Iran Update, October 14, 2024

Andie Parry, Kelly Campa, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Hezbollah’s October 13 drone attack targeting an IDF base is likely part of an effort to impose costs on Israel as Hezbollah faces operational challenges in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah conducted a drone attack on October 13 targeting a training camp south of Haifa for the IDF 1st Infantry Brigade that killed four IDF soldiers and injured 61 others.[1] Hezbollah said that the strike was targeting soldiers as they prepared for operations in Lebanon, and the IDF assessed that Hezbollah deliberately targeted an IDF dining facility during a period in which Hezbollah expected soldiers to be eating.[2] This strike is likely an effort to impose costs on Israel at a time when Hezbollah can conduct only limited defensive operations in southern Lebanon. The Israeli air campaign has severely disrupted Hezbollah’s command-and-control structures, and Israeli forces have observed Hezbollah fighters fleeing or only observing Israeli troops from a distance rather than decisively engaging IDF units.[3] The IDF continues to seize terrain and towns, demonstrating that it can act with impunity in southern Lebanon.[4] Hezbollah attacks into Israel allow it to claim that it is ”resisting” Israeli forces despite being unable or unwilling to defend southern Lebanon.[5]

This attack is part of a possible broader campaign that Hezbollah described on October 12. Hezbollah claimed on October 12 that its fighters continued to target IDF rear positions in northern Israel and “support lines” as part of its defense against Israel’s ground operation in southern Lebanon.[6] Attacks on IDF support elements are meant to degrade the IDF’s ability to conduct effective ground operations, though it is unclear what military effect these attacks will have if any at all. Hezbollah’s decision to target a training camp for the 1st Infantry Brigade—a unit currently operating in southern Lebanon—likely falls within this framework.[7] These attacks also could have an outsized effect in the Israeli domestic political space as well, and Hezbollah may calculate that continued attacks on rear IDF bases that kill even small numbers of IDF soldiers will cause Israeli public support for the ground campaign in Lebanon to decline. Hezbollah’s October 13 attack demonstrates that Hezbollah can precisely target IDF rear positions in northern Israel. The attack also demonstrates that Hezbollah‘s command-and-control network is sufficiently intact to order and execute these sorts of coordinated rocket and missile attacks (see below).

Hezbollah has almost certainly adopted a new tactic in an attempt to evade Israeli air defenses. The development of this tactic is a byproduct of Hezbollah’s year-long learning process during its fires campaign targeting civilian and military sites in northern Israel since October 2023. A preliminary IDF Air Force investigation indicated that Hezbollah launched a combined offensive of drones, rockets, and three precision missiles targeting Haifa at the same time it launched the drone targeting Binyamina.[8] The IDF Navy and Iron Dome intercepted two of the drones near Nahariya and Acre but detection systems lost track of a third drone, a Shahed 107—which ultimately impacted in Binyamina.[9] This tactic of using imprecise indirect fires to distract air defenses and then using precision weapons to strike targets has become common across Iran and its Axis of Resistance in recent years. Hezbollah has used this tactic to distract Israeli air defenses on numerous occasions to allow low-flying drones to enter northern Israel during its year-long campaign.[10] These drone attacks have previously proved difficult for Israeli air defenses to intercept. [11]

Hezbollah likely attempted to replicate the successful October 13 attack by launching three surface-to-surface missiles targeting central Israel at the same time it launched dozens of rockets toward northern Israel on October 14.[12] All three of these missiles were intercepted, but the missiles caused 182 red alerts across central Israel.[13]

The IDF vowed to respond by targeting Hezbollah’s drone unit and drone production infrastructure in response to the October 13 attack. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant told US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin on October 13 that Israel would engage in a “forceful response” against Hezbollah.[14] Israeli Army Radio reported that IDF Air Force commander Major General Tomer Bar instructed the IDF to prioritize airstrikes targeting Hezbollah's drone unit, which is responsible for drone production and operations.[15] Bar said that the IDF Air Force set the goal to target every Hezbollah fighter, “from junior to senior,” in Hezbollah’s drone unit.[16] Israeli airstrikes have primarily targeted Hezbollah’s rocket and missile capabilities but have occasionally targeted Hezbollah drone assets. The IDF recently struck drone warehouses in southern Lebanon on October 8 and 9, for example.[17]

Iranian media reported that Russia will launch two satellites on Iran’s behalf after Iran sent the two satellites to Russia on October 11.[18] Iran sent a high-resolution imaging ”Kowsar” satellite and a small ”Hodhod” communications satellite to Russia.[19] Russia was originally scheduled to launch these satellites in December 2023 but was delayed.[20] Russia previously launched two Iranian satellites in August 2022 and February 2024.[21] Russia will launch these satellites using the Soyuz space launch vehicle, which Russia also used in the February 2024 launch.[22]  Iran could use the ”Kowsar” satellite to collect imagery on US or allied troop positions and bases in the region. CTP-ISW has not observed acknowledgment of the satellite delivery in Russian media.

An unspecified Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force member told Kuwait-based newspaper Al Jarida that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed IRGC Quds Force Deputy Commander Mohammad Reza Fallah Zadeh to serve as an operational adviser to Lebanese Hezbollah.[23] CTP-ISW cannot corroborate or verify this claim. The source claimed that Fallah Zadeh would help ”manage the current war” with Israel and secure logistical and communications support. The source reported that Fallah Zadeh will not advise Hezbollah in political matters or change the political structure of Hezbollah. Hezbollah has not announced its next Secretary General following airstrikes that killed Hassan Nasrallah and his presumed successor Hashem Safi el Din.[24] Al Jarida has previously made unsubstantiated claims citing unspecified IRGC Quds Force officials that CTP-ISW also could not independently verify. No other reputable news organization independently reported similar claims corroborating al Jarida’s previous reports.

Iranian media published the full text of the “Development Plan for the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Technology” on October 14.[25] A parliamentary presidium member recently announced the plan on October 6.[26] The plan calls for the establishment of an “Atomic Energy Council” comprised of 19 members, including the Iranian president and the ministers of energy, foreign affairs, and defense.[27] The plan also stipulates that the National Development Fund must invest at least $1 billion in Iranian nuclear power projects annually.

Iran is continuing to coordinate with regional and Axis of Resistance leaders ahead of an expected Israeli retaliatory strike on Iran. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi traveled to Baghdad on October 13 to discuss the “special and dangerous conditions” in the Middle East with senior Iraqi officials.[28] Araghchi may have warned Iraqi officials against allowing Israel to use Iraqi airspace to attack Iran. Iraqi Foreign Affairs Minister Fuad Hussein described “[Israel's] exploitation of Iraqi airspace” to attack Iran as “completely unacceptable” during a press conference with Araghchi.[29] Iraqi President Abdul Latif al Rashid separately emphasized that Iraq “will never serve as a launching pad” for attacking Iran during a meeting with Araghchi.[30] Western media previously reported that Israel likely used Iraqi airspace to attack Iran on April 18 in retaliation for the April 13 Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel.[31] Previous Iraqi governments have also warned Iran and the United States against using Iraq as a ”launching pad” for regional conflict, though these governments in practice are unable to prevent Iranian-backed groups in particular from using Iraqi territory to target US forces and Israel.[32]

