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Saturday, November 30, 2024

Iran Update, November 30, 2024

  Andie Parry, Siddhant Kishore, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Christina Harward, George Barros, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Syrian opposition forces seized Aleppo City and advanced toward Hama City on November 30.[1] Opposition forces made this progress after launching their surprise offensive only three days prior.[2] The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) acknowledged that its forces have withdrawn from Aleppo City to “strengthen” defensive lines and “prepare for a counterattack.”[3] The SAA also acknowledged that opposition forces have entered “large parts of Aleppo [City].”[4] A pro-Syrian regime social media account reported that the SAA suffered command-and-control problems in Aleppo City, possibly leading to the rapid collapse of SAA defenses.[5] Fateh Mubin—one of the main opposition groups leading the offensive—announced on November 29 that opposition forces had separately taken control of Khan Sheikoun, which is about 20 miles from Hama City.[6] Geolocated footage posted on November 30 similarly showed opposition forces advancing through towns en route to Hama City.[7] CTP-ISW cannot verify whether opposition forces are operating in Hama City at the time of this writing.

Pro-regime forces have failed to mount an effective defense against the surprise offensive by opposition forces. The Syrian regime and affiliated sources claimed that the SAA was preparing defensive lines in northern Hama Province on November 30. It appears that opposition forces have advanced past northern Hama Province at this time, however.[8] Russian forces have separately conducted multiple airstrikes—some in cooperation with the SAA—targeting opposition forces in Aleppo City.[9] Russian and Syrian airstrikes have continued to target opposition positions in the Aleppo, Hama, and Idlib countrysides as well.[10]

Syrian opposition forces have likely captured valuable military equipment that the SAA and other pro-regime forces abandoned amid disorderly withdrawals.[11] Social media accounts claimed that opposition forces have captured armored vehicles and heavy artillery pieces.[12] Opposition forces also entered the Abu al Duhur and Nairab military airports in Idlib Province and Aleppo City, respectively.[13]

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) launched a separate operation into Syrian regime-controlled territory on November 30.[14] The SNA is currently operating northeast of Aleppo City, reportedly with the intent of capturing Tel Rifat, north of Aleppo City, from the joint control of the Syrian regime and Syrian Democratic Forces.[15] The SNA captured Kuweires military airport east of Aleppo City along with several other villages.[16]

The opposition offensive in northern Syria may be inspiring anti-regime activity in other parts of Syria, particularly restive Daraa and Suwayda provinces. Unidentified fighters targeted the Syrian Regime Military Intelligence building in central Suwayda City with a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) on November 30.[17] Local groups have historically targeted this symbol of the Syrian regime in Druze-majority Suwayda City during periods of unrest.[18] Local media separately reported small arms engagements between Syrian regime forces and unspecified actors in multiple areas of Daraa Province.[19] The Syrian regime has faced constant opposition in southern Syria since 2011 and especially since August 2023.[20]

The Syrian regime may struggle to rally the same support from the Axis of Resistance and Russia that they previously provided, which will impede any pro-regime counteroffensives. Hezbollah is in the midst of force regeneration and reorganization after a nearly two-month Israeli campaign in southern Lebanon.[21] Israel’s intense monitoring of the Syria-Lebanon ground line of communication could furthermore disrupt Hezbollah efforts to move materiel and personnel to support the Syrian regime.[22] Iran could still send conventional units and Iraqi militias to support the Syrian regime against the opposition forces, however. Russia is separately constrained by its operations in Ukraine, which are a higher priority than operations in Syria. It is unclear to what extent Russia can divert any attention and resources toward Syria. Russia withdrew S-300 air defense systems from Syria back to Russia in 2022, likely to support Russian operations in Ukraine, highlighting the de-prioritization of operations in Syria.[23] Russian air assets are likewise heavily engaged in Ukraine.

A Hamas delegation traveled to Cairo on November 29 for further ceasefire-hostage negotiations.[24] Egyptian officials are separately discussing a new proposal with Hamas and Israeli officials, according to the Wall Street Journal.[25] The proposal involves pausing fighting for at least 60 days, opening the Rafah border crossing, and increasing the flow of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip to 200 trucks entering daily.[26] The Palestinian Authority would assume control of the Gazan side of the Rafah crossing, according to the proposal.[27] The IDF would then monitor traffic through the border crossing. Wall Street Journal added that Egypt and Hamas have indicated that they will drop their demand that the IDF withdraw from the area around the Rafah border crossing.[28] Hamas may be increasingly willing to accept a ceasefire-hostage deal since Israel and Hezbollah reached a ceasefire in Lebanon.  Hamas expressed its readiness to resume negotiations after the ceasefire began in Lebanon.[29] Hamas may calculate that negotiations are necessary to ensure its survival. Yahya Sinwar previously calculated that Hamas could survive if the October 7 War expanded and thus compelled the IDF to reduce military pressure on Hamas in the Gaza Strip.[30] That scenario is less likely since Hezbollah exited the war.

Hamas published on November 30 a video of an American-Israeli hostage giving what appears to be a coerced testimony.[31] The publication of the video is likely meant to pressure the United States and Israel to support a ceasefire-hostage deal in the Gaza Strip. The hostage, Edan Alexander, called on Israeli citizens to demonstrate daily against IDF operations in the Gaza Strip.[32] Alexander also called on US President-elect Donald Trump to cut military support to Israel and to pressure Israel to negotiate with Hamas. This video is the latest of several that Hamas and other Palestinian militias have published of hostages in recent months as part of an information operation meant to degrade Israeli willingness to sustain military operations in the Gaza Strip.[33]

Key Takeaways:

  • Syria: Syrian opposition forces seized Aleppo City and advanced toward Hama City. Pro-Syrian regime forces have failed to mount an effective defense against the opposition offensive.
  • The Turkish-backed SNA launched a separate offensive into Syrian regime-held territory. The SNA captured a military airport from the joint control of the SAA and SDF.
  • The opposition offensive in northeastern Syria may be inspiring anti-regime activity in other parts of the country, particularly restive Daraa and Suwayda provinces.
  • The Syrian regime may struggle to rally the same support from the Axis of Resistance and Russia that they previously provided, which will impede pro-regime counteroffensives.
  • Gaza Strip: A Hamas delegation traveled to Cairo for further ceasefire-hostage negotiations and has indicated that it will drop its demand for the IDF to withdraw from parts of the Gaza Strip.
  • Hamas published a video of an American-Israeli hostage giving what appears to be a coerced testimony in order to pressure the United States and Israel to support a ceasefire.

