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Tuesday, June 10, 2025

Iran Update, June 10, 2025

 Avery Borens, Andie Parry, Ria Reddy, Carolyn Moorman, Nidal Morrison, Ben Schmida, Ben Rezaei, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.

The Syrian transitional government has quickly responded to several false reports of insurgent activity in coastal Syria over the last week. The government’s rapid response demonstrates that the government remains concerned about violence in coastal Syria despite low levels of Alawite insurgency activity there. Multiple factors, including a lack of Alawite support for insurgent groups, government pressure, and poorly executed insurgent operations, have probably contributed to the decrease in insurgent activity in coastal areas. The transitional government deployed several General Security Services (GSS) and Defense Ministry units to Daliyah, Latakia Province, on June 4 following false reports about an Assadist insurgent attack in the town.[1] The “attack” was reportedly a personal verbal dispute between two people that local officials overstated.[2] Alawite militia “Coastal Shield Brigade” denied that any insurgent attack targeted Daliyah on June 4.[3] The local transitional government officials likely responded to the rumored attack with force and urgency, given that neighboring areas participated in the March attacks against the GSS.[4] Government forces imposed a curfew on Daliyah and arrested alleged “outlaws.“[5] Some of the defense ministry units that deployed to Daliyah committed atrocities targeting Alawite communities on June 4 and 5.[6] 50th Division soldiers reportedly killed three men and burned cars and homes in the neighboring villages of Daliyah.[7] The transitional government arrested the soldiers on June 9, however.[8] This incident underscores the threat posed by the government’s continued discipline issues within certain MoD units. Poorly disciplined units that are deployed to areas in times of crisis could increase the risk of minor incidents devolving into widespread sectarian violence, like that seen in coastal Syria in March 2025.

The transitional government does not appear to be similarly concerned about small-scale insurgent activity in other areas of Syria.[9] Likely ISIS fighters detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting GSS positions in Deir ez Zor province, and unspecified militants detonated IEDs targeting other GSS positions in Daraa from June 4 to June 10, but Damascus had a minimal response.[10] Part of the transitional government’s reaction to incidents in coastal Syria may be linked to continued threats from organized groups and former militia leaders in coastal Syria.[11] Syrian businessman and the maternal cousin of Bashar al Assad, Rami Makhlouf, claimed in late May 2025 that June 2025 will mark the “beginning” of anti-government activity and that this activity will accelerate in July 2025.[12]

Iran is preparing a counter-proposal for the United States that includes terms for an interim deal. Iran may calculate that reaching an interim deal with the United States will delay or prevent snapback sanctions or potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi told Iranian state media on June 10 that Iran is still preparing its response to the recent US nuclear proposal but described the counter-proposal as offering a "framework for an agreement.”[13] Ravanchi stated that Iran is not currently interested in presenting a "very long...comprehensive" proposal. Ravanchi added that Iran and the United States can engage in "more detailed negotiations" after they agree on a framework agreement. A senior US official told Axios on June 10 that the United States has received indications that Iran will reject the recent US proposal while signaling interest in continuing the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.[14] Iran likely wants to continue negotiations in order to delay snapback sanctions or strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action snapback mechanism expires in October 2025, which may give Iran an incentive to prolong negotiations. Iran's push for a framework agreement and continued negotiations also comes ahead of US President Donald Trump's 60-day deadline, which expires on June 12, for Iran to agree to a new nuclear deal.[15] The United States and Iran will reportedly hold a sixth round of the US-Iran nuclear negotiations this week. Axios reported on June 10 that the United States and Iran will hold the sixth round of nuclear talks in Oslo on June 13 or in Muscat on June 15.[16]

Hezbollah is reportedly prioritizing domestic drone production in order to reduce its reliance on procuring Iranian weapons.[17] Israeli media reported on June 9 that Hezbollah has shifted its rehabilitation budget to focus on domestic production of explosive-laden and attack drones over missiles and rocket procurement.[18] These drones are reportedly simpler, faster, and cheaper to produce because they use readily available civilian parts.[19] The Houthis similarly produce some drones domestically and rely upon readily available civilian parts.[20] These Houthi drones were used to sustain a year-long campaign against Saudi Arabia that targeted southern Saudi provinces just over the Yemeni border.[21] Israeli media reported that these drones are harder for Israeli air defense systems to immediately detect and classify.[22] Some of Hezbollah’s most lethal attacks against Israel have used these drones, including the October 2024 drone attack targeting an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) training camp in Binyamina that injured at least 67 Israelis.[23] 

Hezbollah likely seeks to prioritize domestic drone production after recent setbacks that have complicated its ability to procure and smuggle Iranian weapons into Lebanon.[24] The Israeli Air Force officer responsible for overseeing efforts against Hezbollah’s covert aerial unit stated that Hezbollah wants to achieve “greater self-sufficiency and less reliance on Iran.”[25] Hezbollah has historically relied on land, air, and maritime smuggling routes to procure weapons from Iran into Lebanon.[26] The new Syrian government has affirmed that it will not allow Iran to re-establish its activities and influence in Syria, which it previously used to provide financial support and military equipment to Hezbollah.[27] The Syrian transitional government has also continued to dismantle smuggling networks between Iraq and Syria that previously served as a key node in the ground line of communication between Iran and Hezbollah during the Assad regime.[28] Lebanese authorities also tightened security and control at Beirut’s International Airport in May 2025 to curb Hezbollah-linked smuggling.[29] Iran has used civilian flights traveling to Beirut airport to traffic weapons to Hezbollah since at least 2018.[30] The IDF has also continued to target Hezbollah weapons production and storage facilities in recent months.[31] The IDF Air Force struck Hezbollah drone production and storage facilities in Beirut’s southern suburbs on June 5.[32]

