Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Olivia, Gibson, and George Barros with William Runkel
February 23, 2025, 6:00 pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on February 23. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the February 24 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
US Special Envoy to the
Middle East Steve Witkoff referred to the early 2022 Istanbul protocols
as offering "guideposts" for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine on
February 23. An agreement based on those protocols would be a
capitulation document.[1] Russian
President Vladimir Putin and other senior Russian officials have
repeatedly identified the 2022 peace negotiations in Istanbul as their
ideal framework for future peace negotiations to end Putin's war in
Ukraine, as such a framework would force the West to concede to all of
Russia's long-standing demands.[2] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and the New York Times
(NYT) reported in March and June 2024 that both publications obtained
several versions of the draft treaties from the March and April 2022
Ukrainian-Russian peace negotiations in Istanbul that indicate that both
sides initially agreed that Ukraine would forgo its NATO membership
aspirations and be a "permanently neutral state that doesn't participate
in military blocs."[3]
The draft treaties also reportedly banned Ukraine from receiving any
foreign weapons or hosting any foreign military personnel. The WSJ and
NYT reported that Russia pushed for the Ukrainian military to be limited
to 85,000 soldiers, 342 tanks, and 519 artillery systems. Russia also
reportedly demanded that Ukrainian missiles be limited to a range of 40
kilometers (25 miles), a range that would allow Russian forces to deploy
critical systems and materiel close to Ukraine without fear of strikes.
The draft treaties reportedly listed the United States, United Kingdom
(UK), the People's Republic of China (PRC), France, and Russia as
guarantors of the treaty, and Russia reportedly wanted to include
Belarus as a guarantor. The guarantor states were supposed to “terminate
international treaties and agreements incompatible with the permanent
neutrality [of Ukraine]," including military aid agreements. The draft
treaties did not specify if other non-guarantor states would have to
terminate their agreements with Ukraine as well, although this is likely
considering that the treaty would ban Ukraine from having any
foreign-supplied weapons. Russia insisted on these terms in the first
and second months of the war when Russian troops were advancing on Kyiv
City and throughout northeastern, eastern, and southern Ukraine and
before Ukrainian forces conducted successful counteroffensives that
liberated significant swaths of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson
oblasts.
Ukraine is unlikely to accept any peace
agreement based on the Istanbul negotiations as such terms are
effectively a full Ukrainian surrender to Russia's long-term war goals. The
Istanbul negotiations effectively conceded to Russia's long-standing
demands to "denazify" — overthrow and replace the democratically elected
Ukrainian government and install a pro-Russian puppet state — and
"demilitarize" — constrain and shrink the Ukrainian military beyond the
point of being able to defend itself against future Russian aggression —
Ukraine.[4]
The Istanbul negotiations also conceded to Russia's demands that
Ukraine abandon its aspirations to join NATO or any other security blocs
in the future. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky walked away from
the Istanbul negotiations with the backing of Europe and the United
States in 2022 and will almost certainly reject such terms in 2025.
Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to demonstrate his commitment to
preserving Ukraine's democracy and a just resolution to the war. Zelensky
responded to a hypothetical question during the "Ukraine. Year 2025"
Forum on February 23 about stepping down as president and stated that he
is ready to step down in the event of or to facilitate peace or
immediate NATO membership for Ukraine.[5]
Zelensky noted that he remains committed to holding elections after the
war ends and has no interest in being in power "for a decade" and
reiterated that Ukraine cannot hold elections until after Russia stops
attacking Ukraine and after Ukraine lifts martial law.[6]
The Ukrainian Constitution bars the government from holding elections
or amending the Ukrainian constitution in times of martial law, and the
Ukrainian government legally cannot abolish martial law while Russia
continues to attack Ukraine.[7] Zelensky has repeatedly noted Ukraine's commitment to holding fair and democratic elections in the future.[8]
Zelensky
stated during the press conference that several European officials will
visit Kyiv for the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of
Ukraine on February 24, 2025 and reiterated that European countries
should be involved in future peace negotiations about the war in
Ukraine.[9]
Zelensky noted that NATO membership is one of the best security
guarantees that Ukraine could receive and that Ukraine would also
consider membership in the European Union (EU), Western financing for an
800,000-person-strong Ukrainian military, and the presence of a Western
peacekeeping contingent in Ukraine as acceptable security guarantees in
the event of a ceasefire with Russia.[10]
Ukrainian officials continue to highlight Ukraine's domestic defense industry and domestically produced strike capabilities. Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky stated during the "Ukraine. Year 2025"
forum on February 23 that Ukraine produced 2.2 million first person view
(FPV) drones and over 100,000 long-range drones in 2025 and intends to
increase its drone production rate in 2025.[11]
Zelensky stated that Ukraine produced 154 artillery systems in 2024 and
intends to increase production of artillery systems in 2025 and noted
that Ukraine is working to develop an analogue to the US-produced
Patriot air defense system.[12]
Zelensky noted that Ukraine funded 40 percent, European countries
funded 30 percent, and the United States funded another 30 percent of
Ukraine's domestic defense production in 2024. Zelensky stated that
Ukraine intends to fund 50 percent of its domestic defense production in
2025.
Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated at
the forum that Ukraine has become the largest producer of tactical and
long-range drones in the world and that 96 percent of the Ukrainian
military's drones are purchased or produced in Ukraine.[13]
Ukrainian Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov announced
that Ukraine intends to operationalize technology that will allow a
single drone operator to control multiple drones in a "swarm" in 2025.[14]
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksander Syrskyi stated that
Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces conducted 130 long-range operations
and struck 377 objects in Russia in 2024.[15]
Syrskyi noted that Ukraine has deployed over 1.3 million drones to the
frontline and is working to increase its production of fiber-optic
drones. Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian long-range drones can strike
targets up to 1,700 kilometers deep in Russian territory.
Russian
President Vladimir Putin appointed Russian Direct Investment Fund
(RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev as Special Presidential Representative for
Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries on February
23.[16] Dmitriev
was part of the Russian delegation that met with US officials in Saudi
Arabia on February 17, and a source close to the Kremlin told Russian
opposition outlet Meduza in an article published on February 19
that Dmitriev's appointment to the delegation appeared largely as a
response to US demands that Russia appoint someone that would
"understand" the United States, likely given his experiences living and
studying in the US at Standford University and Harvard University and
working for US companies.[17]
Russian
forces launched a record number of drone strikes against Ukraine on the
night of February 22 to 23, ahead of the third anniversary of Russia's
full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24. The Ukrainian
Air Force reported on February 23 that Russian forces launched three
Iskander-M/North Korean-provided KN-23 ballistic missiles from occupied
Crimea and 267 Shahed and other drones from the directions of Oryol,
Bryansk, and Kursk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov
Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda,
Crimea.[18]
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 138
Shahed and decoy drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Chernihiv,
Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, Mykolaiv, Odesa and
Dnipropetrovsk oblasts; that 119 drones were “lost,” likely due to
Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that three drones
flew toward Belarusian airspace. Ukrainian officials reported that
drones damaged infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Poltava, Kyiv,
and Zaporizhia oblasts and that a missile damaged civilian
infrastructure in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[19]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 23 that
Russia launched the largest number of Shahed drones against Ukraine on
the night of February 22 to 23.[20]
Russia appears to be relying more on Iran and North Korea to support its war in Ukraine. Iran
has largely enabled Russia to launch near nightly series of large drone
strikes as it has provided Russia with Iranian designed and produced
Shahed drones and helped Russia establish its own Shahed drone
production facility in Tatarstan Republic.[21]
Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant
General Kyrylo Budanov stated on February 23 during the "Ukraine. Year
2025" Forum on February 23 that half of Russia's ammunition comes from
North Korea and that North Korea has started large-scale deliveries of
170mm self-propelled artillery system and 240mm multiple launch rocket
systems (MLRS).[22] Budanov added that North Korea plans to provide Russia with 148 ballistic missiles, presumably in 2025.[23]
Russian forces continue to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in clear violation of international law. Ukrainian
Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets reported on February 23 that footage
circulating on social media shows a Russian servicemember executing a
Ukrainian POW in an unspecified area of Kursk Oblast.[24]
ISW has observed and reported on numerous instances of Russian
servicemembers executing Ukrainian POWs along the frontline in Ukraine
and Kursk Oblast and continues to assess that this is a systemic trend
in the Russian military and that Russian commanders are either complicit
in or directly enabling their subordinates to conduct such atrocities.[25]
Key Takeaways:
- US
Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff referred to the early
2022 Istanbul protocols as offering "guideposts" for negotiations
between Russia and Ukraine on February 23. An agreement based on those
protocols would be a capitulation document.
