Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, Olivia Gibson, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan
February 12, 2025, 6pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 11:15am ET on February 12. ISW
will cover subsequent reports in the February 13 Russian Offensive
Campaign Assessment.
US President Donald
Trump held bilateral phone calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin
and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on February 12.
Trump stated on February 12 that he discussed the war in Ukraine with
Putin and that he and Putin agreed that their administrations will
"immediately" begin negotiations.[1]
Trump added that he planned to "inform [Zelensky] of the conversation"
after his call with Putin. The official Kremlin readout of the call
claimed that Putin emphasized the need to "eliminate the root causes" of
the war and that Putin "agreed with" Trump that "a long-term settlement
could be achieved through peaceful negotiations."[2]
Russian officials have explicitly defined the "root causes" of the war
as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to advance eastward in
areas near Russia's border, which indicates that the Kremlin remains
committed to imposing its will and security interests on the United
States and Europe and is not interested in compromising on this demand.[3]
Trump confirmed his phone call with Zelensky and stated that they
discussed the war and the upcoming February 14 meeting between Zelensky
and US Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio at the
Munich Security Conference.[4]
Zelensky stated that he and Trump discussed opportunities to achieve
peace, readiness to work together, and Ukraine's technological
capabilities — including drones.[5]
Zelensky stated that Trump shared the details of his conversation with
Putin and that he and Trump agreed to plan future bilateral meetings.
Kremlin
Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Russian Security Council Deputy
Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev explicitly rejected Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky's proposal to trade occupied Ukrainian territory for
territory held by Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast during future peace
negotiations.[6] Medvedev
stated that it would be "nonsense" to swap Russian and Ukrainian
territory, and Peskov stated that Russia will "never discuss" exchanging
its territory. Medvedev's and Peskov's statements further support ISW's
assessment that Russian President Vladimir Putin is uninterested in
making any compromises during future peace negotiations and will only
comply with a peace agreement that fulfills all of Putin's maximalist
demands in Ukraine.[7]
Denmark's
Defense Intelligence Service (DDIS) assessed that Russia may have the
capabilities to launch a full-scale war against NATO in the next five
years, which is consistent with ISW's assessments about Russian efforts
to restructure and prepare its military and society for a future
conflict with NATO in the medium to long-term. The DDIS
published a declassified intelligence assessment on February 11
detailing the growing Russian threat to Denmark and NATO members.[8]
The intelligence assessment notes that Russia is rebuilding its
military to fight NATO on an equal footing, aided by financial and
material support from the People's Republic of China (PRC), North Korea,
and Iran. The intelligence assessment states that Russia's willingness
to risk war with NATO may increase if European countries do not
simultaneously build up their military capabilities in response to
Russian capacity building efforts. The British International Institute
for Strategic Studies (IISS) reported on February 12 that Europe spent
$457 billion on defense in 2024, while Russia by itself spent $462
billion on defense in last year.[9]
The DDIS intelligence assessment notes that Russia has not yet decided
to launch a full-scale war against NATO but is expanding its military
capabilities to maintain that option.[10]
Russia is currently avoiding actions that could trigger NATO's Article 5
— the commitment to mutual self-defense — but may take greater risks if
it perceives a shift in the balance of power in its favor. The DDIS
assessment states that if Russia deems NATO weakened either militarily
or politically it could be more willing to attack a European NATO
member, particularly if Russia doubts US military support to Europe. The
intelligence assessment notably warns that a cessation or freeze of the
war in Ukraine on terms favorable to Russia will free up significant
Russian military resources for their involvement in another future
conventional conflict — consistent with ISW's long-standing assessment. The
DDIS assessment outlines a timeline for Russia's growing military
threat in the event of an end of hostilities in Ukraine: Russia could
wage a local war against a neighboring state other than Ukraine within
six months; Russia could credibly threaten NATO countries in the Baltic
region in two years; and Russia could be prepared for a large-scale war
in Europe, assuming NATO does not rearm at the same pace as Russia, in
five years. ISW previously assessed that Russia's efforts to restructure
the Russian military, revive the Moscow and Leningrad military
