UA-69458566-1

Thursday, December 1, 2022

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 1

 Riley Bailey, Madison Williams, Yekaterina Klepanchuk, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 1, 9:00 pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continued to set informational conditions to resist Russian pressure to enter the war against Ukraine by claiming that NATO is preparing to attack Belarus. Lukashenko blamed Ukraine and NATO for a growing number of provocations near the Belarus-Ukrainian border and stated that Ukraine is trying to drag NATO forces into the war.[1] Lukashenko stated that Belarusian officials managed to deter a potential adversary from using military force against Belarus and that NATO is building up forces and intensifying combat training in neighboring countries.[2] The Belarusian Minister of Defense Viktor Khrenin stated that there is no direct preparation for war and that Belarus will only defend its territory.[3] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) representative Vadym Skibitsky reported that there are no signs of the formation of a strike group on Belarusian territory.[4] Lukashenko and Khrenin likely made the comments to bolster what ISW has previously assessed as an ongoing information operation aimed at fixing Ukrainian forces on the border with Belarus in response to the threat of Belarus entering the war.[5] Lukashenko and Khrenin also likely focused the information operation on supposed NATO aggression and provocative activities along the Belarusian border to suggest that the Belarusian military needs to remain in Belarus to defend against potential NATO aggression, and thus set informational conditions for resisting Russian pressure to enter the war in Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Belarusian entry into the Russian war on Ukraine is extremely unlikely.

Key Takeaways

  • Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continued to set informational conditions to resist Russian pressure to enter the war against Ukraine.
  • Russian forces continued efforts to defend against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
  • Russian forces continued to make incremental gains around Bakhmut and to conduct offensive operations in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area.
  • Russian forces continued to conduct defensive measures and move personnel on the east bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.
  • Russian military movements in Zaporizhia Oblast may suggest that Russian forces cannot defend critical areas amidst increasing Ukrainian strikes.
  • Russian forces are holding reserves in Crimea to support defensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast and on the east bank of the Dnipro River.
  • The Kremlin’s financial strain continues to feed domestic unrest.
  • Evidence persists regarding the continuation of partial mobilization in the face of low morale and high desertion rates amongst Russian troops.
  • Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin continued attempts to bolster the Wagner Group’s reputation.
  • Russian occupation officials continued efforts to integrate occupied territories into the Russian financial and legal spheres.
  • Russian forces continued to exploit Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure in support of Russia’s war effort in Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population, specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine
  • Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and one supporting effort);
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Russian forces continued efforts to defend against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations and regain lost positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line on December 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued to repel Russian ground assaults near Novoselivske (14km northwest of Svatove) and Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove).[6] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces prevented a Ukrainian advance in the direction of Kuzemivka (13km northwest of Svatove).[7] Ukrainian General Staff Deputy Chief Oleksiy Hromov reported that Ukrainian forces anticipate that Russian forces will attempt to restart offensive operations in the Lyman direction to regain the initiative.[8] Hromov added that the Russians are building defensive lines in the Svatove and Lyman directions to prevent Ukrainian advances.[9] Former Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) ambassador to Russia, Rodion Miroshnik, claimed that Ukrainian forces are transferring elite Ukrainian brigades to the Lyman and Kupyansk directions to prevent Russian advances.[10] ISW offers no assessment of this claim.[11]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Kreminna on December 1. The Russian BARS-13 combat reserve Telegram channel claimed that Ukrainian forces have increased ground assaults around the Kreminna area.[12] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack around Kreminna in the direction of Chervonopopivka (6km northwest of Kreminna).[13] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[14] One Russian source reported that Ukrainian forces made significant advances southwest of Chervonopopivka and expressed concern over the possibility that Ukrainian forces may reinforce their lines in the area in order to push through Russian defenses there.[15] Another Russian source claimed that a Russian drone had detected Ukrainian forces in Zhytlivka on the R66 highway to Kreminna.[16] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces are fighting in the western part of Bilohorivka, but did not provide evidence for this claim.[17] Hromov added that Ukrainian forces also repelled Russian assaults on Dibrova, approximately 5km southwest of Kreminna.[18] Russian and Ukrainian forces continued artillery fire in this area.[19]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces likely continued to make marginal advances in the Bakhmut area amidst ongoing offensive operations on December 1. Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Bakhmut; within 22km northeast of Bakhmut near Yakovlivka, Soledar, Bakhmutske, and Bilohorivka; and within 14km southwest of Bakhmut near Opytne, Mayorsk, and Kurdyumivka.[20] Social media sources and a Russian milblogger posted photos on December 1 showing Russian forces south of Bakhmut in Kurdyumivka and Ozarianivka.[21] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces completely control Andriivka (within 10km south of Bakhmut).[22] Geolocated footage posted on December 1 shows Ukrainian forces reportedly withdrawing from positions on the western side of the highway that runs through Opytne (within 4km south of Bakhmut).[23] A Russian milblogger published footage claiming to show Russian forces conducting offensive operations west of Kurdyumvka and claimed that Russian forces now control most of the Horlivka-Bakhmut highway.[24] Another Russian source claimed that Russian forces could now interdict all roads in the Bakhmut direction.[25] CNN published a video report on December 1 in which Ukrainian military commanders in the Bakhmut area tell a correspondent that their forces are outnumbered and facing serious supply issues.[26] The Ukrainian military commanders also told the CNN correspondent that Russian forces are committing significant forces to assaults in the Bakhmut area and are suffering heavy casualties.[27] ISW has previously assessed that the Russian effort to take Bakhmut is a high-cost effort concentrated on a city of limited operational significance.[28]

