UA-69458566-1

Thursday, May 22, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment May 22, 2025

 





 

Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter

May 22, 2025, 5:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45 am ET on May 22. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 23 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is fostering the formation of an informal state ideology based on Russian nationalism that positions Russia in opposition to the West as part of ongoing efforts to militarize and unify Russian society. Putin stated on May 22 at a likely highly scripted award ceremony that "strong family foundations" and "traditional values" support Russia's "1,000-year-old statehood."[1] Putin emphasized that Russia's "most important" task is to preserve its people, culture, and spirituality. A Russian Orthodox priest who received an award during the ceremony thanked Putin for protecting Russian traditional culture, spirituality, and language. The priest noted that Russia's celebrations of its contributions to victory in the Second World War teach Russian youth and those in the "Russkiy Mir" ("Russian World") to defend Russia and love Russia's culture and spiritual foundations. (The "Russian World" is a Kremlin-promoted geopolitical concept with amorphous parameters that broadly encompass those who live outside of Russia's borders but relate in some vague way to Russian language, culture, Orthodoxy, and media). Russian State Historical Museum General Director and awardee Alexei Levikin claimed that many countries hostile to Russia are basing their policies and ideologies on the falsification of historical events and facts. A martial arts school director who received an award claimed that Russia always proves that its fighters are the best on the battlefields and in sports arenas.

Putin notably promoted Russian nationalism by emphasizing Russia's spirituality and thousand-year history and by giving only a Russian Orthodox priest — but no representatives of other faiths — an award, despite the fact that the Russian state formally regards Russian Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism as Russia's "traditional" religions.[2] Putin has previously highlighted ethnic and religious minorities' contributions to Russia at high profile events and has often promoted a civic Russian identity and nationalism.[3] Putin's departure from this rhetoric at the highly staged event on May 22 may be an attempt to appease the increasingly pro-war Russian ultranationalist community. Putin is also attempting to use the awardees' statements to reinforce the creation of an informal state ideology predicated on perpetuating the belief that the West is determined to defeat Russia, thereby justifying a future military conflict against the West to the Russian public.[4] Putin declared 2025 the "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland," and the development of an informal Russian nationalist ideology provides an ideological foundation for the ongoing Kremlin effort to develop a new cadre of loyal elites that includes selected veterans of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[5] Putin will likely expand efforts to unify Russian society against the perceived threat of the West and to develop an elite class of militarized nationalists in order to ensure that any successor will embody similarly aggressive and dangerous ideals that perpetuate eternal conflict with the West and NATO.

Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin — one of the most outspoken Russian ultranationalists in Putin's inner circle — expressed support for the inclusion of an informal state ideology based on Russian nationalism in the Russian Constitution. Russian State Duma Deputy Speaker Pyotr Tolstoy stated on May 19 at the St. Petersburg International Legal Forum that Russia may change its constitution in the future.[6] Duma Committee on State Building and Legislation Head Pavel Krasheninnikov later stated at the forum that the Russian Constitution "meets current realities" and does not need amending, however.[7] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on May 19, in response to Tolstoy, that changing the constitution is "not on the [Kremlin's] agenda."[8] Bastrykin claimed in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS published on May 22 that Russia is built on traditional values, such as patriotism, citizenship, service to the Fatherland, and a strong family, and that these traditional values should underpin Russia's "national idea."[9] Bastrykin further claimed that Russia should enshrine this "national idea" in its constitution. Bastrykin emphasized Russia's need to protect and preserve its "historical heritage" through legal frameworks. Bastrykin routinely publicly expresses interest in an informal Russian state ideology predicated on Russian ethno-religious nationalism and opposition to the West, in contrast to other senior Russian officials.[10] The Russian Constitution notably forbids the adoption of a formal state ideology.[11] Peskov stated on May 22 that it is difficult to comment on proposals to amend the Russian Constitution because the Kremlin does not have the specifics of such proposals — a departure from his May 19 statement apparently dismissing changes to the constitution.[12] Kremlin officials most recently leveraged Victory Day, Russia's largest holiday that commemorates the Soviet Union's contributions to the Second World War, to promote a new informal state ideology based on Russian unity in the face of opposition from the West.[13] The Kremlin is likely accelerating its promotion of this ideology to prepare the domestic population for a future military conflict against the West. Bastrykin is likely spearheading efforts to formally enshrine Russian nationalist ideology in the constitution as one of the most powerful and influential ultranationalists within the Kremlin elite.

Russian authorities are renewing their years-long narrative rejecting the legality of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, possibly to deny Ukrainian and Belarusian sovereignty and independence in the future. Russian State Duma Committee on the Protection of the Family, Fatherhood, Motherhood, and Childhood Head and member of the Communist Party Central Committee Nina Ostanina stated on May 22 that Duma deputies are ready to raise the issue of the alleged illegality of the dissolution of the Soviet Union.[14] Ostanina agreed with Russian Presidential Advisor Anton Kobyakov's May 21 claim that the Soviet Union's founding body was not involved in the dissolution of the Soviet Union and that, therefore, the Soviet Union still legally exists.[15] Ostanina further claimed that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was illegal because "no one gave authority" to then Belarusian Parliament Chairperson Stanislav Shushkevich, then Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic President Boris Yeltsin, and then Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk to sign the December 1991 Belovezha Accords, the internationally recognized document in which the Soviet republics of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus agreed to dissolve the Soviet Union.[16] Russian authorities have intermittently revived false narratives about the illegality of the Soviet Union's dissolution and calls to reestablish the Soviet Union since at least 2014, and promoted this informational effort in 2021 and 2023.[17] The Kremlin has been pursuing its strategic effort to de facto annex Belarus through the framework of the Union State of Russia and Belarus and consistently denies Ukrainian sovereignty.[18] Russian officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin, have frequently invoked the "trinity doctrine" — the ideological concept suggesting that Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians are a "triune" and forcibly separated people.[19] The Kremlin may be instructing lower-level officials to reinject the narrative about the allegedly illegal dissolution of the Soviet Union into the Russian information space in order to set conditions for the Kremlin to withdraw its recognition of Ukraine and Belarus as independent states in the future and call for a united Russian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian state. Russian officials have notably not acted upon past calls for the reestablishment of the Soviet Union, and the most recent iteration of this information campaign is similarly unlikely to have any near-term effects.

