Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, Olivia Gibson, Grace Mappes, and George Barros
February 6, 2025, 6:30 pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 12:15pm ET on February 6. ISW
will cover subsequent reports in the February 7 Russian Offensive
Campaign Assessment.
Ukrainian forces
launched a new series of battalion-sized mechanized assaults in Kursk
Oblast and advanced up to five kilometers behind Russian lines southeast
of Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 6. Geolocated footage
published on February 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently
advanced southwest of Makhnovka (southeast of Sudzha) and north and east
of Cherkasskaya Konopelka (southeast of Sudzha) along the 38K-028
Sudzha-Oboyan highway and seized Kolmakov (north of Cherkasskaya
Konopelka) and Fanaseyevka (just southeast of Cherkasskaya Konopelka).[1]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces
attacked in several waves in the direction of Cherkasskaya Konopelka and
Ulanok (southeast of Cherkasskaya Konopelka along the 38K-028 highway)
with up to two mechanized battalions' worth of armored vehicles and that
Russian forces repelled the attack.[2]
Russian milbloggers estimated that Ukrainian forces attacked with 30 to
50 armored vehicles and claimed that one group of Ukrainian forces
successfully attacked from Makhnovka towards Cherkasskaya Konopelka,
Fanaseyevka, and Ulanok and that Russian forces repelled another
Ukrainian group that attacked from Dmitriukov (just east of Makhnovka)
towards Russkaya Konopelka (east of Sudzha).[3]
A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces
seized Cherkasskaya Konopelka, but two other milbloggers denied this
claim.[4]
Some Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces broke through to or
even seized Ulanok, but other sources also denied these claims.[5]
ISW has not yet observed geolocated evidence to assess that Ukrainian
forces are operating in Ulanok. The Ukrainian General Staff published a
map on February 6 indicating that Russian forces recently marginally
advanced in a forested area southwest of Kurilovka.[6]
A
Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that there are
unconfirmed reports that Ukrainian forces also attacked near Kruglenkoye
(northwest of Sudzha), but ISW did not observe additional claims of
Ukrainian activity in this area or north of Sudzha near Berdin where
Ukrainian forces attacked in early January 2025.[7]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces launched the attacks
southeast of Sudzha during poor weather conditions that complicated
Russian drone operations in the area.[8]
Some Russian milbloggers expressed concern that further Ukrainian
advances in Kursk Oblast could threaten rear areas of the Russian force
grouping attacking Guyevo (south of Sudzha) and complicate Russia's
ability to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs)
within the Ukrainian salient.[9]
Russian sources acknowledged that elements of the Russian 11th Airborne
(VDV) Brigade, 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), 30th
Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps
[AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and 177th Naval Infantry
Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) and Chechen Akhmat drone operators are the
main forces defending against the Ukrainian attacks southeast of Sudzha.[10]
Russian
President Vladimir Putin praised elite Russian VDV and naval infantry
formations defending in Kursk Oblast on February 5, highlighting the
fact that the Ukrainian incursion has pinned about a combined arms
army’s worth of Russian troops in Kursk Oblast since August 6, 2024. Putin
stated during a meeting with acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander
Khinshtein that elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific
Fleet), 810th Naval Infantry Brigade, 106th VDV Division, 76th VDV
Division, and other Russian forces are still operating in Kursk Oblast
and will be rewarded for their service in the future.[11]
Putin's statement underlines the fact that the Ukrainian incursion has
pinned elements of these relatively elite formations in Kursk Oblast for
the last six months, depriving Russia of the opportunity to redeploy
these forces to higher priority areas of the frontline in Donetsk
Oblast.[12]
ISW recently noted that the Russian military command has gathered
around 78,000 troops, including 11,000 North Koreans and elements of
most of Russia's elite VDV and naval infantry formations, to expel
Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.[13]
Putin has yet to prioritize expelling Ukrainian forces from Kursk
Oblast over continuing his gradual advances in Donetsk Oblast and
continues to drag out the liberation of Kursk's border areas, despite
domestic discontent.