districts, and create long-term mechanisms to militarize and radicalize
Russian society against Western ideals and values indicate that Russia
is preparing for a future conflict with NATO.[11]
Russian
forces conducted a missile and drone strike mainly targeting Kyiv City
and Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on the night of February 11 and
12. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces
launched seven Iskander-M ballistic missiles/S-400 air defense missiles
from Bryansk Oblast and occupied Crimea and 123 Shahed and decoy drones
from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and
Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts.[12]
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the Russian missiles targeted
Kyiv City and Kryvyi Rih. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that
Ukrainian forces downed six missiles and 71 drones over Kharkiv,
Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr,
Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, and Mykolaiv oblasts and that 71 decoy drones
were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW)
interference. Ukrainian officials reported on February 12 that Russian
missiles damaged buildings in the Obolonskyi, Svyatoshynskyi,
Darnytskyi, and Holosiivskyi raions of Kyiv City and Boryspil, Kyiv
Oblast, and caused five casualties.[13]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on February 12 that
Russian ballistic missiles and drones damaged civilian infrastructure
and killed at least one person in Kyiv City.[14]
Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported on February 12 that a
Russian missile struck central Kryvyi Rih and damaged civilian
infrastructure.[15]
Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yurii Ihnat emphasized that
Ukraine needs US-provided Patriot air defense missile systems to counter
ballistic missile strikes.[16]
The
Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) recently launched the "Contract
18-24" voluntary recruitment program aimed a recruiting 18 to
24-year-old Ukrainians into the Ukrainian Armed Forces.[17] The
Ukrainian MoD officially launched the program on February 11 and noted
that the program offers 18- to 24-year-olds the ability to join the
military under a one-year contract and the option to either reenlist
after one year or return to civilian life. The Ukrainian MoD will pay
volunteers 200,000 UAH ($4,700) upon signing a one-year contract and an
additional 800,000 UAH ($19,120) during their service in addition to a
monthly salary of 120,000 UAH ($2,870). Volunteers will receive three
months of training before deploying to the frontline. The Ukrainian
government will subsidize future mortgages, education, and medical care
for volunteers and will permit volunteers to travel abroad after their
one year of service. The program also exempts volunteers from
mobilization for 12 months after their one-year contract ends. Ukrainian
Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated that the "Contract 18-24" program
is part of Ukraine's ongoing efforts to create a professional military.
Ukrainian MoD Spokesperson Dmytro Lazutkin stated that the MoD will pay
one million UAH (about $23,900) to any Ukrainian servicemembers who
were under the age of 25 when they signed a voluntary military service
contract.[18]
Russian
President Vladimir Putin held his first official call with Syrian
Interim President Ahmed al Shara on February 12 since the fall of
Russian-backed former Syrian President Bashar al Assad. Putin
affirmed Russia's support for Syria's unity and territorial integrity
and emphasized the need for a dialogue among political and
ethno-religious groups within Syria. Putin pledged continued
socio-economic aid to, and economic cooperation with Syria, and Putin
and al Shara discussed recent negotiations between the interim Syrian
government and the Russian delegation that visited Damascus on January
28.[19]
This delegation failed to reach an agreement with the Syrian government
on Russian military basing rights at Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of
Tartus, however.[20] Russia likely continues to engage with the interim Syrian government in an effort to secure its presence at these bases.
The
Armenian National Assembly approved a draft law in the first reading on
February 12 to commence the process of joining the European Union (EU).[21]
Several Armenian civic organizations initiated the bill via a petition
that garnered enough support (at least 50,000 signatures) for
parliamentary consideration.[22] The legislation calls on Armenian authorities to launch EU accession talks in accordance with the will of the Armenian people.[23]
Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov acknowledged Armenia’s “sovereign
right” to pursue EU membership but urged Armenians to consider whether
the EU shares this goal.[24] Peskov also emphasized the "benefits" Armenia gains as a member of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).[25]
Russian officials and information space commentators previously claimed
that Armenia’s move toward EU membership signaled its withdrawal from
the EAEU.[26]
Armenia continues to strengthen its ties with the EU and the broader
West amid escalating tensions with Russia and concerns that Russia is an
unreliable security partner to Armenia.
