UA-69458566-1

Friday, July 18, 2025

Iran Update, July 18, 2025

Avery Borens, Ben Rezaei, Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

 

Israel reversed its previous demand that Syrian transitional government forces refrain from intervening in Suwayda Province, southern Syria. An unspecified Israeli official reported on July 18 that Israel will “allow” a limited number of Syrian transitional government forces to enter Suwayda for the next 48 hours to restore stability.[1] Syrian transitional government forces withdrew from Suwayda Province on July 17 after Israeli airstrikes conducted "to protect” the Druze inflicted heavy losses on transitional government forces.[2] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on July 16 that Israel would continue to enforce its demand for a demilitarized Syria south of Damascus.[3] Bedouin clans across Syria exploited the security vacuum created in the withdrawal of government forces and deployed to Suwayda to fight Druze militias that are conducting retaliatory killings against Bedouins.[4] These killings by Druze militias are retaliation for the atrocities committed against the Druze in Suwayda by predominantly Sunni militias over the last week. Fighting between factions and attacks on civilians has intensified across Suwayda Province since the government forces withdrew on July 17.

Syrian transitional government forces are reportedly stationed on the outskirts of Suwayda Province.[5] It is unclear if Syrian government forces have entered Suwayda at this time. Syrian media reported on July 17 that Syrian government forces are present near Soura al Kabira on the Damascus-Suwayda Highway and have reportedly allowed non-government fighters to pass through government checkpoints to enter Suwayda.[6] Syrian media reported on July 18 that Syrian General Security Service (GSS) convoys reached the northern countryside of Suwayda but have not advanced beyond the city of Liwa, northeast of Suwayda Province.[7] An unspecified security source told Reuters on July 18 that Syrian government forces “were awaiting a final green light to enter Suwayda.”[8] Suwaydawi media reported on July 18 that some Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI) fighters have removed their uniforms and begun supporting Bedouin fighters.[9] CTP-ISW is unable to verify these claims. The existence of these claims in the information space, combined with atrocities committed by government forces against the Druze over the last week, will have extremely deleterious effects on the government’s ability to present itself as a neutral security guarantor and restore order in Suwayda Province.

It is very unlikely that the Syrian transitional government will be able to re-secure and establish lasting stability in Suwayda Province within the Israeli-dictated 48-hour window. Government forces initially deployed to Suwayda on June 14 to quell intercommunal violence between Druze and Bedouin communities.[10] Unsanctioned violence and abuses committed by government forces between June 14 and June 16 deepened existing distrust between the government and the Druze.[11] Violence in Suwayda Province has intensified as Sunni Bedouin fighters have flooded Suwayda in the wake of the government forces’ withdrawal. These tribal fighters have seized large swaths of Suwayda’s territory. Government forces returning to Suwayda to quell the violence will need to successfully position themselves so that they can adequately protect both Druze and Sunni Bedouin populations in Suwayda before setting up lasting security mechanisms to suppress violence over the long term. This would likely require a ceasefire among the many armed groups involved in the violence, along with a well-disciplined stay-behind force that could protect both the Druze and Sunni Bedouins equally without resorting to the abuses that government forces have been involved in over the last week. A plan that relies on undisciplined government forces or local, communal-based militias is likely to drive additional violence because these forces would continue to conduct retaliatory killings, contribute to a cycle of violence, and fail to protect the local populations.

The E3 (the United Kingdom, Germany, and France) urged Iran to deliver “concrete results” or the E3 would trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism, but more time is unlikely to result in changes to Iranian policy.[12] The E3 foreign ministers held a teleconference with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi on July 17 to urge Iran to resume nuclear negotiations and cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to avoid snapback sanctions.[13] An unspecified French diplomatic source stated the E3 seeks a “verifiable and lasting” deal and reiterated their readiness to reimpose UN sanctions if Iran fails to produce results by the end of August.[14] The E3 would have to initiate the process to impose snapback sanctions by September 3 to complete the 45–65-day process before the measure expires in October 2025.[15] A Wall Street Journal reporter noted that the E3 foreign ministers and European Union Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas also suggested extending the snapback deadline during the call.[16] He added that such an extension would reportedly require agreement from Iran and its UN Security Council allies, Russia and China, to amend the timeline.[17] There is no provision in the JCPOA to extend the snapback clause, however.[18] It is unclear how the UN Security Council could amend the snapback timeline, given that the JCPOA is a political agreement among its participants and not a legally binding UN treaty.[19]