Ukrainian officials provided
additional details about Ukraine's operation in Kursk Oblast in honor of
the six-month anniversary of the incursion. Ukraine's Special
Operations Forces (SSO) commemorated the milestone on February 6 by
acknowledging that small SSO units infiltrated Russia's rear in Kursk
Oblast as early as June 2024 — two months before the main incursion
began in August 2024.[14]
The SSO forces advanced behind Russian lines in Kursk Oblast to prepare
for the Ukrainian incursion, conducting reconnaissance and targeted
strikes to dismantle key elements of Russia's border defenses. The SSO
noted that Ukrainian forces systematically destroyed Russian air defense
and ammunition depots, limiting Russia's ability to respond to the
Ukrainian incursion. The SSO also provided a detailed account of the
operation and the technological adaptations the Ukrainian forces
employed during the Kursk incursion. Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky also awarded honors to the Ukrainian personnel involved in the
Kursk incursion for the anniversary, offering the first official
Ukrainian statement regarding a comprehensive composition of Ukraine's
force deployment in Kursk Oblast.[15]
Zelensky reiterated that the incursion aimed to prevent a new Russian
offensive against Sumy and Kharkiv cities. Zelensky noted that the Kursk
incursion reinforced his "peace through strength" principle, provided
Ukraine with a significant replenishment of POW "exchange funds," and
forced Russia to divert elite military units to Kursk Oblast — impairing
Russian operations elsewhere along the front. Ukrainian officials have
previously noted that the Ukrainian incursion spoiled several Russian
plans to attack northern Ukraine and complicated Russian efforts to
intensify offensive operations in northern Kharkiv, Donetsk, and
Zaporizhia oblasts.[16]
A
Russian state-run poll suggests that the Russian public maintains a
high level of support for the war in Ukraine despite mounting
challenges. The Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM)
released results on February 6 of a survey of 1,600 Russians conducted
from January 28 to February 2, showing that 67 percent of the people
polled support Russia’s war in Ukraine and that 65 percent believe that
the war is "going well" for Russia.[17]
VCIOM’s Political Research Director Mikhail Mamonov stated that the
public demands a swift, favorable conclusion to the war and supports
measures that advance these goals while resenting Russian setbacks like
the Ukrainian Kursk Oblast incursion, slow territorial gains, and
economic hardship. VCIOM’s findings likely reflect Kremlin views and
narratives and likely inflate the level of public support for the war,
however. These results come amid rising casualties, Russian command
controversies, and immense economic strain on the Russian economy during
the war.[18]
Successful renewed Ukrainian counterattacks in Kursk Oblast may also
negatively impact the Russian public’s view of the war in the coming
weeks.
North Korea appears to be using its
alliance with Russia to leverage the war in Ukraine as a testing ground
to refine its missile technology and broader military capabilities. Reuters,
citing two Ukrainian military-affiliated sources, reported on February 6
that North Korean ballistic missiles fired by Russian forces since
December 2024 have shown significantly improved accuracy.[19]
These North Korean missiles, previously accurate within 1 to 3
kilometers, can now strike within 50 to 100 meters of their intended
targets. One Ukrainian source noted that Russia has launched over 20
North Korean missiles in recent weeks, all demonstrating enhanced
precision. Reuters’ sources speculated that North Korea may
have upgraded the navigation systems of its missiles, incorporated new
steering mechanisms, or received improved targeting data and guidance
components from Russia, although the exact modifications remain unclear.
The North Korean missiles not only serve to bolster Russia’s arsenal
but also likely allow North Korea to refine its capabilities for
possible future military operations elsewhere. Other Russian allies,
such as Iran, likely can improve their strike systems’ performance by
leveraging Russia’s lessons learned from operations in Ukraine.
Ukrainian
forces conducted a strike against an air base in Krasnodar Krai on the
night of February 5 to 6 as a part of an ongoing strike campaign against
Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries. The
Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces
(USF) and other Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the
Primorsko-Akhtarsk Air Base, causing an explosion and resulting in a
fire at the facility.[20]
The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian forces use the
Primorsko-Akhtarsk Air Base to store, prepare, and launch Shahed drones
against Ukraine and to conduct maintenance for aircraft operating over
occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. Ukrainian Center for Countering
Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko amplified footage of
the explosion at the Primorsko-Akhtarsk air base.[21]
Ukraine's Western partners continue to provide military assistance to Ukraine.
