the-serbian-orthodox-church-divides-society/30347966.html.
[30] “Montenegrin Protesters Clash with Police Over Religion Law,” Reuters, December 30, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/montenegro-protests/montenegrin-protesters-clash-with-police-over-religion-law-idUSL8N2930LF.
[31] Brandon Davis, “Holy War: How Putin Weaponized the Russian Orthodox Church,” Naval Postgraduate School, September 2019, https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/63444.
[32] Aleksandar Vasovic, “Montenegro's President Accuses Serbia and Russia of Undermining Independence,” Reuters, February 28, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-montenegro-protest-president/montenegros-president-accuses-serbia-and-russia-of-undermining-independence-idUSKCN20M2SS.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Tsvetelia Tsolova, “UPDATE 2-Bulgaria Agrees Deal to Cut Price of Russian Gas Imports by 40%,” Reuters, March 3, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/bulgaria-russia-gas-prices/update-2-bulgaria-agrees-deal-to-cut-price-of-russian-gas-imports-by-40-idUSL8N2AW22T.
[35] “Antitrust: Commission Imposes Binding Obligations on Gazprom to Enable Free Flow of Gas at Competitive Prices in Central and Eastern European Gas Markets,” European Commission Precess Center, May 24, 2018, https://ec.europa(.)eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_3921.
[36] George Barros and Nataliya Bugayova, “Europe Cedes Opportunity in Russia-Ukraine Energy Deal,” Institute for the Study of War, January 30, 2020, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2020/01/europe-cedes-opportunity-in-russia.html.
[37] [“Became Abroad: Bulgaria Intends to Abandon Russian Gas,”] Izvestia, February 3, 2020, https://iz(.)ru/970847/aleksandr-sidorov/stala-zagranitcei-bolgariia-namerena-otkazatsia-ot-rossiiskogo-gaza.
[38]“North Macedonia joins NATO as 30th Ally,” NATO Press Center, March 27, 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_174589.htm.
[39] [“Russian MFA Information and Press Department Commentary Regarding North Macedonia's Accession to NATO,”] Russian Foreign Ministry, March 31, 2020, https://www.mid(.)ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4093913.
[40] Greece demanded that then-“Macedonia” formally rename itself as “North Macedonia” as a condition for North Macedonia to join NATO. Idrees Ali, “U.S. Defense Secretary Warns of Russian Meddling in Macedonia Referendum,” Reuters, September 17, 2018,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-macedonia-usa/mattis-warns-of-russian-meddling-in-macedonia-vote-idUSKCN1LX0ER?il=0 ; “Macedonia is a Tiny Country with a Giant Russia Problem,” The Washington Post, September 20, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/macedonia-is-a-tiny-country-with-a-giant-russia-problem/2018/09/20/47a674d2-bb6b-11e8-a8aa-860695e7f3fc_story.html.
[41] Julian Borger, Andrew MacDowall, and Shaun Walker, “Serbia Deports Russians Suspected of Plotting Montenegro Coup,” The Guardian, November 11, 2016, https://www.theguardian(.)com/world/2016/nov/11/serbia-deports-russians-suspected-of-plotting-montenegro-coup.
Friday, April 17, 2020
Iraq Situation Report: April 8 - 14, 2020
By: Katherine Lawlor and Brandon Wallace
ISW is assessing the ongoing unrest and its effects on political-security dynamics in Iraq. The Iraq Situation Report (SITREP) map series summarizes key events and likely developments to come. The following SITREP map covers the period April 8 - 14, 2020.
Key Takeaway: The United States, Iran, and most of Iraq’s political elites agreed to support Iraq’s new prime minister (PM)-designate, Iraqi National Intelligence Director Mustafa al-Kadhimi, following Iran’s successful political proxy campaign to sink the PM-designation of Adnan al-Zurfi. Most of Iran’s political and militia proxies fell in line behind Kadhimi but conditioned their support on the rapid expulsion of US forces from Iraq. However, key proxy militia Kata’ib Hezbollah maintains its firm anti-Kadhimi stance and may escalate to violence if the government formation process does not favor Iran's preferred outcomes, including key cabinet appointments and 2020 budget allotments. Iran’s proxies are conducting an information operation consisting of rhetorical threats to shape Kadhimi's proposed cabinet and to increase Iraqi political support for ending the US force presence ahead of a US-Iraq strategic dialogue slated for June. Meanwhile, Iran’s proxy militias created a fourth new Shi’a militia group to increase rhetorical and kinetic pressure on US forces.
Thursday, April 16, 2020
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