Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Olivia Gibson, and Frederick W. Kagan
with Nate Trotter and William Runkel
February 16, 2025, 8:30pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on February 16. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the February 17 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov held a telephone call on
February 16 to "open a channel of communication" for future talks about
the war in Ukraine. US State Department Spokesperson Tammy
Bruce stated that Rubio spoke with Lavrov as a follow up to US President
Donald Trump's recent call with Russian President Vladimir Putin and
that Rubio reaffirmed Trump's commitment to ending the war in
Ukraine.[1] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that
Rubio and Lavrov agreed to maintain a channel of communication to
resolve issues in the US-Russian relationship; to remove barriers to
trade, economic, and investment cooperation; to work together on ending
the war in Ukraine and solving issues in the Middle East; and to
organize future meetings to improve the work of foreign missions in the
United States and Russia.[2] The Russian MFA claimed that Rubio and
Lavrov agreed to work to restore "mutually respectful" interstate
dialogue and to hold regular contacts, including a Russian-American
summit in the future. Rubio stated on CBS on February 16 that
his phone call with Lavrov was meant to establish communications for
future efforts aimed at reaching a peace agreement in Ukraine.[3] Rubio
noted that he discussed issues surrounding the operation of American and
Russian embassies because it will be difficult to communicate with
Russia if the embassies are not functioning.
US, Russian,
and Ukrainian delegations are reportedly gathering in Saudi Arabia ahead
of bilateral US-Russia and US-Ukraine negotiations in the coming weeks.
US Special Presidential Envoy for the Middle East Steve
Witkoff stated on February 16 that he, National Security Advisor Mike
Waltz, and other unnamed US officials will travel to Saudi Arabia for
bilateral negotiations with Russia.[4] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio
told CBS that he will also travel to Saudi Arabia this week
and will take advantage of "any opportunity" to further US President
Donald Trump's goal of ending the war in Ukraine.[5] It remains unclear
who will represent Russia during the meeting, although a Russian insider
source claimed on February 16 that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov will arrive in Saudi Arabia in February 18.[6]Ukrainian Economic
Minister Yulia Svyrydenko stated that a Ukrainian delegation has also
arrived in Saudi Arabia on a working visit.[7] It is unclear if US and
Ukrainian officials will meet in Saudi Arabia, as US Special
Presidential Envoy for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg will arrive in
Ukraine in the coming days to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky.[8]
US officials continue to outline their expectations
for the peace negotiations. Witkoff noted that his initial meeting with
Russian officials is about "trust building" and expressed hope that he
will make progress during these initial meetings.[9] Kellogg stated
during the Munich Security Conference on February 15 that Russia must
make territorial concessions during the negotiations and that Russia
could also promise to not use force against Ukraine in the future or
commit to "downsizing" the Russian military.[10] Rubio stated during his
interview with CBS that European officials must be involved in
the peace negotiations in some capacity, but did not provide additional
details.[11] The People's Republic of China (PRC) and Brazil also
released a statement on February 16 calling for major world powers to
work together to promote peace in Ukraine.[12]
Ukraine's
European partners reiterated their support for Ukraine's war effort and
domestic defense industry at the Munich Security Conference.
Zelensky met with Head of the German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall Armin
Papperger on February 15 to discuss the development of joint projects
between the Ukrainian and German defense industries, particularly
regarding 155mm ammunition production, and broader cooperation in
maintenance and repair efforts.[13] Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky met with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and emphasized
strengthening Ukraine's front-line positions, improving air defenses,
and bolstering Ukrainian production of long-range drones and
missiles.[14] Zelensky met separately with Finnish President Alexander
Stubb and Dutch Prime Minister Dick Schoof and discussed increased
defense assistance to Ukraine, direct investments in Ukraine's
production of long-range weapons, and strengthening sanctions on
Russia's shadow tanker fleet.[15] Zelensky met with Norwegian Prime
Minister Jonas Gahr Store to discuss Ukrainian weapons production,
including long-range missile and drone production.[16] Zelensky met with
Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson to discuss increasing sanctions
pressure on Russia and strengthening defense cooperation.[17] Ukrainian
Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak met with former NATO Secretary
General (from 2009-2014) Anders Fogh Rasmussen and discussed
strengthening Europe's own defense and establishing a task force to
develop the concept of a "security guarantee mechanism" for Ukraine,
inspired by the International Task Force on Security and Euro-Atlantic
Integration of Ukraine.[18] Yermak and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy
Sybiha met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and reiterated their
commitment to future peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.[19]
Czech
President Petr Pavel announced the continuation of the Czech-led
Initiative to provide Ukraine with large-caliber ammunition on the
sidelines of the Munich Security Conference and stated that Czechia
secured funding to meet Ukraine's artillery needs until April 2025.[20] Reuters reported
that an unnamed Czech government official reported that by the end of
2024 the Czech Initiative had already provided Ukraine with roughly
500,000 155mm artillery rounds and an estimated one million shells over
100mm caliber.