Russian forces continued to conduct offensive operations in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area on December 1. Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults within 37km southwest of Avdiivka near Krasnohorivka, Vodyane, Pervomaiske, Marinka, Nevelske, and Novomykhailivka, and within 6km northeast of Avdiivka near Kamianka.[29] The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia claimed that the DNR “Sparta” and “Somalia” Battalions repelled a Ukrainian counterattack near Vodyane.[30] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces also repelled Ukrainian counterattacks near Novomykhailivka.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian and Russian forces continued to fight in the western part of Marinka.[32]

Russian forces continued to conduct defensive operations in western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts on December 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces maintain defensive lines on this front.[33] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian counterattack near Volodymyrivka, Donetsk Oblast (within 43km southwest of Donetsk City).[34] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued routine indirect fire along the line of contact in Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.[35]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued to conduct defensive measures, build fortifications, and move personnel on the east bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast on December 1. Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces on the east bank are continuing to hold defensive lines and construct fortifications.[36] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces decreased the number of personnel and equipment in Oleshky and redistributed personnel to positions along the highway between Oleshky and Hola Prystan (further away from the Dnipro River).[37] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command spokesperson Natalia Humenyuk stated that Russian forces are withdrawing equipment, weapons, and units from unspecified populated areas on the left bank of the Dnipro River.[38] Ukrainian General Staff Chief Deputy Brigadier General Oleksiy Hromov stated that the Ukrainian command expects Russian forces to maintain their positions on the east bank and conduct local offensive operations to improve those positions, however.[39] Social media sources published footage on December 1 purporting to show Russian positions on the Nova Kakhovka dam lock.[40] The contradictory reporting on Russian military positions on the east bank in relation to the Dnipro River suggests that Russian forces are currently repositioning their forces in Kherson Oblast, but it is unclear exactly how.

Russian military movements in Zaporizhia Oblast may suggest that Russian forces cannot defend critical areas amidst increasing Ukrainian strikes on Russian force concentrations and logistics. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 1 that Russian forces withdrew or are currently withdrawing personnel from Polohy, Myhailivka, and Inzhenerne in Zaporizhia Oblast.[41] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian occupation officials in Burchak are conducting a census in preparation for future evacuation measures.[42] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces in the previous days struck Russian force concentrations in Myrne, Tokmak, Inzhenerne, Polohy, Yasne, and Kinsky Rozdory in Zaporizhia Oblast.[43] Russian forces may be withdrawing personnel from positions closer to the frontline in Zaporizhia Oblast to reduce the impact of increasing Ukrainian strikes on Russian manpower and equipment concentrations. The potential withdrawal from Polohy is particularly notable as the settlement lies at a critical road junction, and Russian forces would likely have a harder time defending Tokmak from potential Ukrainian operations without control of that junction. The withdrawal from a critical position may suggest that Russian forces cannot defend the entire frontline in Zaporizhia Oblast and are prioritizing where to concentrate forces.  It is just as likely that Russian forces are reorienting their grouping in Zaporizhia Oblast and may move different personnel back into these settlements, however.

Russian forces are holding reserves in Crimea to support defensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast and on the east bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast. Hromov stated that Russian forces are concentrating reserves in northern Crimea to reinforce troops on the east bank in Kherson Oblast and in the direction of Orikhiv in Zaporizhia Oblast.[44] Hromov stated that Dzhankoy and surrounding settlements have become the largest Russian military base in Crimea due to the amount of Russian military personnel and equipment transfers and deployments.[45] Russian forces may be holding reserves to support these sections of the front in Ukraine in the expectation that Ukrainian forces may conduct offensive operations in these areas soon.

Ukrainian officials continued to acknowledge that Ukrainian forces are conducting operations on the Kinburn Spit on December 1. Humenyuk stated that Ukrainian forces are continuing to conduct operations on the Kinburn Spit and that Ukrainian forces have not yet liberated the area.[46] ISW has previously assessed that Ukrainian forces would be better able to conduct potential operations on the left bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast from the Kinburn Spit.[47]

Russian forces continued routine missile and artillery strikes west of Hulyaipole, in western Kherson Oblast, and in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on December 1.[48] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces struck Nikopol, Marhanets, and Kherson City.[49]

Note: ISW will report on activities in Kherson Oblast as part of the Southern Axis in this and subsequent updates. Ukraine’s counteroffensive in right-bank Kherson Oblast has accomplished its stated objectives, so ISW will not present a Southern Ukraine counteroffensive section until Ukrainian forces resume counteroffensives in southern Ukraine.

