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Wednesday, December 4, 2024

Iran Update, December 4, 2024

Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Siddhant Kishore, Alexandra Braverman, Annika Ganzeveld, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)–aligned opposition groups are likely prioritizing the capture of Hama City. Fateh Mubin—a joint operations room led by HTS—is conducting a campaign that appears to have several different subordinate objectives. Fateh Mubin's main effort is focused around the city itself. The main effort aims to isolate Hama City, presumably before assaulting it. The group is supporting its main effort by interdicting regime reinforcements coming from eastern Syria in order to prevent any relief force from reaching the city.


The main effort bypassed key regime defensive positions north of the city and proceeded to cut ground lines of communication (GLOCs) traveling into the city from the east and southeast, thus isolating the city from the east. A second force to the west may be seeking to capture Hama Military Airport. A commander directs their unit to bypass an obstacle in order to maintain the momentum of an operation.[1] The regime has positioned forces on Zain al Abidin Hill, north of the city, and Qomhana town, a key town northwest of the city.[2] The hill is a tactically advantageous position from which a defender has sweeping views northwards up the M5 Highway. Some opposition forces likely fixed these forces while the main western Hama and eastern Hama advances proceeded southwards. Opposition forces east of Hama had proceeded directly south along the M5 Highway before swinging east, bypassing the hill.[3] Opposition forces in the west attacked Qomhana while the remainder continued towards the Hama Military Airport.[4] An unspecified Fateh Mubin military source cited by al Quds al Araby stated that opposition forces plan to "encircle” the city of Hama, which is consistent with CTP-ISW's observation that opposition forces cut two major roads connecting Hama City to areas east of it.[5] Hama is not fully isolated, given major roads moving south.

Fateh Mubin’s supporting effort captured key ground lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting Hama City to eastern Syria likely in order to interdict resupply and reinforcements from the east. Interdict is defined as a tactical mission task that “prevents, disrupts, or delays the enemy’s use of an area or route ... [to] impact ... an enemy force’s plans and ability to respond to friendly actions.”[6] Opposition forces have captured SAA bases northeast of Hama and cut multiple roads far east of Hama to prevent or delay regime forces from reaching the battlefield in time to support regime forces in Hama.[7] Pro-Syrian regime sources claimed that the SAA has continued to send reinforcements to Hama City from Raqqa and Rusafa, which are connected to Hama by these roads, to counter the expected attack on the city.[8] Opposition forces’ advance into towns surrounding Hama with little SAA resistance suggests that the supporting line of effort has had some success.


Opposition groups retained control of previously seized territory in Aleppo Province, including Aleppo City, on December 4. Social media users posted footage of HTS leader Abu Mohammad al Julani visiting Aleppo Citadel on December 4, emphasizing the extent of control that opposition forces maintain in Aleppo City.[9]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted several self-defense airstrikes targeting weapons systems in Deir ez Zor Province, Syria, on December 3.[10] The strikes targeted three truck-mounted Multiple Rocket Launchers, a T-64 tank, and an armored personnel carrier.[11] CENTCOM confirmed that unspecified fighters fired mortars toward US forces at Conoco Mission Support Site before the strikes.[12] The strikes occurred during a Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) offensive into seven regime-controlled villages on the left bank of the Euphrates River.[13] CTP-ISW has not yet observed lasting control-of-terrain changes on the left bank of the Euphrates River as a result of the SDF offensive.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported on December 4 that it recovered the body of an Israeli hostage from an unspecified location in the Gaza Strip.[14] The IDF said that Hamas fighters killed the hostage, Itay Svirski, in January 2024 and kept his body in the Gaza Strip.

An IDF investigation revealed that Hamas fighters shot and killed six hostages in the Gaza Strip in early 2024.[15] The IDF launched an investigation after recovering the bodies of six hostages and six Hamas fighters from a tunnel in Khan Younis in August 2024.[16] Hamas moved the hostages to the tunnel in January 2024.[17] The IDF conducted an airstrike that struck the tunnel in February 2024. The IDF clarified that it did not have any information on the presence of hostages there during the time of the airstrike, however.[18] The investigation found that the bodies had bullet wounds and assessed with high confidence that Hamas fighters shot and killed the hostages. The IDF could not clarify if the Hamas fighters shot and killed the hostages before or after the IDF struck the tunnel. The IDF investigation determined that if the hostages had been alive at the time of the airstrike, the collapse of the tunnel would have killed them by causing the hostages to suffocate. The forensic investigation revealed that the Hamas fighters likely suffocated to death inside the tunnel after the IDF airstrike.[19]

Lebanese Hezbollah will likely try to reconstitute its forces despite significant Israeli degradation to the organization. Reuters, citing a senior US official, a senior Israeli official, and US lawmakers, reported that Hezbollah has begun recruiting new fighters and trying to find new ways to rearm through domestic production and by smuggling materials through Syria in recent weeks.[20] It is unclear, however, if those efforts have slowed due to the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire deal on November 26. US intelligence agencies assessed that Israel destroyed more than half of Hezbollah’s weapons stockpile and killed “thousands” of Hezbollah fighters. CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Hezbollah will almost certainly try to reconstitute its forces despite Israel’s victory in Lebanon.[21]

Hezbollah is likely unable to send its newly recruited fighters to Syria due to the severe losses it suffered in Lebanon and the requirements on the group to train its new fighters. Hezbollah may choose to send these fighters to Syria in the future if the group becomes concerned that it will lose its overland resupply route through Syria due to the Syrian Opposition offensive. Reuters reported that US officials are “concerned” about Hezbollah’s access to Syria following the recent Syrian opposition offensive due to Hezbollah’s previous use of Syria as a safe haven for fighters and a weapons transport corridor.[22] Hezbollah also historically maintained GLOCs in Syria.[23]

