Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 24, 2025

 Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson,
Daria Novikov, and George Barros with Nate Trotter

March 24, 2025, 5:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15am ET on March 24. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US and Russian delegations met in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on March 24 following US–Ukrainian talks on March 23 about the details of temporary ceasefires on long-range strikes and in the Black Sea. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 23 that the US–Ukrainian talks are "more technical in nature."[1] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on March 23 that the US–Ukrainian talks discussed proposals for the safety of energy and infrastructure facilities and that the talks were "productive and focused."[2] A source familiar with the bilateral negotiations in Saudi Arabia told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that the Russian-US meeting on March 24 will consider the ceasefire agreements that Ukraine agreed to on March 23.[3] The source stated that the discussions focused on moratoriums on strikes against energy facilities and civilian infrastructure and attacks in the Black Sea. Ukrainian Presidential Office Advisor Serhii Leshchenko stated that the US–Ukrainian talks concerned a ceasefire against strikes on Russian "facilities at seas and rivers" and against Ukrainian ports in Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts.[4] Leshchenko stated that the Ukrainian delegation will hold additional discussions with the US delegation following the US–Russian talks on March 24.[5] Suspilne reported that the US delegation in the US–Russian talks includes State Department Policy Planning Director Michael Anton, US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg, and National Security Advisor Mike Waltz and that the Russian delegation includes Russian Federation Council International Affairs Committee Chairperson Grigory Karasin and Advisor to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Colonel General Sergei Beseda.[6] Saudi Arabian state-owned outlet Al Arabiya reported that US National Security Council member Andrew Peek is also participating in the US delegation in the US–Russian talks.[7] Kremlin wire TASS reported that the US and Russian delegations will release a joint statement on March 25.[8] ISW will report on the details of the various bilateral talks as information becomes available in the coming days.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Demidovka along the international border in northwestern Belgorod Oblast amid ongoing Ukrainian attacks in the area. Geolocated footage published on March 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[9] Russian milbloggers acknowledged that Ukrainian forces advanced into southern Demidovka but denied that Ukrainian forces seized the settlement.[10] Ukrainian forces began limited attacks into northwestern Belgorod Oblast on March 18 and have made marginal advances towards Grafovka (southeast of Demidovka) and Prilesye (south of Demidovka) over the last six days.[11] Russian milbloggers claimed on March 24 that Ukrainian forces also began attacking towards Popovka (west of Demidovka).[12] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are operating all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and some armored vehicles and attacking in small infantry groups.[13] Russian sources claimed that Russia redeployed border guards, Chechen Akhmat forces, elements of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces, and elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) to respond to the Ukrainian attacks in northwestern Belgorod Oblast.[14] ISW will not offer an assessment of Ukraine's intent behind these attacks at this time.

Ukrainian forces appear to be leveraging long-range strikes to complicate Russian logistics and command and control (C2) in the area. Ukrainian forces recently conducted two strikes on Russian command posts in western Belgorod Oblast, destroying communications equipment.[15] Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on March 24 that Ukrainian forces downed four Russian helicopters over Belgorod Oblast.[16] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces recently struck a bridge near Grafovka and another bridge near Nadezhevka (east of Grafovka), likely to complicate Russian logistics in the area.[17] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian drone strikes, shelling, and HIMARS strikes are also complicating Russian forces' ability to hold some positions in the area.[18]

The Kremlin is recirculating existing narratives aimed at undermining support for Ukraine amid the negotiations in Riyadh and likely remains uninterested in conducting meaningful negotiations to end the war. Kremlin officials are likely attempting to capitalize on the current lack of available details about the US–Ukrainian and US–Russian discussions in Riyadh on March 23 and 24. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov accused Ukraine of being "well-bred Nazis" who lack agency as part of Kremlin efforts to justify the Kremlin's demand of "denazification" — or regime change and the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv — as a condition to end the war in Ukraine.[19] Lavrov also reiterated claims accusing European countries of seeking to prolong the war in Ukraine, likely to drive a wedge between Europe and the United States. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov accused Ukraine of violating the proposed moratorium on energy strikes, despite the fact that the proposed moratorium agreement and its contours are not yet finalized and are currently under discussion in Riyadh.[20] Peskov and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova attempted to temper domestic expectations for the ongoing talks, stating that there is no need to expect breakthroughs and there is still a lot of work to do on technical issues.[21] These statements continue to signal to the domestic Russian audience that Russians should not expect a meaningful peace in Ukraine in the near term and support Kremlin condition-setting for a protracted war effort.[22]

Recent statements by Russian diplomats and academics indicate that the Kremlin likely aims to prioritize bilateral discussions with the United States over talks to end the war in Ukraine and will set this expectation within Russian society. Russian State Duma Foreign Affairs Committee Vyacheslav Nikonov recently told the New York Times (NYT) that Russian President Vladimir Putin sees bilateral Russian-US relations as "more important than the question of Ukraine."[23] Other Russian officials and voices indicated to the NYT that it is more important for Russia to accomplish its goals in bilateral US–Russian relations regarding alleviating sanctions pressure, constraining NATO, and seeking a "broader deal" — which likely includes US–Russian bilateral terms — before agreeing to any ceasefire in Ukraine.[24]

Russia continues to persecute religious minorities, especially Evangelical Christian communities in occupied Kherson Oblast as part of a wider campaign in occupied Ukraine aimed at destroying independent Ukrainian national and religious identities. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on March 23 that Russian occupation officials are forcibly converting and reconsecrating Ukrainian churches into the Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP) in occupied Kherson Oblast.[25] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that ROC MP priests watch Russian occupation officials torture Ukrainian Protestant Christian believers and force Ukrainian children to pray for the "Russkiy Mir" (Russian World) — a Kremlin-promoted geopolitical concept with amorphous parameters that broadly encompasses Russian language, culture, Orthodoxy, and media. ISW has previously reported on Russia's religious oppression in occupied Ukraine, including arbitrary detention and assassinations of Ukrainian clergy or religious leaders and the looting, desecration, and deliberate destruction of places of worship.[26] ISW has also reported at length on Russia's systematic repression of Ukrainian Orthodox communities and other religious minorities, particularly Ukrainian Protestants and Baptists who have faced Russian brutality and other repressions throughout southern Ukraine.[27]

Key Takeaways:

• US and Russian delegations met in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on March 24 following US–Ukrainian talks on March 23 about the details of temporary ceasefires on long-range strikes and in the Black Sea.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Demidovka along the international border in northwestern Belgorod Oblast amid ongoing Ukrainian attacks in the area.
• The Kremlin is recirculating existing narratives aimed at undermining support for Ukraine amid the negotiations in Riyadh and likely remains uninterested in conducting meaningful negotiations to end the war.
• Russia continues to persecute religious minorities, especially Evangelical Christian communities in occupied Kherson Oblast as part of a wider campaign in occupied Ukraine aimed at destroying independent Ukrainian national and religious identities.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Belgorod Oblast and near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian forces are reportedly failing to adequately provision first person view (FPV) drone units amid ongoing efforts to centralize Russian drone operations under the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continue to attack limited Ukrainian positions in Kursk Oblast on March 24 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in the fields east and southeast of Oleshnya (southwest of Sudzha) and northeast and south of Guyevo (south of Sudzha).[28]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are attacking Gogolevka (west of Sudzha) and near the Sudzha checkpoint along the international border southwest of Sudzha.[29] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions southwest of Sudzha in Oleshnya and south of Sudzha in Guyevo and Gornal.[30] Some Russian milbloggers denied limited Russian reports that Russian forces seized Guyevo and Gogolevka.[31]

Ukraine's State Border Guard Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated on March 24 that Russia has accumulated a "significant" number of personnel and equipment in Kursk Oblast.[32]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly continue to operate in Kursk Oblast.[33] Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating near Makhnovka (southeast of Sudzha).[34] Elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near the Sudzha checkpoint.[35]

Russian forces continued attacking into northern Sumy Oblast on March 24 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed Claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced into northern Volodymyrivka and Vodolahy (north of Sumy City), southeast of Zhuravka (northeast of Sumy City) and that elements of the 51st VDV Regiment are advancing northeast of Basivka (southeast of Zhuravka).[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently advanced in the field northeast and east of Oleksandriya (northeast of Sumy City).[37]

Demchenko stated that Russian forces are trying to advance near Zhuravka and Novenke (east of Zhuravka).[38] Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued along the Volodymyrivka-Vasylivka-Zhuravka line (north to northeast of Sumy City along the international border) and near Basivka.[39]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in northern Sumy Oblast.[40]

See topline text for reports of Ukrainian activity in Belgorod Oblast.

Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on March 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted ground attacks north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on March 23 and 24.[41]

Order of Battle: Reconnaissance and artillery units of the Chechen "Akhmat” Spetsnaz “Vakha” Battalion and Russian 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Udy (northwest of Kharkiv City near the international border).[42]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk) but that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the settlement.[43] Another Russian milblogger claimed on March 24 that Russian forces advanced in eastern and western Topoli (northeast of Kupyansk along the international border).[44]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Dvorichna and Topoli, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on March 23 and 24.[45]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces are attacking less frequently as compared to two to three weeks ago (early and mid-March 2024), likely due to manpower and equipment losses.[46] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are using fewer pieces of heavy equipment. The spokesperson for a Ukrainian regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on March 24 that Russian infantry continue attempts to cross the Oskil River but are suffering from heavy losses and cannot conduct evacuations.[47] The spokesperson stated that there are roughly 500 Russian servicemembers dispersed in positions along the west (right) bank of the Oskil River.

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) resumed attacks near Dvorichna.[48] Elements of the Russian 153rd Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps (AC), LMD) are reportedly operating near Ivanivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[49]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 24 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces advanced toward Raihorodka (east of Borova and east of Nadiya).[50]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Bohuslavka and east of Borova near Nadiya and in the direction of Stepove on March 23 and 24.[51]

The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Lyman direction stated on March 23 that Ukraine’s seizure of Nadiya (east of Borova) enables Ukrainian forces to maintain fire control over the Zherebets River, Raihorodka, and Dzherelne (north of Nadiya) and to complicate Russian mechanized assaults against Kopanky (west of Nadiya).[52] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on March 24 that Russian forces are attempting to bypass Nadiya and conduct assaults in small squads of five to six people.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 23 that Ukrainian forces have not seized Nadiya and that the frontline is one to 1.5 kilometers west of the settlement.[54]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st GTA, MMD) are operating near Zahryzove and that elements of the 4th Tank Division, with support from the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 1st GTA, MMD), are operating near Lozova and Andriivka (formerly Pervomaiske) (both northeast of Borova).[55]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on March 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka and toward Zelena Dolyna, Novomykhailivka, Nove, and Zarichne and southeast of Lyman near the Serebryanske forest area on March 23 and 24.[56]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated on March 24 that Russian forces maintain a 10-to-one manpower advantage over Ukrainian forces in parts of this direction and that Russian forces in the area are mostly well-trained soldiers who have signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[57] The brigade stated that Russian forces are mostly attacking in infantry groups.

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated on March 24 that elements of the Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are attacking near Makiivka (northeast of Lyman) and that elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are attacking near Ivanivka and Kolodyazi (both northeast of Lyman).[58]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Footage published on March 22 and geolocated on March 24 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the fields south of Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk).[59]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on March 23 and 24.[60]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on March 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, north of Chasiv Yar near Minkivka, northeast of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky on March 23 and 24.[61]

A Russian milblogger claimed on March 23 that Russian forces are attacking in Shevchenko Microraion in southern Chasiv Yar with armored vehicle support.[62]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 215th Reconnaissance Battalion and 331st VDV Regiment, reportedly continue to operate near Chasiv Yar.[63]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along Mykhaila Hrushevskoho Street in central Toretsk and in northern Nelipivka (south of Toretsk).[64]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Darhomyzhskoho and Donetska streets in northern Toretsk, along Budivelnykiv Street in southwestern Toretsk, and along Radianska Street in northern Oleksandropil (southwest of Toretsk).[65]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on March 24 that Russian forces regained lost positions near the Toretska Mine in northern Toretsk and advanced into Krymske (north of Toretsk).[66] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northwestern Zabalka Microraion in southern Toretsk.[67] Russian milbloggers claimed on March 24 that elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) advanced into southern Panteleymonivka (southwest of Toretsk) and Oleksandropil.[68]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Krymske, Dachne and Dyliivka; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Panteleymonivka and Oleksandropil on March 23 and 24.[69]

Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on March 24 that Russian forces are increasingly deploying fiber-optic capable drones in the Toretsk direction.[70] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Toretsk direction reported that Russian forces are using drones to drop explosives and incendiary devices onto Ukrainian positions in residential buildings and that Russian forces are relying increasingly on drones, particularly fiber-optic capable drones.[71] The deputy commander stated that Russian authorities dismissed the Russian commander of an unspecified division operating in the Toretsk direction as Russian forces have been unable to advance in the area and that Russian higher command is now controlling the force grouping in the area. Elements of the 150th and 20th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 8th CAA, SMD) are operating in the Toretsk direction.[72]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kleban Byk (northwest of Toretsk).[73] ISW has not previously observed elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade operating in the Toretsk direction, as the brigade has been recently operating in the Kurakhove direction.[74] Elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Regiment (possibly a reformed Soviet unit) are reportedly operating south of Toretsk.[75]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northeastern Vodyane Druhe (east of Pokrovsk) and southwest of Nadiivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[76]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southwestern Uspenivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[77]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[78] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the western outskirts of Solone (southwest of Pokrovsk).[79]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka and Vodyane Druhe; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Vidrodzhennya (formerly Novyi Trud) and Shevchenko; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Novooleksandrivka, Uspenivka, Novoandriivka, Kotlyarivka, Bohdanivka, and Novoserhiivka; and northwest of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka on March 23 and 24.[80] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Shevchenko, Pishchane (southwest of Pokrovsk), and Solone.[81]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are assembling in several settlements and are increasing their numbers of command staff, equipment, and infantry.[82] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are attacking in small assault groups and are using motorcycles to approach frontline areas.[83]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) reactivated in the Novopavlivka direction and are attacking in the Nadivka-Kotlyarivka direction and the Sribne-Troitske direction (all southwest of Pokrovsk).[84] Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating near Tarasivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[85] Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[86]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on March 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Oleksiivka, Andriivka, and Ulakly and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on March 23 and 24.[87]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 110th and 114th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA) are attacking near Andriivka and Kostyantynopil.[88]

Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Vilne Pole (west of Velyka Novosilka).[89]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Velyka Novosilka near Skudne and Vesele; west of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and Novosilka; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on March 23 and 24.[90] Mashovets stated that Russian forces have not seized Burlatske (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) or Pryvilne (southwest of Burlatkse).[91]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, EMD) are attacking near Burlatske, Dniproenerihya (north of Velyka Novosilka), Skudne, and Vesele.[92] Mashovets stated that elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet), 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD), and 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are operating near Velyka Novosilka. Elements of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske direction (east of Velyka Novosilka).[93] Drone operators of 77th Reconnaissance Battalion (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) and artillery of the 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Burlatske.[94]

Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on March 23.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1198th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD] or possibly a reformed Soviet-era unit) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Polohy direction.[95]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the western Zaporizhia direction on March 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Robotyne near Lobkove, Maly Shcherbaky, and Stepove on March 24.[96]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on March 24 that elements of the Russian 108th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are operating in the Pyatykhatky-Stepove area (northwest of Robotyne).[97]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on March 24.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 23 and 24. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 99 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Kari.[98] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 57 drones and that 36 drones were ”lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Kyiv, Kharkiv, Sumy, Kirovohrad, and Zaporizhia oblasts and conducted a missile strike against civilian infrastructure in Sumy City.[99]

Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Russian strike campaigns are designed to destroy infrastructure, strike military targets, and terrorize the local Ukrainian population.[100] Ihnat noted that Russian forces intentionally launch a large number of drones targeting densely populated cities knowing that drone debris will damage the cities regardless of how successful Ukrainian air defense is. Ihnat stated that Russian forces are regularly modifying Shahed drones with different explosives and guidance systems.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian forces are reportedly failing to adequately provision first person view (FPV) drone units amid ongoing efforts to centralize Russian drone operations under the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). A Russian milblogger claimed on March 23 that Russian FPV drone crews only receive an allotted 5-6 FPV drones per day from the Russian MoD and that these drones are often poor quality, leaving the crews with 2-3 usable drones.[101] The milblogger, who reportedly provides assistance to frontline Russian forces, claimed that drone crews ask for additional assistance and to exchange poor-quality drones with functional drones as well as parts to repair other drones. The milblogger complained that Russia is wasting federal funds on low-quality drones instead of producing high-quality drones. The milblogger suggested that the MoD could provide drone crews with 20-30 low quality drones so that drone crews can use their components to assemble roughly 10 functional drones. The milblogger also complained that the MoD sends soldiers to hidden FPV drone crew positions with new drones daily, which reveals their positions to Ukrainian forces.[102] The Russian MoD began efforts in August 2024 to centralize ad-hoc Russian drone units, and ISW previously assessed that these formalization efforts would likely degrade Russian drone effectiveness.[103]

Russia continues efforts to invest in long-term drone production and innovation. The Russian Government ordered on March 20 to allocate a grant of 1.28 billion rubles (about $15.2 million) to build a research and production center for civilian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in 2026, and will allocate a total of 21 billion rubles (about $250 million) to create a network of 16 drone research and production centers through 2028.[104]

Russia continues to establish regional veterans' programs as part of long-term efforts to militarize the Russian government and establish promotion pipelines to reward veterans for their continued loyalty to the Kremlin. Omsk Oblast Governor Vitaly Khotsenko announced on March 19 the creation of the regional "Time of Heroes" program, which provides job training for Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine, called the "Movement of Heroes."[105] Khotsenko stated that the "Movement of Heroes" program's first class will accept applications until April 7 and announce participants in July 2025. The Kremlin has appointed graduates of the federal "Time of Heroes" programs to high level positions in the Russian federal, regional, and local governments -- likely to militarize Russian society and prevent veterans from becoming a disenfranchised political cleavage that could pose a risk to the Kremlin’s regime security.[106]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russia continues efforts to increase control over Belarus through Union State integration efforts. Belarusian Security Council Secretary Lieutenant General Alexander Volfovich stated on March 23 that the Belarusian and Russian ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs) will create an institution of special representatives to monitor the implementation of the Union State security guarantees.[107]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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[1] https://suspilne dot media/977673-rozmova-dostatno-korisna-zelenskij-pro-peregovori-zi-ssa-u-saudivskij-aravii/

[2] https://www.facebook.com/rustemumerov.ua/posts/pfbid02eSGnryVWNUGC2WyHbjRYzktowBJsynVeXX3AfxyXVZEBWjNTQtoMa1c9HZKugxTl; https://x.com/rustem_umerov/status/1903908261016870980

[3] https://suspilne dot media/978013-ssa-ta-ukraina-provedut-se-odni-peregovori-pisla-zustrici-ssa-ta-rf/

[4] https://kyivindependent dot com/us-ukraine-talks-in-riyadh-concerned-ceasefire-on-strikes-against-port-infrastructure-official-says/

[5] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/23/world/europe/russia-ukraine-truce-talks.html

[6] https://suspilne dot media/977823-u-saudivskij-aravii-rozpocalis-peregovori-ssa-ta-rosii/

[7] https://english dot alarabiya.net/News/saudi-arabia/2025/03/24/russia-us-talks-in-saudi-arabia-to-start-at-0700-gmt-tass-reports

[8] https://t.me/tass_agency/307388

[9] https://t.me/romanov_92/46426; https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1904137857612063218; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8720 ; https://t.me/romanov_92/46424 https://x.com/moklasen/status/1904114252308263349; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8720

[10] https://t.me/rusich_army/21993 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/19246 ; https://t.me/rybar/69087; https://t.me/brussinf/9232 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/144734 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/22001 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88635 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67489; https://t.me/starshii_pogrannaryada/10758 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/21993; https://t.me/dva_majors/67500 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63049 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/22620 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63053 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/22624; https://t.me/notes_veterans/22625 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63055 ; https://t.me/romanov_92/46421; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1903879807072346498 ; https://t.me/Voenkor_PB/38888; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25861 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67509

[11] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-19-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-22-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2025 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88620

[12] https://t.me/rusich_army/22013 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63066 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22031 ; https://t.me/starshii_pogrannaryada/10761; https://t.me/starshii_pogrannaryada/10765 ; https://t.me/romanov_92/46428 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67540; https://t.me/starshii_pogrannaryada/10765 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67549 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33781 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67550

[13] https://t.me/rusich_army/21993 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/22907 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63066 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67509

[14] https://t.me/dva_majors/67550 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50513 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/22907 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67551

[15] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20-2025

[16] https://t.me/ukr_sof/1518 ; https://suspilne dot media/977731-sili-oboroni-znisili-4-gelikopteri-armii-rf-u-belgorodskij-oblasti/

[17] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25829 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33752 ; https://t.me/sashakots/52682 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1903905926916305382 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1904041960530137408 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/144768

[18] https://t.me/rybar/69087; https://t.me/brussinf/9232 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/22013 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88635 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67489; https://t.me/starshii_pogrannaryada/10758 ; https://t.me/starshii_pogrannaryada/10758; https://t.me/starshii_pogrannaryada/10759

[19] https://t.me/tass_agency/307306; https://tass dot ru/politika/23483163

[20] https://t.me/tass_agency/307304

[21] https://t.me/tass_agency/307331; https://t.me/tass_agency/307301; https://t.me/tass_agency/307302; https://t.me/tass_agency/307303

[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032125

[23] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/24/world/europe/trump-russia-putin-ukraine.html

[24] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/24/world/europe/trump-russia-putin-ukraine.html

[25] https://t.me/sprotyv_official/6516

[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2023 ;

[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2023

[28] https://t.me/yurasumy/22019 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159021 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33758

[29] https://t.me/rybar/69113 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67524; https://t.me/control_sigma/40196 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25840; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159021 ; https://t.me/sashakots/52684

[30] https://t.me/rybar/69113 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67524; https://t.me/control_sigma/40196 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33758

[31] https://t.me/dva_majors/67478; https://t.me/gefestwar/4651

[32] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/977995-rosijska-armia-prodovzue-sturmuvati-prikordonna-sumsini-dpsu/

[33] https://t.me/tass_agency/307270 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50495; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88681

[34] https://t.me/sashakots/52679

[35] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25842

[36] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33758 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33765 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25829 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25832 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63062 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159016 ; https://t.me/sashakots/52684; https://t.me/smotri_z/41500 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67509

[37] https://t.me/yurasumy/22019

[38] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/24/dyversanty-rozpovzayutsya-po-kordonu-grupy-fiksuyut-na-pivnochi-pivdni-ta-pivdennomu-shodi-sumshhyny/ ; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/977995-rosijska-armia-prodovzue-sturmuvati-prikordonna-sumsini-dpsu/

[39] https://t.me/rybar/69113 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25481 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63062

[40] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88637 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33725 ;

[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22316; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22286; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22282; https://t.me/rusich_army/22006

[42] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5589

[43] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33749 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33748 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33750; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33770

[44] https://t.me/dva_majors/67509

[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22316; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22316; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22282; https://t.me/dva_majors/67509; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33748; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33750; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33770;

[46] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/03/23/u-sylah-oborony-poyasnyly-chomu-rosiyany-menshe-atakuyut-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku/

