UA-69458566-1

Thursday, June 13, 2024

Iran Update, June 13, 2024

Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Kathryn Tyson, Brian Carter, Ashka Jhaveri, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Hamas is requiring Israel to meet its maximalist demands sooner than stipulated in the latest Israeli ceasefire proposal. Hamas has seemingly not shortened the timeline on which it would release Israeli hostages, however. Hamas issued new demands on June 11 in response to the latest Israeli ceasefire proposal.[1] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken described the new demands as going beyond Hamas’ previous negotiating position and questioned whether Hamas is acting in good faith in the talks.[2] The new demands involve Israel committing immediately to a permanent ceasefire, accelerating the timeline for reconstruction in the Gaza Strip, and making greater concessions on the release of Palestinian prisoners.[3] Hamas also reportedly requested that Israeli forces withdraw sooner from the Gaza Strip.[4] These changes would help Hamas secure most of its maximalist demands in the first phase of the proposed ceasefire deal and dilutes the second and third phases.[5] An anonymous Hamas official speaking to Reuters downplayed the significant changes that Hamas made to the ceasefire proposal by framing the changes as insignificant and unobjectionable.”[6] 

Hamas’ changes are meant to force Israel to either accept the new demands or risk being perceived as the party that ended ceasefire negotiations. Israeli officials have indicated repeatedly that the latest proposal is the last one.[7] Senior US officials, including President Joe Biden, have stated in recent weeks that Hamas remains the primary obstacle to a ceasefire agreement.[8]

Hamas feels that it can manipulate the ceasefire negotiations in this manner because it is confident that it is winning in the Gaza Strip. Senior Hamas officials have repeatedly expressed confidence that Hamas will survive the war, despite Israeli military pressure.[9] Hamas forces throughout the Gaza Strip remain combat effective and are trying to reconstitute. Hamas has also begun trying to reassert its political authority in some parts of the strip.[10] Hamas has achieved this success by exploiting the fact that Israeli forces withdraw from areas in the Gaza Strip after clearing them rather than conducting follow-on holding operations.

The Houthis claimed on June 12 that they conducted a combined attack with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias targeting two locations in Israel.[11] The Houthis stated that they launched drones and missiles targeting Ashdod and Haifa in cooperation with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[12] The attack marks the second time that the Houthis have claimed a combined operation with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq targeting Israel. The Houthis claimed the first combined operation on June 6.[13] This Houthi-Iraqi militia cooperation comes shortly after a series of coordination calls and meetings across the Axis of Resistance. The Houthis and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have conducted the two combined attacks as part of their larger effort to impose an unofficial blockade on Israel. The growing cooperation between the Houthis and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias furthermore reflects the desire of the Axis of Resistance to present itself as an interoperable coalition.[14]

Iran is continuing to expand its nuclear program. Anonymous diplomats told Reuters on June 12 that Iran is installing new centrifuges at its nuclear facilities at Natanz and Fordow, increasing the Iranian capacity to enrich uranium.[15] The diplomats said that Iran is responding to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors censuring Iran on June 5 for failing to cooperate sufficiently with the IAEA.[16] The diplomats noted that the Iranian retaliation to the IAEA Board of Governors censure “is not as big as many had feared.”

This report comes amid other indications of Iran advancing its nuclear program. The Iranian stockpile of 60-percent-enriched uranium increased by over 15 percent from February to May 2024, according to the IAEA, bringing the stockpile to around 6,201 kilograms.[17] Tehran has separately sought to acquire materials for its nuclear program from Niger in recent months. Iran and Niger began negotiating in late 2023 to trade Iranian drones and surface-to-air missiles for 300 tons of uranium yellowcake from Niger.[18] An Iranian opposition outlet reported on June 1 that Iran and Niger finalized the deal, though CTP-ISW cannot verify that report.[19]

Senior Iranian officials, including a top foreign policy adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, have repeatedly threatened in recent months to pursue nuclear weapons, as CTP-ISW has reported extensively.[20] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated in May 2024 that Iranian officials “must stop” normalizing such discussions.[21] He also called on Iran to "meaningfully engage” with the IAEA so that the IAEA can guarantee that the Iranian nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.[22]

Iranian hardliners are debating and negotiating amongst themselves to unite their faction behind a single candidate in the Iranian presidential election. The faction is concerned that the five hardline candidates risk splitting the vote and inadvertently advantaging the sole reformist candidate, Masoud Pezeshkian. Some hardliners are urging Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf or Saeed Jalili to withdraw in support of the other.[23] Other hardline officials and media outlets are expressing concerns that that the faction is too divided to win the race.[24] Ali Reza Zakani, who is a hardline candidate and the Tehran City mayor, stated on June 13 that candidates who are behind in electoral polls should withdraw in favor of more popular contenders.[25] 

Key Takeaways:

  • Gaza Strip: Hamas is requiring Israel to meet its maximalist demands sooner than stipulated in the latest Israeli ceasefire proposal. Hamas has not seemingly shortened the timeline on which it would release Israeli hostages, however.
  • Yemen: The Houthis claimed for the second time that they conducted a combined attack with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias targeting Israel. They have conducted these attacks as part of a larger effort to impose an unofficial blockade on Israel.
  • Iran: Iran is continuing to expand its nuclear program. Iran is installing new centrifuges to increase its uranium enrichment capacity. Iran has also negotiated with Niger to receive 300 tons of uranium yellowcake.
  • Iran: Iranian hardliners are debating and negotiating amongst themselves to unite their faction behind a single candidate in the Iranian presidential election. The faction is concerned that the five hardline candidates will split the vote and advantage the sole reformist candidate.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The Israel Defense Force (IDF) reported on June 13 that the IDF 99th Division concluded an operation in Zaytoun and Sabra neighborhoods of southern Gaza City over the past week.[26] The IDF said that the operation “deepened” Israeli control over the Netzarim Corridor and surrounding areas.[27] The IDF and Israeli military correspondents similarly reported on June 4 that Israeli forces concluded a raid in Zaytoun and Sabra.[28] Palestinian militias have continued claiming attacks targeting Israeli armor and dismounted infantry in Zaytoun since then, however.[29] Israeli forces killed dozens of Palestinian fighters and destroyed over 50 militia sites during the most recent Zaytoun operation.[30] Israeli forces have conducted at least five distinct clearing operations in Zaytoun since the war began.[31]

The IDF Alexandroni Reserve Infantry Brigade and 8th Reserve Armored Brigade deployed to the Netzarim Corridor, south of Gaza City, over the past week.[32] The two brigades are operating under the 99th Division. The 99th Division killed over 10 Palestinian fighters, including a fighter that participated in the October 7 attacks on the Otef settlement.[33] Palestinian militias conducted several mortar and rocket attacks targeting Israeli forces along the Netzarim Corridor.[34]

The IDF 99th Division and Yahalom combat engineering unit destroyed an 800-meter-long tunnel in Juhor ad Dik, adjacent to the northern side of the Netzarim Corridor.[35] The IDF said that Hamas dug the tunnel 30 meters underground and included military rooms and side hatches.[36] It is notable that the IDF continues to uncover and demolish Hamas underground infrastructure months after holding operational control over the Netzarim Corridor, underscoring how widely Hamas has proliferated tunnels across the strip.

The IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations in Rafah on June 13.[37]  Israeli forces continued targeted operations to locate weapons. The IDF Givati Brigade engaged and killed several Palestinian fighters in Shaboura neighborhood in Rafah, where the brigade has operated in recent days[38] The IDF Agoz Commando unit directed a strike on a Palestinian fighter and military building in Rafah.[39]  A Palestinian militia mortared Israeli forces in Shaboura neighborhood. [40]

The IDF denied on June 13 that it expanded operations into the al Mawasi humanitarian zone northwest of Rafah.[41] Palestinian sources, including the Palestinian Authority's official media arm, reported that Israeli airstrikes, artillery, and small arms fire targeted areas within the al Mawasi humanitarian zone.[42]

Palestinian reports indicate that the IDF is operating in the westernmost part of Rafah. A Palestinian journalist posted footage of Israeli forces establishing security operation points as well as Israeli bulldozers moving earth along the westernmost part of the Philadelphi Corridor.[43] A Palestinian militia mortared Israeli forces operating in al Alam, western Rafah, on June 13.[44]

These reports are consistent with other indications that the IDF was preparing to enter parts of western Rafah. A Palestinian activist reported on June 12 that the IDF issued warnings to people in al Alam of a military operation in the next 24 hours.[45] The al Alam area is roughly one mile south of the al Mawasi humanitarian zone. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Rafah said on June 12 that Israel informed it that fighting will continue in western Rafah but did not have specific information regarding the area.[46]  The IDF had not issued any new evacuation orders in Rafah at the time of this writing.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) conducted seven indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on June 13.[47] PIJ fired rockets at the major Israeli cities of Ashdod and Ashkelon, along with several smaller towns closer to the Gaza Strip.[48] PIJ also mortared IDF sites near the Kerem Shalom crossing into Rafah.[49]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least three locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on June 12.[50] All three locations are in Jenin Governorate. The IDF conducted a raid near Jenin (see below) that probably triggered the kinetic activity in the West Bank on June 12 to  13.

The IDF conducted a 13-hour raid near Jenin.[51] IDF special operations forces (SOF) engaged Palestinian fighters and detained suspected fighters during the operation. PIJ and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades defended against the Israeli raid. PIJ’s Jenin Battalion claimed 11 separate attacks targeting the IDF in Qabatiya, south of Jenin.[52] The IDF killed two high-value targets in Qabatiya during the raid.[53] The IDF killed both individuals by isolating the target building, ensuring that no civilians were inside, and then demolishing the target building, thus killing the two high-value targets inside it.[54] PIJ fighters detonated unspecified explosives and fired small arms at the Israeli SOF elements that were conducting the raid.[55] Qabatiya is a ”stronghold” for Palestinian Islamic Jihad.[56]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
  • Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
  • Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least 19 attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on June 12.[57] Hezbollah attacked eight IDF sites in the Golan Heights, using one-way attack drones in three of the attacks.[58] Hezbollah also fired around 40 rockets into northern Israel in response. Israeli air defenses intercepted most of the rockets with some landing in Israeli territory and causing fires.[59] Shrapnel from the attacks wounded two Israeli civilians. Hezbollah said that the attacks are in response to the IDF airstrike that killed senior Hezbollah field commander Taleb Sami Abdullah in southern Lebanon on June 11.[60]

Unspecified senior IDF officials told Israeli media on June 13 that Israeli strikes on Hezbollah commanders in Lebanon will not achieve Israel's desired end state in Lebanon.[61] The officials are presumably referring to the IDF airstrike that killed Taleb Sami Abdullah on June 11.[62] They said that Hezbollah attacks have increased over the past month and that Israel must make a political decision on restoring Israeli security in northern Israel.[63] Several senior Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former War Cabinet member Benny Gantz, have indicated that Israel will respond to Hezbollah through diplomatic or military action.[64] Israel aims to stop Hezbollah attacks into northern Israel and return displaced Israeli civilians to their homes.[65] Israel also seeks to push Hezbollah forces away from the Israel-Lebanon border in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War.[66]

The IDF said on June 13 that the IDF Kiryati Reserve Armored Brigade and 226th Reserve Paratroopers Brigade concluded a two-week-long military exercise simulating a potential conflict in Lebanon.[67] The exercises included maneuvering in complex terrain and providing logistical support and communications in enemy territory.

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Hamas opened a political office in Iraq on June 11.[68] Members of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Imam Ali visited the office and met with a member of Hamas’ Office for Arab and Islamic Relations, Mohammad al Hafi.[69] Kataib Imam Ali is one of the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that comprise the Islamic Movement in Iraq.[70] Hafi and the Kataib Imam Ali officials discussed the need to coordinate Arab and international efforts to stop Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip and to deliver humanitarian aid to Palestinians.[71]

The leader of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Akram al Kaabi, warned on June 12 that Israel will pay a “heavy price” for killing senior Lebanese Hezbollah commander Taleb Sami Abdullah.[72] Israel killed Abdullah in an airstrike in southern Lebanon on June 12.[73] Kaabi added that the Axis of Resistance will not stop fighting Israel until the "liberation of Jerusalem.”[74]

Acting Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani met with senior Iraqi officials in Baghdad on June 13. Iraqi Foreign Affairs Minister Fuad Hossein called for a permanent ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas war and warned that an Israeli attack on Lebanon would have repercussions across the Middle East during a joint press conference with Bagheri Kani.[75] Bagheri Kani separately stated that Iran is willing to contribute to Iraq’s Development Road Project during a meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani.[76] The Development Road Project is a 20 billion dollar project aimed at connecting Iraq’s al Faw port to Europe via Turkey. [77] Bagheri Kani also met with Iraqi President Abdul Latif al Rashid.[78]

The Houthis were likely responsible for at least two attacks on commercial vessels in Gulf of Aden and Red Sea on June 13.[79] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKTMO) reported that two “unknown projectiles” struck a merchant ship 98 nautical miles east of Aden, Yemen, and caused a fire.[80] British maritime security firm Ambrey separately said on June 13 that a ship was struck by a missile 129 nautical miles east of Aden. It is unclear whether the UKTMO and Ambrey reports are referencing the same attack.[81] UKTMO also reported an explosion near a merchant ship 82 nautical miles northwest of Hudaydah, Yemen.[82] The explosion did not cause any damage to the ship. The Houthis have not claimed the attacks at this time of this writing.

