Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, and Grant Morgan of the Institute for the Study of War;
Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise Institute
Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Nicholas Carl of the American Enterprise Institute
Data Cutoff: February 4, 2025
The
China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for
the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update
supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses
Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for
the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s
(CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to
controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.
Key Takeaways
Cross-Strait Relations
Taiwan
Taiwanese
civil society groups are leading a large-scale recall campaign
targeting legislators from the Kuomintang (KMT) opposition party. These
recalls could erode the current KMT-led majority in the Legislative Yuan
(LY). The Central Election Commission (CEC) has received recall petitions against 19 KMT legislators.[1]
The legislative minority leader of the ruling Democratic Progressive
Party (DPP), Ker Chien-ming, has called for mass recalls against all 41
KMT and KMT-aligned legislators in response to the KMT and its allies
passing controversial cuts and freezes to the national budget, which
could paralyze the government, and measures that are temporarily
preventing the Constitutional Court from functioning ordinarily.[2]
The DPP has criticized the budget cuts and freezes and measures against
the Constitution Court, describing these actions as damaging to
Taiwan’s ability to resist PRC efforts to undermine its sovereignty. The
KMT retaliated by initiating recall petitions against four DPP
legislators, two of which have received enough signatures to be
submitted to the CEC. [3]
Taiwanese billionaire and United Microelectronics founder Robert Tsao has helped lead the anti-KMT recall campaign.[4]
Tsao has previously accused the KMT and its allies of “sabotaging” the
government to the benefit of the PRC. Tsao is an active supporter of
strengthening Taiwan’s resilience against a potential PRC invasion,
which is also a primary focus of President Lai Ching-te’s
administration.
The CEC is reviewing the petitions at time
of writing to assess whether they meet the threshold to initiate a
recall election. Recall petitions meet the threshold if 1 percent of the
electorate submits a valid signature. Any recall petitions that got the
requisite number of signatures will trigger a recall election. The next
step is to pass the recall motion in the recall election. The CEC
currently mandates that a recall motion is passed “if the number of
valid votes in favor is greater than the number of votes against” and
“the number of votes in favor reaches more than one-quarter of the total
number of voters in the original electoral district.”[5]
Not every legislator targeted by recall petitions is from a politically
competitive district; it is thus likely that many recall elections will
fail to remove the targeted official.
Successful recalls
of KMT legislators could empower the DPP in the LY and neutralize the
opposition parties’ efforts to counter Lai’s agenda. Recall efforts
offer the DPP the opportunity to regain control of the LY for the first
time since the January 2024 elections. The LY currently has no majority
party, with the DPP holding 51 seats, the KMT holding 54 (including two
KMT-aligned independents), and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) holding
eight seats. The TPP has aligned with the KMT in the LY, giving the
opposition a majority in practice.[6]
The DPP needs to flip at least six seats (for a total of 57) in order
to gain control of the LY; a mere plurality would be insufficient as
long as the TPP continues to vote with the KMT.
KMT and
TPP-sponsored amendments to the Public Officials Election and Recall Act
may help preserve their influence in the LY, however. They passed an
amendment that requires citizens to provide copies of their ID cards —
rather than just their ID numbers and addresses — when initiating or
signing recall petitions. The DPP-controlled Executive Yuan returned
this amendment to the LY for reconsideration on February 2, which is
unlikely to prevent the amendment’s passage again but will buy
additional time for recall petitions to move forward before the ID
requirement is in place. The LY has 15 days to pass a bill on a second
review, after which President Lai must sign the bill within 10 days.[7]
KMT legislators have also proposed (but not yet passed) an amendment to
raise the threshold for a recall to succeed. The amendment stipulates
that a recall will only remove an official from power if more voters
vote to recall the official than voted to elect the official originally.[8]
Taiwan’s
Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) blocked 13 Shanghai officials from
entering Taiwan for the Taipei Lantern Festival in response to
allegations that the PRC obstructed PRC-based Taiwanese businesspeople
from returning to Taiwan for cross-strait events. The 13
officials included the director of Shanghai’s Taiwan Affairs Office
(TAO) Jin Mei. Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Minister Chiu Chui-cheng
said that the decision to block the Shanghai delegation was largely
based on the PRC obstructing Taiwanese businesspeople living in the PRC
from returning home to join activities organized by the Straits Exchange
Foundation (SEF). The SEF is a semi-official Taiwanese group that
organizes cross-strait exchanges and often invites PRC-based Taiwanese
businesspeople to its Lunar New Year events. Chiu said that Taiwanese
businesspeople based in Shanghai should logically be the largest portion
of PRC-based Taiwanese who participate in such events, as Shanghai is
home to many Taiwanese businesses, but there have been “very few” in
recent years. Chiu added that he asked the Shanghai TAO to freely allow
Shanghai-based Taiwanese to join SEF events in Taiwan the last time
Shanghai officials were “testing the waters” in a cross-strait
event--likely a reference to the Taipei-Shanghai Twin Cities Forum in
December 2024--but there has been no improvement.[9]
The SEF hosted a Spring Festival (Lunar New Year) event for PRC-based
Taiwanese businesspeople on February 3 in Taipei but saw reduced
attendance compared to previous years.[10]
Chiu also said that the TAO delegation submitted its application to
enter Taiwan too late for the MAC to review before the festival.[11] The Taipei Lantern Festival is taking place from February 2 to 16.[12]
The MAC previously blocked Jin and nine PRC media figures from entering
Taiwan for the Taipei-Shanghai Twin Cities Forum, citing the PRC’s
military and legal coercion against Taiwan in 2024.[13]
The
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) flew aircraft into Taiwan’s Air Defense
Identification Zone (ADIZ) 255 times in January 2025. The PRC has
normalized over 200 ADIZ incursions per month since President Lai’s
inauguration in May 2024 in order to degrade Taiwan’s threat awareness
and raise the threshold for its threat response. PLA incursions
into Taiwan’s ADIZ have exceeded 200 per month every month since May
2024 but only did so four times prior to 2024. The volume of ADIZ
incursions in January was the second lowest since May but was still
significantly higher than the pre-2024 average. ADIZ incursion numbers
do not include PLA activity around Taiwan’s outlying islands of Kinmen
and Matsu, which are west of the median line of the Taiwan Strait.[14]
This
“new normal” volume of ADIZ incursions raises the threshold of coercive
activity that will trigger a Taiwanese response, making it more
difficult for Taiwan to detect and respond to a real threat in time.
