Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, Olivia Gibson, and George Barros with Nate Trotter and William Runkel
February 9, 2025, 4:45 pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 11 am ET on February 9. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the February 10 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
Russia continues to leverage
its partnerships with US adversaries, including North Korea, to offset
the resource shortages constraining Russia's economy and war effort. South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reported
on February 9, citing South Korea's National Intelligence Service
(NIS), that thousands of North Korean workers arrived in Russia in 2024
to take construction jobs.[1] Russian official data shows that 13,221
North Koreans entered Russia in 2024 — up to 12 times the number that
entered Russia in 2023. Many of the North Korean workers are reportedly
entering Russia on student visas, with 7,887 North Koreans having
entered Russia in 2024 for alleged education purposes. Russian
opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on February 4 that
the number of North Koreans who came to Russia to study in 2024 was the
highest number since 2019.[2] Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported
in November 2024 that data from the Federal Security Service (FSB)
Border Service showed that a record number of North Koreans entered
Russia for education between July and September 2024 — notably in the
lead up to the reported start of North Korea's deployment of troops to
Russia in early October 2024.[3]
Russia has been suffering
from significant labor shortages in both its civilian and defense
industrial sectors since the start of its full-scale invasion of
Ukraine.[4] The arrival of several thousands of North Koreans to work in
civilian sectors is marginal and will not significantly alleviate
Russia's labor shortages. Russia reportedly has an estimated labor
shortage of 1.5 million workers as of December 2024, for example.[5]
North Korea's provisions of materiel and troops to Russia have
significantly increased over the course of 2024, however, and the
several thousands of North Korean workers that arrived in Russia
recently may be the beginning of larger influxes in the future that
could more significantly help Russia's labor shortage issues. (Russian
forces‘ initial use of small numbers of North Korean artillery and
mortar shells grew rapidly, with 60 percent of Russian forces‘ artillery
ammunition fired now being sourced from North Korea as of December
2024.[6]) Russian enterprises are also likely not paying North Korean
workers the same salaries as Russian citizens, so a significant influx
of North Korean workers into the Russian work force in the future could
also financially benefit Russian enterprises that are having to offer
high salaries to Russian citizens in order to compete against Russian
military and defense industrial enterprises for employees. Significant
increases in the number of North Koreans working in Russia's civilian
sectors in the future could also free up Russian civilian sector
employees to work in the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) or fight
in Ukraine.
The arrival of North Korean workers to
Russia demonstrates how Russia, a permanent member of the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC), is violating UNSC Resolution 2397. Russia
voted for Resolution 2397 in 2017 in response to North Korea's
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests.[7] The resolution
explicitly prohibits North Korea from sending its citizens abroad for
work and mandated that all UN member states expel all North Koreans
"earning income" abroad by December 2019. Russia is likely using the
guise of student visas to hide Russia's violation of the resolution.
North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un continues to reiterate his support for Russia and its war effort in Ukraine. Kim
gave a speech at the North Korean Ministry of National Defense on
February 9 that heavily focused on the threats the US and the West
allegedly pose to North Korean security.[8] Kim criticized the US for
protracting the war in Ukraine and claimed that he is "seriously
concerned" about the West's alleged desire to inflict a strategic defeat
on Russia. Kim notably claimed that the North Korean military and
people will "invariably support and encourage" Russia's "just cause" to
defend its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity "in the
spirit of" the June 2024 Russian-North Korean comprehensive strategic
partnership agreement.
German authorities
reportedly failed to down suspected Russian reconnaissance drones flying
near a German military facility in January 2025 where Ukrainian forces
have undergone training. German outlet Süddeutsche Zeitung
reported on February 8, citing a classified internal German report,
that the German Ministry of Defense (MoD) is investigating possible
espionage connected to six drone sightings near the Schwesing Airbase,
where Ukrainian forces have trained to operate Patriot air defense
systems, from January 9 to 29, 2025.[9] Süddeutsche Zeitung reported
that German forces attempted to jam or down the drones, including with
HP-47 jammers, RADIS drone detection systems, and Wingman counter-drone
systems, but that German forces failed to down the drones or locate the
operators in all six instances. Süddeutsche Zeitung reported
that German authorities described the drones as "specialized objects"
with modifications and are likely not commercially available. Süddeutsche Zeitung noted
that authorities suspect that the operators launched the drones from
ships in the North or Baltic seas and that the operators could be
connected to Russia. A Bundeswehr spokesperson reportedly told Süddeutsche Zeitung that the German military has observed an increase in drones flying over German military facilities in an unspecified timeframe.