Ukrainian officials also met with US officials to discuss continued support for Ukraine. Yermak
met with the US Presidential Envoy for Special Missions Richard Grenell
to discuss preparations for upcoming high-level meetings.[21] Grenell
emphasized that support for Ukraine is an investment in global
stability and security. Zelensky met with a bipartisan delegation of US
congressmen to discuss continued US defense assistance to Ukraine and
the provision of reliable security guarantees.[22]
The
Kremlin officially reiterated its claim that Ukraine has no sovereignty,
setting conditions for Moscow to claim that Ukraine has no standing to
negotiate with Russia or that any agreements reached with Ukraine in the
future are invalid. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed
on February 16 that Russia has adjusted its approach to potential talks
with Ukraine because Ukraine allegedly has a "deficit" of
sovereignty.[23] Peskov claimed that Ukraine's decision to not sign the
peace agreement that Russia and Ukraine were discussing in Spring 2022
in Istanbul shows that Russia cannot trust Ukraine's word. Ukraine and
Russia had not finalized a peace deal in Istanbul in 2022.[24] Kremlin
officials have repeatedly claimed that the West forced Ukraine to walk
away from the Istanbul deal and that Ukraine thus lacks sovereignty.
Peskov also continued longstanding Kremlin efforts to place the blame
for Russia's full-scale invasion on Ukraine, claiming that Ukraine would
"be intact," that the Ukrainian government would not have "abused"
Russians in eastern Ukraine, that there would have been no "civil war,"
and that Russians in eastern Ukraine would have had "no desire...to
separate from Ukraine" had Ukraine fulfilled the terms of the Minsk
agreements.[25] The Minsk agreements were notably extremely favorable to
Russia, placing no obligations on Moscow, yet Russian proxies
continually violated the accords with Russian support.[26]
Kremlin-controlled state media used a February 15 interview with
Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Viktor
Medvedchuk to reiterate the Kremlin's false narrative about Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky's illegitimacy.[27]
Medvedchuk's
interview and Peskov's February 16 statements continue to cast doubt on
Moscow's willingness to negotiate in good faith about a settlement of
the war and set informational conditions for Russia to violate any
agreement reached on the grounds that the Ukrainian government had no
legal right to conclude it.[28] US President Donald Trump
recently reiterated that Ukraine will be part of any talks with Russia
about ending the war.[29] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on
February 16 that Putin expressed his desire to end the war to Trump in
their recent phone call but noted that Putin must follow up his
statement with action in the coming days and weeks to show if he is
serious.[30]
The Kremlin extended an open invitation to US
President Donald Trump to attend the May 9 Victory Day parade in Moscow
as part of efforts to posture Russia's strength and global power
status. Peskov stated in response to a question about whether
the Kremlin is considering hosting Trump at the May 9 Victory Day parade
in Moscow that Russian President Vladimir Putin would be "happy to
welcome" any head of state to the parade.[31] The May 9 parade
highlights the Soviet Union's role in defeating Nazi Germany during the
Second World War. Putin has often used his May 9 speeches to emphasize
the Soviet Union's victory over Nazi Germany while minimizing the
contributions of the other Western Allies.[32] Putin has even previously
claimed that the Soviet Union acted "alone" in the Second World
War.[33] The 2025 Victory Day parade will notably celebrate the 80th
anniversary of the end of the Second World War, and Putin has named 2025
the "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland."[34] ISW continues to note
that Putin is trying to present himself as equal to Trump and to
present Russia as a global power comparable to the United States and as
an heir to the Soviet Union's "superpower" status.[35]
Western
reporting suggested that the United States intends to ease sanctions on
Belarus. Russia uses Belarus as a staging ground for its military
against Ukraine and NATO and as critical tool in its sanctions evasion
schemes. US Deputy Assistance Secretary of State Christopher Smith told CNN on
February 12 that he led a US delegation to Minsk and met with
"Belarusian counterparts" to secure the release of several political
prisoners.[36] Smith stated that Belarusian President Alexander
Lukashenko "didn't get anything for this" release and that the release
was a "unilateral gesture" by Belarus. Belarusian journalist Igar Tur
claimed on February 13 that Smith and unspecified US officials may have
met with Lukashenko during the visit.[37] The New York Times
(NYT), citing sources familiar with Smith's trip, reported on February
15 that Smith met with Lukashenko and Belarusian State Security
Committee (KGB) Head Ivan Tertel in Minsk on February 12.[38] NYT,
citing individuals who attended Smith's briefing after the trip,
reported that Smith later announced that the US is considering a
bilateral agreement in which Lukashenko would release an unspecified
number of political prisoners in exchange for the US easing sanctions on
Belarusian banks and exports of potash, a key ingredient for fertilizer
and major Belarusian export. ISW assesses that any sort of sanctions
relief directed toward Belarus would have a positive effect on the
Russian economy, as Russia has spent decades integrating Belarus into
the Russian economy as part of the Union State project as ISW's George
Barros has recently reported in detail.[39] Belarus is a key tool for
Russia in its sanctions evasion scheme and the Russian and Belarusian
economies are integrated to a degree that Russia's war effort would
directly benefit from the easing of US sanctions on Belarus.[40]
The
Russian military command reportedly redeployed additional elements of
the Southern Military District's (SMD) 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA) to
the Toretsk and eastern Pokrovsk directions, further indicating that the
Russian military command intends to prioritize putting pressure on
Kostyantynivka – the southernmost point of Ukraine's "fortress belt" –
in 2025. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets
stated on February 16 that the Russian military command redeployed
elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division's 242nd, 255th, and 33rd
motorized rifle regiments and the 150th Motorized Rifle Division's 102nd
and 103rd motorized rifle regiments and 163rd Tank Regiment from the
Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk and eastern Pokrovsk directions.[41]
Mashovets stated that elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division
recently arrived in Toretsk and will attempt to advance along the T-0516
Toretskighway towards Pleshchiivka and Kostyantynivka (both northwest
of Toretsk) with the support of the 9th and 132nd motorized rifle
brigades (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps
[DNR AC], SMD). Mashovets stated that elements of the 20th Motorized
Rifle Division arrived near Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk and southwest
of Toretsk) and will attempt to advance along the T-0504
Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway with support from the 5th Motorized
Rifle Brigade (51st CAA). Mashovets stated that the Russian military
command recently reconstituted the 20th and 150th motorized rifle
divisions with new personnel and equipment and estimated that the
Russian military command redeployed 7,000 to 8,000 troops from each
division to the Toretsk and eastern Pokrovsk directions. A Ukrainian
source recently amplified footage of a Russian servicemember claiming
that the Russian military command redeployed the 150th Motorized Rifle
Division to the Toretsk direction, and Mashovets' report supports this
claim.[42] ISW has not observed additional reports of the 20th or 150th
motorized rifle divisions engaged in combat in the Toretsk or eastern
Pokrovsk directions as of this report, however.