Russian authorities and state media continue to publicly question the legitimacy of the Ukrainian negotiating team and the Ukrainian government, likely to further efforts to reject and delay negotiations and to set conditions to renege on any future peace agreement with Ukraine. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Legal Department Director Maksim Musikhin claimed to Kremlin newswire TASS on May 21 that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has "long" lost his "internal" and "external" legitimacy so there "may be problems" with any agreements Zelensky may sign in the future.[20] Musikhin claimed that a person "who has the [Ukrainian] people's mandate" should sign any future agreements and that the Ukrainian people must choose a new leader. Musikhin claimed that the Ukrainian Constitution may grant the head of the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada the power to sign agreements. TASS also amplified a source allegedly "close to the negotiations" in Istanbul claiming that Ukraine will have to change the members of its negotiating group in order to work on a memorandum for a future peace treaty because the Ukrainian delegation at the recent Istanbul talks had a "shortage of politicians."[21] The source further questioned the legitimacy of any future Ukrainian negotiating group by claiming that the group may include "spies" working for European states or the United States. Musikhin is reiterating the longstanding false Kremlin claim that Zelensky is not the legitimate leader of Ukraine and therefore cannot sign any agreements with Russia.[22] Musikhin is also repeating Russian President Vladimir Putin's false claim that the Verkhovna Rada is the only legitimate power in Ukraine.[23] Kremlin officials have repeatedly claimed that Ukraine must hold elections for its government to be legitimate even though Ukraine's constitution and law explicitly prohibits elections during periods of martial law and prohibits the Ukrainian government from lifting martial law during invasion by a hostile country.[24] Musikhin's statements and these Russian state media reports are part of the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to set conditions for Russia to justify its withdrawal from any future peace agreements with Ukraine at a time of Russia's choosing and to support Russia's repeated demand that Ukraine acquiesce to regime change and the installation of a pro-Russian government.[25]

Recent Western reporting provided additional details in a case in which Russian forces executed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in November 2024, supporting ISW's assessment that high-level Russian military commanders are likely involved in these executions. CNN reported on May 21 that a Ukrainian intelligence official provided drone footage and intercepted audio in which a Russian commander ordered the execution of Ukrainian POWs and that the footage and audio correspond to a credible report of a Russian execution in western Zaporizhia Oblast in November 2024.[26] CNN reported that it could not independently verify the radio intercept or its link to the execution but noted that a forensic expert and an unnamed Western intelligence official found the audio to be authentic and "consistent with previously documented brutal executions." Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) told CNN that elements of a "Storm" unit of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) were responsible for the November 2024 executions and at least one other suspected execution. ISW observed additional reporting and footage that indicated that Russian forces captured and disarmed six Ukrainian POWs and executed five at close range near Novodarivka (eastern Zaporizhia Oblast) on November 23, 2024, in violation of international law.[27] UN Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial summary or arbitrary executions Morris Tidball-Binz told CNN that Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs cannot occur at such high numbers or frequency without the orders or consent of the highest Russian military commanders, including Russian President Vladimir Putin. There has been a sharp increase in credible reports and footage of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs throughout 2024 and 2025, and ISW continues to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling their subordinates to conduct systemic executions in direct violation of international law.[28]

Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov confirmed on May 22 Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev's appointment as Russian Ground Forces Commander.[29] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin likely appointed Mordvichev to proliferate positional warfare tactics and operational concepts for grinding marginal advances — the main tactics Russian forces used in the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk direction — across Russia’s Ground Forces.[30]

Key Takeaways:

  • Russian President Vladimir Putin is fostering the formation of an informal state ideology based on Russian nationalism that positions Russia in opposition to the West as part of ongoing efforts to militarize and unify Russian society.
  • Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin — one of the most outspoken Russian ultranationalists in Putin's inner circle — expressed support for the inclusion of an informal state ideology based on Russian nationalism in the Russian Constitution.
  • Russian authorities are renewing their years-long narrative rejecting the legality of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, possibly to deny Ukrainian and Belarusian sovereignty and independence in the future.
  • Russian authorities and state media continue to publicly question the legitimacy of the Ukrainian negotiating team and the Ukrainian government, likely to further efforts to reject and delay negotiations and to set conditions to renege on any future peace agreement with Ukraine.
  • Recent Western reporting provided additional details in a case in which Russian forces executed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in November 2024, supporting ISW's assessment that high-level Russian military commanders are likely involved in these executions.
  • Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov confirmed on May 22 Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev's appointment as Russian Ground Forces Commander.
  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Toretsk, and Velyka Novosilka.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.   

  • Alleged Ceasefire Violation
  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

There are no active ceasefires in Ukraine.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Limited fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on May 22.

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack toward Novyi Put (southeast of Tetkino), and another milblogger claimed that a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group attempted to enter an unspecified area of Glushkovsky Raion (south of Rylsk along the international border).[31]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) reportedly continue operating in the Kursk Oblast border area.[32]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on May 22.

 

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a munitions plant in Tula Oblast overnight on April 21 to 22. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on May 22 that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against Russian state defense corporation Rostec's NPO Splav munitions plant in Tula City.[33] The NPO Splav plant is a leading Russian manufacturer of ammunition for multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), air-launched missiles, and thermobaric artillery systems.[34] Tula Oblast Governor Dmitry Milyaev claimed that Ukrainian drones struck residential areas and infrastructure.[35] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed 10 drones over Tula Oblast overnight.[36]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in northern Sumy Oblast on May 22 but did not advance.

 

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Sumy City near Loknya (northeast of Sumy City) on May 22.[37]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division and "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly continue operating in the Sumy Oblast border area.[38]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Kharkiv City.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northeastern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[39]

 

Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, and Tykhe on May 21 and 22.[40]

Geolocated footage published on May 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently struck a Russian TOS-1A thermobaric artillery system with a first-person view (FPV) drone southeast of Shebekino, Belgorod Oblast (southeast of Belgorod City and north of Vovchansk).[41]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near the international border near Kamyanke, north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka and toward Mala Shapkivka,  and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on May 21 and 22.[42] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on May 22 that Russian forces attacked on eight motorcycles near Mala Shapkivka, that Ukrainian forces destroyed five motorcycles, and that the remaining three motorcycles unsuccessfully attacked toward Kindrashivka.[43]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Nova Krukhlyakivka and Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Novoserhiivka and Olhivka on May 21 and 22.[44] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zahryzove.[45]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on May 22 but did not advance.   

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Novyi Mir, and Zelena Dolyna; northwest of Lyman toward Karpivka; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on May 21 and 22.[46]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking targets near Rubtsi (northwest of Lyman).[47]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on May 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on May 21 and 22.[48]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 2nd Artillery Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Serebryanka (north of Siversk).[49]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 16 shows artillery elements of the Russian 7th Military Base (49th CAA, SMD) striking Ukrainian positions in southeastern Bila Hora (south of Chasiv Yar), indicating that Ukrainian forces advanced in the area.[50] ISW assesses that this Ukrainian advance did not occur recently.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 22 that Russian forces advanced north and northwest of Chasiv Yar.[51]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne and Bila Hora on May 21 and 22.[52]