Gaza Strip:

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip on November 30. A Palestinian journalist reported gunfire from Israeli vehicles and IDF artillery shelling around Beit Lahia and Jabalia refugee camp.[34] The journalist also reported that the IDF demolished civilian infrastructure there.[35] Palestinian militias killed a soldier from the IDF 401st Armored Brigade in the northern Gaza Strip.[36] Palestinian militias separately injured a soldier from the IDF 7th Armored Brigade in the northern Gaza Strip.[37]

The IDF continued clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on November 30. The IDF conducted an airstrike destroying a Palestinian rocket launcher in Deir al Balah humanitarian zone.[38] The IDF stated that the rocket launcher was aiming toward southern Israel.[39] The IDF stated that it took steps to minimize civilian casualties.[40] A Palestinian journalist reported gunfire from Israeli soldiers and vehicles around Maghazi, Bureij, and Nuseirat refugee camps in the central Gaza Strip.[41] The journalist also reported IDF gunfire and shelling in eastern Deir al Balah.[42] Hamas fired RPGs targeting an IDF tank north of Nuseirat refugee camp.[43]

The IDF 143rd continued has clearing operations in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip. The IDF 993rd Infantry Brigade has seized anti-aircraft and anti-tank munitions, Kalashnikov style-rifles, and grenades near an unspecified mosque and hospital in Rafah in recent days.[44] The IDF 993rd Infantry Brigade also directed an airstrike that struck a Hamas cell that rigged explosives an unspecified area in Rafah.[45] A Palestinian journalist reported that the IDF demolished civilian infrastructure in eastern Rafah City.[46]

The IDF Air Force struck a vehicle, killing Palestinian fighter Ahed Azmi Qadih in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip on November 30.[47] The IDF stated that Qadih participated in attacks in Nir Oz, a kibbutz in southern Israel, during the Hamas-led attacks on October 7, 2023.[48] Israeli intelligence agencies were tracking Qadih for a “long time”, according to the IDF.[49] The airstrike also killed four other Palestinians with Qadih.[50] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that Qadih and three other Palestinians killed in the airstrikes were World Central Kitchen (WCK) employees.[51] The IDF clarified that the Qadih was traveling in a private car that was unaffiliated with any aid organization.[52] The IDF is investigating claims of Qadih’s affiliation with WCK.[53]

Palestinian militias claimed three attacks targeting the IDF in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip on November 30.[54] Palestinian militias, including Hamas, fired RPGs and detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting Israeli tanks and armored personnel carriers in eastern Rafah City.[55] The National Resistance Brigades fired rockets targeting the IDF at Rafah border crossing on November 30.[56]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Nothing Significant to Report.

Northern Israel and Lebanon

Lebanese Hezbollah objectives:

  • End Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Survive the October 7 War as a capable political and military organization with control over Lebanon

The Israel-Lebanese Hezbollah ceasefire continued to hold for the fifth day since it went into effect on November 26. Hezbollah has conducted no attacks into Israel, and the IDF and Hezbollah have engaged in no ground combat. The IDF still has a force presence in southern Lebanon for now to counter any potential violations of the ceasefire by Hezbollah.[57] The IDF Home Front Command reduced restrictions for gatherings and schools in the northern Golan Heights and northern Israel on November 30.[58] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson republished ”no-go” zones in southern Lebanon and reiterated that citizens are prohibited from returning until further notice.[59]

The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting Hezbollah fighters and infrastructure in southern Lebanon in response to militant activity that the IDF stated violated the ceasefire.[60]

Israeli leaders have given no indication that they feel that these violations threaten the integrity of the ceasefire. The IDF struck a rocket launcher at a Hezbollah site near Sidon after detecting unspecified activity at the site on November 28.[61] The IDF separately conducted an airstrike targeting armed likely Hezbollah fighters loading a vehicle with RPGs, ammunition, and other military equipment in southern Lebanon on November 30.[62] The IDF also directed an airstrike targeting Hezbollah fighters returning to known Hezbollah sites in southern Lebanon on November 30.[63] The IDF arrived at the scene thereafter and found weapons, including grenades and small arms.[64] The IDF Air Force struck a military vehicle near a Hezbollah missile production site ”deep in Lebanon.”[65] The IDF separately located Hezbollah munitions in a mosque in southern Lebanon in recent days.[66]

The IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike targeting military infrastructure near Lebanon-Syria border crossings after identifying the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah from Syria.[67] Syrian media reported that the IDF struck the Jusiyah border crossing, southern Homs Province, on November 30.[68] The IDF has repeatedly targeted this border crossing due to Hezbollah weapons smuggling here.[69] The weapons are transferred by Hezbollah’s Unit 4400, which is involved in arms smuggling. The IDF reiterated its commitment to remove any threats in Lebanon that violate the ceasefire.

US Special Operations Command Central (SOCENT) Major General Jasper Jeffers traveled to Beirut on November 27 to oversee the implementation and monitoring mechanism of the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire.[70] Jeffers will serve in this role alongside US Special Envoy to Lebanon Amos Hochstein until a permanent civilian US official is named.

Iran and the Axis of Resistance

The IDF intercepted two drones that have approached Israeli airspace from the east since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 29. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are often responsible for these attacks but have not claimed the attacks at the time of this writing.