Hezbollah may be able to smuggle some small shipments of arms through Syria into Lebanon, but Hezbollah will find it far more challenging to smuggle in missile or missile production components. Hezbollah previously used Syria as a rear area where it could produce very sophisticated solid-fuel ballistic missile systems, for example.[33] It will not be possible for Hezbollah to rebuild similar production capabilities. Many missile components, such as engines, are also much larger and difficult to transport compared to small arms or dual-use drone components.

Key Takeaways:

  • Syrian Insurgencies: The Syrian transitional government has quickly responded to several false reports of insurgent activity in coastal Syria over the last week. The government’s rapid response demonstrates that the government remains concerned about violence in coastal Syria despite low levels of Alawite insurgency activity there. The transitional government does not appear to be similarly concerned about small-scale insurgent activity in other areas of Syria.
  • Iran Nuclear Negotiations: Iran is preparing a counter-proposal for the United States that includes terms for an interim deal. Iran may calculate that reaching an interim deal with the United States will delay or prevent snapback sanctions or potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran.
  • Hezbollah Reconstitution: Hezbollah is reportedly prioritizing domestic drone production in order to reduce its reliance on procuring Iranian weapons. Hezbollah likely seeks to prioritize domestic drone production after recent setbacks that have complicated its ability to procure and smuggle Iranian weapons into Lebanon. Hezbollah may be able to smuggle some small shipments of arms through Syria into Lebanon, but Hezbollah will find it far more challenging to smuggle in missile or missile production components.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

Iran continued to reiterate its commitment to the Axis of Resistance and its strategic objective to destroy the Israeli state. Senior Iranian officials met with Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) Deputy Secretary General Jamil Mazhar in Tehran to discuss regional developments.[34] Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Mazhar on June 9 and reaffirmed Iran’s support for Palestinian militia groups in their efforts to ”resist” Israel.[35] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander Major General Hossein Salami and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf separately met with Mazhar on June 9.[36]

Iran continues to emphasize air defense modernization amid potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Iranian Artesh Northwest Air Defense Region Deputy Commander Brigadier General Jafar Saleh inspected the Shahid Tohidi radar station in Bileh Savar, Ardabil Province, on June 10, to evaluate defense capabilities at the site.[37] Advisor to the Artesh Air Defense Force Commander Brigadier General Abazar Jokar separately highlighted the domestic development of the Iranian-made Bavar-373 system. Jokar confirmed that Iran developed Bavar-373 after Russia failed to deliver S-300s.[38] Israeli airstrikes on Iran in April and October 2024 rendered Iran’s four S-300 air defense systems inoperable. CTP-ISW previously assessed that it is unlikely that Russia can supply Iran with new S-300 components, given Russia’s need for S-300s for its war with Ukraine.[39]

The Iranian rial appreciated from 825,000 rials to one US dollar on June 9 to 820,500 rials to one US dollar on June 10.[40]

Syria

There were several engagements between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian army’s 66th Division that clashed in several areas east of Raqqa on June 9.[41] Syrian media reported that the SDF and 66th Division engaged each other near Madan, Abu Hamad, and al Maghla Bridge in the eastern Raqqa countryside on June 9.[42] The new Syrian army sent military reinforcements to its positions in Madan, Raqqa province, following the fighting.[43] The SDF and Syrian transitional government previously agreed on March 10 that the SDF would integrate into the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[44] The SDF and Syrian transitional government have not yet reached an agreement on outstanding issues that the March 10 agreement did not resolve, however.[45]

The United States conducted two separate drone strikes that killed three people in Idlib Province on June 10.[46] The first drone strike killed two unidentified men on a motorcycle in the town of Dana, Idlib Province.[47] The second strike killed the driver of a car and wounded four nearby civilians in the town of Atmeh, Idlib Province.[48] This is the first US strike in territory controlled by the Syrian transitional government since the February 23, 2025, strike, which targeted a former leader of Hurras al Din, a Salafi-jihadi militant group allied to al Qaeda.[49] The US has previously shared secret intelligence with the Syrian transitional government, and it is possible these strikes involved similar intelligence cooperation.[50]

The large number of Assad regime members in government custody is creating challenges for the Syrian transitional government as it attempts to balance the pursuit of transitional justice with the reintegration of low-level regime members. The Syrian Ministry of Interior’s (MoI) spokesperson, Noureddine Baba, held a joint press conference with Supreme Committee for Civil Peace spokesperson Hassan Soufan on June 10 that focused on transitional justice and maintaining order in Syria.[51] The conference was held following the transitional government’s release of prominent Assad regime members, including the head of the National Defense Forces (NDF), Fadi al Saqr, who is implicated in human rights violations perpetrated by the pro-Assad militia throughout the Syrian conflict.[52] Baba said that approximately 123,000 MoI personnel during the Assad regime are implicated in war crimes and that the MoI is coordinating with Interpol to pursue violators outside of Syria.[53]

