Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan
February 19, 2025, 6:45 pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 1:30 pm ET on February 19 ISW
will cover subsequent reports in the February 20 Russian Offensive
Campaign Assessment.
Russian President
Vladimir Putin is reportedly trying to optimize the Russian negotiations
delegation to be most effective with the specific individuals whom the
United States chooses for its negotiation delegation, likely in an
effort to extract maximum concessions from the United States. Kremlin
Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on February 19 that Putin will
appoint a negotiator for talks with the United States after the United
States appoints its own negotiator.[1] Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported
on February 19, citing a source close to the Kremlin, that the United
States was the first to select its delegation for the February 18
bilateral talks in Saudi Arabia, after which Russia attempted to "select
relevant" counterparts for each of the selected US officials.[2]
The source claimed that Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO
Kirill Dmitriev's appointment to the delegation appeared largely as a
response to US demands that Russia appoint someone that would
"understand" the United States. Another source close to the Kremlin told
Meduza that Putin may appoint his aide Vladimir Medinsky to
the Russian negotiations delegation if Ukrainian representatives join
future negotiations because Medinsky took part in the Spring 2022
Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in Istanbul. The source claimed that the
Kremlin does not need to include Medinsky in the Russian delegation so
long as negotiations remain bilateral between the United States and
Russia. The Moscow Times reported on February 19, citing a
diplomatic source familiar with the February 18 US-Russia meeting, that
the Kremlin seeks to restore access to roughly $6 billion worth of
frozen Russian Central Bank reserves in the US.[3]
The source claimed that the Russian negotiations delegation in Saudi
Arabia pushed for the United States to agree that both countries fully
resume the operations of their diplomatic missions in the other country
and to return Russian diplomatic property in the United States, which US
authorities had previously seized on charges of being used for
intelligence purposes. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on
February 18 that the United States and Russia had agreed to restore "the
functionality of [their] respective missions in Washington and Moscow."[4]
The Kremlin appears to be attempting to push the United States to
accept economic and diplomatic terms that are unrelated to the war in
Ukraine, possibly in return for Ukrainian and Western concessions that are related to the war.[5]
US acceptance of these economic and diplomatic terms — without
demanding any Russian concessions on Ukraine in return — would give away
leverage that the United States will need to achieve US
President Donald Trump's stated objective of achieving a lasting and
enduring peace that benefits the United States and Ukraine.
US
Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Adviser Michael
Waltz reiterated on February 18 that US President Donald Trump's
position that the war in Ukraine must end in a way that is "fair,
enduring, sustainable, and acceptable to all parties involved" remains
unchanged.[6] Rubio, Waltz, and Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff gave an interview to CNN and the Associated Press (AP)
on February 18 following bilateral talks with Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov and Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov in Saudi Arabia. Waltz
stated that any future end to the war needs to be "permanent," not
"temporary as we have seen in the past." Waltz stated that there is
going to have to be "some discussion of territory...and security
guarantees" and that future talks will discuss Russia's ability to
retain any Ukrainian territory that Russia has illegally annexed since
February 2022. Rubio answered a question about possible concessions from
Russia, stating that these "kinds of things" will happen through
"difficult diplomacy in closed rooms." Rubio later noted that there will
have to be concessions "made by all sides" in order to bring about an
end to the war. Rubio emphasized that a war can only end when "everyone
involved" in the war — which Rubio explicitly defined as including
Ukraine, Russia, and US partners in Europe — is "okay with" and accepts
the end agreement. Rubio answered a question about his assessment of
Russia's desire to achieve peace following the talks in Saudi Arabia,
stating that Russia appears willing to "begin to engage in a serious
process to determine" the mechanism to end the war, but that an outcome
will ultimately depend on the willingness of every side in the war to
"agree to certain things."
Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated on February 19 that Ukraine needs either
NATO membership or a strong military and security guarantees for a
sustainable peace. Zelensky emphasized that security guarantees do not necessarily mean deploying peacekeeping forces to Ukraine.[7]
Zelensky stated that it would be sufficient if the United States
provided Ukraine with 20 Patriot air defense systems and the license to
domestically produce Patriot missiles.[8]
Zelensky has repeatedly emphasized Ukraine's need for additional
Patriot systems and missiles to defend against Russian missile strikes,
particularly those with ballistic missiles targeting Ukrainian energy
infrastructure, and his February 19 statements are consistent with
previous statements that Ukraine needs a strong military of its own to
deter and defend against future Russian aggression.[9]
US
Special Representative for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg arrived in
Kyiv on February 19 for his first official visit to Ukraine.[10] Kellogg
met with Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy
Yermak, and Yermak emphasized that Ukraine remains interested in a
strategic, long-term, and comprehensive partnership with the United
States.[11]
Ukraine's European partners continue to support Ukraine's military and defense industrial base (DIB). The
Lithuanian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on February 19 that a
new delivery of trucks, thermal imaging sights, and other military
support arrived in Ukraine as part of a package worth 80 million euros
(about $83.3 million) that Lithuania prepared during the Ukraine Defense
Contact Group (the Ramstein format) meeting on February 12.[12]
The Lithuanian MoD estimated that Lithuania's military support for
Ukraine in 2025 could reach one billion euros (about $1.042 billion) and
stated that Lithuania plans to focus its support on Ukraine's air
defense, ammunition, drone, and anti-drone needs and financing for
Ukrainian domestic weapons production.
Ukrainian forces continue to conduct drone strikes against Russian energy facilities supplying the Russian military. Head
of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy
Kovalenko stated that Ukrainian forces struck the Rosneft Syzran Oil
Refinery in Syzran, Samara Oblast on the night of February 18 and 19.[13]
Kovalenko noted that the refinery has a processing capacity of 8.9
million tons of oil per year and produces fuel, jet fuel, and bitumen.
Kovalenko stated that Russian refineries play an important role in
supplying Russian troops. Kovalenko stated that the oil refinery stopped
operating after the strike, and Reuters, citing two industry
sources, also reported that the refinery suspended oil processing after
the drone strike caused a fire at the primary refining unit.[14] The industry sources told Reuters that
the Syzran refinery had been operating at only 4.7 million tons of
capacity in 2024 at least in part due to previous Ukrainian strikes.
Russian opposition outlet Astra published footage on February 19 of a fire at the refinery, which was later geolocated to within Syzran.[15]
Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev claimed that Ukrainian
forces struck the Syzran Oil Refinery but that there was no "major"
damage.[16]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian
President Vladimir Putin is reportedly trying to optimize the Russian
negotiations delegation to be most effective with the specific
individuals whom the United States chooses for its negotiation
delegation, likely in an effort to extract maximum concessions from the
United States.
- US Secretary of State Marco
Rubio and National Security Adviser Michael Waltz reiterated on February
18 that US President Donald Trump's position that the war in Ukraine
must end in a way that is "fair, enduring, sustainable, and acceptable
to all parties involved" remains unchanged.
- Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated on February 19 that Ukraine
needs either NATO membership or a strong military and security
guarantees for a sustainable peace.
- US Special
Representative for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg arrived in Kyiv on
February 19 for his first official visit to Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces continue to conduct drone strikes against Russian energy facilities supplying the Russian military.
- Ukrainian
forces recently advanced near Vovchansk and Toretsk, and Russian forces
recently advanced near Borova, Siversk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka
Novosilka.
- Russian federal subjects are
reportedly halting their recruitment of foreigners who do not speak
Russian for service in the Russian military.
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on February 19 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Sudzha near
Sverdlikovo, north of Sudzha near Pogrebki, and southeast of Sudzha near
Guyevo.[17] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Sverdlikovo.[18]
Unconfirmed
Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian
forces advanced roughly 1.2 kilometers near Lebedevka, in unspecified
areas along the Loknya River (both northwest of Sudzha), and near
Sverdlikovo.[19]
Russian
President Vladimir Putin claimed on February 19 that elements of the
Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) crossed the
Kursk Oblast-Ukraine international border.[20]
Ukrainian officials denied this claim and reported that Ukrainian
forces repelled Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups attempting to
cross the international border, including one recently in the
Nikolayev-Darino-Zhuravka direction (northwest of Sudzha).[21]
Ukraine's State Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated
that the border service has not seen any Russian attempts to break
through the Ukrainian border.[22]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th
Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly
continue operating near Pogrebki; and elements of the 155th Naval
Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 1140th Artillery Regiment (76th
Airborne [VDV] Division), and "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly
referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) reportedly
continue operating in Kursk Oblast.[23]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)
Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Kharkiv City. Russian forces continued limited ground attacks northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on February 19.[24]
Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 18
indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced within central
Vovchansk.[25]
An
officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating near Vovchansk stated that
Russian forces have increased the intensity of their ground attacks in
Vovchansk during colder weather as part of efforts to advance to the
southern bank of the Vovcha River.[26]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 19 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian
forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near
Holubivka and toward Mala Shapkivka, east of Kupyansk near
Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane on February 18
and 19.[27]
A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that
Russian forces conducted an at least reinforced platoon-sized mechanized
assault and that Ukrainian forces destroyed three armored personnel
carriers and one tank.[28]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near
Topoli (north of Kupyansk along the international border).[29]
Unconfirmed
Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian
forces advanced in central Topoli and north of the settlement, north of
Novomlynsk (north of Kupyansk), and near Holubivka.[30]
The
spokesperson a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction
stated that Russian forces are attacking in groups ranging from two to
30 personnel in size.[31]
The spokesperson stated that Russian forces first deploy less well
trained infantry to detect Ukrainian firing positions, then conduct
strikes on Ukrainian positions, and then deploy better trained infantry
to attack the Ukrainian flanks.
Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction. Russian
forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near
Zahryzove and Lozova, east of Borova near Kopanky, and southeast of
Borova near Makiivka on February 18 and 19.[32]
Assessed
Russian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on
February 19 indicating that Russian forces recently seized Zelenyi Hai
(east of Borova).[33]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Makiivka.[34]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on February 19 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian
forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Lyman near
Novolyubivka, Nevske, Yampolivka, and Kolodyazi and east of Lyman in the
Serebryanske forest area on February 18 and 19.[35]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Novolyubivka.[36]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction. Russian
forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near
Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on
February 18 and 19.[37]
Assessed
Russian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on
February 19 indicating that Russian forces recently advanced north of
Mykolaivka (southwest of Siversk).[38]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced in Bilohorivka.[39]
Order
of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle
Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's
Republic Army Corps [AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are
reportedly operating in the Siversk direction.[40]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on February 19 but did not advance. Russian
forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself, northeast
of Chasiv Yar near Vasyukivka, and south of Chasiv Yar toward
Oleksandro-Shultyne on February 18 and 19.[41]
Order of Battle: Elements of the "Shustry" Detachment of Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[42]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction. Russian
forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; northeast of
Toretsk near Ozaryanivka, Dyliivka, and Krymske; east of Toretsk near
Leonidivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on February 18 and
19.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Krymske.[44]
Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 18
indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in eastern
Shcherbynivka.[45]
Unconfirmed
Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian
forces advanced north of Druzhba (east of Toretsk), in Novospaske (west
of Toretsk), and west of Leonidivka.[46]
The
chief of staff of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Toretsk
direction stated that Russian forces rarely use vehicles in urban areas
but are using small infantry groups or even single servicemembers to
advance house to house.[47]
Order
of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that
elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly
1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are operating in Toretsk.[48]
Drone operators of the Russian "Vega" Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards
Spetsnaz Brigade, Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General
Staff [GRU]) are reportedly operating in Toretsk, and elements of the
9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating near
Novospaske.[49]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Pokrovsk near Vodyane
Druhe, Zelene Pole, Malynivka, and Tarasivka; east of Pokrovsk near
Myrolyubivka, Yelyzavetivka, Novotoretske, and Promin; southeast of
Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and
southwest of Pokrovsk near Pishchane, Kotlyne, Udachne, Uspenivka,
Nadiivka, Novooleksandrivka, Kotlyarivka, Preobrazhenka, and
Zaporizhzhia on February 18 and 19.[50] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces successfully counterattacked near Dachenske and advanced south of the settlement.[51]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near
Zaporizhzhia, Preobrazhenka, Tarasivka, and Yelyzavetivka.[52]
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 19 indicates
that Russian forces recently advanced north of Nadiivka.[53]
Unconfirmed
Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian
forces advanced near Myrne, Novolyubivka, and Berezivka [54]
The
spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction
stated on February 19 that Russian forces continue to attack in small
infantry groups and only use civilian vehicles confiscated from
Ukrainian civilians in occupied Ukraine.[55]
Order
of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 5th Motorized
Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are attacking toward Yelyzavetivka.[56]
Mashovets stated that elements of the 74th and 55th motorized rifle
brigades (both of the 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and
30th and 15th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 2nd CAA, CMD) are
operating along the Pishchane-Kotlyne-Udachne-Uspenivka line.[57]
Mashovets stated that elements of the 87th Rifle Regiment (90th Tank
Division, 41st CAA) and 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized
Rifle Division, 2nd CAA) are operating near and south of Uspenivka.