The commander of a Ukrainian company operating in the Kramatorsk direction reported on May 21 that Russian forces are using different assaults tactics, including using heavy tracked vehicles, automobiles, and motorcycles.[53]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Virolyubivka (northwest of Chasiv Yar), and elements of the 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[54]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 21 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northwest of Druzhba (east of Toretsk).[55]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 21 and 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Dyliivka (north of Toretsk) and southwest of Novopaske (west of Toretsk).[56]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north and northwest of Nova Poltavka (southwest of Toretsk).[57]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; east of Toretsk near Druzhba; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk toward Yablunivka and Popiv Yar; west of Toretsk near Romanivka and Shcherbynivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Nova Poltavka and toward Zorya on May 21 and 22.[58] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Dyliivka.[59]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 22 that Russian forces seized Nova Poltavka, but ISW assessed that Russian forces seized the settlement as of May 17.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are dropping at least 10 guided glide bombs on Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk) every day and that Russian first-person view (FPV) drones have fire control over all the roads into the town.[61] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Toretsk's northern outskirts near the No. 12 mine are contested "gray zones."[62]

 

Order of Battle: A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian "Dostovalov" Battalion (a volunteer battalion formed in Republic of Bashkortostan in 2022) with seizing Nova Poltavka.[63] Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka (Toretsk) direction.[64] Elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Dyliivka, and elements of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating near Druzhba.[65]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on May 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk toward Shevchenko Pershe; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Promin, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and  Udachne on May 21 and 22.[66] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novoukrainka (south of Pokrovsk).[67]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on May 22 but did not make any confirmed advances.

 

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northeastern Novomykolaivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[68] Russian milbloggers continued to claim on May 21 and 22 that Russian forces, reportedly from the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), reached the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border north of Horikhove (southeast of Novopavlivka).[69] One Russian milblogger claimed on May 21 that Ukrainian forces destroyed the Russian forces that reached the border, however, and ISW continues to assess that Russian forces very likely have not established enduring positions at the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[70] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported on May 21 that Russian forces have not advanced to the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border.[71]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Novomykolaivka and southeast of Novopavlivka near Troitske and Horikhove on May 21 and 22.[72]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on May 22 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east, south, and southwest of Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove) and that Russian forces occupy roughly two-thirds of the settlement.[73]

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Andriivka, Bahatyr, and Kostyantynopil and southwest of Kurakhove near Odradne on May 21 and 22.[74] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bahatyr and Odradne.[75]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and drone operators of the 30th Artillery Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in Odradne.[76] Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novoukrainka (west of Kurakhove).[77]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.

 

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Dniproenerhiya (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and northwest of Novosilka (west of Velyka Novosilka).[78]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Fedorivka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), northwest of Vilne Pole (west of Velyka Novosilka), and near the Zelene Pole-Novopil line (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[79]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Dniproenerhiya and toward Komar; west of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and Vilne Pole; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil, Zelene Pole, and Novopil on May 21 and 22.[80] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Burlatske (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), Zelene Pole, and Novopil.[81]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Komar direction.[82] Elements of the Russian 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Vilne Pole.[83]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Hulyaipole near Vysoke (formerly Chervone) on May 21 and 22 but did not advance.[84]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Polohy direction.[85]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Zaporizhia direction on May 22 but did not advance.

   

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; southwest of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky, Stepove, and Kamyanske; and northwest of Orikhiv towards Pavlivka on May 21 and 22.[86]

The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Zaporizhia direction reported on May 22 that Russian forces conduct assault during both the day and night but that the intensity of Russian attacks fluctuates.[87]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[88]

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on May 21 and 22 but did not advance.

 

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near the Antonivka road and rail bridges on May 22.[89]

Order of Battle: Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on May 22 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a vehicle and killed four officers from an unspecified Chechen “Akhmat” unit between occupied Skadovsk and Antonivka (in the Russian rear along the Black Sea coast).[90]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 21 to 22. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched an Iskander-M ballistic missile from near Taganrog, Rostov Oblast and 128 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[91] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 112 drones over eastern, northern, southern, and central Ukraine and that 38 drones were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials stated that the Russian strikes affected Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Mykolaiv oblasts.[92]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarus continues to increase its ties with Russian defense industrial enterprises. Belarusian State Military Industrial Committee Chairperson Dmitry Pantus met with the Russian United Aircraft Corporation Deputy General Director Alexander Bobryshev on May 21 at the MILEX-2025 international exhibition of arms and military equipment forum in Minsk, Belarus to discuss joint Belarusian and Russian efforts to expand industrial cooperation in the production of aircraft and aircraft equipment.[93]Pantus and Bobryshev also met with the Russian tank manufacturer Uralvagonzavod Director General Alexander Potapov to discuss cooperation between Belarusian defense enterprises and Uralvagonzavod, including to fulfill Belarusian and Russian defense orders. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced that the Belarusian military signed a contract for small arms ammunition supplies with the Russian Imperial Tula Armament at the MILEX-2025 forum.[94]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 


[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76979

[2] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/17905133 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2023

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-21-2025

[4] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2025

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putin-unlikely-demobilize-event-ceasefire-because-he-afraid-his-veterans

[6] https://tass dot ru/politika/23982089

[7] https://tass dot ru/politika/23983189

[8] https://tass dot ru/politika/23985049

[9] https://tass dot ru/interviews/24009891

[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-21-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2024

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2025

[12] https://tass dot ru/politika/24017377

[13] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2025

[14] https://tass dot ru/politika/24016589; https://www.pnp dot ru/state-duma/deputat-ostanina-v-gosdume-gotovy-rassledovat-vopros-o-yuridicheskom-statuse-sssr.html

[15] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-21-2025

[16] https://www.pnp dot ru/state-duma/deputat-ostanina-v-gosdume-gotovy-rassledovat-vopros-o-yuridicheskom-statuse-sssr.html; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125

[17] https://wsem dot ru/publications/vosstanovim_edinoe_otechestvo_17850/; https://ria dot ru/20211220/gosduma-1764589280.html; https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/gosdumy-rf-poprosil-proverit-zakonnost-raspada-1446624283.html; https://www.gazeta dot ru/comments/2014/04/10_e_5987901.shtml

 

[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-quiet-conquest-belarus; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-14-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-30-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-16-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-30-2024

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112823; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/72863; https://vrns dot ru/forumy/rezolyutsiya-vserossiyskogo-ideologicheskogo-foruma-vsemirnogo-russkogo-narodnogo-sobora-v-sankt-pet/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2024

[20] https://tass dot ru/politika/24012527

[21] https://tass dot ru/politika/24007859

[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925

[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925

[24] https://rm.coe dot int/constitution-of-ukraine/168071f58b; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025

[25] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-17-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040725;

[26] https://archive.is/qjRgi ; https://edition.cnn.com/2025/05/21/europe/russian-forces-ukrainian-troops-radio-chatter-intl-invs

[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2024

[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031525  ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022025

[29] https://t.me/mod_russia/52963

[30] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625

[31] https://t.me/wargonzo/26688; https://t.me/dva_majors/71736 ; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/222427 

[32] https://t.me/mod_russia/52978

[33] https://t.me/astrapress/81668

[34] https://t.me/astrapress/81668; https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/splav-npo.html; https://заводы dot рф/factory/npo-splavv

