China-Taiwan Weekly Update, February 13, 2025

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, and Frank Mattimoe of the Institute for the Study of War;

Alexis Turek and Yeji Chung of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: February 11, 2025

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways  

• Taiwanese civil society groups have now submitted recall petitions targeting 31 opposition Kuomintang (KMT) legislators and 13 legislators from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Recall efforts could shift the balance of power within the Legislative Yuan (LY) by reducing the KMT-led majority.
• Taiwan’s Ministry of the Interior (MOI) investigated claims that Taiwanese and PRC companies helped Taiwanese nationals illegally procure PRC identification cards in support of an expansion of CCP United Front soft power operations against Taiwan.
• The ROC Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported sighting six PRC high-altitude balloons near Taiwan in one day, with one passing directly over the main island.
• The PRC’s new directive restricting online publication of military-related information reflects the PRC’s heightened sensitivity to leaks that expose military capabilities and the reinforcement of CCP control over the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) by silencing narratives that challenge party authority.
• PRC General Secretary Xi Jinping met with South Korea’s National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik in Harbin, Heilongjiang Province on February 7, 2025. The meeting reflects the PRC’s growing efforts to strengthen ties with South Korea amid its escalating trade war with the U.S. and political instability in South Korea.
• The PRC’s appointment of Lu Shaye as special representative for European Affairs signals that Beijing intends to take a more aggressive posture in negotiations with the European Union.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

Taiwanese civil society groups have now submitted recall petitions targeting 31 opposition Kuomintang (KMT) legislators and 13 legislators from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Recall efforts could shift the balance of power within the Legislative Yuan (LY) by reducing the KMT-led majority. These 44 recall petitions have received signatures from more than 1 percent of the eligible voters in their electoral district, clearing the first threshold to initiate a recall election.[1] The next step is for recall petitioners to get signatures from at least 10 percent of eligible voters within the relevant electoral district within 60 days. Once Taiwan’s Central Election Commission verifies these signatures, the recall vote can commence. If a majority of voters vote to recall the elected official, and this majority exceeds 25 percent of eligible voters in the district, a special election must be held within three months to fill the vacated seat. The LY currently has no majority party, with the DPP holding 51 seats, the KMT holding 54 (including two KMT-aligned independents), and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) holding 8 seats. The opposition has a majority in practice, however, because the KMT and TPP have typically aligned on key issues. The DPP could regain control of the LY if its supporters can successfully recall and replace six KMT legislators and maintain all contested DPP legislative seats.  

KMT- and TPP-backed amendments to Taiwan’s Public Officials Election and Recall Act could make recall efforts more difficult, however. The opposition parties passed an amendment on December 20, 2024, requiring those who propose or sign a recall initiative to provide a copy of their ID card instead of their ID numbers and addresses.[2] The Executive Yuan requested a reexamination of the amendment in January 2025, but the LY voted along party lines to preserve the amendment on February 11.[3] The TPP, though not facing a potential recall of its elected legislators, has voiced its opposition to the mass recall campaign. Acting TPP Chairman Huang Kuo-chang called DPP efforts to recall KMT legislators an act of “green authoritarianism,” a reference to the DPP official party color. [4] President William Lai Ching-te has 10 days to sign the bill into law after the LY sends it to him. Petitions that complete both rounds of signature collection before the bill is signed into law will not be subject to the amendment, though it is possible that the KMT may use this amendment as an opportunity to challenge the legality of recall proceedings.

Taiwan’s Ministry of the Interior (MOI) investigated claims that Taiwanese and PRC companies helped Taiwanese nationals illegally procure PRC identification cards in support of an expansion of CCP United Front soft power operations against Taiwan. The MOI initiated its investigation after Taiwanese Youtuber Pa Chiung made a video documentary alleging that between three to five Taiwanese travel companies and public relations firms, as well as two PRC companies, helped Taiwanese citizens apply for PRC ID cards during trips to the PRC.[5] Taiwanese media described Pa as an “anti-CCP” Youtuber, whose content investigates PRC United Front activity targeting Taiwanese nationals.[6]

The United Front is a whole-of-government and society effort to advance the CCP’s ideology and interests by co-opting non-government segments of Chinese society. United Front activities against Taiwan support PRC efforts to politically assimilate Taiwan, particularly by inculcating in the Taiwanese public CCP notions that the PRC is the only legitimate government of China and Taiwan is a part of that China. United Front work can also support covert and clandestine activities, such as infiltration, manipulation, co-optation, and intelligence gathering on target groups.[7]