Key Takeaways:
- US
President Donald Trump held bilateral phone calls with Russian
President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on
February 12.
- Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov
and Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev
explicitly rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's proposal to
trade occupied Ukrainian territory for territory held by Ukrainian
forces in Kursk Oblast during future peace negotiations.
- Denmark's
Defense Intelligence Service (DDIS) assessed that Russia may have the
capabilities to launch a full-scale war against NATO in the next five
years, which is consistent with ISW's assessments about Russian efforts
to restructure and prepare its military and society for a future
conflict with NATO in the medium to long-term.
- The
Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) recently launched the "Contract
18-24" voluntary recruitment program aimed a recruiting 18 to
24-year-old Ukrainians into the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
- Russian
President Vladimir Putin held his first official call with Syrian
Interim President Ahmed al Shara on February 12 since the fall of
Russian-backed former Syrian President Bashar al Assad.
- The
Armenian National Assembly approved a draft law in the first reading on
February 12 to commence the process of joining the European Union (EU).
- Ukrainian
forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk, and Russian
forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Borova, Siversk,
Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
- Russia's Shahed drone production rate may be declining.
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast. Russian
milbloggers claimed that fighting continued northwest of Sudzha near
Nikolskyi; east of Sudzha near Russkaya Konopelka; and southeast of
Sudzha near Cherkasskaya Konopelka.[27] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled five Ukrainian attacks near Kurilovka (south of Sudzha).[28]
A Ukrainian brigade operating in Kursk Oblast posted footage on
February 12 showing the brigade repelling a platoon-sized Russian
mechanized assault in an unspecified area in Kursk Oblast.[29]
Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 11
indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northwest and
northeast of Fanaseyevka (southeast of Sudzha) during a platoon-sized
mechanized assault in the area.[30]
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 12 indicates
that Russian forces advanced into western Sverdlikovo (west of Sudzha)
on the west (right) bank of the Loknya River.[31] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 106th Airborne (VDV) Division advanced in Sverdlikovo.[32]
Unconfirmed
Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian
forces advanced along the western edge of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk
Oblast west of Sudzha near Nikolayevo-Darino, Nizhnyi Klin, and
Sverdlikovo, and northwest of Sudzha near Aleksandriya and Viktorovka.[33]
A
Ukrainian platoon commander operating in Kursk Oblast stated that North
Korean troops recently began attacking in groups of 15 to 20 personnel
instead of larger groups of 50 personnel but continue to suffer
significant losses.[34]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th
Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly
continue to operate in Kursk Oblast.[35]
Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet)
are reportedly operating near Makhnovka (southeast of Sudzha).[36]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported Russian ground attacks in the Kharkiv direction on February 12. Russian
sources claimed on February 11 and 12 that Ukrainian forces
counterattacked near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City) and Vovchansk
(northeast of Kharkiv City).[37]
A
spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction
stated on February 12 that Russian forces have increased drone
operations in this direction, including the use of fiber-optic drones,
since mid-December 2024.[38]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 12 but did not advance. Russian
forces continued ground attacks north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka and
east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on February 11 and 12.[39]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.
Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Borova near
Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Zeleny Hai,
Novoyehoriivka, and Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka
and Novomykhailivka on February 11 and 12.[40]
A Ukrainian commander operating in the Borova direction reported on
February 12 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian mechanized assault
of an unspecified echelon in this direction.[41]
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 12 indicates
that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Makiivka (southeast
of Borova).[42]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on February 12 but did not advance.
Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Lyman towards
Nove; and northeast of Lyman near Novolyubivka, Kolodyazi, and
Yampolivka on February 11 and 12.[43]
Unconfirmed
Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian
forces expanded their bridgehead on the western bank of the Zherebets
River and advanced southwest of Kreminna (northeast of Lyman).[44]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced on the
outskirts of Yampolivka and south of Ivanivka (northeast of Lyman).[45]
Ukraine's
Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on February 11 that Ukrainian
forces repelled a roughly platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault in
the Lyman direction.[46] Ukrainian forces destroyed at least two Russian armored personnel carriers.
Order of Battle: Elements of the "Shrama" Detachment of Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[47]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Siversk.[48]
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 12 indicates
Russian forces recently advanced along Tsentralna street on the western
outskirts of Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[49]
Unconfirmed
Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian
forces advanced north of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[50]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on February 12 but did not advance. Russian
forces continued attacking near and within Chasiv Yar; northeast of
Chasiv Yar near Vasyukivka and Hryhorivka; north of Chasiv Yar toward
Minkivka and Mayske; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky on February
11 and 12.[51]
Unconfirmed
Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian
forces advanced in the fields north of Chasiv Yar.[52]
Russian and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Toretsk.
Russian forces continued attacking near and within Toretsk; west of
Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and north of Toretsk near Dyliivka on
February 11 and 12.[53]
Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 12
indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretska Mine
area (northern Toretsk).[54]
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 11 indicates
that Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Toretsk.[55]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st
Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic
Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly
operating in the Toretsk direction.[56]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction. Russian
forces continued attacking east of Pokrovsk near Vodyane Druhe,
Tarasivka, Yelyazvetivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near
Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Pishchane and Zvirove; and southwest of
Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Molodetske, Nadiivka and Uspenivka.[57]
Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces published footage on February 12
showing Russian forces conducting at least a platoon-sized mechanized
assault in the Pokrovsk direction.[58]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked the eastern
outskirts of Vovkove (south of Pokrovsk and west of Pishchane),
presumably from Pishchane, and that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian
forces back to the outskirts of Kotlyne.[59] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counterattacking near Pishchane, Zvirove, and Vodyane Druhe.[60]
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 11 indicates
that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Vodyane Druhe and in
eastern Pishchane.[61]
Unconfirmed
Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian
forces advanced northwest and southwest of Nadiivka, east of Myrne
(northeast of Pokrovsk), and south of Berezivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[62]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.
Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Kurakhove
near Shevchenko and Andriivka and west of Kurakhove near Dachne,
Kostyantynopil, Oleksiivka, and Bahatyr.[63]
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 12 indicates
that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Dachne.[64]
Unconfirmed
Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian
forces advanced one kilometer north of Andriivka, near Petropavlivka
(northwest of Kurakhove), and towards Kostyantynopil.[65]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment
(150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating
in Dachne.[66]
Russian
forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction
on February 12 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian
forces continued attacking northwest of Velyka Novosilka towards
Burlatske; west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka; and southwest of
Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil on February 11 and 12.[67]
Unconfirmed
Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian
forces advanced northwest of Vremivka (just west of Velyka Novosilka).[68]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 12 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked near Kamyanske (northwest of Robotyne) and Charivne (northeast of Robotyne) on February 12.[69]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported on ground activity in the Kherson direction on February 12.
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
See topline text.
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russia's
Shahed drone production rate may be declining. Head of Ukraine's Center
for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported on
February 12 that Russia's Shahed drone production facility in the
Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan
produced over 6,000 Shahed drones and "thousands" of decoy drones in
2024.[70]
ISW previously reported that the production facility had produced 5,760
Shahed drones between January and September 2024, and Kovalenko's
report suggests that the facility failed to produce many more drones
from October 2024 through December 2024.[71]
The facility may be struggling to source enough materials to maintain
high Shahed production rates, as Russia either still relies on Iran to
provide components for the drones or is attempting to source high-tech
components from abroad by circumventing Western sanctions. The Russian
defense industrial base could also be struggling to figure out how to
produce drone components domestically using Iranian production licenses.