Iran has set a de facto precondition to negotiations that would require the United States to guarantee Iran’s right to enrich before the resumption of any negotiations. Iran has repeatedly reiterated its unwillingness to concede on its right to enrich, though there is an ongoing debate in Iran over resuming negotiations, and this policy could change. Iranian officials have maintained their position on retaining uranium enrichment capabilities despite pressure from the United States and European countries. The delay of snapback sanctions is unlikely to change Iran’s position on nuclear enrichment because a delay does not incentivize Iran to change its position. The Iranian Supreme Leader’s International Affairs Adviser, Ali Akbar Velayati, stated on July 14 that Iran would not oppose negotiations without “preconditions” if the United States guarantees Iran’s right to enrichment.[20] The recognition of this right is itself a precondition, however. US officials repeatedly rejected the demand and insisted on “zero enrichment.”[21] Senior Supreme Leader adviser Ali Larijani separately stated on July 17 that “no talks are underway” and argued that Iran should not rush into negotiations, leaving it to Khamenei to decide when to proceed.[22]

Senior Iranian commanders are discussing air defense modernization as they assess force readiness after the Israel-Iran War. Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi inspected Iran’s air defense headquarters on July 18 to assess postwar readiness.[23] Mousavi highlighted the need for updated air defense systems, creative tactics, and operational agility to counter “future threats.”[24] Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard also presented a report during Mousavi’s visit on recent efforts to strengthen Iran’s air defense capabilities.[25] The emphasis on modernization follows Iran’s ineffective defense against Israeli strikes between June 12 and June 24, using domestically produced systems.[26] Iranian officials may seek to acquire advanced systems from partners like China after domestically produced systems failed.[27]

Key Takeaways:

  • The E3 urged Iran to deliver “concrete results” or the E3 would trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism, but more time is unlikely to result in changes to Iranian policy. Iran has set a de facto precondition to negotiations that would require the United States to guarantee Iran’s right to enrich before the resumption of any negotiations.
  • Senior Iranian commanders are discussing air defense modernization as they assess force readiness after the Israel-Iran War. The emphasis on modernization follows Iran’s ineffective defense against Israeli strikes between June 12 and June 24, using a domestically produced system.
  • Israel reversed its previous demand that Syrian transitional government forces refrain from intervening in Suwayda Province, southern Syria. Syrian transitional government forces are reportedly stationed on the outskirts of Suwayda Province. It is very unlikely that the Syrian transitional government will be able to re-secure and establish lasting stability in Suwayda Province within the Israeli-dictated 48-hour window.

Iran

See topline section.

Iraq

The spokesperson for Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development parliament bloc confirmed on July 18 that Parliament will “proceed” with the Popular Mobilization Authority Law despite objections from unspecified political blocs.[28] The Popular Mobilization Authority Law would integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that operate outside of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) into the PMF before the PMF integrates into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).[29] Sudani withdrew a previous version of the law from the parliament agenda in March 2025 to prevent political deadlock and to prevent the removal of Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh.[30] A previous version of the law would have required around 3,500 PMF leaders, including Fayyadh, to retire. Shia Coordination Framework-aligned Deputy Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi directed the Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee to complete all amendments to the law and submit the final version of the law to Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani for a vote during a parliament session on July 16.[31] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. The amended version of the law allows PMF leaders who entered their posts before the law’s passage to maintain their positions.[32] Sudani reportedly withdrew the amended law from the parliamentary agenda on July 17 following US concerns over the legislation.[33]

Syria

Bedouin and Druze fighters have continued to fight across Suwayda Province.[34] Bedouin fighters have reportedly advanced into several towns in western Suwayda Province on July 17 and 18, according to Syrian media.[35] There were also engagements between Bedouin and Druze fighters near the western entrance to Suwayda City.[36] The Suwayda Military Council (SMC), a Druze force opposed to the Syrian transitional government, claimed on July 18 that its forces control most of Suwayda Province.[37] The SMC is affiliated with the prominent Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri, who has led much of the fighting against the transitional government.[38] The SMC announced that it is conducting operations to clear “extremist terrorist elements” that came to Suwayda from other Syrian provinces.[39] The SMC said that its forces will not “accept any form of surrender” or any concession of Druze rights.[40] The SMC blamed the killings in Suwayda on “extremist terrorist groups” that have entered Suwayda in support of the Syrian transitional government.[41] Footage and images circulated by Syrian media accounts reportedly showed Druze militias affiliated with Hijri also publicly displaying the dead bodies of Bedouin tribesmen throughout Suwayda Province on July 18, which will deepen the animosity between Bedouin and Druze groups and make long-term security in the area more difficult.[42] Neither the Bedouin nor the Druze organizations can be relied upon to properly or adequately provide security in Suwayda because both groups are contributing to continued cycles of violence. Both Bedouin clans and Druze fighters have committed abuses during the ongoing insurgency in Suwayda Province.[43]