[35] https://t.me/tass_agency/316197; https://t.me/tass_agency/316178 ; https://t.me/dmilyaev/4951; https://t.me/dmilyaev/4953 ; https://t.me/astrapress/81643

[36] https://t.me/mod_russia/52966

[37] https://t.me/wargonzo/26688

[38] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28960; https://t.me/mod_russia/52956; https://t.me/mod_russia/52973

[39] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1925095675169050904; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1925095678348333348; https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1925241898941215124; https://t.me/fakhivtsi/363

[40] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92071; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24567; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24532; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24530; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10446

[41] https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1925506337426842044; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1925519549249560823;

[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24567 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24532 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24530

[43] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10446

[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24567 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24532 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24530

[45] https://t.me/tass_agency/316201

[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24567 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24532 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24530 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10446 

[47] https://t.me/mod_russia/52989

[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24567; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24532; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24530; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10446; https://t.me/smotri_z/43597  

[49] https://t.me/mod_russia/52976

[50] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1925319018497364466 ; https://t.me/shtrihgroupgumka/281

[51] https://t.me/wargonzo/26688; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36201 

[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24567 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26688; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24532; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24530; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10446   

[53] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/21/shturmuyut-pid-siryak-vechirnij-abo-rankovyj-na-kramatorskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-probuyut-proryvatysya/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc 

[54] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36201; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28960    

[55] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1925263971130777860; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1925279104082874658; https://t.me/Orki3MsbLauda/179  

[56] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1925465470846513459; https://t.me/ombr_28/2195; https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1925241888015049122; https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/1925200964589346941; https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/1925190876222939597; https://t.me/Lubart_Brigade/636; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/28336  

[57] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92078; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64467; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165579

[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24567; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24532 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24530; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10446; https://t.me/dva_majors/71697; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64467; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28952; https://t.me/rusich_army/23661

[59] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28952

[60] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-17-2025; https://t.me/mod_russia/52979

[61] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92078

[62] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28952

[63] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92113

[64] https://t.me/frontline_pvt/8353

[65] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165520; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13838; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1925263971130777860; https://t.me/Orki3MsbLauda/179; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1925279104082874658

[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24567 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24532 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24530 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10446 

[67] https://t.me/voin_dv/15099

[68] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36174

[69] https://t.me/rybar/70583 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64472 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71697 ; https://t.me/SolovievLive/322661  ; https://t.me/epoddubny/23505 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165579

[70] https://t.me/yurasumy/23094 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125

[71] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9295

[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24567 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24532 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24530https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10446  ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64491 ; https://t.me/rybar/70594

[73] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64495 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15091 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165601 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36186 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36207 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64471

 

[74] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24532 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0XRCbRXiWXMvWX3ZuigXQ4s7hKTNPFft4uzQXFNLhfFGWsPaQWacVr1HWHJ22YtXLl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24530 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10446 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36207 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64471 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64492 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15100

[75] https://t.me/dva_majors/71697 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64492 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26688 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15099

[76] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36207 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15098

[77] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165538

[78] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/28348; https://t.me/Poltavska_brigadeNGU/538; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9204 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9206; https://t.me/ZSU_141OMBr/1095

[79] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165579 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165588 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26688 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36188    

[80] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165588 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71697 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15099

[81] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165588 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36188 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15099

[82] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165602

[83] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36188

[84] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24567; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24532 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0XRCbRXiWXMvWX3ZuigXQ4s7hKTNPFft4uzQXFNLhfFGWsPaQWacVr1HWHJ22YtXLl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24530

[85] https://t.me/voin_dv/15081 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15088

[86] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24567; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24532 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0XRCbRXiWXMvWX3ZuigXQ4s7hKTNPFft4uzQXFNLhfFGWsPaQWacVr1HWHJ22YtXLl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24530; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165588;  https://t.me/wargonzo/26688

[87] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/22/robyly-propagandystskyj-moment-na-zaporizkomu-napryamku-vsi-vylazky-rosiyan-kontrolyuyut-drony/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZeLvZO1vkI8 

[88] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28977 

[89] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0XRCbRXiWXMvWX3ZuigXQ4s7hKTNPFft4uzQXFNLhfFGWsPaQWacVr1HWHJ22YtXLl

[90] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/chetvero-kadyrovtsiv-iz-zirochkamy-vybukhnuly-pid-skadovskom.html

[91] https://t.me/kpszsu/34808

[92] https://t.me/kpszsu/34808; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2520 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2521  ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1023843-raketnogo-udaru-po-harkovu-ne-bulo-buv-povitranij-bij-sinegubov/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/14381

[93] https://belta dot by/society/view/rossija-i-belarus-rasshirjajut-sotrudnichestvo-v-aviatsionnoj-sfere-716329-2025/ ; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/313129    

[94] https://www.facebook.com/mod.mil.by/posts/pfbid0xRcu1viEMmSL3zdVYFpTDzXd5aAo3NE2sKpaQU3hphLjLVTCbA99pqEajvidGYRgl ; https://t.me/modmilby/47751 

 

Wednesday, May 21, 2025

Iran Update, May 21, 2025

 Katherine Wells, Ben Schmida, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Carolyn Moorman, Avery Borens, Andie Parry, Kelly Campa, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.

An unsanctioned oil tanker that is operated by a US-sanctioned entity and has probably illicitly transported oil to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from Iran issued a false distress call in the Strait of Hormuz on May 20.[1] The Panamanian-flagged oil tanker the Themir likely issued a distress call that claimed it had been hijacked.[2] A British maritime security firm said that the distress call occurred 51 nautical miles northwest of Bandar-e Jask, which is consistent with the Themir’s position. The firm confirmed on May 21 that the hijacking call was a false alarm.[3] It remains unclear at the time of writing why the Themir issued the false distress call, but the vessel is linked to Iranian efforts to illicitly transfer oil.[4] The United States sanctioned the Themir’s Malaysia-based owner, IMS Ltd, on February 24 for aiding the Iranian oil export network, as part of US President Donald Trump’s ”maximum pressure” policy.[5]

The Themir’s pattern of behavior suggests it may have conducted a ship-to-ship transfer at some time while off the coast of Iran.[6] Iran and the PRC use ship-to-ship transfers to obfuscate the transportation of PRC purchases of Iranian oil, and ships travel in circular holding patterns when conducting ship-to-ship transfers.[7] The Themir was in a circular holding pattern 51 nautical miles northwest of Bandar-e Jask Port on the southern coast of Iran at the time of the distress call, according to maritime data.[8] The ship and its two sister ships—the Peterpaul and the Chamtang—have regularly sailed between the Gulf of Oman and the PRC.[9] Both the Peterpaul and the Chamtang are sanctioned for illicit transfers of Iranian oil to the PRC.[10] The ships usually enter circular holding patterns in the Gulf of Oman before sailing eastwards to PRC ports. Circular holding patterns can indicate that the ships are executing ship-to-ship transfers.[11] The Themir also previously travelled from the Gulf of Oman to the PRC’s biggest oil offloading port, Shandong Port, in September 2024.[12] The US Treasury Department recently sanctioned refineries in Shandong for importing billions of dollars in Iranian oil.[13] The Themir has also travelled along similar routes as its two sanctioned sister ships from near Bandar-e-Jask Port to eastern PRC through the Gulf of Oman and Malacca Strait five times since January 2024, suggesting that the Themir has previously illicitly transported Iranian oil to the PRC.[14]