Araghchi separately met with senior Omani officials and senior Houthi official Mohammad Abdulsalam in Muscat, Oman, on October 13.[33] Araghchi told reporters in Muscat that Iran has stopped indirect talks with the United States, likely referring to indirect talks that US and Iranian officials have held in Oman in recent months to try to avoid escalation in the region.[34] Oman and Iraq have historically served as intermediaries between Iran and the United States, and Araghchi may have called on the Omani and Iraqi governments to pressure the United States to restrain Israel’s response to the October 1 Iranian attack.[35] Unspecified sources told CNN on October 12 that Iranian officials have been conducting “urgent diplomacy” with Middle Eastern countries to try to reduce the scale of Israel’s retaliation.[36] The sources added that the Iranian regime is “extremely nervous” about the retaliation and is “uncertain” that the United States can convince Israel not to strike Iranian nuclear and energy infrastructure.[37]

Key Takeaways:

• Hezbollah Drone Strike in Israel: Hezbollah’s October 13 drone attack targeting an IDF base is likely part of an effort to impose costs on Israel as Hezbollah faces operational challenges in southern Lebanon. This strike is likely an effort to impose costs on Israel at a time when Hezbollah can conduct only limited defensive operations in southern Lebanon.
• Hezbollah Tactical Adaptation: Hezbollah has almost certainly adopted a new tactic in an attempt to evade Israeli air defenses. The development of this tactic is a byproduct of Hezbollah’s year-long learning process during its fires campaign targeting civilian and military sites in northern Israel since October 2023.
• Iran-Russia: Iranian media reported that Russia will launch two satellites on Iran’s behalf after Iran sent the two satellites to Russia on October 11.
• Iranian Support to Hezbollah: An unspecified Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force member told Kuwait-based newspaper Al Jarida that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed IRGC Quds Force Deputy Commander Mohammad Reza Fallah Zadeh to serve as an operational adviser to Lebanese Hezbollah. CTP-ISW cannot corroborate or verify this claim.
• Iranian Preparations for Israeli Strike: Iran is continuing to coordinate with regional and Axis of Resistance leaders ahead of an expected Israeli retaliatory strike on Iran.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and the public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip
  
  

The IDF announced on October 14 that the IDF Air Force had struck and killed the head of Hamas’ aerial unit in the Gaza Strip, Samer Ismail Hader Abu Daqa, in September 2024.[38] Abu Daqa was responsible for the infiltration of drones into Israeli territory, including during the October 7 attacks.[39] The IDF Air Force struck in the al Mawasi humanitarian zone in Kahn Younis on September 9 targeting three senior Hamas commanders, including Daqa.[40]

Humanitarian aid groups began the second round of the mass polio vaccination campaign in the Gaza Strip on October 14.[41] The Gazan Ministry of Health announced on October 13 that this round of the campaign will consist of three phases that would start in Deir al Balah on October 14.[42] The other phases of the campaign will occur in Khan Younis and Rafah and then Gaza and the northern Gaza Strip. Humanitarian aid groups completed the first round on September 12.[43] Israel and Hamas both agreed to observe limited humanitarian pauses in designated areas of the central, southern, and northern Gaza Strip throughout the first round of the campaign.[44] Neither Hamas nor Israel have publicly agreed to observe limited humanitarian pauses for this round of the campaign at the time of this writing. UNRWA claimed that Israeli forces near the Nuseirat refugee camp fired several tank rounds on October 13 that hit a UNRWA school that humanitarian aid groups had planned to use as an immunization site during the second ground of the campaign.[45] UNRWA head Phillippe Lazzarini said that a UNRWA school in the central Gaza Strip recently hit by an Israeli airstrike was also to be used for the vaccination campaign.[46]

The IDF 143rd, 162nd, and 252nd Divisions continued operations in the Gaza Strip on October 14.[47] IDF forces killed fighters in combat operations and located weapons, warehouses, tunnel shafts, and unspecified infrastructure.

Hamas fired small arms and detonated an IED targeting Israeli armor north of Beit Lahia on October 13.[48]

Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) conducted multiple IED, mortar, and small arms attacks targeting Israeli personnel and armor both within Jabalia Camp and in areas surrounding the camp.[49] The IDF 162nd Division continues to conduct clearing operations in Jabalia.[50]

The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and the Popular Resistance Committees fired rockets targeting Israeli forces along the Netzarim Corridor on October 13.[51] The IDF 252nd Division operates along the Corridor.[52]

The IDF Air Force struck a Hamas command-and-control site in the central Gaza Strip on October 13.[53] The IDF said that Hamas fighters used the al Aqsa Martyrs' Hospital in Deir al Balah to plan and conduct attacks targeting Israeli forces and Israeli territory. The IDF added that it took steps to minimize civilian casualties.[54] The Wall Street Journal reported that the strike killed four Palestinians and injured around 40.[55] The IDF last struck a Hamas command-and-control site based in the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Hosptial in Deir al Balah on October 6.[56]

The IDF said that a 401st Armored Brigade soldier was injured on October 13 by anti-tank fire targeting an armored force in the southern Gaza Strip.[57] The IDF Air Force struck Palestinian fighters who had fired an anti-tank guided missile targeting Israeli forces on October 14.[58] The IDF also said that a 460th Armored Brigade soldier died in battle in the southern Gaza Strip on October 14.[59] Hamas fired a rocket-propelled grenade targeting an IDF tank east of Rafah on October 13.[60] Hamas separately detonated an anti-personnel mine targeting Israeli forces east of Rafah on October 14.[61]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel
  
  

An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that Israeli forces entered “the heart of Jenin refugee camp” on October 14 to arrest a senior militia fighter.[62] The correspondent added that Israeli forces isolated the building and then forced the fighter to surrender.

Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least three locations in Jenin since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 13.[63] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades conducted multiple small arms and IED attacks targeting Israeli forces within Jenin refugee camp.[64] PIJ also fired small arms and detonated an IED targeting Israeli forces and armor near the camp.[65]

Northern Israel and Lebanon

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria
  
  

Hezbollah continued to engage Israeli forces near Aita al Shaab and Ramyeh in southern Lebanon on October 14.[66] An unspecified IDF Division began operations in the area on October 13.[67] Hezbollah targeted an Israeli armored personnel carrier with an anti-tank guided missile in Aita al Shaab and claimed that the attack killed and wounded Israeli soldiers.[68] Hezbollah fighters also engaged Israeli forces with various types of machine guns, rockets, and mortars in Aita al Shaab.[69]

Hezbollah claimed to target Israeli forces attempting to enter Markaba in southeast Lebanon on October 14. Hezbollah targeted Israeli forces near the village with mortar and rocket fire.[70] Hezbollah-affiliated sources reported IDF armor movements near Markaba and other nearby border areas.[71] The IDF began operating in Odaisseh, which is adjacent to Markaba, on October 1, but Hezbollah-affiliated sources reported that Israeli forces withdrew from Odaisseh on October 7.[72]

The IDF 146th Reserve Division continued clearing operations in southwestern Lebanon on October 13.[73] The IDF 2nd Infantry Brigade (Res.) has located dozens of tunnel shafts and ammunition depots since beginning targeted operations in southwest Lebanon.[74] The brigade has killed several Hezbollah fighters, including at least five Hezbollah Radwan SOF fighters.[75] An Israeli Army Radio journalist released footage of a Hezbollah command compound near Labbouneh on October 13.[76] Hezbollah targeted Israeli forces in Labbouneh with multiple rocket barrages.[77]

The IDF 91st Division continued clearing operations in southern Lebanon.[78] The IDF 8th Armored Brigade discovered a Hezbollah Rawdan SOF underground command post complex in ”the heart of a residential neighborhood.”[79] The IDF said that the command post was fully stocked with weapons and supplies for Radwan fighters that they would need to complete a ground incursion into northern Israel.[80] Israeli forces engaged a Hezbollah fighter barricaded in the complex.[81]

The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson called on civilians to evacuate immediately from 25 towns and villages in southern Lebanon on October 14.[82] Most of the towns are north of the Litani River.[83] The spokesperson told residents that they should move north of the Awali River.