- Ukraine
is unlikely to accept any peace agreement based on the Istanbul
negotiations as such terms are effectively a full Ukrainian surrender to
Russia's long-term war goals.
- Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to demonstrate his commitment to
preserving Ukraine's democracy and a just resolution to the war.
- Ukrainian officials continue to highlight Ukraine's domestic defense industry and domestically produced strike capabilities.
- Russian
President Vladimir Putin appointed Russian Direct Investment Fund
(RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev as Special Presidential Representative for
Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries on February
23.
- Russian forces launched a record number of
drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 22 to 23, ahead
of the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on
February 24.
- Russia appears to be relying more on Iran and North Korea to support its war in Ukraine.
- Russian forces continue to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in clear violation of international law.
- Ukrainian
forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Russian forces recently
advanced near Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
- The Russian government continues efforts to increase its defense industrial output.
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on February 23 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian
forces continued ground attacks northwest of Sudzha near Lebedevka and
Pogrebki, northeast of Sudzha near Kositsa, and southeast of Sudzha near
Guyevo.[26]
Unconfirmed
Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of
the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA],
Southern Military District [SMD]) seized Maryevka and are advancing in
Pogrebki (both northwest of Sudzha).[27]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the 1st Battalion of the 9th Motorized Rifle
Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad
Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Pogrebki.[28]
Elements of the 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) and
30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC,
LMD) reportedly continue to operate in Kursk direction.[29] Elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating near Guyevo.[30]
Elements of the 51st VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly
operating near Lebedevka. Elements of the 1427th Motorized Rifle
Regiment (formed during 2022 partial reserve call up) are reportedly
operating near Kositsa. Elements of the 11th VDV Brigade are reportedly
operating near Cherkasskaya Konopelka (southeast of Sudzha).
A
Ukrainian source posted footage on February 21 showing Ukrainian forces
striking a Russian Strela-10 air defense system in an unspecified area
of Kursk Oblast.[31]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Kharkiv direction on February 23 but did not advance. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on February 22 and 23.[32]
Unconfirmed
Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed on February 23
that Russian forces marginally advanced in Vovchansk.[33]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Kupyansk
Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Kupyansk direction on February 23 but did not make confirmed advances.
Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Dvorichna and Zapadne,
northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka, and east of Kupyansk near
Petropavlivka on February 22 and 23.[34] A Russian milblogger claimed on February 23 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Dvorichna.[35]
Unconfirmed
Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed on February 23
that Russian forces captured Topoli (north of Kupyansk near the
international border) and Holubivka (north of Kupyansk) and advanced
near Kutkivka (north of Kupyansk) and Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[36]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 23 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and
southeast of Borova near Cherneshchyna and Novoyehorivka on February 22
and 23.[37]
Unconfirmed
Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed on February 23
that Russian forces advanced 450 meters near Hrekivka and advanced near
Makiivka (both southeast of Borova).[38]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on February 23 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian
forces attacked northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka, Novolyubivka,
Ivanivka, and Kolodyazi and east of Lyman near Kuzmyne and the
Serebryanske forest area on February 22 and 23.[39]
Unconfirmed
Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed on February 23
that Russian forces advanced near Novolyubivka, Ivanivka, Balka Zhuravka
(formerly Nevske) (northeast of Lyman), Kolodyazi, and Yampolivka.[40]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction. Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka on February 22 and 23.[41]
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 23 indicates
that Russian forces recently seized Bilohorivka and the quarry south of
the settlement.[42]
Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle
Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's
Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) with
seizing the settlement.[43]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 12th Territorial Defense Battalion are reportedly advancing near Bilohorivka.[44]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on February 23 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked near
Chasiv Yar itself, northeast of Chasiv Yar near Vasyukivka, and south
of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Bila Hora on February 22 and 23.[45]
Ukrainian
Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on
February 23 that frozen ground conditions and the freezing of water
features near Chasiv Yar has enabled Russian forces to more easily
advance in the Chasiv Yar direction and that Russian forces are
regrouping north of Chasiv Yar.[46]
Trehubov added that Russian forces continue to deploy small infantry
groups with limited drone and armored vehicle support and that Russian
forces are marginally advancing north of Chasiv Yar but have not seized
Chasiv Yar completely.