The MOI is investigating whether the Taiwanese companies assisted the Taiwanese nationals in illegally obtaining the ID cards in breach of Taiwan’s Act Governing Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area.[8] The MOI also aims to determine whether the Taiwanese companies’ actions “were purely commercial” or part of a larger United Front operation to promote the PRC’s annexation of Taiwan, as Taiwan designates commercial activities by Taiwanese companies in the PRC as permissible by law.[9]  Taiwan’s Interior Minister Liu Shyh-fang stated that Taiwan's and the PRC’s citizenship registration systems “are mutually exclusive,” making it illegal for Taiwanese citizens to simultaneously hold PRC citizenship documents or household registrations.[10] The MOI has interviewed over 30 individuals it identified as possessing PRC ID cards as part of its investigation, though Pa Chiung made an unverified claimed that up to 200,000 Taiwanese citizens may have obtained PRC IDs in the last decade.[11] Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau called Pa’s claims exaggerated.[12] Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council also announced that three Taiwanese nationals have had their citizenship revoked due to possession of illegal PRC ID cards since it began its investigation in January.[13]

The PRC’s issuance of IDs to Taiwanese nationals dovetails with efforts to encourage people-to-people exchanges between Taiwan and the PRC to promote the PRC’s political incorporation of Taiwan.[14] The Fujian United Front Work Department announced a plan in January to promote further Taiwanese visits to the PRC by increasing professional exchanges in various fields, adding more flights between Taiwan and Fujian Province, and encouraging first-time visitors to find jobs in the province.[15] Fujian is central to Beijing’s “peaceful reunification” efforts because it is the site of the “Fujian Cross-Strait Integration Zone,” which the PRC unveiled in 2023 to strengthen ties between Fujian and Taiwan and facilitate the integration of Taiwanese nationals into Fujian’s society, economy, and governance.[16] The issuance of PRC ID cards to Taiwanese people is one of many policies intended to make it easier for Taiwanese to live, work, study, invest, and travel in Fujian and elsewhere in the PRC.

These efforts may represent PRC “passportization” efforts against Taiwan, wherein the PRC seeks to legitimize its claim on the island by granting PRC documents to Taiwanese nationals and support rhetoric identifying Taiwan as a part of China. The PRC could attempt to use Taiwanese citizens’ possession of PRC ID cards as justification for intervention in Taiwan under the pretense of protecting “PRC citizens” from oppression under the DPP government. The passportization campaign against Taiwan bears similarities with Russia’s passportization campaign in occupied Ukrainian territory, wherein Russia uses those who have “willfully” adopted Russian citizenship to support assertions that its territorial claims “are incontrovertible and irreversible,” providing further justification for Russia’s military occupation of Ukraine.[17] Residents of Taiwan’s Kinmen and Matsu archipelagos, which the PRC consider to be part of Fujian province, may be particularly vulnerable to such “passportization” efforts. The islands’ residents rely on the PRC economically and often travel to and from the PRC mainland. Pa Chiung’s documentary showed that Taiwanese citizens who take the ferry from Kinmen to Xiamen, Fujian, are encouraged to register for a Taiwan Compatriot Certificate, which enables them to travel freely to the PRC, buy property and establish a bank account, the first steps in obtaining residency in the PRC.[18] Kinmen in particular is a target of United Front efforts, including an initiative called the “Kinmen-Xiamen Common Living Circle,” which seeks to promote economic and cultural ties between Taiwan and the PRC. National Chengchi University Taiwan-China affairs researcher Soong Kuo-cheng stated that with further economic and integration through transport links, the PRC could integrate Kinmen into Fujian province and demonstrate that the ‘one country, two systems’ policy could be replicated with all of Taiwan.[19]  The islands’ reliance on the PRC and the PRC’s emphasis on economic integration makes it likely that the PRC’s passportization program has disproportionately affected the residents of the islands.