US CENTCOM stated on June 12 that its forces destroyed three Houthi anti-ship cruise missile launchers in Houthi-controlled Yemen and intercepted a Houthi drone in the Red Sea.[83] CENTCOM also reported that the Houthis launched two anti-ship ballistic missiles from Yemen into the Red Sea. CENTCOM said that the missiles did not cause any injuries or damage to US, coalition, or commercial ships in the Red Sea. CENTCOM confirmed a Houthi attack on June 12 in which the group disabled a commercial vessel in the Red Sea.[84]

Interim Iranian President Mohammad Mokhber discussed energy and transportation cooperation in a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on June 13.[85] Mokhber and Putin emphasized their commitment to the long-term Russo-Iranian cooperation agreement.[86] Russian state media recently reported on June 11 that Iran and Russia temporarily suspended working on the agreement due to unspecified issues raised by Iran.[87]

The Artesh Ground Forces conducted a military exercise with Azerbaijani forces in northwestern Iran on June 13.[88] Artesh Ground Forces Deputy Commander Brigadier General Karim Cheshak claimed on June 13 that the Aras Dam, which is located on the Aras River on the Iran-Azerbaijan border, is “threatened by terrorist groups.”[89] Cheshak stated that special forces and rapid response units participated in the exercise to confront any terrorist threat. Cheshak emphasized that the goal of the exercise was to “maintain peace, safeguard mutual interests, and boost sustainable security” in the southern Caucasus.[90]

 


[1] https://t.me/hamaswestbank/52023 ;  https://x.com/MofaQatar_EN/status/1800599203174850910/photo/1; https://www.axios.com/2024/06/11/hamas-response-gaza-israel-hostage-ceasefire-proposal

[2] https://www.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news-06-12-24-intl/h_66d336cfbd179612409f9bedca244af5

[3] https://www dot timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/main-sticking-point-in-hostage-talks-is-hamas-demand-for-upfront-israeli-vow-to-end-war-officials ; https://13tv.co dot il/item/news/politics/state-policy/mpox8-904099140/?pid=525 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-proposed-amendments-gaza-ceasefire-plan-not-significant-senior-leader-2024-06-13/

[4] https://www dot timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/hamas-wants-written-guarantee-from-us-that-hostage-deal-will-mean-permanent-end-of-war/

[5] https://www dot middleeasteye.net/news/gaza-war-text-ceasefire-proposal-approved-israel

[6] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-proposed-amendments-gaza-ceasefire-plan-not-significant-senior-leader-2024-06-13/

[7] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/senior-israeli-official-there-will-not-be-a-better-hostage-deal-offer-than-one-we-made-last-week/

[8] https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/biden-hamas-stands-cease-fire-questions-israel-remain/story?id=110786109

[9] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/hamas-thinks-it-could-win-gaza-war-with-israel-6254a8c6; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/gaza-chiefs-brutal-calculation-civilian-bloodshed-will-help-hamas-626720e7

[10] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/06/01/israel-gazan-clan-take-over-after-war/?ICID=continue_without_subscribing_reg_first

[11] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1800983376897196495/photo/1;                     https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1182

[12] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1800983376897196495/photo/1

[13] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1798700699725029693/photo/1; https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1173

[14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-6-2024

[15] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-expanding-enrichment-capacity-after-iaea-resolution-diplomats-say-2024-06-12/ ;

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[16] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-expanding-enrichment-capacity-after-iaea-resolution-diplomats-say-2024-06-12/

[17] https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/24/06/gov2024-26.pdf

[18] https://twitter.com/africa_in_fr/status/1785968816662425650?s=46&t=3jADKce4MtZBKDyf5P9itQ

[19] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202405319613

[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-18-2024

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-15-2024

[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-15-2024

[23] https://www.etemadonline dot com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-9/663370-%D9%81%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%AC%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA

[24] https://t dot co/5iUGy1oQDf ;

https://t dot co/YN7NZ7BXPg

[25] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/03/24/3103647

[26] www dot idf.il/208469

[27] www dot idf.il/208469 ; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1801207992668258738 ; https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1801228082956648869

[28] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1797991771000984016 ; https://www.idf

dot il/206646 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1796881956702973992

[29] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2461 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6603 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2453 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2454 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2450 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2422 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2423

[30] www dot idf.il/208469

[31] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate051724 ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate060224

[32] https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1801207918466871715 ; www dot idf.il/208469 ;

[33] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1801142324031864922

[34] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2459 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6610 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2462

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[41] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1801116566446031063

[42] www dot wafa.ps/Pages/Details/97660 ; https://www dot timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/report-israeli-forces-striking-targets-in-gaza-safe-zone/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-forces-thrust-deeper-into-rafah-diplomacy-falters-2024-06-13/

[43] https://twitter.com/ytirawi/status/1801199029163844077

[44] https://t.me/mojahdeenpal/4587

[45] https://t.me/hamza20300/255841; https://t.me/hamza20300/255836

[46] https://www.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news-06-12-24-intl/h_41e3f983e578d3476e4b337f7b1788f1

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[48] https://t.me/sarayaps/18097

[49] https://t.me/sarayaps/18095

[50] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6607; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6606; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6609; https://t.me/AymanGouda/6174

[51] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1801290321546154376

[52] https://t.me/sarayajneen/1330; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1340; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1349; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1338; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1337; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1336; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1335; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1334; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1333; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1332; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1331

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[54] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1801290327254278448

[55] https://t.me/sarayajneen/1340; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1334

[56] https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/1801293034665218378

[57] https://twitter.com/GLZRadio/status/1801093871838847467; https://t.me/mmirleb/4816; https://t.me/mmirleb/4805; https://t.me/mmirleb/4818; https://t.me/mmirleb/4825; https://t.me/mmirleb/4827; https://t.me/mmirleb/4829; https://t.me/mmirleb/4832; https://t.me/mmirleb/4840; https://t.me/mmirleb/4836

[58] https://twitter.com/GLZRadio/status/1801237292100603969; https://t.me/mmirleb/4816; https://t.me/mmirleb/4825

[59] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1801236993935818886

[60] https://t.me/mmirleb/4816; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-strike-lebanon-kills-four-including-senior-hezbollah-commander-2024-06-11/; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1800839411921526893; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1800839418468859973

[61] https://twitter.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1801160517878161724

[62] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-strike-lebanon-kills-four-including-senior-hezbollah-commander-2024-06-11/; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1800839411921526893; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1800839418468859973

[63] https://twitter.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1801160517878161724

[64] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-5-2024

[65] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-5-2024

[66] https://peacemaker.un.org/israellebanon-resolution1701

[67] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1801249464067187088 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1801249517674614798

[68] https://t.me/AliBattalions/4965

[69] https://t.me/AliBattalions/4965

[70] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/lmht-amt-ktayb-alamam-ly