Taiwan must put personnel on standby to respond to each ADIZ incursion
if necessary, which strains resources and exhausts the personnel. Taiwan
does not typically scramble its own aircraft to respond to such
incursions, however, because the incursions are so frequent. Taiwanese
media revealed in late 2024 that the Republic of China (ROC) Ministry of
National Defense (MND) quietly shortened the warning distance for air
raid warnings from 70 to 24 nautical miles at the end of 2022 because
the increased volume of PLA activity would have required near-daily air
raid alerts under the previous threshold. The new threshold would give
residents of some Taiwanese regions just three minutes to seek shelter
in a real air raid, however.[15]
The
MND also detected 16 PRC high-altitude balloons in Taiwan’s ADIZ in
January, including seven that flew directly over Taiwan, over a total of
10 days of the month. The PRC has resumed and gradually escalated such
balloon incursions since November 2024, after carrying out a much
higher-volume campaign of balloon incursions in the winter of 2023–2024.
The MND reported 57 balloons in Taiwan’s ADIZ in January 2024,
including incursions nearly every day of the month.[16]
The greatly reduced volume of balloon activity this January compared to
last year strengthens ISW’s previous assessment that the 2024 balloon
incursions were in part politically motivated to influence Taiwan’s
election in January 2024. The balloons also support the broader ADIZ
incursion campaign of wearing down Taiwan’s threat awareness, however,
and may be conducting reconnaissance. The PRC TAO claimed in January
2024 that the balloons were “mostly” meteorological and “mostly”
launched by private enterprises, even though they flew much lower than
most meteorological balloons.[17]
The balloons’ true purpose and intelligence gathering potential remains
unclear, but even collecting standard meteorological data over Taiwan
can be useful for planning missile strikes.[18]
China
The
success of PRC-based artificial intelligence (AI) company DeepSeek’s
newly released reasoning model demonstrates the ineffectiveness of
current US export controls to prevent PRC access to advanced
semiconductors. DeepSeek released its new
reasoning model called R1 in January. R1 demonstrated competitive
performance that is on par with leading models from the United States,
such as OpenAI’s ChatGPT. One of the primary goals of
US export controls on advanced semiconductors to the PRC is to inhibit
the PRC’s development of AI to support its military modernization
efforts, including applying AI to improve the speed and accuracy of
military decision making, planning, and logistics.[19]
US
government entities, including the White House, Department of Commerce,
and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), are investigating whether
DeepSeek used semiconductors that are subject to PRC-focused export
restrictions to develop R1.[20]
Investigating agencies are specifically trying to determine whether
DeepSeek used intermediaries in Singapore to circumvent US export
controls and purchase Nvidia chips, according to Bloomberg.[21]
Nvidia is the dominant provider of advanced semiconductors that are
optimized to train generative AI models, maintaining a market share of
approximately 80 percent.[22]
Singapore’s
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) stated on February 1 that many of
Nvidia’s customers use their business entities in Singapore to purchase
chips that are produced for consumption in the United States and Western
countries.[23]
Nvidia’s financial and regulatory statements disclosed that
approximately 22 percent of the company’s revenue was attributed to
shipments to Singapore in 2024 but that “most shipments associated with
Singapore were to locations other than Singapore, and shipments to
Singapore were insignificant.”[24]
Nvidia’s financial and regulatory statements disclosed that
approximately 22 percent of the company’s revenue was attributed to
shipments to Singapore in 2024 but that “most shipments associated with
Singapore were to locations other than Singapore, and shipments to
Singapore were insignificant.”[25]
MTI stated that it expects US companies to comply with US export
controls and that Singapore’s customs and law enforcement agencies would
continue to work with US counterparts to uphold the restrictions.[26]
MTI noted in the same statement that “Nvidia has also stated that there
is no reason to believe that DeepSeek obtained any export-controlled
products from Singapore.”
The US Department of Commerce’s
Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) implemented expanded export
controls in October 2023 on advanced semiconductors to more than 40
additional countries that presented a risk of diversion to the PRC, but
this list did not include Singapore.[27]
US legislators John Moolenaar and Raja Krishnamoorthi of the House
Select Committee on the CCP wrote in a January 30 letter to National
Security Advisor Mike Waltz that “countries like Singapore should be
subject to strict licensing requirements absent a willingness to crack
down on PRC transshipment through their territory.”[28]
BIS placed additional entities from the PRC and Singapore on the Entity
List on January 15 for violating US export controls on advanced
semiconductors, however.[29]
DeepSeek’s
development of R1 could have used either chips that were shipped before
export restrictions were implemented or chips that are currently
excluded from export restrictions, which would demonstrate the need to
further tighten the performance limits of chips that currently qualify
for shipment to the PRC. Nvidia released two downgraded variants of its
top AI semiconductors, the H800 and H20, to accommodate increasingly
stringent performance limits for the chips that it can sell to the PRC.