IDF continued an air campaign to degrade Hezbollah capabilities and leadership on October 14. The IDF Air Force struck about 200 Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon and deep inside Lebanon over the past day.[84] The strikes targeted rocket launchers, anti-tank guided missile launching positions, military buildings, and weapons depots.[85] Hezbollah has recently used some of the rocket launchers to target Israel.[86] Unspecified CNN sources reported on October 13 that the IDF has paused targeting Beirut after conversations with the Biden Administration.[87] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated on October 14 that Israel would continue to target Hezbollah assets in Beirut.[88] The IDF Air Force struck and killed Hezbollah Radwan SOF anti-tank missile unit commander Muhammad Kamal Naim in Nabatiyeh, southern Lebanon.[89] An Israeli airstrike also targeted Hezbollah member Ahmed Faqih near Tripoli, according to local Lebanese sources.[90] The Lebanese Red Cross said that the strike killed at least 18.[91] This strike is the second time that the IDF has targeted the Tripoli area during its air campaign.[92] Hezbollah does not have a strong support base in Tripoli.

This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on October 13to 2:00pm ET on October 14. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.

Hezbollah has conducted at least 30 attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 13.[93] Hezbollah targeted IDF bases near Haifa and Netanya.[94] Hezbollah’s operations room issued a statement on October 11 that Hezbollah forces would gradually increase their rate of attack targeting Israeli towns and military bases ”deep” in Israel.[95] Hezbollah fired rockets and mortars in at least 18 separate attacks targeting Israeli positions along the Israel-Lebanon border.[96] Hezbollah targeted Israeli forces in Manara six separate times.[97]

Iran and the Axis of Resistance

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf attended the 149th Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) Assembly in Geneva on October 13 to 17.[98] Ghalibaf called on the international community to put pressure on the United States to restrain Israel in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon in his speech to the IPU.[99] Ghalibaf reiterated his plea to isolate and confront Israel at the Assemblies of Asian Countries (APA) on the sidelines of the IPU Assembly.[100] Ghalibaf also held bilateral meetings with his Emirati and Iraqi, Tanzanian counterparts.[101] Ghalibaf underlined in the Emirati, Iraqi, and Tanzanian meetings how the current instability in the Middle East requires further political and economic cooperation between Iran and these states.[102]

The US State Department and the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assests Control (OFAC) sanctioned a total of 16 entities engaged in Iran’s petroleum trade and 22 identified vessels as blocked property on October 11.[103] These sanctions follow Iran’s October 1 attack on Israel.

The United Kingdom Foreign, Common & Development Office (FCDO) announced new sanctions on October 14 in response to the October 1 Iranian ballistic missile attack on Israel on the following individuals and entities:[104]

• Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi
• Artesh Deputy Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Hossein Dadras
• Artesh Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Habibollah Sayyari
• Artesh Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi
• Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Intelligence Organization Chief Brigadier General Mohammad Kazemi
• IRGC spokesperson Brigadier General Ali Mohammad Naini
• Chief Engineer of Farzanegan Propulsion Systems Design Bureau (FPSDB), Hossein Pourfarzaneh
• Farzanegan Propulsion Systems Design Bureau (FPSDB), responsible for producing engine technology for cruise missiles
• The Iranian Space Agency, responsible for launching vehicle technologies for ballistic missile development

The European Union council sanctioned seven individuals and seven entities in Iran on October 14 for their involvement in Iran’s drone and missile transfers to Russia, for Russia to use in its offensive campaign in Ukraine.[105] The sanctioned entities include three airlines: Saha Airlines, Mahan Air and Iran Air, and two procurement firms. The EU Council also imposed asset freezes and travel bans on Iranian Deputy Defense Minister Seyed Hamazeh Ghalandari and other prominent officials in the IRGC Quds Force, IRGC Khatam al Anbiya Central Headquarters, IRGC Aerospace Force Space Division, and the managing directors of Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries (HESA) and Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO).

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei discussed domestic economic issues in a meeting with President Masoud Pezeshkian on October 14.[106] Pezeshkian stated that the Supreme Leader called on Pezeshkian to implement plans to expand economic relations with neighboring countries. Pezeshkian stated that if these plans are implemented it will reduce the impact of sanctions. Pezeshkian added that Iran is considering expanding cooperation with China and other unspecified countries that ”have a desire for strategic cooperation” with Iran. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei previously identified resolving Iran’s economic issues as one of his thirteen policy recommendations he gave to Pezeshkian at the start of his presidency.[107]|

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed two drone attacks targeting unspecified “vital target[s]” in the Jordan Valley since CTPs-ISW's last data cutoff on October 13.[108] The Israeli Air Force intercepted two drones on October 14 that approached Israel from Syria.[109] The drones did not enter Israeli airspace.

 

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[1] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-13-2024 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/15463;  https://x.com/idfonline/status/1845579620189606395;  

[2] https://t.me/mmirleb/7888  ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/15463 

[3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-11-2024  ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/15318  ; https://x.com/israelradar_com/status/1842559548646670685?s=46&t=TMbDQtRFur-HDVAEVR7Byg  

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-9-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-11-2024  

[5] https://t.me/mmirleb/7888

[6] https://t.me/mmirleb/7797

[7] www dot idf.il/238966

[8] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15463

[9] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15463 ; https://www.haaretz dot com/israel-news/2024-10-14/ty-article/.premium/will-israel-find-a-way-to-stop-lethal-drones-from-exposing-its-weak-point/00000192-8b53-d622-a9da-cf5bf1d70000

[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-25-2024

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-5-2024

[12] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15469 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1845835766896758929 

[13] jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-824555 ; https://t.me/IL_RedAlerts/13267

[14] https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-lebanon-iran-gaza-attack-10-14-24-intl-hnk#cm292gbzm000s3b6mvxqx8zcp

[15] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15463 ; https://x.com/Lazar_Berman/status/1845827597667545342  

[16] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15463; https://x.com/Lazar_Berman/status/1845827597667545342 

[17] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1843972108063580510 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1844024735862329737

[18] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/07/21/3175967

[19] https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-sends-satellites-russia-rocket-launch-tasnim-reports-2024-10-12/

[20] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/08/21/2987297

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-28-2024 ; https://apnews.com/article/russia-iran-satellite-space-launch-vostochny-roscosmos-60e877149748b46a63c597c7e3714be0

[22] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/07/21/3175967 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-28-2024

[23] https://www.aljarida dot com/article/77625

[24] https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-israel-hezbollah-airstrikes-28-september-2024-c4751957433ff944c4eb06027885a973 ; https://www.axios.com/2024/10/03/hezbollah-leader-israel-airstrike-beirut-lebanon