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin’s financial strain continues to feed domestic unrest. A Russian source shared footage that shows Oleg Mikhailov, a deputy from the Russian Communist Party, proposing to increase the payments to veterans at a government meeting in Komi Republic, to a hostile audience of his United Russia party peers.[50] This event exemplifies the growing rift between Russian nationalist parties under increasing economic strain. The Financial Times also reported on November 29 on the growing disenchantment of Russian businesses, reporting that unnamed owners and executives of large Russian companies stated that they believe mobilization would have been handled better if entrusted to businesses rather than the government.[51] Independent Russian media outlet ASTRA reported that more than 100 mobilized personnel from Moscow Oblast did not receive promised payments.[52] ASTRA reported that a unit stationed in Belarus related that of its 408 members, 108 did not receive any payments in October and 200 did not receive full payments.[53]

Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin continued attempts to bolster the Wagner Group’s reputation. Western media reported on November 29 that the United States is considering designating Wagner Group as a foreign terrorist organization.[54] Prigozhin responded by claiming that Wagner does not fit the criteria of a terrorist organization, while the United States clearly does.[55] Prigozhin proceeded to tout Wagner’s successes by falsely claiming that the Wagner Group defeated the Islamic State in Syria, stopped the (nonexistent) “genocide” of Russians in the Donetsk People’s Republic, prevented Western-funded terrorists from staging coups in Africa, and, notably, won a trial against the United States in the District of Columbia concerning Russian interference in the 2016 elections.[56] A Wagner-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that the Wagner Group’s training facility in the Russian Federation is designed to provide an accelerated three-week training course for new members.[57] Russian sources shared video footage purportedly showing Wagner Group recruits training in Molkin, Krasnodar Krai, and in Belgorod and Kursk Oblasts, under the tutelage of experienced Wagner Group fighters.[58]

Russian sources provided more evidence for the continuation of partial mobilization. One Russian milblogger reported that Orenburg Oblast officials allocated one million rubles for a mobilization hotline from December 15, 2022, to January 31, 2023.[59] A Russian media source reported that a soldier who had a contract with the Russian MoD that expired in October was told she is required to work “until the end of mobilization.”[60] Another Russian media source reported that the Russian MoD stated that it did not support a State Duma bill on December 1 that would defer any candidates and doctors of science who work in universities or research institutions.[61] Russian media also reported that workers at the Chelyabinsk sugar factory received mobilization summonses on November 28 including non-Russian nationals.[62]

The Russian military continues to contend with low morale and high rates of desertion and refusals to fight among its forces. The Ukrainian General Staff Deputy Chief Oleksiy Hromov reported that Russian forces have had to reinforce multiple regiments in Kherson Oblast with more mobilized personnel due to the high number of deserters and mobilized soldiers who refuse to fight.[63] Hromov also added that Russian security forces have reported an increased number of deserters in Luhansk Oblast – many of whom are now attempting to cross the border back into Russia and are being detained by security services in the dozens.[64] Independent Russian media outlet ASTRA reported that Russian forces have held around 90 of the mobilized personnel who refused to fight in Luhansk Oblast at Beryozka children's camp in the village of Makarove, Luhansk for over a month.[65] A Russian local media page in Magnitogorsk reported on November 29 that family members of Magnitogorsk mobilized personnel who refused to fight are appealing to the Prosecutor’s office in an attempt to keep their family members from returning to the front.[66] The media page stated that the military leadership abandoned Magnitogorsk mobilized personnel on the front, causing them to retreat from their positions but not desert them.[67] Hromov reported that Russian forces are continuing to inflict friendly fire upon themselves and stated that a Russian artillery unit shelled a position of the 1st Army Corps on the southwestern outskirts of Tsukura, Kherson Oblast, on November 24.[68]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials continued efforts to integrate occupied territories into the Russian financial and legal spheres. Zaporizhia Oblast Occupation Deputy Vladimir Rogov stated that occupation officials in Zaporizhia Oblast plan to pull Ukrainian hryvnias from circulation on January 1, 2023.[69] Rogov declared that all enterprises in Zaporizhia Oblast have until the end of 2022 to exchange their hryvnias for rubles.[70] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin stated that only Russian federal legislation can regulate mobilization protocols including restriction of movement within the occupied Donetsk Oblast.[71] Kherson Oblast Occupation Head Vladimir Saldo claimed that occupation authorities, by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s order, are working to simplify the process for obtaining housing certificates for legal residents of occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts who had sought refuge in Kherson City prior to Russian withdrawal from the city.[72]

Russian occupation authorities are continuing to face administrative problems. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that half of the residential buildings in the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts are without heat, partly due to a lack of personnel and water supplies.[73] The Ukrainian Resistance Center added that the mass mobilization of men in occupied areas of Donbas ignited personnel shortages.[74] Zaporizhia Oblast Occupation Head Yevheny Balitsky reported that occupation officials in the Zaporizhia Oblast are giving residents free coal, presumably in an effort to resolve the heating issue.[75]

Russian forces are reportedly continuing to exploit Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure to support their war efforts throughout Ukraine. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that occupation officials are demanding money from Crimean teachers to sponsor the Russian war effort.[76] The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian authorities reported that Russian forces continue to use civilian facilities and abandoned homes across the occupied territories, and have set up a field hospital in a school in the Zaporizhia Oblast.[77]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.  