Armed groups from across Syria have reportedly continued to mobilize to deploy to Suwayda Province to engage in the fighting, which will likely exacerbate violence between Druze and Sunni Bedouin armed factions.[44] Syrian media reported on July 18 that at least 30 Bedouin fighters in Deir ez Zor Province began mobilizing to deploy to Suwayda Province.[45] Syrian media also reported on July 18 that unspecified armed convoys from the Syrian desert began deploying to Barek, northeast of Suwayda Province.[46] Bedouin clans across Syria have mobilized and deployed to Suwayda since July 17 to fight Druze militias that are conducting retaliatory killings against Bedouins after the transitional government withdrew from the province.[47] It is unclear at the time of writing how many groups, if any, have successfully deployed to Suwayda. The arrival of armed groups will likely increase intercommunal violence in Suwayda if there continues to be no neutral forces to prevent intercommunal violence.

The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria – the First of the Brave said on July 17 that it will confront sectarian strife with “weapons and reason.”[48] The group is opposed to Israel and uses iconography widely associated with and inspired by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). It is relatively weak and limited to no military capability to seriously threaten IDF formations.[49] The Islamic Resistance Front of Syria – the First of the Brave previously claimed responsibility for a small-scale rocket attack from southwestern Syria into the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights on June 3.[50] The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria – the First of the Brave declared a general mobilization of all free fighters to move towards sites in which Israeli forces are present.[51] Israeli forces have been positioned in several Syrian towns in Daraa and Quneitra provinces since December 2024.[52]

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.


[1] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/israel-says-its-allowing-syrian-forces-to-enter-sweida-for-48-hours-amid-renewed-clashes/

[2] https://apnews.com/article/syria-druze-israel-clashes-sweida-ceasefire-sharaa-67fdcbd1be73c4890a4ce81bd954d447 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/24244

[3] https://t.me/moriahdoron/24222

[4] https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/1945885395335446926 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1945894267735708079 ; https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1945899007240220934 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1945831594272411959 ; https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/1945836321236242692

[5] https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/63252

[6] https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid05d46dcpfprXy3dsTnRc3BRprwEf7xznb51KhKxaT6YkiKZRjLhjWDcLvNDr52rTyl ; https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid036oXWiFF33tbp4BPvq2ADdqRYEBm7WuHAYpE1yorxWvrcTTwb3QQW1qFxuDVs6dNbl

[7] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/764971/الأمن-السوري-يتجه-إلى-الجنوب-إثر-تعبئة/

[8] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-agrees-allow-syrian-troops-limited-access-sweida-2025-07-18/

[9] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1946166836032065614

[10] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1944710037772910613 ; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/14/world/middleeast/syria-clashes-deaths-bedouin-druse.html

[11] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1945170313303744593 ; https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1945084786285879705 ; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1945054541587578965 ; https://www.facebook.com/alraased/posts/1148135394002180?__cft__[0]=AZX3LUmraaCgSnV8CJo1rFEqsb0v_hIMQBL0sNGSvmY2Gn0vMoiSpI0aQr8bIdw_ZdojX1Aq4ihL3TORAUUskTkU5Fr7VF9rX77_wZDZzzbHj0wqrl5V-eNBkCj9ZpLJIJFUulvlkl9d80ZE6-UFU2YNdAuYlyoHr-wglKZmAhB7bQ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[12] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/europeans-warn-iran-un-sanctions-if-no-concrete-progress-nuclear-issue-2025-07-17/

[13] https://x.com/laurnorman/status/1946202162310021132 ; https://x.com/laurnorman/status/1946201966830301582

[14] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/europeans-warn-iran-un-sanctions-if-no-concrete-progress-nuclear-issue-2025-07-17/

[15] https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf

[16] https://x.com/laurnorman/status/1946202511976677591

[17] https://x.com/laurnorman/status/1946202511976677591

[18] file:///C:/Users/Ben%20Rezaei/Desktop/245317.pdf

[19] https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/fdd-backgrounder-faq-the-snapback-of-un-sanctions-on-iran.pdf