The Iraqi Army has deployed three brigades including the 101st Armored Brigade to Sinjar in northwestern Iraq, along the border with Syria on November 30.[71] These deployments are in response to securing Iraqi border with Syria in the wake of Syrian opposition forces seizing military and civilian sites in northwestern Syria.[72] The Iraqi army also deployed two Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Brigades along the Iraq-Syria border.[73] Iraqi Defense Minister Thabet al Abbasi traveled to Sinjar and conducted a situational assessment of the security situation along the border.[74]

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf held a phone call with Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri on November 30.[75] The two discussed the ceasefire in Lebanon and the surprise Syrian opposition offensive in Syria.

Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naghdi announced on November 29 that the Iranian focus is on conducting al Aqsa Storm 2, implying another ground attack on Israel, rather than conducting True Promise 3, implying another missile attack on Israel.[76]

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.


[1] https://x.com/hasanabdalgany/status/1862643119478431987 ; https://x.com/davidnewschool/status/1862918491436658779

[2] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate112724

[3] https://www.facebook.com/mod.gov.sy/posts/pfbid0NLvqs8he1nfSAwDXZNjNchF2yedWWd5xb4qxoQz7XzmxhgtYVvKReg4NWE5sRZmFl?__cft__[0]=AZWnkGBp-bkDqSbt2ugI57nF8Q3IdU8FfpcLB_yNXNjnEZW1F3JYXTu8VPyFpaOrUOOGg1NhBjTrDxz-ve_35s-CoPyVRIkiNc06_TUWD6AfqERRPRymeRvagU_n6-yIOPQSQkYut6HOLbP4nPYkvEZzV_a5664Bj0dhjDgxEkUxNZBT1CqBMtKPujpEvh0ZB-k&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[4] https://www.facebook.com/mod.gov.sy/posts/pfbid0NLvqs8he1nfSAwDXZNjNchF2yedWWd5xb4qxoQz7XzmxhgtYVvKReg4NWE5sRZmFl?__cft__[0]=AZWnkGBp-bkDqSbt2ugI57nF8Q3IdU8FfpcLB_yNXNjnEZW1F3JYXTu8VPyFpaOrUOOGg1NhBjTrDxz-ve_35s-CoPyVRIkiNc06_TUWD6AfqERRPRymeRvagU_n6-yIOPQSQkYut6HOLbP4nPYkvEZzV_a5664Bj0dhjDgxEkUxNZBT1CqBMtKPujpEvh0ZB-k&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[5] https://x.com/SAMSyria0/status/1862779726147834242

[6] https://x.com/hasanabdalgany/status/1862846110248714577

[7] https://x.com/Asia_Intel/status/1862872174240936144; https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/1862865338326569460 ;

https://x.com/GermanObserver1/status/1862876310575403052; https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/1862866198192341183 ; https://x.com/JohnSevenTwo/status/1862885196460114369; https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/1862882368006009275 ; https://x.com/TwistyCB/status/1862893511596490816; https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/1862862175502471613

[8] https://x.com/SAMSyria0/status/1862856902801084589 ; https://www.facebook.com/mod.gov.sy/posts/pfbid0zEamWBhofmpfjAP5ZpPx8ktB2aXKBGeiWHuSuQ1pgXCX7h4JggSA9JFby5jyZsSel?__cft__[0]=AZVhNdQTxLHL2WHfnmmN7ZJtNHpMtTZrHZwn3HcxshH2ngrpBF37c3qlmLxdV7zB4Z0odR42LAtT9yyM9c24l89XSSbpwHU1hOXh3nbnmaJ4o14VYzhJxKlDNoRN0b4EV00-17UZnyTVamtkOdnJj5VIBjNzvA-qpk9plMRchNgU39O1IjPU9VirZznt7yDEGmY&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://www.facebook.com/mod.gov.sy/posts/pfbid034a6N4wbi7Uo39PiBLPiQXwvoCHngg1zFzZcUuQWHBLnDKizjYWPu6NcLb8UjdiPdl?__cft__[0]=AZU5HnNAgoocr1eFEedpbu7Mkr1SMNzCIct1esjFL-FGi88hECLdRPGp6oNr9r_L2bJ8Hceh3SPgrC1G3naxREHshc9orU50p1UF_bayrgnTD7BZoJ8SEVlAHUy5sbE075fGcSfC-PlR0kK0fvtT3fx1aIABDOtOQRXfLnw9PdGNtZNvsn6epuKApxmpN_yESr0&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[9] https://x.com/SAMSyria0/status/1862874800210771985 ; https://www.bbc.com/news/live/cy5l50y76k3t?post=asset%3A28279de0-6ea4-4548-b820-d18a3f335810#post

[10] https://x.com/SAMSyria0/status/1862874800210771985 ; https://x.com/SAMSyria0/status/1862791560137498958 ; https://x.com/SAMSyria0/status/1862777592882819186 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1862790474391597121 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1862918670663533034

[11] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1862783884242370590 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1862901099927122279 ; https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1862507049436803443; https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/1862499016908382278; https://x.com/hasanabdalgany/status/1862112394815684652; https://t.me/damascusv011/25295

[12] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1862783884242370590,; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1862901099927122279

[13] https://www dot enabbaladi.net/archives/517156; https://thiqa-agency dot com/%d8%aa%d8%b6%d9%85-%d8%b7%d8%a7%d8%a6%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d9%85%d8%b3%d9%8a%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d9%88%d8%b5%d9%88%d9%84-%d8%b4%d8%ad%d9%86%d8%a9-%d8%a3%d8%b3%d9%84%d8%ad%d8%a9-%d8%a5%d9%8a%d8%b1%d8%a7/; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-air-strike-targets-syrias-aleppo-airport-statement-2023-03-22/ ; https://www dot newarab.com/news/syria-rebels-seize-control-idlib-air-base-abu-al-duhur ; https://x.com/Asia_Intel/status/1862767423683805360; https://x.com/mintelworld/status/1862760729427734670; https://x.com/Conflict_Radar/status/1862784106460766324

[14] https://npasyria.com/en/118846/

[15] https://anfenglish dot com/rojava-syria/clashes-between-the-sdf-and-sna-on-al-bab-front-76587

[16] https://x.com/Peter_Bucci/status/1862885314194239905; https://x.com/fsasoldier/status/1862866561888829712 ; https://x.com/clashreport/status/1862791072927084970 ; https://x.com/NavvarSaban/status/1862807885501317418