The fifth round of the US-Iran nuclear negotiations will take place in Rome on May 23.[15] Two unspecified diplomatic sources in Iran told anti-regime media on May 21 that Iran asked Omani mediators to convince the United States to ease US demands in negotiations, likely referring to the US demand for zero uranium enrichment.[16] The issue of zero uranium enrichment is the main sticking point in the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.[17] The Trump administration's negotiating position appears to have cohered around zero uranium enrichment, but Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei explicitly rejected the US demand for zero uranium enrichment during a speech on May 20.[18] CTP-ISW previously assessed that disagreements between Iran and the United States about the issue of zero uranium enrichment may stall the negotiations or delay a deal.[19] 

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov falsely accused the Syrian transitional government of “ethnic [and sectarian] cleansing,” which supports the objectives of the pro-Assad Alawite insurgency in western Syria.[20] The Coastal Shield Brigade, a pro-Assad Alawite insurgent group in western Syria, said in March 2025 that it seeks to undermine international support for the transitional government by triggering mass reprisal killings of Alawites in response to its attacks. Lavrov said that Russia is deeply concerned about the situation in Syria and claimed that “radical militant groups are carrying out real ethnic cleansing and mass killings of people based on their nationality and religion.”[21] Lavrov also claimed that Western countries ignore crimes around the world as long as they do not conflict with the West’s global agenda.[22] Lavrov characterized the violence on the Syrian coast in March 2025 as “ethnic cleansing,” which echoes false Russian state media claims that over 1,500 people were killed during the coastal violence.[23] This number is double the amount recorded by Syrian human rights organizations.[24] Lavrov made these comments despite a marked decrease in sectarian violence on the Syrian coast since March.[25] There have been no major massacres since early March, despite continued sectarian killings and other murders in western Syria. These killings and murders, while serious and concerning, are not systematic” cleansing” as Lavrov implies. The Syrian transitional government also did not in March 2025 and still does not exert complete control over various armed factions that make up the Ministry of Defense (MoD), which indicates that the March 2025 violence was spontaneous and seriously threatened Syria’s stability, but it was not systematic.[26] The Syrian transitional government took steps during the insurgency to limit violence, which included the removal of military units involved in massacres as well as the establishment of an independent committee to investigate the events on the coast.[27] The government, despite these steps, still must take real, tangible steps to arrest, try, and convict those accused of sectarian massacres along Syria‘s coast.

A group of unspecified fighters attacked Russian forces stationed at Hmeimim air base, Latakia Province, on May 20.[28] The Syrian transitional government is extremely unlikely to have sanctioned any attack on Russian forces at Hmeimim, given Syria and Russia’s active negotiations over the two countries’ economic and military cooperation. The militants attacked the southwest perimeter of the airfield but retreated after Russian forces killed at least three fighters.[29] The fighters killed two Russian soldiers at the base.[30] Russian sources at the time of the attack claimed that the attackers were Uzbek foreign fighters who were unaffiliated with Syrian security forces.[31] Syrian sources later claimed that the attackers were foreign military trainers for HTS who attacked the Russians without orders, however.[32] Uzbek nationals and Central Asians have historically made up an important portion of HTS’s military structure, including training HTS special forces.[33] HTS-allied Central Asian and Caucasian armed groups such as Katibat al Tawhid wa Jihad (KTJ), the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), and Ajnad al Kavkaz (Soldiers of the Caucasus) are known for their extreme loyalty to HTS.[34] It is unlikely that these factions and their associated private military companies would act independently of HTS’s chain of command, given that HTS has integrated foreign fighters into the transitional government's military.[35] Foreign fighters in HTS are particularly unlikely to disobey HTS leaders because they have few options if they disobey orders and are deported or imprisoned. A return to their home countries would result in jail time at a minimum.

Key Takeaways:

  • Iranian Activity in the Persian Gulf: An unsanctioned oil tanker that is operated by a US-sanctioned entity and has probably illicitly transported oil to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from Iran issued a false distress call in the Strait of Hormuz on May 20. The tanker's pattern of behavior suggests it may have conducted a ship-to-ship transfer at some time while off the coast of Iran. Iran and the PRC use ship-to-ship transfers to obfuscate the transportation of PRC purchases of Iranian oil.
  • US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations: The fifth round of the US-Iran nuclear negotiations will take place in Rome on May 23. Two unspecified diplomatic sources in Iran told anti-regime media on May 21 that Iran asked Omani mediators to convince the United States to ease US demands in negotiations, likely referring to the US demand for zero uranium enrichment.
  • Syria and Russia: Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov falsely accused the Syrian transitional government of “ethnic [and sectarian] cleansing,” which supports the objectives of the pro-Assad Alawite insurgency in western Syria. Lavrov made these comments despite a marked decrease in sectarian violence on the Syrian coast since March.
  • Russians in Syria: A group of unspecified fighters attacked Russian forces stationed at Hmeimim air base, Latakia Province, on May 20. Syrian sources claimed that the attackers were foreign military trainers for HTS who attacked the Russians without approval from HTS.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry announced on May 21 that Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli has been appointed as Iran’s new ambassador to China.[36] This appointment suggests Iran may aim to strengthen political and security cooperation with China, given Rahman Fazli’s background in internal security and his connections to the 2021 China-Iran cooperation agreement. Rahmani Fazli previously served as the Iranian Interior Minister under former President Hassan Rouhani and held senior security positions, including Law Enforcement Command Deputy Commander in Chief and the National Security Council head.[37] The United States sanctioned Rahmani Fazli in 2020 for authorizing lethal force against protestors during the November 2019 protests, which killed hundreds of Iranians, including minors.[38] Rahman Fazli has a strong relationship with senior Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Larijani, who played a key role in elevating Rahmani Fazli to Interior Minister in 2013. Larijani and Rahman Fazli cooperated in the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), the National Security Council, and the Iranian Parliament.[39] Rahmani Fazli’s appointment as ambassador to China aligns with Larijani’s long-standing role overseeing the Iranian strategic partnership with China, including the 25-year cooperation agreement signed in 2021.[40] Rahmani Fazli’s background in internal security and high-level state coordination may reflect an Iranian objective to strengthen political and security cooperation with China.