The United States expanded export restrictions in October 2023 to
include Nvidia’s H800 chips.[30]
DeepSeek’s researchers stated in a December 27 report that the company
used 2,048 H800 chips to train its V3 model, which it may have legally
purchased before October 2023.[31] The H20 chip is currently outside the scope of US export controls and accessible to PRC companies, such as DeepSeek.
DeepSeek’s
competitive AI performance highlights the failure of current
semiconductor export controls against the PRC in inhibiting AI
development, whether due to illegal trans-shipment or insufficiently
inclusive restrictions.
The PRC is constructing a
massive military complex in western Beijing that is estimated to be ten
times the size of the Pentagon, according to anonymous current and
former US officials that spoke to the Financial Times (FT).[32]
US intelligence officials are reportedly examining satellite images of
the approximately 1,500-acre construction project, which began in
mid-2024. The exact purpose of the facility is still unclear. Center for
Naval Analysis (CNA) geospatial intelligence analyst Decker Eveleth
noted that the satellite imagery suggests significant portions of the
facility will be underground.[33]
Taiwanese security experts expressed doubts about the facility’s
utility as a bunker, however. Hsu Yen-chi of the Council on Strategic
and Wargaming Studies, a Taiwan-based think tank, speculated that the
new military facility could serve administrative or training purposes
due to its size.[34]
The
PRC currently lacks an equivalent to the Pentagon or a centralized
Ministry of Defense facility that integrates facilities across domains.
These new facilities could reflect a PRC effort to integrate command and
control as the PLA works to improve interoperability across domains. An
unnamed US official told FT that the facility will likely replace the
PRC’s Central Military Commission (CMC) Joint Operations Command Center
in the Western Hills of Beijing, which is currently near the top of the
chain of command to alert or use nuclear weapons.[35]
This would align with ongoing PRC efforts to centralize and streamline
the command and control of the PLA. The US Department of Defense (DoD)
2024 China Military Power Report (CMPR) assessed that the PLA is working
toward improving its ability to conduct joint operations.[36]
The PRC has taken several measures to this end in recent years,
including the creation of a new military support branch in April 2024
that is focused on optimizing information networks to achieve rapid and
informed decision-making.
The PRC announced
retaliatory economic measures against the United States on February 4 in
response to the US implementation of 10 percent tariffs on PRC imports.
The PRC’s measures include a 15 percent tariff on US coal and
liquefied natural gas (LNG) products and a 10 percent tariff on crude
oil, agricultural machinery, large-displacement cars, and pickup trucks.[37]
The tariffs will take effect on February 10. The comparatively narrow
scope of PRC tariffs on US imports indicates the PRC’s reluctance to
enact reciprocal measures, which likely stems from a desire to limit the
impact of trade tensions on domestic consumption. The PRC Ministry of
Commerce stated its intent to file a lawsuit against the United States
with the World Trade Organization (WTO) on the grounds that the US 10
percent tariffs on PRC imports violate WTO rules and disrupt global
supply chains. The PRC’s appeal to a supranational authority and framing
of US tariffs as detrimental to the global economy is consistent with
PRC narratives that aim to portray it as a champion of multilateralism
and free trade while characterizing the United States as protectionist
and unilateral.[38]
The PRC State Administration for Market Regulation announced an anti-monopoly investigation against Google the same day.[39]
The PRC also added biotechnology company Illumina and PVH, the holding
company for clothing brands such as Calvin Klein and Tommy Hilfiger, to
the “unreliable entity list” for “discriminatory measures against
Chinese enterprises,” which could potentially subject the companies to
fines and sanctions. [40]
The
PRC’s export controls on critical minerals will inhibit US access to
materials that are essential to economic and national security. The
PRC implemented export controls on 25 products related to bismuth,
indium, molybdenum, tellurium, and tungsten on February 4, likely as
part of its retaliation for US tariffs. The PRC Ministry of Commerce
(MOFCOM) framed the measures as a legitimate and “internationally
accepted practice” taken out of concern for national security.[41]
The
US Department of Interior designates all five of these minerals as
critical minerals. These minerals have a range of applications in
civilian and defense production. Tungsten is used in military-grade
steel production, aerospace components, armor-piercing munitions,
missiles, and ground vehicle armor.[42]
Molybdenum is used in the production of aerospace parts, heat radiation
shields, jet engines, missiles, vehicle and body armor, and as an
alloying agent to strengthen steel.[43]
Indium is used in the production of phone screens, television displays,
fiber optics, solar cells, control rods for nuclear reactors, and
semiconductors.[44] Bismuth is used in the production of ammunition, thermoelectric devices, solder, and as an alloying agent.[45]
Tellurium is used in the production of night vision and thermal imaging
devices, solar batteries, radar, explosives detectors, and
thermoelectric devices.[46]
Unclassified inventories of US National Defense Stockpiles (NDS) of
critical minerals did not include bismuth, indium, molybdenum, or
tellurium as of September 2022.[47]
The PRC is the dominant producer for all five of these critical
minerals, and in some cases, the largest source supplier of US imports.[48]
The
PRC’s dominant position in the supply chain extends to a variety of
other critical minerals, many of which already have restricted US
access. The PRC issued an outright ban on the export of critical
minerals gallium, germanium, antimony, and superhard materials to the
United States and implemented tighter controls on exports of graphite on
December 3 in response to US semiconductor export restrictions directed
at the PRC.[49]
The United States’ annual demand for some of those critical minerals,
such as antimony, exceeds any other single country’s mining production.[50]
The PRC’s latest export controls on critical minerals are likely part
of its asymmetric response to US tariffs that aims to use targeted
measures to pressure the United States without escalating into a trade
war.
