Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Kelly Campa, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter and William Runkel
February 15, 2025, 6:50 pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 11:45am ET on February 15. ISW
will cover subsequent reports in the February 16 Russian Offensive
Campaign Assessment.
Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russian President Vladimir Putin is
attempting to create conditions to frame Putin as the victor over US
President Donald Trump in negotiations. Zelensky stated during
his address at the Munich Security Conference on February 15 that Putin
intends to cut Ukraine out of negotiations about the resolution of the
war in Ukraine and conduct direct bilateral negotiations with the United
States.[1] ISW has previously noted that Putin has recently attempted
to present himself as equal to Trump and to present Russia as a global
power comparable to the United States and as an heir to the Soviet
Union's "superpower" status.[2] Zelensky stated that Putin wants to
embarrass Trump and have Trump attend the Russian Victory Day Parade —
which highlights Russia's role in defeating Nazi Germany during the
Second World War — on May 9 as a "prop."[3] Zelensky's warning aligns
with a report from Russian opposition news outlet Meduza that
the Kremlin instructed Russian state media to reduce reporting about
Trump and instead portray Putin as a strong and decisive leader, as well
as to frame the February 12 Putin-Trump phone call as a victory for
Putin.[4] Zelensky also stated that Trump has not discussed the prospect
of having other European states participate in negotiations and that
Ukraine and the rest of Europe need to present a united front to Putin
and Europe needs to participate in decisions about its own future.[5]
The Kremlin has routinely attempted to portray the US as the only other
relevant actor in Ukraine besides Russia to deny Ukraine's agency in
future negotiations and set conditions to convince the US to ignore
Ukraine's interests, all likely to demand significant concessions in
Russia's favor.[6] Zelensky also reiterated his warning that Russia will
field 15 new divisions and use military exercises in Belarus to
threaten NATO.[7]
Ukrainian and US officials continue to provide details on upcoming peace negotiations to end the war. Zelensky told Newsmax on
February 15 that Russian forces at "minimum" need to withdraw to the
pre-full scale invasion frontline and reiterated his commitment to
ending the war in 2025.[8] US Special Representative for Russia and
Ukraine Keith Kellogg stated that the US aims to engage "all parties in a
peace process" within 180 days (by roughly August 2025) and noted that
other European states would not "be at the table" in peace negotiations
but that the US will consider their points of view.[9]
Ukraine's US and European partners continue to work to jointly develop Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB). Ukraine's
state-owned defense enterprise Ukroboronprom signed a joint venture
agreement with French defense company Thales International SAS on
February 15 to create advanced technology and provide operational
support in the areas of air defense, radar, electronic warfare (EW),
tactical communications, and optoelectronic systems.[10] Ukrainian
Defense Minister Rustem Umerov met on February 15 with the heads of
European defense companies KNDS France and KNDS Deutschland to discuss
maintaining equipment that Ukraine's partners have transferred to
Ukraine and the supply of new weapons, including self-propelled
artillery systems.[11] The delegations also discussed the possibility of
jointly producing 155mm artillery ammunition, repairing and modernizing
Ukrainian air defense systems, and developing drone systems and
artificial intelligence (AI). Umerov also met on February 15 with a
delegation from Boeing Defense, Space, and Security to discuss joint
drone, ammunition, and air weapons production.[12]
Kremlin-controlled
state media used an interview with Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian
Verkhovna Rada Deputy Viktor Medvedchuk to reiterate the Kremlin's false
narrative about Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's illegitimacy
and Russia's longstanding goal of destroying the Ukrainian state.
Medvedchuk — a close personal ally of Putin whom Putin initially wanted
to install in place of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky following
Russia's full-scale invasion — claimed during an interview Kremlin
newswire TASS published on February 15 that Zelensky is the
illegitimate leader of Ukraine and therefore that Zelensky cannot cancel
the 2022 decree banning negotiations with Putin.[13] Medvedchuk claimed
that the only government body that can cancel the decree in the absence
of a legitimate president is the Ukrainian Constitutional Court but
that the court currently does not have the necessary quorum to make
decisions.[14] Medvedchuk is attempting to exploit the fact that the
terms of three judges on the Ukrainian Constitutional Court ended two
weeks ago (in January 2025), leaving the court with only 11 of its 18
judges and unable to hold Grand Chamber meetings, which require a quorum
of 12 judges.[15] (Ukrainian officials are in the process of
interviewing and ranking candidates to make the final selections.[16])
Zelensky, however, remains the legitimate president of Ukraine as he
adhered to Ukrainian law and constitution and did not hold elections
under martial law in 2024.[17] Putin and other Kremlin officials have
repeatedly used deliberately false readings of Ukraine's law and
constitution to claim that Zelensky is an illegitimate president, and
Medvedchuk's claims about the Constitutional Court are just the latest
variation on this theme.[18] The platforming of the Kremlin's
false narrative about Ukraine's legal inability to negotiate by a major
Kremlin-controlled outlet casts serious doubts on Moscow's willingness
to negotiate in good faith about a settlement of the war and sets
informational conditions for Russia to violate any agreement reached on
the grounds that the Ukrainian government had no legal right to conclude
it.