[47] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/977923-vazlivi-ale-neveliki-operacii-bila-dvoricnoi-na-harkivsini-u-berezni-zvilnili-castinu-teritorii/

[48] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2642

[49] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33750; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33770

[50] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2642

[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22316; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22286; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22282; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6766

[52] https://www.pravda.com dot ua/news/2025/03/23/7504151

[53] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/978175-zvilnenna-nadii-v-tretij-sturmovij-rozpovili-pro-uspisnu-operaciu-na-lugansini/

[54] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/158956

[55] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2642

[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22316; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22286; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22282; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6766

[57] https://t.me/ombr66/1621

[58] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2642

[59] https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/1904200548976337263; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1904186660654358870 ; https://t.me/ombr_155/158

[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22286 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22282

[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22316 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22286 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22282 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6766 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25481 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67509

[62] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25822

[63] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25827

[64] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1903870445557788721; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1903842881380487496; https://www.instagram.com/stories/asp.kr/3587639972548097514/; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1903885134249460089; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1904190539093704928; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1904190787450974334; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1904190940895461508; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YKsDO53G_Ek https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1903886059974328363; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1903842881380487496; https://www.instagram.com/stories/asp.kr/3587642048401547725/

[65] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1903868902976663976 https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1903842881380487496; https://www.instagram.com/stories/asp.kr/3587639972548097514/; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1903928292148727941; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8722 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6778 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1903843165162914025; https://www.instagram.com/stories/asp.kr/3587649004453022251/; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1903948510296146263; https://www.instagram.com/stories/asp.kr/3587650955978949163/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ZD4mqViE74; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1903773596138209335; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/158962

[66] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25839 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159006

[67] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/158962

[68] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33775 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63063

[69] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6766 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22282 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22286 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22316 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67509 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33780 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22032

[70] https://suspilne dot media/977167-delegacii-ukraini-ta-ssa-zustrinutsa-v-saudivskij-aravii-udar-zsu-po-zastavi-v-rf-1124-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1742746244&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[71] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/24/komandyra-dyviziyi-vidstoronyly-vid-posady-na-toreczkomu-napryamku-zhorstki-boyi-v-urbanizovanyj-misczevosti/

[72] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-15-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2025

[73] https://t.me/voin_dv/14051 ; https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/20956

[74] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2025

[75] https://t.me/dva_majors/67508

[76] https:// t.me/gimbatov34/4349; https://x.com/Richer214469/status/1903882369393979819

[77] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8717; https://t.me/kvbarmy/391

[78] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33742

[79] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33742

[80] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22316; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22286 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22282; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6766; https://t.me/wargonzo/25481

[81] https://t.me/dva_majors/67509

[82] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/977819-ce-dovoli-serjozno-vijska-rf-skupcuutsa-na-kilkoh-dilankah-bila-pokrovska/

[83] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/03/24/dvijka-mala-uspih-zapuskajte-shhe-poblyzu-pokrovska-rosijski-komandyry-duryat-svoyih-shturmovykiv/

[84] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2643

[85] https://t.me/dva_majors/67522

[86] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159028

[87] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22316; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22286 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22282; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6766

[88] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2643

[89] https:// t.me/creamy_caprice/8724 ; https:// t.me/ombr_31/371

[90] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22316; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22286 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22282;

[91] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2643

[92] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2643

[93] https://t.me/voin_dv/14054

[94] https://t.me/voin_dv/14056

[95] https://t.me/voin_dv/14047

[96] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22316 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/307249 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25481 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67509

[97] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2644

[98] https://t.me/kpszsu/31346

[99] https://t.me/kpszsu/31346; https://t.me/synegubov/13527; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/978245-vibuh-u-sumah-vden-24-berezna-so-vidomo/; https://t.me/kobzarartemsn/4448; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/34525; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/03/24/rossiyskie-voennye-nanesli-udar-po-tsentru-sum-bolee-20-chelovek-raneny; https://suspilne dot media/977689-pidsumki-zustrici-delegacij-ukraini-ta-ssa-u-trampa-prositimut-rf-povernuti-vikradenih-ditej-1125-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1742820930&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/17593 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/17587 ; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/977705-armia-rf-vcergove-atakuvala-zaporizza-vinikla-pozeza/

[100] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/24/zlyva-z-vorozhyh-droniv-u-povitryanyh-sylah-poyasnyly-pryhovanu-metu-nalotiv-shahediv/

[101] https://t.me/notes_veterans/22621 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/22622; https://t.me/notes_veterans/22623

[102] https://t.me/notes_veterans/22623

[103] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-efforts-centralize-drone-units-may-degrade-russian-drone-operations

[104] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7602556; https://www.idelreal dot org/a/udmurtiya-poluchit-1-3-mlrd-rubley-na-razvitie-tsentra-bpla-v-2026-godu-/33357309.html

[105] https://rg dot ru/2025/03/19/reg-sibfo/vremia-novyh-vozmozhnostej.html

[106] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-7-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-7-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-18-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2025

[107] https://belta dot by/society/view/institut-spetspredstavitelej-kto-budet-kontrolirovat-dogovor-o-garantijah-bezopasnosti-v-sg-704421-2025/ ; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/301560

Iran Update March 24, 2025

 Katherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Annika Ganzeveld, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, Siddhant Kishore,
Andie Parry, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff 2:00pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Iranian officials are open to indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States but reportedly remain unwilling to make any concessions on Iran’s missile program or its role in leading the Axis of Resistance. US President Donald Trump sent a letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on March 5 that proposed negotiations on Iran's nuclear program. [1] Top Trump Administration Envoy Steve Witkoff said that the proposal sought to put in place verification mechanisms and prevent weaponization of Iran’s nuclear material.[2] Witkoff added that Iran did express interest in the proposal by reaching back out via multiple intermediaries, and Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi said on March 24 that Iran is open to indirect talks ”through various channels,” though it rejects direct negotiations.[3]

Other Iranian sources added that the Trump letter also included demands that Iran curtail its missile program and its role in supporting its proxies and partners in the Axis of Resistance, which Iranian sources called “unacceptable” or unrealistic.[4] An Iranian expert close to the regime and an Iranian media outlet close to a former Iranian Supreme National Security Council secretary both said that Iran would not negotiate over its missile program.[5] The Iranian expert also added that Iranian officials could not negotiate over its role in the Axis of Resistance because its proxy and partner militias “are not proxies.”[6] This is a continuation of a long-running Iranian information operation that seeks to obfuscate Tehran’s role as the leader of the Axis of Resistance. These positions echo previous statements from senior Iranian leaders including Khamenei rejecting any measures to "set new expectations" for Iran's missile range.[7]

Iran is unlikely to agree to curtail its missile program or the Axis of Resistance because to do so would cause it to lose the primary means with which it seeks to achieve its strategic objectives. Iran seeks to expel the United States from the region to exert itself as the regional hegemon and shape the region in its image. Its missile program forms one part of this effort. Iran uses its ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones to coerce its adversaries and provide new capabilities to its allies. Expelling the United States and emerging as a regional hegemon also requires like-minded partners and proxies that can actualize Iran’s vision in regional countries, including Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. An Iranian decision to curtail its proxy and partner network would be akin to an Iranian surrender and would require top Iranian leaders to give up on key ideological positions they have held for their entire adult lives.