[1] https://interfax(dot)com/newsroom/top-stories/85598/ ;

[2] https://t.me/modmilby/20425 ; https://t.me/modmilby/20426 ; https://t.me/modmilby/20427 ; https://t.me/modmilby/20429 ; https://interfax(dot)com/newsroom/top-stories/85598/

[3] https://t.me/modmilby/20445 ; https://t.me/modmilby/20446

[4] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/sohodni-oznak-stvorennia-potuzhnoho-udarnoho-uhrupovannia-na-terytorii-bilorusi-nemaie-skibitskyi.html

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112822

[6] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028FjaPPi2zroh1P1qr4vYc7gTPD22CTnpfYWSbdbXwLL1apoCEHxu5Hmc68ykKhkTl

[7] https://t.me/mod_russia/22262

[8] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/12/01/bryfing-predstavnykiv-syl-bezpeky-ta-oborony-ukrayiny-8/;

[9] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/12/01/bryfing-predstavnykiv-syl-bezpeky-ta-oborony-ukrayiny-8/; 

[10] https://t.me/miroshnik_r/9755

[11] https://t.me/miroshnik_r/9755

[12] https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/35134

[13] https://t.me/mod_russia/22262

[14] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028FjaPPi2zroh1P1qr4vYc7gTPD22CTnpfYWSbdbXwLL1apoCEHxu5Hmc68ykKhkTl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02z4foiZiFAEY7qbXJh1Yy3JVurjbMe2uHaRFn6menYoqVSfry9YwR3vVFsK4Picz1l; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/12/01/bryfing-predstavnykiv-syl-bezpeky-ta-oborony-ukrayiny-8/

[15] https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/35134

[16] https://t.me/milchronicles/1354

[17] https://t.me/rybar/41602

[18] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/12/01/bryfing-predstavnykiv-syl-bezpeky-ta-oborony-ukrayiny-8/

[19] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/12/01/bryfing-predstavnykiv-syl-bezpeky-ta-oborony-ukrayiny-8; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/35150; https://t.me/synegubov/4911; https://t.me/millnr/9816 ; https://t.me/miroshnik_r/9746; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/35144; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02z4foiZiFAEY7qbXJh1Yy3JVurjbMe2uHaRFn6menYoqVSfry9YwR3vVFsK4Picz1l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028FjaPPi2zroh1P1qr4vYc7gTPD22CTnpfYWSbdbXwLL1apoCEHxu5Hmc68ykKhkTl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/9526; https://t.me/rybar/41602; https://t.me/pavlokyrylenko_donoda/5722; https://t.me/milchronicles/1354

[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028FjaPPi2zroh1P1qr4vYc7gTPD22CTnpfYWSbdbXwLL1apoCEHxu5Hmc68ykKhkTl  ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/12/01/bryfing-predstavnykiv-syl-bezpeky-ta-oborony-ukrayiny-8/

[21] https://twitter.com/fdov21/status/1598374060437737507?s=20&t=0S9LeGh69HdsLOlOs9lElg ; https://t.me/yaremshooter/437  ; https://t.me/epoddubny/13920 ;

[22] https://t.me/mod_russia/22262   

[23]  https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1597974154862821376?s=20&t=wK_0QjS503sW7HxxQ0y9gg ; https://t.co/2UVD1az1pU 

[24] https://t.me/wargonzo/9532https://t.me/rybar/41602

[25] https://t.me/readovkanews/47978 

[26] https://www.cnn.com/videos/world/2022/11/30/ukraine-battle-for-bakhmut-chance-pkg-ac360-vpx.cnn/video/playlists/russia-ukraine-military-conflict/ 

[27] https://www.cnn.com/videos/world/2022/11/30/ukraine-battle-for-bakhmut-chance-pkg-ac360-vpx.cnn/video/playlists/russia-ukraine-military-conflict/ 

[28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-30

[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028FjaPPi2zroh1P1qr4vYc7gTPD22CTnpfYWSbdbXwLL1apoCEHxu5Hmc68ykKhkTl ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/12/01/bryfing-predstavnykiv-syl-bezpeky-ta-oborony-ukrayiny-8/

[30] https://t.me/nm_dnr/9497   

[31] https://t.me/mod_russia/22262

[32] https://t.me/rybar/41605  https://t.me/rybar/41602

[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028FjaPPi2zroh1P1qr4vYc7gTPD22CTnpfYWSbdbXwLL1apoCEHxu5Hmc68ykKhkTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02z4foiZiFAEY7qbXJh1Yy3JVurjbMe2uHaRFn6menYoqVSfry9YwR3vVFsK4Picz1l