Medvedchuk reiterated the need to address
the "root causes" of the war during future peace negotiations and
claimed that the way to eliminate the "root causes" is to remove the
legitimate government in Ukraine, disarm the Ukrainian military, and
remove Western-supplied weapons and equipment from Ukraine. Medvedchuk
claimed that the only way to address these issues and guarantee Russia's
security interests is if Russia "controls the territories under
[Ukrainian control.]" Russian officials have explicitly defined the
"root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not
to expand eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination
against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture within
Ukraine.[19] Medvedchuk claimed that Russia "has every reason" to
return allegedly "historical Russian lands" that have "belonged to
[Russia] for centuries" in order to allegedly "save the Ukrainian
people."[20] Medvedchuk echoed Russian Security Council Deputy
Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's longstanding claims that Ukraine's
neighbors, including Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria,
are hoping to annex territories in Ukraine in order to sow discord among
Ukraine's European allies.[21] Medvedchuk also claimed that Russia
withdrew from Kyiv during the Spring 2022 peace talks in Istanbul "as a
gesture of goodwill," ignoring the fact that poor Russian logistics,
heavy losses, and effective Ukrainian counterattacks stymied advances
and forced Russian forces to withdraw from Kyiv.[22]
It is notable that Kremlin newswire TASS published
Medvedchuk's interview, particularly after the Kremlin recently
reportedly issued instructions to Russian government-linked media to
portray Putin as a strong leader in contrast to Trump.[23] The Kremlin
almost certainly approved the publication of Medvedchuk's interview on
February 15 in order to reinject the information operation targeting
Zelensky's alleged illegitimacy into the information space and to
reiterate Russia's long-term objectives of "denazifying,"
"demilitarizing," and forcing Ukraine to abandon its aspirations to join
NATO amid the reported start of limited US-Russia and US-Ukraine talks.
These Kremlin informational efforts aim to shape any future
negotiations and use different Kremlin-linked actors like Medvedchuk to
amplify Russia's longstanding negotiating position.
Russian
advances south and southwest of Pokrovsk have slowed over the last two
weeks amid indications that the Russian military command may prioritize
offensive operations against Kostyantynivka — the southernmost point of
Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast — in Spring and Summer 2025. Russian
forces made rapid advances aimed at expanding the Russian salient south
and southwest of Pokrovsk in December 2024 and January 2025, but
Russian advances have slowed southwest of Pokrovsk since early February
2025.[24] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 14
during the Munich Security Conference that the situation in the Pokrovsk
direction has improved in recent days, and the spokesperson for a
Ukrainian brigade operating in the area stated that Russian activity has
become less intense near Pokrovsk in recent days.[25] Russian forces
have struggled to advance north of Kotlyne and west of Udachne as they
appear to have come up against more concerted Ukrainian defenses in
these areas.[26] Ukrainian forces have also conducted several
counterattacks near Kotlyne and Pishchane (southeast of Kotlyne) aimed
at threatening Russian positions in the salient.[27] One Russian
milblogger expressed concern on February 15 that slowing Russian
advances may allow Ukrainian forces to launch significant counterattacks
in the coming weeks and risk giving Ukrainian forces the opportunity to
collapse the Russian salient south of Pokrovsk.[28]
Russian
advances may be slowing south of Pokrovsk due to degradation among
frontline Russian units and intensified Ukrainian drone operations in
the area. Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson
Major Viktor Trehubov reported on February 11 that Russian forces
suffered roughly 7,000 personnel killed in action (KIA) in the Pokrovsk
direction in January 2025, and Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General
Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on February 2 that Russian forces suffered
15,000 total casualties in this direction in January 2025.[29] Russian
forces have suffered significant personnel losses throughout the
frontline in the past five and a half months and have likely suffered
most of these losses in the Pokrovsk direction.[30] Such losses are
likely negatively impacting the combat effectiveness of Russian units in
the area.