Key Takeaways:

  • Hama Campaign: Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-aligned opposition groups are likely prioritizing the capture of Hama City. The main effort bypassed key regime defensive positions north of the city and proceeded to cut ground lines of communication (GLOCs) traveling into the city from the east and southeast, thus isolating the city from the east. Fateh Mubin’s supporting effort captured key GLOCs connecting Hama City to eastern Syria likely in order to interdict resupply and reinforcements from the east.
  • Eastern Syria: US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted several self-defense airstrikes targeting weapons systems in Deir ez Zor Province, Syria, on December 3.
  • Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported on December 4 that it recovered the body of an Israeli hostage from an unspecified location in the Gaza Strip.
  • Hezbollah and Syria: Lebanese Hezbollah will likely try to reconstitute its forces despite significant Israeli degradation to the organization. Hezbollah is likely unable to send its newly recruited fighters to Syria due to the severe losses it suffered in Lebanon and the requirements on the group to train its new fighters.


Gaza Strip:

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The IDF continued clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip on December 4. The IDF operated overnight on December 3 and 4 in Beit Lahia.[24] A Palestinian journalist reported that Gazans evacuated Beit Lahia amid IDF clearing operations there.[25] Geolocated images show Gazans evacuating Beit Lahia and moving south towards the Salah al Din Road.[26] The IDF started facilitating evacuations in Beit Lahia on November 6, when it began clearing operations there.[27] A Palestinian journalist reported gunfire from Israeli vehicles in the eastern Jabalia refugee camp.[28] The IDF reported that it destroyed militia infrastructure and killed several Palestinian fighters in Jabalia via ground and air operations during the past week.[29] The IDF also located an explosives manufacturing facility inside a residential building and separately confiscated dozens of weapons in Jabalia.

Hamas claimed four attacks targeting the IDF in the northern Gaza Strip on December 4.[30] Hamas fired a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting an Israeli tank and an armored personnel carrier (APC) in Jabalia refugee camp. A Hamas sniper also fired at two Israeli soldiers in Jabalia refugee camp. Hamas also fired an RPG and detonated an IED targeting two Israeli tanks in Beit Lahia.

The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) mortared Israeli forces along the Netzarim Corridor on December 4.[31]

The IDF continued operating in the central Gaza Strip on December 4. IDF special operations forces raided a house in Deir al Balah and detained a Hamas intelligence operative on December 3, according to a Palestinian journalist.[32] A Palestinian journalist also reported gunfire from Israeli vehicles near Gaza City.[33] A PIJ sniper shot an Israeli soldier in eastern Gaza City.[34]

Palestinian militias claimed two attacks targeting the IDF in the southern Gaza Strip on December 4.[35] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired rockets targeting Israeli forces at the Rafah border crossing.[36] PIJ mortared the IDF in eastern Rafah City.[37]



The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) reported that 122 humanitarian aid trucks entered the Gaza Strip on December 3.[38]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  •  Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli settlers clashed with IDF forces that were demolishing an illegal outpost in Nablus Governorate on December 4.[39] The settlers set fire to cars and assaulted Palestinians in neighboring villages including Hawara and Beit Furik.[40] Israeli forces detained at least eight settlers following the attack, though it is unclear if Israeli forces are still detaining the settlers.[41]

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz reversed his decision to suspend administrative detention for Israeli settlers in the West Bank on December 4 in response to the settler violence in the West Bank.[42]

Israeli forces arrested four Palestinians for throwing explosives at the Israeli settlement of Beit El near Ramallah.[43]

Northern Israel and Lebanon

Lebanese Hezbollah objectives:

  • End Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Survive the October 7 War as a capable political and military organization with control over Lebanon

Geolocated images showed the IDF 810th Mountain Brigade (210th Division) conducting destroying tunnels in the Chebaa area.[44] Israeli media reported on December 3 that the IDF 810th and 1st Infantry brigades and combat engineers demolished Hezbollah bunkers north of the Israeli border in the Chebaa area in recent weeks.[45] Israeli troops seized weapons in several underground sites and destroyed the underground infrastructure[46] Hezbollah fired two rockets at an IDF border position in the Israeli-controlled Shebaa Farms on December 2.[47]

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) continued to deploy to southern Lebanon on December 4. Lebanese media reported that LAF soldiers returned to their positions in Chebaa, southeastern Lebanon, after withdrawing at the start of the IDF’s ground invasion in early October.[48] Lebanese media separately published a video of an LAF convoy heading towards an unspecified area of southern Lebanon on December 4.[49] Lebanese Foreign Affairs Minister Abdallah Bou Habib said on November 26 that the LAF is prepared to deploy at least 5,000 troops to southern Lebanon.[50]


Israeli forces continued to operate near Maroun al Ras in southwestern Lebanon on December 4. Lebanese media reported that Israeli forces and tanks operated in Yaroun, near Maroun al Ras, on December 4.[51] Lebanese media separately reported IDF troops fired at Bint Jbeil from an unspecified location.[52]

The IDF Air Force conducted a strike on December 4 targeting a Hezbollah rocket launcher in Majdal Zoun.[53] The IDF stated that the launcher posed a threat to Israel and violated the ceasefire agreement.[54] Lebanese media reported two Israeli drone strikes in Majdal Zoun on December 4.[55]

The IDF destroyed Hezbollah weapon stockpiles in Aitaroun, Khiam, and Souaneh in southern Lebanon on December 4.[56] It is unclear how the IDF destroyed the Souaneh stockpile, given that it is 3 kilometers from the Israeli lines.