The Syrian transitional government must balance the prosecution of former Assad regime members who committed crimes with disarming and reintegrating low-level former Assad regime members. Soufan stated that Saqr and other former Assad regime members were released as part of a political decision to preserve civil peace.[54] The lack of an effective transitional justice system has driven revenge-based attacks targeting individuals with ties or suspected ties to the former Assad regime. These attacks, in turn, discourage cooperation between Alawite communities who could effectively reintegrate into society and the transitional government. The Syrian transitional government must prosecute, charge, and imprison perpetrators of crimes committed under the former Assad regime through fair trials to effectively gain the trust of the Syrian population. The Supreme Committee for Civil Peace’s decision to release Saqr could further undermine confidence in these transitional justice institutions.[55]

Iraq

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) General Directorate of Security and Discipline announced on June 9 that it had arrested an unspecified number of PMF members for using their authority under the PMF for electoral fraud.[56] The PMF Directorate announced that the arrests are part of an ongoing investigation into PMF members illegally obtaining voter cards or intimidating voters, following directives from Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and Popular Mobilization Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh.[57] The 2016 PMF Commission Law, which formalized the PMF as an independent security force, prohibits PMF members from being affiliated with or participating in political activities.[58] The PMF General Directorate of Security and Discipline aims to prevent PMF members from engaging in criminal activities.[59] These arrests follow reports of the PMF being exploited for electoral purposes ahead of the November 2025 elections.[60] Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia political actors have used the PMF for illegal voter intimidation and election interference in past election cycles.[61] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service primarily comprised of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias who nominally report to the prime minister but actually report to their respective commanders, many of whom have political wings.[62] The head of the PMF General Directorate of Security and Discipline, Abu Zainab al Lami, is a member of Iranian-backed militia Kata’ib Hezbollah.[63] Lami could either conduct a phony investigation or abuse his investigative powers to support the electoral interests of the Hoquq Movement, which is KH’s political wing, or its allies.

Shia Coordination Framework-affiliated politicians continue to try to discredit Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani ahead of the upcoming elections. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs.[64] Sudani’s Special Envoy to Syria, Izzat Shabandar, met with Syrian President Ahmed al Shara in Damascus on June 9.[65] Shabandar posted on X (Twitter) that the visit was in Iraq’s interest.[66] A Shia Coordination Framework-affiliated parliamentarian claimed on June 9 that unspecified Syrian officials gave Shabandar Assad regime Iraq-related documents. The parliamentarian claimed that Sudani will use these documents in his election campaign.[67] The parliamentarian did not indicate the content of the alleged documents. Iranian-backed Iraqi figures may seek to cast Sudani’s meeting with Shara in a negative light as part of a broader effort to oppose Iraq-Syria normalization. They previously criticized Sudani’s invitation to Shara to attend the May 2025 Arab Summit in Baghdad.[68] Shia Coordination Framework members opposed to Sudani also recently accused Sudani and his coalition of corruption, likely to damage his electoral prospects in the upcoming elections.[69]

Arabian Peninsula

The Houthis have launched two separate ballistic missile attacks on Israel since June 9.[70] The Houthis launched one ballistic missile on June 9 that landed outside Israeli territory.[71] The Houthis conducted a second ballistic missile attack on June 10, targeting Ben Gurion Airport.[72] The IDF intercepted the missile.[73]

The IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike on the Hudaydah port on June 10 in retaliation for Houthi drone and missile attacks.[74] The IDF stated that the airstrike was intended to impede military use of the port.[75] UKMTO stated on June 9 that commercial ships should reconsider docking at Hudaydah port.[76]

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

See topline section.

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.


[1] https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/58604 ; https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/58605 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1930299901348348152 ; https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1930699934908748231 ;

[2] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1930698372538867720 ; https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1930698375021871289

[3] https://t.me/almougahid313/1075

[4] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1930698375021871289

[5] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1930530921783963872

[6] https://t.me/almougahid313/1075 ; https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1930698375021871289

[7] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1932177587658441161 ; https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1930699934908748231 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1930569790281724192

[8] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1932177587658441161

[9] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1932103456141250992 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1931357457974186027 ; https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1931344714290057389 ;                     https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/144022

[10] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1932103456141250992 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1931357457974186027 ; https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1931344714290057389 ;                     https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/144022

[11] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-3-2025

[12] https://www.facebook.com/RamiMakhloufSY/posts/pfbid02cY9cCMpGbu1hidos2PvPY7E4HudBbVkqWWq4x9B52N4H5JEKrDkbRP3vcmtyobcMl?locale=ar_AR

[13] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85857415

[14] https://www.axios.com/2025/06/10/trump-camp-david-iran-gaza-meeting

[15] https://www.mako.co dot il/news-diplomatic/2025_q2/Article-9c5624fb7461691026.htm