[25] https://mehrnews dot com/news/6256273/

[26] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/07/15/3172569

[27] https://mehrnews dot com/news/6256273/

[28] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/07/23/3178332

[29] https://www.barrons.com/news/iraq-says-against-expansion-of-war-towards-iran-use-of-airspace-6d287377 ;

https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%B9-%D8%AD%D8%B0%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%B1-%D9%88%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B6%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82

[30] https://farsnews dot ir/Qaysar/1728894894153275105/President%3A-Iraq-Not-A-Platform-for-Attack-on-Iran

[31] https://apnews.com/article/iran-israel-mideast-tensions-4-19-2024-a7ccbae2e2844bab089e8e4377a24ddb ;

https://amwaj.media/article/israel-attack-on-iran

[32] https://www.reuters.com/article/world/iraqi-leader-battles-pressure-from-friends-and-foes-in-security-crackdown-idUSKBN2761AF/ ;

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/why-did-iran-back-mustafa-al-kadhimi-as-iraqi-prime-minister/

[33] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/iranian-fm-meets-top-houthi-official/ ;

https://mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/754882 ;

https://mfa.gov dot ir/portal/newsview/754904

[34] https://www.barrons.com/news/iran-says-no-grounds-for-indirect-talks-with-us-25565c78 ;

https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-may-27-2024

[35] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/18/us/politics/us-iran-talks-oman.html ;

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/15/world/middleeast/iran-us-secret-talks.html ;

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47321

[36] https://www.cnn.com/2024/10/11/politics/iran-nervous-israel-response-missile-attacks/index.html

[37] https://www.cnn.com/2024/10/11/politics/iran-nervous-israel-response-missile-attacks/index.html

[38] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1845871598756344103

[39] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1845871602476486853 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1845871605076922381

[40] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-10-2024

[41] https://x.com/UNICEFpalestine/status/1845741688125292910

[42] https://t.me/hamza20300/300848

[43] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-13-2024

[44] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-1-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-6-2024

[45] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/10/14/israel-airstrike-gaza-hospital-tent-camp-fire/

[46] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-drone-strike-kills-4-israeli-soldiers-injures-dozens-911aa861?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1

[47] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1845740679869112726

[48] https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/20067/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84-373-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AB%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88

[49] https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/20067/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84-373-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AB%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/18680 ; https://t.me/newpress1/93725 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/18682

[50] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-13-2024

[51] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7688

[52] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-13-2024

[53] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1845621583911469340

[54] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1845621583911469340

[55] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-drone-strike-kills-4-israeli-soldiers-injures-dozens-911aa861?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1

[56] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1843097714449592799

[57] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1845703487444717814 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/15444 ;

[58] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1845740682528338319

[59] https://idfanc dot activetrail.biz/ANC1410202044380756335

[60] https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/20067/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84-373-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AB%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88

[61] https://t.me/newpress1/93705

[62] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15453

[63] https://t.me/sarayajneen/1646 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7689

[64] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7689 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7690 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7692 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1647

[65] https://t.me/sarayajneen/1646 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1648

[66] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15406  ;

[67] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15406

[68] https://t.me/mmirleb/7907

[69] https://t.me/mmirleb/7906

[70] https://t.me/mmirleb/7919 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7912 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7905 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7897

[71] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/91323

[72] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1840981159968198785 ; https://t.me/dahieh4all/41268 ; https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-iran-missile-attack-middle-east-10-02-24-intl-hnk#cm1rsa7ns001c3b6oefa8up2y

[73] www dot idf.il/239865

[74] www dot idf.il/239865

[75] www dot idf.il/239865

[76] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1845480091612254304

[77] https://t.me/mmirleb/7892 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7898

[78] www dot idf.il/239900

[79] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1845858905286381699

[80] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1845858905286381699

[81] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1845858905286381699

[82] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1845763386891522301

[83] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1845763386891522301

[84] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1845740672654926048 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1845740676257833144

[85] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1845740676257833144

[86] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1845782944163434544 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1845784394314707340

[87] https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-lebanon-iran-gaza-attack-10-14-24-intl-hnk#cm28tbta700053b6m023cnwj2

[88] https://x.com/netanyahu/status/1845860445355151443

[89] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1845782937310044481 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1845784394314707340

[90] https://www dot mtv.com.lb/News/%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%B1/1501209/%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%A3%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%B7%D9%88-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%82%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%B2%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%A7-%D9%87%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A4%D9%88%D9%84-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D9%81%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%87 ; https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1845811401941536921 ; https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1845792796109578558

[91] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1845811401941536921 ; https://www dot mtv.com.lb/News/%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%B1/1501209/%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%A3%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%B7%D9%88-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%82%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%B2%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%A7-%D9%87%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A4%D9%88%D9%84-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D9%81%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%87

[92] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/88136

[93] https://t.me/mmirleb/7876 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7877 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7878 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7879 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7880 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7882 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7883 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7884 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7885 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7893 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7894 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7899 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7900 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7903 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7904 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7910 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7908 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7909 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7911 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7918 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7920

https://t.me/mmirleb/7921 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7922 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7923 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7925 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7926 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7927 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7928 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7929 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7930

[94] https://t.me/mmirleb/7903 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7900 https://t.me/mmirleb/7885

[95] https://t.me/mmirleb/7917

[96] https://t.me/mmirleb/7930 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7928

https://t.me/mmirleb/7929 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7920 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7921  ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7922 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7918 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7904 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7899  ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7893 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7894 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7883 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7876 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7877 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7878 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7879 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7880 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7882

[97] https://t.me/mmirleb/7921 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7876 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7878 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7879 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7880 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7882

[98] https://www.ipu.org/event/149th-ipu-assembly-and-related-meetings;

https://farsnews dot ir/Rahgozar_b/1728819002843624489/Iran-Speaker-Calls-for-Cutting-Political%2C-Economic-Ties-with-Zionists

[99] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6255491

[100] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/07/22/3177154/

[101] https://mehrnews dot com/news/6255862;

https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/07/23/3178641/;

https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/698183

[102] https://mehrnews dot com/news/6255862;

https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/07/23/3178641/;

https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/698183

[103] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2644;

https://www.state.gov/sanctioning-entities-that-have-traded-in-irans-petroleum/

[104] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-announces-sanctions-against-iranian-military-figures-and-organisations-following-attack-on-israel

[105] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/10/14/iran-seven-individuals-and-seven-entities-sanctioned-in-response-to-iran-s-missile-transfer-to-russia/

[106] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/07/23/3178865

[107] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-august-27-2024

[108] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1348 ;

https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1346

[109] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1845771865635098941

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 14, 2024

Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, Christina Harward, Nate Trotter, and George Barros