Russia
appears to be leveraging the technological innovations it is developing
in its war in Ukraine directly against NATO states. Russia has
been developing and improving its drone capabilities, including drone
resistance to electronic warfare (EW) and Russia's own EW capabilities,
in its ongoing war against Ukraine. NATO and its member states have
increasingly warned of Russian sabotage and hybrid operations against
NATO members throughout 2024.[10] Reports that a NATO member state is
struggling to combat likely Russian reconnaissance drones demonstrate
the need for NATO states to further develop their defensive capabilities
as Russia continues to use its experience on the battlefield in Ukraine
to innovate new technologies.
Key Takeaways:
- Russia
continues to leverage its partnerships with US adversaries, including
North Korea, to offset the resource shortages constraining Russia's
economy and war effort.
- The arrival of North
Korean workers to Russia demonstrates how Russia, a permanent member of
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), is violating UNSC Resolution
2397.
- North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un continues to reiterate his support for Russia and its war effort in Ukraine.
- German
authorities reportedly failed to down suspected Russian reconnaissance
drones flying near a German military facility in January 2025 where
Ukrainian forces have undergone training.
- Russia
appears to be leveraging the technological innovations it is developing
in its war in Ukraine directly against NATO states.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Vovchansk.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
- Russia
continues efforts to recruit Russians and citizens of other
Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) countries to sign military
service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces recently advanced southeast of Sudzha amid continued fighting in Kursk Oblast on February 9. Russian
sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted mechanized attacks
southeast of Sudzha near Russkaya Konopelka and Fanaseyevka.[11] Russian
sources also claimed that Russian forces counterattacked northwest of
Sudzha near Sverdlikovo and Nikolskyi, north of Sudzha near Malaya
Loknya, and southeast of Sudzha near Cherkasskaya Konopelka.[12]
Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 9
indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along the 38K-028
Sudzha-Oboyan highway southwest of Russkaya Konopelka.[13]
Russian-claimed
advances: Russian milbloggers continued to make conflicting claims
about the situation in Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Fanaseyevka (both
southeast of Sudzha). Some milbloggers claimed that Russian forces
partially or completely pushed Ukrainian forces from Cherkasskaya
Konopelka and Fanaseyevka, while others claimed that Russian forces
failed to advance during attacks in the area.[14] Another milblogger
claimed that Ukrainian forces are no longer in windbreaks near Ulanok
(southeast of Sudzha).[15]
Order of Battle: Elements of
the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz are reportedly operating near Cherkasskaya
Konopelka and Ulanok, and elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV)
Brigade are reportedly operating southeast of Sudzha.[16] Drone
operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment, "Rubikon" Center for
Advanced Unmanned Technologies, and 155th Naval Infantry Brigade
(Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast; and elements
of the 83rd VDV Brigade, 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined
Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), "Anvar Spetsnaz"
detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer
detachment), and 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle
Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are
reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[17]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on February 9. Russian
forces attacked near Vovchansk (north of Kharkiv City) on February 8
and 9.[18] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian sabotage and
reconnaissance groups are active on the outskirts of Lyptsi (north of
Kharkiv City).[19]
Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 8
indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Vovchansk
Aggregate Plant in central Vovchansk.[20]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 9 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on February 8 and 9.[21]
Russian-claimed
advances: Russian milbloggers claimed on February 9 that Russian forces
advanced west of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[22] ISW has not observed
confirmation of this claim, however.
Order of Battle: Elements of
"Kontora" detachment of the 375th Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (47th
Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District
[MMD]) and drone operators of the "Tilt" detachment are reportedly
operating in the Kupyansk direction.[23]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 9 but did not advance. Russian
forces attacked northeast of Borova near Bohuslavka, Zahyrzove, and
Zeleny Hai and southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka on February 8 and
9.[24]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on February 9 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian
forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Lyman near
Yampolivka, Ivanivka, and Novolyubivka and towards Nove and east of
Lyman near Torske on February 8 and 9.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed
that Russian forces are conducting reconnaissance-in-force missions near
Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman) in order to identify weak points in
Ukrainian defenses.[26] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces
are trying to counterattack northwest of Ivanivka.[27]
Russian-claimed
advances: Russian milbloggers claimed on February 9 that Russian forces
advanced 300 meters near Novolyubivka, 2.5 kilometers meters south of
Ivanivka, west of Yampolivka, and one kilometer within Yampolivka.[28]
ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however.