[71] https://t.me/AliBattalions/4965

[72] https://t.me/Akram_Alkaabi/143

[73] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-12-2024

[74] https://t.me/Akram_Alkaabi/143

[75] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/216449/Iran-will-not-let-Israel-to-hurt-regional-stability-security

[76] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%B6-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9

[77] https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/what-know-about-iraq-turkey-europe-development-road-project#:~:text=The%20Development%20Road%20will%20link,to%20be%20completed%20by%202028. ;

https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%B6-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9

[78] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%8A-%D9%83%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA

[79] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/vessel-reports-missile-impacting-it-129-nm-east-yemens-aden-ambrey-says-2024-06-13/; https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1801221350427607240; https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1801250283776815301

[80] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1801221350427607240

[81] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/vessel-reports-missile-impacting-it-129-nm-east-yemens-aden-ambrey-says-2024-06-13/

[82] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1801250283776815301

[83] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1801024662526107997

[84] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1800981179052752901; https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1801024662526107997

[85] https://iranpress dot com/mokhber--putin-discuss-on-energy-and-transportation

[86] https://x.com/IranIntl_En/status/1801312605522268621

[87] https://www.moscowtimes dot ru/2024/06/11/rossiya-iiran-priostanovili-razrabotku-soglasheniya-ostrategicheskom-sotrudnichestve-a133649

[88] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/672801/

[89] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/672801/

[90] https://en.irna dot ir/news/85508329/Tehran-Baku-hold-joint-military-drill-in-northwestern-Iran

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 13, 2024

Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Karolina Hird, and George Barros

June 13, 2024, 6:45pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:15pm ET on June 13. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 14 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukraine signed bilateral ten-year security agreements with the United States and Japan on June 13 as other partner states reaffirmed their long-term support for Ukraine within the Group of 7 (G7) and Ramstein formats. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on June 13 that he signed bilateral ten-year security agreements with US President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on the sidelines of the ongoing G7 Summit.[1] The US-Ukraine agreement provides for long-term cooperation in defense and security, economic recovery and reform, and the advancement of Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration.[2] The Japan-Ukraine agreement provides for Japan's $4.5 billion contribution to Ukraine in 2024 and continued ten-year long support in security and defense, humanitarian aid, technical and financial cooperation, reconstruction efforts, and sanction measures against Russia.[3] Zelensky lauded both agreements as historic breakthroughs for Ukraine's bilateral relations with both the United States and Japan.[4] The United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister's Office reported on June 12 that UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak will announce up to £242 million (about $208 million) in bilateral assistance for Ukraine's humanitarian, energy, and economic and social recovery needs while at the G7 Summit.[5] French outlet France24 reported that G7 leaders are also finalizing details on the transfer of up to $50 billion in frozen Russian assets to Ukraine by the end of 2024.[6] G7 countries collectively possess $235 billion in frozen Russian assets, and G7 leaders are reportedly brokering a deal that would rely on a US-led $50 billion loan that would reach Ukraine by the end of 2024 and be "topped up" with contributions by other allies.[7] NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg also announced during a Ukraine Defense Contract Group at the Ramstein Airbase in Germany on June 12 that NATO partners will agree on a comprehensive military and financial aid package for Ukraine during the upcoming NATO summit in July 2024 and emphasized that NATO will lead efforts to provide security assistance and training for Ukraine.[8] Stoltenberg also stated that the supply of weapons to Ukraine may become mandatory for NATO members in order to ensure that NATO's security assistance for Ukraine remains "reliable and large-scale."[9]

The United States finally sanctioned the Moscow Exchange, other significant Russian financial institutions, and Russian defense manufacturers 839 days into Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The US Department of the Treasury announced on June 12 sanctions against more than 300 individuals and entities supporting Russia's wartime economy, including the Moscow Exchange and its subsidiaries; major banks VTB Bank, Sberbank, and Tochka Bank; and leading Russian defense industrial base (DIB) entities including state owned defense conglomerate Rostec, the state owned aerospace and defense company United Aircraft Corporation, vehicle and vehicle components manufacturer Kamaz, main Russian tank manufacturer Uralvagonzavod, and helicopter design and manufacturing company Russian Helicopters.[10] The UK also announced similar sanctions targeting Russian financial institutions, entities supporting the Russian DIB, and Russia's shadow fleet of oil tankers.[11]

The Russian government appears confident that these new sanctions will minimally impact the Russian financial system, and the delay in US and other Western countries sanctioning these entities has given the Russian financial system time to prepare and mitigate such sanctions. The Moscow Exchange immediately suspended trading in US dollars (USD), euros, and Hong Kong dollars (HKP) in several markets on June 12 following the US sanctions announcement, and the Russian Central Bank instituted a fixed exchange rate for over-the-counter trading using the USD and euro on June 13.[12] Western and some Russian media widely circulated reports of some Russian banks appearing to sell USD to Russians at 100-200 rubles per dollar on June 12 and 13, but prominent Russian banks Sberbank and VTB quickly announced on June 12 that the new US sanctions would not impact their operations.[13] The Russian Central Bank has prepared for these sanctions and developed a procedure in October 2022 for setting currency exchange rates when it cannot obtain such data from the Moscow Exchange (data the Moscow Exchange can presumably no longer provide for USD).[14] The Russian Central Bank began publishing information on over-the-counter foreign exchange trade in April 2024.[15] The Russian Central Bank set its rubles per USD exchange rate for June 14 to 88.2080, only 88 kopecks lower than the previous rate, and the ruble-to-euro exchange rate only decreased by 91 kopecks to 94.8342 rubles per euro.[16] Bloomberg reported that multiple Russian metals producers and a fertilizer maker are not worried about the end of USD-ruble exchange trading and that Russian state-owned gas monopoly Gazprom has not used the Moscow Exchange for settlements "in a long time."[17] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev complained about the new US sanctions, claiming that Russia is stable enough that it does not need to react to these sanctions out of economic need but that Russia should inflict "maximum harm" on the West in reaction to these sanctions because the United States and its allies "declared war on us [Russia] without rules."[18] Medvedev's choice to publish this only on his Russian language Telegram account indicates he likely means to posture strength and stability to a domestic Russian audience rather than address international audiences.

Bloomberg assessed on June 13 that the new US sanctions would make it more difficult for Russian businesses to trade on the international market due to the increased costs of over-the-counter trading and reduced foreign willingness to do business with Russian entities due to the fear of secondary sanctions.[19] A source close to the Russian Central Bank told Bloomberg that Chinese banks will gradually reduce their cooperation with the Moscow Exchange given these issues but that these banks will still provide yuan liquidity to support imports. The source also stated that there is uncertainty whether the Russian Central Bank's new exchange rates will work and how much costs of foreign trading and business will rise.