Southeast Asia
Philippines
The
Philippines National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) arrested five PRC
nationals from January 24–25 for spying on Philippine Coast Guard (PCG)
ships and photographing military bases while posing as Taiwanese tourists.[51]
The PRC nationals allegedly installed surveillance cameras on coconut
trees facing the sea to monitor PCG activity, operated drones without
authorization, and photographed military facilities.[52]
Philippine authorities recovered footage from the drones and
military-grade, high-resolution video cameras disguised to look like
CCTV. Philippine Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Romeo Brawner Jr.
said during a press conference on January 30 that the recovered video
footage was sent in real time to a remote location.[53]
NBI Director James Santiago said that the alleged spies monitored the
activities of a naval detachment, coast guard ships, an air base, a
naval base, and a dockyard in the Philippines’ Palawan province. Palawan
the closest major landmass to the Spratly Islands, which is a group of
islands in the South China Sea that the Philippines contests with the
PRC. Philippine officials discovered photographs in the suspects’ mobile
devices of a PCG station, small navy crafts and assets, and PCG vessels
BRP Teresa Magbanua and BRP Gabriela Silang.[54]
The former PCG vessel is frequently deployed to the South China Sea and
is the victim of aggressive PRC coercion tactics during confrontational
encounters near disputed features.[55]
Philippine
authorities suspect the PRC nationals operated in a spy network and are
trying to identify other potential accomplices. The NBI stated that the
five individuals in this case were working with PRC national Deng
Yuanqing, who was arrested on January 17 on espionage charges for
driving around a car that transmitted topographic information as well as
for surveilling military bases and other critical infrastructure in the
Philippine island of Luzon.[56]
The five PRC nationals arrested on January 24-25 claimed to be members
of civic groups Qiaoxing Volunteer Group of the Philippines and the
Philippine-China Association of Promotion of Peace and Friendship. NBI
Director Santiago said that they also befriended local officials.[57]
The
PRC condemned the Philippine military’s announcement that the
US-supplied Typhon missile system would be used during unilateral drills
in mid-February. The PRC views the missile system, which is stationed
in Luzon, as a threat to its security. The upcoming Philippine
exercise, which is a continuation of previous drills from 2024, will
help to prepare Philippine forces for larger, joint drills with the
United States that are scheduled for later this year.[58]
The United Stated began deploying the Typhon missile system within the
Philippines for joint operations as part of the Balikatan Exercise in
April 2024.[59]
The system was placed on the north side of the island of Luzon and has
remained deployed there despite criticism from the PRC and premature
announcements from Philippine officials that it would be removed.[60] The Philippines said in December 2024 that it plans to acquire the missile system from the United States.[61]
The
PRC has stated that the system’s deployment could represent a new
regional arms race that could jeopardize regional security and increase
geopolitical confrontation.[62]
The PRC likely views the Typhon system’s deployment as a threat to
potential future naval operations, as the system can launch Tomahawk
missiles with the range to reach targets in the South China Sea, the
Taiwan Strait, and the mainland PRC.[63]
The PRC views expanding US-Philippines military cooperation more
broadly as undermining its long-term strategy of achieving regional
hegemony and solidifying control of its claimed territory, such as
Taiwan and the South China Sea.[64]
Philippine
President Ferdinand "Bongbong" Romualdez Marcos Jr in response to
ongoing PRC criticism said on January 31 that he was willing to remove
the Typhon system from the Philippines if the PRC would cease its
operations in the West Philippine Sea--the part of the South China Sea
where the Philippines claims territory.[65]
Marcos called on the PRC to “Stop claiming our territory, stop
harassing our fishermen and let them have a living, stop ramming our
boats, stop water cannoning our people, stop firing lasers at us, and
stop your aggressive and coercive behavior, and we’ll return the Typhon
missiles.”[66] PRC officials have yet to comment on the statement from Marcos.
The
PLA is increasing its air and naval presence around the disputed
Scarborough Shoal to solidify PRC control amid perceived encroachment by
the Philippines and its allies. The PLA Southern Theater
Command (STC) conducted “combat readiness patrols” in the territorial
sea and airspace around Scarborough Shoal on January 31. It conducted
additional “routine patrols” on February 4 and 5.[67]
The STC stated that it has “consistently enhanced patrols and vigilance
in the surrounding waters and airspace of Huangyan Dao (Scarborough
Shoal)” since the beginning of January to strengthen the PRC’s control
over the area.[68]
The PLA air patrol on February 4 coincided with a joint US-Philippine
air patrol and interception drill over the South China Sea, including
near Scarborough Shoal.[69]
STC spokesperson Tian Junli accused the Philippines of “collud[ing]
with a foreign country to organize a so-called ‘joint patrol’ to
deliberately undermine peace and stability in the South China Sea.”
There were no reports of confrontations between the militaries, however.
The PLA previously confronted Philippine aircraft on patrol near
Scarborough Shoal in August 2024 and fired flares in their flight path,
triggering condemnation from the Philippine government.[70] The
increased PLA activity around Scarborough Shoal is in addition to the
China Coast Guard’s continuous presence west of the Philippine province
of Zambales, which is near Scarborough Shoal, since the beginning of
2025.[71]
Scarborough
Shoal is an uninhabited atoll that the Philippines, PRC, and ROC all
claim. The PRC seized the shoal from the Philippines in 2012 by
surrounding it with coast guard vessels to block Philippine entry. It
has not built any infrastructure on the shoal, however, apparently in
keeping with the 2002 PRC-ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in
the South China Sea, which stated that signatories shall not inhabit
any previously uninhabited islands, reefs, or other features in the sea.[72]
The Philippines has attempted to reassert control over Scarborough
Shoal by conducting air and sea patrols in the area as well as using
government ships to resupply Philippine fishermen that maintain a
consistent presence in the area. The PRC has opposed such efforts with
its own coast guard and military forces, including by blasting
Philippine ships with water cannons and warding off Philippine planes
with air interceptions and flares.