Mashovets stated that elements of the 6th, 80th, and 239th tank
regiments and 228th Motorized Rifle Regiments (all of the 90th Tank
Division) are operating along the Nadiivka-Sribne line (southwest of
Pokrovsk).[58]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction. Russian
forces continued attacking west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil,
Andriivka, and Ulakly and toward Oleksiivka and southwest of Kurakhove
near Rozdolne on February 18 and 19.[59]
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 16 indicates
that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kostyantynopil.[60]
Unconfirmed
Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian
forces advanced northwest of Andriivka and south of Rozlyv (southwest of
Kurakhove).[61]
The
spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka
(Kurakhove) direction stated on February 19 that Russian forces recently
conducted a roughly reinforced battalion-sized mechanized assault in
the Kurakhove direction with roughly 40 armored vehicles in several
columns.[62]
The spokesperson stated that Ukrainian drone operators destroyed
roughly 20 armored vehicles. The spokesperson is likely referring to the
roughly battalion-sized mechanized assault near Bahatyr (west of
Kurakhove) on February 15.[63]
The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the
Novopavlivka direction stated that Russian forces previously used
"hundreds of thousands " of artillery shells but are now focusing on
artillery accuracy.[64]
Order
of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 67th Rifle
Regiment (90th Tank Division) are operating near Andriivka.[65]
Mashovets stated that elements of the 110th and 114th motorized rifle
brigades (both of the 51st CAA), 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA,
Eastern Military District [EMD]), 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th
AC, EMD), and 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are operating
along the Dachne-Ulakly line.
Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction. Russian
forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka
towards Burlatske, west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and towards
Pryvilne, and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on February 18
and 19.[66]
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 15 indicates
that Russian forces recently advanced to southeastern Novoocheretuvate
(north of Velyka Novosilka).[67]
Unconfirmed
Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian
forces advanced east of Novoocheretuvate, southeast of Pryvilne, and
east of Novosilka.[68] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces have seized most of Novoocheretuvate and Novosilka.[69]
Order
of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 127th
Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, EMD), 40th Naval Infantry Brigade
(Pacific Fleet), 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet), and 34th
Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th CAA, SMD) are operating north and
northwest of Velyka Novosilka.[70] Elements of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in Novosilka.[71]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces continued ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 19 but did not advance. Russian forces conducted assaults northwest of Robotyne near Mali Shcherbaky, Novoandriivka, and Stepove on February 18 and 19.[72]
A
Ukrainian brigade operating in Zaporizhia Oblast published footage on
February 19 of Ukrainian drones destroying a Russian Tor M-2, a Buk M-2,
and a Buk M-3 air defense system in the past day.[73]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 19 that Ukrainian
forces struck a position of the Russian 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade
(35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) near
Chumatske (south of Hulyaipole in the Russian near rear).[74]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in the Kherson direction on February 19.
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 80th Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade
(14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly
continue operating in the Kherson direction.[75]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian
forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine
on the night of February 18 and 19. The Ukrainian Air Force reported
that Russian forces struck Sumy Oblast with two Iskander-M/Kn-23
ballistic missiles launched from Voronezh Oblast.[76]
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 167
Shahed and decoy drones from Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts;
Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalove, Smolensk Oblast; and
Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported
that Ukrainian forces shot down 106 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy,
Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Khmelnytskyi, Zhytomyr,
Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Kherson, Odesa, and Mykolaiv oblasts and
that 56 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic
warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian
drones struck Odesa, Kyiv, Sumy, Cherkasy, and Zaporizhia oblasts and
that Russian drones struck energy infrastructure in Odesa City.[77]
Ukraine's
State Emergency Service reported on February 19 that emergency services
are still working to extinguish the smoldering fires at the Chornobyl
Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) following the February 14 Russian drone strike
against the NPP.[78]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian
federal subjects are reportedly halting their recruitment of foreigners
who do not speak Russian for service in the Russian military. Russian
opposition outlet Verstka reported on February 19 that
authorities in Moscow Oblast are not deploying those who signed military
service contracts but do not speak Russian to training, and a source
stated that there are currently 150 Chinese citizens who have signed
contracts but are waiting for orders.[79] Two military recruiters told Verstka that
other unspecified federal subjects have also largely stopped recruiting
foreigners who do not speak Russian. A military recruiter suggested
that language barriers are causing issues on the frontline, but Verstka noted that friction due to language barriers is not new among Russian frontline forces.