Order of Battle: Elements of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd AC) are reportedly operating near Bila Hora.[47]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction. Russian forces attacked Toretsk itself and north of Toretsk near Krymske and in the direction of Dyliivka on February 22 and 23.[48]
Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 23
indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in western
Toretsk.[49]
Order
of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade
(51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD)
reportedly continue to operate near Toretsk.[50]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction. Russian
forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Vodyane Druhe; east of
Pokrovsk near Promin, Novotoretske, and Yelyzavetivka; southeast of
Pokrovsk near Dachenske; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne,
Novooleksandrivka, Bohdanivka, and Udachne on February 22 and 23.[51]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on February 23 that
Russian forces seized Novoandriivka, although ISW assessed that Russian
forces likely seized the settlement as of February 4.[52]
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 22 indicates
that Russian forces recently advanced northeast and south of Nadiivka
(southwest of Pokrovsk).[53]
The
deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operation in the Pokrovsk
direction stated on February 23 that Russian forces have intensified
drones strikes and reconnaissance, including with fiber-optic drones, in
the area.[54]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces operating near
Pokrovsk are now operating the same number of drones as Ukrainian
forces, but that Ukrainian drones are better quality.[55]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 506th and 433rd motorized rifle
regiments (both of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central
Military District [CMD]) are operating along the Udachne-Uspenivka line
(southwest of Pokrovsk).[56]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on February 23 but did not advance. Russian
forces attacked northwest of Kurakhove near Andriivka; west of
Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Oleksiivka, and Ulakly; and southwest of
Kurakhove near Rozlyv on February 22 and 23.[57]
The Russian MoD claimed on February 23 that elements of the Russian
39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD])
and 1472nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th AC, EMD) seized Ulakly, but
ISW observed that Russian forces seized the settlement as of February
21.[58]
Unconfirmed
Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed on February 23
that Russian forces advanced southwestward in the fields east of
Oleksiivka (west of Kurakhove) and are advancing in Kostyantynopil.[59]
A
Russian milblogger claimed that Russian attacks on Kostyantynopil and
Rozlyv as well as along the Vovcha River near Ulakly have been
intensifying since February 16 as Russian forces seek to interdict
Ukrainian logistics in the area.[60]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th
CAA, EMD) and 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly
operating near Kostyantynopil.[61]
Russian forces recently advanced north of Velkya Novosilka. Russian
forces continued attacks north of Velyka Novosilka near Skudne and
Dniproenerhiia, northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Burlatske, and west
of Velkya Novosilka near Novosilka on February 22 and 23.[62]
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 22 indicates
that Russian forces recently advanced in the fields southeast of
Dniproenerhiia during a company-sized mechanized assault.[63]
The Ukrainian brigade that repelled the assault reported that Russian
forces attacked in two columns with a total of 10 armored vehicles and
that the brigade destroyed nine vehicles.[64]
Unconfirmed
Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian
forces advanced further in the fields southeast of Skudne than ISW has
observed.[65]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Zaporizhia direction on February 23 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northwest of Robotyne near Shcherbaky, Stepove, Kamyanske, and Pyatykhatky on February 22 and 23.[66]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near
Kamyanske and Orikhiv (north of Robotyne) on February 23.[67]
Unconfirmed
Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed on February 23
that Russian forces with drone support advanced into Pyatykhatky and
seized a significant portion of the settlement.[68]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1455th Motorized Rifle Regiment
(reportedly of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms
Army, Southern Military District) are reportedly operating near Orikhiv.[69]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on February 23 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of the Kherson direction on February 22 and 23.[70]
Order
of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Lotus" drone unit of the
"Smuglyanka" Detachment are reportedly operating in east (left) bank
Kherson Oblast near Kherson City.[71]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
See topline text.
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
The
Russian government continues efforts to increase its defense industrial
output. Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) Head Lieutenant
General Oleh Ivashchenko stated during the "Ukraine. Year 2025" forum on
February 23 that Russia plans to produce 3,000 long-range missiles and
more than seven million rounds of ammunition in 2025.[72]
Ivashchenko added that the seven million rounds amount to more
ammunition than all the countries in the European Union (EU)
collectively produce (presumably on an annual basis).
A
Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor claimed that Russian
forces continue to struggle with improving drone operations.[73]
The milblogger claimed that Russian forces fail to collect reliable
statistics on successful drone strikes which impedes drone operation
innovation. The milblogger asserted that poorly manufactured Russian
drones and inflated successful strike statistics likely cause the
disconnect between Russia's supposed superior number of drones and
Russian forces' often unsuccessful drone operations.
