Davit Gasparyan, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson, Angelica Evans, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and George Barros
January 22, 2025, 7:00 pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 pm ET on January 22. ISW
will cover subsequent reports in the January 23 Russian Offensive
Campaign Assessment.
The Kremlin has
launched an information operation that seeks to create the false
impression that the Russian economy is performing well despite numerous
continued indicators of macroeconomic distress. Russian
President Vladimir Putin claimed during a meeting on economic issues on
January 22 that 2024 was a "strong year" for the Russian economy.[1]
Putin claimed that Russia has a manageable budget deficit of 1.7
percent and achieved a 26 percent increase in non-oil-and-gas revenue to
25.6 trillion rubles (approximately $257.9 billion) in 2024 and
announced a retroactive 9.5 percent increase in insurance and military
pensions to address rising Russian inflation. Bloomberg reported
on January 21 that the Russian Finance Ministry released a report
projecting economic strength and suggesting that Russian budget revenue
in December 2024 reached a record high of over 4 trillion rubles (about
$40 billion) — a 28 percent increase compared to December 2023 and the
highest level recorded since 2011.[2]
The data fails to account for Russia's unsustainable levels of defense
spending, rampant inflation, a growing deficit and the erosion of
Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, however.[3]
ISW continues to observe macroeconomic data that directly contradict
the Kremlin's claims that the Russian economy is performing well. The
Kremlin has recently adopted policies aimed at increasing defense
spending all while Russian society faces labor shortages, broader
demographic issues, declining savings, and increasing reliance on
bailouts as the Russian economy faces rising interest rates, inflated
salaries, and deteriorating production capacity.[4]
These economic realities suggest that the Kremlin's efforts to posture
economic strength are largely an information operation aimed at
reassuring domestic audiences and posturing Russian strength abroad
while masking the true challenges Russia's economy is facing,
particularly heightened due to its war against Ukraine.
Russia
continues long-term efforts to build out its manpower reserve with
All-Russian Cossack Society organizations and create a willing and
well-trained prioritized pool designed to buffer the Kremlin from
potential blowback in the event of a possible future partial call up of
Russian reservists. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's northwestern Russia service Sever Realii
reported on January 22 that Russian organizations have allocated a
total of 11.4 million rubles (roughly $114,880) for territorial defense
training for 100 officers within the "Great Don Army" branch of the
All-Russian Cossack Society, including 5.6 million rubles (approximately
$56,400) from the Russian Presidential Grant Fund and 5.7 million
rubles (approximately $57,400) from the "Great Don Army" organization.[5]
The training will include drone piloting training and tactical,
medical, and fire training. A separate portion of the training will be
devoted to organizing defense and interacting with political authorities
in "wartime conditions." The Kremlin's efforts to expand the
All-Russian Cossack societies, following the March 2024 law enrolling
members of the All-Russian Cossack Society into the Russian military's
mobilization reserve, are likely an effort to expand the number of
well-trained troops in Russia's active reserve pools that the Kremlin
can call up to fight in Ukraine or elsewhere during a possible future
partial call up of Russian reservists.[6]
North
Korea will reportedly deploy new military personnel to Russia by
mid-March 2025, likely to maintain the current pace and intensity of
attritional, infantry-led assaults in Kursk Oblast. The New York Times (NYT)
reported on January 22 that a US senior defense official stated that
additional North Korean forces will arrive in Russia "within the next
two months," (roughly mid-March 2025).[7]
The NYT did not specify the number of troops or whether North Korea is
rotating forces or increasing the size of its total force grouping in
Russia, however. The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff reported on
December 23 that North Korea may be preparing to deploy an unspecified
number of additional forces to Ukraine and military equipment to Russia,
either as a rotation or additional deployment of forces.[8] Western officials told the BBC on
January 22 that North Korean forces have suffered roughly 1,000 killed
in action and 3,000 missing or wounded in action as of mid-January 2025,
roughly 33 to 40 percent of the 11,000 to 12,000 total North Korean
personnel already in Russia.[9]
ISW recently assessed that the entirety of the North Korean contingent
in Russia may be killed or wounded in action by about mid-April 2025 at
their current casualty rate, and a new North Korean deployment — whether
intended to increase the current grouping or rotate out existing forces
— is likely intended to sustain Russia’s tempo of operations despite
heavy losses of about 30,000 - 45,000 causalities (combined killed and
wounded) per month.[10]
North Korean forces reportedly spent at least a month training in
eastern Russia before deploying to Kursk Oblast for further training in
near rear areas in November 2024 and joining combat operations at least
as of early December 2024.[11]
This timeline roughly coheres with the possibility that a fresh
contingent of North Korean forces could undergo training and replace the
shrinking North Korean group in Kursk Oblast by mid-April 2025,
assuming the reported next batch of North Korean troops will train for
the same duration as their predecessors, and deploy to Russia imminently
in late January or early February 2025.