The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 27 airstrikes targeting Houthi military infrastructure and leadership in several locations across Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen since March 21.[8] CENTCOM reportedly targeted a Houthi military base and ammunition depots in al Jawf Governorate in northern Yemen on March 22 and a Houthi storage facility in western Sanaa suburbs on March 23.[9] CENTCOM also struck Houthi ports and an airport in Hudaydah on March 22, reportedly injuring Houthi naval operations chief Mansour al Saadi, also known as Abu Sajjad.[10] US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz told CBS on March 23 that CENTCOM eliminated the Houthis’ missile unit chief.[11] Local media also reported that US airstrikes killed three Houthi commanders in Majzar, Maarib Governorate, on March 22.[12] The Houthis launched a retaliatory drone attack and a separate combined missile and drone attack targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier on March 21 and 23, respectively.[13]

The Houthis modified their military communication encryption codes and enhanced personal security measures for Houthi leadership in response to CENTCOM airstrikes targeting Houthi officials, according to a March 22 report in Yemeni media.[14] The Houthis have also reportedly increased security around military sites and imposed further censorship restrictions on the Yemeni population in Houthi-controlled territory, to prevent leaks showing Houthi military activities, sites, and leaders. Waltz also confirmed that CENTCOM will continue to target Houthi military infrastructure, weapons production sites, and communication lines, alongside Houthi leadership, to deter and weaken the Houthis’ capabilities to conduct attacks on Israel and international shipping.[15] Regional sources reported that CENTCOM struck the Houthis’ Communications Ministry and Postal Authority in the capital city Sanaa on March 19.[16]

Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi falsely claimed on March 22 that the United States ordered the USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group to sail to the Red Sea because the USS Harry S. Truman carrier strike group failed to confront the Houthis.[17] US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth ordered the Vinson to deploy to the Red Sea and extended Truman’s deployment by one month to maintain a continuous carrier presence in the region.[18]

The Houthis separately launched two ballistic missiles targeting Ben Gurion Airport in central Israel on March 21 and 23, respectively.[19] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted both Houthi missiles before they entered Israeli airspace.[20] An Israeli war correspondent, citing an anonymous defense source, reported that the Houthis also launched a missile on March 22. The March 22 missile fell short of Israel and landed in an unidentified location in Saudi Arabia.[21]

The Houthis may calculate that they can compel Saudi Arabia and the UAE to pressure the United States to stop its air campaign by conducting attacks targeting Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Houthi-controlled Yemeni Central Bank in Sanaa accused Saudi Arabia and the UAE of breaching the Yemeni ceasefire by pressuring Sanaa-based banks to relocate to Aden, which is outside of Houthi control after the United States designated the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization in January.[22] The Central Bank added that this move will impact the Houthis’ economy. The Houthis previously threatened to attack Saudi Arabia and the UAE after the Yemeni government attempted to remove the Houthi-controlled wing of the Yemeni Central Bank in Sanaa from the SWIFT system in July 2024.[23] The Saudis and Emiratis promptly and successfully pressured the Yemeni government to cease its plan to remove the Houthi-controlled Yemeni Central Bank from SWIFT.

The Houthis evacuated their headquarters in Baghdad and are considering closing their other two offices in Iraq after Iran warned the United States may strike Houthi targets, according to a Saudi news report on March 22.[24] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani reportedly warned Iraqi militia leaders that US airstrikes against Houthi facilities could ”quickly backfire on Baghdad.” Ghaani called for ”avoiding any military activity during this sensitive period.”

Iran and the Iraqi federal government continue to pressure Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to “avoid all provocations” with Israel or US forces in Iraq and Syria in response to US airstrikes targeting the Houthis and Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip.[25] An unspecified source told Saudi media on March 21 that Ghaani, during his visit to Baghdad on March 19, told Iranian-backed militia and Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) leaders to avoid provoking the United States or Israel.[26] Iraqi Foreign Minister Faud Hussein separately acknowledged in a recent interview that the federal government’s failure to reach an agreement with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, purportedly to avoid striking Israel or US forces in Iraq and Syria, could lead to US or Israeli attacks in Iraq.[27] A Shia Coordination Framework-affiliated politician told Iraqi media on March 19 that the militias may resume unspecified activities due to regional developments, likely in reference to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip and US airstrikes targeting the Houthis.[28] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, including some parties with Iranian-backed armed wings. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have recently taken precautions to avoid Israeli strikes in Iraq, including via the transfer of weapons and personnel from militia positions to new positions throughout Iraq and at night.[29]

The draft PMF law currently in discussion in the Iraqi Parliament does not address the threat that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias pose to the United States and its partners in the Middle East. The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[30] The Iraqi parliament first read through the draft law, titled the “Popular Mobilization Authority Law,” in a session on March 24 and Parliament will reportedly vote on the law on April 1.[31] Iranian-backed Iraqi parliamentarians have debated the Popular Mobilization Authority Law’s components for weeks.[32] Iraqi media reported on March 12 that the Iraqi federal government sought to replace the PMF Service and Retirement Law, which has been debated in parliament several times in recent months, with a rewritten law--presumably the new Popular Mobilization Authority Law--that would integrate the PMF into the Iraqi armed forces.[33] This effort to restructure the PMF occurred as the United States pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve and disarm the PMF and has reportedly threatened to sanction PMF leaders.[34]

Kurdish media reported on March 24 that the draft Popular Mobilization Authority law will replace the 2016 PMF Commission Law that formalized the PMF as an independent entity reporting directly to the Iraqi prime minister.[35] The current form of the PMF law clarifies the PMF’s structure and administrative functions, including the Popular Mobilization Commission Chairman’s authorities and the number of departments and directorates associated with the PMF.[36] The Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC) is formally responsible for ensuring that the militias in the PMF answer to the Iraqi federal government.[37] The draft law adds that the PMF will have a military academy like other Iraqi security institutions.[38] The draft law also prohibits PMF members from associating with any political parties, as did the 2016 version.[39]

The draft law in its current form will not seriously impede Iran’s efforts to capture the Iraqi security sector because most commanders of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias within the PMF do not officially lead individual militia formations in the PMF, nor do they officially hold public office as a member or leader of their political parties. Most Iraqi political leaders instead control their parties from outside government, unlike in most parliamentary systems. This means that Iranian-backed Iraqi figures like Qais al Khazali or Hadi al Ameri—leaders of Asaib Ahl al Haq and the Badr Organization respectively—could easily continue to control both their military organizations and their political organizations without technically violating this law. The law also does not make any changes that would impede Iran’s ability to command and control the PMF, which does not listen to its official commander-in-chief, the Iraqi prime minister. Many elements of the PMF instead take their orders from Iran or Iranian-backed commanders.

Tensions between Iranian Kurds and Azeris in northwestern Iran have flared up in recent days. Shia Azeris held a ceremony in Urumiyeh, West Azerbaijan Province, on March 22 to mourn the death of Ali bin Abi Talib, the first Shia Imam.[40] The ceremony devolved into protests against Kurdish residents in Urumiyeh for holding Nowruz celebrations and displaying Kurdish symbols during these celebrations.[41] Some demonstrators chanted slogans such as “Urumiyeh is Turkic and will remain Turkic.”[42] An Iranian professor told Iranian media on March 23 that Azerbaijan and Turkey seek to “create divergences between different Iranian groups” and “create chaos” in Iran, likely in response to the recent demonstrations in Urumiyeh.[43] This statement reflects a broader, long-standing belief among Iranian officials that Azerbaijan and Turkey seek to promote Azeri separatism in northwestern Iran.[44] The incident in Urumiyeh comes amid heightened tensions between Iran and Turkey over Turkish support for the fall of the Assad regime and growing Turkish influence in Syria.[45] Iranian police arrested 22 demonstrators in Urumiyeh for “promoting hatred and ethnic sedition.”[46] The Iranian culture and Islamic guidance minister warned on March 23 that “ethnic and religious faults in Iran should not be provoked [because] they can quickly turn into a melting and destructive flame.”[47]

The Iranian regime has intensified hijab enforcement through mass policing, surveillance technology, and state-backed vigilantism, aiming to control public behavior and suppress dissent. The United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran presented new evidence on March 14 that demonstrates ongoing and systematic human rights violations by the Iranian regime in response to the protests that sparked in September 2022.[48] The report states that women are increasingly summoned to court for alleged non-compliance with mandatory Hijab laws. Penalties include fines, flogging, and bank account closure and are often based on photos or reports submitted by police or loyalist groups. The report states that Iranian authorities also rely heavily on advanced surveillance tools to monitor hijab violations. These include facial recognition systems, aerial drones, and mobile apps such as Nazer, which allows approved users to report women not wearing the hijab—even in private vehicles or ambulances. These developments reflect the Iranian regime’s broader effort to tighten control over the population by expanding surveillance and leveraging informal enforcement networks.