French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu announced on February 6 that
France transferred an unspecified number of French Mirage 2000-5 fighter
jets to Ukraine — the first batch of Mirage jets Ukraine has received.[22]
French President Emmanuel Macron announced on June 6, 2024 that France
would provide Ukraine with an unspecified number of Mirage 2000-5
fighter jets and equip and train several pilots to operate the jets.[23]
Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on February 6 that the
Netherlands recently delivered an unspecified number of US-made F-16
fighter jets to Ukraine.[24]
Russian
President Vladimir Putin appointed Deputy Minister of Transport Dmitry
Bakanov to replace Yuri Borisov as head of the state-owned Russian space
agency Roscosmos on February 6.[25] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on February 6 that Bakanov's appointment is part of a regular personnel rotation.[26]
Several Russian milbloggers characterized the reshuffling, however, as a
result of Kremlin officials' dissatisfaction with Roscosmos's
underperformance under Borisov's leadership, including Borisov's
inability to accelerate the development of a full-fledged portable
satellite communications system for the Russian military by 2026.[27]
A Russian insider source noted that Borisov served as Deputy Minister
of Defense under former Russian Defense Minister and Security Council
Secretary Sergei Shoigu from 2018-2022 and was one of the last remaining
nodes of Shoigu's patronal network that controlled the Russian Ministry
of Defense prior to widespread arrests of Ministry of Defense officials
in Summer 2024.[28] Bakanov previously served as the head of Russia's Gonets communication satellite program from 2011-2019.[29] Gonets is a possible civilian analogue to Western Starlink terminals.[30]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian
forces launched a new series of battalion-sized mechanized assaults in
Kursk Oblast and advanced up to five kilometers behind Russian lines
southeast of Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 6.
- Russian
President Vladimir Putin praised elite Russian VDV and naval infantry
formations defending Kursk Oblast on February 5, highlighting the fact
that the Ukrainian incursion has pinned about a combined arms army’s
worth of Russian troops in Kursk Oblast since August 6, 2024.
- Ukrainian
officials provided additional details about Ukraine's operation in
Kursk Oblast in honor of the six-month anniversary of the incursion.
- A
Russian state-run poll suggests that the Russian public maintains a
high level of support for the war in Ukraine despite mounting
challenges.
- North Korea appears to be using its
alliance with Russia to leverage the war in Ukraine as a testing ground
to refine its missile technology and broader military capabilities.
- Ukrainian
forces conducted a strike against an air base in Krasnodar Krai on the
night of February 5 to 6 as a part of an ongoing strike campaign against
Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries.
- Ukraine's Western partners continue to provide military assistance to Ukraine.
- Russian
President Vladimir Putin appointed Deputy Minister of Transport Dmitry
Bakanov to replace Yuri Borisov as head of the state-owned Russian space
agency Roscosmos on February 6.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and recaptured lost positions near Kurakhove.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, and Kurakhove.
- Russian
authorities continue efforts to increase social benefits for Russian
military personnel likely to support ongoing recruitment efforts.
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
See topline text for reports of battlefield activity in Kursk Oblast and Ukrainian strikes in Russia.
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued
offensive operations north of Kharkiv City along the international
border near Kozacha Lopan and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk
on February 5 and 6 but did not make any confirmed advances.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that positional fighting is ongoing in Vovchansk itself and east of Vovchansk near Tykhe.[32]
The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are amassing forces north of
Kharkiv City near northern Lyptsi to prepare for future Russian
attacks.
Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger
claimed on February 5 that Russian forces advanced the fields south of
Hlyboke (northeast of Kharkiv City).[33] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim, however.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 6. Russian forces continued attacking east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on February 5 and 6.[34]
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 6 indicates
that Russian forces recently advanced on the west bank of the Oskil
River along the O-210921 highway, into Fyholivka (northeast of Kupyansk
and north of Dvorichna), and seized the settlement.[35]
Russian-claimed
advances: Russian milbloggers claimed on February 5 and 6 that Russian
forces advanced north, northwest, and south of Zapadne (north of
Kupyansk); crossed the Oskil River near Topoli (northeast of Kupyansk
and along the international border) and consolidated positions on the
west (right) bank of the river; and advanced south and southwest of
Topoli.[36] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however.