[20] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6529656

[21] https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1941430780518924595 ;

[22] https://iranwire dot com/fa/news-1/143316-%D8%B9%D9%84%DB%8C-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D9%81%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%B0%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA/

[23] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6534037

[24] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6534037

[25] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6534037

[26] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/15/world/middleeast/irans-air-defenses-were-diminished-in-rounds-of-conflict-giving-israel-greater-aerial-freedom.html ;

https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/1411633/ ;

[27] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/military/article/3315901/chinas-dong-jun-hosts-iran-defence-minister-and-others-warship-condemns-hegemony?module=top_story&pgtype=subsection ;

http://www.mod.gov dot cn/gfbw/qwfb/16393377.html ;

https://armyrecognition.com/news/aerospace-news/2025/intelligence-iran-seeks-to-acquire-chinese-j-10c-fighter-jets-to-counter-israeli-f-35i-superiority ;

https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/750222 ;

[28] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/alsumariaspecial/533918/كتلة-الاعمار-والتنمية-ماضون-بتشريع-قانون-الحشد-رغم-اعتراض-بعض-الكتل

[29] https://almadapaper dot net/400352/

[30] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A8-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86 ; https://almadapaper dot net/398498/    ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-12-2025

[31] https://en.964media dot com/38210/

[32] https://baghdadtoday dot news/278745-.html

[33] https://www.alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=230032

[34] https://x.com/MiddleEast_24/status/1946241699241402597 ; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1946166836032065614

[35] https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1945897690220368261 ; https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/63241 ; https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/63242 ; https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/63245 ; https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/63291

[36] https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/63247 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/147744

[37] https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=122145078584763635&set=a.122110127870763635

[38] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-17-2025

[39] https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=122145078584763635&set=a.122110127870763635

[40] https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=122145078584763635&set=a.122110127870763635

[41] https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=122145078584763635&set=a.122110127870763635

[42] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/147787 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/147796 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/147792

[43] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-15-2025 ;  https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-16-2025

[44] https://x.com/MiddleEast_24/status/1946241699241402597

[45] https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1946188105192480957

[46] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1946225843509875194

[47] https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/1945885395335446926 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1945894267735708079 ; https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1945899007240220934 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1945831594272411959 ; https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/1945836321236242692

[48] https://t.me/almkaomasy/415

[49] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-25-2025 ; https://israel-alma dot org/the-islamic-resistance-front-in-syria-is-this-a-new-potential-threat-to-israel/

[50] https://t.me/almkaomasy/345 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-4-2025

[51] https://t.me/almkaomasy/415

[52] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/02/02/israel-syria-golan-ceasefire-line/ ; https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/middle-east/israel-expands-military-presence-in-southern-syria-with-10-bases-residents-displaced/3624194#:~:text=DAMASCUS/ISTANBUL,breach%20of%20the%20disengagement%20accord.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 18, 2025

Jessica Sobieski, Jennie Olmsted, Olivia Gibson, Angelica Evans, and Kateryna Stepanenko

July 18, 2025, 6:15 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:00 pm ET on July 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

 

The European Council of the European Union (EU) approved its 18th sanctions package on July 19, mainly targeting Russian oil revenues and sanctions evasion schemes.[1] The EU announced a landmark oil cap to contain Russian oil prices at 15 percent of the average market price that will automatically adjust semi-annually, and noted that the current price cap is set at $47.60 per barrel – well below the previous $60 per barrel cap.[2] The EU imposed a full transaction ban on any transactions related to the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines, which will prevent the completion, maintenance, and operation of the pipelines. The EU also ended Czechia's exemptions for Russian oil imports. The EU sanctioned an additional 105 vessels of the Russian shadow fleet, increasing the overall number of sanctioned tankers to 444. The EU sanctioned Russian and international companies managing the shadow fleet, an oil refinery in India in which the Russian state oil company Rosneft is a main shareholder, the captain of a shadow fleet vessel, a private operator of an international flag registry, and one entity in the Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector. The EU also imposed an import ban on refined petroleum products made from Russian crude oil and imported from any third country, with the exception of Canada, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Russian government reportedly accounted for some decrease in oil and gas revenue as part of Russia's upcoming national budget, although the EU oil cap and shadow fleet sanctions will likely further degrade Russian oil revenues beyond what the Kremlin previously expected.[3] The EU measures target both Russia’s current ability to sell oil at advantageous pricing and undermines Russia's long-term ability to sell oil to Europe. The EU noted that oil revenues constitute one-third of Russia’s overall revenue, and that recent declines in Russia’s oil revenues in combination with a decrease in market earning potential poses a risk to the Russian federal budget.