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian
General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating
first-person view (FPV) drones with fiber optic cables near Zarichne
(east of Lyman).[29]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian
forces continued offensive operations northeast of Siversk near
Bilohorivka on February 8 and 9 but did not advance.[30] Ukraine's
Khortytsia Group of Forces stated that Russian forces unsuccessfully
tried to bypass Ukrainian positions near Bilohorivka using
motorcycles.[31]
Russian forces continued
offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on February 9 but did
not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted
offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near
Bila Hora on February 8 and 9.[32] Ukrainian military officials
reported on February 9 that Ukrainian forces destroyed and damaged two
tanks, two armored personnel carriers, two infantry fighting vehicles,
and an armored tractor in the Kramatorsk (Chasiv Yar) direction.[33]
Russian-claimed
advances: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on February 9
that Russian forces seized Orikhovo-Vasylivka (northeast of Chasiv
Yar).[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have not
seized Orikhovo-Vasylivka, however, and that neither Ukrainian nor
Russian forces maintain a presence in the settlement.[35] Another
Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced north and
south of Orikhovo-Vasylivka.[36] ISW has not observed confirmation of
any of these Russian claims, however.
Order of Battle:
Elements of the Russian 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (98th
Airborne [VDV] Division) and the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd
Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army
Corps [LNR AC]) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[37]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 9. Russian
forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself, east of
Toretsk near Krymske, and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on February
8 and 9.[38]
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 8 indicates
that Russian forces advanced along Klymenka Street in northern
Leonidivka (west of Toretsk).[39]
Ukraine's Khortytsia
Group of Forces stated that Russian forces are using civilian passenger
cars during assaults in the Toretsk direction due to a shortage of
armored vehicles.[40]
Order of Battle: Elements of the
Russian 1st "Slovaynsk" Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st
Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD])
are reportedly operating within Toretsk.[41]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 9.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself;
east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Promin, Novotoretske, Vodyane
Druhe, Novooleksandrivka, Kalynove, and Zelene Pole; southeast of
Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko; and southwest
of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Preobrazhenka, Pishchane, Nadiivka,
Novoserhiivka, Sribne, Uspenivka, Zaporizhzhia, Novoandriivka, and
Udachne on February 8 and 9.[42] The Khortytsia Group of Forces also
reported that Russian forces attempted a mechanized assault of an
unspecified echelon south of Yasenove (southwest of Pokrovsk) and that
Ukrainian mines damaged two tanks and two infantry fighting
vehicles.[43] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces
counterattacked near Kotlyne and Zvirove (south of Pokrovsk) and towards
Nadiivka, Sribne, and Pishchane.[44] Another Russian milblogger claimed
that the first Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups entered the
outskirts of Pokrovsk.[45]
Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 9
indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Mine No. 3 in
southeastern Pishchane.[46]
Assessed Russian advances:
Geolocated footage published on February 9 indicates that Russian forces
recently advanced west of Zvirove.[47] The Ukrainian General Staff
published a map on February 9 indicating that Russian forces recently
advanced north of Novoyelyzavetivka (southwest of Pokrovsk) and within
southeastern Malynivka (east of Pokrovsk).[48]
Russian-claimed
advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized
Udachne and advanced into eastern Zaporizhzhia, northeast of Zvirove,
and one kilometer towards Sribne.[49] ISW has not observed confirmation
of these claims, however.
Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of
Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov reported on February 9 that
Russian forces continue efforts to bypass Pokrovsk from the west and are
constantly bringing reinforcements to the area.[50] Trehubov noted that
Russian forces continue attacking in small assault groups. A Russian
milblogger claimed that Ukrainian mines are preventing Russian forces
from advancing near Kotlyne.[51]
Order of Battle: Elements
of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are
reportedly operating near Novoukrainka (southwest of Pokrovsk), and
reconnaissance elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central
Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Zaporizhzhia.[52]
Elements of the 6th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division) are reportedly
operating in the Russian near rear near Selydove (southeast of
Pokrovsk).[53]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on February 9 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian
forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Kurakhove near
Shevchenko and Andriivka; west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil and
Dachne; and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on February 8 and 9.[54] A
Russian milblogger claimed that neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces
control Zelenivka (southwest of Kurakhove).[55]
Russian-claimed
advances: Russian milbloggers claimed on February 9 that Russian forces
advanced towards Ulakly (west of Kurakhove) and along Haharina Street
in central Andriivka.[56] ISW has not observed confirmation of these
claims, however.