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are developing an offensive south of Zapadne alongside the Oskil River.[37]
The milblogger claimed that small groups of Russian forces are
attempting to encircle Ukrainian forces in Dvorichna (north of
Kupyansk). A Ukrainian brigade commander operating in the Kupyansk
direction stated that Russian forces are attempting to create a
bridgehead on the banks of the Oskil River but have failed to make
significant advances in the brigade's area of responsibility (AoR) thus
far.[38]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th
Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly
continue to attack near Dvorichna.[39] Elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army ([GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Kupyansk.[40]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 6 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Borova near Pishchane,
Zahryzove, Kolisnykivka, Nova Kruhlyakivka, and Lozova; east of Borova
near Zelenyi Hai and Kopanky; and southeast of Borovva near
Novoyehorivka, Novoserhiivka, and Hrekivka on February 5 and 6.[41]
Russian-claimed
advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized
Zahryzove and advanced west of Lozova and south and west of Zelenyi Hai.[42] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim, however.
Ukraine's
Khortytsia Group of Forces reported that Ukrainian forces damaged a
Russian tank and two armored vehicles transporting Russian infantry to
forward positions near Zahryzove.[43]
The Khortytsia Group of Forces also stated that Ukrainian forces
destroyed four tanks and two armored vehicles involved in a Russian
assault near Kopanky.[44]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on February 6 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Russian forces continued attacking north of Lyman near Nove and Zelena
Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Novolyubivka, Yampolivka, and Kolodyazi;
and east of Lyman near Torske on February 5 and 6.[45]
A
Ukrainian battalion officer operating in the Lyman direction stated
that Russian forces use a large number of drones, including fiber-optic
drones, in the Lyman direction in order to complicate Ukrainian
logistics routes. The battalion officer stated that Russian forces bring
in reinforcements of 30 to 40 personnel weekly in the direction, which
the officer stated suggests that Russian forces may be preparing for a
larger-scale offensive operation in the area.[46]
The officer noted that Terny, Ivanovka (northeast of Lyman), and the
Serebryanske forest area (east of Lyman) are the most active areas of
the frontline in this direction.
Order of Battle: Elements
of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) and
Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz "Shram" Group reportedly continue operating in
the Lyman direction.[47]|
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on February 6 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself, northeast of Siversk near
Bilohorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of
Siversk near Spirne on February 5 and 6.[48]
Ukraine's Khortytsia Grouping of Forces reported that Russian forces
are using armored vehicles, civilian vehicles, and motorcycles to
transport personnel near Verkhnokamyanske.[49]
Order
of Battle: Reconnaissance elements of the Russian 2nd Guards Artillery
Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's
Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are
reportedly operating near Verkhnokamyanske.[50]
Russian
forces recently advanced in Chasiv Yar amid continued offensive
operations near Chasiv Yar itself and to the south near Stupochky on
February 5 and 6.[51]
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 6 indicates
that Russian forces recently advanced west of the central Refractory
Plant in Chasiv Yar and likely seized the remainder of the Refractory
Plant.[52]
Russian-claimed
advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced
northward to the fields north of Pivnichnyi Microraion in Chasiv Yar and
westward to the fields south of Chasiv Yar.[53]
Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces forced Ukrainian
forces out of the Avanhard Stadium in central Chasiv Yar.[54] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however.