[34] https://t.me/mod_russia/22262

[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028FjaPPi2zroh1P1qr4vYc7gTPD22CTnpfYWSbdbXwLL1apoCEHxu5Hmc68ykKhkTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02z4foiZiFAEY7qbXJh1Yy3JVurjbMe2uHaRFn6menYoqVSfry9YwR3vVFsK4Picz1l

[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028FjaPPi2zroh1P1qr4vYc7gTPD22CTnpfYWSbdbXwLL1apoCEHxu5Hmc68ykKhkTl ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/12/01/bryfing-predstavnykiv-syl-bezpeky-ta-oborony-ukrayiny-8/

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028FjaPPi2zroh1P1qr4vYc7gTPD22CTnpfYWSbdbXwLL1apoCEHxu5Hmc68ykKhkTl

[38] https://suspilne dot media/328982-sist-miljoniv-ukrainciv-bez-svitla-zelenskij-zaprosiv-maska-v-ukrainu-281-den-vijni-onlajn/

[39] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/12/01/bryfing-predstavnykiv-syl-bezpeky-ta-oborony-ukrayiny-8/

[40] https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1598259387801690113 ; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1598236343808974848?s=20&t=Sy_9ATD9xVxUww04hE7-kw

[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02z4foiZiFAEY7qbXJh1Yy3JVurjbMe2uHaRFn6menYoqVSfry9YwR3vVFsK4Picz1l

[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02z4foiZiFAEY7qbXJh1Yy3JVurjbMe2uHaRFn6menYoqVSfry9YwR3vVFsK4Picz1l

[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02z4foiZiFAEY7qbXJh1Yy3JVurjbMe2uHaRFn6menYoqVSfry9YwR3vVFsK4Picz1l

[44] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/12/01/bryfing-predstavnykiv-syl-bezpeky-ta-oborony-ukrayiny-8/

[45] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/12/01/bryfing-predstavnykiv-syl-bezpeky-ta-oborony-ukrayiny-8/

[46] https://suspilne dot media/328982-sist-miljoniv-ukrainciv-bez-svitla-zelenskij-zaprosiv-maska-v-ukrainu-281-den-vijni-onlajn/

[47] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112122

[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028FjaPPi2zroh1P1qr4vYc7gTPD22CTnpfYWSbdbXwLL1apoCEHxu5Hmc68ykKhkTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02z4foiZiFAEY7qbXJh1Yy3JVurjbMe2uHaRFn6menYoqVSfry9YwR3vVFsK4Picz1l ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/2624 ; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/2185  ; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/2184

[49] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/2624 ; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/2185  ; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/2184  ;

[50] https://t.me/bazabazon/14725

[51] https://www.ft.com/content/893b76bd-b58e-4ae4-a5d5-12d45d825cec ; https://storage.googleapis(dot)com/istories/news/2022/11/30/skazhite-biznesu-chto-dlya-zashchiti-suvereniteta-nuzhno-300-tisyach-chelovek-dumaete-mi-ne-nashli-bi-dobrovoltsev/index.html ; https://t.me/istories_media/1800

[52] https://t.me/astrapress/16589

[53] https://t.me/astrapress/16589  

[54] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-11-29/russia-s-wagner-group-mercenaries-may-be-labeled-terrorists-by-the-us; https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/30/politics/us-wagner-group-mercenaries-terrorists/index.html;

[55] https://t.me/Prigozhin_hat/2129 ; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/79

[56] https://t.me/Prigozhin_hat/2129 ; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/79

[57] https://t.me/grey_zone/15996

[58] https://t.me/milinfolive/93905 ; https://t.me/riafan_everywhere/14860

[59] https://t.me/nuhachrus/6448  

[60] https://zona(dot)media/article/2022/11/30/contract; https://t.me/mediazzzona/10192

[61] https://kommersant-ru(dot)turbopages.org/kommersant.ru/s/doc/5694328; https://t.me/military_ombudsmen/731   

[62] https://t.me/sotaproject/50253

[63] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/12/01/bryfing-predstavnykiv-syl-bezpeky-ta-oborony-ukrayiny-8/

[64] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/12/01/bryfing-predstavnykiv-syl-bezpeky-ta-oborony-ukrayiny-8/

[65] https://t.me/astrapress/16623; https://t.me/astrapress/16633; https://t.me/astrapress/16631    

[66] https://vk.com/wall-129888920_236045 ; https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-nov-29-30 

[67] https://vk.com/wall-129888920_236045 ; https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-nov-29-30 

[68] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/12/01/na-hersonshhyni-okupanty-obstrilyaly-svij-zhe-pidrozdil-zagynulo-14-mobilizovanyh/

[69] https://t.me/vrogov/6298 

[70] https://t.me/vrogov/6298

[71] https://t.me/pushilindenis/2947 

[72] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/229

[73] https://sprotyv dot mod dot gov.ua/2022/12/01/okupanty-zirvaly-opalyuvalnyj-sezon-na-tymchasovo-okupovanyh-terytoriyah-shodu-ukrayiny/

[74] https://sprotyv dot mod dot gov.ua/2022/12/01/okupanty-zirvaly-opalyuvalnyj-sezon-na-tymchasovo-okupovanyh-terytoriyah-shodu-ukrayiny/

[75] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/548 

[76] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/12/01/v-krymu-okupanty-vymagayut-vid-vchyteliv-skydaty-groshi-na-armiyu-rf/

[77] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028FjaPPi2zroh1P1qr4vYc7gTPD22CTnpfYWSbdbXwLL1apoCEHxu5Hmc68ykKhkTl

 

Iran Crisis Update, December 1

 Nicholas Carl, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 1, 5:00 pm ET

The Iran Crisis Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Crisis Updates via email, please subscribe here.