A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z
instructor claimed on February 15 that Ukrainian drone operations are
significantly impeding Russian activity in the Pokrovsk direction.[31]
The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drones are striking any Russian
forces operating more than three kilometers north and west of Selydove
(currently 11 kilometers south and 35 kilometers east of the frontline)
and that Ukrainian drones are monitoring and restricting access to all
roads in this direction. The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drones
are making it "impossible" for Russian forces to conduct rotations or
resupply frontline units and that Russian activity south and southwest
of Pokrovsk is currently very challenging. The milblogger suggested that
Ukrainian forces have created a strong layered defense comprised of
minefields, conventional artillery systems, and strike and
reconnaissance drones and are successfully integrating reconnaissance
from drones with ground-based fire systems to improve Ukrainian strike
capabilities in the area. The milblogger expressed concern that Russia
is far from reaching parity with Ukrainian drone operations and noted
that excessive Russian formalization efforts have stalled the
development of Russia's drone capabilities.
The
Russian military command may also intend to prioritize assaults on
Kostyantynivka in 2025 and are thus reportedly not reinforcing the
Russian force grouping south of Pokrovsk. Ukrainian military
observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on February 15 that the Russian
military command has redeployed elements of the 8th Combined Arms Army
(CAA) (Southern Military District [SMD]) from the Kurakhove direction to
the Toretsk (Kostyantynivka) direction.[32] A Ukrainian source
suggested on February 5 that the Russian military command was
redeploying elements of the 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments,
163rd Tank Regiment, and 381st Artillery Regiment (all of the 150th
Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) and elements of the 96th regiment
(reportedly also part of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, although
ISW has not previously observed reports of this unit fighting in
Ukraine) from the Kurakhove direction to the Kostyantynivka
direction.[33] ISW has not observed further reports of the redeployment
of elements of the 8th CAA to the Toretsk direction as of this report.
Mashovets and some Russian milbloggers stated that elements of the 150th
Motorized Rifle Division are still operating in the Kurakhove direction
in recent days.[34] The Russian military command may be in the process
of redeploying the 8th CAA or may intend to split the 8th CAA between
the Kurakhove and Kostyantynivka directions until Russian forces
eliminate the small Ukrainian salient remaining west of Kurakhove.
Seizing Pokrovsk has been the Russian military command’s main
operational objective in Donetsk Oblast since February 2024, and the
Russian military command could have redeployed elements of the 8th CAA
to reinforce degraded Russian units in the Pokrovsk direction if Russia
intended to continue prioritizing this effort in 2025.[35] The
redeployment of significant Russian forces to the Kostyantynivka
direction indicates that the Russian military command may have
identified attacking Kostyantynivka as its priority effort for Spring
and Summer 2025.[36]
Russian cargo vessels have
continued to evacuate military assets from the port of Tartus as Russia
negotiates its presence in Syria with the interim government. NOTE: A version of this text also appears in ISW-CTP's February 15 Iran Update. OSINT analyst MT Anderson posted satellite imagery from February 14 showing the Russian cargo vessel Baltic Leader and potentially the Admiral Golovko Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate about 250 kilometers south of the coast of southwestern Cyprus.[37] Anderson said that the Baltic Leader
departed the port of Tartus sometime after February 4, when satellite
imagery showed the vessel at the port.[38] It is unclear at this time if
the Baltic Leader will bring evacuated Russian cargo to Russia
or Libya. Russia sent some assets from Syria to Libya by air in
December 2024 and January 2025.[39] Publicly available marine tracking
data showed that two cargo vessels that departed Tartus in late January,
the Sparta and Sparta II, were sailing off the coast
of the Netherlands on February 15, presumably in transit to Russia.[40]
Continued Russian-Syria engagement — including a recent phone call
between Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara and Russian President
Vladimir Putin — suggests that Syria seeks some relationship with Russia
even as Russia withdraws its military assets from Syria.[41] Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Maria Zakharova said on
February 14 that Russia continues to discuss its military presence in
Syria with the new Syrian administration.[42]
Key Takeaways:
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian forces recently advanced in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast. Fighting
continued near Sverdlikovo (west of Sudzha), and Russian milbloggers
claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Sverdlikovo,
Kurilovka (south of Sudzha), Russkaya Konopelka (east of Sudzha), and
Cherkasskaya Konopelka (southeast of Sudzha).[43]
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 15 indicates
that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Sverdlikovo.[44]
Unconfirmed
Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian
forces advanced near Pogrebki (northwest of Sudzha) and northwest of
Guyevo (south of Sudzha).[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian
forces occupy 70 percent of Sverdlikovo.[46]
Order of
Battle: Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th
Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and
Molniya-2 drone crews of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet)
are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast; elements of the 83rd Airborne
(VDV) Brigade and 106th VDV Division are reportedly operating near
Sverdlikovo and Darino (southeast of Korenevo); and elements of the
"Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar"
volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating near Russkaya Konopelka
and Fanaseyevka (southwest of Russkaya Konopelka).[47]
The
Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted a
precision strike on a Russian position near Yelizavetovka, Kursk Oblast
(just west of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and near the
international border) on February 13.[48] The Ukrainian General
Staff reported that the strike destroyed a fortified position of a
platoon of the 28th Rifle Battalion of the 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade
(5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and that Russian forces used
the position to launch drones against Sumy Oblast.