Ukrainian
Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro
Zaporozhets stated on February 6 that Russian forces are accumulating
forces in northern Chasiv Yar and noted that Russian forces are
concentrating manpower in the Pivichnyi Microraion and no longer have to
move through the Siverskyi Donets Donbas Canal's pipes.[55]
Zaporozhets stated that Russian forces are using more four-wheelers and
buggies in the area and noted that Ukrainian forces destroyed at least
10 units of Russian armored vehicles in January 2025. Successful and
costly Ukrainian strikes against Russian armored vehicles in the area
may have prompted Russian forces to use less-costly, alternative modes
of transport more frequently. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian
forces are attacking Ukrainian forces defending the T-05-04 highway and
preparing to attack along the highway toward Stupochky.[56]
Order
of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment
and of the 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (both of the 98th VDV
Division) reportedly continue to operate near Chasiv Yar.[57]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on February 6 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked in Toretsk itself, north of Toretsk near
Dyliivka, and southwest of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on February 5 and
6.[58] A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting is ongoing for the waste heap west of the Toretska Mine in northern Toretsk.[59]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the "Maksim Krivonos" volunteer detachment,
allegedly formed by former members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces who
defected to fight for Russia, are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[60]
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Pokrovsk on February 6 but did not advance. Russian
forces continued assaults east of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka, Vodyane
Druhe, Yelyzavetivka, Myrolyubivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk
near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Pishchane and Zvirove; and
southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Nadiivka, Kotlyarivka,
Uspenivka, Sribne, and Zaporizhzhia on February 5 and 6.[61]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully
counterattacked with armored vehicle support near Pishchane and
Nadiivka.[62]
Russian-claimed
advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced
northwest of Kotlyne towards Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk), northeast
of Pishchane and Udachne, north and south of Nadiivka, and in the
fields north of Arkhanhelske (east of Pokrovsk) and Vidrozhennya (south
of Porkovsk, formerly Novyi Trud).[63]
Ukraine's
Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov reported
that Russian forces lost 7,000 killed in action (KIA) and 15,000 wounded
in action (WIA) in the Pokrovsk direction in January 2025.[64]
Order
of Battle: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 90th Tank
Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are attacking
towards Zaporizhzhia (west of Sribne).[65]
Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced west of Kurakhove amid ongoing offensive operations in the area on February 6. Russian
forces continued attacks northwest of Kurakhove near Shevchenko and
Andriivka, west of Kurakhove near Dachne and Kostyantynopil, and
southwest of Kurakhove near Ulakly on February 5 and 6.[66]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are attacking towards
the H-15 Kurakhove-Pokrovske highway and Bahatyr (further west of
Kurakhove) while trying to seize positions along the highway, but that
Ukrainian forces have thus far repelled these attacks.[67]
Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 6
indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Zelenivka
(southwest of Kurakhove).[68]
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 6 indicates
that elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle
Division, 8th CAA, SMD) recently advanced into northwestern Dachne,
seized Dachne, and likely pushed Ukrainian forces from positions in the
fields immediately north and south of the settlement.[69]
Russian-claimed
advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing
in central and northern Andriivka, southeast of Kostyantynopil, and
along the T-0515 Kostyantynopil-Pokrovsk highway between Andriivka and
Kostyantynopil.[70]
Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized a bridge
(likely the bridge over the Vovcha River near Andriivka) along the
T-0515 highway.[71]
Russian
forces continued assault northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Rozdolne
and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on February 5 and 6 but did
not advance in the area.[72] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Novyi Komar (north of Velyka Novosilka).[73]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern
Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in Velyka Novosilka.[74]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in the Polohy direction on February 6.
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th
Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are
reportedly operating in the Polohy direction.[75]
Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 6, but Russian forces did not advance.[76]
The
Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces published footage on February 5 of
Ukrainian forces destroying a Russian Buk-M3 air defense system in an
unspecified location in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast, likely referring to
the same strike that the Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 5.[77] A Russian milblogger claimed on February 6 that Russian forces are targeting Ukrainian Starlink terminals in Zaporizhia Oblast.[78]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in the Kherson direction on February 6.
Russian
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Habr" drone detachment
are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Antonivka (immediately
east of Kherson City).[79]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian
forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night
of February 5 to 6. The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Russian forces
launched 77 Shahed and decoy drones from Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk
oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast and
two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Rostov Oblast.[80]
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 56 drones
over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Zhytomyr, Cherkasy,
Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Vinnytsia oblasts; that 18 decoy drones
were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW)
interference; and that Russian drones struck Kharkiv, Cherkasy, and
Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. Ukrainian officials stated on February 5 and 6
that Russian drones struck a market in Kyivskyi raion, Kharkiv City,
causing a fire at a nearby pavilion and that a Russian drone struck a
residential building in Saltivskyi raion, Kharkiv City.[81] BBC Russia reported on February 5 that a Russian missiles strike struck a residential building in Odesa raion, Odesa Oblast.[82]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian
authorities continue efforts to increase social benefits for Russian
military personnel likely to support ongoing recruitment efforts.