[17] https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/videos/1630986050831925/?__cft__[0]=AZW-3KuL6ZRDKFJkz8R0JEpVmaHQ-CF24OjPPxqyBCmQ9JAepxBKbZZ4-vaaG6UcKpGhsE9dyErklcHnPjsPQn2picoJqOFrrQ44lSwmLHfoo9fc3aWLHpHSY-nLbAXwgavrcC2v13C6uoCJ_s_ZY-zlK1331tQYg7cdpu8F7SaoslKP-oCPHeRcmMm16eSbGt2sdNu_81H1UTGzklkElOCs&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid0321trAgnSUX5SZmn6Qc9UxssFC9XRgmAFFTTCx6MqNziFJHpQijFYFa2sJsi5bRW4l?__cft__[0]=AZUMq7GunZvN1i0xC1yJMOItK5wx_GHL7E3z1uTB8YrNgbZCPQgrrHKRBDLpwnamHj4m7imYaYErVTc1JHbtVDE7Tj4UurimzY6ueIffABvl14UWEcj0TlTQK6ugbICIzZkrnTXoxWYf7vDC2-qwGh_czq_UUZI8-ScMjQRCEtGlUxM_GNMRd2UmmtYtQmcgXIg&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[18] https://syriadirect.org/suwayda-sidesteps-a-spiral-of-violence-following-clashes/

[19] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1862910261708869857 ; https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/1862908017550701047 ; https://x.com/clashreport/status/1862917354981601441

[20] https://suwayda24 dot com/?p=21699; https://npasyria dot com/en/102909/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/protests-erupt-syrias-druze-city-over-fuel-hikes-2023-08-17/  ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/syria-protest-update-august-29%E2%80%94september-4

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/understanding-israel%E2%80%99s-campaign-defeat-hezbollah-lebanon

[22] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1862778870891466897 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1861141206060892627 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856793273420968420

[23] https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1563214929938694144 ; https://twitter.com/SamRamani2/status/1563309536626151424 ; https://twitter.com/obretix/status/1563520254386802691 ; https://twitter.com/YorukIsik/status/1563501206668189697 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-ships-s-300-air-defence-missiles-out-syria-satellite-images-2022-08-29/

[24] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-831346

[25] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/egypt-israel-in-talks-to-reopen-rafah-crossing-a-crucial-gaza-aid-route-shut-for-months-d08d667a?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2  

[26] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/egypt-israel-in-talks-to-reopen-rafah-crossing-a-crucial-gaza-aid-route-shut-for-months-d08d667a?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2

[27] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/egypt-israel-in-talks-to-reopen-rafah-crossing-a-crucial-gaza-aid-route-shut-for-months-d08d667a?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2

[28] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/egypt-israel-in-talks-to-reopen-rafah-crossing-a-crucial-gaza-aid-route-shut-for-months-d08d667a?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2

[29] https://hamasinfo dot info/2024/11/27/4642/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-26-2024

[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-11-2024

[31] https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/20107/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84-421-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%B5%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%8A

[32] SITE Intelligence Group, “American-Israeli Citizen Held by Hamas Calls on U.S. President-elect Trump to Negotiate Hostage Releases,” November 30, 2024, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com.

[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-13-2024

[34] https://t.me/hamza20300/314308 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/314537

[35] https://t.me/hamza20300/314339 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/314309

[36] https://www.idf dot il/%D7%A0%D7%95%D7%A4%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%97%D7%9C%D7%9C%D7%99-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%9C%D7%97%D7%9E%D7%94/%D7%96%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%A8-%D7%91%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%A7/

[37] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1862926472362480114

[38] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1862920474881085508

[39] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1862920474881085508

[40] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1862920477817098520

[41] https://t.me/hamza20300/314300 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/314376

[42] https://t.me/hamza20300/314368

[43] https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/20107/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84-421-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%B5%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%8A

[44] https://www.idf dot il/252503

[45] https://www.idf dot il/252503 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1862798757382819906

[46] https://t.me/hamza20300/314464

[47] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1862862143210520828 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1862798757382819906

[48] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1862862146746404875

[49] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1862815317329694763

[50] https://t.me/moriahdoron/17074

[51] https://t.me/moriahdoron/17074

[52] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1862815317329694763 

[53] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1862815317329694763

[54] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4474 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7930 ; https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/20107/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84-421-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%B5%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%8A

[55] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7930 ; https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/20107/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84-421-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%B5%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%8A

[56] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4474

[57] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1862127227225215459

[58] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/home-front-command-eases-restrictions-in-northern-israel/

[59] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1862708673165865216

[60] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1862191647427080590; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1862191653357834278

[61] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1862127227225215459; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/107259; https://www.axios.com/2024/11/28/israel-hezebollah-lebanon-ceasefire-violation

[62] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1862849347223695794

[63] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1862849353263501479

[64] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1862849353263501479

[65] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1862849358506389769

[66] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1862765940959584482

[67] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1862778870891466897 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1862778875748479471

[68] https://www dot athrpress.com/%d9%84%d9%84%d9%85%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%a8%d8%b9%d8%a9-%d8%ba%d8%a7%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d8%a5%d8%b3%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%a6%d9%8a%d9%84%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%ac%d9%88%d8%b3%d9%8a%d8%a9/%d8%b3%d9%8a%d8%a7%d8%b3%d8%a9/

[69] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-24-2024

[70] https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3981254/mg-jasper-jeffers-arrives-in-beirut-to-serve-as-co-chair-for-the-implementation/

[71] https://x.com/Entekhab_News/status/1862799390877818893 ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%84%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF ;

[72] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-29-2024

[73] https://www.skynewsarabia dot com/middle-east/1758745-%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%94%D9%87%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%94%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%94%D9%84%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9; https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1862605365122080968

[74] https://t.me/MODiraq/10343

[75] https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/1990662

[76] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/709165

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 30, 2024

Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, Angelica Evans, Nate Trotter, and George Barros