Ukrainian forces reportedly targeted the oil refinery in Volgograd Oblast on the night of February 14 to 15. Head
of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy
Kovalenko implied on February 15 that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone
strike against Volgograd City and targeted Lukoil's Volgograd Oil
Refinery in Volgograd City.[49] Kovalenko noted that Russian forces were
trying to repel the strike and did not clarify if Ukrainian forces
struck the refinery. Geolocated footage published on February 15 shows
explosions in Volgograd City.[50] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrei
Bocharev claimed that Russian forces repelled a "massive" drone strike
against the oblast overnight and that falling drone debris started a
fire at the industrial zone in Volgograd City.[51] Russian opposition
outlet Astra geolocated footage showing the location where a
drone crashed in Volgograd City – directly opposite a Russian military
housing area.[52] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that
Russian forces downed 17 drones over Volgograd Oblast overnight.[53]
Kursk
Oblast authorities are investigating a local Telegram channel that
criticized Russia's inadequate response to Ukraine's incursion into
Kursk Oblast. Russian opposition outlet SOTA reported
on February 15 that acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein
ordered an investigation into the "Sudzha Rodnaya" Telegram channel
following claims from the local council overseeing refugee issues that
the channel is spreading "fake news" about the situation with refugees
in Kursk Oblast.[54] The "Sudzha Rodnaya" Telegram channel previously
criticized Kursk Oblast authorities for issues with civilian evacuations
in August 2024 at the start of Ukraine's incursion into the area and
complained that authorities did not deliver promised payments to
refugees.[55] Roman Alekhin, a Russian milblogger and advisor to former
Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov, claimed that the Telegram channel
does not post false information and that accusations against the channel
will only increase negativity among refugees and Kursk Oblast residents
towards the federal government.[56] Russian President Vladimir Putin
appointed Khinshtein to his post in early December 2024, following
intense backlash from Kursk Oblast residents for authorities' failure to
communicate with or support residents displaced by the Ukrainian
incursion.[57] Kursk Oblast residents have continued to protest about
poor assistance from Russian authorities for refugees.[58]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued
ground attacks north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of
Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Tykhe on February 14 and 15 but did not
make confirmed advances.[59]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced about 60 meters in Vovchansk.[60]
Order
of Battle: Drone operators of the Chechen "Zapad-Akhmat" Battalion and
Rosgvardia's 116th "Stalnaya" Special Purpose Brigade are reportedly
striking Ukrainian targets in Kharkiv Oblast.[61]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 15 but did not advance. Russian
forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Dvorichna, east of Kupyansk near
Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and
Hlushkivka and toward Novoosynove on February 14 and 15.[62]
Unconfirmed
Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed on February 14
that Russian forces have seized the entirety of Dvorichna and advanced
near Dvorichna and Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[63]
A
source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence
reported on February 14 that Russian forces operating in the Kupyansk
direction have a quantitative advantage in drones over Ukrainian forces
in the area.[64]
Order of Battle: The Russian Ministry of
Defense (MoD) reported that drone operators of the Russian "Rubikon"
Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are operating in the Kupyansk
direction.[65]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 15 but did not advance. Russian
forces attacked northeast of Borova near Kolisnykivka, Zahryzove,
Bohuslavka, Lozova, and Zelenyi Hai and southeast of Borova near
Novoserhiivka and Hrekivka on February 14 and 15.[66]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on February 15 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian
forces continued offensive operations north of Lyman near Nove and
northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Yampolivka on February 14 and
15.[67]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers
claimed on February 15 that Russian forces advanced within central
Yampolivka and one kilometer southwest of the settlement.[68] A Russian
milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the
forest area east of Yampolivka.[69]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian
forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka,
east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near
Ivano-Darivka on February 14 and 15 but did not advance.[70]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on February 15 but did not advance. Russian
forces attacked in Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near
Predtechyne, Stupochky, and Bila Hora on February 14 and 15.[71]
Unconfirmed
Russian-claimed advances: A Russian source claimed on February 15 that
Russian forces control half of southern Chasiv Yar.[72]
The
spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating near Chasiv Yar reported
that Russian forces are taking advantage of low visibility on foggy days
to reinforce the frontline and that Russian reinforcements in the area