Iranian authorities arrested dozens of Iranians across at least three provinces to suppress public gatherings and anti-regime expressions. A large crowd gathered at Iranian poet Ferdowsi’s tomb near Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi on March 20 and chanted anti-regime slogans.[49] The governor of Mashhad confirmed that 15 individuals were arrested for what he described as “subversive slogans,” and stated they would face legal consequences.[50] Citizens in Fars Province gathered at Hafezieh in Shiraz on March 20, where many women appeared without the mandatory hijab, some participants danced in celebration and chanted pro-monarchy slogans.[51] Kurdistan Province Chief Prosecutor separately reported the arrest of seven individuals on March 23, accusing them of organizing anti-state activities under the guise of Nowruz events in the province.[52] The Prosecutor claimed that the suspects had “organizational ties” and aimed to spread propaganda and insult religious sentiments. Independent human rights group Hengaw confirmed three of the arrests but noted the exact charges remain unclear.[53] The arrests during Nowruz celebrations highlight the regime’s deepening fear of public gatherings that could evolve into anti-regime protests.

Likely Hezbollah fighters launched six rockets at Metula, northern Israel, on March 21.[54] This marked the first rocket attack from Lebanon into Israel since early December 2024.[55] The IDF intercepted three rockets, and the other three landed in Lebanese territory.[56] The IDF conducted counterbattery fire against the rocket launch site and later conducted two waves of airstrikes targeting Hezbollah weapons depots, headquarters, fighters, and rocket launchers across Lebanon on March 22 and 23.[57] The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) destroyed three rudimentary rocket launchers that consisted of simple wood and metal launch rails in two towns in Nabatieh District, southern Lebanon, on March 22.[58]

Hezbollah denied ”any connection” to the rocket attack on March 21.[59] Hezbollah previously claimed nearly all of its rocket attacks targeting Israel before the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement. Hezbollah has not claimed attacks in the past that go against its overall objectives, however. This could suggest that Hezbollah either did not conduct the attack or that central leadership did not approve the attack and it feels that the attack is not in Hezbollah’s own interest right now. Hezbollah released a statement on March 18 condemning the renewed Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip. Hezbollah has not said that it would resume attacks against Israel.[60]

The Alawite insurgency in Syria appears to be adopting new tactics that were originally outlined by the head of the pro-Assad Coastal Shield Brigade.[61] Likely anti-government insurgents killed a Hayat Tahrir al Sham commander and two other pro-government fighters in separate areas of Idlib province on March 22 and March 24 respectively.[62] These attacks come after Coastal Shield Brigade commander Miqdad Fatiha stated on March 12 that the insurgency would begin to target interim government forces with improvised explosive devices and assassinations as part of the insurgency’s second phase.[63] Insurgent leaders can use public statements as a way to signal intent to their followers.[64] These attacks, combined with the discovery of two rudimentary IEDs on the Jableh-Latakia road on March 19 suggest that the insurgency may be adopting new tactics that are consistent with Fatiha’s second phase of operations.[65]

Syrian interim government forces conducted search operations on March 23 and 24 in towns with known insurgent presence. Interim government forces launched a search operation in Khan Sheikhoun, Idlib Province, on March 23 targeting former regime members who failed to register with the interim government and arrested individuals who refused to disarm.[66] It is unclear if government forces cordoned off the area before conducting its search. Former Assad regime members previously ambushed interim government forces on February 19 along the Maarat al Numan-Khan Sheikhoun road.[67] Government forces also arrested approximately 15 individuals in Jisr al Shughur, Idlib Province, on March 24 charged with collaboration under the former Assad regime.[68] Pro-Assad insurgents killed approximately 25 individuals, primarily interim government forces, in Jisr al Shughur in the coordinated attack in early March.[69]

Thirty-four diverse Syrian parties and organizations formed an alliance to unify political efforts to demand a new Syrian constitution and promote a decentralized and democratic Syrian state.[70] The “Syrian Equal Citizenship Alliance,” or “Tamasuk,” identified itself as an alliance that transcends ”ethnic, sectarian, tribal, and even political and ideological” affiliations that seek to encourage a "civil, democratic, and pluralistic state” during its first press conference in Damascus on March 22.[71] The Tamasuk alliance comprises at least 34 political and civil groups, including the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) and other Kurdish, Christian, and Druze-affiliated groups.[72] The SDC is the SDF’s political wing. A leader from the leftist ”People's Will Party” said that Tamasuk does not see itself as an “opposition” group but a group that is willing to engage ”all forces,” including the Shara government, in dialogue.[73] The alliances’ founding statement confirmed that it seeks to work towards a ”unified Syria” under a single state and single army and called for a “just, democratic solution to the Kurdish issue.”[74] The coalition, while relatively small, is the first organized political alliance in Syria outside of the government itself since the fall of the regime.

The formation of the alliance, which brings together diverse groups from various Syrian communities and ideologies, demonstrates the degree to which many in Syria are frustrated with the direction of the Shara government. Many of these parties and groups have previously criticized the Shara government for its exclusionary organization of the National Dialogue Conference.[75] Many groups, like the SDC, have rejected Shara’s constitution for granting the executive branch “absolute powers.”[76] Tamasuk called for the writing of a new constitution that better defines the dispersion of decentralized powers in order to allow the people to exercise direct authority within their regions while centralizing affairs like foreign affairs, defense, and the economy under the central government.[77] The Shara government has so far ignored local calls from Syria’s various communities demanding decentralized powers.[78]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Iranian officials are open to indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States but reportedly remain unwilling to make any concessions on Iran’s missile program or its role in leading the Axis of Resistance. Other Iranian sources added that the Trump letter also included demands that Iran curtail its missile program and its role in supporting its proxies and partners in the Axis of Resistance, which Iranian sources called “unacceptable” or unrealistic. Iran is unlikely to agree to curtail its missile program or the Axis of Resistance because to do so would cause it to lose the primary means with which it seeks to achieve its strategic objectives.
• US Air Campaign against the Houthis: The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 27 airstrikes targeting Houthi military infrastructure and leadership in several locations across Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen since March 21.
• Houthi-Gulf Relations: The Houthis may calculate that they can compel Saudi Arabia and the UAE to pressure the United States to stop its air campaign by conducting attacks targeting Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Houthi-controlled Yemeni Central Bank in Sanaa accused Saudi Arabia and the UAE of breaching the Yemeni ceasefire by pressuring Sanaa-based banks to relocate to Aden, which is outside of Houthi control after the United States designated the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization in January.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi Militias: The draft PMF law currently in discussion in the Iraqi Parliament does not address the threat that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias pose to the United States and its partners in the Middle East. The draft law in its current form will not seriously impede Iran’s efforts to capture the Iraqi security sector because most commanders of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias within the PMF do not officially lead individual militia formations in the PMF, nor do they officially hold public office as a member or leader of their political parties.
• Ethnic Tension in Iran: Tensions between Iranian Kurds and Azeris in northwestern Iran have flared up in recent days. Shia Azeris held a ceremony in Urumiyeh, West Azerbaijan Province, on March 22 to mourn the death of Ali bin Abi Talib, the first Shia Imam. The ceremony devolved into protests against Kurdish residents in Urumiyeh for holding Nowruz celebrations and displaying Kurdish symbols during these celebrations.
• Iranian Social Control: The Iranian regime has intensified hijab enforcement through mass policing, surveillance technology, and state-backed vigilantism, aiming to control public behavior and suppress dissent. Iran is using mobile applications, drones, and other tactics and technologies as part of this effort.
• Protests in Iran: Iranian authorities arrested dozens of Iranians across at least three provinces to suppress public gatherings and anti-regime expressions.
• Lebanon-Israel Ceasefire: Likely Hezbollah fighters launched six rockets at Metula, northern Israel, on March 21. Hezbollah denied ”any connection” to the rocket attack on March 21.[79] Hezbollah previously claimed nearly all of its rocket attacks targeting Israel before the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement. Hezbollah has not claimed attacks in the past that go against its overall objectives, however. This could suggest that Hezbollah either did not conduct the attack or that central leadership did not approve the attack and it feels that the attack is not in Hezbollah’s own interest right now.
• Alawite Insurgency in Syria: The Alawite insurgency in Syria appears to be adopting new tactics that were originally outlined by the head of the pro-Assad Coastal Shield Brigade. Syrian interim government forces conducted search operations on March 23 and 24 in towns with known insurgent presence.
• Syrian Politics: Thirty-four diverse Syrian parties and organizations formed an alliance to unify political efforts to demand a new Syrian constitution and promote a decentralized and democratic Syrian state. The formation of the alliance, which brings together diverse groups from various Syrian communities and ideologies, demonstrates the degree to which many in Syria are frustrated with the direction of the Shara government.