These
fresh North Korean forces are unlikely to decisively improve Russian
operations and will likely face the same high casualty rates and
complications operating with Russian forces as the current North Korean
contingent, provided the Russian command continues to use North Korean
forces the same way as it has thus far. US officials and
Ukrainian soldiers told the NYT that North Korean and Russian forces
continue to struggle with communications and cohesion and that Russian
and North Korean forces have "clashed" at least twice due to troop
identification errors.[12]
A Ukrainian commander told the NYT that North Korean assault groups now
include a translator who speaks Russian but that these groups are still
not very effective. Ukrainian soldiers reported that North Korean
forces continue conducting mass infantry assaults and that North Korean
soldiers do not retreat even if injured. Ukraine's Special Operations
Forces (SSO) published footage on January 22 of North Korean forces
massing for an infantry assault and reported that Ukrainian forces
killed 21 and wounded 40 North Korean soldiers during the eight-hour
long combat engagement.[13]
Ukrainian soldiers told the NYT that Russian forces are still
attempting to conceal the presence of North Koreans on the battlefield
by conducting drone strikes against wounded North Korean troops as
Ukrainian forces attempt to take them prisoner.[14]
ISW continues to assess that North Korea's high casualty rate and
interoperability difficulties with Russian forces will affect the
lessons that the North Korean military command will learn from fighting
in Russia's war.[15]
Russian
milbloggers complained and expressed concern over recent claims that
the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government in Syria suspended
Russian investment and financial involvement in the port of Tartus as
Russia's long-term military presence in Syria remains unclear. A
Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on January 22 that the
Russian government, via a Russian military official based in Turkey,
recently reached an unspecified agreement with HTS that appears to have
included permission for Russian vessels to dock in the port of Tartus.[16] Marine Traffic, a shipping tracking website, shows that the Russian Sparta and Sparta II
cargo ships are docked in the port of Tartus as of January 22, and
these ships are likely supporting the Russian military's evacuation of
military equipment from the port. The milblogger claimed that the
Russian and HTS-led governments continue to negotiate about the future
of Russia's presence at the Tartus and Khmeimim military bases and noted
that it is unclear if any other third-party might be interested in
using the port of Tartus in the future.[17]
Other Russian milbloggers expressed confusion over the situation in
Syria and accused unspecified actors of spreading rumors about Russia's
supposed agreement with the HTS-led government.[18]
Syrian Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra stated on January 22
that Russian and Syrian officials have not reached a final solution in
the negotiations about future Russian military bases in Syria.[19]
A
Russian state media outlet reported that Russia may resume direct gas
deliveries to Transnistria despite recent discussions about sourcing
non-Russian gas to the region. Russian business outlet Kommersant, citing its own sources, reported
on January 22 that Russia may resume gas supplies to Transnistria via
the TurkStream pipeline, using the Cyprus-based company Obzor
Enterprises as an intermediary.[20] Kommersant,
citing data from the European Union (EU)'s Regional Booking Platform
(RBP) for natural gas transmission, reported that Obzor Enterprises
booked the TurkStream pipeline on January 20 to transit 3.1 million
cubic meters of gas per day to the Strandzha-2 entry point from February
1 to March 1, volumes which Kommersant assessed align with Transnistria's estimated humanitarian needs. Kommersant reported