US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire is “holding” despite a series of incidents in recent days.[57] Blinken stated that the mechanism the United States established with France to ensure the ceasefire is monitored and implemented is working. Lebanese Interim Prime Minister Najib Mikati stated that the countries that are implementing the ceasefire, namely the United States, are working to address the recent violations.[58]

Hezbollah has not claimed any attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on December 3.

Iran and the Axis of Resistance

A senior Iraqi military delegation inspected defensive lines along the Iraq-Syria border on December 4.[59] Iraqi Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Abdul Amir Rashid Yarallah and Joint Operations Command Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Qais Khalaf al Muhammadi led the delegation.[60] The Iraqi Army has deployed forces to secure the Iraq-Syria border in recent days amid the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria.[61] Syrian media reported Iraqi aircraft and helicopter activity near the Iraq-Syria border on December 4.[62]

Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri discussed the ongoing Syrian opposition offensive with Iraqi President Abdul Latif al Rashid on December 4. Ameri and Rashid emphasized the need to end the conflict in Syria while preserving security and stability in Syria and the Middle East.[63] Badr Organization fighters have reportedly deployed to northern Syria in recent days to help defend the Syrian regime.[64]

Iran is trying to prevent the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) from triggering "snapback sanctions" by threatening Iranian withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).[65] Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi warned that Iran could leave the NPT if the E3 reimposes UN security council sanctions on Iran through the snapback mechanism. Iranian officials have long threatened to withdraw from the NPT, but these statements are noteworthy given the current standoff between Iran and the West over Iranian nuclear activities.[66] Ravanchi stated that Iran will likely hold another round of discussions with European countries following his meetings with the E3 in Geneva on November 29.[67]

Iranian leadership met with Chinese officials in Tehran on December 4. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said that Iran will continue implementing the 25-year Sino-Iranian cooperation agreement, which Iran and China signed in March 2021, during a meeting with Chinese Vice Premier Zhang Guoqing.[68] Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref separately met with Guoqing to discuss the expansion of Sino-Iranian economic cooperation.[69]

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.


[1] https://irp.fas.org/doddir/army/fm3-90-1.pdf

[2] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1864280395836973073; https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1864382779116400971; https://x.com/SAMSyria0/status/1864272452659957815

[3] https://www.alquds.co.uk/%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%AD/

[4] https://x.com/SAMSyria0/status/1864272452659957815

[5] https://www.alquds.co.uk/%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%AD/

[6] https://irp.fas.org/doddir/army/fm3-90.pdf

[7] https://x.com/Asia_Intel/status/1864301994166374669 ; https://x.com/CalibreObscura/status/1864262522921992247 ; https://x.com/Asia_Intel/status/1864245809388097736 ; https://www.alquds.co.uk/%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%AD/ ; https://x.com/hasanabdalgany/status/1864336794415722792

[8] https://x.com/muhrez996/status/1864057404536627252 ;

[9] https://x.com/RevTamam/status/1864296899705983464 ; https://x.com/AsemAbdelMajed/status/1864325384164036889 ; https://x.com/ivarmm/status/1864306156757303650 ; https://x.com/MousaAlomar/status/1864312641004470371

[10] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1864142271152783770

[11] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1864142271152783770

[12] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1864142271152783770

[13] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1863646667922088125; https://x.com/EuphratesPost/status/1863659309856432203 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1863873489398030584/photo/1; https://t.me/motopatriot/30013

[14] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1864369408912523700

[15] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1864319593126174821

[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-August-20-2024

[17] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1864319593126174821

[18] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1864319593126174821

[19] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1864319593126174821

[20] https://www.reuters.com/world/lebanons-hezbollah-aims-rebuild-longer-term-despite-israeli-blows-us-intel-says-2024-12-04/

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/israels-victory-lebanon ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-25-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/understanding-israel%E2%80%99s-campaign-defeat-hezbollah-lebanon

[22] https://www.reuters.com/world/lebanons-hezbollah-aims-rebuild-longer-term-despite-israeli-blows-us-intel-says-2024-12-04/

[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Hezbollah_Sullivan_FINAL.pdf

[24] https://t.me/hamza20300/315518 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/315715 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/315569

[25] https://x.com/ytirawi/status/1864282791900229727

[26] https://x.com/MiddleEastBuka/status/1864253772802719807

[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-6-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-7-2024

[28] https://t.me/hamza20300/315538

[29] https://www.idf dot il/253333

[30] https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/20111/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84-425-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%AA%D9%83%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1

[31] https://t.me/sarayaps/18886

[32] https://x.com/ytirawi/status/1864281658716836060'

[33] https://t.me/hamza20300/315611

[34] https://t.me/sarayaps/18887

[35] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7941 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/18888

[36] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7941

[37] https://t.me/sarayaps/18888

[38] https://x.com/cogatonline/status/1864216479282909291

[39] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1864218534571606486

[40] https://x.com/Yesh_Din/status/1864220688837439913 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-settlers-attack-two-palestinian-towns-their-own-military-west-bank-2024-12-04/

[41] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/idf-several-settlers-nabbed-for-rioting-attacking-palestinians-in-west-bank-towns/

[42] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-832029

[43] https://x.com/hod_barel/status/1864334134505513028

[44] https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/1864034357146484833

[45] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-destroys-hezbollah-bunkers-clearing-all-threats-in-mount-dov-border-area/

[46] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-destroys-hezbollah-bunkers-clearing-all-threats-in-mount-dov-border-area/

[47] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1863598817012040102 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-2-2024

[48] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/108027

[49] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/124098

[50] https://english.alarabiya dot net/News/middle-east/2024/11/26/-hopefully-by-tonight-we-will-have-a-ceasefire-lebanon-foreign-minister-says-

[51] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/108025

[52] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/108025

[53] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1864345565753905230

[54] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1864345565753905230

[55] https://t.me/dahieh4all/48117 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/108043