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian
102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments (150th Motorized Rifle
Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly
operating near Dachne – contradicting limited Russian claims from
February 8 that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the
102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments from the Kurakhove direction
to the Toretsk direction.[57] Elements of the Russian 381st Artillery
Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly
operating near Kurakhove.[58] Elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle
Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in Andriivka.[59]
Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 9. Russian
forces conducted offensive operations southwest of Velyka Novosilka
near Novopil and north of Velyka Novosilka near Novyi Komar on February 8
and 9.[60]
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage
published on February 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced
northeast of Novyi Komar (north of Velyka Novosilka).[61]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 9, but Russian forces did not advance.[62] A
Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted several
unsuccessful counterattacks involving two tanks and three infantry
fighting vehicles in the Orikhiv direction (north of Robotyne).[63]
The
spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Zaporizhia
direction reported on February 9 that Russian attacks have decreased in
the area and that Russian forces are trying to create new assault groups
for further attacks but that the accumulation of Russian forces is not
significant enough to conduct assault operations for a long period.[64]
The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are using first-person view
(FPV) drones with fiber optic cables.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported activity in the Kherson direction on February 9.
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian BARS-Sarmat Detachment (Russian
Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Dnipro
direction.[65]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian
forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night
of February 8 and 9. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian
forces launched 151 Shahed and decoy drones from Kursk, Oryol, and
Bryansk oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk,
Krasnodar Krai.[66] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian
forces downed 70 drones over Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Cherkasy,
Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Rivne, Volyn, Mykolaiv,
Kherson, and Odesa oblasts and that 74 decoy drones were ”lost,” likely
due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian
official sources reported that Russian drone strikes hit Kyiv, Sumy,
Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Zhytomyr, and Volyn oblasts.[67]
Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on February 9 that Russian forces
launched over 10 missiles, almost 750 strike drones, and over 1,260
glide bombs against Ukraine in the past week (between February 2 and
9).[68]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russia
continues efforts to recruit Russians and citizens of other
Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) countries to sign military
service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). A Russian
milblogger amplified a recruitment advertisement for prospective drone
operators to sign MoD contracts in Yaroslavl City, advertising one-year
contracts with monthly salaries of 240,000 rubles (about $2,476) and a
one-time payment of 1,345,000 rubles (about $13,877).[69] The
advertisement states that people from anywhere within Russia or other
CIS states can sign up and receive the benefits.
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Russian
milbloggers published footage on February 9 showing Russian soldiers
installing anti-drone nets over roads, claiming that Russian forces have
covered a two-kilometer stretch of road between Bakhmut and Chasiv Yar,
Donetsk Oblast with these nets to shield against Ukrainian drone
strikes.[70]
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
Russian
occupation authorities continue efforts to eradicate Ukrainian ethnic
and national identity in occupied Ukraine and to militarize Ukrainian
children. Ukrainian news outlet ArmyInform reported on February
9, citing the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Commissioner's
Office, that Russian occupation authorities coerced 29,000 Ukrainian
children in occupied Crimea to join Russian youth military-patriotic
organization Yunarmiya in 2021 and that roughly 7,500 Ukrainian children
in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts joined regional Yunarmiya
branches in the same time period.[71] ArmyInform noted that
Russian authorities also send children from occupied Ukraine to train at
the Rosgvardia Military Institute in Perm and the Nakhimov Naval School
in occupied Mariupol and that Russian authorities plan to double the
number of students at the Nakhimov Naval School from 240 in 2024 to 560
in 2025. ArmyInform reported that schools in occupied Ukraine
hold military-patriotic lessons for schoolchildren every week and have
Ukrainian children write letters of support to Russian soldiers.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://en.yna dot co.kr/view/AEN20250209000700315?section=nk/nk
[2]
https://storage dot
googleapis.com/istories/news/2025/02/04/v-2024-godu-bolee-7-tisyach-severokoreitsev-vekhali-v-rossiyu-s-tselyu-uchebi-na-fone-soobshchenii-ob-uchastii-soldat-iz-kndr-v-voine-s-ukrainoi/index.html
; https://t.me/istories_media/8882
[3] https://zona dot media/news/2024/11/08/koreya; https://en dot yna.co.kr/view/AEN20241018006856315?section=nk/nk