that authorities are discussing extending these supplies through
mid-April and that Russia would pay roughly $160 million to purchase the
gas. Kommersant's sources noted that Russia is prioritizing
efforts to transfer the gas to Transnistria through the Trans-Balkan
pipeline, which runs through Bulgaria and Romania before reaching
Transnistria. Russian and Transnistrian authorities have recently been
exploring the possibility of sourcing Russian-funded European gas to
Transnistria through the European spot market, but Moldovan President
Maia Sandu has stated that only Moldovan gas company Moldovagaz has the
authority to deliver gas to Transnistria and that Moldovagaz can only
work with companies that do not violate Moldovan law or international
sanctions.[21]
Ukrainian and Moldovan officials have noted how Russia is trying to
leverage the manufactured gas crisis to affect Moldovan public opinion
before the Summer 2025 Moldovan parliamentary elections.[22]
Key Takeaways:
- The
Kremlin has launched an information operation that seeks to create the
false impression that the Russian economy is performing well despite
numerous continued indicators of macroeconomic distress.
- Russia
continues long-term efforts to build out its manpower reserve with
All-Russian Cossack Society organizations and create a willing and
well-trained prioritized pool designed to buffer the Kremlin from
potential blowback in the event of a possible future partial call up of
Russian reservists.
- North Korea will reportedly
deploy new military personnel to Russia by mid-March 2025, likely to
maintain the current pace and intensity of attritional, infantry-led
assaults in Kursk Oblast.
- These fresh North
Korean forces are unlikely to decisively improve Russian operations and
will likely face the same high casualty rates and complications
operating with Russian forces as the current North Korean contingent,
provided the Russian command continues to use North Korean forces the
same way as it has thus far.
- Russian
milbloggers complained and expressed concern over recent claims that the
Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government in Syria suspended
Russian investment and financial involvement in the port of Tartus as
Russia's long-term military presence in Syria remains unclear.
- A
Russian state media outlet reported that Russia may resume direct gas
deliveries to Transnistria despite recent discussions about sourcing
non-Russian gas to the region.
- Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions near Toretsk.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
- Russia and Uzbekistan are deepening military cooperation.
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian
forces continued offensive operations along the Ukrainian salient in
Kursk Oblast on January 22 but did not make confirmed advances. A
Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces reached the outskirts of
Guyevo (south of Sudzha), but ISW has not observed evidence of this
claim.[23]
Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Sudzha near
Pogrebki and south of Sudzha near Makhnovka and in and west of
Kurilovka.[24] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Makhnovka and northwest of Sudzha near Kruglenkoye.[25]
Elements of the Chechen "Zapad-Akhmat" Battalion are reportedly
conducting reconnaissance operations near Russia's international border
with Sumy Oblast.[26]
Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly
operating a TOS-1A thermobaric artillery system in Kursk Oblast.[27]
Ukraine's
Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on January 22
that GUR first person view (FPV) strike drones struck a piece of Russian
satellite equipment near Tetkino, Kursk Oblast on January 17.[28]
The GUR reported that the equipment supported Russia's use of the
Yamal-401, Yamal-402, and Yamal-300K communications satellites in the
area.