have little to no combat experience.[73]
Order of Battle:
Elements of the Russian 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (98th
Airborne [VDV] Division) continue to operate near Chasiv Yar.[74] Drone
operators of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment and 1442nd Motorized
Rifle Regiment (both of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps
[AC]) are reportedly striking targets near Predtechyne, including with
fiber-optic drones.[75]
Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk. Russian
forces continued attacking in Toretsk itself, north of Toretsk near
Dyliivka and Krymske, southwest of Toretsk near Leonidivka, and west of
Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on February 14 and 15.[76]
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 13 indicates
that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Shcherbynivka.[77]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian
forces continued assaults east of Pokrovsk near Zelene Pole, Tarasivka,
Vodyane Druhe, Yelyzavetivka, Myrolyubivka, and Promin; southeast of
Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novopavlivka, Dachenske,
and Pishchane; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne,
Zaporizhzhia, Nadiivka, Preobrazhenka, and Uspenvika on February 14 and
15.[78] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces intensified
counterattacks near Dachenske and Lysivka.[79] Another Russian
milblogger claimed that Ukrainian counterattacks northwest of Pishchane
have slowed, and one milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain
positions in half of Pishchane.[80]
Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 14
indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in eastern
Dachenske.[81]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: The
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized
Berezivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[82] Russian milbloggers claimed that
Russian forces are advancing in central and eastern Udachne, advanced in
central Pishchane and east of Vodyane Druhe into Berezivka, and are
attempting to envelop Yelyzavetivka.[83]
Order of Battle:
Elements of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central
Military District [CMD]) and 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD)
are attacking near Zvirove (south of Pokrovsk).[84]
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Kurakhove on February 15 but did not advance.
Russian forces continued assaults northwest of Kurakhove near
Shevchenko and Andriivka and towards Oleksiivka; west of Kurakhove near
Dachne, Ulakly, Kostyantynopil, and Bahatyr; and southwest of Kurakhove
near Zelenivka and Rozlyv on February 14 and 15.[85]
Unconfirmed
Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of
the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army
[CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, Southern
Military District [SMD]) are advancing in northwestern Andriivka.[86]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of
Dachne and up to the southeastern outskirts of Kostyantynopil and the
southern outskirts of Ulakly.[87] A Russian milblogger claimed that
Russian forces advanced along the T-0518 Velyka Novosilka-Bahatyr
highway and attacked into Bahatyr.[88]
Order of Battle:
Elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern
Military District [EMD]) are reportedly attacking south of Ulakly and
Kostyantynopil, elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th
Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD] are
reportedly attacking south of Dachne, and elements of the 102nd
Motorized Rifle Regiment and 68th Tank Regiment (both of the 150th
Motorized Rifle Division) are clearing Dachne and attacking west of the
settlement.[89]
Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka. Russian forces continued assaults near Velyka Novosilka,
west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka, and northwest of Velyka
Novosilka near Burlatske and Pryvilne on February 14 and 15.[90]
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 14 indicates
that Russian forces advanced northeast of Novyi Komar (north of Velyka
Novosilka) during a platoon-sized mechanized assault in the area.[91] A
Ukrainian brigade operating in the area reported that the brigade
destroyed a Russian tank and two armored personnel carriers in the
assault.[92]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian
milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced 1.5 kilometers between
Vremivka (immediately west of Velyka Novosilka) and Novosilka.[93]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th
CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Velyka Novosilka area.[94]
Ukrainian forces recently struck a Russian air defense system near Velyka Novosilka. Ukrainian
forces posted footage on February 14 and 15 showing Ukrainian drones
striking a Russian Strela-10 short-range air defense system southeast of
Velyka Novosilka.[95]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 15 but did not make confirmed advances.
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian
counterattacks near Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne).[96]
Unconfirmed
Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian
forces seized Ukrainian positions near Mala Tokmachka.[97]
Order
of Battle: Drone operators of the "Shaman" detachment of the Russian
1455th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 42nd Motorized Rifle
Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District
[SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Orikhiv.[98]
Russian and Ukrainian sources did not report ongoing ground fighting in the Kherson direction on February 15.