US President Joe Biden reiterated his opposition to allowing Ukrainian forces to strike military targets in Russia’s operational or deep rear areas in Russian territory with US-provided weapons. Biden acknowledged that it “makes a lot of sense” to allow Ukrainian forces to strike Russian forces on the immediate side of the international border in Russian territory but that the United States has not changed its restrictions prohibiting Ukraine from striking Russia’s operational or deep rear in Russian territory.[20] ISW assesses that the Biden Administration’s limited policy change permitting Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike some Russian military targets in a small area within Russian territory has reduced the size of Russia’s ground sanctuary by only 16 percent at maximum.[21] ISW assesses that the West maintains the ability to substantially disrupt Russian operations at scale by allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to strike Russia’s operational rear and deep rear areas in Russian territory.[22]

Sustained Ukrainian strikes against Russian military targets in occupied Crimea appear to be forcing the Russian military to commit additional air defense assets to Crimea in order to defend existing bases and logistics infrastructure, and further Ukrainian strikes against such air defense assets may render the peninsula untenable as a staging ground for the Russian military. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov reported on June 12 that Russian forces placed an S-500 air defense system (essentially a modernized version of the S-300) in Crimea as part of their efforts to strengthen Russia's air defense umbrella over Crimea.[23] Budanov stated that Russian forces have not previously used an S-500 air defense system in combat and characterized the system as "experimental." Forbes reported on June 12 that the Belbek Airfield in occupied Crimea is becoming an "attrition trap" for Russian air defenses following several successful Ukrainian strikes on air defenses near the airfield.[24] Forbes stated that it is possible that Ukrainian forces have destroyed elements of four or five S-400 batteries during recent strikes but noted that the Russian military has over 50 S-400 batteries. An X (formerly known as Twitter) user, citing satellite imagery, noted on June 11 that Russian forces have placed 17 barges near the Kerch Strait Bridge that connects occupied Crimea to Krasnodar Krai.[25] Russian forces likely intend for the barges to serve as defenses against Ukrainian naval drone strikes against the bridge, and Russian forces previously installed eight barges on the southern side of the bridge for similar reasons.[26] Ukraine's current efforts to attrit the Russian air defense umbrella in Crimea notably may have the exploitable effect of drawing more Russian air defense assets to Crimea, making them vulnerable to further Ukrainian strikes. ISW previously assessed that Ukrainian forces may be conducting an organized effort to degrade Russian air defenses, which could enable Ukraine to more effectively leverage manned fixed-wing airpower (namely using F-16 fighter jets) in the long term.[27] The West has long supported Ukraine's right to strike Russian military targets in occupied Crimea, and Ukrainian forces could in principle be able to replicate their successful strikes against military targets in Russia if the West approved such strikes in Russia's rear.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) is reportedly using diplomatic channels to convince other countries to not support the upcoming June 15-16 Global Peace Summit in Switzerland. Reuters reported on June 13 that 10 Beijing-based diplomats from unspecified countries stated that the PRC is using meetings with visiting foreign officials, phone calls, and messages on the WeChat platform to lobby other countries to support the PRC's and Brazil's suggested six-point peace plan, which called for a peace conference that includes both Ukraine and Russia.[28] Reuters reported that diplomatic sources stated that the PRC has not overtly criticized the upcoming peace summit in Switzerland when speaking with developing states and is instead trying to subtly bring about certain outcomes. One diplomatic source stated that the PRC has told developing states that the Swiss peace summit will prolong the war in Ukraine, and two diplomatic sources reportedly stated that the PRC has also been telling unspecified Western states that many developing states agree with the PRC's views about the Swiss peace summit. Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly asked PRC President Xi Jinping in May 2024 to "snub" the peace conference in Switzerland.[29] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 2 that Russia is using Chinese influence and diplomats to disrupt the Global Peace Summit.[30] The Kremlin is likely trying to exploit the PRC's greater diplomatic connections and influence in the world to forward Russian interests.

The United States, United Kingdom (UK), and Canada released a joint statement on July 13 acknowledging and condemning Russian subversive activity and electoral interference efforts in Moldova, which is consistent with ISW's long-standing assessment of the Kremlin's ongoing hybrid campaign to destabilize Moldovan democracy.[31] The statement noted that the United States, UK, and Canada share Moldovan President Maia Sandu's concerns that the Kremlin is seeking to undermine Moldovan democratic institutions and practices in the lead-up to Moldova's October 2024 presidential election and European Union (EU) membership referendum. The statement noted that the Kremlin is leveraging criminal groups to finance political activities that undermine Moldovan democracy and is supporting candidates for the presidency that are "exacerbating social tensions." The statement heavily emphasizes the role of Russian disinformation campaigns targeting Moldovan democracy. ISW has written at length about recent Kremlin efforts to destabilize Moldova internally, including by supporting pro-Kremlin Moldovan political parties and conducting targeted disinformation campaigns.[32]

Key Takeaways:

  • Ukraine signed bilateral ten-year security agreements with the US and Japan on June 13 as other partner states reaffirmed their long-term support for Ukraine within the Group of 7 (G7) and Ramstein formats.
  • The US finally sanctioned the Moscow Exchange, other significant Russian financial institutions, and Russian defense manufacturers 839 days into Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
  • The Russian government appears confident that these new sanctions will minimally impact the Russian financial system, and the delay in US and other Western countries sanctioning these entities has given the Russian financial system time to prepare and mitigate such sanctions.
  • US President Joe Biden reiterated his opposition to allowing Ukrainian forces to strike military targets in Russia’s operational or deep rear areas in Russian territory with US-provided weapons.
  • Sustained Ukrainian strikes against Russian military targets in occupied Crimea appear to be forcing the Russian military to commit additional air defense assets to Crimea in order to defend existing bases and logistics infrastructure, and further Ukrainian strikes against such air defense assets may render the peninsula untenable as a staging ground for the Russian military.
  • The People's Republic of China (PRC) is reportedly using diplomatic channels to convince other countries to not support the upcoming June 15-16 Global Peace Summit in Switzerland.
  • The US, United Kingdom (UK), and Canada released a joint statement on July 13 acknowledging and condemning Russian subversive activity and electoral interference efforts in Moldova, which is consistent with ISW's long-standing assessment of the Kremlin's ongoing hybrid campaign to destabilize Moldovan democracy.
  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Kharkiv City and Russian forces marginally advanced near Siversk and Avdiivka.
  • Russian federal subjects (regions) continue to increase monetary incentives to recruit military personnel.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Russian Technological Adaptations
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas
  • Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
  • Russian Information Operations and Narratives
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions north of Kharkiv City amid continued Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 13. Geolocated footage posted on June 13 shows Ukrainian forces conducting a counterattack and seizing positions along a windbreak just southeast of Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City).[33] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking around Hlyboke, and one milblogger noted that Ukrainian counterattacks are complicating the situation for Russian forces in the area.[34] Several Russian sources also reported Ukrainian counterattacks in and around Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City), but claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 1.8 kilometers deep along a 4.5-kilometer-wide front north of Vovchansk and are making gains in the area of the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant.[35] Russian and Ukrainian sources both suggested that Russian forces introduced reserves to the northern Kharkiv Oblast axis, although the size of these reserve formations remains unclear.[36] A Russian source claimed that elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are operating near Vovchansk, but ISW has most recently observed that the elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade were fighting in the Marinka area (west of Donetsk City) as of June 3.[37] If true, the appearance of elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade in the Vovchansk area could indicate a redeployment from the Donetsk direction to the Kharkiv direction in order to bolster the Russian grouping in Kharkiv Oblast, which may also in part account for discussions of Russian reserves arriving in the area. Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Yuriy Povkh noted that Russian forces are also trying to build fortifications around their current positions in the northern Kharkiv direction.[38] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Hlyboke, Vovchansk, and Tykhe (east of Vovchansk) on June 12 and 13.[39]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on June 13 but did not make any confirmed advances. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported fighting northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane; northwest of Svatove near Stelmakhivka, Myasozharivka, and Berestove; northwest of Kreminna near Druzhelyubivka, Nevske, and Hrekivka; west of Kreminna near Terny; and southwest of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area on June 12 and 13.[40] Several milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing west of Ivanivka towards Stepova Novoselivka (both southeast of Kupyansk), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of recent Russian advances in this area.[41] Elements of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[42]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces recently advanced south of Siversk. Geolocated footage published on June 13 shows that Russian forces advanced to the eastern outskirts of Rozdolivka (south of Siversk).[43] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division have been operating on the eastern outskirts Rozdolivka since June 12 and that Russian forces also advanced 1.12 kilometers in depth near Vyimka (southeast of Siversk).[44] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces captured an unspecified Ukrainian position near Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk).[45] Fighting also continued near Bilohorivka (north of Siversk) and Spirne (southeast of Siversk) on June 12 and 13.[46]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on June 13 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued ground attacks in eastern Chasiv Yar, north of Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka, east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske, and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Andriivka.[47] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar).[48] Elements of the Russian 1065th VDV Artillery Regiment (98th VDV Division), 58th Spetsnaz Battalion (1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]), and "Sever-V" Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) reportedly continue operating near Chasiv Yar.[49]