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued limited
ground attacks northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on January 21
and 22 but did not advance.[29]
Elements of the Chechen “Zapad-Akhmat” Battalion and Rosgvardia’s 116th
Special Purpose “Stalhaya" Brigade are reportedly operating in Kharkiv
Oblast.[30]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian
forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on
January 22 but did not make confirmed advances. The Russian Ministry of
Defense (MoD) claimed on January 22 that Russian forces seized Zapadne
(north of Kupyansk).[31]
Russian milbloggers claimed on January 22 that Russian forces advanced
both north and south of Zapadne and south of and in central Dvorichna
(northeast of Kupyansk).[32]
ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian
forces continued ground attacks north of Kupyansk near Dvorichna and
Kutkivka and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on January 21 and 22.[33] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 22 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Vilshana (northeast of Kupyansk).[34]
Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov
stated on January 22 that Russian forces are attempting to cross the
Oskil River near Dvorichna with small vessels - particularly small
rubber boats - under the cover of night.[35]
Trehubov noted that Ukrainian drones are targeting Russian forces
attempting to cross the Oskil River and hiding in windbreaks. Trehubov
also stated that Russian forces conduct assaults on the west (right)
bank of the Oskil River, have accumulated an unspecified amount of
personnel, and have not established logistics across the Oskil River as
the water has not frozen. A Ukrainian drone battalion commander
operating in the Kupyansk direction stated on January 22 that Russian
commanders are forcing infantry to attack despite poor weather
conditions preventing the proper use of drone or armored vehicle
support.[36]
The Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on January 22 that
Russian forces used an unspecified number of armored vehicles to conduct
recent assaults in the Petropavlivka direction (east of Kupyansk) and
near Lozova (northeast of Borova).[37]
Drone operators of the Russian Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned
Technologies reportedly continue operating in the Kupyansk direction.[38]
Russian
forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on
January 22 but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger
claimed on January 22 that Russian forces advanced southwest of Lozova
(northeast of Borova) and west of Nadiya (east of Borova).[39]
ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim, however. Russian
forces continued ground attacks northeast of Borova near Lozova, Nova
Kruhlyakivka, and Zahryzove; east of Borova near Kopanky; and southeast
of Borova near Novoyehorivka and Novoserhiivka on January 21 and 22.[40]
Russian
forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on January
22 but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed on
January 22 that Russian forces advanced southwest of Terny (northeast
of Lyman), northwest and west of Ivanivka (northeast of Lyman), and
north and east of Kolodyazi.[41]
ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian
forces continued ground attacks north of Lyman near Zelena Dolyna;
northeast of Lyman near Kuzmyne, Terny, and Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman
near the Serebryanske forest area on January 21 and 22.[42]
Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined
Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue
operating in the Lyman direction.[43]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on January 21 and 22 but did not advance.[44]
Russian
forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction amid continued
offensive operations in the area on January 22. Geolocated footage
published on January 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced
along Zaliznychna Street in northwestern Chasiv Yar and recently
marginally advanced north and northwest of the Chasiv Yar Refractory
Plant in central Chasiv Yar.[45]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further along
Tsentralna Street in central Chasiv Yar, but ISW has not observed
confirmation of this claim.[46]
Russian forces continued ground attacks near Chasiv Yar itself and
north of Chasiv Yar in the direction of Fedorivka on January 21 and 22.[47]
Snipers of the Russian 299th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV
Division) are reportedly operating in Chasiv Yar itself, and elements of
the Russian 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (98th VDV Division) are
reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Chasiv Yar itself.[48]
Ukrainian
and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction amid
continued offensive operations in the area on January 22. Geolocated
footage published on January 22 shows drone operators of the Russian 9th
Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the
1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) striking Ukrainian
forces in western Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk), indicating that
Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in the area.[49]
Geolocated footage published on January 11 and geolocated on January 22
indicates that Russian forces advanced along Kachalova and Puzanova
streets in northern Toretsk.[50]
The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Toretsk
direction stated on January 22 that Ukrainian forces are defending in
limited positions in Toretsk and trying to contain Russian forces in the
settlement.[51]
Russian milbloggers claimed on January 21 and 22 that Russian forces
advanced to a field between Toretsk and Petrivka (west of Toretsk) and
that Russian forces advanced east of the Toretska Mine waste heap in
northern Toretsk, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[52] Russian forces continued ground attacks within Toretsk itself on January 21 and 22.[53]
Russian
forces recently advanced southwest of Pokrovsk amid ongoing offensive
operations near Pokrovsk on January 22. Geolocated footage published on
January 22 indicate that Russian forces recently advanced in the fields