Mashovets assessed
that Russian forces intend to eliminate the Ukrainian pocket around
Stara Mykolaivka and along the H-20 Avdiivka-Kostyantynivka highway
before advancing on Kostyantynivka from the south and southwest, which
is consistent with ISW's assessment that Russian forces may want to
eliminate the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk in order to firm up
their southern flank ahead of a push on Kostyantynivka.[43] Russian
forces likely intend to leverage advances southwest of Toretsk and
northeast of Pokrovsk to force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from this
pocket under threat of envelopment in the coming months. Mashovets
suggested that the Russian military command may redeploy elements of the
110th and 114th motorized rifle brigades (51st CAA) to the
Toretsk-Vozdvyzhenka area to reinforce this effort after these elements
complete the seizure of Andriivka (west of Kurakhove) and level the
frontline west of Kurakhove.[44] ISW assesses that Russian forces
operating east of Pokrovsk near Vozdvyzhenka are roughly 22 kilometers
south of Kostyantynivka at their closest point of advance and that
Russian forces operating in Toretsk are roughly 11 kilometers from
Kostyantynivka at their closest point of advance as of February 16.
Russian forces could possibly reach the southern outskirts of
Kostyantynivka in May 2025 should Russian forces be able to replicate
their recent rate of advance south of Pokrovsk, but this is unlikely
given the likely more significant Ukrainian defenses that Russian forces
will face on the road to Kostyantynivka and the degradation of the
Russian units involved.
The Russian military appears to be
committing to a multi-years long effort to seize Ukraine's "fortress
belt" in Donetsk Oblast, further underscoring Russia's Putin's apparent
disinterest in a lasting and enduring peace in Ukraine. Mashovets
stated that the Russian military command also redeployed the 10th Tank
Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) and 68th Tank Regiment (150th
Motorized Rifle Division) to the 3rd CAA's area of responsibility in the
Siversk and Chasiv Yar directions.[45] ISW has not recently observed
reports of Russia reinforcing the Siversk or Chasiv Yar directions, but
Mashovets' report suggests that the Russian military command may be
reprioritizing those efforts. ISW has recently observed an
intensification in Russian activity in the Lyman and Chasiv Yar
directions and consistent activity in the Siversk direction.[46] Russian
forces may intend to leverage advances in these areas to pressure
Slovyansk and Kramatorsk from the north and east as Russian forces
attempt to advance on Kostyantynivka from the south.
Ukraine's
"fortress belt" is a 50-kilometer-long line of four major cities
(Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, and Kostyantynivka) that forms the
backbone of Ukraine's defenses in Donetsk Oblast, and Russia has long
aspired to seize these cities.[47] Russian forces are currently between
25 and 30 kilometers from Slovyansk's eastern outskirts, roughly 20
kilometers from Kramatorsk's eastern outskirts, and nine kilometers from
Kostyantynivka's northeastern outskirts at their closest points along
the frontline in Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces in the Lyman and Siversk
directions will have to seize Lyman and Siversk (likely months-long
efforts themselves) and advance through numerous fields and small
settlements before they can begin to threaten Slovyansk. Russian forces
have spent most of the last 10 months slowly grinding through the urban
areas of Chasiv Yar and Toretsk but have yet to completely seize these
towns. Russian forces may intend to advance southwest of Kostyantynivka
and attempt to cut the settlement off from the rest of the fortress belt
to the west, but such advances would not collapse the entire fortress
belt. Russian advances east and south Kostyantynivka would pressure the
fortress belt, but Russian forces are unlikely to completely collapse
and seize the fortress belt in 2025 or even 2026.