[16] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1932178309514662036

[17] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/by11zol4mxl

[18] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/by11zol4mxl

[19] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/by11zol4mxl

[20] https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/46283842630243379f0504ece90a821f ; https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2019/08/houthi-uav-strategy-in-yemen/

[21] https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/46283842630243379f0504ece90a821f ; https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2019/08/houthi-uav-strategy-in-yemen/

[22] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/by11zol4mxl 

[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-13-2024 ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wg7qJiORo0E 

[24] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/dont-assume-irans-supply-lines-hezbollah-are-cut ; https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/hjjxlco1xl ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/idf-targets-hezbollah-weapons-manufacturing-storage-site-in-lebanons-beqaa-valley/

[25] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/by11zol4mxl

[26] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/dont-assume-irans-supply-lines-hezbollah-are-cut

[27] https://www.npr.org/2025/02/04/g-s1-46361/syrias-new-leader-denounces-iran-calling-its-proxies-a-regional-threat ; https://www.understandingwar.org/report/iranian-strategy-syria

[28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-25-2023 ; https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2020/03/the-transformation-of-the-iraqi-syrian-border-from-a-national-to-a-regional-frontier?lang=en&center=middle-east ; https://newlinesmag.com/spotlight/life-returns-to-al-bukamal-after-iranian-militias-flee/

[29] https://www.jns.org/tehrans-use-of-beirut-airport-to-smuggle-arms-is-major-threat-to-region/ ; https://www.jns.org/lebanese-govt-wresting-control-of-main-airport-from-hezbollah/

[30] https://www.jns.org/tehrans-use-of-beirut-airport-to-smuggle-arms-is-major-threat-to-region/ ; https://www.jns.org/lebanese-govt-wresting-control-of-main-airport-from-hezbollah/

[31] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/hjjxlco1xl ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/idf-targets-hezbollah-weapons-manufacturing-storage-site-in-lebanons-beqaa-valley/ 

[32] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1930753541846487369 

[33] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/rjshezmikx ;

[34] https://x.com/IRIMFA_EN/status/1932411907660484637 ;

https://x.com/KhosroIsfahani/status/1932135274852892740 ;

https://x.com/ghalibaffans/status/1932056320548516197

[35] https://x.com/IRIMFA_EN/status/1932411907660484637

[36] https://x.com/KhosroIsfahani/status/1932135274852892740 ;

https://x.com/ghalibaffans/status/1932056320548516197

[37] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85857734/

[38] https://farsnews dot ir/Mahdi128/1749544206455400527

[39] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/consequences-idf-strikes-iran ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/israel-strike-on-iran-took-out-radar-sets-to-guide-ballistic-missiles-report/

[40] www.bon-bast.com

[41] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1932403481630966090

[42] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/144123 ; https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1932403481630966090 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/144134

[43] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/144128

[44] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-10-2025

[45] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1922997343885943053 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-15-2025

[46] https://x.com/SyriaCivilDefe/status/1932334771767533640 ; https://x.com/SyriaCivilDefe/status/1932376867979325448 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1932357848685785574

[47] https://x.com/SyriaCivilDefe/status/1932334771767533640

[48] https://x.com/SyriaCivilDefe/status/1932376867979325448

[49] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-24-2025 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1894381228645654933

[50] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/01/24/us-syria-intelligence-hts-isis/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/us-withdrawal-syria-will-reinvigorate-isis-terror-threat

[51] https://www dot enabbaladi.net/758575/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d8%a7%d8%ae%d9%84%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%a8%d8%b9%d8%b6-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b6%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%b7-%d8%aa%d8%b9%d8%a7%d9%88%d9%86%d9%88%d8%a7-%d8%ae%d9%84%d8%a7%d9%84-%d9%85%d8%b9%d8%b1/

[52] https://syrianobserver dot com/syrian-actors/public-outrage-over-settlements-with-war-criminals-fadi-saqr-back-in-the-spotlight.html

[53] https://www dot enabbaladi.net/758575/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d8%a7%d8%ae%d9%84%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%a8%d8%b9%d8%b6-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b6%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%b7-%d8%aa%d8%b9%d8%a7%d9%88%d9%86%d9%88%d8%a7-%d8%ae%d9%84%d8%a7%d9%84-%d9%85%d8%b9%d8%b1/

[54] https://en dot zamanalwsl.net/news/article/69785/

[55] https://en dot zamanalwsl.net/news/article/69786/

[56] https://almadapaper dot net/404931

[57] https://almadapaper dot net/404931

[58] https://www.aljazeera dot net/encyclopedia/2016/11/27/%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B1%D9%81-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A6%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A

[59] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20-%20ISF%20PMF%20Orders%20of%20Battle_0_0.pdf

[60] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-4-2025

[61] https://alarab.co dot uk/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%AF%D9%85-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%AA%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A3%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86 ; https://www.aa.com dot tr/ar/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%B2%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A8/1161063

[62] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces

[63] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20-%20ISF%20PMF%20Orders%20of%20Battle_0_0.pdf , pg. 34 ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%B9-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%81%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%88-%D8%B2%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%AA%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF

[64] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-4-2025

[65] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/144100

[66] https://x.com/IAlshabandar/status/1932419030654079075

[67] https://x.com/Y_B_Alkilaby/status/1932492115352932451 ; https://x.com/KurdistanWatch/status/1932165229187944498 ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/khlaf-byn-sayb-ahl-alhq-w-mnzmt-bdr-hwl-alsytrt-ly-alryys-aljdyd-lmjls-alnwab ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/aljnah-alarhaby-dakhl-alhkwmt-alraqyt-yard-zyart-alshr

[68] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate051625 ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate022725

[69] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-4-2025

[70] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/rja11ie1bll ; https://t.me/army21ye/3089?single

[71] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/rja11ie1bll

[72] https://t.me/army21ye/3089?single

[73] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1932484340555919473

[74] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1932313149534826697

[75] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1932313149534826697

[76] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1931770861650092279

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 10, 2025

 Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, Christina Harward, Jennie Olmsted, and George Barros

June 10, 2025, 6:00 pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on June 10. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be switching between rhetoric focused on Russian ethnic nationalism and Russian multinationalism, but remains committed to promoting anti-Western sentiment and the militarization of Russia's youth. Putin held a meeting with the Security Council on June 10 that largely focused on the unification of the peoples of Russia and the use of military-patriotic youth programs and Russian government initiatives to promote Russian patriotism.[1] Putin highlighted the work of the "Movement of the First," a Russian youth movement aimed at promoting military-patriotic education in Russia and occupied Ukraine, and "Yunarmiya" ("The Youth Army"), a movement that is responsible for instilling pro-war sentiments in Russian children and teenagers. Putin also highlighted the Russian state-mandated weekly lessons in schools that often include lectures by soldiers from the war in Ukraine. Putin platformed BRICS, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) — Russian-dominated organizations that Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly postured as the foundation of Putin's envisioned anti-Western and anti-NATO Eurasian security architecture.[2] Putin stated that Russia must respond to challenges that promote interethnic and interreligious conflict in Russia and highlighted the "unity of the peoples of Russia." Putin recently began forwarding an unofficial ideology formulated on Russian nationalism that positions Russia in opposition to the West, which marked a notable departure from Putin's usual rhetoric promoting the multiethnic and multireligious makeup of Russia's population.[3] Putin's remarks at the June 10 Security Council meeting appear to be a return to this rhetoric about the diversity of Russia and Russian civic nationalism. Putin appears committed, however, to promoting anti-Western and pro-war sentiments, especially in Russian youth, likely as part of efforts to prepare Russian society for a protracted war in Ukraine and possible future conflict with NATO. Putin's June 10 statements about harmony and unity in Russia indicate that he likely remains hesitant to fully commit to a nationalist ideology centered around ethnic Russians, as this risks fragmenting Russia's multiethnic population. ISW continues to assess that Putin must work to balance appeasing the influential xenophobic and ultranationalist community, which is a key constituency for Putin, with the need to leverage migrants to offset immediate economic and force generation challenges and long-term demographic decline.[4]

Russia is reportedly working to increase the number of North Korean labor migrants in Russia, likely to support Russia's workforce and to directly join the Russian military. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov reported on June 7 that Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu agreed during his recent visit to North Korea to work to bring more North Korean migrants to work in Russia.[5] This reported agreement is a violation of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2397, to which Russia is a signatory and which prohibits North Korea from sending its citizens abroad for work and mandated that all UN member states expel all North Koreans "earning income" abroad by December 2019.[6] Russia vetoed in March 2024 an annual UNSC resolution extending a monitoring panel tracking adherence to UN sanctions against North Korea.[7] Budanov stated that Russia is likely looking to North Koreans to replace migrants from Central Asia. Budanov stated that many North Korean laborers in Russia will likely sign military contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). ISW assessed in February 2025 that Russia was creating opportunities for North Korean migrants to go to Russia to join the Russian workforce or the Russian military.[8] Russia and North Korea have been overtly increasing their defense cooperation through mutual defense treaties, the transfer of military technology and materiel, and the deployment of North Korean forces to fight alongside Russian forces in Kursk Oblast.[9] Russia and North Korea appear to be trying to engage in more covert ways to create pathways through which North Koreans can enter Russia’s military recruitment pipeline.

Ukraine and Russia conducted the second round of prisoner of war (POW) exchanges on June 10, in accordance with agreements the parties reached in Istanbul on June 2. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Russian MoD confirmed that Ukraine and Russia exchanged an unspecified number of wounded POWs.[10] Zelensky noted that this exchange marked the first stage of the exchange of seriously wounded POWs, and that Russia and Ukraine are expected to continue POW exchanges.