northeast of Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk) and within the northeastern
part of the settlement.[54]
Russian milbloggers reiterated claims that Russian forces advanced near
Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk), seized Baranivka (northeast of
Pokrovsk and north of Vozdvyzhenka) and Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk),
advanced 3.6 kilometers in depth west of Vovkove (southwest of
Pokrovsk), and within Nadiivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[55]
A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian military command recently
introduced reserve forces into combat east of Pokrovsk and that these
forces participated in the supposed seizure of Baranivka.[56]
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian
forces recently introduced elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade
(2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) to offensive operations south
of Pokrovsk, indicating that Russian forces continue to prioritize the
envelopment of Pokrovsk from the southwest.[57]
Mashovets assessed that Russian advances south and east of Pokrovsk
have slowed in recent weeks. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian
forces are counterattacking near Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[58]
Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Pokrovsk near
Vodyane Druhe, Zelene Pole, Myrolyubivka, Yelyzavetivka, Promin, and
Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near
Novyi Trud, Zvirove, and Petropavlivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near
Novoserhiivka, Kotlyne, Uspenivka, and Sribne and in the direction of
Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) on January 21 and 22.[59]
Russian
forces recently advanced west of Kurakhove amid continued offensive
operations in the Kurakhove direction on January 22. Geolocated footage
published on January 21 indicates that Russian forces recently
marginally advanced in the fields south of Dachne (west of Kurakhove).[60]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced along
windbreaks southwest of Slovyanka (northwest of Kurakhove) and two
kilometers towards Kostyantynopil (west of Kurakhove) and that Russian
forces are clearing Ukrainian forces from the area west of the
Kurakhivske Reservoir (west of Kurakhove).[61]
ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, however.
Mashovets stated on January 22 that elements of the Russian 110th
Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) have struggled to advance towards
Andriivka (west of Kurakhove) from the south since their last advance as
of January 12 despite being reinforced with elements of the 114th
Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA).[62]
Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Kurakhove near
Slovyanka and Shevchenko; west of Kurakhove near Dachne, Andriivka, and
Kostyantynopil; and southwest of Kurakhove near Ulakly and Yantarne on
January 21 and 22.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka and Zelenivka (southwest of Kurakhove).[64]
Russian
forces recently advanced near and within Velyka Novosilka amid
continued offensive operations in the area on January 22. Geolocated
footage published on January 21 and 22 indicates that Russian forces
recently advanced along a road west of Rozdolne (northeast of Velyka
Novosilka) and along Horizhnia Street in northeastern Velyka Novosilka.[65]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of
Vremivka (west of Velyka Novosilka) and further within eastern Velyka
Novosilka and reiterated claims that Russian forces have partially
enveloped Ukrainian forces in Velyka Novosilka from the north, east, and
south.[66]
Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle
Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 5th Tank Brigade
(36th CAA) are attacking in southeastern Velyka Novosilka and that
elements of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, EMD) are
attacking in the southwestern part of the settlement.[67]
Mashovets noted that elements of the Russian 336th Naval Infantry
Brigade (Baltic Fleet, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are advancing
near the northern outskirts of Velyka Novosilka.[68]
Russian forces continued ground assaults near Velyka Novosilka and just
west of Velyka Novosilka near Vremivka on January 21 and 22.[69] Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD) are reportedly operating within Velyka Novosilka.[70]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks northwest of Robotyne near Kamyanske on January 21 and 22 but did not advance.[71] Drone operators of the Russian "Smuglyanka" Detachment are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[72]
A
Ukrainian drone group operating in the Zaporizhia direction posted
footage on January 22 showing a Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drone
strike against a Russian Buk-M3 air defense system likely in western
Zaporizhia Oblast.[73]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Dnipro direction on January 21 and 22 but did not advance.[74]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have intensified
drone and HIMARS strikes against the Russian rear in occupied Kherson
Oblast.[75]
Drone operators of the Russian 10th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Main
Military Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the
Kherson direction.[76]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian
forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night
of January 21 to 22. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian
forces launched 99 Shahed and other strike and decoy drones from
Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Bryansk,
Kursk, and Oryol oblasts; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[77]
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 65 drones
over Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kyiv, Khmelnytskyi,
Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts; that 30 drones were "lost,"
likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that
drone strikes damaged institutions, industrial enterprises, farm
buildings, residential homes, and apartment buildings in Mykolaiv,
Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv, Cherkasy, Sumy, and Khmelnytskyi oblasts.