Russian State Duma deputy Igor Antropenko proposed simplifying the
process for relatives of Rosgvardia personnel to obtain military service
certificates recognizing their relatives' service in Ukraine in a
document addressed to Rosgvardia Director Viktor Zolotov on February 6.[83]
Russian personnel must have these certificates to receive social
benefits as veterans of the war. The Russian State Duma adopted a bill
in its first reading on February 6 that improves social benefits to
veterans who served in the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republic (DNR
and LNR) militias, including pensions for personnel wounded in combat,
disability pensions without applications, and paying pensions to
relatives of deceased personnel.[84]
Russian
milbloggers complained on February 6 that Russian personnel first
mobilized during the Fall 2022 partial reserve call up have low morale. A
milblogger complained that allowing Russian mobilized personnel to take
temporary leave would improve their morale and claimed that Russia has
enough contract personnel to completely demobilize these personnel but
that Russia will not demobilize these troops until after the war.[85]
A second milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor disagreed, claiming
that the Russian military command wants to get rid of all mobilized
personnel in costly, infantry assaults in Ukraine.[86]
The second milblogger claimed that the Russian "Dnepr" and Southern
groupings of forces ordered frontline commanders to "agitate" these
personnel to persuade them to sign contracts with the Russian Ministry
of Defense (MoD) to inflate recruitment numbers and avoid paying
mobilized personnel for injuries and deaths.
Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii
reported on February 6 that it analyzed Russian dog tag numbers with
the prefix "AB" and determined that the Russian Ministry of Defense
(MoD) recruited roughly 30,000 penal recruits for "Storm-Z" units from
roughly 108 penal colonies from February to August 2023.[87]
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Nothing significant to report.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1887542437943394694; https://t.me/morpeh_810/7799
; https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1887523796405412135;
https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1887523796405412135;
https://x.com/moklasen/status/1887520310171140378;
https://t.me/sudoplatov_official/4099; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85764 ; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1887462416621183477; https://t.me/btr80/24804?single ; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1887428900872966254; https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1887424486711955953
[2] https://t.me/mod_russia/48611
[3] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18767 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61937 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61936 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23515 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23513 ; https://t.me/rybar/67770 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85752 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85744 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/21802 ; https://t.me/sashakots/51741 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153754
[4] https://t.me/rybar/67776 ; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/5988 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/63998 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153787; https://t.me/divgen/62853
[5] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61936 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23513 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/22380 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/20646 ; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/5986 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153769 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153787; https://t.me/divgen/62853
[6] https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=971610598485352&set=pcb.971611048485307
[7] https://t.me/rybar/67776 ; https://t.me/rybar/67785 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010525
[8] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18769 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18767 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/20629 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20954
[9] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85752 ; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/5984 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/63977 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20950
[10] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61936 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/64022 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85751 ; https://t.me/zovpobedy/14379 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/63976 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/63991 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153757 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153773; https://t.me/iamsniper/10641 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/48617 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85754
[11] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76214
[12] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment
[13] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment
[14]