[56] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1864345569386254644

[57] https://www.barrons.com/news/blinken-says-ceasefire-is-holding-in-lebanon-cbeeb622

[58] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/124109 ; https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/124110 ; https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/124111

[59] https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq/Iraqi-military-leaders-inspect-Syrian-border ;

https://t.me/MODiraq/10398

[60] https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq/Iraqi-military-leaders-inspect-Syrian-border ;

https://t.me/MODiraq/10398

[61] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-2-2024

[62] https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1864301516258992465

[63] https://t.me/platformB/3140

[64] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraqi-militias-enter-syria-reinforce-government-forces-military-sources-say-2024-12-02/

[65] https://farsnews dot ir/Qaysar/1733306053694609851/Iran-Warns-of-Withdrawal-from-NPT-in-Case-of-Snapback-Mechanism-Triggering

[66] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-23-2024?mkt_tok=NDc1LVBCUS05NzEAAAGW-rXcjiQRertrF40Q5x8wKHlWD8xR9X-QN3-XI81dja6o-vOVDiV6GzhfkF9FrriUKEFNt5RckVlTadPARbPJkg3b4KFfRePzE51Z9OIdVLMr3u4i

[67] https://farsnews dot ir/Qaysar/1733306053694609851/Iran-Warns-of-Withdrawal-from-NPT-in-Case-of-Snapback-Mechanism-Triggering ; https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-europeans-test-diplomacy-with-trump-term-looming-2024-11-29/

[68] https://president dot ir/fa/155723;

https://www.reuters.com/article/world/iran-and-china-sign-25-year-cooperation-agreement-idUSKBN2BJ0HG/

[69] https://basirat dot ir/fa/news/369407

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 4, 2024

 Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, Olivia Gibson, Grace Mappes, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and Kateryna Stepanenko

December 4, 2024, 6:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:00am ET on December 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Mounting evidence continues to personally implicate Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior Kremlin officials in the forced deportation and "re-education" of Ukrainian children in Russia. The US Department of State and Yale University's Humanitarian Research Lab published a report on December 3 detailing the role of Putin, Kremlin Commissioner on Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova, members of Russia's ruling United Russia party, Russia's Ministry of Education, and occupation officials in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in at least 314 confirmed cases of child deportation from occupied Ukraine.[1] The report states that Putin maintains primary control over and is the main decision-maker for Russia's deportation program and that Lvova-Belova acts as Putin's executive officer who oversees the implementation of the program. The report notes that Russian authorities have used military transport aircraft and aircraft under Putin's personal control to deport children from occupied Ukraine to intermediary holding facilities in Russia. The report states that Russian and occupation authorities have primarily deported to Russia children whom Russian authorities claim to be orphans or children without parental care and that Russian authorities have placed most of the children in Russian foster or adoptive families. The report assesses that it is highly likely that most, if not all, deported Ukrainian children have been naturalized as Russian citizens and that Russian authorities force the children to participate in a patriotic re-education program intended to Russify, militarize, and indoctrinate them into Russian cultural and historical narratives and forcibly separate them from their Ukrainian heritage. The report notes that the true number of Ukrainian children that Russia has forcibly deported to Russia remains unclear and that the number is significantly higher than the 314 children identified in the report. ISW has reported extensively on Russia's crimes in occupied Ukraine, including the forced deportation of Ukrainian youth to Russia.[2] The Geneva Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines "forcibly transferring children of a group to another group" as an act constituting genocide.[3]

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to posture Russian economic stability and growth while high interest rates and efforts to combat inflation suggest that the Kremlin is worried about economic stability in the long-term. Putin claimed at the Russian state-owned bank VTB Bank's investment forum on December 4 that the Russian economy will grow by four precent by the end of 2024 and that Russia's GDP grew by 4.1 percent from January to October 2024.[4] Putin is likely attempting to posture economic stability despite reports that Russia may raise key interest rates to 25 percent in December 2024, after the Russian Central Bank already raised the key interest rate to 21 percent in October 2024.[5] Russian Central Bank Head Elvira Nabiullina stated on December 4 that the Central Bank may raise the key interest rate at the upcoming Central Bank's board of directors meeting.[6] Putin tacitly acknowledged some economic problems on December 4 by calling on the Central Bank to contain inflation.[7] Russian state outlet RBK reported on December 4, citing Central Bank data, that Russians' cash savings have fallen to a historical low and that cash rubles account for only 15 percent of Russian citizens' savings.[8] VTB Banks Deputy Chairperson Georgy Gorshkov assessed that cash savings may fall by "a couple" percentage points by the end of 2024.[9] Putin also suggested that the Russian economy is growing by boasting a record low country-wide unemployment rate of 2.3 percent and claiming that unemployment rates, particularly for Russians 25-years-old and younger, have decreased significantly.[10] Putin failed to note that unemployment rates are likely at a record low for youth as many young Russian men are fighting in Ukraine and that Russia is suffering significant labor shortages.[11]

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced on December 4 that Armenia has effectively reached "the point of no return" in its ties with the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).[12] Pashinyan criticized CSTO allies for failing to respond to Azerbaijan's encroachment on Armenia's internationally recognized territory in 2021 and 2022 - likely referring to encroachments into Syunik and Gegharkunik provinces - despite prior assurances that any violation of Armenia's territorial integrity was a "red line" for the CSTO.[13] Pashinyan stated that the CSTO lacks credibility because it does not have a clearly defined zone of responsibility in Armenia — despite Armenia still formally being a member state - and emphasized that Armenia's issues with the CSTO are not necessarily related to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Pashinyan indicated that Armenia no longer participates in CSTO activities or policymaking. ISW continues to observe souring Armenian-Russian bilateral relations and assesses that a formal Armenian withdrawal from the CSTO would serve as another blow to Russian power projection across the countries that the Soviet Union once colonized.[14]

Key Takeaways:

  • Mounting evidence continues to personally implicate Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior Kremlin officials in the forced deportation and "re-education" of Ukrainian children in Russia.
  • Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to posture Russian economic stability and growth while high interest rates and efforts to combat inflation suggest that the Kremlin is worried about economic stability in the long-term.
  • Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced on December 4 that Armenia has effectively reached "the point of no return" in its ties with the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
  • Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in Toretsk and near Velyka Novosilka. Russian forces recently advanced in Chasiv Yar, near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Vuhledar, Velyka Novosilka, and in Kursk Oblast.
  • The Kremlin continues to use its "Time of Heroes" program to place veterans of the war in Ukraine in leadership positions within the Russian government and major state companies.