Iranian Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi met with Belarusian Deputy Chief of the General Staff Major General Vladimir Kupriyanyuk on May 21 to discuss defense cooperation.[41] Both sides emphasized the importance of strengthening ties in key areas, including military training, experience-sharing, and broader defense coordination. Iran and Belarus previously signed two memoranda of understanding on defense and trade cooperation in March and April 2024, respectively. Iran has begun work on establishing a military drone factory in Belarus since May 2023 to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[42] Cooperation between Iran and Belarus, a key Russian ally, comes amid increased engagement and defense coordination between Iranian and Russian defense officials since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.[43]

Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri inspected ongoing efforts to fortify Iran’s eastern border during a visit to Sistan and Baluchistan Province on May 21.[44] Bagheri stated that sealing the eastern frontier remains a top priority in order to counter terrorism, drug trafficking, and illegal border crossings. The project includes four-meter-high concrete walls equipped with drones, 360-degree cameras, and smart sensors. Border security will eventually cover 300 kilometers. Iran’s ongoing efforts to fortify its southeastern border are likely motivated in part by an uptick in attacks by anti-regime groups, especially Jaish al Adl. Jaish al Adl is a Baloch Salafi-jihadi group that has targeted Iranian security personnel and infrastructure in Sistan and Baluchistan Province since December 2023.[45]

The Iranian rial appreciated from 843,000 rial to one US dollar on May 20 to 841,000 rial to one US dollar on May 21.[46]

Syria

Top Syrian officials met with the Turkish intelligence chief, likely primarily to discuss the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).[47] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani, and Syrian Intelligence Chief Hussein Salama met with Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin in Damascus on May 20.[48] The officials discussed the integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the Syrian state, border security, and counter-ISIS activities, including transferring supervision of detention camps in northeastern Syria to the Syrian state.[49] Salama, who was a key HTS leader, has been responsible for negotiations with the SDF and its constituent militias across Syria, including in Aleppo City and Deir ez Zor Province.[50] Turkey has recently expressed concern about the slow integration of the SDF.[51] Salama’s presence suggests that the SDF was a major point of focus during the discussions. Counter-ISIS activities and the transfer of detention camps to government control would fall under the umbrella of SDF issues because the SDF plays a very prominent role in counter-ISIS operations and controls the detention camps where ISIS fighters are held.[52] Syrian and Turkish officials have met since January 2025 to discuss joint defense concerns, including Turkey’s military presence in Syria and Turkish assistance to the Syrian army.[53]

Turkey and Israel reportedly established a de-confliction line in April 2025, according to a recent report by a Turkish journalist.[54] The de-confliction line seeks to prevent misunderstandings or military incidents between Turkey and Israel, according to two sources familiar with the matter.[55] Recent Turkish tensions with Israel may have delayed several Turkish initiatives to develop a military presence in Syria.[56] Israel struck several Syrian bases in March and April 2025 as a ”warning” to Turkey before it positioned its assets at the bases.[57] Syrian military sources told Western media on April 7 that Turkish military teams planned to visit the T4 and Palmyra air bases in Syria but had to cancel the visit after Israel struck both bases hours prior, thus making them unusable.[58] Turkey and Israel held their first ”technical“ meeting in Azerbaijan on April 9 to establish a de-confliction mechanism.[59] Turkey and Israel have reportedly held several meetings since April 9 and are scheduled to meet later this month to discuss a broader de-confliction deal.[60] This open line of communication between Turkey and Israel could possibly prevent a potential stand-off between the two parties, which both have strategic interests in Syria. Syrian government representatives and the head of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Operations Directorate Oded Basyuk also reportedly held direct talks in Azerbaijan to resolve joint concerns.[61]

The United States and Turkey held a new round of the Syria Working Group in Washington, DC, on May 20.[62] The Syria Working Group is a high-level US and Turkish working group that aims to synchronize policy and deepen bilateral cooperation in Syria between the two countries.[63] The US and Turkish delegations discussed shared priorities in Syria, including sanctions relief and combating terrorism.[64] Several US and Turkish officials attended the meeting, including US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau, Turkish Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Nuh Yilaz, US Ambassador to Turkey Thomas Barrack, Jr., and Turkish Ambassador to the US Sedat Onal.[65] Barrack was reportedly tapped as the US special envoy to Syria on May 21.[66] US and Turkish officials affirmed their commitment to increasing cooperation and coordination on Syria’s stability and security.[67] US President Donald Trump and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan have both previously stressed the importance of a US-Turkey partnership for Syria’s stability and security.[68]

The United States announced on May 21 that it will begin to restore normal diplomatic relations with Syria.[69] Unspecified diplomatic sources told Western media that the United States would appoint current US Ambassador to Turkey Thomas Barrack Jr. as a special envoy for Syria.[70] Trump administration officials also announced that the United States will issue a temporary sanctions waiver that covers much of the Syrian economy before the US Congress passes a new law to repeal sanctions targeting Syria.[71] The Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019, which is the most stringent of US sanctions imposed on Syria, will require an act of Congress to remove. The Caesar Act targets anyone who provides support to the Syrian government, supports the Syrian oil and gas industry, exports aircraft or military equipment to Syria, or provides construction or engineering services directly or indirectly to the Syrian government.[72] The complicated legislative steps in the United States and decades of US sanctions targeting Syria mean that it will take time for the United States to fully lift sanctions on Syria.[73] A previous temporary US sanctions waiver issued in January 2025 did not lead to significant investment in Syrian industries, partly due to confusion over what activities were included in the waiver.[74] Internal instability and uncertainty regarding Syria's future may similarly deter investment in the short- to medium-term. It will therefore likely take weeks or months before the removal of sanctions generates visible and tangible economic effects throughout the country.

Syrian Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra met with the 60th Division to discuss the division's recent deployments in Aleppo on May 21.[75] Qasra met with 60th Division commander Brigadier General Awad Mohammad (Abu Qutayba al Shami) and other division commanders and personnel.[76] Abu Qutayba was a commander within HTS’s predecessor organization, Jabhat Fateh al Sham, since at least 2016.[77] Abu Qutayba then oversaw HTS’s Aleppo Sector and commanded an HTS brigade in 2020.[78] The Syrian MoD stated that Qasra and the 60th Division commanders discussed the division's recent deployments to northern and eastern Aleppo Province.[79] The 60th Division deployed to villages west of Tishreen Dam on April 14 to monitor the area and conduct de-mining operations after the SDF withdrew from its positions there as part of its agreement with the transitional government.[80] It is notable that Qasra met with this force, which is controlled by HTS personnel, after SNA forces reportedly clashed with the SDF on May 19.[81] Qasra may have discussed those clashes and ways that the 60th Division can respond to them in the future.

