Siddhant Kishore, Alexandra Braverman, Ben Rezaei, Kelly Campa, and Brian Carter
NOTE: CTP and ISW will publish abbreviated updates on Saturdays and Sundays after February 8, 2025. We may publish full updates as events warrant, however.
The Wall Street Journal reported on February 15 that Israeli officials requested to hold ground in five tactically significant locations in southern Lebanon after the expiration of the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement.[7] The five sites Israel requested reportedly include sites near Khiam, Odaisseh, Naqoura, and Ramyeh, according to Lebanese officials. The Wall Street Journal noted that the five sites in Lebanon overlook Israeli towns in northern Israel and could ”give the military the ability to respond quickly to any threats.” Israeli officials reportedly made the request to American officials during negotiations in recent weeks. Lebanese media separately claimed on February 14 that the IDF intends to retain positions in the following areas:[8]
- Tal Labbouneh, southeast of Naqoura, Lebanon.[9] Tal Labbouneh overlooks areas in southern Lebanon and northern Israel.[10]
- Jabal Blat, northwest of Ramyeh, Lebanon. Jabal Blat is located approximately one kilometer from the Blue Line and overlooks western and central Lebanon.[11]
- Tal Aaziyyeh, north of Odaisseh, Lebanon. Tal Aaziyyeh overlooks the Litani River.[12]
- Tal al Awida, north of Odaisseh, Lebanon. Lebanese media noted that Tal al Awida is the “only hill” that overlooks Metula and "the rest” of the northern Israel towns in the northern tip of the Galilee panhandle.[13] Hezbollah frequently targeted Metula with drone and missile attacks between October 2023 and the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire in November 2024.[14]
- Tal al Hamamis, south of Khiam, Lebanon. Tal al Hamamis is located approximately one kilometer from the Blue Line and provides a view of Metula, Israel, from the north.[15] Hezbollah media reported on February 14 and 15 that the IDF constructed bunkers and barriers on Tal al Hamamis.[16] CTP-ISW previously noted that Tal al Hamamis would have strategic significance to the IDF because control over Tal Hamamis would prevent Hezbollah from using the elevated terrain to conduct direct fire or support indirect fire attacks into the Upper Galilee from there.[17]
Key Takeaways:
- Russia in Syria: Russian cargo vessels have continued to evacuate military assets from the port of Tartus as Russia negotiates its presence in Syria with the interim government.
- IDF in Lebanon: The Wall Street Journal reported on February 15 that Israeli officials requested to hold ground in five tactically significant locations in southern Lebanon after the expiration of the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement.
- Gaza Strip: Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) released three Israeli hostages.
- Hezbollah in Lebanon: Pro-Hezbollah protesters set fire to a vehicle in a United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) convoy and injured a UNIFIL officer during protests outside Beirut’s Rafic Hariri International Airport on February 14.
Axis of Resistance objectives:
- Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and society
- Harden the Iraqi government against internal dissent
Arabian Peninsula
Axis of Resistance objectives:
- Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
- Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
- Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip
The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon
Axis of Resistance objectives:
- Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and the public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
- Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip
- Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern Lebanon
- Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel
CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.
[1] https://x.com/MT_Anderson/status/1890449461433819509
[2] https://x.com/MT_Anderson/status/1890449461433819509
[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-january-24-2025-russia-continues-pivot-libya-and-mali-saf-advances-khartoum
[4] https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:365758/mmsi:273389870/imo:9268710/vessel:SPARTA; https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:362360/mmsi:273394890/imo:9160994/vessel:SPARTA_II
[5] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate021225; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76258
[6] https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1890682191404761541; www.ria dot ru/20250214/rossija-1999393609.html
[7] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-wants-to-extend-presence-in-lebanon-testing-trump-diplomacy-c7543982
[8] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/114085
[9] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110800; https://x.com/N12News/status/1876695110647185507; https://t.me/almanarnews/189913
[10] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/114085 ;
[11] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/114085
[12] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/114085
[13] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/114085
[14] https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1719329218633269748 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/42055 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/4387 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/5433
[15] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/114085
[16] https://x.com/AlakhbarNews/status/1890376349514137797 ; https://t.me/alichoeib1970/13463
[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-29-2024
[18] https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/20149/%D8%A5%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AD-3-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%89-%D8%B6%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B5%D9%81%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%B7%D9%88%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%89-%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B1 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/19172
[19] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/released-hostages-dekel-chen-troufanov-and-horn-in-israel-after-498-days-in-captivity/
[20] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1890510338090545171
[21] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4g7n3l98z6o
[22] https://x.com/UNIFIL_/status/1890505983689990355 ; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/czdl6d0r2g5o
[23] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-842062 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1889778534627025000 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-14-2025
[24] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-peacekeeping-mission-outgoing-deputy-force-commander-injured-after-convoy-2025-02-14/
[25] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1890722565330461080; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135926; https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1890760366423974273
[26] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135938
[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-8-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-7-2025
[28] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1890709305738789141; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135918
[29] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1890709305738789141; https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1890658376322887832; https://x.com/SyriaCivilDefe/status/1890714866098319560
[30] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/123103
[31] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/123105 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-intelligence-says-it-thwarted-islamic-state-attack-shiite-shrine-2025-01-11/
[32] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-intelligence-says-it-thwarted-islamic-state-attack-shiite-shrine-2025-01-11; https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/01/24/us-syria-intelligence-hts-isis/
[33] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/123104; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg1797; https://www.alarabiya dot net/arab-and-world/gulf/2017/11/23/%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%87%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%9F
[34] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/123106
[35] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1890791477627732473
[36] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1890819503530881362; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135969
[37] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1890819503530881362
[38] https://x.com/SDCPressT/status/1890642435266818057
[39] https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/494
[40] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-12-2025; https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/494
[41] https://x.com/SDCPressT/status/1890642435266818057
[42] https://x.com/SDCPressT/status/1890642435266818057
[43] https://www.sana dot sy/en/?p=346973
[44] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/377
[45] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1890755746175893748; https://x.com/shahokurdy/status/1890725889551298901
[46] https://x.com/shahokurdy/status/1890725889551298901
[47] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/27/3258153
[48] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/27/3258092