November 30, 2024, 3:45 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30am ET on November 30. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Kremlin officials responded to Syrian opposition forces' offensive into Syrian regime-held territory on November 29 and 30 and expressed interest in using the Astana Process to respond to the situation. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on November 29 that the Syrian opposition forces' offensive is an "encroachment on Syria's sovereignty" and that Russia advocates for Syrian authorities to restore "constitutional order."[1] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke on the phone with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan on November 30 to discuss the situation in Syria.[2] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that both parties expressed serious concerns about the "dangerous developments" in Aleppo and Idlib provinces. Lavrov and Fidan reportedly discussed the need to coordinate joint Russian-Turkish actions to stabilize the situation, primarily through the Astana Process that Russia, Turkey, and Iran launched in December 2016. (The Astana Process is a rival political process to the United Nations [UN]-led Geneva Process under UN Security Council Resolution 2254.) Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi also reportedly initiated a telephone conversation with Lavrov on November 30, during which Lavrov and Araghchi expressed "extreme concern" about the "dangerous escalation" in Syria.[3] Lavrov reportedly reaffirmed Russia's strong support for Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and both agreed to intensify joint efforts to stabilize and review the situation through the Astana Process. It remains unclear whether the Kremlin will be able to deploy additional assets to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's regime given the high tempo and operational requirements for Russia to continue conducting operations in Ukraine – the Kremlin’s priority theater. Russia withdrew S-300 systems from Syria back to Russia in 2022, likely to support Russian operations in Ukraine.[4]  ISW collected unconfirmed reports in March 2022 that Russia withdrew Russian soldiers and Wagner militants from Syria, likely to support Russian operations in Ukraine.[5]

Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un during his unannounced trip to Pyongyang on November 30.[6] Belousov and Kim discussed the Russia-North Korea strategic partnership and relations between the Russian and North Korean militaries.[7] Kim reiterated support for Russia's war in Ukraine and boilerplate rhetoric that the Kremlin uses to forward its reflexive control campaign aimed at forcing the West into self-deterrence.[8]

Key Takeaways:

  • Kremlin officials responded to Syrian opposition forces' offensive into Syrian regime-held territory on November 29 and 30 and expressed interest in using the Astana Process to respond to the situation.
  • Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un during his unannounced trip to Pyongyang on November 30.
  • Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions north of Kharkiv City, and Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar.
  • Russian milbloggers continued to criticize poor Russian military command decisions and poor training and discipline among Russian personnel.
 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Russian Technological Adaptations
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on November 30 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Martynovka (northeast of Sudzha) and Darino and in eastern Tolsty Lug (both southeast of Korenevo) and seized the remainder of Darino, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[9] Russian sources claimed that fighting continued southeast of Korenevo near Novoivanovka, Darino, Nikolayevo-Darino, and Nizhny Klin; northwest of Sudzha near Sverdlikovo; and south of Sudzha near Plekhovo.[10] A Ukrainian senior non-commissioned officer of a company operating in the Kursk direction reported on November 30 that Russian forces are mostly conducting assaults on foot in teams of three-to-five people and stopped using heavy equipment following destructive Ukrainian strikes, and are instead using all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), motorcycles, and buggies.[11] The officer stated that Russian forces are concentrating reserve forces five-to-seven kilometers from the frontline but that Ukrainian strikes are preventing Russian forces from conducting rotations. Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[12]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in Glushkovsky Raion west of the main Ukrainian salient on November 30.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions north of Kharkiv City amid continued Russian offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on November 30. Geolocated footage published on November 30 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian forces in a forested area southeast of Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently regained tactical positions in the area.[13] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked with armored vehicle support between Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City) and Hlyboke.[14] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian drone strikes are preventing Ukrainian forces from crossing the Vovcha River in Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[15] Russian forces continued assaults along the international border northwest of Kharkiv City near Kudiivka, Hoptivka, and Kozacha Lopan; north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke; and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Tykhe on November 29 and 30.[16]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 30. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced near Novomlynsk (north of Kupyansk and on the western bank of the Oskil River); northwest of Kolisnykivka (southeast of Kupyansk); up to 500 meters near Lozova (southeast of Kupyansk); towards Yampolivka (northwest of Kreminna); and in eastern Terny (west of Kreminna).[17] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces control half of Zahryzove (southeast of Kupyansk).[18] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Kupyansk near Kolisnykivka, Pishchane, Lozova, and Zahryzove; west of Svatove near Pershotravneve, Zeleny Hai, and Vyshneve; southwest of Svatove near Druzhelyubivka, Hrekivka and Novoyehorivka; northwest of Kreminna near Terny; west of Kreminna near Yampolivka, Torske, and Zarichne; southwest of Kreminna near Dibrova and the Serebryanske forest area; and south of Kreminna near Hryhorivka.[19] Elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Kopanky (west of Svatove); the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) near Terny; and drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) near Zarichne.[20]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

A Russian milblogger claimed on November 29 that fighting continues in the Siversk direction northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske.[21]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on November 30 but did not make confirmed advances in the area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing near the southern outskirts of the refractory plant in Chasiv Yar and south of Chasiv Yar.[22] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain defensive positions in Novyi Microraion in eastern Chasiv Yar, but that Russian forces recently seized a position in northern Novyi Microraion that could complicate Ukraine's defense in the area.[23] The milblogger claimed that the Block-9 mine (south of Chasiv Yar) is a contested "gray" zone and that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near the mine. The representative of a Ukrainian brigade operating near Chasiv Yar reported that Russian forces are trying to bypass Ukrainian positions in the town and are trying to flank Chasiv Yar from the north and south.[24] The representative stated that Russian forces have not established enduring positions on the west bank of the Siversky Donets Donbas Canal within Chasiv Yar, but that Russian forces are penetrating Ukraine's defensive lines in small groups. The representative noted that Ukrainian drone operators are striking Russian personnel concentrations in the area. Russian forces continued assaults north of Chasiv Yar near Kalynove; within Chasiv Yar itself; and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne, Stupochky, and in the direction of Bila Hora on November 29 and 30.[25]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on November 30 but did not make confirmed advances. The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported that Russian infantry are attacking only on foot in some areas of the Toretsk direction and are using vehicles to support assaults in other areas of this direction.[26] The commander stated that the Russian military command recently deployed more forces to the Toretsk area in order to penetrate Ukraine's defensive lines. Russian forces continued assaults north of Toretsk near Druzhba, near Toretsk itself, and south of Toretsk near Nelipivka and Shcherbynivka on November 29 and 30.[27]