Russia may alternatively be prioritizing production of decoy drones to
overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses instead of focusing on more costly
Shahed strike drones.[72]
The
Russian Armed Forces are intensifying efforts to coerce mobilized
personnel to sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry
of Defense (MoD). Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported
on February 12 that Russian commanders are forcing personnel mobilized
in 2022 to sign contracts with the MoD, but that it is unclear if the
MoD will honor the end-dates provided in such contracts.[73]
Commanders are threatening subordinates who refuse to sign the
contracts with redeployment to separate assault companies for
highly-attritional infantry-led "meat assaults." Verstka reported
that one mobilized soldier emphasized that the Russian command is aware
of high rates of demoralization and fatigue among personnel and is
concerned that large numbers of mobilized personnel will leave service
without a contract mechanism in place.
Russian regional
occupation officials continue to support the Kremlin-directed mandate of
expanding programs to prepare Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine
for government positions. Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail
Razvozhaev announced on February 12 the "Sevastopol – City of Heroes"
educational program that is designed to prepare Russian veterans of the
war in Ukraine for leadership positions in local government and
state-owned enterprises.[74]
The "Sevastopol - City of Heroes" program is likely an analogue to
Russia's "Time of Heroes" program, which also works to install
Kremlin-selected veterans of the war into positions of power within the
Russian government and business sector.
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Nothing significant to report.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/113991956474899296
[2] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76259
[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar013025
[4] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/113992264519415084
[5] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1889737480892719552
[6] https://t.me/tass_agency/300317 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/300349 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/300350 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/300351 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/300353
[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar013025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012425
[8] https://www.fe-ddis dot dk/globalassets/fe/dokumenter/2025/trusselsvurderinger/-20250209_opdateret_vurdering_af_truslen_fra_rusland_mod--.pdf ; https://www.fe-ddis dot dk/da/produkter/situations--og-trusselsvurderinger2/trusselsvurderinger/opdateret-vurdering-af-truslen-fra-rusland/
[9] https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2025/02/global-defence-spending-soars-to-new-high/
[10] https://www.fe-ddis dot dk/globalassets/fe/dokumenter/2025/trusselsvurderinger/-20250209_opdateret_vurdering_af_truslen_fra_rusland_mod--.pdf ; https://www.fe-ddis dot dk/da/produkter/situations--og-trusselsvurderinger2/trusselsvurderinger/opdateret-vurdering-af-truslen-fra-rusland/
[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia%E2%80%99s-military-restructuring-and-expansion-hindered-ukraine-war ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar123124
[12] https://t.me/kpszsu/28631
[13] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/38157 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/38193 ; https://kyivcity.gov dot ua/news/unaslidok_raketno_ataki_u_stolitsi_odin_zagibliy_i_troye_postrazhdalikh_pozhezhi_v_riznikh_rayonakh_mista/ ; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/4460
[14] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13290
[15] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12061
[16] https://www.facebook.com/yuriy.ignat/posts/pfbid03zAxAAitgsg4T5ypaiCMLf26P6NqxYNAoZojUdxS1vBpy32ZNPMu45aA3tDoiPYzl?__cft__[0]=AZWy0cQ357BEQlZw2DW8xa_ynwQrYTiF2q6zExMnBg7kUMp-5eWFar1ApYZA5o8AkxvuZ6ve8D1tWaLEVkX3N3LXKKbm5-UfEIxe6KsP5xV-TO7fTvE2GCVNfl4MIsw9yqg&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
[17] https://mod.gov dot ua/news/kontrakt-18-24-minoboroni-zapuskaye-novij-format-dobrovilnoyi-sluzhbi ; https://18-24.army.gov dot ua/?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR1vDp2LJvsl6ScxgXiElzsXKbDNTTDCHn1KCzUpMaEaNflqW4n5vyfJ4ss_aem_8MjcYdtnRZdB3NX9LG4y5A