We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Russian Technological Adaptations
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces recently advanced in Ukraine's main salient in Kursk Oblast amid continued fighting in the area on December 4. Geolocated footage published on December 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Darino (southeast of Korenevo).[15] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into forested areas near Malaya Loknya (north of Sudzha) and are clearing the the area, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[16] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Nikolayevo-Darino, Darino, and Novoivanovka (all southeast of Korenevo).[17] Russian forces continued assaults near Darino and northeast of Sudzha near Martynovka.[18] Reconnaissance elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) and drone operators of the Russian 83rd VDV Brigade are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[19]


Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes on Russian military targets in Ryazan Oblast and Republic of Chechnya on the night of December 3 to 4 and during the day of December 4. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed three Ukrainian drones over Ryazan Oblast over the night of December 3 to 4 and another drone during the day on December 4.[20] Russian sources claimed that three drones struck the Russian Dyagilevo Air Base near Ryazan City and that a Ukrainian drone struck the Chechen "Kadyrov" Spetsnaz Police Regiment's barracks in Grozny, Republic of Chechnya on December 4.[21]

Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the international border north of Kharkiv City towards Kozacha Lopan and near Hlyboke, and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on December 3 and 4 but did not make any confirmed advances.[22] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on December 4 that Russian forces are constructing complex defensive positions between underground trenches up to 10 meters deep to provide cover from Ukrainian drone strikes.[23] The spokesperson added that the complexity and depth of these underground positions make it difficult for Ukrainian forces to attack Russian positions. Drone operators of the Russian 44th Army Corps (AC) (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[24]


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces reportedly pushed Russian forces from recently taken positions north of Kupyansk. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on December 4 that Ukrainian forces eliminated a Russian bridgehead on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River near Novomlynsk (north of Kupyansk and northeast of Dvorichna) and significantly reduced another Russian bridgehead on the right bank in the direction of Masyutivka-Zapadne area (southeast of Dvorichna).[25]

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on December 4 but did not advance. Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; north of Kupyansk near Dvorichna; east of Kupyansk near Kucherivka and Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Stelmakhivka and Kolisnykivka; west of Svatove near Lozova, Pershotravneve, and Zelenyi Hai; southwest of Svatove near Novoyehorivka, Hrekivka, and Druzhelyubivka; northwest of Kreminna near Terny and Makiivka; and west of Kreminna near Zarichne and Yampolivka on December 3 and 4.[26] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 1.2 kilometers deep in the direction of Lozova and attacked Ukrainian forces from several directions in the area.[27] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Artem Lysohor stated on December 4 that Russian forces have significantly increased their use of drones in the Luhansk direction.[28]


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian and Ukrainian sources did not report combat engagements in the Siversk direction on December 4. Artillery elements of the Russian "Nevsky" Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) reportedly continue operating near Vasyukivka (southwest of Siversk).[29]


Russian forces marginally advanced within Chasiv Yar amid continued offensive operations in the area on December 4. Geolocated footage published on November 28 shows that Russian forces advanced south of and within the Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed on December 4 that elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division entered the Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar from the southeast and secured positions.[31] The milblogger claimed that a Ukrainian counterattack from Ivanivske (south of Chasiv Yar) forced Russian forces to withdraw from some positions along the H-32 Bakhmut-Kostyantynivka highway. Russian forces continued attacks within Chasiv Yar and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Bila Hora on December 3 and 4.[32]


Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced within Toretsk amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on December 4. Geolocated footage published on December 3 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced along Ryaboshapky Street in central Toretsk.[33] Additional geolocated footage published on December 3 indicates that Russian forces also advanced in northern Leonidivka (southwest of Toretsk), although this advance did not occur within the past 24 hours and likely occurred in September 2024.[34] Russian milbloggers claimed on December 3 and 4 that Russian forces have seized most of Zabalka Microraion (southernmost Toretsk) and advanced south of Toretsk to the Tsentralna Mine and adjacent waste heaps.[35] A Ukrainian brigade spokesperson stated that Russian forces in the Toretsk direction continue attacking in groups of up to eight personnel under the cover of smokescreens and with drone and artillery support.[36] Russian forces continued ground attacks within Toretsk and to the south near Nelipivka on December 3 and 4.[37]


Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction. Geolocated footage published on December 4 shows that Russian forces recently marginally advanced to northwestern Zhovte (south of Pokrovsk).[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Novyi Trud (south of Pokrovsk) and reached the outskirts of Zelene and Shevchenko (immediately east and west of Novyi Trud, respectively).[39] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces bypassed Novopustynka (southwest of Pokrovsk) by advancing in fields northeast of the settlement to cut the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Novotroitske highway and also bypassed Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) from the south to advance towards Dachenske (south of Pokrovsk).[40] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces also continued offensive operations east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske, Shevchenko, Pushkine (Chumatske), and Zhovte; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Novopustynka on December 3 and 4.[41]