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Ukraine's
Main Military Intelligence (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov
stated during the "Ukraine. Year 2025" Forum on February 23 that
Russian forces have attempted to integrate first person-view (FPV) drone
launch systems onto helicopters to counter Ukrainian naval drones.[74]
Budanov stated that Russian forces recently damaged two helicopters
while trying to launch FPV drones from the helicopters, presumably over
the Black Sea, and that Russian forces no longer are attempting to
launch FPV drones from helicopters.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.cnn.com/2025/02/23/politics/video/steve-witkoff-russia-ukraine-war-provoked-sotu-digvid
[2]
http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/75909 ;
https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1000390 ; https://tass dot
ru/politika/23045449
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-1-2024
; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2024
[3] https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-ukraine-peace-deal-2022-document-6e12e093 ; https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/06/15/world/europe/ukraine-russia-ceasefire-deal.html
[4]
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/23/world/europe/putin-announces-a-military-operation-in-ukraine-as-the-un-security-council-pleads-with-him-to-pull-back.html
; http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/67843 ; http://kremlin
dot ru/events/president/news/67843
[5] https://suspilne dot media/955309-a-gotovij-piti-z-posadi-prezidenta-zaradi-miru-v-ukraini-zelenskij/ ; https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/zelenskiy-zayaviv-gotovnist-zalishiti-posadu-1740322595.html ; https://www.kyivpost dot com/uk/post/47671 ; https://hromadske dot ua/viyna/240224-zelenskyy-ia-hotovyy-obminiaty-post-prezydenta-na-bezpekovi-harantiyi-dlia-ukrayiny
[6] https://kyivindependent.com/do-international-observers-want-to-be-placed-in-pokrovsk-zelensky-criticizes-calls-for-elections-following-trumps-comments/ ; https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-polytics/3963508-zelensky-holding-elections-in-wartime-impossible-for-multiple-reasons.html
[7]
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2024
; https://www.president dot
gov.ua/ua/documents/constitution/konstituciya-ukrayini-rozdil-v ;
https://unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/hlm/prgm/cph/experts/ukraine/ukr.constitution.e.pdf
[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010325
[9] https://suspilne dot media/955309-a-gotovij-piti-z-posadi-prezidenta-zaradi-miru-v-ukraini-zelenskij/ ; https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/zelenskiy-zayaviv-gotovnist-zalishiti-posadu-1740322595.html ; https://www.kyivpost dot com/uk/post/47671 ; https://hromadske dot ua/viyna/240224-zelenskyy-ia-hotovyy-obminiaty-post-prezydenta-na-bezpekovi-harantiyi-dlia-ukrayiny ; https://suspilne dot media/955279-zelenskij-dae-preskonferenciu-naperedodni-tretih-rokovin-vijni-golovni-zaavi/
[10] https://suspilne
dot
media/955365-zelenskij-rozpoviv-aki-garantii-bezpeki-viznae-ukraina/ ;
https://suspilne dot
media/955309-a-gotovij-piti-z-posadi-prezidenta-zaradi-miru-v-ukraini-zelenskij/
; https://www.rbc dot
ua/rus/news/zelenskiy-zayaviv-gotovnist-zalishiti-posadu-1740322595.html
; https://www.kyivpost dot com/uk/post/47671 ; https://hromadske dot
ua/viyna/240224-zelenskyy-ia-hotovyy-obminiaty-post-prezydenta-na-bezpekovi-harantiyi-dlia-ukrayiny
[11] https://suspilne dot media/955367-zelenskij-2024-roku-ukraina-virobila-22-miljona-fpv-droniv-u-2025-mu-zrobit-bilse/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/23/volodymyr-zelenskyj-ukrayina-za-rik-zrobyla-bilshe-artylerijskyh-system-nizh-krayiny-nato/
[12] https://hromadske dot ua/viyna/240233-ukrayina-rozrobliaye-analoh-patriot-zelensky ; https://suspilne dot media/955367-zelenskij-2024-roku-ukraina-virobila-22-miljona-fpv-droniv-u-2025-mu-zrobit-bilse/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/23/volodymyr-zelenskyj-ukrayina-za-rik-zrobyla-bilshe-artylerijskyh-system-nizh-krayiny-nato/
[13] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/23/rustem-umyerov-ukrayina-stala-najbilshym-vyrobnykom-droniv-u-sviti/
[14] https://suspilne dot media/954997-fedorov-anonsuvav-tehnologiu-so-dozvolae-pilotu-odnocasno-keruvati-kilkoma-dronami/
[15]
https://united24media dot
com/latest-news/ukraines-drone-strikes-now-reach-1700-km-inside-russia-says-commander-in-chief-6147
; https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2025/02/23/ukrayina-vzhe-bye-na-1700-kilometriv-u-glybynu-terytoriyi-krayiny-agresora/
[16] https://t.me/tass_agency/302180
[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021925
[18] https://t.me/kpszsu/29327