A PLA destroyer sailed through the Basilan Strait between the Philippine islands of Mindanao and Basilan for the first time. A
PLA Navy (PLAN) Type 055 stealth missile destroyer, a type 054A
frigate, and a Type 903 replenishment ship sailed through the Basilan
Strait toward the Sulu Sea on February 2. PRC state broadcaster CCTV
later aired footage of the ships carrying out far-seas combat training
at an undisclosed location in the Pacific Ocean. Philippine officials
expressed concern about the PLA warships so close to Philippine
territory, while the Philippines’ Western Mindanao Command stated that
it was tracking the three ships in what it described as “Philippine
waters.”[73]
STC spokesperson Tian Junli disputed the Philippine characterization of
the transit and criticized the Philippines for “hyping” what he called a
“normal transit” that was “fully in line with international law.”[74]
Russia
A
US-sanctioned tanker unloaded Russian oil in the PRC after being forced
to change its destination from Shandong Province, whose main port
authority banned sanctioned tankers at its ports. The threat of US
secondary sanctions is increasing PRC sanctions compliance and raising
costs on sanctioned countries that trade with the PRC. Bloomberg reported that the tanker Huihai Pacific
unloaded 770,000 of crude oil from the Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean
(ESPO) pipeline at the major PRC port of Tianjin after an unusually long
sea journey of nearly four weeks. The ship loaded its cargo at the
Russian Pacific port of Kozmino on January 5 and departed for the port
of Dongjiakou in the PRC’s Shandong province, a journey that typically
takes about one week.[75]
Reuters reported on January 7 that the Shandong Port Group, a
provincial state-owned enterprise that operates Shandong’s major ports,
banned US-sanctioned tankers from unloading goods at its ports. The Huihai Pacific was not on that sanctions list when it left Kozmino. The US Department of Treasury imposed sanctions on the Huihai Pacific on January 10, however, as one of 183 oil tankers that it identified as part of Russia’s “shadow fleet.” The Huihai Pacific
is registered in Panama and owned by a Hong Kong company, which until
recently allowed it to operate unhindered by the sanctions imposed on
Russia.[76] The tanker ultimately had to change its destination from Shandong to another PRC port, which greatly delayed its journey.
Shandong
is home to many independent oil refiners that are the biggest importers
of oil from US-sanctioned countries in the PRC. Shandong imported about
1.74 million barrels per day of oil from Russia, Iran, and Venezuela in
2024, accounting for about 17 percent of the PRC’s oil imports.[77]
The Shandong Port Group controls many major Chinese ports, including
Yantai, Rizhao, and Qingdao. The threat of secondary sanctions,
including the potential loss of access to the US financial system, has
been effective at compelling some PRC entities, such as Shandong Port
Group and many banks, to cease business with sanctioned Russian
entities. Shandong’s compliance with US sanctions will increase shipping
costs for independent refiners, possibly to the point of making them
unprofitable, since many of them operate on thin margins and buy
sanctioned oil because it is sold at a discount. It will also make it
more difficult and less profitable for US-sanctioned countries, such as
Russia, to sell oil in the PRC. The sanctions will likely push Chinese
oil refineries to seek alternative sources elsewhere in the Middle East,
Africa, and the Americas and curb the PRC’s access to cheap oil
resources.[78]
PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Guo Jiakun claimed
on January 8 to be unaware of Shandong Port Group’s ban but stated that
the PRC opposes “illegal unilateral sanctions” by the United States.[79]
Africa
South Africa
South
Africa demanded that Taiwan's representative office leave the
administrative capital of Pretoria by the end of March in an effort by
South Africa to strengthen ties with the PRC. The Taiwanese
foreign ministry stated that it received a letter in late January from
the South African government reiterating demands for the de-facto
Taiwanese embassy, the Taipei Liaison Office, to leave Pretoria and
rename itself as a trade office.[80]
South Africa and Taiwan have no formal diplomatic relations but
maintain unofficial ties. South Africa first verbally requested that the
Taipei Liaison Office move from Pretoria in December 2023, then issued
another request in April 2024, before finally giving an ultimatum on
October 7, 2024, for the office to move or close.[81]
The Taiwanese foreign ministry suggested that the renewed demands are a
result of the PRC sanctioning the federal chairman of the South
Africa’s Democratic Alliance, Ivan Meyer, after he visited Taiwan in
January 2025.[82]
The Democratic Alliance is a major political party in South Africa that
has been part of the ruling coalition with the African National
Congress (ANC) since the 2024 elections.