[4]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24-2023;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2024;
https://meduza dot io/en/feature/2024/12/11/a-perfect-storm
[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2024
[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23-2024
[7] https://en.yna.co dot kr/view/AEN20250209000700315?section=nk/nk
[8]
https://kcnawatch dot
org/newstream/1739089983-55802660/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-pays-congratulatory-visit-to-ministry-of-national-defence-on-day-of-kpa-founding/;
http://rodong.rep dot kp/en/index.php?MTVAMjAyNS0wMi0wOS1IMDEzQA==
[9]
https://archive.ph/TzHaC; https://www.sueddeutsche dot
de/politik/bundeswehr-alarmiert-drohnen-sichtungen-patriot-standort-schwesing-li.3198286?reduced=true;
https://www.politico.eu/article/german-military-suspects-russia-espionage-spy-defense-war-drone-key-airbase/
[10]
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2024;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2024;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar072524; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071124
[11] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23616; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31989; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85946;
[12] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154069; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85946; https://t.me/yurasumy/21022;
[13] https://x.com/giK1893/status/1888577987970269403; https://t.me/zogrussia1/911
[14]
https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23605;
https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23616; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31983;
https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85946; https://t.me/yurasumy/21022
[15] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23616
[16] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5480; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23616
[17]
https://t.me/mod_russia/48712; https://t.me/dva_majors/64231;
https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23614; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85925;
https://t.me/voin_dv/13283; https://t.me/basurin_e/16970;
https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85940
[18]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07DuJ2NuyMrsuYL9hzGm69qBw8Lpp297vUMnHW1byThs6tMpN3vmwuuWdvgUaLWX4l
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZsYzpkRCyxw4LmWV4g2qwvQ3wpP1Ze9HH9mDwCuukFeum4jZaAMBSCiXaTZbML3nl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mppRU36W2SmV6dnjV5vmmZUpEDboHEHAs3d7chYaYrQu7vWyUTXdgFYpSs4eVreNl
; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5098 ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/4231
[19] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12436
[20] https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1888457919169237245; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/21551
[21]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07DuJ2NuyMrsuYL9hzGm69qBw8Lpp297vUMnHW1byThs6tMpN3vmwuuWdvgUaLWX4l
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZsYzpkRCyxw4LmWV4g2qwvQ3wpP1Ze9HH9mDwCuukFeum4jZaAMBSCiXaTZbML3nl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mppRU36W2SmV6dnjV5vmmZUpEDboHEHAs3d7chYaYrQu7vWyUTXdgFYpSs4eVreNl
; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5098
[22] https://t.me/yurasumy/21008 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154047 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61989
[23] https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/49214 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/16966
[24]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07DuJ2NuyMrsuYL9hzGm69qBw8Lpp297vUMnHW1byThs6tMpN3vmwuuWdvgUaLWX4l
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZsYzpkRCyxw4LmWV4g2qwvQ3wpP1Ze9HH9mDwCuukFeum4jZaAMBSCiXaTZbML3nl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mppRU36W2SmV6dnjV5vmmZUpEDboHEHAs3d7chYaYrQu7vWyUTXdgFYpSs4eVreN
[25]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07DuJ2NuyMrsuYL9hzGm69qBw8Lpp297vUMnHW1byThs6tMpN3vmwuuWdvgUaLWX4l
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZsYzpkRCyxw4LmWV4g2qwvQ3wpP1Ze9HH9mDwCuukFeum4jZaAMBSCiXaTZbML3nl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mppRU36W2SmV6dnjV5vmmZUpEDboHEHAs3d7chYaYrQu7vWyUTXdgFYpSs4eVreNl;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5098;
https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23619; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85947
[26] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23619
[27] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23619
[28] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23619; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23622; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154047
[29] https://t.me/voin_dv/13288
[30]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZsYzpkRCyxw4LmWV4g2qwvQ3wpP1Ze9HH9mDwCuukFeum4jZaAMBSCiXaTZbML3nl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mppRU36W2SmV6dnjV5vmmZUpEDboHEHAs3d7chYaYrQu7vWyUTXdgFYpSs4eVreNl
[31] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5098
[32]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07DuJ2NuyMrsuYL9hzGm69qBw8Lpp297vUMnHW1byThs6tMpN3vmwuuWdvgUaLWX4l
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZsYzpkRCyxw4LmWV4g2qwvQ3wpP1Ze9HH9mDwCuukFeum4jZaAMBSCiXaTZbML3nl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mppRU36W2SmV6dnjV5vmmZUpEDboHEHAs3d7chYaYrQu7vWyUTXdgFYpSs4eVreNl
; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5098
[33]
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5100; https://dpsu.gov dot
ua/ua/news/45984-video-na-kramatorskomu-napryamku-prikordonniki-pidbili-7-odinic-bronetehniki-voroga;