Russian forces recently advanced south of Pokrovsk amid continued offensive operations in the direction on November 30. Geolocated footage published on November 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the E50 highway northeast of Hryhorivka (south of Pokrovsk), seized the remainder of Yurivka (southwest of Hryhorivka), and advanced west of Pushkine (further southwest of Yurivka).[28] Russian milbloggers claimed on November 29 and 30 that Russian forces operating south of Pokrovsk advanced towards Ukrainka, to the outskirts of Novopustynaka, and also seized Zhovte, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[29] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that fighting continued east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Myrnohrad, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka, Krasnyi Yar, and Krutyi Yar; and south of Pokrovsk near Novyi Trud, Pustynka, Dachenske, Chumatske, and Zhovte on November 29 and 30.[30]

Russian forces recently advanced north and northwest of Kurakhove amid continued offensive operations in the direction on November 30. Geolocated footage published on November 29 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Novodmytrivka (northwest of Kurakhove).[31] ISW currently assesses that it is unlikely that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence in the deep and narrow salient in the field south and southeast of Novoselydivka, north of Illinka, and northeast of Berestky (all north of Kurakhove). Russian forces likely hold positions in these fields given previous geolocated footage of Russian forces operating northwest and southwest of the fields. Russian milbloggers claimed on November 30 that Russian forces entered Stari Terny (north of Kurkahove and on the northwestern bank of the Kurakhivske Reservoir) but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[32] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued unsuccessful ground attacks near Kurakhove itself; northwest of Kurakhove near Sontsivka, Zorya, and Novodmytrivka and in the direction of Dachne; north of Kurakhove near Berestky; and south of Kurakhove near Dalne on November 29 and 30.[33] Elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Dalne; elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) are reportedly operating within Kurakhove itself; and elements of the 255th Motorized Rifle Brigade (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction.[34]

Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Vuhledar amid continued offensive operations in the Vuhledar direction on November 30. Geolocated footage published on November 29 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced northwest of Trudove (northwest of Vuheldar) during a platoon-sized mechanized assault.[35] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces operating northwest of Vuhledar advanced in an area 2.47 kilometers wide and 1.15 kilometers in depth west of Trudove and also advanced near Kostyantynopolske and Yansa Polyana.[36] Russian forces continued assaults north of Vuhledar near Veselyi Hai, Romanivka, Yelizavetivka, Hannivka, Katerynivka, and Antonivka and northwest of Vuhledar near Trudove, Rozlyv, Kostyantynopolske, and Sukhi Yaly on November 29 and 30.[37] Drone operators of the Russian 14th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade are reportedly operating in the south Donetsk (Vuhledar-Velyka Novosilka) direction.[38] Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Illinka.[39]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on November 30 but did not advance. Russian milbloggers claimed on November 30 that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) advanced in the fields southeast and east of Blahodatne and that Russian forces advanced southeast of Urozhaine (both south of Velyka Novosilka), although ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[40] Russian forces continued attacking near Velyka Novosilka itself; southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil, Novodarivka, and in the direction of Novopil; and northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Rozdolne on November 29 and 30.[41] Elements of the Russian 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Novodarivka (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[42] Elements of the Russian 139th Separate Motorized Rifle Battalion (29th CAA, EMD) reportedly cut the T-0518 Kurakhove-Velyka Novosilka highway near Rozdolne, which a Russian milblogger claimed will complicate Ukrainian defenses in the area.[43]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast including north of Robotyne near Novodarivka on November 30 but did not make confirmed advances.[44] The commander of a Ukrainian National Guard brigade warned that Russian forces continue to prepare for a future large-scale offensive operation in Zaporizhia Oblast and are accumulating and regrouping forces and equipment in the area.[45] The commander noted that Russian forces are mainly conducting infantry assaults in Zaporizhia direction but occasionally use motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs). Elements of the BARS "Sarmat" volunteer detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[46]

The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy and Russian sources reported on November 30 that likely Russian shelling caused the Russian occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to disconnect from the Ferrosplavna-1 power line.[47]

Russian forces continued assaults in the Dnipro direction, including in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast, on November 29 and 30 but did not make confirmed advances in the area.[48]

Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian air defense systems and radars in occupied Crimea.[49]Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 30 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian "Kasta-2e2" radar system and two "Podlyot" radar systems in occupied Crimea on November 29.[50]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a small series of drone strikes on Ukraine on the night of November 29 to 30. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 10 Shahed drones and other unidentified drone types (possibly referring to decoy drones) from Kursk Oblast and Primorsk-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[51] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed eight drones over Kyiv, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kherson oblasts; that one drone became "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) Interference; and that another drone flew into airspace over occupied Ukraine. Mykolaiv Oblast Military Administration Head Vitaly Kim stated that Russian ballistic missiles caused a fire at an agricultural enterprise in Mykolaiv Raion.[52]

Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Major Ilya Yevlash stated on November 29 that some Russian Shahed drone variants with reduced payloads can fly around Ukraine for over 24 hours.[53] Yevlash noted that Russian forces modify the drones to have smaller warheads and larger fuel tanks, which allows them to fly for longer periods of time. Yevlash noted that the Ukrainian Air Force considers Russian drones to be "locationally lost" when the drones crash, run out of fuel or experience EW interference and reiterated that Russian forces are using decoy drones without warheads to overload Ukraine's air defense systems.