It is
unlikely that the Russian military can sustain a multi-year and
multi-axis campaign against Ukraine's fortress belt alongside its other
offensive operations in Ukraine. ISW has extensively reported
on Russia's mounting personnel and equipment losses in Ukraine and
continues to assess that such losses are unsustainable in the medium- to
long-term given Russia's current force generation and defense
industrial capabilities.[48] A multi-year campaign against a series of
significant Ukrainian defensive positions will almost certainly require
more forces and materiel than previous Russian efforts in less
operationally significant frontline areas. Russian forces have yet to
face significant and sufficiently built-up Ukrainian defenses since
their campaign against Bakhmut in Spring 2023 and Avdiivka in Winter
2023-2024, and Russian forces' current method of advancing using its
current manpower advantage to conduct costly infantry assaults is
unlikely to achieve the same results in the face of significant
Ukrainian defenses.[49] ISW previously noted that the Russian military
command has demonstrated its willingness to commit to operations that
could take months or even years to conclude as Russian President
Vladimir Putin continues to hold a theory of victory that assumes that
Russia is able to continue the war until Russia militarily defeats
Ukraine.[50] Putin's willingness to begin a likely years-long campaign
against Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast further supports this
assessment and calls into question Russia's interest and intent in
sitting down for bilateral negotiations with the United States.
Key Takeaways:
- US
Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov held a telephone call on February 16 to "open a channel of
communication" for future talks about the war in Ukraine.
- US,
Russian, and Ukrainian delegations are reportedly gathering in Saudi
Arabia ahead of bilateral US-Russia and US-Ukraine negotiations in the
coming weeks.
- Ukraine's European partners
reiterated their support for Ukraine's war effort and domestic defense
industry at the Munich Security Conference.
- The
Kremlin officially reiterated its claim that Ukraine has no
sovereignty, setting conditions for Moscow to claim that Ukraine has no
standing to negotiate with Russia or that any agreements reached with
Ukraine in the future are invalid.
- Medvedchuk's
interview and Peskov's February 16 statements continue to cast doubt on
Moscow's willingness to negotiate in good faith about a settlement of
the war and set informational conditions for Russia to violate any
agreement reached on the grounds that the Ukrainian government had no
legal right to conclude it.
- The Kremlin
extended an open invitation to US President Donald Trump to attend the
May 9 Victory Day parade in Moscow as part of efforts to posture
Russia's strength and global power status.
- Western
reporting suggested that the United States intends to ease sanctions on
Belarus. Russia uses Belarus as a staging ground for its military
against Ukraine and NATO and as critical tool in its sanctions evasion
schemes.
- The Russian military command
reportedly redeployed additional elements of the Southern Military
District's (SMD) 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA) to the Toretsk and eastern
Pokrovsk directions, further indicating that the Russian military
command intends to prioritize putting pressure on Kostyantynivka – the
southernmost point of Ukraine's "fortress belt" – in 2025.
- The
Russian military appears to be committing to a multi-years long effort
to seize Ukraine's "fortress belt" in Donetsk Oblast, further
underscoring Russia's Putin's apparent disinterest in a lasting and
enduring peace in Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces
recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in
Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Siversk, and Kurakhove.

We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian
Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the
international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube
artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort
#2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into
eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian forces recently advanced in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast. Fighting
continued west of Sudzha near Sverdlikovo, northwest of Sudzha near
Pogrebki and Malaya Loknya, north of Sudzha near Cherkasskoye
Porechnoye, and south of Sudzha near Guyevo.[51] A Russian milblogger
claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful counterattacks near
Sverdlikovo, Russkaya Konopelka (east of Sudzha), and Kurilovka (south
of Sudzha).[52] A Ukrainian brigade operating in Kursk Oblast reported
on February 16 that elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade
(Pacific Fleet) conducted an unsuccessful mechanized assault consisting
of more than a dozen tanks in Kursk Oblast.[53]
Assessed Russian
advances: Geolocated footage published on February 15 indicates that
Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Sverdlikovo.[54]
Unconfirmed
Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian
forces seized Sverdlikovo and advanced near Pogrebki, in Fanaseyevka
(southeast of Sudzha), and northwest and south of Guyevo.[55] A
Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have
not seized the entirety of Sverdlikovo, however.[56]

The
deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in Kursk Oblast
reported that Russian forces recently resumed using armored vehicles
during assaults and unsuccessfully attacked with roughly seven armored
vehicles in an unspecified area on February 16.[57] The deputy commander
stated that North Korean soldiers recently resumed assaults in groups
of 10 to 15 personnel and that the groups are attacking in more spread
out formations as part of efforts to complicate Ukrainian efforts to
strike the attacking forces. North Korean forces reportedly recently
withdrew from active combat operations in Kursk Oblast after suffering
heavy casualties in large part from Ukrainian drone strikes, and reports
that North Korean have adjusted their tactics on the battlefield to
counter Ukrainian drone strikes indicates that North Korean forces may
be learning lessons and gaining valuable combat experience.[58]
Order
of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade
(Pacific Fleet) and 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly using
fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones in Kursk Oblast; elements of
the Russian "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the
BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating near
Sudzha; elements of the 106th VDV Division are reportedly operating in
Sverdlikovo and near Darino (southeast of Korenevo); and elements of the
83rd VDV Brigade are reportedly operating in Sverdlikovo, Darino, and
Nikolayevo-Darino (west of Sudzha).[59]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on February 16 but did not advance. Russian
forces conducted offensive operations along the international border
north of Kharkiv City toward Kozacha Lopan and northeast of Kharkiv City
near Vovchansk and Tykhe on February 15 and 16.[60]
Unconfirmed
Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed on February 15
that Russian forces marginally advanced in eastern Vovchansk.[61]
Order
of Battle: Drone operators of the Chechen 204th "Akhmat" Spetsnaz
Regiment reportedly are striking Ukrainian positions in the Kharkiv
direction.[62]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction. Russian
forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Dovhenke, Zapadne, Doroshivka,
and Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Dvorichna and Fyholivka;
east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and Stepova Novoselivka; and
southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and toward Novoosynove on February
15 and 16.[63]
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage
published on February 16 indicates that Russian forces recently crossed
the Oskil River and advanced in the fields southwest of Topoli
(northeast of Kupyansk).[64]
Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces
Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov reported on February 16 that Russian
forces have intensified their assaults in the Kupyansk direction in
order to cross the Oskil River and create a bridgehead on the west
(right) bank of the river.[65] Trehubov reported that Russian forces
continue to cross the river in small groups, accumulate on the opposite
bank, and then conduct attacks. Trehubov noted that Russian forces have
increased their activity since the freezing ground has facilitated the
movement of equipment across the river.