[18] https://armyinform.com
dot
ua/2025/02/12/molodi-dobrovolczi-zsu-yaki-vzhe-sluzhat-takozh-mozhut-otrymaty-miljon-minoborony/
; https://youtu.be/mnh10nvHqyA
[19]
http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76258;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2025
[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-29-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2025
[21] https://www.politico.eu/article/armenia-european-union-membership-accession-nikol-pashinyan/; http://www.parliament dot am/news.php?cat_id=2&NewsID=21730&year=2025&month=02&day=12&lang=eng; https://oc-media dot org/armenian-eu-membership-bill-passes-first-reading/; https://x.com/alensimonyan/status/1889604138159227251
[22] https://radar dot am/en/news/social-2658583656/
[23]
https://www.politico.eu/article/armenia-european-union-membership-accession-nikol-pashinyan/;
http://www.parliament dot
am/news.php?cat_id=2&NewsID=21730&year=2025&month=02&day=12&lang=eng;
https://oc-media dot
org/armenian-eu-membership-bill-passes-first-reading/
[24] https://t.me/tass_agency/300353
[25] https://news dot am/eng/news/866327.html
[26] https://tass dot com/politics/1899005; https://t.me/tass_agency/296126
[27] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32128 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23725 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86090
[28] https://t.me/dva_majors/64368
[29] https://t.me/stepova_61/831
[30] https://x.com/klinger66/status/1889476164952936448; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=605904372291589
[31] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8377; https://t.me/ua_marines_36brigade/2696
[32] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62082 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86090
[33] https://t.me/dva_majors/64368 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24760 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86090
[34]
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2025/02/12/korejczi-zminyly-svoyu-taktyku-na-kurshhyni-soldaty-z-kndr-lizut-na-pozycziyi-syl-oborony-yak-targany/;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg
[35] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86091
[36] https://t.me/dva_majors/64356
[37] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23724; https://t.me/tass_agency/300248
[38] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/946635-prikordonna-brigada-gart-pro-rosijski-droni-na-optovolokni/
[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0or7VD7X48cZ6mvoQ9oRcEknLqE5syHopBScPnB728VMBMeTRug4UvwVXjg3fJmsNl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jiWHLTdXHjrvsKUiEKxSBq82azsCMjwsuiKUiz2hAz4A3jdqvfJwTTuP4sFpQHVXl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029TeKddZNM6JzBKM5EuQAdXaYT45V5qAHnP1L1Rt89adJXFPZSnWzKAtdXUS1vx7jl
; https://t.me/synegubov/13062.
[40]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0or7VD7X48cZ6mvoQ9oRcEknLqE5syHopBScPnB728VMBMeTRug4UvwVXjg3fJmsNl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jiWHLTdXHjrvsKUiEKxSBq82azsCMjwsuiKUiz2hAz4A3jdqvfJwTTuP4sFpQHVXl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029TeKddZNM6JzBKM5EuQAdXaYT45V5qAHnP1L1Rt89adJXFPZSnWzKAtdXUS1vx7jl
[41]
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2025/02/12/pyhalychi-shtovhayut-pihotu-vpered-na-harkivshhyni-same-vony-zakydayut-targanamy-ukrayinski-pozycziyi/
[42] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8376; https://t.me/ombr66/1532
[43]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0or7VD7X48cZ6mvoQ9oRcEknLqE5syHopBScPnB728VMBMeTRug4UvwVXjg3fJmsNl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jiWHLTdXHjrvsKUiEKxSBq82azsCMjwsuiKUiz2hAz4A3jdqvfJwTTuP4sFpQHVXl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029TeKddZNM6JzBKM5EuQAdXaYT45V5qAHnP1L1Rt89adJXFPZSnWzKAtdXUS1vx7jl
; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23741
[44] https://t.me/yurasumy/21094
[45] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23741
[46] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5195
[47] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5486
[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0or7VD7X48cZ6mvoQ9oRcEknLqE5syHopBScPnB728VMBMeTRug4UvwVXjg3fJmsNl ; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/25562 ; https://t.me/OTU_Luhansk/451 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8369 ; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1889397744957091945