 

Russian forces have seized Novopokrovske (northwest of Avdiivka). Geolocated footage published on June 13 shows Russian forces raising a flag in western Novopokrovske, and Russian milbloggers widely claimed on June 13 that Russian forces seized the village after making diverging claims about seizing the settlement on June 12.[50] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked near Mezhove (southwest of Novopokrovske) for the first time on June 13, also indicating that fighting has advanced beyond Novopokrovske.[51] Additional geolocated footage published on June 13 shows that Russian forces also advanced west of Semenivka and north of Umanske (both west of Avdiivka).[52] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced south of Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Avdiivka), west of Netaylove (west of Avdiivka), and 620 meters deep in southeastern Nevelske (southwest of Avdiivka), though ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[53] Russian forces also attacked northwest of Avdiivka near Kalynove, Novoselivka Persha, Yevhenivka, and Sokil on June 12 and 13.[54]

 

Russian forces intensified offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City as of June 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported in the morning and early afternoon of June 13 that Russian forces have been most active in the Kurakhove direction (west and southwest of Donetsk City) and intensified efforts west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Paraskoviivka on June 13.[55] A Ukrainian military officer claimed on June 13 that Russian forces conducted a company-sized mechanized attack with 19 armored vehicles and that Ukrainian forces destroyed 14 of the vehicles while repelling the attack.[56] ISW has not observed corroborating visual evidence of this specific attack, but if true, footage of the attack will likely become available in open-source in the coming days. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 5th and 110th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 1st DNR AC) continued to advance in western Krasnohorivka and north of the Refractory Plant in the northern part of the settlement.[57] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction stated on June 12 that Russian forces are actively operating armored vehicles in attempts to capture Kostyantynivka (southwest of Donetsk City) and Paraskoviivka to reach the Vuhledar-Marinka road and pressure the rear of the Ukrainian grouping near Vuhledar.[58]

Limited positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Staromayorske and Urozhaine (both south of Velyka Novosilka) on June 12 and 13, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[59]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued ground attacks near Robotyne, Verbove (east of Robotyne), and Mala Tokmachka (northwest of Robotyne) in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 13, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[60] Elements of the Russian 4th Military Base (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Kamianske (west of Robotyne).[61]

 

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued assaults near Krynky in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on June 12 and 13, but there were no confirmed changes in the area.[62] Elements of the Russian 80th Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[63] Ukrainian Naval Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated on June 13 that Ukrainian forces have recently succeeded in destroying five Russian military boats per day in southern Ukraine after previously only destroying one or two boats per day, but Pletenchuk did not provide a reason why Ukrainian forces are destroying more boats.[64]

 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a limited series of strikes against targets in Ukraine on June 13. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhii Lysak reported on June 13 that Russian forces struck residential and energy infrastructure in Novomoskovsk, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast with an unspecified weapon, injuring six people including children.[65] Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Head Oleh Synehubov reported that Russian forces struck civilian and logistics infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast with almost 20 guided glide bombs but conducted fewer S-300/400 air defense system strikes against Kharkiv Oblast over the past day.[66] Ukrainian Southern Air Command reported that Ukrainian air defenses destroyed two Russian Zala reconnaissance drones and two Supercam reconnaissance drones over southern Ukraine on the night of June 12 to 13.[67] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk stated that Ukrainian air defenses have downed 19 Shahed-136/131 drones, 20 Zala drones, five Supercam drones, 28 Lancet loitering munitions, 17 Orlan 10/30 reconnaissance drones, four Privit-82 attack drones, and three unknown drones over unspecified areas of Ukraine between June 6 and 13.[68]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian federal subjects (regions) continue to increase monetary incentives to recruit military personnel. Chelyabinsk Oblast Governor Alexei Teksler proposed increasing one-time regional payments for contract military personnel (kontraktniki) to 350,000 rubles (about $3,900).[69] Russian opposition outlet Chelyabinsk of the Future stated that this is the second time in 2024 that the Chelyabinsk Oblast government has increased payments to kontraktniki following an increase from 75,000 (about $850) to 225,000 rubles (about $2,500).[70] Russian opposition outlets also noted that 14 Russian federal subjects have similarly increased payments to kontraktniki in 2024.[71]

The Russian Navy reportedly began sea trials for the Project 885M "Arkhangelsk" Yasem-M class nuclear submarine in the White Sea on June 11.[72] The submarine will reportedly undergo tests in the summer of 2024 and then begin state tests.[73] Russian shipbuilder Sevmash delivered the Project 885M “Arkhangelsk” to the Russian Navy for testing in November 2023.[74]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian forces reportedly used a modified Kh-101 cruise missile equipped with cluster munitions for the second time during a series of missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 11 to 12. Ukrainian military analyst Ivan Kyrychevskyi stated on June 12 that the modified Kh-101 had a warhead with a total mass of 800 kilograms and that if Ukrainian forces shoot down the missile, the cluster munition warhead can still fall out of the missile and can detonate, causing damage to targets on the ground.[75] Russian forces reportedly used the modified Kh-101 with cluster munitions for the first time during strikes on the night of June 6 to 7.[76]

The Russian military has reportedly developed the "Murena-300" maritime strike drone that can carry up to 250 kilograms of explosives and has a cruising range of 250 kilometers.[77] The maritime drone will reportedly be able to carry 250 kilograms of explosives in the future and includes an inertial navigation system.