Order of Battle: Elements
of the Russian 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army
[CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near
Dvorichna.[66]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 16 but did not advance. Russian
forces attacked north of Borova toward Novoplatonivka; northeast of
Borova near Kolisnykivka, Lozova, and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova
near Zeleny Hai; and southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka,
Novoyehorivka, and Hrekivka on February 15 and 16.[67]
Order of
Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian
General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near
Cherneshchyna (southeast of Borova).[68]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on February 16 but did not advance. Russian
forces attacked north of Lyman toward Nove; northeast of Lyman near
Novolyubivka, Novomykhailivka, Yampolivka, Kolodyazi, and Terny; and
east of Lyman near Torske and Dibrova and in the Serebryanske forest
area on February 15 and 16.[69]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian
brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on February 16 that
Russian forces continue to deploy small groups of two to four soldiers
without armored vehicle support but with first-person view (FPV) drone
support to attack in the area.[70]
Order of Battle: Elements of
the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military
District [MMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Lyman direction,
and drone operators of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly
operating near Kolodyazi.[71]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk. Russian
forces continued assaults north of Siversk toward Dronivka, east of
Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near
Ivano-Darivka on February 15 and 16.[72]
Assessed Russian
advances: Geolocated footage published on February 16 indicates that
Russian forces recently marginally advanced in northern Bilohorivka
(northeast of Siversk).[73]
Order of Battle: Elements of the
Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA],
formerly the 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern
Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Siversk
direction.[74]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on February 16 but did not advance. Russian
forces attacked near and within Chasiv Yar itself, northeast of Chasiv
Yar near Vasyukivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky,
Predtechyne, and Bila Hora on February 15 and 16.[75]
Unconfirmed
Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of
the Russian 1442nd and 1008th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 6th
Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC) advanced east of Stupochky and seized
tactical heights east of the settlement and that Russian forces are
operating on the outskirts of the settlement.[76]
Order of Battle:
Drone operators of the Russian 85th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA)
are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[77]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces continued attacking in Toretsk itself and north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Krymske on February 15 and 16.[78]
Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 15
indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in northern
Toretsk.[79]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on February 16 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk
near Tarasivka and Malynivka; east of Pokrovsk near Vodyane Druhe,
Yelyzavetivka, Promin, Zelene Pole, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of
Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko and Dachenske;
and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Pishchane, Udachne, Uspenivka,
Nadivka, and Zaporizhzhia on February 15 and 16.[80] Russian milbloggers
claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pishchane and north
of Shevchenko and maintain positions between Dachenske and Lysivka.[81]
Unconfirmed
Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian
forces seized Berezivka (northeast of Pokrovsk) and advanced west of
Tarasivka, up to the southeastern outskirts of Malynivka (northeast of
Pokrovsk), within and on the eastern outskirts of Pishchane, in Udachne,
and in Zaporizhzhia (southwest of Pokrovsk).[82]
Ukraine's
Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on
February 16 that Ukrainian forces recently pushed Russian forces out of
Pishchane in part due to effective interaction between Ukrainian drone
and ground assault elements.[83] Ukrainian military observer Yuriy
Butusov stated that Ukrainian forces pushed elements of the Russian 74th
Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) out
of Pishchane in early February.[84] Russian milbloggers claimed that
Russian forces occupy all or most of the industrial zone in Pishchane
and that Ukrainian forces currently only occupy a small part of the
residential sector.[85]
A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z
instructor claimed that Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction have an
insufficient quantity of small transport vehicles and that Ukrainian
drone and artillery strikes are complicating Russian logistics and
preventing Russian advances.[86] The milblogger complained that the
Russian military command has not created separate strike drone brigades
to support Russian efforts to break through Ukrainian defenses, as
Russian artillery is insufficient, and Russian forces are not able to
sufficiently concentrate airstrikes against a single frontline area to
facilitate advances.
Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction. Russian
forces conducted offensive operations west of Kurakhove near
Kostyantynopil, Oleksiivka, Andriivka, Dachne, and Ulakly and southwest
of Kurakhove near Zelenivka and Rozlyv on February 15 and 16.[87] A
source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence
reported that Russian forces used between 20 and 37 units of equipment
to attack towards Kostyantynopil and between eight and 10 armored
vehicles to attack towards Ulakly on February 15.[88] A Russian
milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near
Kostyantynopil and Ulakly.[89]
Assessed Russian advances:
Geolocated footage published on February 16 indicates that Russian
forces recently advanced southeast of Ulakly.[90] Additional geolocated
footage published on February 16 shows Russian forces conducting a
roughly platoon-sized mechanized assault on the southern outskirts of
Ulakly and southwest of the settlement, indicating that Russian forces
recently advanced in the area.[91]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed
advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced along
the H-15 highway between Dachne and Ulakly, into Ulakly, east of
Ulakly, up to southern Kostyantynopil, and to southern Bahatyr (west of
Kurakhove) - clearing the Ukrainian pocket east of Ulakly.[92] A Russian
source claimed that some Ukrainian forces remain in the pocket,
however.[93]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces took advantage of poor weather conditions to advance near Ulakly.[94]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th
AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near
Ulakly; elements of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment and 68th Tank
Regiment (both of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are
reportedly operating in Dachne; elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle
Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD)
are reportedly operating in Andriivka; and elements of the 14th
Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are
reportedly operating near Rozlyv.[95]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Velyka Novosilka on February 16 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian
forces conducted offensive operations near Velyka Novosilka itself,
north of Velyka Novosilka near Novyi Komar, northwest of Velyka
Novosilka toward Burlatske, and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka
on February 15 and 16.[96] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian
forces conducted a mechanized assault of an unspecified echelon using
vehicles equipped with electronic warfare (EW) systems towards
Novosilka.[97]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian
milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to central Novosilka,
in Novoocheretuvate (north of Velyka Novosilka), and towards
Dniproenerhiia (north of Novoocheretuvate).[98]
Order of Battle:
Elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly
operating near Novoocheretuvate; elements of the 40th Naval Infantry
Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Dniproenerhiia;
and elements of the 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are
reportedly operating near Velyka Novosilka.[99]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 16 but did not advance. Russian
forces attacked northwest of Robotyne near Novoandriivka, Shcherbaky,
Mali Shcherbaky, and Pyatykhatky on February 15 and 16.[100]

Russian
operations continue to disrupt the work of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) at the Russian-occupied Zaporizhia Nuclear Power
Plant (ZNPP). Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
Spokesperson Heorhyi Tykhyi stated on February 16 that Russian forces
prevented IAEA experts from leaving the ZNPP following two similar
rotation disruptions in January 2025 and earlier in February 2025.[101]
Russian
forces continued limited ground attacks in the Dnipro direction and on
the islands in the Dnipro River Delta on February 15 and 16 but did not
advance.[102]
Russian milbloggers complained about
insufficient quantities of boats in the Dnipro direction as Russian
forces are using Soviet-era fishing boats to deliver cargo and personnel
to frontline positions.[103]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian
forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine
targeting critical infrastructure on the night of February 15 to 16. The
Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 143 Shahed
and decoy drones from Oryol and Bryansk oblasts and Shatalovo, Smolensk
Oblast and two ballistic missiles targeting Odesa Oblast from occupied
Crimea.[104] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot
down 95 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Kyiv,
Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv oblasts and that 46
decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare
(EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces
struck Kyiv, Sumy, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts.[105] Ukrainian Prime
Minister Denys Shymhal stated that Russian drones damaged the Mykolaiv
Thermal Power Plant (TPP) in Mykolaiv City, disrupting heat supply to
Ukrainian civilians.[106]
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that
Ukrainian forces downed six Iskander-M and Kh-23 ballistic missiles; one
Kh-101 cruise missile, and 479 Shahed drones from February 10 to
16.[107]
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported on
February 15 that Ukrainian authorities are still working to extinguish
fires following the February 14 Russian strike on the Chornobyl Nuclear
Power Plant (NPP).[108] The IAEA confirmed that the Russian strike
breached the outer and inner cladding of the New Safe Confinement (NSC)
and damaged equipment and electrical cables.
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Nothing significant to report.