The ROC Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported sighting six PRC high-altitude balloons near Taiwan in one day, with one passing directly over the main island. This marked the highest number of PRC balloons in Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in one day since February 10, 2024.[20] The MND reported nine PRC military aircraft, two official ships, and six warships — a “normal” number of non-balloon ADIZ incursions — near Taiwan during the same period as the balloon sightings (February 6–7).[21] The MND began reporting PRC balloons in its ADIZ in December 2023. Balloon activity spiked in volume and increased to daily frequency during the weeks leading up to Taiwan’s election on January 13, 2024, then gradually tapered off until April 2024.[22]  MND began reporting balloon sightings again in November 2024, which gradually increased in subsequent months.[23] At least 16 PRC balloons flew through Taiwan’s ADIZ in January 2025, including seven that flew directly over Taiwan, and 13 in February as of the time of writing (at least two of them over Taiwan).[24]  The balloon overflights are part of a broader PRC effort to harass Taiwan, degrade its response capabilities, and strain its resources, consistent with the effect of normalizing ADIZ incursions more generally.[25] Balloons are able to enter Taiwan’s airspace without triggering a Taiwanese military response, unlike military aircraft.

The PRC balloons over Taiwan also likely serve surveillance and other data collection purposes that may help the PRC plan military activities such as airstrikes. The PRC has maintained that balloons sighted over Taiwan are “mostly” weather balloons.[26] Reuters reported that most weather balloons fly 80,000–120,000 ft above the ground; the balloons spotted in Taiwan between December 2023 and April 2024 flew between altitudes of 10,000–40,000 ft, however.[27] A similar PRC spy balloon crossed the United States in February 2023 at an altitude of 60,000 ft.[28] PRC surveillance balloons could provide the PRC with a low-cost, deniable means of collecting intelligence on Taiwan’s topography and meteorology, among other things.

The PRC is using its political influence in developing countries to create the impression of widespread international support for its goals to annex Taiwan. Studies by the Economist and the Lowy Institute found that dozens of “Global South” countries, especially in Africa, adopted language in support of “all” PRC efforts to achieve “national reunification” in the last two years. The Australian think tank The Lowy Institute’s January 2025 study broke UN member states into five distinct categories based on their stances on the status of Taiwan. No countries can have diplomatic relations with both the PRC and Taiwan due to Beijing’s insistence on its “one-China principle.” Only 11 UN states, plus Vatican City, formally recognize the ROC over the PRC. 40 countries, including the United States, recognize the PRC government in Beijing but stop short of recognizing the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan. 142 countries explicitly recognize the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan; of these, 119 have endorsed Beijing’s one-China Principle directly. A further subset of 89 “Beijing backer” countries recognize the PRC, support the one-China principle, and support the PRC’s actions to “achieve national reunification” without specifying a preference for peaceful means.[29]  The Economist published a similar study on February 9 that identified 70 countries that recognize PRC sovereignty over Taiwan as well as “all” efforts by the PRC to achieve national reunification. The study noted that 97% of those 70 countries were in the Global South, and that the vast majority of them adopted that new wording in the past 18 months.[30] Many African countries joined this category for the first time during the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in September 2024, when 53 African states signed a joint statement that said “Africa […] firmly supports all efforts by the Chinese government to achieve national reunification.”[31]

The PRC has sought to cultivate pro-PRC sentiment globally by portraying itself as a leader of the Global South and has used this diplomatic goodwill to garner support for its stance against the ROC. The PRC’s efforts to garner support for Taiwan “reunification” efforts suggests that the PRC is prioritizing information operations designed to create the appearance of a global consensus. PRC foreign policy officials likely understand that very few of the Global South countries that have expressed approval for reunification efforts would substantively aid either side in an invasion of Taiwan. The PRC likely aims instead to use the rhetorical support it has created among Global South countries to create the appearance of legitimacy for any actions it chooses to take against Taiwan. Beijing wishes to take a leadership role in the international system, including in existing institutions, and it needs the support of as many countries as possible. Gaining rhetorical support from a growing number of countries for “all efforts” at “reunification” can help insulate the PRC from some of the reputational damage it may incur if it takes aggressive action against Taiwan.