[49] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/25562 ; https://t.me/OTU_Luhansk/451 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8369 ; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1889397744957091945
[50] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62083
[51]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0or7VD7X48cZ6mvoQ9oRcEknLqE5syHopBScPnB728VMBMeTRug4UvwVXjg3fJmsNl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jiWHLTdXHjrvsKUiEKxSBq82azsCMjwsuiKUiz2hAz4A3jdqvfJwTTuP4sFpQHVXl
; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029TeKddZNM6JzBKM5EuQAdXaYT45V5qAHnP1L1Rt89adJXFPZSnWzKAtdXUS1vx7jl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24760 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23759 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62083 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62083 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23768 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154367
[52] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62083
[53]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0or7VD7X48cZ6mvoQ9oRcEknLqE5syHopBScPnB728VMBMeTRug4UvwVXjg3fJmsNl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jiWHLTdXHjrvsKUiEKxSBq82azsCMjwsuiKUiz2hAz4A3jdqvfJwTTuP4sFpQHVXl
; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029TeKddZNM6JzBKM5EuQAdXaYT45V5qAHnP1L1Rt89adJXFPZSnWzKAtdXUS1vx7jl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/64368 ;
[54] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1889583650355737038; https://t.me/operator_ak12/8485
[55] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1889576307731657167; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1889576538166735205
[56] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154267
[57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0or7VD7X48cZ6mvoQ9oRcEknLqE5syHopBScPnB728VMBMeTRug4UvwVXjg3fJmsNl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jiWHLTdXHjrvsKUiEKxSBq82azsCMjwsuiKUiz2hAz4A3jdqvfJwTTuP4sFpQHVXl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029TeKddZNM6JzBKM5EuQAdXaYT45V5qAHnP1L1Rt89adJXFPZSnWzKAtdXUS1vx7jl
[58] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5224
[59] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32140 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21092
[60] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154282 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62073 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/64368
[61] https://x.com/giK1893/status/1889414000959693280 ; https://t.me/tankova_brugada/2473 ; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1889372185103352134 ; https://t.me/sokoly_foksa_47/160
[62] https://t.me/yurasumy/21093 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21092
[63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0or7VD7X48cZ6mvoQ9oRcEknLqE5syHopBScPnB728VMBMeTRug4UvwVXjg3fJmsNl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jiWHLTdXHjrvsKUiEKxSBq82azsCMjwsuiKUiz2hAz4A3jdqvfJwTTuP4sFpQHVXl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029TeKddZNM6JzBKM5EuQAdXaYT45V5qAHnP1L1Rt89adJXFPZSnWzKAtdXUS1vx7jl ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21090 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/64368
[64] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8378; https://t.me/wargonzo/24766
[65] https://t.me/wargonzo/24760 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23764 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/13363
[66] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154284
[67] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jiWHLTdXHjrvsKUiEKxSBq82azsCMjwsuiKUiz2hAz4A3jdqvfJwTTuP4sFpQHVXl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029TeKddZNM6JzBKM5EuQAdXaYT45V5qAHnP1L1Rt89adJXFPZSnWzKAtdXUS1vx7jl ; https://t.me/voin_dv/13363 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21089
[68] https://t.me/wargonzo/24760; https://t.me/yurasumy/21089
[69] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0or7VD7X48cZ6mvoQ9oRcEknLqE5syHopBScPnB728VMBMeTRug4UvwVXjg3fJmsNl
[70] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8804
[71] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-27-2024
[72] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-27-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2024
[73] https://verstka dot media/peace_negotiation_perpetual-contract_svo_news
[74] https://t.me/razvozhaev/10151