Russian forces reportedly advanced north of Kurakhove amid continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on December 4. Russian sources claimed that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) seized Stari Terny (north of Kurakhove and on the northern shore of the Kurakhivske Reservoir) on December 3 and are advancing south toward the western outskirts of Kurakhove and Dachne (west of Kurakhove).[42] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Stari Terny on December 1 and accused other Russian milbloggers of falsely presenting this as a new advance.[43] ISW has not observed visual evidence to verify these Russian claims, however, and still has not observed evidence of Russian forces operating in Stari Terny. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 3 and 4 that Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Kurakhove near Sonstivka, Zorya, and Novodmytrivka; in Kurakhove itself; north of Kurakhove near Berestky; west of Kurakhove near Dachne; and south of Kurakhove near Dalne.[44]


Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Vuhledar amid continued offensive operations in the Vuhledar direction on December 4. Geolocated footage posted on December 3 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced southeast of Kostyantynopolske (northwest of Vuhledar) during a reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault.[45] Russian sources further claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Sukhi Yaly (northeast of Vuhledar) and reiterated claims that Russian forces have seized and are securing positions in Romanivka (north of Vuhledar).[46] ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation that Russian forces have seized Romanivka, however. A Russian milblogger also claimed on December 4 that Russian forces are currently attacking two Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) - the Novomykhailivka-Zelenivka road which passes through Kostyantynopolske and Uspenivka (northwest of Vuhledar) and the H-15 Kurakhove-Zaporizhzhia City highway which runs through Kurakhove and Dachne (west of Kurakhove).[47] Russian sources asserted that Russian forces operating northwest of Vuhledar continue to conduct ground attacks toward Kostyantynopolske, which could complicate Ukrainian defensive operations and future withdrawals from Uspenivka, Hannivka, and Veselyi Hai. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 3 and 4 that Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Vuhledar near Hannivka; northeast of Vuhledar near Romanivka and Yelyzavetivka; and northwest of Vuhledar near Uspenivka, Sukhi Yaly, and Kostyantynopolske.[48] Elements of the Russian 36th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating northeast of Vuhledar near Sukhi Yaly and northwest of Vuhledar near Yantarne and surrounding forest belts; and artillery elements of the Russian 1472nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th AC, EMD), including drone operators of the regiment's "Aleppo" detachment, are purportedly operating northwest of Trudove (northwest of Vuhledar).[49]

Both Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka amid intense Russian offensive operations in this direction on December 4. Geolocated footage published on December 3 shows that Ukrainian forces regained positions in southeastern Rozdolne (northeast of Velyka Novosilka), and a Ukrainian brigade operating in the area reported that it repelled Russian forces from the settlement.[50] Additional geolocated footage published on December 4 indicates that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) advanced in southern Blahodatne and east of Makarivka (both south of Velyka Novosilka), and some Russian sources claimed that Russian forces have seized Blahodatne.[51] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of further Russian advances into Blahodatne beyond the southern part of the settlement, however. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced near Novyi Komar (north of Velyka Novosilka), where Ukrainian forces are conducting counterattacks.[52] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces are enveloping Velyka Novosilka and gained "fire control" (the ability to prosecute close-range artillery fires on an area to inhibit movement) over all roads into the city.[53] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 3 and 4 that Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Rozdolne (northeast of Velyka Novosilka), Makarivka (south of Velyka Novosilka), and Novodarivka (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[54] Elements of the Russian 36th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Velyka Novosilka; elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) and other detachments of the 36th CAA are purportedly operating northeast of Blahodatne; and elements of the Russian 143rd and 394th motorized rifle regiments (both 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Vremivka (Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area) direction.[55]


Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Robotyne, Novoandriivka (northwest of Robotyne), and Novodanylivka (north of Robotyne) on December 3 and 4 but did not make any advances.[56]


Russian forces continued assaults in the Dnipro direction on December 3 and 4 but did not make any confirmed advances in the area.[57] Ukrainian Volunteer Army's Southern Group of Forces Spokesperson Serhiy Bratchuk told the Financial Times (FT) in an article published on December 4 that Russian forces recently conducted a "large attack" against Ukrainian forces on Kozatskyi Island (northeast of Kherson City near Nova Kakhovka).[58] Bratchuk reported that Russian forces hope to seize the Dnipro River Delta islands and advance closer to the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on December 4 that Russian forces are constantly assaulting Ukrainian positions on the islands in the Dnipro River Delta.[59] Voloshyn added that Russian forces continue to train assault units of the so-called "Dnipro Flotilla" to conduct naval assault operations using boats in occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts and that the Russian military command transferred these boats to occupied Tendrivska Spit in Kherson Oblast and Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast in early Fall 2024. Voloshyn also noted that the Ukrainian military intelligence is aware that Russian forces transferred about 300 boats in the Dnipro direction. Voloshyn stated that Russian forces have transferred more artillery and air defense systems and river boats to the occupied Kinburn Spit since October 2024.[60] Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Prokudin told FT that the Russian military deployed several of its best drone units to Kherson Oblast to refine drone tactics, train new drone operators, and support Russian assaults against Ukrainian positions on the Dnipro River islands.[61]


Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes in Ukraine on the night of December 3 to 4. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Kh-59/69 cruise missile from Kursk Oblast and 50 Shahed drones and other unidentified drone types (likely referring to decoy drones) from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Oryol City.[62] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 29 drones over Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Chernihiv, Khmelnytskyi, Ternopil, Mykolaiv, and Donetsk oblasts; that 18 drones became ”locally lost”, likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that one drone flew into the airspace over occupied Ukraine. A Russian milblogger claimed that a Russian naval drone destroyed a gas terminal located near Odesa City's port on December 4.[63] ISW has not observed official confirmation of this claim, however.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin continues to use its "Time of Heroes" program to place veterans of the war in Ukraine in leadership positions within the Russian government and major state companies. Russian sources claimed that Russian authorities appointed "Time of Heroes" participant Captain Second Rank Nikolai Korolev to be St. Petersburg's Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Legality, Law, and Order and Security; and appointed "Time of Heroes" participant Captain Pavel Yakushev to be an advisor to the Deputy General Director for Personnel on Patriotic Education at Russian state nuclear energy operator Rosatom.[64]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

See topline text.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian and People's Republic of China (PRC) military representatives met on December 4 in Minsk to discuss deepening bilateral military cooperation.[65]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.