The Lowy Institute and Economist studies also reveal that the degree of “international consensus” behind the PRC stance on Taiwan is less overwhelming than it claims. The PRC often claims that the 180 UN member states that recognize the PRC rather than Taiwan, as well as UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, constitute an overwhelming international consensus in support of its “one China principle” that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the PRC. UNGA 2758 was the 1971 resolution that expelled “the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek” (i.e., the ROC) from the United Nations and gave “China’s” UN seat to the PRC instead. The resolution does not mention the status of Taiwan, however. PRC officials reference this supposed consensus in response to any countries that they perceive to be supporting Taiwan’s independence or opposing the PRC’s sovereignty claim over Taiwan. Not all countries that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan explicitly recognize Beijing’s sovereignty over Taiwan, however. Even countries that recognize Beijing’s sovereignty claims do not necessarily endorse “reunification” by force. The UN as an institution has clarified that it does not endorse Beijing pursuing “reunification” by any means it wishes.[32]

 

China

The PRC’s new directive restricting online publication of military-related information reflects the PRC’s heightened sensitivity to leaks that expose military capabilities and the reinforcement of CCP control over the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) by silencing narratives that challenge party authority. The PRC published directives on February 8 that limit the information that PRC military bloggers and media outlets are permitted to share online regarding the PLA.[33] The directive prohibits online military information providers from “producing, copying, publishing, or disseminating” previously undisclosed information about the military, including troop activities, the development, testing, and deployment of weapons and equipment; information about military facilities, and more. The stated aims of the directives, according to the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), are to strengthen the management of information to prevent the leaking of military secrets, manage public opinion relating to the military, and stop the spread of disinformation.[34] Tighter restrictions on what content is allowed to be published online imply greater challenges for monitoring PRC military developments in the open source.

The directive signals the PRC’s increasing sensitivity over leaks that threaten to expose certain capabilities and possible intentions amid the PRC’s ongoing development of new military technology and equipment. The rules apply to any entities that publish online information about the military, such as media outlets, military units and departments, security-related education institutions, and individual scholars and bloggers. PRC military bloggers and social media users have previously circulated footage of military hardware that potentially undermines the confidentiality of PLA capabilities. PRC netizens shared pictures and videos of a previously unknown sixth generation stealth combat aircraft flying above Chengdu on December 26.[35]

The directive, which takes effect on March 1, also focuses on maintaining the CCP’s control over the PLA. The directive emphasizes the responsibility of publishers of military-related content not to spread notions that contradict the CCP’s absolute authority over the PLA and the CMC Chairman Responsibility System. The CMC Chairman Responsibility System refers to a concept that emphasizes the CMC Chairman (Xi Jinping)’s centrality in the military hierarchy and command structure.[36] The directive encourages publishers of military-related content to endorse Xi Jinping’s political theory, including Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military. This doctrine promotes the notion that Xi’s organizational reforms of the PLA, orientation of the CCP around Xi, and emphasis on strict CCP control of the PLA are necessary to strengthen the PLA as a fighting force. The explicit connection indicates that Xi regards insufficient consensus over the CCP’s governance of the military as an inhibitor of the PLA’s warfighting capability.

The issuance of the directive follows several recent incidents that may indicate tension in the PLA regarding party-military relations. The PRC Ministry of Defense (MOD) announced on November 28 that it had suspended Director of the Political Work Department of the CMC Miao Hua amid his investigation for suspected “serious violations of discipline.”[37] Miao Hua was the highest-ranking political commissar in the PLA, a position that carries the ultimate responsibility of instilling Xi’s vision of political loyalty throughout the military. Multiple PLA affiliated organizations published articles in December 2024 that emphasized tenets of collective leadership and intra-party democracy as the guiding principles of the party’s governance of the military, which is inconsistent with Xi’s vision of centralized hierarchy.[38] The CMC subsequently replaced the political commissar of the PLA Ground Force on December 23, possibly signaling that Xi held other high-ranking officers responsible for perceived failures to achieve his version of political loyalty.[39] The new directive outlined plans to increase scrutiny over public agencies and military commands’ dissemination of military-related content through media training.

The directive’s focus on silencing undesirable views regarding the CCP’s control over the military amid instability in the highest echelons of the PLA’s political commissars signals that the CCP perceives the sources of these narratives as threats that ultimately inhibit the PLA’s effectiveness as a fighting force.