The EU's new sanctions target Russia’s ability to engage with international markets. The EU fully banned EU-based specialized financial messaging services from conducting transactions with 22 Russian banks, in addition to the 23 previously sanctioned Russian banks already subject to the ban.[4] The European Union lowered the threshold for sanctioning third-country financial, credit, and crypto-asset service providers that are connected to the Russian Central Bank’s System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS) or generally supporting Russian sanctions evasion schemes. The EU banned any transaction with the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), its sub-funds and companies, and any companies investing in or owned by the RDIF. The EU also banned the sale, supply, transfer, and export of software management systems and banking and financial sector software to Russia. The EU sanctions target an existing vulnerability within the Russian banking and financial sector, decreasing Russia’s ability to maintain a strong presence in international trade and diversify its economy.

The EU's new sanctions package also targets actors directly supporting Russian military capabilities. The EU sanctioned three entities based in the People's Republic of China (PRC) and eight companies operating in Belarus that sell goods to the Russian military.[5] The EU also imposed a full transaction ban on Belarusian specialized financial messaging services and embargoed arms imports from Belarus. The EU tightened export restrictions on 26 entities involved in dual-use goods and technologies, including 11 entities in third countries other than Russia. The EU approved over 2.5 billion euros worth of other export bans on items that could support Russia's war effort, including computer numerical control machines and chemicals for propellants. The EU also sanctioned several individuals involved in indoctrinating Ukrainian children, crimes in occupied Ukraine, and spreading Russian propaganda.

Russian officials continued to falsely claim that sanctions do not have an impact on the Russian economy in response to the EU's new sanctions package. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that the EU's new sanctions package is illegal, that Russia has already gained immunity and adapted to life under restrictive measures, and that Russia will analyze the effects of the new package and minimize their effects.[6] Peskov added that each new sanctions package disadvantages those who authorized it. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev responded to the EU’s newest sanctions by claiming that the package will not change Russia’s position and that the Russian economy will survive and Russia will continue to fight Ukrainian forces.[7] Medvedev threatened to target Kyiv City and other Ukrainian cities with increasing force in response to the EU’s sanctions package. Medvedev claimed that Russia must learn to “hate” the EU and its “Russophobia” as much as Russia's ancestors did and that “how this ends for Europe is known.” CEO of the RDIF and Presidential Special Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries, Kirill Dmitriev, claimed that the EU’s newest sanctions package is hurting Europe more than Russia and limiting European energy supply by closing Russian markets to European companies.[8] Head of the Russian State Duma Committee on Financial Markets Anatoly Aksakov claimed that the new EU sanctions on Russia’s financial system are just a fluctuation in the air, as Russian banks have already been under restrictions from the EU.[9]

Select Russian officials are acknowledging the impact of sanctions on the Russian economy despite the Kremlin's efforts to disguise and dismiss such impacts. The Moscow Times reported on July 17 that Russian Energy Minister Sergei Tsivilev recently told the Russian Federation Council that Russian oil companies are struggling to procure parts to repair refineries due to Western sanctions.[10] Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina notably stated at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 19 that Russia has exhausted many of its “free resources“ since the start of Russia‘s full-scale war against Ukraine and needs to think of a new growth model.[11] Russia's Minister of Economic Development, Maxim Reshetnikov, stated at SPIEF that Russia is on the "brink of recession."[12] Russia's ongoing sanctions evasion schemes, including via the PRC, are a key aspect of the Kremlin's strategy to offset Western sanctions and relieve pressure on the Russian economy. Russia has created a network of actors to circumvent Western sanctions and is reconfiguring its economic policy and business models to withstand sanctions in the long term, although more extensive Western sanctions will complicate this effort. The EU's newest sanctions are a positive step, but wider Western compliance and enforcement are necessary to inflict maximum economic pressure on Russia.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed former Defense Minister Rustem Umerov as Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council on July 18.[13] Umerov stated that he will oversee the coordination of arms deliveries, joint production efforts, and defense partnerships, as well as advance Ukraine's negotiation track with Russia.[14]