Protesters in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province rhetorically defended prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid against the regime on December 1, underscoring the dilemma the regime faces in its protest crackdown. Protesters gathered and erected a large poster of Abdol Hamid in a city square.[1] The poster read that Abdol Hamid is the protesters’ “red line,” implying that they will not tolerate the regime arresting him or suppressing his message. The protesters may be responding to the purported internal regime memo that the Black Reward hacker group released on November 30.[2] The memo reported that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei tried to discredit and threatened to arrest Abdol Hamid for his role in inspiring protests, although CTP cannot verify these claims. Abdol Hamid’s message is seemingly resonating with a growing number of Iranians, especially in the Iranian Sunni community. Any regime action to silence him risks inflaming protests and anti-regime frustrations further. The regime may target individuals close to Abdol Hamid as a less escalatory step to silence him.  The protestors today posed an additional dilemma for the regime, however, since failure to act against Abdol Hamid after the erection of the poster could make it appear that the regime was daunted by the protester threats and thus encourage similar defiance and threats elsewhere.

The Raisi administration may be conducting a purge of local officials across Iran to install more loyal cadres. Parliamentarian Jalal Mahmoud Zadeh accused President Ebrahim Raisi and Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi of conducting this purge in some towns such as Mahabad, West Azerbaijan Province on December 1.[3] Raisi has historically used his authorities in different regime positions to purge political opponents.[4] Mahmoud Zadeh represents Mahabad in Parliament and has previously criticized the security forces’ crackdown there.[5] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) deployed conventional ground units to violently suppress protesters in Mahabad on November 19, as CTP previously reported.[6]

The Raisi administration may be trying to remove local officials who opposed the brutality of the regime crackdown. IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency reported on October 19 that two percent of arrested protesters were government employees.[7]

Key Takeaways

  • Protesters in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province rhetorically defended prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid against the regime.
  • The Raisi administration may be conducting a purge of local officials across Iran to install more loyal cadres.
  • At least five protests took place in four cities across four provinces.
  • Neighborhood youth groups disseminated instructions on how to prevent state security services from collecting intelligence on protesters in preparation for the planned protests on December 5-7.

Anti-Regime Protests

At least five protests took place in four cities across four provinces on December 1. CTP assesses with moderate to high confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Esfahan City, Esfahan Province[8]

  • Size: Medium
  • Demographic: Mourners
  • Notes: Commemoration ceremony for Arshiya Imam Ghloi Zadeh, a 16-year-old boy who reportedly killed himself after being arrested and released for participating in anti-regime protests.

Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province[9]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Al Zahra Hospital medical students and professors

Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province[10]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Sunni Cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid supporters
  • Notes: Protesters stood adjacent to a banner including Abdol Hamid and the slogan “Abdol Hamid is our red line.”

CTP assesses with low confidence that protests occurred in the following locations on December 1:

Esfahan City, Esfahan Province[11]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Esfahan University of Technology Students

Ganaveh, Bushehr Province[12]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Workers
  • Notes: Possibly old footage; only one clip of protest circulating on social media

Note: CTP defines small protests as fewer than 100 individuals, medium protests as between 100 and 1,000, and large protests as over one thousand.

Neighborhood youth groups disseminated instructions on how to prevent state security services from collecting intelligence on protesters in preparation for the planned protests on December 5-7. The Karaj group advised protesters to clear their cellphones and electronic devices of information related to the protests and relevant contacts, place their cellphones on airplane mode, and password-protect their Instagram accounts.[13] The Mashhad Neighborhood Youth called on its “operational teams” to destroy CCTV cameras to prevent the state security services from using them to identify protesters.[14] The Mashhad Neighborhood Youth has repeatedly issued guidance and instructions to these operational teams since November 2022, implying some level of organization within this particular group.[15]

President Ebrahim Raisi traveled to Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province and met with local religious leaders, among others, on December 1.[16] His visit suggests that Raisi and his administration concluded that the unrest in Sanandaj had subsided enough to allow a safe trip. Raisi’s travel is his first to Kurdistan Province since protests began on September 16.

Axis of Resistance and Regional Developments

There was nothing significant to report today.