The Russian Airburg drone production company reportedly created the "Phaeton" transport and reconnaissance drone that can perform vertical takeoffs, has a flight time of five hours and a flight range of up to 500 kilometers, and can carry payloads of 15 kilograms.[78]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova reiterated known Kremlin narratives intended to place the onus for Russian aggression and increasing tension in eastern Europe on the West.[79]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Russian MoD 12th Directorate Head Lieutenant General Igor Kolesnikov reported on June 13 that Russian and Belarusian forces began the second stage of joint military exercises with non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons.[80] Kolesnikov reported that the second stage involves transporting tactical nuclear ammunition and launchers to a specific position. ISW continues to assess that Russian and joint Russian-Belarusian tactical nuclear exercises are part of Russia's ongoing reflexive control campaign designed to influence Western decision-making with nuclear saber-rattling and other forms of manipulation.[81]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 


[1] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1801268384182526460?t=yBGvsZZD_rxup71Px_AmTA&s=35;

https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1801327762193489982

[2] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/06/13/bilateral-security-agreement-between-the-united-states-of-america-and-ukraine/

[3] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1801268384182526460?t=yBGvsZZD_rxup71Px_AmTA&s=35

[4] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1801327762193489982; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1801268384182526460?t=yBGvsZZD_rxup71Px_AmTA&s=35

[5] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-shows-enduring-commitment-to-ukraine-at-g7-summit

[6] https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20240613-g7-leaders-to-50-billion-ukraine-loan-backed-by-russia-s-frozen-assets; https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-shows-enduring-commitment-to-ukraine-at-g7-summit

[7] https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20240613-g7-leaders-to-50-billion-ukraine-loan-backed-by-russia-s-frozen-assets

[8] https://suspilne dot media/767123-stoltenberg-rozpoviv-pro-ocikuvanna-vid-samitu-nato/

[9] https://suspilne dot media/767203-postacanna-zbroi-ukraini-stane-obovazkovim-dla-vsih-krain-nato-stoltenberg/

[10] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2404

[11] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-uk-sanctions-to-crack-down-on-putins-war-machine

[12] https://www.cbr dot ru/press/pr/?file=638538857295023335SUP_MEAS.htm; https://www.cbr dot ru/press/pr/?file=638538346095961665SUP_MEAS.htm; https://www.moex dot com/n70156

[13] https://t.me/tass_agency/254327; https://t.me/tass_agency/254333; https://t.me/bankrollo/28162; https://www.newsweek.com/moscow-stock-exchange-trade-halted-ruble-collapse-sanctions-1912161

[14] https://cbr dot ru/Queries/UniDbQuery/File/90134/2659

[15] https://www.cbr dot ru/press/pr/?file=638489599567862726DATABASES.htm

[16] https://t.me/tass_agency/254509; https://www.cbr dot ru/currency_base/daily/ ; https://t.me/istories_media/6626

[17] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-13/usd-rub-after-us-dollar-trade-sanctions-russians-look-to-yuan-cny?srnd=markets-vp

[18] https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/505

[19] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-13/usd-rub-after-us-dollar-trade-sanctions-russians-look-to-yuan-cny?srnd=markets-vp

[20] https://www.c-span.org/video/?536363-2/president-biden-ukrainian-president-zelensky-hold-news-conference-7-summit

[21] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2024

[22] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2024

[23] https://suspilne dot media/crimea/767227-okupanti-v-krimu-posiluut-sistemu-ppo-pisla-uspisnih-udariv-zsu-budanov/ ; https://kyivindependent.com/budanov-russia-places-s-500-air-defense-systems-in-occupied-crimea/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0mWdnpwgDjY&ab_channel=%D0%A2%D0%A1%D0%9D

[24] https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/06/12/ukrainian-atacms-rockets-are-blowing-up-russias-best-s-400-air-defenses-as-fast-as-the-s-400s-can-deploy-to-crimea/

[25] https://x.com/tom_bike/status/1800519604927967381

[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2024 ; https://x.com/DefenceHQ/status/1799347576157651027 ; https://x.com/DefenceHQ/status/1799347796115431912

[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2024

[28] https://www.reuters.com/world/china-pushes-rival-ukraine-peace-plan-before-swiss-summit-diplomats-say-2024-06-13/

[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-3-2024

[30] https://www.politico.eu/article/zelenskyy-accuses-certain-states-of-helping-russia-sabotage-peace-summit/

[31] https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-exposing-russias-subversive-activity-and-electoral-interference-targeting-moldova/

[32] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060924; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010924; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011224; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012824; https://isw.pub/UkrWar013124; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021424; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022724; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022824; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050924

[33] https://x.com/small10space/status/1801253010166645010; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1801255900994216279

[34] https://t.me/wargonzo/20467; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11769

[35] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70196; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11745; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11758; https://t.me/wargonzo/20467; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/12175; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/126729

[36] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/767557-koli-rosiani-rozumiut-so-prograli-sturm-zajmautsa-samopidrivannam-recnik-3-i-osbr-pro-harkivskij-napramok/ ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/767557-koli-rosiani-rozumiut-so-prograli-sturm-zajmautsa-samopidrivannam-recnik-3-i-osbr-pro-harkivskij-napramok/; https://t.me/dva_majors/45036

[37] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1922; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-3-2024; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1800999053758488588; https://t.me/rustroyka1945/17163

[38] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/767193-13-cervna-golovni-novini-harkova-ta-oblasti-aki-naseleni-punkti-perebuvali-pid-udarami-rf/?anchor=live_1718274822&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/19684

[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nEvnxPetcgieH54SP2uEkJ3k1h9D49ZCMgfQ1qZtyZgeGrWgG2MpepKZMNE8uGPZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qpRfP17RFFvbs21PEBMkSyZReuWQEJ468aUdjzthSx6J2AburMMDp3MfukgyGMfhl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02f6UVk3Y22Gx4YzrYEn34ySayBz7qX5gad8oqinkv6aFrcJHES5kDifKYAXS7zbEBl  