Iraq

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani announced on May 21 that his Reconstruction and Development Coalition will contest the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections.[82] The coalition includes parties led by Popular Mobilization Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh and former Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) spokesperson Ahmed al Asadi. The coalition notably does not include Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri, whose absence follows reports that Ameri left Sudani’s coalition over disagreements with Sudani.[83] Iran recently urged unity amongst Shia Coordination Framework leaders (presumably including Sudani) ahead of the elections to improve the likelihood that Iranian-backed parties will maintain control of the Iraqi government.[84] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. The Coordination Framework supported Sudani for prime minister in 2022. State of Law coalition head Nouri al Maliki and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq leader Qais al Khazali will reportedly run separate lists in opposition to Sudani.[85]

The Iraqi Independent High Electoral Commission rejected the Sunni-led United Anbar Coalition’s participation in the upcoming parliamentary elections.[86] The party is opposed to major Sunni politician Mohammad al Halbousi. Top Sunni politicians formed the United Arab Coalition in 2022 in opposition to former Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi.[87] It includes former Finance Minister Rafai al Issawi. Former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s administration charged Issawi with corruption in 2013 after Issawi condemned Maliki’s policies.[88] Maliki weaponized the IHEC against his political opponents during his administration.[89]

A Kataib Hezbollah-affiliated Iraqi parliamentarian called for the dismissal and trial of the Sadrist Basra governor on May 21 after the governor attempted to demolish homes in an area in which Iranian-backed parties may have substantial economic interests.[90] Kataib Hezbollah is a key Iranian proxy in Iraq.[91] Prime Minister Sudani sent a letter to Basra Governor Asad al Eidani on May 19 in which Sudani requested that Eidani delay the demolition of houses in Basra Province. The head parliamentarian of the committee formed to investigate Eidani noted that the Basra provincial government has taken steps to remove encroachments for years and implied that the provincial government is currently working to remove encroachments in al Zubair District.[92] Al Zubair District hosts an oil field that produces about 200,000 barrels per day, and the district is a stronghold for Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties, who have repeatedly attempted to create a separate province for the district.[93] The involvement of al Zubair District and its oil rents may have motivated Iranian-backed actors to act against Eidani. Multiple parliamentarians said that the committee’s investigation of Eidani and call for his dismissal falls outside of parliament's jurisdiction.[94] Another Iranian-backed parliamentarian praised the creation of the committee and subsequent call for his dismissal.[95]

It is notable that Iranian-backed parliamentarians have called for the removal of a Sadrist governor ahead of the upcoming elections.[96] Eidani is also reportedly an ally of Sudani, who has formed a coalition that will oppose other Shia Coordination Framework parties.[97] A Basra parliamentarian implied that the investigation intends to politically target Eidani because he is a contender for the premiership.[98]

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
  • Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
  • Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

Nothing significant to report.

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.


[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hijack-call-ship-off-iran-false-alarm-security-firm-ambrey-says-2025-05-21/; Data available by subscription from Starboard Maritime Intelligence; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0026

[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hijack-call-ship-off-iran-false-alarm-security-firm-ambrey-says-2025-05-21/ ; Data available by subscription from Starboard Maritime Intelligence;

[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hijack-call-ship-off-iran-false-alarm-security-firm-ambrey-says-2025-05-21

[4] Data available by subscription from Starboard Maritime Intelligence

[5] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0026

[6] Data available by subscription from Starboard Maritime Intelligence

[7] https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2024-iran-south-china-sea-oil-trade

[8] Data available by subscription from Starboard Maritime Intelligence

[9] Data available by subscription from Starboard Maritime Intelligence

[10] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0026

[11] https://documentation.spire.com/blog/port-events-api-upgrades-summer-2024

[12] Data available by subscription from Starboard Maritime Intelligence

[13] https://www.state.gov/sanctioning-a-china-based-teapot-refinery-to-pressure-iran-further/#:~:text=The%20United%20States%20is%20today,including%20to%20China%2C%20to%20zero.

[14] Data available by subscription from Starboard Maritime Intelligence

[15] https://x.com/badralbusaidi/status/1925221902991097994

[16] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202505218603

[17] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-envoy-witkoff-cites-us-red-line-with-iran-against-uranium-enrichment-2025-05-18/ ; https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1924483539325616490 ; https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6466382 ; https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/news-content?id=60234

[18] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-may-19-2025 ; https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/news-content?id=60234

[19] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-may-15-2025

[20] https://tass dot ru/politika/23990807

[21] https://tass dot ru/politika/23990807

[22] https://tass dot ru/politika/23990807

[23] https://tass dot ru/politika/23990807 ; https://www.enabbaladi dot net/743680/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A8%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%82-803-%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A8%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AB-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7/ ; https://snhr dot org/arabic/2025/03/11/%d9%85%d9%82%d8%aa%d9%84-803-%d8%a3%d8%b4%d8%ae%d8%a7%d8%b5-%d8%ae%d8%a7%d8%b1%d8%ac-%d9%86%d8%b7%d8%a7%d9%82-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%82%d8%a7%d9%86%d9%88%d9%86-%d8%a8%d9%8a%d9%86-6-%d9%8810-%d8%a2%d8%b0/

[24] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/743680/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A8%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%82-803-%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A8%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AB-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7/ ; https://snhr dot org/arabic/2025/03/11/%d9%85%d9%82%d8%aa%d9%84-803-%d8%a3%d8%b4%d8%ae%d8%a7%d8%b5-%d8%ae%d8%a7%d8%b1%d8%ac-%d9%86%d8%b7%d8%a7%d9%82-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%82%d8%a7%d9%86%d9%88%d9%86-%d8%a8%d9%8a%d9%86-6-%d9%8810-%d8%a2%d8%b0/

[25] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-12-2025

[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-10-2025

[27] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1898507756807790846 ; https://english.enabbaladi dot net/archives/2025/03/investigation-committee-for-coastal-events-clarifies-its-work-mechanism/

[28] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1924879322877247834 ; https://www.independent.co.uk/news/bashar-assad-syrian-observatory-for-human-rights-sergey-lavrov-moscow-united-states-b2755512.html

[29] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/bashar-assad-syrian-observatory-for-human-rights-sergey-lavrov-moscow-united-states-b2755512.html ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1925267030099341435

[30] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/bashar-assad-syrian-observatory-for-human-rights-sergey-lavrov-moscow-united-states-b2755512.html ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1925267030099341435

[31] https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84-4-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B3 ; https://t.me/mash/64119

[32] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/bashar-assad-syrian-observatory-for-human-rights-sergey-lavrov-moscow-united-states-b2755512.html ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1925267030099341435

[33] https://www.rferl.org/a/syria-hts-tajikistan-northmacedonia-kosovo-albania/33237636.html ; https://www.aymennjawad.org/2019/03/hayat-tahrir-al-sham-red-bands-interview ; https://syriaaccountability.org/militant-enterprises-the-jihadist-private-military-companies-of-northwest-syria/

[34] https://www.danielegarofalomonitoring.com/p/yurtugh-tactical-interview-with-their?ref=syriaaccountability.org ; https://www.rferl.org/a/foreign-fighters-syria-military-hts-blowback-concerns/33266542.html

[35] https://www.rferl.org/a/foreign-fighters-syria-military-hts-blowback-concerns/33266542.html