[19] https://t.me/kpszsu/29327 ; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/829 ; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/830 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/8699 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12126 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/19678 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/19681
[20] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1893589416465035352
[21] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081723
[22] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/23/kyrylo-budanov-50-boyeprypasiv-na-fronti-u-rosiyan-z-kndr/ ; https://euromaidanpress dot com/2025/02/23/north-korea-provides-50-of-russias-ammunition-says-ukraines-spymaster/
[23] https://suspilne dot media/955303-rf-planue-viroblati-3-tisaci-dalekobijnih-raket-u-2025-roci-rozvidka/
[24] https://t.me/dmytro_lubinetzs/8052
[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024
[26] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32643 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32650 ;
[27]https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86765 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24292 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/65196 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24305 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24297
[28] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24297 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/65198 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32627 ;
[29] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86790 ; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/49930 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/65187
[30] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32650
[31] https://t.me/ssternenko/40328
[32]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06JWKfWMzVwiFkwWaBqHzqxdRVZF2JzzThrCSZePvVzBG1ikrnbSriss5vTBo4TxFl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid01CSNKJv5XXQuLkj7GjYJBisp8vYnCfxBHkuRZVaBkJaxfMXBTD45ZxuegwBEo2Atl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xZMXxBvkPDpUvAUDBXrxGzao6BBPEV96V3PpimhBctTEdxG47V2iJ2XmZkWBS2cl
[33] https://t.me/dva_majors/65185 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12538
[34]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06JWKfWMzVwiFkwWaBqHzqxdRVZF2JzzThrCSZePvVzBG1ikrnbSriss5vTBo4TxFl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid01CSNKJv5XXQuLkj7GjYJBisp8vYnCfxBHkuRZVaBkJaxfMXBTD45ZxuegwBEo2Atl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xZMXxBvkPDpUvAUDBXrxGzao6BBPEV96V3PpimhBctTEdxG47V2iJ2XmZkWBS2cl ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24339
[35] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24339
[36]https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86767 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32637 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24339 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21346
[37]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06JWKfWMzVwiFkwWaBqHzqxdRVZF2JzzThrCSZePvVzBG1ikrnbSriss5vTBo4TxFl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid01CSNKJv5XXQuLkj7GjYJBisp8vYnCfxBHkuRZVaBkJaxfMXBTD45ZxuegwBEo2Atl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xZMXxBvkPDpUvAUDBXrxGzao6BBPEV96V3PpimhBctTEdxG47V2iJ2XmZkWBS2cl
[38] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30947 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/155553
[39]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06JWKfWMzVwiFkwWaBqHzqxdRVZF2JzzThrCSZePvVzBG1ikrnbSriss5vTBo4TxFl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid01CSNKJv5XXQuLkj7GjYJBisp8vYnCfxBHkuRZVaBkJaxfMXBTD45ZxuegwBEo2Atl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xZMXxBvkPDpUvAUDBXrxGzao6BBPEV96V3PpimhBctTEdxG47V2iJ2XmZkWBS2cl
[40] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30947 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/155553
[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid01CSNKJv5XXQuLkj7GjYJBisp8vYnCfxBHkuRZVaBkJaxfMXBTD45ZxuegwBEo2Atl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xZMXxBvkPDpUvAUDBXrxGzao6BBPEV96V3PpimhBctTEdxG47V2iJ2XmZkWBS2cl ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32614
[42] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8465; https://t.me/shock3OA/605
[43] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32663 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62356 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/65228 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32614
[44] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32663
[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06JWKfWMzVwiFkwWaBqHzqxdRVZF2JzzThrCSZePvVzBG1ikrnbSriss5vTBo4TxFl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid01CSNKJv5XXQuLkj7GjYJBisp8vYnCfxBHkuRZVaBkJaxfMXBTD45ZxuegwBEo2Atl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xZMXxBvkPDpUvAUDBXrxGzao6BBPEV96V3PpimhBctTEdxG47V2iJ2XmZkWBS2cl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24929