Northeast Asia

Japan

The PRC strongly condemned a joint statement by US President Donald Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba for its comments on Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands. Trump and Ishiba met in Washington, DC, on February 7 for their first bilateral summit. A joint statement from the two leaders encouraged the “peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues” and “opposed any attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force or coercion.”[40] Japanese newspaper Nikkei reported that this was the first time the United States’ and Japan’s stated position on the Taiwan Strait explicitly opposed changes to the cross-strait status quo through “coercion.”[41] The joint statement also expressed support for Taiwan’s “meaningful participation” in international organizations.[42] PRC MFA spokesperson Guo Jiakun said that the PRC was “strongly dissatisfied” and lodged “solemn representations” with the US and Japanese governments over the statement, which he claimed “blatantly interferes in China's internal affairs, attacks and smears China, and exaggerates regional tensions.” He said that “the Taiwan issue is purely China's internal affairs and the core of China's core interests,” stressing that Japan, in particular, “should be more cautious in its words and deeds” due to its history of colonizing Taiwan. He argued that Japan and the United States should abide by the one-China principle and clearly oppose Taiwan’s independence if they truly want peace. He further stated that Taiwan “has no basis, reason or right” to participate in international organizations that only admit sovereign states.[43]

The PRC also objected to Trump's and Ishiba’s statements about the Senkaku Islands, a disputed but Japan-administered uninhabited archipelago in the East China Sea. Trump and Ishiba reaffirmed in their joint statement that the US-Japan mutual defense treaty of 1960 applies to the Senkaku Islands, which means that an attack on the islands would trigger US military intervention to aid Japan. The United States has held this position since 1972. The two leaders also stated their “strong opposition to any action that seeks to undermine Japan’s longstanding and peaceful administration of the Senkaku Islands.”[44] The PRC and Taiwan also claim the Senkaku Islands under the name “Diaoyu Islands,” and PRC coast guard vessels patrolled within the islands’ contiguous zone nearly every day of 2024 and 2023 to assert PRC legal jurisdiction there.[45] MFA spokesperson Guo stated that “the Diaoyu Islands and their affiliated islands are China's inherent territory. China's activities in the relevant waters are completely legitimate and legal.”[46]

The PRC’s especially strong objection to the Trump-Ishiba comments on Taiwan likely results from the fact that the comments signaled a new level of US-Japan alignment in opposition to what the PRC perceives to be its core interests. The US and Japanese opposition to cross-strait reunification by force is longstanding. The addition of “coercion” in the language of the joint statement, however, extends that opposition to a greatly expanded range of PRC “gray zone” activities including coast guard patrols around Taiwanese territory, coercive economic measures, cyberattacks, and other nonviolent means that the PRC has employed to intimidate or pressure Taiwan. The inclusion of “coercion” in the language also brings the joint statement more in line with the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, which stipulates that the United States shall maintain the capacity “to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.”[47] The Trump-Ishiba joint statement did not include concrete commitments of action against PRC coercion but signified an intent by Japan and the United States to more strongly challenge tactics that the PRC regularly uses to advance its eventual goal of “reunification.” Beijing also views US-Japan rhetorical alignment on the Taiwan issue as part of a trend of anti-PRC coalition-building within the PRC’s home region. The PRC very likely fears that such a coalition will reduce its chance of successfully annexing Taiwan and will be used to “contain” the PRC within the First Island Chain. The PRC MFA’s reaction to the Senkaku Islands statement was relatively mild, by contrast, both because the US-Japanese position on that subject is not new and because the Senkaku Islands are of lesser importance to the PRC than Taiwan.

North Korea

A PRC regional bank is reportedly involved in facilitating financial transactions related to North Korean minerals, potentially enabling North Korea to circumvent international sanctions. South Korean media outlet Daily NK reported on February 5, citing sources in the PRC, that “Bank A” has been handling payments for mineral trade transactions between PRC companies and North Korean trading firms since January 23.[48] The UN Security Council’s sanctions under Resolution 2371 prohibit the export of North Korean minerals. The report claims that North Korea is earning “tens of thousands of yuan in monthly operating profit, with a 0.5-1% commission per transaction.” The report also accused the bank of “falsifying transaction records” to conceal large transfers of money from the PRC to North Korea and disguising the nature of the items traded.  The report suggested that local PRC government officials may be cooperating with North Korean firms as import-export businesses are required to report their activities to the local authorities. Despite this, the PRC maintains that it “faithfully fulfills its due international obligations.”[49] The report’s allegations, nevertheless, would point to ongoing efforts by the PRC to help North Korea circumvent international sanctions and generate illicit revenues for its regime.