Key Takeaways:

  • Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be switching between rhetoric focused on Russian ethnic nationalism and Russian multinationalism, but remains committed to promoting anti-Western sentiment and the militarization of Russia's youth.
  • Russia is reportedly working to increase the number of North Korean labor migrants in Russia, likely to support Russia's workforce and to directly join the Russian military.
  • Ukraine and Russia conducted the second round of prisoner of war (POW) exchanges on June 10, in accordance with agreements the parties reached in Istanbul on June 2.
  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Borova, Lyman, and Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Toretsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian and Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on June 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in unspecified areas in Kursk Oblast on June 9 and 10.[11] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and attempted to enter Novyi Put (east of Tetkino).[12]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in northwestern Belgorod Oblast on June 10.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on June 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast and southwest of Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City).[13]

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Yablunivka and Novomykolaivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on June 9 and 10.[14] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka, Andriivka (both north of Sumy City), and Yunakivka.[15]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that the Russian military command has deployed most of the Russian Kursk Group of Forces to northern Sumy Oblast.[16]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, LMD), 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th AC, LMD), 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division), 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), and 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are attacking in the Novomykolaivka direction.[17] Mashovets reported that elements of the 83rd and 11th VDV brigades are attacking in the Yablunivka direction and that elements of the 106th VDV Division are attacking in the Yunakivka and Sadky (northeast of Sumy City) directions. Drone operators of the 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[18]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kharkiv direction.

Ukrainian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on June 10 that Ukrainian forces regained control over the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant in northern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[19]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and toward Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Starytsya on June 9 and 10.[20]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Chechen "Zapad-Akhmat" Battalion; Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) from Kurchaloyevsky Raion, Republic of Chechnya; and 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[21]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 9 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian forces northwest of Krasne Pershe (northeast of Kupyansk), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[22]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced near Fyholivka (southwest of Krasne Pershe).[23]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near the international border near Kamyanka and toward Dvorichanske; north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka and Holubivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Kurylivka on June 9 and 10.[24]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are operating north of Kupyansk.[25]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Novoyehorivka (southeast of Borova).[26]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Makiivka (southeast of Borova).[27]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Zelenyi Hai, Zahryzove, and Kolisnynivka; east of Borova near Nadiya; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Olhivka on June 9 and 10.[28]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Novoyehorivka.[29]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Torske (east of Lyman).[30]

Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces back 400 to 500 meters in the Karpivka direction (north of Lyman).[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced between Karpivka and Lypove (southwest of Karpivka) and near Zelena Dolyna (south of Lypove).[32]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Lyman near Karpivka, Zelene Dolyna, Ridkodub, Novyi Myr, and Lypove; northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka; and east of Lyman near Torske and the Serebryanske forest area on June 9 and 10.[33]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD), reinforced by elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st GTA, MMD), are operating in the Lyman direction.[34]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[35]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Siversk near Serebryanka, northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on June 9 and 10.[36]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[37]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Chasiv Yar itself, southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdymivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and toward Stupochky on June 9 and 10.[38]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion, 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment, and 299th VDV Regiment (all of the 98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[39]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 9 and 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Dyliivka (north of Toretsk) and in an industrial area northwest of Toretsk.[40]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 9 and 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Toretsk.[41]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Toretsk, northeast of Romanivka, and north of Zorya (both west of Toretsk).[42] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in Dyliivka and have nearly seized Yablunivka (west of Toretsk).[43]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Yablunivka, Poltavka, and Oleksandro-Kalynove, and toward Kleban-Byk; west of Toretsk near Leonidivka and Shcherbynivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Novoolenivka on June 9 and 10.[44]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on June 10 that elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment and 163rd Tank Regiment (both of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) have recently advanced between 1.5 and 1.7 kilometers south of Popiv Yar (northwest of Toretsk).[45] Mashovets stated that Russian forces recently advanced in the direction of Dyliivka and Shcherbynivka.[46] Mashovets stated that Russian forces continue to concentrate on the area north of Vozdvyzhenka (southwest of Toretsk) and are redeploying additional forces, including elements of the 1st and 9th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD), to the area.[47]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are trying to advance near Yablunivka from the south and southwest.[48] Mashovets stated that elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are attacking near Popiv Yar and Shevchenko Pershe (west of Toretsk and northeast of Pokrovsk). Elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating near Dyliivka.[49] Elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating northwest of Toretsk, and elements of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating near Zorya.[50] Elements of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in Ivanopillia (northwest of Toretsk) and north of Toretsk.[51] Elements of the 33rd and 1219th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating south of Yablunivka.[52] Elements of the 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC) are reportedly striking the southern outskirts of Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[53] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 10 that the Russian military command is redeploying unspecified elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk direction.[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Shevchenko Pershe (northeast of Pokrovsk).[55]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrne and toward Novotoretske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Yelyzavetivka, Promin, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne on June 9 and 10.[56]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced on the southwestern outskirts of Novomykolaivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[57]

Unconfirmed claims: Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces have pushed Russian forces back half a kilometer southeast of Novomykolaivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[58] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka).[59]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Kotlyarivka and toward Muravka and southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Bohdanivka on June 9 and 10.[60]

The chief sergeant of a Ukrainian artillery battery operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that Russian forces are conducting assaults on motorcycles and mopeds to advance to the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[61]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Division and 30th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are attacking near Novomykolaivka and Novoserhiivka.[62] Elements of the Russian "Vega" Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[63]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on June 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north and west of Oleksiivka (west of Kurakhove) and to Zelenyi Kut (just west of Oleksiivka).[64]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Kurakhove near Bahatyr, Kostyantynopil, Oleksiivka, Andriivka, and Zelenyi Kut and toward Zaporizhzhia and southwest of Kurakhove near Odradne on June 9 and 10.[65]

Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions within Kostyantynopil and Bahatyr.[66]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are operating near Bahatyr and Oleksiivka.[67]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces out of Fedorivka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[68] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces continue to hold Vesele.[69]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Komar, Vesele, Vilne Pole, Burlatske, and Shevchenko and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and Zelene Pole on June 9 and 10.[70] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Fedorivka, Komar, and Shevchenko.[71]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that the Russian military command returned elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), which were previously operating in Kursk Oblast, to battle in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[72] Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[73]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on June 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on June 9 and 10.[74]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating south of Hulyaipole.[75]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka, southwest of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka and Nesteryanka, and west of Orikhiv near Stepove and toward Pavlivka on June 9 and 10.[76]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Nemets" group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[77] Drone operators of the BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment, subordinated to Airborne Forces) are reportedly operating near Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv).[78]

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on June 9 and 10 but did not advance.[79]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[80]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 9 to 10 and hit a maternity hospital in Odesa City. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 315 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[81] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched two KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast and five Iskander-K cruise missiles from Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 213 drones, the two KN-23 missiles, and all five of the Iskander-K cruise missiles, and that 64 drones were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Kyiv oblasts, damaging civilian infrastructure.[82] Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces struck a maternity hospital in Odesa City.[83] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yurii Ihnat stated that drone debris in Kyiv City contained thermobaric, high-explosive fragmentation warheads.[84]

Forbes Ukraine reported on June 9 that Russia's use of Shahed and decoy drones in its long-range drone strike series was largely cyclical in early 2025 with Russian forces launching about 2,500 drones in one month, then about 4,000 drones per month over the next two months, then again about 2,500 drones in the following month.[85] Forbes Ukraine reported that Russian forces launched 2,611 drones in January 2025; 3,830 in February 2025; 4,198 drones in March 2025; 2,476 drones in April 2025; and at least 3,628 drones in May 2025.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russia and Belarus continue efforts to deepen cooperation and further connect their economic, military, and national policies. A Russian delegation, which Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov led, and a Belarusian delegation, which Belarusian Foreign Minister Maxim Ryzhenkov led, met in Moscow on June 9 and 10.[86] Lavrov claimed that the two delegations discussed strengthening bilateral cooperation through the Union State framework. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that the parties declared their willingness to increase joint efforts to form a Eurasian security architecture — a reference to Russian President Vladimir Putin's envisioned Eurasian security architecture, a Russian-led bloc which aims to counter the West and NATO.[87] The Russian delegation committed to helping Belarus deepen cooperation with BRICS. Ryzhenkov claimed on June 10 that Russia and Belarus have completed a third of the 310 Belarusian-Russian integration projects for 2024 to 2025, including projects related to the space industry and microchip production.[88]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.


[1] https://t.me/tass_agency/319302 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/319303 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/319305 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/319307

[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022525

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052225 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2025

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-21-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050925

[5] https://www.twz.com/news-features/russia-giving-shahed-136-attack-drone-production-capabilities-to-north-korea-budanov

[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020925; https://main.un dot org/securitycouncil/en/s/res/2397-%282017%29

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2024

[8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-9-2025

[9] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-signs-mutual-defence-treaty-with-north-korea-2024-11-09/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/north-korea-joins-russias-war-against-ukraine-operational-and-strategic-implications; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060525; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012225

[10] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14587 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14597 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14607 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/53620 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/53621 ; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/rosiya-protyagom-uzhe-misyaciv-postijno-zbilshuye-kilkist-za-98361

[11] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25320 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25299 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25322

[12] https://t.me/dva_majors/73135 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29912

[13] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167896 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93219

[14] https://t.me/wargonzo/27072 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73135 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36997

[15] https://t.me/dva_majors/73135

[16] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2792

[17] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2792

[18] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93187 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37004

[19] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2792

[20] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25320 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25299 ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/6539 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11867 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2792

[21] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5779

[22] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9353; https://t.me/Ochi151/94; https://x.com/giK1893/status/1932135145953526015

[23] https://t.me/tass_agency/319203

[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25296 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25320; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25299 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11867

[25] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2792

[26] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1932263534580367414; https://t.me/operationall_space/4488 https://t.me/Sinkovka_Kupyansk/12855

[27] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29909

[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25296; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25320; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25299 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11867; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29909

[29] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1932263534580367414 https://t.me/operationall_space/4488 https://t.me/Sinkovka_Kupyansk/12855

[30] https://t.me/operationall_space/4492; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1932306090911469616

[31] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2792

[32] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29909

[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25296; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25320; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25299 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11867

[34] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2792

[35] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31844

[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25320 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25299 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36991 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25296

[37] https://t.me/don_partizan/8429

[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25320 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25299 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11867 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/97405 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27072 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36992; https://t.me/t3mny/2283 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36996 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25296

[39] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29901 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2792

[40] https://t.me/z4lpr/1064 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1932384319110312012 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93192 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1932206371002581077 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1932205675003646239