October 14, 2024, 5:50pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on October 1. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov arrived in the People's Republic of China (PRC) for an official visit on October 14, highlighting continued Russia-PRC defense cooperation against the backdrop of bilateral naval exercises in the Pacific Ocean. Belousov met with PRC Defense Minister Dong Jun in Beijing on August 14 and discussed the role of bilateral cooperation in enhancing each state's respective defensive capabilities and maintaining global security and regional stability.[1] Dong emphasized that Russia and the PRC share a common desire to develop military cooperation and open new avenues for unspecified joint defense cooperation.[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) notably published footage on October 14 of ongoing joint Russia-PRC People's Liberation Army (PLA) anti-submarine naval exercises in the northwestern Pacific Ocean and claimed that a detachment of Russian and PLA naval vessels are conducting a joint patrol of the Asia–Pacific region.[3] Such joint naval exercises are manifestations of intensified Russia-PRC defense cooperation, as each party can learn valuable lessons from one another during combined exercises, improving interoperability and potentially shaping military doctrine in the future. Russian forces have experience repelling Ukrainian autonomous naval drone strikes against Russian naval and port infrastructure, and the PLA may hope to absorb some of these lessons in planning for the PRC's potential future actions against Taiwan. Taiwan's MoD warned that the PRC launched "massive military drills" encircling Taiwan with warships on October 14, which overlapped with Belousov's visit.[4]

Russian forces struck civilian vessels docked at Ukrainian ports for the fourth time since October 5, part of an apparent Russian strike campaign targeting port areas to undermine Ukraine's grain corridor, spoil international support for Ukraine, and push Ukraine into premature negotiations. Odesa Oblast officials reported that Russian forces struck the port of Odesa with a ballistic missile during the day on October 14, hitting the civilian vessels NS Moon flying the Belize flag and the Optima dry cargo vessel flying the Palau flag, as well as port infrastructure and a grain warehouse.[5] The officials stated that Russian strikes on October 7 already damaged the Optima. Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces most recently struck civilian vessels docked at the port of Odesa overnight on October 5 to 6 and on October 7 and 9.[6] Russian ultranationalist milbloggers responded to the October 9 strike with rhetoric supporting existing Kremlin narratives aimed at undermining confidence in the grain corridor as well as attempting to justify the strike.[7] Milbloggers explicitly called for further Russian strikes against Ukrainian grain infrastructure, civilian vessels at Ukrainian ports, and other targets that would further degrade Ukraine's economic potential. ISW recently assessed that Russian strikes against civilian vessels and other grain corridor infrastructure are almost certainly intended to undermine Western confidence in Ukraine's ability to enforce and defend the corridor, influence ongoing Western discussions about long-term support for Ukraine, and impede Ukraine's ability to survive economically during the war.[8]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov arrived in the People's Republic of China (PRC) for an official visit on October 14, highlighting continued Russia-PRC defense cooperation against the backdrop of bilateral naval exercises in the Pacific Ocean.
• Russian forces struck civilian vessels docked at Ukrainian ports for the fourth time since October 5, part of an apparent Russian strike campaign targeting port areas to undermine Ukraine's grain corridor, spoil international support for Ukraine, and push Ukraine into premature negotiations.
• Russian sources claimed that Russian forces recaptured positions in Kursk Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces recently regained positions in central Toretsk.
• Russian forces recently conducted a reduced battalion-sized mechanized assault in the Kurakhove direction and recently made confirmed advances northeast of Vuhledar.
• Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on October 11 that sources within the Russian Presidential Administration stated that the Kremlin's "Time of Heroes" program, which places veterans of the war in Ukraine into government positions after returning to Russia, is meant to increase the popularity of contract military service and boost recruitment.
• Russian occupation officials continue to pathologize Ukrainian identity in an effort to indoctrinate children in occupied Ukraine.
  

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus
  
  

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces reportedly recaptured territory in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on October 14. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recaptured Tolsty Lug (southeast of Korenevo), and one milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade recaptured Cherkasskaya Konopelka (southeast of Sudzha).[9] The milblogger later claimed that they could not confirm the Russian capture of Cherkasskaya Konopelka but that Russian forces had recaptured the "Lotos" gas station north of the settlement.[10] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces recaptured territory southeast of Koreveno near Novoivanovka and southeast of Sudzha near Borky and Plekhovo.[11] ISW has not observed confirmation of any of these Russian claims, however. A Russian milblogger claimed that reports that Russian forces have advanced to the outskirts of Sudzha are false, and ISW has only collected sufficient data to assess that Russian forces are around seven kilometers from the outskirts of Sudzha at the closest point, although Russian forces may be closer.[12] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Kremyanoye (east of Korenevo), Lyubimovka (southeast of Korenevo), Zeleny Shlyakh (immediately east of Lyubimovka), Novoivanovka, Fanaseevka (southeast of Sudzha), and Plekhovo.[13] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Olgovka (east of Korenevo), Lyubimovka, Tolsty Lug, Nizhny Klin (southeast of Lyubimovka), Zeleny Shlyakh, and Cherkasskaya Konopelka.[14] Elements of the Russian 106th VDV Division are reportedly operating near Lyubimovka; elements of the 83rd VDV Brigade are reportedly operating near Tolsty Lug and Pokrovsky (southwest of Tolsty Lug); and elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Military District [SMD]), 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]), 98th VDV Division, and 22nd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Kursk direction.[15]

 

Russian forces reportedly recaptured territory in Glushkovsky Raion (west of the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast) on October 14. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Novy Put (southwest of Glushkovo) and have pushed Ukrainian forces out of most of the Ukrainian salient south of Veseloye (also southwest of Glushkovo).[16] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novy Put.[17] Elements of the Russian 56th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Glushkovsky Raion.[18]

A Russian milblogger claimed that the autumnal muddy season (rasputitsa) has begun in Kursk Oblast and that Russian forces' reliance on tracked vehicles gives Russian forces an advantage over Ukrainian wheeled vehicles.[19] The milblogger noted that the mud is affecting both Ukrainian and Russian combat operations. ISW previously assessed that the approaching muddy season likely impacted the Russian operational calculus to intensify counterattacks in Kursk Oblast on October 10.[20]

Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov claimed on October 14 that Russian forces have recaptured roughly half of the territory that Ukrainian forces occupied in Kursk Oblast since the beginning of the Kursk Oblast incursion in August 2024.[21] ISW has observed visual evidence or Russian claims of Russian forces recapturing approximately 46 percent of the territory within the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast.

Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on October 14 that a fire started by unspecified actors destroyed a Russian Tu-134 aircraft belonging to the 117th Military Transport Aviation Regiment after a fire broke out at the "Orenburg-2" Military Airfield near Orenburg City, Russia on the night of October 12 to 13.[22] The GUR stated that Russian forces use Tu-134 aircraft to transport senior Ministry of Defense (MoD) staff. ISW cannot independently verify the destruction of the aircraft or the actors responsible at this time.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces reportedly advanced within Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) amid continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 14. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced along Korolenka Street in northern Vovchansk, although ISW has not yet observed visual evidence of this claim.[23] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Starytsya (southwest of Vovchansk) on October 13 and 14.[24] Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) reportedly continue to operate in northern Kharkiv Oblast, and elements of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City).[25]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces reportedly marginally advanced northwest of Kreminna amid continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on October 14. A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) advanced east of Novosadove (northwest of Kreminna), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[26] Ukrainian Severodonetsk City Administration Head Roman Vlasenko stated that Russian forces are focusing their attacks northwest of Kreminna in the directions of Zhuravka Balka and Makiivka and south of Kreminna in the directions of Bilohorivka and the Serebryanske forest area.[27] Russian forces also continued attacks northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane, Stepova Novoselivka, Lozova, and Kolisnykivka; west of Svatove near Kopanky and Vyshneve; southwest of Svatove near Novoyehorivka, Druzhelyubivka, Hrekivka, Nevske, Terny, and Yampolivka; and west of Kreminna near Torske and Zarichne on October 13 and 14.[28] Elements of the Russian 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th CAA, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[29]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on October 14, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[30]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on October 14, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed on October 14 that Russian forces advanced along the T0504 Bakhmut-Kostyantynivka highway east of Chasiv Yar and in fields southwest of Hryhorivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar), however ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[31] Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar, north of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky on October 13 and 14.[32] Elements of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[33] Elements of the Russian 1008th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating in the forest area east of Stupochky.[34]