Latin America
Panama
Panama
announced that it would withdraw from the PRC’s Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) and consider canceling contracts that allow a Hong
Kong-based company to operate two ports on the Panama Canal after US
Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned Panama to curtail PRC influence in
the country. Rubio told Panamanian President Jose Raul Mulino
during a meeting between the two in Panama City on February 2 that the
United States would “take measures necessary to protect its rights” if
Panama failed to curtail PRC influence over the Panama Canal.[83]
The Donald Trump administration has accused the PRC of undue influence
over the canal, a strategic waterway through which up to 40 percent of
US seaborne trade passes.[84] Bloomberg estimated that 75 percent of the cargo passing through the canal is traveling to or from the United States.[85]
A US State Department readout stated that “President Trump has made a
preliminary determination that the current position of influence and
control of the Chinese Communist Party over the Panama Canal area is a
threat to the canal and represents a violation of the Treaty Concerning
the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal.”[86]
The 1977 treaty, which returned the Panama Canal from the United States
to Panama, stipulates that the United States may intervene militarily
if a conflict or foreign power affects the canal’s operations.[87]
Rubio and the Trump administration specifically objected to the
presence of two Panama Canal ports controlled by a Hong-Kong based
company, which they claimed violated the treaty.[88]
Ports situated at either end of the canal—Cristobal and Balboa—are run
by Panama Ports Co., which is part of Hutchison Ports, a subsidiary of
Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison Holdings.[89]
US Senator Ted Cruz objected to the construction of a PRC-funded bridge
over the Panama Canal as well, arguing that the PRC could use the
bridge to block the canal without warning.[90]
PRC
MFA spokeswoman Mao Ning stated in a press conference on January 22
that “China does not participate in the management and operation of the
canal and never interferes in canal affairs.”[91]
Hutchison is not a state-owned enterprise and does not control access
to the canal. It is responsible only for supplying and loading container
ships at its ports.[92]
Hutchison’s involvement in the port also predates BRI, which PRC
President Xi Jinping inaugurated in 2013. Hutchison has provided
logistical services at the two ports since 1997.[93] There are three other ports in the Panama Canal, which are owned and operated by US, Singaporean, and Taiwanese companies.
Panama’s
withdrawal from BRI represents a loss of one of the PRC’s key soft
power tools in Latin America. Panama was the first Latin American
country to sign onto BRI in 2017, shortly after it switched its
diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC. Panama renewed this
memorandum of understanding in 2020 and 2023. Panamanian President
Mulino, after his meeting with Rubio, said that Panama will not renew
its participation in 2026, the next time it comes up for renewal, and
will consider early withdrawal.[94] Twenty-two Latin American and Caribbean countries, including Panama, were formal BRI members at the end of 2024.[95]
Western observers have accused the PRC of using BRI to spread its
influence and advance its model of governance and portray itself as a
leader of the Global South.[96]
PRC economic and political influence in Panama via BRI contributes to
US concerns over neutrality in a place where the United States has
significant economic security concerns.[97]
The
impact of Panama’s withdrawal from BRI on existing infrastructure
projects, as well as projects currently under construction, is unclear.
Rubio’s visit appears to have set in motion controversies against CK
Hutchison, however. Two Panamanian lawyers accused the Hutchison
subsidiary of violating Panama’s constitution and failing to pay taxes
and benefits; they filed to cancel this 1997 concession on February 4.[98]
Panamanian President Jose Raul Mulino has also announced that Panama is
considering cancelling Hutchison’s contracts over its two Panama Canal
ports.[99]
The PRC-backed bridge over the canal is still under construction at the
time of writing, however. PRC MFA spokesman Lin Jian deflected a
question about Panama’s withdrawal from BRI and said that PRC-Panama
cooperation was “proceeding normally” in a regular press conference on
February 5.[100]
A spokesperson for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR)
said that the Hong Kong government does not interfere in the affairs of
Hong Kong businesses and that Hong Kong opposes any country’s
interference in normal business operations.[101]
[1] https://www.taiwannews.com dot tw/news/6030202
[2]
https://tw.news.yahoo dot
com/%E7%BD%B7%E5%85%8D%E6%87%B6%E4%BA%BA%E5%8C%85%EF%BC%9A%E7%BD%B7%E5%85%8D%E9%80%A3%E7%BD%B2%E6%80%8E%E9%BA%BC%E5%81%9A%EF%BC%9F%E7%BD%B7%E5%85%8D%E6%88%90%E7%AB%8B%E9%9C%80%E5%A4%9A%E5%B0%91%E9%80%A3%E7%BD%B2%EF%BC%9F%E7%BD%B7%E5%85%8D%E9%80%9A%E9%81%8E%E9%96%80%E6%AA%BB%E7%82%BA%E4%BD%95%EF%BC%9F%E7%BD%B7%E5%85%8D%E4%BA%94%E5%A4%A7qa%E4%B8%80%E6%AC%A1%E7%9C%8B%EF%BC%81-090902655.html
[3] https://www.taiwannews.com dot tw/news/6027388
[4] https://www.taiwannews.com dot tw/news/6028165; https://www.taiwannews.com dot tw/news/6022045
[5] https://www.cec.gov dot tw/central/article/31568
[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-january-30-2025
[7] https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202412200015
[8] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/02/03/2003831263
[9] https://news.ltn.com dot tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4939727
[10] https://www.worldjournal dot com/wj/story/121220/8526046
[11] https://www.taiwannews.com dot tw/news/6028149
https://news.ltn.com dot tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4939727
[12] https://news.immigration.gov dot tw/NewsSection/Detail/C293A963-3352-4E6A-9CEA-85404FF510B2?lang=EN
[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-december-20-2024
[14] https://x.com/MoNDefense