[1] https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Russias_Systematic_Program_of_Coerced_Adoption_and_Fostering_of_Ukraines_Children.pdf

[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlins-occupation-playbook-coerced-russification-and-ethnic-cleansing-occupied

[3] https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-prevention-and-punishment-crime-genocide

[4] https://t.me/tass_agency/288969 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/75751

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2024 ; https://www.rbc dot ru/quote/news/article/67484ec19a7947ff8940370b

[6] https://ura dot news/news/1052851782

[7] https://t.me/tass_agency/288946 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/75751

[8] https://www.rbc dot ru/finances/04/12/2024/674f31f09a7947dbf7cbd2f8 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/12/04/dolya-nalichnyh-sberezheniy-rossiyan-upala-do-istoricheskogo-minimuma

[9] https://www.rbc dot ru/finances/04/12/2024/674f31f09a7947dbf7cbd2f8

[10] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/75751

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101624

[12] https://armenpress dot am/en/article/1206671 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/12/04/my-schitaem-sebya-vne-odkb-my-proshli-tochku-nevozvrata-pashinyan-o-ne-uchastii-armenii-v-organizatsii-dogovora-o-kollektivnoy-bezopasnosti; https://www.civilnet dot am/en/news/808128/point-of-no-return-pashinyan-signals-definitive-split-from-russia-led-military-alliance/

[13] https://mil dot am/hy/news/10460 ; https://oc-media dot org/live-updates-azerbaijan-launches-attacks-along-armenian-border/ ; https://hetq dot am/en/article/144181

[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2024

[15] https://x.com/blinzka/status/1863959221177393635; https://t.me/kryvyirih17otbr/3961; https://t.me/ua_marines_36brigade/2500

[16] https://t.me/dva_majors/59286; https://t.me/rybar/66007

[17] https://t.me/dva_majors/59286; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20346

[18] https://t.me/rybar/66000; https://t.me/pentagonkh/119; https://t.me/motopatriot/30107; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dpRJvqK2Z3RzPejmg6LT66n5BZLsYBzezMfWk9n5SPK52egMv7h8GwEnSCRKbFtml

[19] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20305; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20309; https://t.me/rusich_army/19016

[20] https://t.me/mod_russia/46470; https://t.me/mod_russia/46471 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/46485

[21] https://t.me/vchkogpu/53007; https://t.me/bbbreaking/195286 ; https://t.me/abusaddamshishani/6378 ; https://t.me/abusaddamshishani/6379 ; https://t.me/astrapress/69721 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/53005 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/136662

[22]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dpRJvqK2Z3RzPejmg6LT66n5BZLsYBzezMfWk9n5SPK52egMv7h8GwEnSCRKbFtml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02R7MrM3M1PsyfyWkfMkktGUJEzJKpcTPK1dw9WvzZuuhY8aLNH1zeG4vgHUJaDufYl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04vxQs37PenZy7KrrSZmajsULfk5aBT4ghw16xudZi3D6wzFCq4mC2YrBkCTykc6pl ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/2919

[23] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/12/04/shozhe-na-vyetnamsku-vijnu-okupanty-rozumiyut-yakshho-vony-budut-kopaty-to-duzhe-shvydko-zakinchatsya/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ScdUZNkwcYc

[24] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146686

[25] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2386 ; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid02gUd9R1jjpUy4LQ5qsvuYSAg5SkJcTw7DFGvtUhiRWywk7syn8nZ6dvakDwpexpobl?__cft__[0]=AZX1cYZGE-FpuL4UnFkXFUd1SPMGKxtWyAi4Xxi7PO46bNGLWt0kK_ZvagjKR8WCMwaFhEE61-31yPSudyOr4IAppWBH7MSHqM_cf7daQ-ijOqARzTa4yQ-GkkflBkMrcSsbf2vycaP9AdcXZP0mhvv-nMBesndXvM1KydjQLFdCxlmjKLzQ2W0UBeiufuZQohM&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[26] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dpRJvqK2Z3RzPejmg6LT66n5BZLsYBzezMfWk9n5SPK52egMv7h8GwEnSCRKbFtml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02R7MrM3M1PsyfyWkfMkktGUJEzJKpcTPK1dw9WvzZuuhY8aLNH1zeG4vgHUJaDufYl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04vxQs37PenZy7KrrSZmajsULfk5aBT4ghw16xudZi3D6wzFCq4mC2YrBkCTykc6pl

[27] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146637

[28] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/23135

[29] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/41938

[30] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7732; https://t.me/RVP244/2157

[31] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20335

[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02R7MrM3M1PsyfyWkfMkktGUJEzJKpcTPK1dw9WvzZuuhY8aLNH1zeG4vgHUJaDufYl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04vxQs37PenZy7KrrSZmajsULfk5aBT4ghw16xudZi3D6wzFCq4mC2YrBkCTykc6pl; https://t.me/wargonzo/23499; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20305; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20335

[33] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1864113389183651950; https://t.me/ZParaBellumMD/13476

[34] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1864099954433630554; https://t.me/azov_media/6311; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1864061425141821567