[41] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9360; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93192

[42] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167808

[43] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36992; https://t.me/t3mny/2283 ; https://t.me/don_partizan/8429

[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25320 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25299 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11867 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73135 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36992 ; https://t.me/t3mny/2283 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2793 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2794 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25296

[45] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2793

[46] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2794

[47] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2793

[48] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2793

[49] https://t.me/z4lpr/1064 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1932384319110312012

[50] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93192 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1932206371002581077 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1932205675003646239 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1932098732163531024; https://t.me/wargonzo/26920 ; https://t.me/ankavolonter/11932; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1932435380927926776

[51] https://t.me/ZParaBellumMD/19604 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1932439448832422292

[52] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37018 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37022

[53] https://t.me/sashakots/54219

[54] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37023

[55] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31841

[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25296; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11867; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25299; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25320

[57] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/28802; https://t.me/BlackWings59/45; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9354; https://x.com/giK1893/status/1932199655598604731; https://x.com/giK1893/status/1932199658735993139

[58] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2793

[59] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31850

[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25296; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11867; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25299; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25320; https://t.me/dva_majors/73135

[61] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/10/myasni-shturmy-na-mopedah-yak-okupanty-namagayutsya-distatys-do-kordoniv-dniprovshhyny/; https://youtu.be/RfRB0VNerUE?t=1547

[62] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2793

[63] https://t.me/sashakots/54211

[64] https://t.me/dva_majors/73135; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64972; https://t.me/wargonzo/27072; https:/t.me/boris_rozhin/167896

[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25296; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11867; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25299; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25320; https://t.me/dva_majors/73135; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64972; https://t.me/wargonzo/27072; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2793

[66] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2793

[67] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2793

[68] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2794

[69] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2794

[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25296; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11867; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25299; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25320; https://t.me/dva_majors/73135; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64972; https://t.me/wargonzo/27072; https://t.me/voin_dv/15411; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2794

[71] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64972; https://t.me/voin_dv/15411

[72] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2794

[73] https://t.me/voin_dv/15404 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15407 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15412

[74] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25320; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25299; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25296; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid026K17WpAzCb3xEhqaX1RFYLFikUyPksYpXTge8rvHjX7TUYLhFfPvTMS8bdYqQyM6l ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93219 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2794

[75] https://t.me/voin_dv/15398

[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25320; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25299; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25296; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid026K17WpAzCb3xEhqaX1RFYLFikUyPksYpXTge8rvHjX7TUYLhFfPvTMS8bdYqQyM6l ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2794

[77] https://t.me/wargonzo/27105

[78] https://t.me/rogozin_do/7186

[79] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25320; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25299; https://t.me/s/GeneralStaffZSU/25296; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid026K17WpAzCb3xEhqaX1RFYLFikUyPksYpXTge8rvHjX7TUYLhFfPvTMS8bdYqQyM6l

[80] https://t.me/dva_majors/73101 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73176

[81] https://t.me/kpszsu/36106

[82] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/21438; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/10/naslidky-rosijskogo-udaru-po-chernigivshhyni-pid-udarom-15-naselenyh-punktiv/; https://t.me/synegubov/14906; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/12267 ; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1278 ; https://t.me/UA_National_Police/42049; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/10/masovanyj-udar-po-kyyevu-chetvero-postrazhdalyh-poshkodzheni-budynky-ta-infrastruktura/; https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=4079574565694406&id=100009257087776&mibextid=wwXIfr&rdid=ZIBpjg4ay3cdT8hG#; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/10/u-kyyevi-vorozhym-obstrilom-poshkodzheno-sofijskyj-sobor/ ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4790; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/5756; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/10/na-kyyivshhyni-tryvaye-likvidacziya-naslidkiv-nichnoyi-ataky-rosiyi-ye-poraneni/; https://x.com/SESU_UA/status/1932328999780290861; https://x.com/SESU_UA/status/1932397101821919606; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12555

[83] https://x.com/andrii_sybiha/status/1932303583401181660?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1932303583401181660%7Ctwgr%5E0a87d4ce7243d2c84fe96942745040601adaf93f%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fsuspilne.media%2F1038793-sibiga-zaklikav-ne-zvolikati-z-novimi-sankciami-proti-rf%2F ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12555; https://t.me/truonline/6087 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/10/ye-zagyblyj-ta-postrazhdali-v-odesi-vorozhi-bpla-vdaryv-po-medzakladah-ta-zhytlovomu-budynku/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/9942; https://t.me/odesa_prokuratura/1418; https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/30496

[84] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/10/kyyiv-atakuvaly-z-usih-napryamkiv-yurij-ignat-pro-masshtabnyj-nichnyj-obstril/

[85] https://forbes.ua/news/rosiya-viroblyae-2700-shakhediv-na-misyats-mayzhe-stilki-zh-imitatoriv-gur-09062025-30369

[86] https://t.me/MID_Russia/60469 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/60473

[87] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2025

[88] https://belta dot by/politics/view/ryzhenkov-rasskazal-ob-integratsionnyh-planah-belarusi-i-rossii-720060-2025/; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/316683