[1] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1598325555128143873?s=20&t=99mUNZNkzFma8WL_VKrU6Q

[2] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-november-30

[3] https://eslahatnews dot com/%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AC-%DA%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%87-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%88%DA%86%DA%A9-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA

[4] https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Whatever-it-takes-to-end-it.pdf

[5] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-november-21#_edn4c076172923f4af20320503a7d210f978

[6] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-november-19

[7] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-19

[8] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1598385111128571911?s=20&t=x3JSUniNfe9Nb3Vv2CCwOg ; https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1598412314465763329?s=20&t=x3JSUniNfe9Nb3Vv2CCwOg ; https://twitter.com/Mojtabapacino/status/1597500883926818816?s=20&t=IGQy_bZmc5kQWNYVoLH35w

 [9] https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1598338165626048513?s=20&t=99mUNZNkzFma8WL_VKrU6Q ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1598329133125304321?s=20&t=MWGx3KUzzemL3z2tJhTIWw

 [10] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1598325555128143873?s=20&t=99mUNZNkzFma8WL_VKrU6Q ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1598286684000378880?s=20&t=99mUNZNkzFma8WL_VKrU6Q ; https://twitter.com/IranIntl/status/1598316257752875009?s=20&t=lER-IqboGcFm59Yhvz2h1w

 [11] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1598327086095237120?s=20&t=IoFaMa_nNLe5g62K8Pfrlg ; https://twitter.com/VOAfarsi/status/1598393493444886528?s=20&t=yRvsnaQp3DHtC1S60Rc-uQ

[12] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1598372721519431690?s=20&t=99mUNZNkzFma8WL_VKrU6Q

[13] https://twitter.com/javanane_k/status/1598340102085918720

[14] https://twitter.com/Javanan_mashhad/status/1598287820690333699

[15] https://twitter.com/search?q=%D8%AA%DB%8C%D9%85%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C%20%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AA%DB%8C%20javanan&src=typed_query

[16] http://www.president dot ir/fa/141119; http://www.president dot ir/fa/141111

Wednesday, November 30, 2022

Iran Crisis Update, November 30

Nicholas Carl, Zachary Coles, Johanna Moore, and Frederick W. Kagan

November 30, 5:30 pm ET

The Iran Crisis Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Crisis Updates via email, please subscribe here.

Contributor: Amin Soltani

Protest activity may increase on December 5-7. An increasingly wide range of protest coordinators and organizations have called for countrywide demonstrations on these days. These organizers include neighborhood youth groups and Shirin—a Persian-language social media account that previously tweeted a political manifesto calling for the establishment of a democratic, secular Iranian republic.[1] Protest activity did not surge during the last planned demonstrations on November 24-26, however, possibly due to poor coordination.[2]

The recent calls for protests may highlight the increasing organization and sophistication of the protest movement as well as some fractures. Thirty neighborhood youth groups published a joint statement on November 27 announcing the planned protests on December 5-7.[3] More neighborhood youth groups signed this joint statement than the last one on November 22, which had 29 signatories.[4] A neighborhood youth group from Tehran notably signed the November 22 statement but not the November 27 one—the only group missing from the original 29 signatories. The Karaj neighborhood youth group refused to explain when a social media user asked why the Tehran group did not sign the second statement.[5]

The nature of the planned protests furthermore suggests that at least some protest organizers are adapting to more effectively counter regime repression. The Tehran Neighborhood Youth released on November 30 its own call for demonstrations on December 5-7 and offered more specific instructions.[6]The group advised against simultaneous protests and strikes because the reduction in regular traffic caused by strikes allows security forces to more easily crack down. The group accordingly called for countrywide strikes on December 5, scattered protests on December 6, and concentrated protests around universities on December 7.

Anti-regime outlet Iran International published on November 30 a purportedly internal regime memo discussing the protests.[7] Iran International claimed that it received the document from Black Reward—the anti-regime group that hacked Fars News Agency and claimed to have recovered internal data, documents, and files on November 25.[8] CTP cannot verify this document and is treating it with great skepticism. We offer no assessment of its authenticity apart from noting that the style and word choice of portions of the document seem unusual for native Persian speakers. We are nevertheless reporting some of the key points of the document to make them accessible in English.[9] The document claims the following:

  • Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei believes that protests will continue for the foreseeable future. Khamenei called on the state security apparatus to more effectively fight in the “media war” against the West.
  • Khamenei criticized President Ebrahim Raisi, Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani, and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Hossein Salami over their handling of the protests. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf similarly criticized Raisi’s indecisiveness.
  • Khamenei ordered the regime to discredit prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid for his role in inspiring protests. Khamenei ordered Law Enforcement Commander Brigadier General Hossein Ashtari to threaten to arrest Abdol Hamid after he refused to stop publicly criticizing the regime.
  • The Interior Ministry found that most Iranians do not believe the protests will soon end nor do they trust state media. The ministry also concluded many protesters are no longer afraid of the security forces.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani met with US-sanctioned Astan Quds Razavi (AQR) Custodian Ahmad Marvi in Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province on November 30, possibly to discuss commercial or financial cooperation.[10] AQR is a parastatal economic conglomerate that is responsible for the Imam Reza shrine in Mashhad and controls a vast network of commercial interests active in agriculture, energy, financial services, information technology, and manufacturing.[11] AQR is a “vital economic artery” for regime officials and has ties to the IRGC.[12] Marvi is a close associate of Supreme Leader Khamenei and has headed AQR since March 2019.[13] The US has sanctioned both AQR and Marvi for their ties to Khamenei.[14] Iranian state media has not explicitly reported on the Sudani-Marvi meeting at the time of this writing but has published photos depicting the two together.[15]

Key Takeaways

  • Protest activity may increase on December 5-7.
  • The recent calls for protests may highlight the increasing organization and sophistication of the protest movement as well as some fractures.
  • Anti-regime outlet Iran International published a purportedly internal regime memo discussing the protests.
  • Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani met with US-sanctioned Astan Quds Razavi (AQR) Custodian Ahmad Marvi in Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province, possibly to discuss commercial or financial cooperation.
  • At least nine protests took place in seven cities across six provinces.
  • An Intelligence and Security Ministry member died due to an unspecified cause in Zabol, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.