[35] https://t.me/rybar/66000 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/59286; https://t.me/rybar/66007; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20337; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81906; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29897

[36] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/12/04/odyn-dva-distayutsya-okopiv-tam-yih-znyshhuye-pihota-abo-drony-poblyzu-toreczka-vorog-dotrymuyetsya-taktyky-targaniv/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDXWlQ2K0dM

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dpRJvqK2Z3RzPejmg6LT66n5BZLsYBzezMfWk9n5SPK52egMv7h8GwEnSCRKbFtml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02R7MrM3M1PsyfyWkfMkktGUJEzJKpcTPK1dw9WvzZuuhY8aLNH1zeG4vgHUJaDufYl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04vxQs37PenZy7KrrSZmajsULfk5aBT4ghw16xudZi3D6wzFCq4mC2YrBkCTykc6pl; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81906;

[38] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7731; https://t.me/answertime1/108

[39] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60482

[40] https://t.me/rybar/66000; https://t.me/dva_majors/59286; https://t.me/rybar/66007; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20340; https://t.me/motopatriot/30090; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29907; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81933;

[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dpRJvqK2Z3RzPejmg6LT66n5BZLsYBzezMfWk9n5SPK52egMv7h8GwEnSCRKbFtml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02R7MrM3M1PsyfyWkfMkktGUJEzJKpcTPK1dw9WvzZuuhY8aLNH1zeG4vgHUJaDufYl

[42] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146612 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146635 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146636; https://t.me/epoddubny/21817; https://t.me/notes_veterans/20865; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60481 https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81920; https://t.me/dva_majors/59286; https://t.me/rybar/66007

[43] https://t.me/motopatriot/30034 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/30041

[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02R7MrM3M1PsyfyWkfMkktGUJEzJKpcTPK1dw9WvzZuuhY8aLNH1zeG4vgHUJaDufYl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dpRJvqK2Z3RzPejmg6LT66n5BZLsYBzezMfWk9n5SPK52egMv7h8GwEnSCRKbFtml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dpRJvqK2Z3RzPejmg6LT66n5BZLsYBzezMfWk9n5SPK52egMv7h8GwEnSCRKbFtml

[45] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7725; https://www.facebook.com/37obrmp/videos/1360811338236121/

[46] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146685; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60481; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146685; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20341; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20305; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146612;

[47] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60485

[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dpRJvqK2Z3RzPejmg6LT66n5BZLsYBzezMfWk9n5SPK52egMv7h8GwEnSCRKbFtml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02R7MrM3M1PsyfyWkfMkktGUJEzJKpcTPK1dw9WvzZuuhY8aLNH1zeG4vgHUJaDufYl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04vxQs37PenZy7KrrSZmajsULfk5aBT4ghw16xudZi3D6wzFCq4mC2YrBkCTykc6pl

[49] https://t.me/voin_dv/12115; https://t.me/voin_dv/12113

[50] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2qsqxa1VqVs ; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1864248892017045723 ; https://t.me/skalabatalion/459

[51] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7729 ; https://t.me/burpobeda/9201 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81947

[52] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60481;https://t.me/wargonzo/23499

[53] https://t.me/wargonzo/23504; https://t.me/dva_majors/59286 ; https://t.me/rybar/66007; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81920 ;

[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04vxQs37PenZy7KrrSZmajsULfk5aBT4ghw16xudZi3D6wzFCq4mC2YrBkCTykc6pl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02R7MrM3M1PsyfyWkfMkktGUJEzJKpcTPK1dw9WvzZuuhY8aLNH1zeG4vgHUJaDufYl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dpRJvqK2Z3RzPejmg6LT66n5BZLsYBzezMfWk9n5SPK52egMv7h8GwEnSCRKbFtml

[55] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146623; https://t.me/dva_majors/59336; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81947

[56]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02R7MrM3M1PsyfyWkfMkktGUJEzJKpcTPK1dw9WvzZuuhY8aLNH1zeG4vgHUJaDufYl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04vxQs37PenZy7KrrSZmajsULfk5aBT4ghw16xudZi3D6wzFCq4mC2YrBkCTykc6pl

[57]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dpRJvqK2Z3RzPejmg6LT66n5BZLsYBzezMfWk9n5SPK52egMv7h8GwEnSCRKbFtml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02R7MrM3M1PsyfyWkfMkktGUJEzJKpcTPK1dw9WvzZuuhY8aLNH1zeG4vgHUJaDufYl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04vxQs37PenZy7KrrSZmajsULfk5aBT4ghw16xudZi3D6wzFCq4mC2YrBkCTykc6pl

[58] https://www.ft.com/content/31b630b3-2639-456c-ba50-3caea7a9b2b5

[59] https://suspilne dot media/kherson/873777-vijskovi-rf-namagautsa-zakripitisa-na-ostrovah-poblizu-hersona-j-zibrali-300-kateriv-na-livoberezzi-volosin/

[60] https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-armiia-rosii-kilkist-pidrozdiliv-kinburnka-kosa/33225408.html ; https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/894629-rosiani-stagnuli-svoi-pidrozdili-na-kinburnskij-pivostriv-so-na-mikolaivsini-sili-oboroni-pivdna/

[61] https://www.ft.com/content/31b630b3-2639-456c-ba50-3caea7a9b2b5 ; https://suspilne dot media/894345-ssa-vidilat-825-mln-na-posilenna-energostijkosti-ukraini-golova-opu-ermak-ide-do-vasingtona-1015-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1733304958&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[62] https://t.me/kpszsu/24101

[63] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146696 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146700

[64] https://xn--b1aachba0csne6n dot xn--p1ai/news/tpost/02343mcnz1-uchastnik-programmi-vremya-geroev-nikola ; https://t.me/readovkanews/90120

[65] https://t.me/modmilby/43671