[46] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/955155-rosianam-stalo-legse-nastupati-situacia-bila-casovogo-aru/
[47] https://t.me/voin_dv/13545
[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06JWKfWMzVwiFkwWaBqHzqxdRVZF2JzzThrCSZePvVzBG1ikrnbSriss5vTBo4TxFl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid01CSNKJv5XXQuLkj7GjYJBisp8vYnCfxBHkuRZVaBkJaxfMXBTD45ZxuegwBEo2Atl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xZMXxBvkPDpUvAUDBXrxGzao6BBPEV96V3PpimhBctTEdxG47V2iJ2XmZkWBS2cl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/65185 ;
[49] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1893669094047526970 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1893669524156678552
[50] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13448
[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06JWKfWMzVwiFkwWaBqHzqxdRVZF2JzzThrCSZePvVzBG1ikrnbSriss5vTBo4TxFl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid01CSNKJv5XXQuLkj7GjYJBisp8vYnCfxBHkuRZVaBkJaxfMXBTD45ZxuegwBEo2Atl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xZMXxBvkPDpUvAUDBXrxGzao6BBPEV96V3PpimhBctTEdxG47V2iJ2XmZkWBS2cl
[52] https://t.me/mod_russia/49290 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/302121 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-4-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2025
[53] https://x.com/klinger66/status/1893400976817528915; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VTNfD38LeR4; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8461 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/1043
[54] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/955053-armia-rf-zminila-metodi-rozvidki-na-pokrovskomu-napramku/
[55] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62354
[56] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32662
[57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06JWKfWMzVwiFkwWaBqHzqxdRVZF2JzzThrCSZePvVzBG1ikrnbSriss5vTBo4TxFl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid01CSNKJv5XXQuLkj7GjYJBisp8vYnCfxBHkuRZVaBkJaxfMXBTD45ZxuegwBEo2Atl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xZMXxBvkPDpUvAUDBXrxGzao6BBPEV96V3PpimhBctTEdxG47V2iJ2XmZkWBS2cl ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86747 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/65185
[58] https://t.me/mod_russia/49289 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/49297 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-21-2025
[59] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62358 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30941
[60] https://t.me/yurasumy/21342
[61] https://t.me/mod_russia/49297 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/13546 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21342
[62] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06JWKfWMzVwiFkwWaBqHzqxdRVZF2JzzThrCSZePvVzBG1ikrnbSriss5vTBo4TxFl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid01CSNKJv5XXQuLkj7GjYJBisp8vYnCfxBHkuRZVaBkJaxfMXBTD45ZxuegwBEo2Atl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xZMXxBvkPDpUvAUDBXrxGzao6BBPEV96V3PpimhBctTEdxG47V2iJ2XmZkWBS2cl ; https://t.me/rybar/68264 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21342 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62358 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24929 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21341
[63] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8460; https://t.me/prolibertate110/1081
[64] https://t.me/prolibertate110/1081 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5601
[65] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/155519?single
[66] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06JWKfWMzVwiFkwWaBqHzqxdRVZF2JzzThrCSZePvVzBG1ikrnbSriss5vTBo4TxFl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid01CSNKJv5XXQuLkj7GjYJBisp8vYnCfxBHkuRZVaBkJaxfMXBTD45ZxuegwBEo2Atl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xZMXxBvkPDpUvAUDBXrxGzao6BBPEV96V3PpimhBctTEdxG47V2iJ2XmZkWBS2cl ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86769 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24929 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62352
[67] https://t.me/dva_majors/65185
[68] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86769
[69] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86743
[70] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid01CSNKJv5XXQuLkj7GjYJBisp8vYnCfxBHkuRZVaBkJaxfMXBTD45ZxuegwBEo2Atl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xZMXxBvkPDpUvAUDBXrxGzao6BBPEV96V3PpimhBctTEdxG47V2iJ2XmZkWBS2cl
[71] https://t.me/dva_majors/65215
[72] https://suspilne dot media/955303-rf-planue-viroblati-3-tisaci-dalekobijnih-raket-u-2025-roci-rozvidka/
[73] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2087
[74]
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2025/02/23/nachalnyk-gur-namagannya-rosiyan-protydiyaty-morskym-dronam-zakinchylys-vybuhamy-na-mi-8/