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Nothing significant to report.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.state.gov/secretary-rubios-call-with-russian-foreign-minister-lavrov
[2] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1997596/
[3] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/marco-rubio-face-the-nation-transcript-02-16-2025/
[4] https://www.foxnews.com/video/6368922229112
[5] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/marco-rubio-face-the-nation-transcript-02-16-2025/
[6] https://t.me/russo_corridor/452 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/54781
[7]
https://meduza dot
io/news/2025/02/16/v-saudovskuyu-araviyu-pribyla-delegatsiya-pravitelstva-ukrainy-tam-mogut-sostoyatsya-mirnye-peregovory;
https://www.facebook.com/yulia.svyrydenko/posts/pfbid0ZuJdLL9fpcoJCkMAyvw117omS94VtP7ZTADrkAteNdUoLF3Zo7Ev9Cc1ZwaJyM85l
; https://t.me/bbcrussian/76664
[8]
https://www.youtube.com/live/FxZ_I8G7BkY ; https://suspilne dot
media/949481-zelenskij-ukraina-povinna-virisuvati-hto-mae-buti-za-stolom-peregovoriv/
; https://suspilne dot
media/949505-zelenskij-hoce-povezti-kelloga-na-front-abi-toj-potim-rozpoviv-pro-realii-vijni-trampu/
; https://suspilne dot
media/949501-zelenskij-poasniv-comu-ukraini-potriben-vlasnij-pivtoramiljonnij-kontingent-akso-ne-bude-nato/
[9] https://www.foxnews.com/video/6368922229112
[10]
https://www.youtube.com/live/9XDbK34XmSo ; https://suspilne dot
media/949525-specpredstavnik-ssa-kellog-rf-mae-piti-na-teritorialni-postupki/
; https://newsukraine dot
rbc.ua/news/kellogg-names-concessions-russia-must-make-1739644456.html
[11] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/marco-rubio-face-the-nation-transcript-02-16-2025/
[12]
https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/wjbzhd/202502/t20250216_11555775.shtml ;
https://suspilne dot
media/949711-kitaj-ta-brazilia-zrobili-zaavu-pro-vreguluvanna-vijni-v-ukraini-j-nazvali-ii-krizou/
[13] https://www.president.gov dot ua/en/news/prezident-obgovoriv-iz-generalnim-direktorom-rheinmetall-roz-96109
[14] https://www.president.gov dot ua/en/news/u-myunheni-volodimir-zelenskij-zustrivsya-z-olafom-sholcom-96105
[15]
https://www.president.gov dot
ua/en/news/sankciyi-proti-tinovogo-flotu-rf-i-koordinaciya-iz-soyuznika-96117
; https://www.president.gov dot
ua/en/news/volodimir-zelenskij-i-dik-shoof-obgovorili-kroki-dlya-zmicne-96093
[16] https://www.president.gov dot ua/en/news/prezident-ukrayini-i-premyer-ministr-norvegiyi-obgovorili-zb-96101
[17] https://www.president.gov dot ua/en/news/pidtrimka-ukrayini-ta-sankciyi-proti-rosiyi-volodimir-zelens-96121
[18] https://www.president.gov dot ua/en/news/u-myunheni-andrij-yermak-i-anders-fog-rasmussen-obgovorili-s-96129
[19] https://www.president.gov dot ua/en/news/andrij-yermak-i-andrij-sibiga-proveli-zustrich-iz-ministrom-96133
[20] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ammunition-initiative-ukraine-continue-czech-president-says-2025-02-15/
[21] https://www.president.gov dot ua/en/news/andrij-yermak-zustrivsya-zi-specialnim-poslannikom-z-osobliv-96141
[22] https://www.president.gov dot ua/en/news/vijskova-dopomoga-ta-pidtrimka-ukrayini-prezident-proviv-zus-96081
[23] https://ria dot ru/20250216/peskov-1999672566.html
[24] https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/06/15/world/europe/ukraine-russia-ceasefire-deal.html;
[25] https://tass dot ru/politika/23155167
[26]
https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Minsk%20Revised%2C%20February%2011%2C%202025%20final%20PDF.pdf;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2024;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar121924
[27] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2025
[28] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2025
[29] https://www.reuters.com/world/eu-warns-against-dirty-deal-ukraine-after-trump-putin-phone-call-2025-02-13/;
[30] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/marco-rubio-face-the-nation-transcript-02-16-2025/
[31] https://ria dot ru/20250216/putin-1999662082.html
[32] https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-putin-victory-day-speech-shuns-west-allies/31248055.html
[33] https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-putin-victory-day-speech-shuns-west-allies/31248055.html
[34] https://isw.pub/UkrWar123124
[35]
https://isw.pub/UkrWar021525;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2025;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2025
[36] https://edition.cnn.com/2025/02/12/europe/russia-citizen-exchange-marc-fogel-intl/index.html
[37] https://t.me/glav_tur/13763
[38] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/15/world/europe/belarus-us-prisoners-diplomacy.html
[39] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-quiet-conquest-belarus
[40]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putin-vulnerable-western-policy-masks-russian-weakness
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-quiet-conquest-belarus
[41] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2564
[42]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2025
; https://t.me/supernova_plus/35958
[43] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/256 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012625
[44] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2565
[45] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2564 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2565
[46]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2025
;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-11-2025
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-14-2025
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2025
[47]
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2024
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis
[48] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar123124
[49] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut
[50] https://isw.pub/UkrWar013125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060724
[51] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154758 ; https://t.me/rybar/68074
[52] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23914
[53] https://t.me/brygada47/1258
[54] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8395 ; https://t.me/ua_marines_36brigade/2698?single
[55]https://t.me/dva_majors/64632
; https://t.me/rybar/68074 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32228 ;
https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23945 ;
https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23914 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32249 ;
https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23914 ;
[56] https://t.me/rybar/68074
[57] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/16/na-kurshhyni-znovu-pishly-v-shturm-soldaty-kndr-a-rosiyany-atakuyut-tehnikoyu/
[58]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2025
;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2025
[59]https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86366
; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23920 ; https://t.me/sashakots/51968 ;
https://t.me/mod_russia/48939 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/22475 ;
https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23925 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86405 ;
https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23945
[60]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21004 ;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023TV5rwJTkBDaNtJ9W7Ntyy8A3SAnZvNpC5h13xEnfUSWrE8LDRaKaVZyLdDykkmCl
; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5328 ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/4374
[61] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23914 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23928
[62] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5497
[63]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21029 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21004
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023TV5rwJTkBDaNtJ9W7Ntyy8A3SAnZvNpC5h13xEnfUSWrE8LDRaKaVZyLdDykkmCl
; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5328 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154758 ;
https://t.me/motopatriot78/32265 ; https://t.me/rybar/68071
[64] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8398 ; https://t.me/army_3otbr/1647