South Korea

PRC General Secretary Xi Jinping met with South Korea’s National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik in Harbin, Heilongjiang Province on February 7, 2025.[50] The meeting reflects the PRC’s growing efforts to strengthen ties with South Korea amid its escalating trade war with the U.S. and political instability in South Korea. Woo, in China for the Asian Winter Games, invited Xi to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in South Korea in October. Xi indicated that he would seriously consider the invitation, which would mark his first visit to South Korea in 11 years.[51] Woo also addressed the PRC’s export restrictions on South Korean films and games, imposed in retaliation for South Korea’s deployment of the US-provided Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in 2017.[52] Xi acknowledged the importance of cultural exchange in bilateral relations and said that it should not be hindered by unnecessary complications.  

The meeting could signal Xi’s efforts to leverage South Korea’s political instability to strengthen economic ties with South Korea amid the PRC’s intensifying trade war with the United States. US President Donald Trump imposed 10% duties on all PRC imports, to which the PRC responded with retaliatory duties.[53] South Korea, a key-US ally, is especially important to PRC efforts to weaken a US-led economic coalition. South Korea faces a leadership vacuum and an expected early presidential election in June after President Yoon Suk-yeol's impeachment. The potential presidency of Lee Jae-myung, the opposition party leader, could signal a South Korean foreign policy shift from a pro-US stance to a more balanced approach between the PRC and the United States. Xi’s meeting with Woo may indicate the PRC’s strategy to position itself favorably ahead of potential leadership changes in South Korea.

South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) accused the PRC’s artificial intelligence (AI) start-up DeekSeek of “excessively” collecting and storing user data on February 10.[54] The NIS said, “unlike other generative AI services, it has been confirmed that chat records are transferable as it includes a function to collect keyboard input patterns that can identify individuals and communicate with Chinese companies’ servers.” Several South Korean government agencies such as the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy; Ministry of National Defense; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and state-run Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power restricted or blocked access to DeepSeek for their employees due to security concerns on February 6.[55] PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said the PRC “attaches great importance to and legally protects data privacy and security,” adding that the PRC has “never demanded, nor will it require, enterprises or individuals to collect or store data in an illegal manner,” in response to the South Korean government agencies’ ban on the app.[56]  South Korea joins a growing list of countries, including the United States , Australia, Italy, and the ROC, that have banned the app for government employees due to security risks.[57] The concerns are linked to the PRC’s National Intelligence Law, which could allow the state to access corporate data.[58]

Oceania

The PRC appears to be exploiting divisions between the Cook Islands and New Zealand, which have a free association arrangement.[59] The Cook Islands will sign a comprehensive strategic partnership with the PRC as the PRC seeks to expand influence and access in the South Pacific. PRC MFA spokesman Guo Jiakun said that the Cook Islands has been “an important partner of China in the South Pacific region” since relations were established in 1997 and that bilateral ties are “not directed against any third party” in a regular press conference on February 10.[60] The MFA has not released information detailing the terms of the comprehensive strategic partnership at the time of writing. A Cook Islands government readout detailed that Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown would travel to Beijing from February 10–14 to sign the agreement, which “presents an opportunity to enhance cooperation across key sectors, including trade, investment, and tourism; infrastructure; climate resilience and renewable energy; agriculture; maritime and oceans, including shipping and seabed minerals development.”[61]

New Zealand and the Cook Islands have maintained a compact of free association, through which New Zealand funds aid and defense for the Cook Islands. The Cook Islands were administered by New Zealand until 1965. The islands are now self-governing, but citizens have New Zealand passports and citizenship, and the country does not have a UN seat. The United States recognizes the Cook Islands as an independent state, however. The Cook Islands and New Zealand agreed in 2001 to maintain regular discussions on foreign policy issues of mutual interest.[62] New Zealand officials expressed surprise amid the Cook Islands’ decision to sign a deal with the PRC. Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of New Zealand Winston Peters said that New Zealand was “blindsided” by the development.[63] Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown argued that the Cook Islands were not obligated to inform New Zealand because the agreement with the PRC was not germane to policing or security issues.[64] Brown also rejected accusations of “secretive” Cook Islands-PRC engagement and argued that the agreement was in the Cook Islands’ “best interest.”[65]