https://t.me/ukr_sof/1424 ; https://suspilne dot
media/942595-znisuvali-rosijsku-oboronu-u-tilu-sili-specoperacij-zsu-pocali-zahoditi-u-kursku-oblast-se-u-cervni-2024-roku/
[15]
https://www.president.gov dot
ua/news/prezident-vidznachiv-derzhavnimi-nagorodami-voyiniv-yaki-ber-95913
; https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2025/02/06/pivroku-vid-pochatku-kurskoyi-operacziyi-prezydent-vidznachyv-yiyi-uchasnykiv-derzhavnymy-nagorodamy/
[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment
[17]
https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/23066275 ; https://wciom dot
ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/specialnaja-voennaja-operacija-na-ukraine-monitoring
[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-22-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-22-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2024
[19]
https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/ukraine-sees-marked-improvement-accuracy-russias-north-korean-missiles-2025-02-06/
[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YdN4X4swQNZpTafDau6wJzatvCeyD9LSZavKzNzqYxafXbocdgp5j5PzMc8rRGtEl
[21] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8760
[22]
https://x.com/SebLecornu/status/1887436710021050400; https://suspilne
dot
media/942221-ukraina-otrimala-persi-francuzki-vinisuvaci-mirage-2000/
[23]
https://www.france24 dot
com/en/live-news/20240606-%F0%9F%94%B4-macron-to-supply-ukraine-with-mirage-2000-5-warplanes-and-train-fighter-pilots-in-france
[24] https://t.me/ministry_of_defense_ua/11736
[25] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76217 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76216 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/299337
[26] https://t.me/tass_agency/299368
[27] https://t.me/rybar/67768 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/63945 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153751
[28] https://t.me/vchkogpu/54580 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2024
[29] https://t.me/sotaproject/93498
[30] ; https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-09/2021-09-23-advanced-military-technology-in-russia-bendett-et-al.pdf
[31] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AiGQazctgM4syHPM4ybafAp4SZsjWPtRpLi5hxoMKhEBqX2CbuEN89PE43oqFuhCl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dGM6u1tgYYVp5EQUgUsyQvrzvbTfNVUEgUDGJVfDvWimGwGtkNvj7tXJ9RPXPbgyl ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/4146 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VPdWaDx6GDYmdUTAJPToxjr4UZG5LQVQNzN6L1NS74GFZ23nTSGxTYkM3xQUY5vUl
[32] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23511 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23505
[33] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23505
[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AiGQazctgM4syHPM4ybafAp4SZsjWPtRpLi5hxoMKhEBqX2CbuEN89PE43oqFuhCl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dGM6u1tgYYVp5EQUgUsyQvrzvbTfNVUEgUDGJVfDvWimGwGtkNvj7tXJ9RPXPbgyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VPdWaDx6GDYmdUTAJPToxjr4UZG5LQVQNzN6L1NS74GFZ23nTSGxTYkM3xQUY5vUl
[35] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/25404; https://t.me/rubak112/146
[36] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23487; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85718; https://t.me/tass_agency/299325
[37] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23487
[38]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA ; https://armyinform.com
dot
ua/2025/02/06/berut-doshhechky-lyagayut-i-plyvut-yak-rosiyany-namagayutsya-forsuvaty-oskil-i-shho-z-togo-vyhodyt/
[39] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85718; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85720
[40] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153678
[41]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AiGQazctgM4syHPM4ybafAp4SZsjWPtRpLi5hxoMKhEBqX2CbuEN89PE43oqFuhCl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dGM6u1tgYYVp5EQUgUsyQvrzvbTfNVUEgUDGJVfDvWimGwGtkNvj7tXJ9RPXPbgyl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VPdWaDx6GDYmdUTAJPToxjr4UZG5LQVQNzN6L1NS74GFZ23nTSGxTYkM3xQUY5vUl
[42] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23487
[43] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4982
[44] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4982
[45]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AiGQazctgM4syHPM4ybafAp4SZsjWPtRpLi5hxoMKhEBqX2CbuEN89PE43oqFuhCl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dGM6u1tgYYVp5EQUgUsyQvrzvbTfNVUEgUDGJVfDvWimGwGtkNvj7tXJ9RPXPbgyl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VPdWaDx6GDYmdUTAJPToxjr4UZG5LQVQNzN6L1NS74GFZ23nTSGxTYkM3xQUY5vUl
[46]
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2025/02/06/zayihav-czikavishyj-pidrozdil-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-protyvnyk-rizhe-logistychni-arteriyi/
[47] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18766; https://t.me/epoddubny/22375; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5468
[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AiGQazctgM4syHPM4ybafAp4SZsjWPtRpLi5hxoMKhEBqX2CbuEN89PE43oqFuhCl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dGM6u1tgYYVp5EQUgUsyQvrzvbTfNVUEgUDGJVfDvWimGwGtkNvj7tXJ9RPXPbgyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VPdWaDx6GDYmdUTAJPToxjr4UZG5LQVQNzN6L1NS74GFZ23nTSGxTYkM3xQUY5vUl
[49] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4982
[50] https://t.me/epoddubny/22378