The
Kremlin continues efforts to posture the Russian defense industrial
base (DIB) as highly productive. Russian President Vladimir Putin
visited the Radar MMS defense enterprise in St. Petersburg on February
19 and awarded the enterprise with the state "Order of Alexander Nevsky"
award.[80]
Putin highlighted the enterprise's role in manufacturing advanced
drones, radio electronic and telecommunications equipment, earth surface
monitoring systems, and navigation systems that support Russian
detection and precision strike capabilities. Russian Security Council
Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev visited the Kazan Gunpowder Plant on
February 19 and claimed that modernization allowed the plant to increase
its production of ammunition for multiple unspecified weapons.[81]
Russian milbloggers continue to raise alarm about the Russian military
command's poor treatment of wounded personnel. A Russian milblogger
published an address reportedly from a battalion commander in the 5th
Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st
Donetsk People's Republic [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) to
wounded personnel who requested to be pulled from combat, in which the
battalion commander reprimanded the injured soldiers for using their
injury payments and complaining about their injuries.[82]
Another Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor, who
frequently complains about systemic issues in the Russian military,
criticized the battalion commander for his reprimands.[83]
The milblogger accused the battalion commander of failing to manage his
forces and criticized the commander's belief that being able to shoot a
gun is sufficient recovery from an injury.
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Nothing significant to report.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/tass_agency/301494 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/23183285
[2] https://meduza
dot
io/feature/2025/02/18/kak-vyyasnila-meduza-sostav-rossiyskoy-delegatsii-na-peregovorah-s-ssha-mozhet-izmenitsya-esli-v-nih-vse-taki-priglasyat-kiev
[3]
https://www.moscowtimes dot
ru/2025/02/19/rossiya-naperegovorah-sssha-prosit-razblokirovat-milliardi-dollarov-gosaktivov-ioslabit-sanktsii-a155708
[4] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/us-russia-talks-ukraine-europe-invasion-rcna192544
[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2025
[6]
https://www.state.gov/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-national-security-advisor-mike-waltz-and-special-envoy-to-the-middle-east-steve-witkoff-with-jennifer-hansler-of-cnn-and-matthew-lee-of-the-associated-press/
[7]
https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2025/02/19/prezydent-zayavyv-shho-naselennya-ukrayiny-ne-pidtrymuye-postupky-rosiyi/;
https://t.me/CenterCounteringDisinformation/13354;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gAxDak8wERs
[8] https://suspilne dot media/952275-20-patriot-ta-licenzia-na-virobnictvo-raket-do-nih-mogli-b-zaminiti-amerikanski-vijska-v-ukraini-zelenskij/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-3-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-12-2025;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putins-safe-space-defeating-russias-kharkiv-operation-requires-eliminating-russias
[10] https://suspilne dot media/951951-specpredstavnik-ssa-kellog-priihav-u-kiiv/ ; https://t.me/astrapress/74843
[11] https://t.me/ermaka2022/5884 ; https://suspilne dot media/952539-ermak-zustrivsa-zi-specpredstanikom-ssa-kellogom/
[12] https://kam dot lt/lietuva-ukrainai-perdave-sunkvezimiu-ir-termovizoriniu-taikikliu/
[13] https://t.me/s/akovalenko1989
[14] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-syzran-oil-refinery-suspended-operations-following-drone-attack-sources-2025-02-19/; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8843
[15] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1892014175129350636; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1892010047971983410; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1892010047971983410; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1892128892472672487; https://t.me/astrapress/74840
[16] https://t.me/Fedorischev63/2246; https://t.me/Fedorischev63/2248
[17] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24081; https://t.me/dva_majors/64851; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24122; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24122; https://t.me/wargonzo/24860; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32451; https://t.me/yurasumy/21268
[18] https://t.me/dva_majors/64851; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24122; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24122; https://t.me/yurasumy/21268
[19] https://t.me/dva_majors/64851; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24122; https://t.me/yurasumy/21268
[20] https://t.me/tass_agency/301578 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/49088
[21]
https://www.facebook.com/dmytro.lykhoviy/posts/9231568210231479?ref=embed_post;
https://suspilne dot
media/952479-putin-zaaviv-pro-perehid-vijsk-rf-cerez-kordon-u-kurskij-oblasti-u-dpsu-ta-zsu-ce-sprostuvali/
; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8847; https://t.me/CenterCounteringDisinformation/13357; https://www.rbc dot ua/ukr/news/dpsu-feyk-putina-sprob-prorivu-kordonu-fiksuvali-1739977979.html
[22] https://www.rbc dot ua/ukr/news/dpsu-feyk-putina-sprob-prorivu-kordonu-fiksuvali-1739977979.html
[23] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32451; https://t.me/philologist_zov/2054; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24122; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86538
[24] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0244Kp9mG56DS3WRdo9WHsQNfmjYgBWijSUa591do3dc86WanWvE2TPkyLz6WefrjGl
[25]
https://geoconfirmed.org/ukraine/d6b8e6a8-4809-4c99-660b-08dd4e7d1aee;
https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1891957924458557930;
https://t.me/btr80/25217
[26] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/19/shturmy-kryzhanoyu-dorogoyu-morozy-aktyvizuvaly-okupantiv-u-vovchansku/
[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0244Kp9mG56DS3WRdo9WHsQNfmjYgBWijSUa591do3dc86WanWvE2TPkyLz6WefrjGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UNLXaPuLs3BAxr5jLmJxibpctGeAag1X3vZJqiHB9JSyCVycafofn1gnKj11YTA3l; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20627 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21116; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24089
[28] https://t.me/oaembr77/701
[29] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24089
[30] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30915; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24089; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20627
[31] https://armyinform.com
dot
ua/2025/02/01/spochatku-myaso-potim-profi-desantnyky-rozpovily-pro-vorozhi-shturmy-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku/;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc
[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UNLXaPuLs3BAxr5jLmJxibpctGeAag1X3vZJqiHB9JSyCVycafofn1gnKj11YTA3l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21116;
[33] https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=980926827553729&set=pcb.980927104220368; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UNLXaPuLs3BAxr5jLmJxibpctGeAag1X3vZJqiHB9JSyCVycafofn1gnKj11YTA3l
[34] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30909
[35] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5434; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UNLXaPuLs3BAxr5jLmJxibpctGeAag1X3vZJqiHB9JSyCVycafofn1gnKj11YTA3l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0244Kp9mG56DS3WRdo9WHsQNfmjYgBWijSUa591do3dc86WanWvE2TPkyLz6WefrjGl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21116
[36] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30909
[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0244Kp9mG56DS3WRdo9WHsQNfmjYgBWijSUa591do3dc86WanWvE2TPkyLz6WefrjGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UNLXaPuLs3BAxr5jLmJxibpctGeAag1X3vZJqiHB9JSyCVycafofn1gnKj11YTA3l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21116
[38] https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=980926797553732&set=pcb.980927104220368
[39] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24121
[40] https://t.me/epoddubny/22521
[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0244Kp9mG56DS3WRdo9WHsQNfmjYgBWijSUa591do3dc86WanWvE2TPkyLz6WefrjGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UNLXaPuLs3BAxr5jLmJxibpctGeAag1X3vZJqiHB9JSyCVycafofn1gnKj11YTA3l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21116
[42] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5504
[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0244Kp9mG56DS3WRdo9WHsQNfmjYgBWijSUa591do3dc86WanWvE2TPkyLz6WefrjGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UNLXaPuLs3BAxr5jLmJxibpctGeAag1X3vZJqiHB9JSyCVycafofn1gnKj11YTA3l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21116; https://t.me/rybar/68128
[44] https://t.me/rybar/68128
[45]
https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1891963636823859395;
https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1891947817020600390; https://t [dot]
me/rastratchikRadistka/1449;
https://geoconfirmed.org/ukraine/ec4b732e-0342-4200-6611-08dd4e7d1aee
[46] https://t.me/rybar/68128; https://t.me/yurasumy/21264; https://t.me/rybar/68154
[47] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/19/u-nyh-ye-styl-posylaty-na-zabij-rosijski-komandyry-lyublyat-vykorystovuvaty-zhyvu-vybuhivku/
[48] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2575
[49] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86544; https://t.me/yurasumy/21264
[50]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0244Kp9mG56DS3WRdo9WHsQNfmjYgBWijSUa591do3dc86WanWvE2TPkyLz6WefrjGl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UNLXaPuLs3BAxr5jLmJxibpctGeAag1X3vZJqiHB9JSyCVycafofn1gnKj11YTA3l
; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21116 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62254; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62256 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21263 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21262