The Kremlin continues to advance its long-term censorship efforts to assert greater control over the Russian online information space. First Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Committee on Information Policy Anton Gorelkin warned on July 18 that the popular WhatsApp messenger should prepare to leave the Russian market, as it is "highly likely" that it will fall under restrictive measures.[15] Gorelkin added that the Kremlin-controlled messaging platform MAX will become a replacement for WhatsApp's users. Russian State Duma Information Policy Committee member Anton Nemkin opined that WhatsApp's presence in Russia's digital space constitutes a breach in national security and proposed that Russia consider Telegram as an alternative, while admitting that MAX is the primary choice for replacing WhatsApp.[16] Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported that WhatsApp is the most popular messenger in Russia, with roughly 84 million daily users, and that two sources close to the Russian Presidential Administration stated that Russian authorities are almost guaranteed to ban WhatsApp.[17] Another source close to the Presidential Administration told Meduza that Russian authorities are likely to tolerate Telegram as it hosts many Kremlin-affiliated channels and the Kremlin has been able to establish an entire information infrastructure. WhatsApp is owned by Meta, which the Kremlin has designated as an extremist organization.[18] Russian President Vladimir Putin recently ordered the government to impose additional restrictions on the use of software from "unfriendly countries."[19]

ISW previously noted that the Kremlin planned to designate MAX as its national messenger and that the Kremlin may attempt to ban Telegram and other social media connected to the Western world in the medium- to long-term if the rollout of the new national messenger application is successful.[20] The Kremlin will very likely continue to implement increasingly repressive measures that aim to insulate and censor Russian citizens and promote the Kremlin's war efforts.

Key Takeaways:

  • The European Council of the European Union (EU) approved its 18th sanctions package on July 19, mainly targeting Russian oil revenues and sanctions evasion schemes.
  • Russian officials continued to falsely claim that sanctions do not have an impact on the Russian economy in response to the EU's new sanctions package.
  • Select Russian officials are acknowledging the impact of sanctions on the Russian economy despite the Kremlin's efforts to disguise and dismiss such impacts.
  • Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed former Defense Minister Rustem Umerov as Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council on July 18.
  • The Kremlin continues to advance its long-term censorship efforts to assert greater control over the Russian online information space.
  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 18.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 17 and 18.[21] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked toward Glushkovo and Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and toward Novyi Put (east of Tetkino) from Pavlivka, Sumy Oblast (south of Novyi Put).[22]

Ukrainian open-source intelligence group CyberBoroshno published satellite imagery on July 17 that shows damage at Russia's Energiya chemical and weapons component plant, indicating that Ukrainian forces likely struck the plant during a drone strike in Yelets, Lipetsk Oblast, on July 15.[23]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 18 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Varachyne (northeast of Sumy City).[24]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced farther southwest of Varachyne than July 18 geolocated footage indicated.[25] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into northeastern Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[26]

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and Varachyne on July 17 and 18.[27] Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka and Andriivka, and northeast of Sumy City near Sadky and Yablunivka.[28]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Sumy direction stated on July 17 that Russian forces are sending sabotage and reconnaissance groups to Ukrainian rear areas to interdict Ukrainian logistics routes.[29] The spokesperson noted that Russian drone operators drop supplies and ammunition to the sabotage and reconnaissance groups once the groups establish positions in the rear, and then the Russian military command deploys “disposable” assault groups to pressure Ukrainian defenses and disrupt their logistics.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[30]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 18 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[31]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Starytsia, and Zelene on July 17 and 18.[32]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Kanada Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Kozacha Lopan (northwest of Kharkiv City).[33] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the direction of Vovchansk.[34]

Russian forces continued limited assaults in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 18 but did not advance.

A Russian miblogger claimed that Russian forces continue attacking in the Velykyi Burluk direction and Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) and that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Milove.[35]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northwest of Kupyansk near Radkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pishchane on July 17 and 18.[36]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, Nova Kruhlyakivka, and Zelenyi Hai and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka and Hrekivka and toward Cherneshchyna and Druzhelyubivka on July 17 and 18.[37]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on July 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman toward Shandryholove, Korovii Yar, and Serednie; north of Lyman near Kaprivka, Novyi Myr, and Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on July 17 and 18.[38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka on July 17 and 18.[39]