 

Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in central Toretsk amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on October 14. Geolocated footage published on October 13 shows elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA] [formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) shelling Ukrainian forces in central Toretsk, indicating that Ukrainian forces recently regained positions in the area.[35] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 14 that Russian forces advanced in southern Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[36] Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk and Shcherbynivka on October 13 and 14.[37] Elements of the Russian "Lavina" Battalion (132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating within Toretsk.[38]

 

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk on October 14, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Novotoretske, Myrolyubivka, and Myrnohrad and southeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhyi Yar, Hirnyk, Lysivka, Selydove, Tsukuryne, Kreminna Balka, Izmailivka, Novohrodivka, Krutyi Yar, Novodmytrivka, Kurakhivka, Novoselydivka, Zhelanne Druhe, and Zoryane on October 13 and 14.[39] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Myrnohrad, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[40]

 

Russian forces recently conducted a reinforced-platoon mechanized assault in the Kurakhove direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on October 14. Geolocated footage published on October 13 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a Russian-reduced battalion-sized mechanized assault consisting of 25 armored vehicles and five tanks in the Kurakhove direction.[41] Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed seven of the armored vehicles and one tank. Russian milbloggers continued to claim on October 14 that Russian forces seized Ostrivske (east of Kurakhove), but ISW has yet to observe confirmation that Russian forces have seized the entire settlement.[42] Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Kurakhove near Maksymilyanivka on October 14.[43] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade and 20th Motorized Rifle Division (both of the 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Dalne (south of Kurakhove), and elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Ostrivske.[44] Elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD), including its 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment, are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction.[45]

Russian forces recently made confirmed advances southwest of Donetsk City near Vuhledar amid continued offensive operations in the area on October 14. Geolocated footage published on October 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Vodyane (northeast of Vuhledar).[46] Russian milbloggers claimed on October 14 that Russian forces advanced northwest of Vodyane and northwest of Vuhledar, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[47] Russian forces continued offensive operations near northeast of Vuhledar near Kostyantynivka, Antonivka, Katerynivka, and Vodyane; northwest of Vuhledar towards Bohoyavlenka; and west of Vuhledar near Zolota Nyva on October 13 and 14.[48] Elements of the Russian “Karia” detachment of the 68th AC (Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Katerynivka.[49] Elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Zolota Nyva.[50]

 

Russian forces reportedly advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on October 14, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed on October 14 that Russian forces advanced northeast of Pryyutne and north of Levadne (both southwest of Velyka Novosilka), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[51] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko stated on October 14 that Russian forces have transferred large amounts of personnel from Novoazovsk towards Vremivka or Polohy (west of Vremivka) on October 13.[52] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces struck near Novodarivka (southwest of Velyka Novosilka) with 60 unguided aerial rockets.[53] Elements of the Russian ”Storm” Detachment of the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Levadne.[54]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces conducted ground assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Robotyne, Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne), and Novodanylivka (north of Robotyne) on October 13 and 14 but did not make any confirmed gains.[55]

 

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 13 and 14 that Russian forces conducted assaults in the Dnipro direction, likely referring to left (east) bank Kherson Oblast and the islands in the Dnipro River Delta.[56]

 

Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reiterated on October 14 that Russian forces are prioritizing allocating resources to protect the Kerch Strait Bridge — more so than towards protecting other critical infrastructure, such as oil depots.[57] Pletenchuk noted that Russian forces are no longer able to use naval assets to protect the bridge, likely due to the threat of Ukrainian strikes, but are now using booms, barriers, and aviation to protect the bridge. Pletenchuk previously stated that Russian forces were constructing structures near the bridge — possibly either a hydrotechnical or barrier structure — and placed an unspecified number of air defense systems in occupied Crimea to defend the bridge against Ukrainian drone and missile strikes.[58]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces did not conduct missile or drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on October 13 to 14. Ukrainian Air Force Communications Department Acting Head Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that the night of October 13-14 was the first night in 48 days (since August 29) that Russian forces did not attempt to strike Ukraine with Shahed drones.[59]

See topline text for reporting on the Russian missile strike against the port of Odesa during the day on October 14.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on October 11 that sources within the Russian Presidential Administration stated that the Kremlin's "Time of Heroes" program, which places veterans of the war in Ukraine into government positions after returning to Russia, is meant to increase the popularity of contract military service and boost recruitment.[60] Presidential Administration sources reportedly stated that the Kremlin's recent rush to appoint military personnel to government positions is in part due to the situation at the front in Ukraine. Some of the Russian veterans who have received political positions through the program have reportedly not actually begun working in their new workplaces, and sources stated that the program selects positions in which the veterans will not actually have any "political weight." A source within the Russian Federation Council reportedly stated that the Kremlin is trying to use appointments through the "Time of Heroes" program to prove that military personnel are "well employed in civilian life." Verstka's sources stated that some of the veteran appointees in the Federation Council lack higher education and that other senators do not accept or communicate with them. The Kremlin leveraged the Russian regional elections in early September 2024 to integrate Russian veterans, including those from the "Time of Heroes" program, into government positions.[61] Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev appointed a veteran of the war in Ukraine as the oblast's acting vice-governor and head of the anti-corruption department on October 14.[62]