Anti-Regime Protests

At least nine protests took place in seven cities across six provinces on November 30. CTP assesses with moderate to high confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Esfahan City, Esfahan Province[16]

  • Crowd Size: Small

Esfahan City, Esfahan Province[17]

  • Crowd Size: Small
  • Demographic: Medical workers
  • Protest Type: Strike and protest

Bandar Anzali, Gilan Province[18]

  • Crowd Size: Small
  • Protest Type: Mehran Samak’s funeral

Saghez, Kurdistan Province[19]

  • Crowd Size: Small
  • Demographic: Highschool students

Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province[20]

  • Crowd Size: Small
  • Demographic: Kurdistan University students

Khorramabad, Lorestan Province[21]

  • Crowd Size: Medium
  • Protest Type: Masoud Doulat Shahi’s funeral

Tehran City, Tehran Province[22]

  • Crowd Size: Small
  • Demographic: Highschool students

Tehran City, Tehran Province[23]

  • Crowd Size: Undetermined
  • Protest Type: Fires lit in street

CTP assesses with low confidence that protests occurred in the following locations on November 30:

Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province[24]

  • Crowd Size: Undetermined
  • Demographic: Medical workers
  • Protest Type: Strike and protest

Note: CTP defines small protests as fewer than 100 individuals, medium protests as between 100 and 1,000, and large protests as over one thousand.

 

An Intelligence and Security Ministry member died due to an unspecified cause in Zabol, Sistan and Baluchistan Province on November 30.[25] Anti-regime militants commonly operate around Zabol and may have killed the intelligence officer. Over 60 security personnel have died since the protests began on September 16.[26]

IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ali Fadavi stated on November 30 that many of Iran’s problems are due to unspecified officials not properly following the orders of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.[27] Fadavi may have been criticizing regime officials who have less enthusiastically supported the regime protest crackdown in his remarks. Fadavi expressed implicit support for the regime using greater brutality in its crackdown on November 21, as CTP previously reported.[28]

Axis of Resistance and Regional Developments

There was nothing significant to report today.

 


[1] https://twitter.com/javanane_k/status/1596829675376070656; https://twitter.com/javanane_t/status/1598028102633857024; https://twitter.com/MahsaAmini40/status/1597892449036222464; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-18

[2] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-november-27

[3] https://twitter.com/javanane_k/status/1596829675376070656

[4] https://twitter.com/javanane_k/status/1595095807480717313

[5] https://twitter.com/javanane_k/status/1597145574008311809

[6] https://twitter.com/javanane_t/status/1598028102633857024

[7] https://www.iranintl.com/202211304302

[8] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-november-25

[9] https://issuu.com/iranintl/docs/b29_2_1_

[10] www.mashreghnews dot ir/photo/1441464

[11] https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/supreme-leadership-iran/

[12] https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/supreme-leadership-iran/

[13] www.leader dot ir/fa/content/22874

[14] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1234

[15] www.mashreghnews dot ir/photo/1441464

[16] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1597903493117120514?s=20&t=_mzZIdmeBeTK8P9qizDrQw; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1597936702450176001?s=20&t=_mzZIdmeBeTK8P9qizDrQw

[17] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1598047954954293248?s=20&t=_mzZIdmeBeTK8P9qizDrQw

[18] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1597938615740690434?s=20&t=_mzZIdmeBeTK8P9qizDrQw; https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1597966768768704513?s=20&t=_mzZIdmeBeTK8P9qizDrQw

[19] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1597883756370878464?s=20&t=_mzZIdmeBeTK8P9qizDrQw

[20] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1597939089009168385?s=20&t=_mzZIdmeBeTK8P9qizDrQw

[21] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1597976527471226881?s=20&t=_mzZIdmeBeTK8P9qizDrQw

[22] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1597950112025972738?s=20&t=_mzZIdmeBeTK8P9qizDrQw; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1597967679658528769?s=20&t=_mzZIdmeBeTK8P9qizDrQw

[23] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1598023296129585152?s=20&t=_mzZIdmeBeTK8P9qizDrQw

[24] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1598025524173213696?s=20&t=_mzZIdmeBeTK8P9qizDrQw

[25] www.isna dot ir/news/1401090906289

[26] https://twitter.com/Alfoneh/status/1595434754589196288

[27] http://www.defapress dot ir/fa/news/559007

[28] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-november-22