Ukraine continues to rely on Western-provided systems to defend itself against large-scale Russian strikes. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told UK outlet SkyNews during an interview published on November 29 that that Ukrainian forces used F-16 fighter jets to destroy seven Russian cruise missiles during a large-scale Russian missile strike on Ukrainian infrastructure "two nights ago," likely referring to the large-scale Russian strike on the night of November 27 to 28.[54] Zelensky noted that Ukraine does not have enough F-16 aircraft or Patriot air defense systems to defend against large-scale Russian drone and missile strikes and called on the West to provide additional aircraft and air defense systems.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian milbloggers continued to criticize poor Russian military command decisions and poor training and discipline among Russian personnel. A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor complained that the command of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) is responsible for some assault elements of the 109th Motorized Rifle Regiment (1st "Slovyansk" Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st CAA) and that the 132nd Brigade's command sent an injured soldier back to an assault company in the Toretsk direction.[55] The milblogger noted this is a systemic problem within the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade and other Russian units more broadly. Another milblogger complained that Russian air defense forces in the near rear frequently attempt to shoot down Russian drones due to poor training, even though Russian drone operators always inform Russian air defenses when they launch drones.[56] The milblogger proposed that the military command punish personnel who attempt to shoot down Russia's own drones.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on November 30 that the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) and Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) conducted a joint air patrol over the Sea of Japan, East China Sea, and western Pacific Ocean.[57]

A Russian insider source claimed that Russian law enforcement raids against nightclubs in Moscow, which Russian authorities conducted overnight on November 29 to 30 to enforce Russian censorship laws and the pseudo-state ideology, are actually intended to replenish the populations of penal colonies for Russian force generation efforts.[58] Russian authorities previously conducted raids targeting migrant communities to coerce migrants into joining the Russian military and capitalize on xenophobia against migrants following the March 2024 Crocus terrorist attack in Moscow.[59]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 


[1] https://tass dot ru/politika/22533161

[2] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1984573/

[3] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1984580/

[4] https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1563214929938694144; https://twitter.com/SamRamani2/status/1563309536626151424; https://twitter.com/obretix/status/1563520254386802691; https://twitter.com/YorukIsik/status/1563501206668189697; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27; https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-ships-s-300-air-defence-missiles-out-syria-satellite-images-2022-08-29/

[5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-mobilizes-reinforcements-syria-and-africa-ukraine; 

http://syria dot tv/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%B5

[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112924

[7] https://apnews.com/article/north-korea-russia-troops-ukraine-belousov-visit-35a6fd80f64ae2dd01637ed5e5b6451d ; https://t.me/tass_agency/288190 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/11/30/ministr-oborony-rf-andrey-belousov-vstretilsya-s-kim-chen-ynom-i-priglasil-voennyh-severnoy-korei-na-parad-9-maya; https://t.me/mod_russia/46353; https://kcnawatch dot org/newstream/1732968641-691807260/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-receives-russian-minister-of-defence/; http://rodong.rep dot kp/en/index.php?MTVAMjAyNC0xMS0zMC1IMDExQA==

[8] https://kcnawatch dot org/newstream/1732968641-691807260/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-receives-russian-minister-of-defence/; http://rodong.rep dot kp/en/index.php?MTVAMjAyNC0xMS0zMC1IMDExQA==; https://t.me/tass_agency/288191

[9] https://t.me/dva_majors/58963; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81645; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20126

[10] https://t.me/dva_majors/58963; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81645; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20126; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146113; https://t.me/rusich_army/18902; https://t.me/dva_majors/58992

[11] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/30/obnulennya-zamist-rotacziyi-rosiyany-poshyryuyut-taktyku-zombi-shturmiv-j-na-kurshhyni/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDXWlQ2K0dM

[12] https://t.me/tass_agency/288202 ; https://t.me/ombr41/930

[13] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7689; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/4476

[14] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81619; https://t.me/motopatriot/29891; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146113  

[15] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20133

[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aRBawRAPHgoyUJFeLTL9LQgA6vowLBvdcG6yVTq7yixwnvrXCuagQnCmPampJ8Pml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nh8CuqBLm9McEnYz2yN7ECCaf21Q4x9M7jPedUq3SUXj749R9E8wGGX8DC4Z8cCQl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0twA2ug8EJqKjA58HhwAWWPoYbg3hpEygohFNvS7A5A2eSjf5r4oHYEMj7rGDhaBql; https://t.me/otukharkiv/2854  

[17] https://t.me/tass_agency/288201; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146113; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20130; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146113 

[18] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146113

[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aRBawRAPHgoyUJFeLTL9LQgA6vowLBvdcG6yVTq7yixwnvrXCuagQnCmPampJ8Pml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nh8CuqBLm9McEnYz2yN7ECCaf21Q4x9M7jPedUq3SUXj749R9E8wGGX8DC4Z8cCQl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0twA2ug8EJqKjA58HhwAWWPoYbg3hpEygohFNvS7A5A2eSjf5r4oHYEMj7rGDhaBql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aRBawRAPHgoyUJFeLTL9LQgA6vowLBvdcG6yVTq7yixwnvrXCuagQnCmPampJ8Pml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nh8CuqBLm9McEnYz2yN7ECCaf21Q4x9M7jPedUq3SUXj749R9E8wGGX8DC4Z8cCQl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0twA2ug8EJqKjA58HhwAWWPoYbg3hpEygohFNvS7A5A2eSjf5r4oHYEMj7rGDhaBql; https://t.me/dva_majors/58963    

[20] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146214; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146167; https://t.me/rian_ru/271014; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18167 ; https://t.me/sashakots/50496 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/21785 

[21] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146113

[22] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146113 ; https://t.me/rybar/65831

[23] https://t.me/rybar/65831

[24] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rhp6uQ7g9Vw ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/29/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-bezuspishni-sproby-rosiyan-perejty-kanal-u-chasovomu-yari/

[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aRBawRAPHgoyUJFeLTL9LQgA6vowLBvdcG6yVTq7yixwnvrXCuagQnCmPampJ8Pml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nh8CuqBLm9McEnYz2yN7ECCaf21Q4x9M7jPedUq3SUXj749R9E8wGGX8DC4Z8cCQl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0twA2ug8EJqKjA58HhwAWWPoYbg3hpEygohFNvS7A5A2eSjf5r4oHYEMj7rGDhaBql ; https://t.me/wargonzo/23420 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146113 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20165 ; https://t.me/rybar/65831