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 80th Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade
(14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly
continue to operate in the Kherson direction.[99]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian
forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on
February 14 to 15. The Ukrainian Air Force reported Russian forces
launched 70 Shahed and decoy drones from Oryol Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov
Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda,
Crimea.[100] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces
downed 33 Shahed and decoy drones over Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, Poltava,
Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Donetsk oblasts and that the remaining
37 drones were lost in location. The Mykolaiv Oblast Military
Administration reported that Shahed drone debris damaged agricultural
and residential areas on February 15 and that a likely S-300/S-400 air
defense missile struck an open area on the morning of February 14.[101]
A New York Times
(NYT) report indicates that the Russian drone strike against the
protective structure of the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) will
likely have lasting impacts on the structure's effectiveness. The NYT,
citing analysis from UK consulting company McKenzie Intelligence
Services, reported that the Shahed drones use a guidance system with
preset coordinates of its target and that "this would indicate the
almost certain deliberate targeting" of the Chornobyl NPP by Russian
forces.[102] The NYT reported that the hole in the structure over
Reactor No. 4 is about 540 square feet, and Ukrainian State Emergency
Head Andriy Danyk told the NYT that the hole will take months to repair
and that it is unclear what Ukraine needs to do to repair the damage.
Chornobyl NPP's Chief Engineer Oleksandr Tytarchuk told the NYT that
Ukrainian engineers will temporarily seal the opening to prevent
corrosion but that this seal will not be radiation-proof. The Ukrainian
Exclusion Zone Management Agency reported that Ukrainian emergency
services are still working to put out the last of the smoldering fires
in the Chornobyl NPP's protective structure on February 15.[103]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian
occupation authorities continue to create regional analogues to the
federal "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to place veterans of the
war in Ukraine in government positions as part of Kremlin efforts to
integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia and militarize society and
government. Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik
announced on February 15 the launch of the "Heroes of Luhansk Oblast"
program that parallels the Russian federal "Time of Heroes"
program.[104]
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
The
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) highlighted Russia's "Molniya-2"
aircraft-type strike and reconnaissance drone on February 15 and noted
that the drone has an increased flight range of 20 to 35 kilometers and a
load capacity compared to quadcopters.[105]
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://suspilne dot media/949247-zelenskij-vistupiv-na-drugomu-dni-munhenskoi-konferencii-promova/
[2]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2025;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2025
[3] https://suspilne dot media/949247-zelenskij-vistupiv-na-drugomu-dni-munhenskoi-konferencii-promova/
[4]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-14-2025;
https://meduza dot
io/feature/2025/02/14/sozvon-putina-i-trampa-kazhetsya-otlichnym-informatsionnym-povodom-dlya-prokremlevskih-smi
; https://meduza dot io/en/feature/2025/02/14/we-don-t-talk-about-trump
[5] https://suspilne dot media/949247-zelenskij-vistupiv-na-drugomu-dni-munhenskoi-konferencii-promova/
[6]
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-26-2024;
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-25/russia-ukraine-putin-signals-interest-in-discussing-end-to-war?srnd=premium:
https://isw.pub/UkrWar010224
[7] https://suspilne dot media/949247-zelenskij-vistupiv-na-drugomu-dni-munhenskoi-konferencii-promova/
[8]
https://www.breitbart.com/clips/2025/02/14/zelensky-russia-has-to-go-to-at-least-pre-2022-invasion-borders/
; https://suspilne dot
media/949361-zelenskij-rf-mae-sonajmense-vidstupiti-do-kordoniv-stanom-na-lutij-2022-roku/
[9]
https://united24media dot
com/latest-news/the-us-aims-to-engage-russia-and-ukraine-in-negotiations-within-180-days-kellogg-says-5926;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QHFv2VvnOag ; https://suspilne dot
media/949043-zelenskij-zustrivsa-z-viceprezidentom-ssa-na-caes-prodovzuut-gasiti-tlinna-pisla-udaru-drona-rf-1088-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1739628623&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
; https://www.themoscowtimes dot
com/2025/02/15/no-seat-at-the-table-for-europe-in-ukraine-peace-talks-says-trump-envoy-a88032
[10] https://ukroboronprom dot com.ua/news/ukroboronprom-i-thales-international-sas-stvoryat-spilne-pidprijemstvo
[11] https://t.me/ministry_of_defense_ua/11838
[12] https://t.me/ministry_of_defense_ua/11841
[13]
https://english dot
nv.ua/nation/zelenskyy-russia-planned-to-replace-me-with-medvedchuk-at-war-s-start-50483644.html;
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/06/03/russia-europe-far-right-espionage/;
https://tass dot ru/interviews/23142461
[14] https://tass dot ru/interviews/23142461
[15]
https://www.ukrinform dot
ua/rubric-society/3950472-ksu-vtratit-kvorum-27-sicna-pisla-odnocasnoi-vidstavki-troh-suddiv-dzerelo.html
[16]
https://www.ukrinform dot
net/rubric-society/3950504-constitutional-court-to-lose-quorum-jan-27-once-three-judges-resign-at-once-source.html
[17]
https://isw.pub/UkrWar122624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010325 ;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar121624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072524 ;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2024
[18]
https://isw.pub/UkrWar122624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010325 ;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar121624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072524 ;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2024