Ukrainian official sources reported that Russian drone strikes hit a
residential home and an administrative building in Mykolaiv Oblast and a
residential home in Sumy Oblast.[78]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russia
and Uzbekistan are deepening military cooperation. Russian Defense
Minister Andrei Belousov met with Uzbek Defense Minister Shukhrat
Halmukhamedov in Tashkent on January 22 and signed a joint
Russian-Uzbekistan military cooperation plan for 2025 and a strategic
military partnership plan for 2026-2030.[79]
Belousov stated that the delegation also discussed bilateral
military-technical cooperation and regional security issues and claimed
that Russian-Uzbek cooperation has a significant impact on regional
security in Central Asia. Belousov also met with Uzbek President Shavkat
Mirziyoyev on January 22.[80]
Russia
continues efforts to improve state monitoring processes and streamline
force generation mechanisms. Moscow City Military Recruitment Head Maxim
Loktev announced on January 21 that regional officials will send text
messages to boys turning 17 years old in 2025 regarding automatic
registration for military service.[81]
The Kremlin adopted a law in 2023, implemented in Fall 2024, which
authorized authorities to dispatch automatic summons via electronic
methods, thereby boosting the state's visibility among recruitment pools
and automating recruitment notices, and Loktev's announcement appears
to be part of this effort.[82]
The
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to grapple with
unprofessionalism and abuse among Russian commanders. A
Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on January 22 that Luhansk
Oblast occupation authorities arrested the commander of a Russian
assault company of the 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms
Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) for crimes ranging from
embezzlement to creating a private prison to punish his subordinates.[83]
The milblogger claimed that this is the second scandal in two days for
the unit and that occupation officials recently arrested a military
police officer for beating a contract soldier. The milblogger noted that
such beatings are common and have a negative impact on Russian society
and force generation efforts. The milblogger called on Russian military
officials to make an example of such individuals.
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Nothing significant to report.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76145
[2] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-01-21/russia-s-budget-revenue-surges-to-record-in-december-despite-sanctions
[3] https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-national-wealth-fund-38-billion-deficit/32229281.html; https://www.aa dot com dot tr/en/economy/russias-national-wealth-fund-reserves-down-117b/3452503
[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates-june-1-september-30-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-29-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-4-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-30-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2024
[5] https://vsko dot ru/ ; https://t.me/severrealii/29287
[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2024
[7] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/22/world/europe/north-korea-soldiers-ukraine.html
[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23-2024
[9] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c87djeezjxeo
[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011625
[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112124; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111324; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110524; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102824; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-26-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-18-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20November%2021%2C%202024%20PDF.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-30-2024
[12] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/22/world/europe/north-korea-soldiers-ukraine.html
[13] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/22/sso-pokazaly-zapeklyj-bij-svoyih-operatoriv-bpla-z-vijskovymy-kndr/
[14] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/22/world/europe/north-korea-soldiers-ukraine.html
[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011125
[16] https://t.me/rybar/67364
[17] https://t.me/rybar/67366 ; https://t.me/rybar/67364
[18] https://t.me/rustroyka1945/19885 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62940 ; https://t.me/Mestb_Dobroj_Voli/14188; https://t.me/dva_majors/62941 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61604
[19] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/22944889
[20] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7445089
[21]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2025;
https://newsmaker dot
md/ro/recean-si-serebrian-califica-drept-schema-contractul-asumat-de-vicol-doar-moldovagaz-poate-livra-gaz-in-stanga-nistrului/;
https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/22921917; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011425
[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011425
[23] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31572
[24] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22731; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22771; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61595
[25] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61595; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22771; . https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61595
[26] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5440
[27] https://t.me/mod_russia/48135; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84939
[28] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/rozvidnyky-znyshchyly-vorozhe-suputnykove-obladnannia.html
[29]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l ; https://t.me/synegubov/12756
[30] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5439
[31] https://t.me/mod_russia/48130