Syria

The Suwayda Military Council (SMC) and other unsupported independent military bodies will almost certainly struggle with recruitment and retention. The SMC is a group of Druze fighters who were previously aligned with the Assad regime.[80] Members of the SMC attacked the home of Military Council leader Colonel Tariq al Shoufi in Suwayda Province due to delayed salary payments on March 21.[81] Shoufi claimed that he had not agreed to pay salaries and said that the SMC has not fully formalized into a structure that would require him to compensate its members.[82] This suggests that the SMC has no foreign backers and lacks a revenue stream inside Syria that would enable it to sustain itself. The interim government later began recruiting local Suwaydawi police and security personnel and paid employees four times the standard salary that existed under the Assad regime.[83] The interim government reached an initial agreement on March 6 with prominent Suwayda-based Druze militias, including the Men of Dignity Movement, Mudafa al Karama, and Ahrar Jabal al-Arab Gathering to establish locally-led provincial security forces under interim Syrian government control.[84] Unsupported independent militias will similarly struggle with recruitment and retention unless they receive external support or find ways to generate their revenue streams.

The Syrian interim government will reportedly establish committees to assume control of the oil fields in SDF-held territories of northeastern Syria.[85] The Syrian interim oil ministry announced on March 23 that these committees will survey the fields and assess their production capacity.[86] The interim government will reportedly allow the SDF to retain one-third of the total oil production.[87] SDF commander Mazloum Abdi agreed in January to transfer the oil resources from SDF-controlled areas to the interim government, provided it allocates the income fairly across Syria.[88] The interim government will also export a portion of the oil to foreign countries to generate income.[89] The interim government-SDF ceasefire agreement stipulates that the SDF must relinquish control of all border crossings, airports, and oil and gas fields in its territories.[90]

The Syrian Defense Ministry appointed the US-sanctioned commander of the Turkish-backed Hamza Division to lead the new Syrian army’s 76th Division.[91] Saif al Din Boulad, also known as ”Saif Abu Bakr,” commands the Hamza Division, a Turkish-backed faction that operates under the Syrian National Army (SNA). The United States sanctioned Abu Bakr in 2023 for committing serious human rights abuses against Kurds in Afrin, northern Syria.[92] The Hamza Division has been active near Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak bridgeheads in operations targeting the SDF.[93] The Defense Ministry has not acknowledged Abu Bakr’s appointment, but Suleiman Shah Brigades commander Abu Amsha congratulated Abu Bakr on his appointment on social media on March 23.[94] The Syrian Defense Ministry has not acknowledged any prior division-level appointments. The Defense Ministry also promoted Abu Bakr to the rank of brigadier general.[95] The 76th Division will reportedly operate in Aleppo Province, according to Syrian media.[96]

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) and Turkey resumed attacks on US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) positions in northeastern Syria after a four-day pause on March 22.[97] SNA forces clashed with SDF fighters along the Tishreen Dam frontlines in Aleppo Province, resulting in the deaths of six SNA fighters on March 22.[98] The SNA also launched mortar and artillery strikes on SDF positions near the dam.[99] The SDF repelled an SNA attack on March 23 along the Tishreen Dam frontlines and killed three SNA fighters.[100] A Turkish drone strike killed one SDF fighter near the dam on March 22.[101] SNA and Turkey also shelled two villages near Qara Qozak Bridge with mortar and artillery fire on March 23 and 24 that damaged civilian infrastructure.[102]

An SDF first-person view (FPV) drone struck an SNA vehicle in an unspecified location in SNA-held territory of northeastern Syria on March 22.[103] SDF claimed that the drone strike was in response to a Turkish drone strike that killed an SDF fighter near Tishreen Dam on March 22.

The SDF reported on March 24 that its Martyr Haroun drone units intercepted six Turkish and SNA drones that attempted to attack SDF positions in an unspecified location.[104]

Israeli airstrikes struck approximately 20 aircraft hangars at Palmyra and Tiyas air bases, eastern Homs Province, on March 21. The IDF stated that it struck “strategic military capabilities” in the bases.[105] Satellite imagery from the aftermath of the strike indicates that the strikes hit approximately 20 aircraft hangars at both bases.[106] The strike destroyed at least one Russian-built Syrian Su-24 fighter jet at Tiyas airbase.[107] The airstrikes also hit an ammunition warehouse near Palmyra airbase and reportedly injured four Syrian army soldiers.[108] The IDF previously struck Syrian military positions in Homs Province on March 18.[109] Homs Province is outside the IDF-declared “demilitarized” zone in southern Syria.[110]

Iraq

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and society
• Harden the Iraqi government against internal dissent

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
• Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
• Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

See topline section.

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip
• Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern Lebanon
• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Newly appointed Lebanese Finance Minister Yassine Jaber told the New York Times on March 24 that Hezbollah “cannot” finance reconstruction efforts in southern Lebanon, likely because Hezbollah is prioritizing rebuilding its military forces over reconstruction efforts after the October 7 war.[111] The New York Times noted that Hezbollah has not yet fulfilled all its financial assistance promises to families in southern Lebanon as promised by Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem. Economic problems in Iran and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria have almost certainly disrupted Iranian financial and materiel support to Hezbollah.

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

See topline section.

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

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[1] https://www.axios.com/2025/03/07/trump-iran-nuclear-deal-letter

[2] https://x.com/TuckerCarlson/status/1903207340696014945?t=5179

[3] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/04/3280493/

[4] https://t dot co/m8UiJkokUW ; https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/status/1903173404624367902 ; https://nournews dot ir/en/news/217575/Decoding-the-White-House's-Message-to-Iran-A-Real-Change-or-Diplomatic-Deceit ; https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/28066 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-17-2025#_edn129f2f44aa71bd2039dc27abf151f11317

[5] https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/status/1903173404624367902 ; https://nournews dot ir/en/news/217575/Decoding-the-White-House's-Message-to-Iran-A-Real-Change-or-Diplomatic-Deceit

[6] https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/status/1903173404624367902

[7] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/28066

[8] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1903847270207893757; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1903149761160474855; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1903546272377610456;  https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1903554064664695263; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1903554064664695263; https://x.com/AlArabiya/status/1903602338327351712; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1903575004517671166; https://x.com/Alhadath_Brk/status/1903557371282280799; https://x.com/Almasirahbrk/status/1903563096108454142; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1903575004517671166; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1903535388586545409; https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/1903587476825845912; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1903563790559621491; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1903575004517671166; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1903620632304079310; https://x.com/YemeniFatima/status/1903635555989983387; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1903625483972980779; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1903620632304079310; https://x.com/YemeniFatima/status/1903635555989983387; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1903625483972980779; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1903826876910506052; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1903892983994339563; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1903901387525656580; https://x.com/YemeniFatima/status/1903924170905268566; https://apnews.com/article/yemen-houthis-us-airstrikes-israel-hamas-war-911e99729c71e3c59420f8b511afa2e9; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1903922466742747248; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1903922466742747248;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1903567258414190616;

https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1903887714082025474;    

 