https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2025/02/09/chergovyj-nevdalyj-shturm-rosiyan-prykordonnyky-nakryshyly-bronetehniky/;
[34] https://t.me/mod_russia/48707 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/48708
[35] https://t.me/yurasumy/21019
[36] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154047
[37] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23614; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154016
[38]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07DuJ2NuyMrsuYL9hzGm69qBw8Lpp297vUMnHW1byThs6tMpN3vmwuuWdvgUaLWX4l;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZsYzpkRCyxw4LmWV4g2qwvQ3wpP1Ze9HH9mDwCuukFeum4jZaAMBSCiXaTZbML3nl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mppRU36W2SmV6dnjV5vmmZUpEDboHEHAs3d7chYaYrQu7vWyUTXdgFYpSs4eVreNl;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5098
[39] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/25478; https://t.me/azov_media/6543
[40] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5101
[41] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85930
[42]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07DuJ2NuyMrsuYL9hzGm69qBw8Lpp297vUMnHW1byThs6tMpN3vmwuuWdvgUaLWX4l;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZsYzpkRCyxw4LmWV4g2qwvQ3wpP1Ze9HH9mDwCuukFeum4jZaAMBSCiXaTZbML3nl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mppRU36W2SmV6dnjV5vmmZUpEDboHEHAs3d7chYaYrQu7vWyUTXdgFYpSs4eVreNl;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5098 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62000;
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61985; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31966;
https://t.me/motopatriot78/31969; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85926;
https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85951 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62000;
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62002
[43] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5098
[44]
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61988; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61985;
https://t.me/rybar/67870 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21012;
https://t.me/yurasumy/21031; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61988
[45] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85955
[46] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1888319277305917824; https://t.me/sudoplatov_official/4121
[47] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8349; https://t.me/nova_afu/169
[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZsYzpkRCyxw4LmWV4g2qwvQ3wpP1Ze9HH9mDwCuukFeum4jZaAMBSCiXaTZbML3nl
[49]
https://t.me/rybar/67870 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61985;
https://t.me/motopatriot78/31981; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85951;
https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85955;
[50] https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2025/02/09/spovilnena-dynamika-ta-zhodnogo-prosuvannya-u-zsu-rozpovily-pro-manevry-voroga-bilya-pokrovska/
[51] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31981
[52] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85951; https://t.me/astrapress/74088;
[53] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/17268
[54]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07DuJ2NuyMrsuYL9hzGm69qBw8Lpp297vUMnHW1byThs6tMpN3vmwuuWdvgUaLWX4l;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZsYzpkRCyxw4LmWV4g2qwvQ3wpP1Ze9HH9mDwCuukFeum4jZaAMBSCiXaTZbML3nl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mppRU36W2SmV6dnjV5vmmZUpEDboHEHAs3d7chYaYrQu7vWyUTXdgFYpSs4eVreNl;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5098; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61992;
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154047
[55] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61992
[56] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61992; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154047
[57]
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61992;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2025
[58] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13363
[59] https://t.me/yurasumy/21010
[60]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZsYzpkRCyxw4LmWV4g2qwvQ3wpP1Ze9HH9mDwCuukFeum4jZaAMBSCiXaTZbML3nl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mppRU36W2SmV6dnjV5vmmZUpEDboHEHAs3d7chYaYrQu7vWyUTXdgFYpSs4eVreNl;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5098
[61] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/25479; https://t.me/ombr_110/465
[62] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12049
[63] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23625
[64]
https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2025/02/09/u-okupantiv-nemaye-velykogo-kulaka-na-zaporizkomu-napryamku-znyzylas-kilkist-shturmiv/
[65] https://t.me/rogozin_do/6712
[66] https://t.me/kpszsu/28367
[67]
https://suspilne dot
media/dnipro/944271-armia-rf-vdarila-dronom-po-sinelnikivskomu-rajonu-dnipropetrovsini-so-vidbuvaetsa-na-misci-podii/;
https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/19363; https://t.me/kpszsu/28367
[68]
https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13273; https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2025/02/09/armiya-rf-posylyla-povitryanyj-teror-ponad-2000-udariv-po-ukrayini-za-tyzhden/
[69] https://t.me/sashakots/51800
[70] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61998; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85964
[71]
https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2025/02/09/kadetski-klasy-orlyata-rosiyi-i-liga-z-peregoniv-droniv-dity-v-okupacziyi-stayut-potenczijnym-vijskovym-rezervom-armiyi-rf/