Russian authorities reportedly continue to impress migrants into signing military contracts. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's (RFE/RL) Current Time outlet reported on October 14 that Russian prison authorities are using threats of punishment to force prisoners from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to renounce their native citizenship, apply for Russian citizenship, and sign contracts with the Russian military to fight in Ukraine.[63] Current Time reported that prisoners stated that Russian prison guards are intentionally treating Tajik and Uzbek prisoners poorly to coerce them to sign Russian military contracts.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 13 that the Russian military created a first-person view (FPV) drone operator course within the Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Force operating in occupied Kherson Oblast.[64] The training will reportedly include tactical and technical theory, computer simulations, and practical hands-on training. The Russian ultranationalist milblogger community recently expressed mass outrage after a Russian military commander disbanded a specialized drone unit and committed drone operators to frontal assaults in Donetsk Oblast, resulting in the operators' deaths, and the Russian MoD may be attempting to appease this outrage by dedicating resources to specialized drone operator training.[65]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is suspending publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts until further notice.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials continue to pathologize Ukrainian identity in an effort to indoctrinate children in occupied Ukraine. Kherson Oblast occupation Information Policy Department Head Yevgeny Brykov emphasized on October 14 the merits of Russian "military-patriotic education" as a "cure" for Ukrainian "ideologies" and claimed that pro-Ukrainian sentiments in children are a "virus" that Russia needs to treat.[66] Various Ukrainian officials discussed Russian military-patriotic education and indoctrination efforts aimed at eliminating Ukrainian identity and pro-Ukrainian sentiment in occupied areas, strongly emphasizing the insidious effect of Russian efforts to pathologize Ukrainian identity and to claim that it is somehow "dangerous" or "deviant."[67] Social media footage circulated on October 14 shows a group of primary school-aged children in occupied Mariupol participating in "Orlyata Rossii," which ISW has previously reported is a branch of the Kremlin-funded "Movement of the First" youth organization that works to spread pro-Russian and hyper-militaristic ideals among youth in occupied Ukraine and within Russia.[68] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko warned that "Orlyata Rossii" is intended to expand "ideological influence" over young Ukrainian children and raise them to support and potentially fight in the Russian military in the future.[69] Ukrainian Berdyansk City Head Victoria Halitsina noted that Russian occupation authorities in Berdyansk are increasingly threatening parents with fines if they do not send their children to Russian-run schools and reported that the Russian occupation of Berdyansk has militarized school curricula.[70]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian sources promoted threatening narratives accusing Central Asian states of anti-Russian actions in an effort to undermine the agency of Central Asian states and the role of the US in the region. A prominent Kremlin-awarded milblogger, who notably runs several media and information policy schools in Central Asia, complained on October 14 that history textbooks in Kazakhstan and other unspecified Central Asian states describe Russia as an "oppressor, colonizer, and strangler" and claimed that Central Asian states are increasingly pursuing an agenda that is "hostile" to Russian interests.[71] The milblogger also accused Kazakhstan of being insufficiently supportive of the propagation of the Russian language in Kazakhstan.[72] The milblogger notably concluded that the gradual transition of the Kazakh population away from pro-Russian sentiments closely parallels factors that gave rise to the "special military operation" — directly comparing Kazakhstan's efforts to safeguard its national, cultural, and linguistic autonomy to Russia's alleged justifications for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russia employed the falsely constructed concept that Russian speakers abroad were "under attack" to justify its military aggression against Ukraine.[73] Another prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that the US is increasingly attempting to undermine Russia's position in Kazakhstan by working with the Kazakh government on nuclear research — a narrative that mirrors Russian information operations about supposed American biolabs in Ukraine.[74]

Russian officials continue to invoke international humanitarian and human rights laws in order to deflect from Russia's continue violation of such laws and norms. Kremlin-appointed Human Rights Commissioner Tatiana Moskalkova suggested on October 14 that Ukraine forcibly removed up to 1,000 Russians from Kursk Oblast since the start of Ukraine's Kursk Oblast incursion and claimed that Ukrainian authorities deported children to Austria from Ukraine after Russia's invasion in 2022.[75] Moskalkova notably did not provide evidence of the alleged forced removals or deportations. ISW previously reported that Russian authorities failed to provide humanitarian support for residents of Kursk Oblast following Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024, leaving a vacuum which Ukrainian authorities filled in order to fulfil their international legal requirements to the civilian population.[76] Moskalkova's baseless accusations are in part intended to undermine Ukraine's efforts to provide support for Russian civilians and to deflect from the well-documented roster of Russian human rights and humanitarian law abuses against Ukrainian soldiers and civilians.[77]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

---

[1] https://ria dot ru/20241014/belousov-1977950089.html; https://t.me/mod_russia/44482; https://t.me/mod_russia/44485; https://t.me/mod_russia/44486

[2] https://t.me/mod_russia/44486

[3] https://t.me/mod_russia/44474

[4] https://t.me/bbcrussian/71564

[5] https://suspilne dot media/odesa/857591-armia-rf-udarila-balistikou-po-odesi-odna-ludina-zaginula-e-poraneni-poskodzeno-dva-sudna/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/7067; https://t.me/OleksiyKuleba/4987

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10-2024; https://t.me/odeskaODA/6995 ; https://armyinform.comdot ua/2024/10/10/tretya-raketna-ataka-na-czyvilne-sudno-za-chotyry-dni-rosiya-zabrala-zhyttya-shesty-lyudej/ ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/10/09/rossiya-udarila-po-portovoy-infrastrukture-odesskoy-oblasti-pyat-chelovek-pogibli-povrezhdeno-grazhdanskoe-sudno; https://t.me/odeskaODA/6969; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/853013-armia-rf-skeruvala-na-odesu-balisticni-raketi-e-zagiblij-ta-patero-travmovanih/; https://t.me/OleksiyKuleba/4957 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/08/armiya-rf-atakuvala-balistykoyu-czyvilne-sudno-v-portah-odeshhyny-ye-zagybli-ta-poraneni/ ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/6943 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/10/06/rossiya-atakovala-odesskuyu-oblast-dronami-i-raketami-pod-udar-popali-sklady-gazoprovod-i-suhogruz

[7] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/140642; https://t.me/dva_majors/55036

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10-2024

[9] https://t.me/dva_majors/55011; https://t.me/DKulko/669; https://t.me/motopatriot/28473; https://t.me/motopatriot/28494

[10] https://t.me/motopatriot/28456

[11] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/78680; https://t.me/dva_majors/55011

[12] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/140738

[13] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/78680; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/78680 ; https://t.me/rybar/64416 ; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/189306; https://t.me/dva_majors/54997; https://t.me/DKulko/669; https://t.me/motopatriot/28473; https://t.me/motopatriot/28456

[14] https://t.me/rybar/64416; https://t.me/dva_majors/55011; https://t.me/mod_russia/44483

[15] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/78741; https://t.me/dva_majors/55034; https://t.me/voin_dv/11330; https://t.me/EnotHersonVDV/4353; https://t.me/sashakots/49524; https://t.me/sashakots/49526; https://t.me/epoddubny/21341; https://t.me/DKulko/669; https://t.me/motopatriot/28473; https://t.me/voin_dv/11333; https://t.me/russian_airborne/7632

[16] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19181; https://t.me/zovpobedy/13405 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/140663

[17] https://t.me/rybar/64416; https://t.me/zovpobedy/13405 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/140663

[18] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/78693; https://t.me/dva_majors/54992

[19] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/140759

[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar101124

[21] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/22119289

[22] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/spalyly-vorozhu-tushku-na-rosii-znyshcheno-viiskovo-transportnyi-litak-tu-134.html

[23] https://t.me/motopatriot/28467; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17283

[24] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DkgfdXQHUF4eXUueG6LTb6gZHTuaANtNfrCNpF5bJMsDSJ6kebNQNZnfyvtPTv9cl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04frdtK6kHTFjLcvaKKqvDRkRN2hCBVg7bFEK2YwM4Wim5zHEeWKZQBGuUwwfADrKl; https://t.me/otukharkiv/2081

[25] https://t.me/milinfolive/132745; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2267

[26] https://t.me/z_arhiv/28564

[27] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/21983

[28] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0usqvidb5NNaBqWoJZQvXSpE8DrfjP8m18nxFmSKk99EbgWR5PZP74WvbmM96aZ6Yl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DkgfdXQHUF4eXUueG6LTb6gZHTuaANtNfrCNpF5bJMsDSJ6kebNQNZnfyvtPTv9cl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04frdtK6kHTFjLcvaKKqvDRkRN2hCBVg7bFEK2YwM4Wim5zHEeWKZQBGuUwwfADrKl

[29] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/140698

[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0usqvidb5NNaBqWoJZQvXSpE8DrfjP8m18nxFmSKk99EbgWR5PZP74WvbmM96aZ6Yl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DkgfdXQHUF4eXUueG6LTb6gZHTuaANtNfrCNpF5bJMsDSJ6kebNQNZnfyvtPTv9cl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04frdtK6kHTFjLcvaKKqvDRkRN2hCBVg7bFEK2YwM4Wim5zHEeWKZQBGuUwwfADrKl