[26] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JFvyCBahZ_k ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/891931-aku-taktiku-zastosovue-rosijska-armia-na-toreckomu-napramku/

[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aRBawRAPHgoyUJFeLTL9LQgA6vowLBvdcG6yVTq7yixwnvrXCuagQnCmPampJ8Pml  ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nh8CuqBLm9McEnYz2yN7ECCaf21Q4x9M7jPedUq3SUXj749R9E8wGGX8DC4Z8cCQl  ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0twA2ug8EJqKjA58HhwAWWPoYbg3hpEygohFNvS7A5A2eSjf5r4oHYEMj7rGDhaBql  ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146113  

[28] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7696; https://t.me/jagers68/468; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7697; https://www.facebook.com/3012NGU/videos/1103819791122910/ ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7697; https://www.facebook.com/3012NGU/videos/1103819791122910/

[29] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146113  ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60401

[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aRBawRAPHgoyUJFeLTL9LQgA6vowLBvdcG6yVTq7yixwnvrXCuagQnCmPampJ8Pml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nh8CuqBLm9McEnYz2yN7ECCaf21Q4x9M7jPedUq3SUXj749R9E8wGGX8DC4Z8cCQl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0twA2ug8EJqKjA58HhwAWWPoYbg3hpEygohFNvS7A5A2eSjf5r4oHYEMj7rGDhaBql

[31] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7687; https://t.me/hydra_subdivision137/60

[32] https://t.me/wargonzo/23420; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60401

[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aRBawRAPHgoyUJFeLTL9LQgA6vowLBvdcG6yVTq7yixwnvrXCuagQnCmPampJ8Pml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nh8CuqBLm9McEnYz2yN7ECCaf21Q4x9M7jPedUq3SUXj749R9E8wGGX8DC4Z8cCQl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0twA2ug8EJqKjA58HhwAWWPoYbg3hpEygohFNvS7A5A2eSjf5r4oHYEMj7rGDhaBql

[34] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13045 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146172; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81656 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81631; https://t.me/dva_majors/58951;

[35] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7686; https://www.facebook.com/37obrmp/videos/592205193343557/

[36] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146113 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/58998; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/2747 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1862571235160240316 

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aRBawRAPHgoyUJFeLTL9LQgA6vowLBvdcG6yVTq7yixwnvrXCuagQnCmPampJ8Pml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nh8CuqBLm9McEnYz2yN7ECCaf21Q4x9M7jPedUq3SUXj749R9E8wGGX8DC4Z8cCQl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0twA2ug8EJqKjA58HhwAWWPoYbg3hpEygohFNvS7A5A2eSjf5r4oHYEMj7rGDhaBql

[38] https://t.me/voin_dv/12067

[39] https://t.me/dva_majors/58991

[40] https://t.me/ne_rybar/3208 ; https://t.me/rybar/65877

[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aRBawRAPHgoyUJFeLTL9LQgA6vowLBvdcG6yVTq7yixwnvrXCuagQnCmPampJ8Pml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nh8CuqBLm9McEnYz2yN7ECCaf21Q4x9M7jPedUq3SUXj749R9E8wGGX8DC4Z8cCQl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0twA2ug8EJqKjA58HhwAWWPoYbg3hpEygohFNvS7A5A2eSjf5r4oHYEMj7rGDhaBql

[42] https://t.me/voin_dv/12063

[43] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81611

[44] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0cjBiYYm7frVp9WFRbLgtKKKt5zjD7Jp1QkXThCRkpFX4zt37EkdwCFPedk84ywXyl ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/11821

[45] https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/891535-rosijska-armia-gotuetsa-do-nastupu-v-zaporizkij-oblasti-hilcenko/

[46] https://t.me/rogozin_do/6527

[47] https://t.me/energyofukraine/3302 ; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/891817-timcasovo-okupovana-zaporizka-aes-vcergove-vtratila-pidklucenna-do-odniei-z-zovnisnogo-linij-zivlenna-minenergo/ ; https://t.me/tass_agency/288224

[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nh8CuqBLm9McEnYz2yN7ECCaf21Q4x9M7jPedUq3SUXj749R9E8wGGX8DC4Z8cCQl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0twA2ug8EJqKjA58HhwAWWPoYbg3hpEygohFNvS7A5A2eSjf5r4oHYEMj7rGDhaBql

[49] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2024

[50] https://t.me/DIUkraine/4925 ; https://suspilne dot media/crimea/891833-v-okupovanomu-krimu-zniseno-tri-radiolokacijni-stancii-gur/

[51] https://t.me/kpszsu/23957 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dtgDgZYjZePvbpCcfscAcVVEfvMJiyYtBpyGxE2phs5w7nqKgsDgcZpsYaR9ecdMl

[52] https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/12306; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/30/protyvnyk-udaryv-balistykoyu-po-mykolayivshhyni-ryatuvalnyky-likviduvaly-pozhezhu/

[53] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1UeMazF9wqI ; https://newsukraine.rbc dot ua/news/shahed-can-fly-for-up-to-24-hours-over-ukrainian-1732914439.html

[54] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112924 ; https://news.sky.com/video/sky-news-speaks-exclusively-to-president-zelenskyy-about-putin-nato-and-trump-13263345 ; https://www.youtube.com/live/7Df0DQ7GWUc ; https://suspilne dot media/892019-zelenskij-zaaviv-so-f-16-pid-cas-ostannoi-masovanoi-ataki-znisili-sim-rosijskih-raket/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/30/prezydent-rozpoviv-skilky-krylatyh-raket-znyshhyly-litaky-f-16-pid-chas-ostannoyi-ataky/

[55] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1745

[56] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18156

[57] https://t.me/mod_russia/46374

[58] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18156; https://t.me/tass_agency/288230 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/11/30/politsiya-provela-reydy-v-treh-moskovskih-nochnyh-klubah ; https://t.me/astrapress/69491; https://t.me/astrapress/69492

[59] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2024