[40] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/126697; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/56900; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02f6UVk3Y22Gx4YzrYEn34ySayBz7qX5gad8oqinkv6aFrcJHES5kDifKYAXS7zbEBl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qpRfP17RFFvbs21PEBMkSyZReuWQEJ468aUdjzthSx6J2AburMMDp3MfukgyGMfhl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CeBWimGHMqqC7owsYxmxAL4xUnBDS4H93WGA3bXDXJmv7icTjoKH6gZVxRXiZ2myl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nEvnxPetcgieH54SP2uEkJ3k1h9D49ZCMgfQ1qZtyZgeGrWgG2MpepKZMNE8uGPZl; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/126697; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/56900; ttps://t.me/dva_majors/45021

[41] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11757; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/126697; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/56900

[42] https://t.me/voin_dv/9103 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/16184

[43] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/483; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5806

[44] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70264; https://t.me/motopatriot/23896; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/126697; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/56900

[45] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11753

[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qpRfP17RFFvbs21PEBMkSyZReuWQEJ468aUdjzthSx6J2AburMMDp3MfukgyGMfhl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02f6UVk3Y22Gx4YzrYEn34ySayBz7qX5gad8oqinkv6aFrcJHES5kDifKYAXS7zbEBl; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/126697; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/56900

[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nEvnxPetcgieH54SP2uEkJ3k1h9D49ZCMgfQ1qZtyZgeGrWgG2MpepKZMNE8uGPZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nEvnxPetcgieH54SP2uEkJ3k1h9D49ZCMgfQ1qZtyZgeGrWgG2MpepKZMNE8uGPZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qpRfP17RFFvbs21PEBMkSyZReuWQEJ468aUdjzthSx6J2AburMMDp3MfukgyGMfhl; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11759; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11762; https://t.me/wargonzo/20467; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/126697; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/56900

[48] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11762; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/126697; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/56900

[49] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/126766; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/12181; https://t.me/mod_russia/39701 (Chasiv Yar)

[50] https://t.me/rusich_army/15171; https://x.com/EjShahid/status/1801263777926537613; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5810; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27043; https://t.me/dva_majors/45021; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70234; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18079; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2024

[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nEvnxPetcgieH54SP2uEkJ3k1h9D49ZCMgfQ1qZtyZgeGrWgG2MpepKZMNE8uGPZl

[52] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/483; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5805; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/483; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5809; https://t.me/motopatriot/23908 

[53] https://t.me/z_arhiv/27042; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27041; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70222; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18082; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18082; https://t.me/wargonzo/20467

[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nEvnxPetcgieH54SP2uEkJ3k1h9D49ZCMgfQ1qZtyZgeGrWgG2MpepKZMNE8uGPZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CeBWimGHMqqC7owsYxmxAL4xUnBDS4H93WGA3bXDXJmv7icTjoKH6gZVxRXiZ2myl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qpRfP17RFFvbs21PEBMkSyZReuWQEJ468aUdjzthSx6J2AburMMDp3MfukgyGMfhl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02f6UVk3Y22Gx4YzrYEn34ySayBz7qX5gad8oqinkv6aFrcJHES5kDifKYAXS7zbEBl

[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CeBWimGHMqqC7owsYxmxAL4xUnBDS4H93WGA3bXDXJmv7icTjoKH6gZVxRXiZ2myl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CeBWimGHMqqC7owsYxmxAL4xUnBDS4H93WGA3bXDXJmv7icTjoKH6gZVxRXiZ2myl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qpRfP17RFFvbs21PEBMkSyZReuWQEJ468aUdjzthSx6J2AburMMDp3MfukgyGMfhl

[56] https://t.me/officer_alex33/3015; https://t.me/officer_alex33/3016

[57] https://t.me/wargonzo/20467; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70230; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/126697; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/56900

[58] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/12/vorog-hoche-vyjty-v-tyl-vugledaru-ne-dyvlyachys-na-vtraty/

[59] https://t.me/tass_agency/254424; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11756; https://t.me/voin_dv/9100; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02f6UVk3Y22Gx4YzrYEn34ySayBz7qX5gad8oqinkv6aFrcJHES5kDifKYAXS7zbEBl

[60] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qpRfP17RFFvbs21PEBMkSyZReuWQEJ468aUdjzthSx6J2AburMMDp3MfukgyGMfhl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/20467 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/56900; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/126697

[61] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70212

[62] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CeBWimGHMqqC7owsYxmxAL4xUnBDS4H93WGA3bXDXJmv7icTjoKH6gZVxRXiZ2myl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid01Ev5JqF5WdrUWcCzf7LbRWxQXgZc7KFfnyZJycLKJsXdBXsMePTMdaspGiRHy9tvl

[63] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/36794

[64] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/13/na-pivdennomu-napryamku-rosiyany-vtratyly-5-chovniv-za-den/

[65] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/13657

[66] https://t.me/synegubov/9967 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/767193-13-cervna-golovni-novini-harkova-ta-oblasti-aki-naseleni-punkti-perebuvali-pid-udarami-rf/?anchor=live_1718271455&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CwQl49tDPT

[67] https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=842563431255690&set=a.605159881662714&type=3&ref=embed_post

[68] https://t.me/Pavliuk_KSV/5502

[69] https://t.me/ChelFuture/5565; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/19057 ; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6762636

[70] https://t.me/ChelFuture/5565

[71] https://t.me/ChelFuture/5565; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/19057

[72] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/126695; https://t.me/milinfolive/123879; https://rg dot ru/2024/06/13/reg-szfo/atomnaia-podvodnaia-lodka-arhangelsk-pristupila-k-hodovym-ispytaniiam.html

[73] https://rg dot ru/2024/06/13/reg-szfo/atomnaia-podvodnaia-lodka-arhangelsk-pristupila-k-hodovym-ispytaniiam.html

[74] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2023

[75] https://espreso dot tv/viyna-z-rosiyeyu-vorog-udariv-po-kievu-modifikovanimi-raketami-kh-101-ekspert-kirichevskiy-rozpoviv-chomu-voni-nebezpechni-navit-pislya-zbittya

[76] https://en.defence-ua dot com/news/1-10770.html; https://t.me/war_home/1575

[77] https://lenta dot ru/news/2024/06/12/v-rossii-razrabotali-kater-kamikadze/ ; https://rtvi dot com/stories/nadeemsya-na-podderzhku-belousova-glava-razrabotchikov-katera-bespilotnika-ob-ispytaniyah-i-borbe-s-ukrainskimi-vodnymi-dronami/

[78] https://news dot ru/russia/faeton-novyj-transportno-razvedyvatelnyj-dron-predstavlen-v-moskve/

[79] https://t.me/tass_agency/254488 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/254482 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/41851 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/254517

[80] https://t.me/mod_russia/39702 ; https://t.me/modmilby/39462 ; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/252706; https://www.belta dot by/society/view/minoborony-otrabatyvajutsja-voprosy-boevogo-dezhurstva-s-uchebnymi-jadernymi-boepripasami-640974-2024/

[81] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2024