[31] https://t.me/z_arhiv/28561 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28555

[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0usqvidb5NNaBqWoJZQvXSpE8DrfjP8m18nxFmSKk99EbgWR5PZP74WvbmM96aZ6Yl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DkgfdXQHUF4eXUueG6LTb6gZHTuaANtNfrCNpF5bJMsDSJ6kebNQNZnfyvtPTv9cl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04frdtK6kHTFjLcvaKKqvDRkRN2hCBVg7bFEK2YwM4Wim5zHEeWKZQBGuUwwfADrKl

[33] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/78728; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17280

[34] https://t.me/motopatriot/28476

[35] https://t.me/drezdennow/616; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1845536361144832448

[36] https://t. me/z_arhiv/28558

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0usqvidb5NNaBqWoJZQvXSpE8DrfjP8m18nxFmSKk99EbgWR5PZP74WvbmM96aZ6Yl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DkgfdXQHUF4eXUueG6LTb6gZHTuaANtNfrCNpF5bJMsDSJ6kebNQNZnfyvtPTv9cl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04frdtK6kHTFjLcvaKKqvDRkRN2hCBVg7bFEK2YwM4Wim5zHEeWKZQBGuUwwfADrKl

[38] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/140660

[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0usqvidb5NNaBqWoJZQvXSpE8DrfjP8m18nxFmSKk99EbgWR5PZP74WvbmM96aZ6Yl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DkgfdXQHUF4eXUueG6LTb6gZHTuaANtNfrCNpF5bJMsDSJ6kebNQNZnfyvtPTv9cl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04frdtK6kHTFjLcvaKKqvDRkRN2hCBVg7bFEK2YwM4Wim5zHEeWKZQBGuUwwfADrKl

[40] https://t.me/dva_majors/55011; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/189306; https://t.me/dva_majors/54997

[41] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1713953349381167&rdid=Nq3NH7UazIfotXFK; https://t.me/odshbr79/395 ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/14271; https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/79-brygada-vidbyla-masovnyj-mehanizovanyj-shturm/; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1845456282603458595; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1845467415582232943; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1845467415582232943

[42] https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/189347; https://t.me/motopatriot/28472; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1845668896621097395 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/140734; https://t.me/milinfolive/132800; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/140734

[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DkgfdXQHUF4eXUueG6LTb6gZHTuaANtNfrCNpF5bJMsDSJ6kebNQNZnfyvtPTv9cl  

[44] https://t.me/nm_dnr/12816 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11578; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/40542;%20https://t.me/mod_russia/44477

[45] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/78736; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/140632

[46] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7113; https://t.me/ssternenko/34829; https://t.me/motopatriot/28486

[47] https://t.me/z_arhiv/28570; https://t.me/motopatriot/28486

[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0usqvidb5NNaBqWoJZQvXSpE8DrfjP8m18nxFmSKk99EbgWR5PZP74WvbmM96aZ6Yl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DkgfdXQHUF4eXUueG6LTb6gZHTuaANtNfrCNpF5bJMsDSJ6kebNQNZnfyvtPTv9cl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04frdtK6kHTFjLcvaKKqvDRkRN2hCBVg7bFEK2YwM4Wim5zHEeWKZQBGuUwwfADrKl

[49] https://t.me/voin_dv/11323

[50] https://t.me/dva_majors/55038

[51] ttps://t.me/zovpobedy/13413; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/140748; https://t.me/zovpobedy/13413; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/140748

[52] https://t.me/andriyshTime/28345

[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0usqvidb5NNaBqWoJZQvXSpE8DrfjP8m18nxFmSKk99EbgWR5PZP74WvbmM96aZ6Yl

[54] https://t.me/oruzhejnyj_master/3957

[55]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0usqvidb5NNaBqWoJZQvXSpE8DrfjP8m18nxFmSKk99EbgWR5PZP74WvbmM96aZ6Yl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DkgfdXQHUF4eXUueG6LTb6gZHTuaANtNfrCNpF5bJMsDSJ6kebNQNZnfyvtPTv9cl ;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04frdtK6kHTFjLcvaKKqvDRkRN2hCBVg7bFEK2YwM4Wim5zHEeWKZQBGuUwwfADrKl

[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0usqvidb5NNaBqWoJZQvXSpE8DrfjP8m18nxFmSKk99EbgWR5PZP74WvbmM96aZ6Yl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DkgfdXQHUF4eXUueG6LTb6gZHTuaANtNfrCNpF5bJMsDSJ6kebNQNZnfyvtPTv9cl ;https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04frdtK6kHTFjLcvaKKqvDRkRN2hCBVg7bFEK2YwM4Wim5zHEeWKZQBGuUwwfADrKl

[57] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/14/najczinnisha-zabavka-okupantiv-u-vms-zsu-rozpovily-yakyj-obyekt-najpylnishe-zahyshhayut-rosiyany/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg

[58] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-5-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2024

[59] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/14/vpershe-za-48-dib-nich-v-ukrayini-mynula-bez-atak-shahedamy/

[60] https://verstka dot media/kak-uchastnikam-voyni-v-ukraine-ne-udaetsia-ustroitsia-vo-vlasti

[61] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-9-2024

[62] https://tass dot ru/politika/22115137/amp

[63] https://www.currenttime dot tv/a/migrantov-v-koloniyah-v-rossii-prinuzhdayut-ehat-na-front-svedem-schety-s-zhiznyu-no-ne-otkazhemsya-ot-grazhdanstva-i-ne-poedem-na-voynu-/33153540.html; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/10/14/nastoyaschee-vremya-osuzhdennye-v-rossii-migranty-iz-tadzhikistana-i-uzbekistana-pozhalovalis-chto-ih-zastavlyayut-idti-na-voynu-s-ukrainoy

[64] https://t.me/mod_russia/44460

[65] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2024

[66] https://t.me/andriyshTime/28346

[67] https://suspilne dot media/857197-rozstril-rosianami-polonenih-na-kursini-ta-obstril-mist-na-doneccini-964-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1728886461&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/berdmisk/10670; https://t.me/andriyshTime/28346

[68] https://t.me/andriyshTime/28346; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-15-2023

[69] https://t.me/andriyshTime/28346

[70] https://t.me/berdmisk/10670

[71] https://t.me/rybar/64427; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2024

[72] https://t.me/rybar/64405

[73] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-28-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011624

[74] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/140687

[75] https://t.me/sotaproject/88467; https://t.me/tass_agency/279148 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/10/14/moskalkova-zayavila-chto-vsu-nasilno-vyvezli-iz-kurskoy-oblasti-bolee-tysyachi-zhiteley; https://aif dot ru/politics/russia/bol-slyozy-i-nadezhda-moskalkova-rasskazala-o-spasyonnyh-ot-ognya-i-razluki

[76] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2024

[77] https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15395.doc.htm; https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/agenda/briefing/2024-03-11/12/ukrainian-children-deported-to-russia-plenary-debate; https://cl.usembassy.gov/forced-transfer-and-deportation-of-children-during-russias-illegal-war-against-ukraine/; https://ukraine.un.org/en/264368-un-says-russia-continues-torture-execute-ukrainian-pows