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported that the intensity of Russian offensive operations in the brigade's area of responsibility (AoR) has noticeably declined due to Ukrainian forces destroying better-trained Russian forces.[40] The NCO reported that Russian forces are training new units and that the situation remains tense. The NCO reported that Russian forces are using large numbers of motorcycles across the entire frontline but noted that 90 percent of Russian motorcycles are of poor quality and from the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, northeast of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora, Predtechyne, and Stupochky on July 17 and 18.[41]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have developed effective tactics for downing Ukrainian drones in the Chasiv Yar direction, thereby reportedly enabling Russian forces to advance despite Ukrainian drone superiority in the area.[42]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 299th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th Airborne Division) reportedly continue to operate in Chasiv Yar.[43]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on July 18 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced near Popiv Yar (northwest of Toretsk) and Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[44]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; northwest of Toretsk near Rusyn Yar, Oleksandro-Kalynove, Popiv Yar, and Poltavka, and toward Nelipivka, Stepanivka, Katerynivka, and Pleshchiivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Novospaske on July 17 and 18.[45]

A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported on July 17 that Russian forces are constantly attacking despite sustaining high casualties.[46] The servicemember reported that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Novospaske and that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are attempting to raise Russian flags on the outskirts of the settlement to falsely claim control of the settlement.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC] Eastern Military District [EMD]), including its 2nd Separate Artillery Battalion, are reportedly operating near Popiv Yar.[47]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 17 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) and likely seized the settlement.[48]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Volodymyrivka, Novotoretske, Myrolyubivka, and Novoekonomichne and toward Rodynske; east of Pokrovsk toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka and Zvirove; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and Udachne, and toward Molodetske on July 17 and 18.[49]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions north and northeast of Pokrovsk.[50] Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk).[51] Drone operators of the Typhoon Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Pokrovsk direction.[52]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently retook Yalta (south of Novopavlivka).[53] Additional geolocated footage published on July 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced southwest of Komar (south of Novopavlivka).[54] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that Ukrainian forces recently retook Yalta and Voskresenka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[55] ISW previously noted that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in key frontline areas to slow Russian advances.[56]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) advanced in an area one kilometer in depth and two kilometers wide southwest of Piddubne (southwest of Novopavlivka).[57]

Russian forces continued attacks toward Novopavlivka; northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Dachne, and Oleksiivka; south of Novopavlivka toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zirka, Piddubne, Myrne, and Voskresenka and toward Oleksandrohrad on July 17 and 18.[58]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) reportedly struck Ukrainian positions near Oleksandrohrad.[59]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued assaults northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and Shevchenko and toward Komyshuvakha and west of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole and Novopil and toward Temyrivka on July 17 and 18.[60]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are operating toward Maliivka and Sichneve (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[61] Drone operators of the 30th Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 36th CAA) and the 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA) are reportedly also operating near Sichneve.[62]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on July 18 but did not advance.

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces intensified fighting near Marfopil (southwest of Hulyaipole).[63]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Orikhiv near Bilohiria, south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka, and southwest of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka and Stepove.[64]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske on July 17 and 18.[65]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division, including drone operators of its 108th VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[66]

Russian forces continued limited attempts to cross the Dnipro River in the Kherson direction on July 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attempted to cross the Dnipro River northeast of Kherson City toward Sadove, Prydniprovske, and Kozatsky Island and southwest of Kherson City toward Dniprovske and Hola Prystan on July 18.[67]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 17 to 18. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 29 Shahed drones and six decoy drones from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and targeted Ukrainian frontline positions in eastern Ukraine.[68] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 11 drones and that six decoy drones were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck locomotives and civilian infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, killing one person.[69]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russia continues to rely on Belarusian defense companies to produce weapons components for Russia's war effort and to evade sanctions. Ukrainian TV channel Kanal 24 reported on July 17 that Russian defense companies are increasingly using Belarusian-made microcircuits, capacitors, stabilizers, and other components in Russian missiles, including Kh-101 and Kh-69 cruise missiles and Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles, and S-300 and S-400 air defense systems.[70] Kanal 24 obtained a letter from the Russian Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade Kirill Lusogorsky to the Belarusian State Military-Industrial Committee Head Dmitry Pantus requesting Belarusian defense companies, namely the Minsk-based Integral and Peleng facilities, supply microelectronics to Russia. Kanal 24 reported that Russia also uses Belarusian microchips in guided glide bombs and unguided missiles.

 

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.