[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AiGQazctgM4syHPM4ybafAp4SZsjWPtRpLi5hxoMKhEBqX2CbuEN89PE43oqFuhCl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dGM6u1tgYYVp5EQUgUsyQvrzvbTfNVUEgUDGJVfDvWimGwGtkNvj7tXJ9RPXPbgyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VPdWaDx6GDYmdUTAJPToxjr4UZG5LQVQNzN6L1NS74GFZ23nTSGxTYkM3xQUY5vUl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24669 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20951
[52] https://x.com/Noobieshunta_/status/1887543794783916130 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1887533081080324179
[53] https://t.me/yurasumy/20951/ ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23500
[54] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85734
[55] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg
; https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2025/02/06/protyvnyk-zrobyv-try-prohody-v-kanali-v-chasovomu-yaru-vorog-atakuye-z-pivnochi-na-pivden/
[56] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85734 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20951
[57] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23499 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23499 ; https://t.me/EnotHersonVDV/6053
[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AiGQazctgM4syHPM4ybafAp4SZsjWPtRpLi5hxoMKhEBqX2CbuEN89PE43oqFuhCl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dGM6u1tgYYVp5EQUgUsyQvrzvbTfNVUEgUDGJVfDvWimGwGtkNvj7tXJ9RPXPbgyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VPdWaDx6GDYmdUTAJPToxjr4UZG5LQVQNzN6L1NS74GFZ23nTSGxTYkM3xQUY5vUl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24669
[59] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23502
[60] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85731
[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AiGQazctgM4syHPM4ybafAp4SZsjWPtRpLi5hxoMKhEBqX2CbuEN89PE43oqFuhCl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dGM6u1tgYYVp5EQUgUsyQvrzvbTfNVUEgUDGJVfDvWimGwGtkNvj7tXJ9RPXPbgyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VPdWaDx6GDYmdUTAJPToxjr4UZG5LQVQNzN6L1NS74GFZ23nTSGxTYkM3xQUY5vUl ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61935 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/63936 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153779 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20949
[62] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61935 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20947 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20948
[63] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61935 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20949 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20948 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20947
[64] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg; https://armyinform.com
dot
ua/2025/02/06/sim-tysyach-zagyblyh-za-misyacz-pid-pokrovskom-zagynulo-bilshe-rosiyan-nizh-pid-chas-drugoyi-chechenskoyi-vijny/
[65] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85714
[66] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AiGQazctgM4syHPM4ybafAp4SZsjWPtRpLi5hxoMKhEBqX2CbuEN89PE43oqFuhCl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dGM6u1tgYYVp5EQUgUsyQvrzvbTfNVUEgUDGJVfDvWimGwGtkNvj7tXJ9RPXPbgyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VPdWaDx6GDYmdUTAJPToxjr4UZG5LQVQNzN6L1NS74GFZ23nTSGxTYkM3xQUY5vUl
[67] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61932 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20946
[68] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/25397 ; https://fb.watch/xAvUPwT8J3/; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8297
[69] https://x.com/Ryan72101/status/1887497852726702145; https://t.me/wargonzo/24686; https://x.com/SimonMarek66/status/1887455135338471662
[70] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61932 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153779
[71] https://t.me/yurasumy/20946
[72] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AiGQazctgM4syHPM4ybafAp4SZsjWPtRpLi5hxoMKhEBqX2CbuEN89PE43oqFuhCl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dGM6u1tgYYVp5EQUgUsyQvrzvbTfNVUEgUDGJVfDvWimGwGtkNvj7tXJ9RPXPbgyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VPdWaDx6GDYmdUTAJPToxjr4UZG5LQVQNzN6L1NS74GFZ23nTSGxTYkM3xQUY5vUl
[73] https://t.me/wargonzo/24669 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153779
[74] https://t.me/voin_dv/13239
[75] https://t.me/voin_dv/13237
[76] https://t.me/wargonzo/24669
[77]
https://t.me/usf_army/386; https://suspilne dot
media/zaporizhzhia/941997-na-zaporizkomu-napramku-sili-bezpilotnih-sistem-znisili-zrk-buk-m3-armii-rf/;
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20595
[78] https://t.me/dva_majors/63936
[79] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23506
[80] https://t.me/kpszsu/28224
[81] https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2113; https://t.me/synegubov/12998; https://t.me/synegubov/12997 ; https://t.me/synegubov/13002 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2116
[82] https://t.me/bbcrussian/76233 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/8489;
[83] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/23065741
[84] https://t.me/government_rus/18675
[85] https://t.me/vault8pro/52368
[86] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1964; https://t.me/philologist_zov/1965
[87] https://t.me/istories_media/8905; https://storage.googleapis dot com/istories/stories/2025/02/06/v-otryadi-shtorm-z-mogli-zaverbovat-do-29-tisyach-zaklyuchennikh/index.html