[36] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/232110

[37] https://www.jamaran dot news/%D9%85%D8%A4%D9%84%D9%81-38-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A7-%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D9%81%D8%B6%D9%84%DB%8C ;

https://spreadingjustice.org/individual-violator/sj84567/

[38] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1015

[39] https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-larijani-possible-candidate-of-reformist-for-president/29614673.html

[40] https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-larijani-possible-candidate-of-reformist-for-president/29614673.html ;

https://old.iranintl.com/en/world/larijani-appointed-pursue-iran-china-strategic-cooperation-deal ;

https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/27/world/middleeast/china-iran-deal.html

[41] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/232109

[42] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/607393 ;
https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-742605

[43] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russian-basing-in-iran-is-about-more-than-isis

[44] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/31/3318323

[45] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-19-2025 ;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-18-2025 ;

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-28-2025 ;

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-10-2025

[46] https://bon-bast.com/

[47] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1924827559658733899 ; https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/middle-east/turkish-intelligence-chief-meets-with-syrian-president-in-damascus/3574091

[48] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1924827559658733899 ; https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/middle-east/turkish-intelligence-chief-meets-with-syrian-president-in-damascus/3574091

[49] https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/middle-east/turkish-intelligence-chief-meets-with-syrian-president-in-damascus/3574091 ; https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1924827559658733899

[50] https://www.newarab.com/news/former-hts-leader-al-salama-tapped-head-syrian-intelligence

[51] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-15-2025

[52] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/us-withdrawal-syria-will-reinvigorate-isis-terror-threat

[53] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-sharaa-discuss-defense-pact-with-turkeys-erdogan-sources-say-2025-02-04 ; https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2025/03/turkey-increasing-military-assistance-to-syria.php ; https://x.com/HornReview/status/1885003185376411841 ; https://x.com/Sy_Defense/status/1924838243859624391

[54] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-israel-establish-hotline-syria

[55] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-israel-establish-hotline-syria

[56] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-848620 ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/coming-clash-over-syria-israel-and-turkey-are-collision-course ; https://www.forbes.com/sites/pauliddon/2025/04/02/turkeys-planned-syria-military-deployment-echoes-russias-a-decade-ago ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-hit-syrian-bases-scoped-by-turkey-hinting-regional-showdown-sources-say-2025-04-04

[57] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-848620 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-hit-syrian-bases-scoped-by-turkey-hinting-regional-showdown-sources-say-2025-04-04

[58] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-hit-syrian-bases-scoped-by-turkey-hinting-regional-showdown-sources-say-2025-04-04

[59] https://apnews.com/article/israel-turkey-syria-conflict-talks-447f81a8eff6e1bb81b85dca0b7c6034

[60] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-israel-establish-hotline-syria ; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/could-trump-be-mediator-in-chief-for-turkey-and-israel-in-syria

[61] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-israel-establish-hotline-syria ; https://edition.cnn.com/2025/05/16/middleeast/israeli-syrian-official-hold-rare-direct-talks-intl

[62] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/05/joint-statement-on-the-u-s-turkiye-syria-working-group

[63] https://www.paturkey dot com/news/2025/turkiye-u-s-to-hold-syria-working-group-talks-on-may-20-in-washington-20771

[64] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/05/joint-statement-on-the-u-s-turkiye-syria-working-group

[65] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/05/joint-statement-on-the-u-s-turkiye-syria-working-group

[66] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-appoint-thomas-barrack-special-envoy-syria-sources-say-2025-05-21/

[67] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/05/joint-statement-on-the-u-s-turkiye-syria-working-group

[68] https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/turkiye/president-erdogan-stresses-vital-role-of-turkiye-us-partnership-for-regional-global-stability/3571512 ; https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2025/5/5/erdogan-trump-phone-call-ukraine-russia-war-gaza-syria-us-turkiye-ties ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-says-turkey-holds-key-syrias-future-2024-12-16

[69] https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-a-un-security-council-briefing-on-the-political-and-humanitarian-situations-in-syria-12/

[70] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-appoint-thomas-barrack-special-envoy-syria-sources-say-2025-05-21/

[71] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-preparing-issue-some-sanctions-relief-syria-2025-05-15/ ; https://www.cnn.com/2025/05/17/politics/syria-sanctions-scramble-trump

[72] https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2021/07/the-power-and-limits-of-threat-the-caesar-syrian-civilian.html

[73] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate051325 ; https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1924468469359137224

[74] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-ease-aid-restrictions-syria-limited-show-support-new-government-wsj-reports-2025-01-06/ ; https://syriadirect.org/syria-embarks-on-fragile-transition-sanctions-stand-in-the-way/ ; https://x.com/RojavaNetwork/status/1894800717233234417 ; https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933861/download?inline ; https://www.newarab.com/analysis/caesar-act-explained-new-us-sanctions-syria; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-sanctions-hold-up-qatari-support-syria-sources-say-2025-02-26

[75] https://t.me/Sy_Defense/430

[76] https://t.me/Sy_Defense/430

[77] https://youtu.be/ZE6jVnCoBFE?si=QNKBiSZbztRylP7u

[78] https://www.syrianmemory.org/archive/documents/64c7b4b5c1522a0001cffac9 ; https://stepagency-sy dot net/2020/04/15/ألوية-وقيادات-جديدة-تحرير-الشام-تهيكل/

[79] https://t.me/Sy_Defense/430

[80] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1912218465861054918 ; https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=pfbid0oS7zfovtjTdZJouhxK1nt54nbZftGrwMUjK8WPJp5yxWC2yNFuYtzmEjxmCsMRyul&id=100063944832166&_rdr ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-14-2025

[81] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1924366390116430264; https://x.com/ScharoMaroof/status/1924369088391848329; https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1924242034560262384

[82] https://www.rudaw dot net/sorani/middleeast/iraq/200520257

[83] https://al-aalem dot com/%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B2%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%84/

[84] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate043025

[85] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%B4-%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA

[86] https://almadapaper dot net/403575/

[87] https://rawabetcenter dot com/archives/155348

[88] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Malikis-Authoritarian-Regime-Web.pdf pg. 30

[89] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Malikis-Authoritarian-Regime-Web.pdf pg 22

[90] https://www.rudaw dot net/sorani/middleeast/iraq/21052025 ; https://www.rudaw dot net/sorani/middleeast/iraq/200520251

[91] https://www.rudaw dot net/sorani/middleeast/iraq/21052025 ; https://www.rudaw dot net/sorani/middleeast/iraq/200520251

[92] https://www.al-mirbad dot com/detail/181034

[93] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/270320253 ; https://aawsat dot com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/5126454-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%AB%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82

[94] https://www.al-mirbad dot com/detail/181075 ; https://www.al-mirbad dot com/detail/181048

[95] https://www.al-mirbad dot com/detail/181049

[96] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/between-power-sharing-and-power-consolidation-impact-iraqs-provincial-elections

[97] https://english.aawsat dot com/features/5057029-al-sudani-and-maliki-more-just-iraqi-cold-war

[98] https://www.al-mirbad dot com/detail/181075