[1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/07/18/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-18th-package-of-economic-and-individual-measures/

[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eus-new-russia-sanctions-aim-more-effective-oil-price-cap-2025-07-18/; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-07-18/eu-backs-revised-russia-oil-price-cap-and-new-russia-sanctions

[3] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-09-23/russia-sees-oil-and-gas-revenue-shrinking-for-next-three-years

[4] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/07/18/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-18th-package-of-economic-and-individual-measures/

[5] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/07/18/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-18th-package-of-economic-and-individual-measures/

[6] https://t.me/tass_agency/325915

[7] https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/598; https://t.me/medvedev_telegramE/87

[8] https://t.me/kadmitriev/163

[9] https://t.me/tass_agency/325956

[10] https://www.moscowtimes dot ru/2025/07/17/vrossii-iz-za-sanktsii-nachalis-problemi-sremontom-npz-a169109

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925

[13] https://www.president dot gov.ua/documents/4962025-55709

[14] https://x.com/rustem_umerov/status/1946125164158070960 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15175

[15] https://t.me/webstrangler/4310

[16] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/24548611

[17] https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/07/18/99-chto-eto-sluchitsya-1-ostavim-na-malo-li-chto ; https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/07/18/voyna

[18] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/24548299 ; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/16427317

[19] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/24543571

[20] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2025

[21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772

[22] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31421;

[23] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/satellite-confirms-strike-on-protected-building-at-russia-s-energia-plant/#google_vignette; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/11765?single

[24] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1945984391978643768; https://www.instagram.com/reel/DMNSSx5iYfU/; https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1946005382461014242

[25] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31439

[26] https://t.me/wargonzo/27900

[27] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31439; https://t.me/dva_majors/75601; ttps://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772

[28] https://t.me/dva_majors/75601; https://t.me/wargonzo/27900

[29] https://t.me/OSHP_225/5044; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/17/spochatku-dyversanty-potim-myaso-nova-taktyka-rosiyan-na-sumskomu-napryamku/

[30] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31414

[31] https://t.me/wargonzo/27900

[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964

[33] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5845

[34] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96034

[35] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31405 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75601

[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964

[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66007

[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964

[40] https://www.youtube.com/live/ZVMUSS0B0yo?si=SQi52gl6yTizHiXb ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1069955-na-doneccini-54-brigada-fiksue-spad-nastupalnogo-potencialu-rf/

[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/24765

[42] https://t.me/rusich_army/24765

[43] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31414

[44] https://t.me/rybar/72241 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27900 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/325820

[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964

[46] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/17/dyversijna-grupa-namagalasya-vstanovyty-prapor-poblyzu-toreczka-shturmy-pochynayutsya-o-tretij-nochi/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSS0B0yo

[47] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14057

[48] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1945974942522036545 https://t.me/echo_2_25/612; https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1945991088646312173

[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75601 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75602 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31429 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27900

[50] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14058

[51] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172771

[52] t.me/motopatriot78/39004

[53] https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1946108213516005661 ; https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1946113299575099569 https://youtu.be/MyYW6wXLkHk?si=Qr9fjJm0dPq1_RK5 https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1945929547091763686; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9612; https://www.facebook.com/20armycorps/videos/1359756871756913/

[54] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9618; https://t.me/burpobeda/13844

[55] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/18/syly-oborony-ukrayiny-vstanovyly-prapory-u-voskresenczi-ta-yalti/ ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1359756871756913&rdid=q1PZmeBdtVjMSlo4

[56] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071425

[57] https://t.me/voin_dv/16048

[58] https://t.me/dva_majors/75601 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl

[59] https://t.me/voin_dv/16046

[60] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl

[61] https://t.me/voin_dv/16048

[62] https://t.me/voin_dv/16045 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/16042

[63] https://t.me/wargonzo/27900

[64] https://t.me/wargonzo/27900

[65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02m2vteSHE6k2VBHQxBmQwYMm4HvugsTYCaT4ize8Sonn34wMxewHqJeFc6vdtp3Eyl ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12756 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl

[66] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31414 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/153139

[67] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl

[68] https://t.me/kpszsu/38692

[69] https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/7110; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22975; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/18/rosijski-drony-atakuvaly-dnipropetrovshhynu-zagynuv-mashynist-potyaga/;

[70] https://24tv dot ua/bilorus-prichetna-do-obstriliv-ukrayini-yak-vigotovlyaye-mikroshemi_n2870664 ; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/investigation-belarusian-defense-industry-aids-russia-in-missile-production/