[9] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1903554064664695263; https://x.com/AlArabiya/status/190360233832735171; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1903892983994339563;

[10]

https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1903575004517671166;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1903535388586545409; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1903563790559621491; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1903575004517671166;https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1903878147709227465

[11] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/mike-waltz-national-security-adviser-face-the-nation-03-23-2025/

[12] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1903546272377610456; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1903554064664695263; https://www dot 4may dot net/news/141124

[13] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1903214957019210198;

https://x.com/army21ye/status/1903785025960575467

[14] defenseliney dot com/posts/230

[15] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/mike-waltz-national-security-adviser-face-the-nation-03-23-2025/

[16] https://x.com/AlArabiya_Brk/status/1902404444316434917

[17] https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1903525672875626626

[18] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-21-2025; https://apnews.com/article/pentagon-warships-middle-east-carrier-increase-0801c2c12cac065eefa06bd73667fd69

 

[19] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1903214957019210198; https://x.com/army21ye/status/1903785025960575467

[20] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1903184258069565741;

https://x.com/idfonline/status/1904233792044437771

[21] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1903476907045278150

[22] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1903174027113533946 ; https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/01/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-re-designates-the-houthis-as-a-foreign-terrorist-organization/

 

[23] https://al-ain dot com/article/withdrawing-swift-yemeni-central-bank-al-houthi; https://www.bbc.com/news/business-60521822; https://www.newarab dot com/news/houthis-threaten-riyadh-aerial-footage-key-airports

[24] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5124533-رسالة-قاآني-تجلي-جماعة-الحوثي-من-بغداد

[25] tps://aawsat dot com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/5124373-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A2%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D8%B0%D9%91%D9%8E%D8%B1-%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86

[26] https://aawsat dot com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/5124373-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A2%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D8%B0%D9%91%D9%8E%D8%B1-%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86

[27] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/831319/%D9%81%D8%A4%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%A7-%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%A1%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A3%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B6-%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A3-%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AA ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4MaW9AI2yQU

[28] https://almadapaper dot net/398982/

[29] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5-%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84-%D9%84%D9%85%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%8A-%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA

[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces

[31] https://iq.parliament dot iq/blog/%d8%ac%d8%af%d9%88%d9%84-%d8%a7%d8%b9%d9%85%d8%a7%d9%84-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ac%d9%84%d8%b3%d8%a9-%d8%b1%d9%82%d9%85-%d9%a5-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a7%d8%ab%d9%86%d9%8a%d9%86-%d9%a2%d9%a4-%d8%a7%d8%b0%d8%a7/; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D8%B7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86%D9%87-%D8%B1%D9%87%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AA

[32] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate031225 ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate021925

[33] https://almadapaper dot net/398498/

[34] https://almadapaper dot net/389291/ ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B0%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-10-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B6%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA

[35] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/240320252 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces

[36] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/240320252

[37] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces

[38] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/240320252

[39] et/arabic/middleeast/iraq/240320252 ; https://www.aljazeera dot net/encyclopedia/2016/11/27/%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B1%D9%81-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A6%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A

 

[40] https://amwaj.media/en/media-monitor/deep-dive-tension-between-azeris-kurds-escalates-in-northwestern-iran

[41] https://farsi.alarabiya dot net/iran/2025/03/24/%D9%87%D8%B4%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%AE%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%87 ;

https://www.rudaw dot net/english/middleeast/iran/230320251

[42] https://www.aa dot com.tr/fa/%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86/%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%B9-%DA%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%85-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%AA%D9%8F%D8%B1%DA%A9-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%88-%D8%AA%D9%8F%D8%B1%DA%A9-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF/3517205

[43] https://x.com/Entekhab_News/status/1903807786384834946

[44] https://www.mashreghnews dot ir/news/1008311 ;

http://irdiplomacy dot ir/fa/news/2031839 ;

https://basirat dot ir/fa/news/370553

[45] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-11-2025

[46] https://www.iribnews dot ir/fa/news/4484099

[47] https://x.com/S_A_Salehi/status/1903877648146747511

 

[48] https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/ffm-iran/index ;

https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session58/advance-version/a-hrc-58-63-AV.pdf

[49] https://iranwire.com/fa/news-1/139916

[50] https://www.sharghdaily dot com/بخش-جامعه-220/986928-نفر-از-شعاردهندگان-به-مراکز-قضایی-معرفی-شدند

[51] https://x.com/IsraelPersian/status/1770342229770444998 ;

https://x.com/ManotoNews/status/1902752973358338411 ;

https://x.com/IranIntl/status/1771768062032724126

[52] https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/2041124

[53] https://hengaw.net/en/news/2025/03/article-97

[54] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/at-least-5-rockets-fired-from-lebanon-at-metula-idf-responds-with-artillery-fire/

[55] https://t.me/mmirleb/9639

[56] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1903422352227983461

[57] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1903422352227983461 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1903408723042677240 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1903515870665544178

[58] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1903387510874542401

[59] https://t.me/mmirleb/9713

[60] https://t.me/mmirleb/9708 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1904218617224306821 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1904233792044437771

[61] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1903463180153569595 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1904212908004844020 ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1323265752211807

[62] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1904212908004844020 ; https://t.me/mzmgr_syria/26965 ; tps://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1903463180153569595 ; https://t.me/nahermedia/45958 ;

[63] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1323265752211807

[64] https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3058&context=parameters#:~:text=In%20the%20broadest%20sense%2C%20the%20extensive%20use%20of%20or%20reliance,on%20swarming%20tactics%20and%20operations. ; https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3828857.

[65] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1902308461292958156

[66] https://t.me/Idlib_Gov/16451 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1903892533228244994

[67] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1892148685187829774

[68] https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/53561 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1904118391192891576 ; https://t.me/Idlib_Gov/16472

[69] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1898107147709284754

[70] https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61574403485441

[71] https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=122101695542813449&id=61574403485441

[72] https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=122101695542813449&id=61574403485441

[73] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/تماسك-تحالف-سياسي-سوري-يضم-تيارات-من-مشارب-مختلفة?ocid=Nabd_App

 

[74] https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=122101695542813449&id=61574403485441

[75] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/syria/250220253

 

[76] https://x.com/SDCPressT/status/1900460888781439061

[77] https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=122101695542813449&id=61574403485441

[78] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-13-2025

[79] https://t.me/mmirleb/9713

[80] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1893704565544903043 ; https://t.me/nahermedia/45125

[81] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1903560523397947556 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/139119

[82] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1903560523397947556

[83] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1903431827584336288 ; https://www.facebook.com/SweidaGov1/posts/pfbid0TtqQFfrZrXJ6yHMUT8RdW6ReNVrsvNM5SSUoTv1Cwyc7vc7tSKatUjvL25v7p6Hfl

[84] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-13-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-6-2025 ; https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=1181914033301593&id=100044490217016

 

 

[85] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1903778136724050015

[86] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1903778136724050015

[87] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/139170

[88] https://asharq dot com/politics/113001/%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%A8-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7/

[89] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/139170

[90] https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/593

[91] https://x.com/abo33amsha/status/1903816904478798108; https://halabtodaytv dot net/archives/281026

[92] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1699

[93] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1880968763266199918

[94] https://x.com/abo33amsha/status/1903816904478798108

[95] https://x.com/abo33amsha/status/1903816904478798108

[96] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1903768244650983866

[97] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1903747611082764775 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-21-2025

[98] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1903747611082764775

[99] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1903747611082764775

[100] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1904163720395215186

[101] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1903747611082764775

[102] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1903747611082764775 ; https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1904163720395215186

[103] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1903747611082764775

[104] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1904163720395215186

[105] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1903203544003465615

[106] https://x.com/obretix/status/1903502666443198663 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1903874430952190008

[107] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1903535555419210126

[108] https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/53437 ; https://x.com/ALBADIA24/status/1903190915113426964 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1903197948629881242

[109] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-19-2025

[110] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-24-2025

[111] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/24/world/europe/lebanon-hezbollah-israel-government-economy.html