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1qbfYF0VgDBJoFZN5elpZwNTiKZ4nvCUcs5a7oYwm52g/edit?pli=1&gid=1177684118#gid=1177684118
[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-december-5-2024
[16] https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1qbfYF0VgDBJoFZN5elpZwNTiKZ4nvCUcs5a7oYwm52g/edit?pli=1&gid=1177684118#gid=1177684118
[17] http://www.gwytb dot gov.cn/m/speech/202401/t20240131_12597322.htm
https://reuters.com/graphics/TAIWAN-CHINA/BALLOONS/lbpglrgwwvq/
[18] https://reuters.com/graphics/TAIWAN-CHINA/BALLOONS/lbpglrgwwvq/
[19] https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-strengthens-restrictions-advanced-computing-semiconductors-enhance-foundry
[20] https://www.reuters.com/technology/us-looking-into-whether-deepseek-used-restricted-ai-chips-source-says-2025-01-31/
[21] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-01-31/us-probing-whether-deepseek-got-nvidia-chips-through-singapore
[22] https://www.fool.com/investing/2025/02/03/deepseek-shocked-the-ai-market-last-week-heres-why/
[23]
https://www.mti dot
gov.sq/Newsroom/Press-Releases/2025/02/Press-Statement-on-whether-DeepSeek-gained-access-to-US-export-controlled-chips
[24] https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1045810/000104581024000316/nvda-20241027.htm
[25] https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1045810/000104581024000316/nvda-20241027.htm
[26]
https://www.mti dot
gov.sq/Newsroom/Press-Releases/2025/02/Press-Statement-on-whether-DeepSeek-gained-access-to-US-export-controlled-chips
[27] https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/about-bis/newsroom/2082
[28] https://selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/1.29.25%20Letter%20to%20NSC%20on%20DeepSeek.pdf
[29] https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-strengthens-restrictions-advanced-computing-semiconductors-enhance-foundry
[30] https://www.cnbc.com/2023/10/17/us-bans-export-of-more-ai-chips-including-nvidia-h800-to-china.html
[31] https://arxiv dot org/html/2412.19437v1
[32] https://www.ft.com/content/f3763e51-8607-42b9-9ef9-5789d5bf353d
[33] https://x.com/bradyafr/status/1885349922666434761 ; https://x.com/dex_eve/status/1885341080247230895?s=46
[34] https://www.rfa.org/cantonese/news/china-military-biggest-military-command-centre-in-beijing-01312025054209.html?encoding=simplified; https://www.ft.com/content/f3763e51-8607-42b9-9ef9-5789d5bf353d
[35] https://www.ft.com/content/f3763e51-8607-42b9-9ef9-5789d5bf353d
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-06/Phillip_Saunders_Testimony.pdf
[36] https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF
[37] https://www.mof dot gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caizhengxinwen/202502/t20250204_3955222.htm
[38] https://www.ft.com/content/eb169eab-dde1-4f1b-a6dd-76d83c31b0c1
https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202502/t20250202_11548194.shtml
https://www.mofcom dot gov.cn/xwfb/xwfyrth/art/2025/art_356b19f92e0b4603ae798804b6ea4be3.html
[39] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/04/business/economy/trump-tariffs-china.html
[40] https://www.reuters.com/technology/china-anti-monopoly-regulator-launches-probe-into-google-2025-02-04/
[41] https://www.mofcom dot gov.cn/xwfb/xwfyrth/art/2025/art_7b08ff0fc4f0405d855c03a48cdbbea1.html
[42] https://investornews.com/critical-minerals-rare-earths/tungsten-supply-crisis-threatens-defense-and-tech-industries/#:~:text=Tungsten%20is%20known%20as%20one,smart%20phones%20to%20hypersonic%20missiles.
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4000947/department-of-defense-makes-investment-to-strengthen-the-tungsten-supply-chain/
[43] https://www.refractorymetal.org/innovations-in-molybdenum-alloys-for-defense-and-military-applications.html#:~:text=Molybdenum%20alloys%20are%20at%20the,the%20safety%20of%20military%20personnel.
https://www.efineametals.com/refractory-metal-supplier/molybdenum/molybdenum-applications-rod-sheet-plate-threaded-rod-nuts/#:~:text=Molybdenum%20Applications,largest%20technical%20professional%20organizations%20worldwide.
https://themarketbull.com.au/2023/11/13/molybdenum-the-overlooked-critical-mineral/
[44] https://www.refractorymetal.org/uses-of-indium.html
https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/what-are-five-new-critical-metal-exports-restricted-by-china-2025-02-04/
[45] https://www.dla.mil/Strategic-Materials/Materials/
[46] https://www.dla.mil/Strategic-Materials/Materials/#:~:text=Automotive%20electronics,IED%20detectors
[47] https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47833
[48] https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2024/mcs2024-tungsten.pdf
https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2024/mcs2024-molybdenum.pdf
https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2024/mcs2024-indium.pdf
https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2024/mcs2024-tellurium.pdf
https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2024/mcs2024-bismuth.pdf
[49] http://www.mofcom dot gov.cn/zwgk/zcfb/art/2024/art_3d5e990b43424e60828030f58a547b60.html
[50] https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2024/mcs2024-antimony.pdf
[51] https://www.taiwannews dot com.tw/news/6025644
https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/front/archives/2025/01/31/2003831096
[52] https://www.pna dot gov.ph/articles/1243005
[53] https://www.pna dot gov.ph/articles/1243005
[54] https://www.abs-cbn dot com/news/nation/2025/1/30/alleged-chinese-spies-posed-as-tourists-in-palawan-official-0920
[55] https://news.usni.org/2024/12/03/chinese-warships-cutters-harass-philippine-patrol-near-scarborough-shoal-say-officials
[56] https://cebudailynews.inquirer dot net/620390/nbi-arrests-5-suspected-chinese-spies-in-palawan
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/philippines-arrests-chinese-national-suspicion-espionage-2025-01-20/
https://www.scmp dot com/week-asia/politics/article/3295612/philippines-arrest-chinese-sleeper-agent-sparks-fears-widespread-spying
[57] https://www.pna dot gov.ph/articles/1243005
[58] https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12135