[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2025
[20] https://tass dot ru/interviews/23142461
[21] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030424 ; https://tass dot ru/interviews/23142461
[22] https://tass dot ru/interviews/23142461
[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021425
[24]
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2024
;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28-2024
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-5-2025
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-13-2025
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-30-2025
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2025
;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-12-2025
[25] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-14-2025
[26]
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-12-2025
;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2025
;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-11-2025
[27]
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-12-2025
;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2025
;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-11-2025
[28] https://t.me/yurasumy/21168
[29]
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-11-2025
;
https://kyivindependent.com/15-000-russian-troops-neutralized-in-pokrovsk-direction-in-january-alone-syrskyi-says/
[30] https://isw.pub/UkrWar123124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120524
[31] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2028 ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/2030 ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/2031
[32] https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid0dWfDJNhRq7YfwF18cYkjMDtGA77Z1UBEgjWS83umy6An1xucdrAgnryxC8eAYRuNl
[33]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2025
; https://t.me/supernova_plus/35958
[34]
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2025;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-12-2025
; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32215 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32218 ;
https://t.me/voin_dv/13421 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/13410
[35]
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine
[36] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-26-2025
[37] https://x.com/MT_Anderson/status/1890449461433819509
[38] https://x.com/MT_Anderson/status/1890449461433819509
[39]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-january-24-2025-russia-continues-pivot-libya-and-mali-saf-advances-khartoum
[40]
https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:365758/mmsi:273389870/imo:9268710/vessel:SPARTA;
https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:362360/mmsi:273394890/imo:9160994/vessel:SPARTA_II
[41] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate021225; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76258
[42] https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1890682191404761541; www.ria dot ru/20250214/rossija-1999393609.html
[43]
https://t.me/rybar/68046; https://t.me/dva_majors/64568;
https://t.me/yurasumy/21170; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23907;
https://t.me/rybar/68032; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32192
[44] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8394; https://t [dot] me/ua_marines_36brigade/2698
[45] https://t.me/rybar/68046; https://t.me/dva_majors/64568; https://t.me/wargonzo/24796; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23907
[46] https://t.me/rybar/68032
[47]
https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86297; https://t.me/mod_russia/48923;
https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23907; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86295;
https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86345
[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20961
[49] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8826
[50] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1890654113165144527; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/5819
[51] https://t.me/rgn_34/8383; https://t.me/rgn_34/8384; https://t.me/rgn_34/8384
[52] https://t.me/astrapress/74509; https://t.me/astrapress/74497; https://t.me/astrapress/74502
[53] https://t.me/mod_russia/48914
[54] https://t.me/sotaproject/93887; https://t.me/sekundamedia/23886
[55] https://t.me/ostorozhno_novosti/33775
[56] https://t.me/Alekhin_Telega/13087
[57] https://isw.pub/UkrWar012125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120624
[58]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2025;
https://meduza dot
io/news/2025/01/18/bezhentsy-iz-prigranichnyh-rayonov-vyshli-na-miting-v-kurske-oni-potrebovali-podderzhki-vlastey;
https://t.me/astrapress/72926; https://dddkursk dot
ru/lenta/2025/01/21/115471/; https://meduza dot
io/news/2025/01/21/nashi-deti-stali-zabyvat-chto-takoe-rodnoy-dom-bezhentsy-iz-prigranichnogo-rayona-kurskoy-oblasti-vyshli-na-miting-i-potrebovali-ot-hinshteyna-pryamogo-dialoga;
https://t.me/www46tvru/20177
[59]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20995;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gckFWazj7jfg6qcNJZKkUECfw938zf8cn9oHT7xSG9x9CDVsJ9pLGNkNSmuCma18l
; https://t.me/synegubov/13092; https://t.me/otukharkiv/4358;
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20962; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5292;
https://t.me/dva_majors/64568
[60] https://t.me/rybar/68046; https://t.me/dva_majors/64568
[61] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5494
[62]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20995
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gckFWazj7jfg6qcNJZKkUECfw938zf8cn9oHT7xSG9x9CDVsJ9pLGNkNSmuCma18l
; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20962
[63] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86296
[64] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21281
[65] https://t.me/mod_russia/48921
[66]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20995 ;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gckFWazj7jfg6qcNJZKkUECfw938zf8cn9oHT7xSG9x9CDVsJ9pLGNkNSmuCma18l
; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20962 ;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5292
[67]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gckFWazj7jfg6qcNJZKkUECfw938zf8cn9oHT7xSG9x9CDVsJ9pLGNkNSmuCma18l
; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20962 ;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5292
[68] https://t.me/rybar/68046 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/64568 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86318
[69] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32202
[70]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20995;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gckFWazj7jfg6qcNJZKkUECfw938zf8cn9oHT7xSG9x9CDVsJ9pLGNkNSmuCma18l
; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/24635; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20962;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5292
[71]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20995;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gckFWazj7jfg6qcNJZKkUECfw938zf8cn9oHT7xSG9x9CDVsJ9pLGNkNSmuCma18l;
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20962; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5292;
https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23894
[72] https://t.me/tass_agency/300854
[73]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc ; https://suspilne dot
media/donbas/949261-zsu-pro-casiv-ar-okupanti-namagautsa-navazati-boi-za-spinou-i-zrujnuvati-kanal/
[74] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23875; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23875
[75] https://t.me/sashakots/51945; https://t.me/epoddubny/22470; https://t.me/epoddubny/22471
[76]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20995;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gckFWazj7jfg6qcNJZKkUECfw938zf8cn9oHT7xSG9x9CDVsJ9pLGNkNSmuCma18l;
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20962;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5292
[77]
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8393; https://t.me/voron1OO/120;
https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1890697967612379143;
https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1890734430806847745
[78]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20995 ;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gckFWazj7jfg6qcNJZKkUECfw938zf8cn9oHT7xSG9x9CDVsJ9pLGNkNSmuCma18l
; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20962 ;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5292 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21167 ;
[79] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154689
[80] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62151 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32207
[81] https://youtu.be/4-6ZBGSdrMI?si=5ub6Gdc3_Qh7RS5s; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1890510473046413519
[82] https://t.me/tass_agency/300912 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/48924 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/48925
[83]
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62143 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62144 ;
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62140 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24796 ;
https://t.me/yurasumy/21169 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62151
[84] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32207
[85]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20995 ;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gckFWazj7jfg6qcNJZKkUECfw938zf8cn9oHT7xSG9x9CDVsJ9pLGNkNSmuCma18l
; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20962 ;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5292 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62150 ;
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62145 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24796
[86] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62145
[87]
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62157 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21176 ;
https://t.me/yurasumy/21179 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62150
[88] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32218
[89]
https://t.me/motopatriot78/32215 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32218 ;
https://t.me/voin_dv/13421 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/13410
[90]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20995 ;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gckFWazj7jfg6qcNJZKkUECfw938zf8cn9oHT7xSG9x9CDVsJ9pLGNkNSmuCma18l
; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20962 ;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5292 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62145
[91] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8391; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5280 ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1379838863372437
[92] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1379838863372437
[93] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23887 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30878 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154596
[94] https://t.me/tass_agency/300924
[95]
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5304 ; https://t.me/usf_army/401 ;
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2025/02/14/strila-yaka-ne-vluchyla-v-sercze-bo-vluchyly-u-neyi-dronari-znyshhyly-rosijskyj-zrk/
; https://t.me/usf_army/401 ; https://mil dot
in.ua/uk/news/syly-bezpilotnyh-system-zneshkodyly-rosijskyj-zrk-strela-10/
[96] https://t.me/dva_majors/64568; https://t.me/rybar/68046
[97] https://t.me/dva_majors/64568; https://t.me/rybar/68046
[98] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86315
[99] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/43728
[100] https://t.me/kpszsu/28832
[101]
https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/13173 ; https://suspilne dot
media/mykolaiv/949139-poskodzeni-budivli-armia-rf-masovano-atakuvala-mikolaivsinu/
[102] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/14/world/europe/chernobyl-drone-blast-scene.html
[103]
https://suspilne dot
media/kyiv/949185-na-caes-ratuvalniki-prodovzuut-gasiti-zagoranna-spricinene-atakou-rosijskogo-bezpilotnika/
[104] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/3433
[105]
https://smolgazeta dot
ru/daylynews/126738-molniya-2-unichtojaet-obekty-i-tehniku.html ;
https://www1 dot
ru/news/2025/02/14/samyi-massovyi-rossiiskii-tank-t-72b3m-polucil-novuiu-dinamiceskuiu-zashhitu.html