[32] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84927; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30650; https://t.me/notes_veterans/21526 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22774
[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l
[34] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22774
[35] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/22/okupanty-na-gumovyh-chovnah-pereplyvayut-oskil-ale-yih-zustrichayut-nashi-dronari/
[36]
https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2025/01/21/stymulyuvannya-rozstrilamy-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-vorog-pidtrymuye-rytm-shturmiv-stratamy/
[37] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4309
[38] https://t.me/epoddubny/22231
[39] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30647 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30647
[40]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4309
[41] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30644; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30644
[42]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l
[43] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18626
[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4309
[45]
https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/1882013082530238489;
https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24878;
https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1882092705913930238;
https://t.me/Rarog_24OMBr/392
[46] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30656 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30659
[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l; https://t.me/dva_majors/62896; https://t.me/wargonzo/24387
[48] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22735
[49] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1882076801478078537; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13287
[50]
https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/582;
https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/573; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8189;
https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1882067413816275303;
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8188
[51]
https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2025/01/22/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-sytuacziyu-u-toreczku/;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg
[52] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22724; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152093
[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l;
https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2025/01/22/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-sytuacziyu-u-toreczku/;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg
[54] https://t.me/ssternenko/39091; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8193
[55] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30640 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61599 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61585 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84923 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/3158 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22762 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22769 ; https://t.me/vrogov/18848 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152093
[56] https://t.me/yurasumy/20711
[57] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2508
[58] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61592
[59]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl
; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61599; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20709
[60] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8185; https://t.me/AFUStratCom/27774
[61] https://t.me/dva_majors/62896; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22731
[62] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2509
[63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l; https://t.me/dva_majors/62896; https://t.me/yurasumy/20706
[64] https://t.me/yurasumy/20706
[65] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24867; https://t.me/ombr_110/420; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8192
[66] https://t.me/yurasumy/20705 ; https://t.me/sashakots/51449 ; https://t.me/smotri_z/39304 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/22233 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84900 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62937 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152093
[67] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2509
[68] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2510
[69] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l
[70] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84900 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/12929
[71]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l
[72] https://t.me/dva_majors/62900
[73] https://t.me/Ronins44_65/431; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/22/zrubaly-chergovyj-buk-nashi-dronari-vidznachylysya-na-pivdni/
[74]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l
[75] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22770
[76] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1892
[77] https://t.me/kpszsu/27392
[78] https://t.me/senkevichonline/11293; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/12895; https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/924153-zagroza-bezpilotnikiv-u-mikolaevi-prolunali-vibuhi/ ; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/01/22/rossiyskiy-dron-popal-v-shestietazhnyy-dom-v-nikolaeve-chastichno-razrushen-verhniy-etazh; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/37268 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/37268
[79] https://t.me/mod_russia/48119
[80] https://t.me/mod_russia/48132
[81] https://www.rbc dot ru/society/21/01/2025/678f6f419a794753e2dea007
[82] https://www.rbc dot ru/society/14/04/2023/64399bbf9a79473c8e25e2ec ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2024
[83] https://t.me/rybar/67368