[59] https://www.defensenews.com/land/2024/04/16/us-army-deploys-midrange-missile-for-first-time-in-philippines/
https://ph.usembassy.gov/philippine-u-s-troops-to-kick-off-exercise-balikatan-2024/
[60] DNGTS: https://www.eurasiantimes.com/the-philippine-army-confirms-withdrawal/
https://apnews.com/article/us-philippines-china-military-typhon-midrange-missile-system-69242b99335eb55032894fbc83d75135
[61] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/philippines-us-typhon-missile-system-warnings-from-china/
[62] https://www.newsweek.com/us-news-army-missile-system-china-doorstep-hits-moving-target-fire-test-2015063
[63] https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/why-tensions-south-china-sea-are-bolstering-us-philippines-alliance
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-december-5-2024
[64] https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/chinas-blue-dragon-strategy-in-the-indo-pacific/
[65]
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/philippine-president-offers-a-deal-to-china-stop-sea-aggression-and-ill-return-missiles-to-us/ar-AA1y7aij?ocid=BingNewsSerp
[66]
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/philippine-president-offers-a-deal-to-china-stop-sea-aggression-and-ill-return-missiles-to-us/ar-AA1y7aij?ocid=BingNewsSerp
[67] http://www.81 dot cn/fyr/16367745.html
http://www.81 dot cn/fyr/16367743.html
https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202502/1327740.shtml
[68] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202502/1327740.shtml
https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3297077/pla-holds-combat-readiness-patrols-around-hotly-disputed-south-china-sea-shoal
[69] https://apnews.com/article/philippines-us-joint-patrol-scarborough-shoal-843b68e5833dd640fc9336ac415705c3
[70] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-august-16-2024
[71] https://qa.philstar dot com/headlines/2025/02/03/2418957/china-coast-guard-presence-near-zambales-reaches-month
[72] https://asean dot org/declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea-2/
[73] https://globalnation.inquirer dot net/238824/fwd-break-2-chinese-navy-warships-monitored-in-basilan-strait
https://www.scmp
dot
com/news/china/military/article/3297247/chinese-military-disputes-manilas-version-south-china-sea-naval-crossing?module=top_story&pgtype=subsection
[74] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202502/1327787.shtml
[75] https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/russia-oil-trade-china-india-stalls-sanctions-drive-up-shipping-costs-2025-01-28/
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-01-31/sanctioned-ship-unloads-russian-oil-in-china-after-long-journey?srnd=next-china
[76] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2777
[77] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/chinas-shandong-port-group-blacklists-us-sanctioned-oil-vessels-say-traders-2025-01-07/
[78] https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/tougher-us-sanctions-curb-russian-oil-supply-china-india-2025-01-12/
[79] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/202501/t20250110_11530934.shtml
[80] https://www.reuters.com/world/taiwan-says-safrica-gives-march-deadline-move-office-pretoria-2025-02-03/
https://www.mofa dot gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=95&sms=73&s=119073
[81] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-october-23-2024
https://www.chinatimes dot com/realtimenews/20241022002848-260407?chdtv
https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202410210006
[82] https://www.mofa dot gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=95&sms=73&s=119073
https://www.scmp
dot
com/news/china/politics/article/3297201/south-africa-presses-taiwan-vacate-liaison-office-pretoria?module=top_story&pgtype=subsection
[83] https://www.cnn.com/2025/02/02/americas/panama-china-belt-and-road-initiative-rubio-visits-intl-latam/index.html
[84] https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2025/1/examining-the-panama-canal-and-its-impact-on-u-s-trade-and-national-security/2bd42caa-e77a-440f-9693-5db9a3ebed01
[85] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-02-04/panama-said-to-mull-canceling-port-deal-with-hong-kong-firm
[86] https://www.state.gov/secretary-rubios-meeting-with-panamanian-president-mulino/
[87] https://www.cnn.com/2025/02/02/americas/panama-china-belt-and-road-initiative-rubio-visits-intl-latam/index.html
[88] https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/rubio-panama-canal-migration-talks-he-begins-latin-america-trip-2025-02-02/
[89] https://www.newsweek.com/china-news-reacts-trump-panama-canal-control-2018816
[90] https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2025/1/sen-cruz-evidence-shows-panama-may-be-in-violation-of-canal-treaty
[91] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/202501/t20250122_11542823.shtml
[92] https://www.cnn.com/2025/02/02/americas/panama-china-belt-and-road-initiative-rubio-visits-intl-latam/index.html; https://www.cnn.com/2025/01/31/americas/panama-canal-china-rubio-explainer-intl-latam/index.html; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/15/world/asia/china-panama-explained.html
[93]
https://www.scmp dot
com/news/world/americas/article/3297324/panama-court-urged-cancel-hong-kong-firms-canal-contract-amid-trump-threat;
[94] https://www.voachinese.com/a/china-s-reaction-to-panama-s-decision-of-quitting-the-bri-initiative-20250203/7960959.html
[95] https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/11/13/china-latin-america-investment-development-bri-apec-summit/
[96] https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/10/why-china-rebooting-belt-and-road-initiative
[97] https://www.politico.com/news/2022/10/23/china-diplomacy-panama-00062828
[98]
https://www.scmp dot
com/news/world/americas/article/3297324/panama-court-urged-cancel-hong-kong-firms-canal-contract-amid-trump-threat
[99] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-02-04/panama-said-to-mull-canceling-port-deal-with-hong-kong-firm
[100] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/fyrbt_673021/202502/t20250205_11549494.shtml
[101] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202502/1327911.shtml