[65]
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2025/02/16/na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-aktyvizuvalysya-rosiyany-peretynayut-richku-oskil-malymy-grupamy/
[66] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32265
[67]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21029 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21004
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023TV5rwJTkBDaNtJ9W7Ntyy8A3SAnZvNpC5h13xEnfUSWrE8LDRaKaVZyLdDykkmCl
[68] https://t.me/Secrets_of_Vinakos/5548
[69]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21029 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21004
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023TV5rwJTkBDaNtJ9W7Ntyy8A3SAnZvNpC5h13xEnfUSWrE8LDRaKaVZyLdDykkmCl
; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154758
[70] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/16/sytuacziya-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-stabilno-atakuyut-i-stabilno-vmyrayut/
[71] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18845
[72]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21004 ;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023TV5rwJTkBDaNtJ9W7Ntyy8A3SAnZvNpC5h13xEnfUSWrE8LDRaKaVZyLdDykkmCl
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5328
[73] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/25691; https://t.me/apachi_fpv/325
[74] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154738
[75]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21029 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21004
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023TV5rwJTkBDaNtJ9W7Ntyy8A3SAnZvNpC5h13xEnfUSWrE8LDRaKaVZyLdDykkmCl
; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5328 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/64632 ;
https://t.me/wargonzo/24809 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23914 ;
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154758 ;
[76] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32242 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21193 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154770
[77] https://t.me/frontline_pvt/6234
[78]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21029; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21004;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023TV5rwJTkBDaNtJ9W7Ntyy8A3SAnZvNpC5h13xEnfUSWrE8LDRaKaVZyLdDykkmCl;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5328; https://t.me/dva_majors/64632
[79] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1890845143378350503; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86359
[80]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21029; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21004;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023TV5rwJTkBDaNtJ9W7Ntyy8A3SAnZvNpC5h13xEnfUSWrE8LDRaKaVZyLdDykkmCl;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5328; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62143;
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154758
[81] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62143; https://t.me/dva_majors/64654 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/64657
[82]
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154753; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62140;
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62143; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23914;
https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23937; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154753 ;
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154718; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154758
[83]
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2025/02/16/vorog-otrymav-serjoznogo-udaru-u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-yak-vybyly-rosiyan-z-pishhanogo/
; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc ; https://suspilne dot
media/donbas/949739-ukrainski-vijska-vibili-armiu-rf-z-sela-pisane-na-pokrovskomu-napramku-recnik-osuv-hortica/?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=ps
[84] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/17442
[85] https://t.me/dva_majors/64673; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62151
[86] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2033
[87]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21029; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21004;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023TV5rwJTkBDaNtJ9W7Ntyy8A3SAnZvNpC5h13xEnfUSWrE8LDRaKaVZyLdDykkmCl;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5328; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62143;
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154758;
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62150;
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62157; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62158;
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62168; https://t.me/yurasumy/21187
[88] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21288
[89] https://t.me/yurasumy/21187
[90] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8399; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5330;
[91] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8406; https://t.me/tivaz_artillery/5031
[92]
https://t.me/yurasumy/21187; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154798;
https://t.me/yurasumy/21203 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/64632 ;
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154770; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62168;
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62173; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62173;
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62157
[93] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32238
[94] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86373
[95]
https://t.me/motopatriot78/32255; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32238;
https://t.me/motopatriot78/32233; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154722;
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62145; https://t.me/voin_dv/13427
[96]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21029 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21004
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023TV5rwJTkBDaNtJ9W7Ntyy8A3SAnZvNpC5h13xEnfUSWrE8LDRaKaVZyLdDykkmCl;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5328
[97] https://t.me/rybar/68076; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86402
[98]
https://t.me/motopatriot78/32243; https://t.me/rybar/68076;
https://t.me/motopatriot78/32256; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62164;
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62168; https://t.me/yurasumy/21186;
https://t.me/yurasumy/21192; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86402
[99] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32256; https://t.me/voin_dv/13430
[100]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21029; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21004;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023TV5rwJTkBDaNtJ9W7Ntyy8A3SAnZvNpC5h13xEnfUSWrE8LDRaKaVZyLdDykkmCl
[101]
https://mfa.gov dot
ua/news/komentar-rechnika-mzs-georgiya-tihogo-shchodo-povtornogo-zrivu-rosiyeyu-rotaciyi-magate-na-zaes
; https://suspilne dot
media/949873-moskva-hoce-pidirvati-nezaleznist-magate-mzs-pro-blokuvanna-rotacii-misii-agentstva-na-zaes/
[102]
https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0272f4Udg2hb4wa33sMFzBFBJ47K7YR1jfhoGubBZW36f5fdynpjv99WdzqNfpuFMSl;
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21004;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023TV5rwJTkBDaNtJ9W7Ntyy8A3SAnZvNpC5h13xEnfUSWrE8LDRaKaVZyLdDykkmCl;
https://t.me/dva_majors/64632
[103] https://t.me/dva_majors/64678; https://t.me/osetin20/10136; https://t.me/dva_majors/64632
[104] https://t.me/kpszsu/28887
[105]
https://t.me/kpszsu/28887; https://t.me/astrapress/74569 ;
https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/13181; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/38355
[106] https://t.me/Denys_Smyhal/9547
[107] https://t.me/kpszsu/28902
[108]
https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-276-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-14-2025