[51] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2573
[52] https://t.me/yurasumy/21262 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24860 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62254
[53] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/25802
[54] https://t.me/yurasumy/21264 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30909
[55] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/19/tehniky-my-majzhe-ne-bachymo-rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-myasni-shturmy-na-pokrovsk/
[56] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2575
[57] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2573
[58] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2574
[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0244Kp9mG56DS3WRdo9WHsQNfmjYgBWijSUa591do3dc86WanWvE2TPkyLz6WefrjGl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UNLXaPuLs3BAxr5jLmJxibpctGeAag1X3vZJqiHB9JSyCVycafofn1gnKj11YTA3l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21116 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86514 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24115 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/64851 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32411 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21261
[60] https://x.com/klinger66/status/1891972618321899844; https://t.me/tivaz_artillery/5034
[61] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86514; https://t.me/yurasumy/21261
[62] https://armyinform.com
dot
ua/2025/02/19/jshly-yak-kachenyata-za-kachechkoyu-yegeri-desantnyky-rozbyly-bronovanu-kolonu-yaka-zablukala-na-minnomu-poli/
[63] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-17-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2025
[64] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/19/merznut-u-posadkah-majbutnim-dobryvom-na-novopavlivskomu-napryamku-vorog-ne-otrymav-zhodnogo-vyhlopu/
[65] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2574
[66] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UNLXaPuLs3BAxr5jLmJxibpctGeAag1X3vZJqiHB9JSyCVycafofn1gnKj11YTA3l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21116; https://t.me/dva_majors/64851; https://t.me/voin_dv/13495
[67] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/25793; https://t.me/prolibertate110/1075; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8431;
[68] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30912 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30912; https://t.me/yurasumy/21260
[69] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/155076; https://t.me/zovpobedy/14493
[70] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2575
[71] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86547
[72] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0244Kp9mG56DS3WRdo9WHsQNfmjYgBWijSUa591do3dc86WanWvE2TPkyLz6WefrjGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UNLXaPuLs3BAxr5jLmJxibpctGeAag1X3vZJqiHB9JSyCVycafofn1gnKj11YTA3l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21116
[73] https://www.facebook.com/100085694807468/videos/519527351176453;
https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2025/02/19/nebesnyj-sejshn-vid-syl-oborony-bijczi-velykogo-lugu-znyshhyly-try-vorozhi-zrk-za-den/;
[74] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/videos/569310222778766/
[75] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/43844
[76] https://t.me/kpszsu/29085
[77]
https://suspilne dot
media/951829-specpredstavnik-ssa-kellog-pribude-do-ukraini-es-gotue-novij-paket-vijskovoi-dopomogi-na-6-mlrd-evro-1092-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1739946077&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
; https://t.me/kyivoda/25491; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/951897-unaslidok-ataki-droniv-na-odesu-travmuvalos-cotiri-ludini/; https://t.me/truonline/4440; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/951845-v-odesi-vnaslidok-ataki-droniv-castina-budinkiv-zalisilis-bez-tepla-vodi-ta-svitla/; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/951977-poskodzena-ditaca-likarna-foto-naslidkiv-nicnoi-ataki-bpla-na-odesu/; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0TWsAbpeY9rWYFVKobQRFQoyvMutgn9ps8kqtGzPmP9dALJTVL3vJ2XYtTXK9Ze7Vl ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/951897-unaslidok-ataki-droniv-na-odesu-travmuvalos-cotiri-ludini/; https://t.me/truonline/4440; ; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/mass-russian-drone-attack-leaves-much-ukraines-odesa-without-power-heat-2025-02-19/; https://t.me/dtek_ua/2309
[78] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021425; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/38462; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/952087-caes-pisla-udaru-drona-trivae-likvidacia-naslidkiv/
[79] https://verstka dot media/v-moskve-perestali-nabirat-v-armiyu-inostranczev-bez-znaniya-russkogo-yazyka
[80] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76285
[81] https://t.me/tass_agency/301596
[82] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12502
[83] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2058; https://t.me/philologist_zov/2059