ISW has tracked PRC diplomatic outreach in the South Pacific and noted that foreign direct investment (FDI), security cooperation, and military diplomacy can all offer the PRC a path to improve its power projection in Oceania.[66] The Solomon Islands signed a security agreement with the PRC in March 2022 that included granting the PRC access and replenishment rights to Solomon Islands ports, as well as the right to use its armed forces to protect Chinese projects and personnel in the Solomon Islands.[67] PRC agreements with other Pacific Island states have not included such overt concessions to PRC military interests but serve to expand PRC political influence in the countries to advance Beijing’s strategic ambitions and in some cases convince the countries to abandon their support for Taiwan.  A comprehensive strategic partnership with the Cook Islands could present the PRC with an opportunity to make political inroads with a country located close to New Zealand and the US territory of American Samoa. The Cook Islands has shown a willingness to reduce its dependence on New Zealand, including an announcement by Mark Brown on February 7 that the country could issue its own passports.[68]

PRC efforts to expand influence in the Pacific have faced backlash from the Five Eyes intelligence sharing group, most notably the United States and Australia. New Zealand is a Five Eyes member state but has faced criticism for taking a softer approach toward the PRC than its counterparts.[69] Current New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters expressed interest in expanding engagement with the Five Eyes and led the development of the Pacific Reset strategy, which sought to cultivate New Zealand’s ties with Pacific neighbors.[70]

 

 

Europe

The PRC’s appointment of Lu Shaye as special representative for European Affairs signals that Beijing intends to take a more aggressive posture in negotiations with the European Union. Lu Shaye was the PRC’s ambassador to France from July 2019 to December 2024. He was one of Beijing’s most controversial ambassadors due to his combative “wolf warrior” style, a term Lu embraced. The French foreign ministry summoned Lu seven times in his five-year tenure over various high-profile disputes, including his comment in April 2023 that ex-Soviet states do not have “effective status” under international law, which he made when asked whether he considered Crimea to be part of Ukraine. The Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post cited “people familiar with the case” who said Lu had lost access to any relevant French government organs by the time he left Paris.[71] Lu replaced Wu Hongbo as the PRC Special Representative for European Affairs, a role that Wu held since it was created in 2019.[72] Lu’s special representative role is distinct from the post of PRC Ambassador to the EU, which is held by another diplomat. “Special representative” is an ad hoc role that the PRC MFA creates when it sees a need to have one chief negotiator responsible for a broad region or issue area, such as European affairs, the Korean Peninsula, or climate change.

Lu’s appointment follows signs from European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen that the EU may be softening its stance on the PRC. Von der Leyen, widely described in Western and PRC media as a prominent “China hawk” for her efforts to reduce the EU’s reliance on the PRC, said in a speech at the EU Ambassadors Conference on February 3 that there is “room to engage constructively with China — and find solutions in our mutual interest,” including “agreements that could even expand our trade and investment ties.”[73] She said the EU would continue “de-risking” policies to “rebalance” EU-PRC trade and investment relations, however.[74] Von der Leyen’s apparent shift toward the PRC may stem from uncertainty about the future of the US-EU economic relationship in the near term, as US President Donald Trump had promised tariffs on EU goods.[75] Trump announced on February 11 that the United States would raise tariffs on foreign aluminum and steel to 25%, prompting condemnation and a promise of “firm and proportionate countermeasures” from von der Leyen.[76]

The PRC’s promotion of Lu Shaye as its top representative to the EU likely signals Beijing’s intent to aggressively negotiate against European “de-risking” policies. The PRC may seek to take advantage of the shakiness of the EU’s economic relationship with the United States, its largest trading partner.[77] Lu’s “wolf warrior” approach is more likely to offend and alienate his European interlocutors, however, than to improve the EU-PRC trade relationship.

Lu’s appointment may also portend the PRC taking a more overtly pro-Russia stance on the war in Ukraine. The PRC’s main negotiator on the Ukraine War is Special Representative for Eurasian Affairs Li Hui, but Lu Shaye’s new role may position him as an important voice as well.[78] The PRC has consistently claimed to be an impartial mediator and voice for peace in the war in Ukraine, despite providing dual-use goods and economic support to Russia throughout the war. It has refrained from overtly endorsing Russia’s invasion and political aims, but has adopted Russian framing in many ways including defending Russia’s “legitimate security concerns” about NATO expansion, criticizing Western aid to Ukraine for “adding fuel to the fire,” opposing unilateral sanctions on Russia, proposing peace plans that do not call for withdrawing Russian troops, and refusing to call the war a war.[79] The PRC distanced itself at the time from Lu’s comments undermining the sovereignty of former Soviet states.[80] Its elevation of Lu to such a key position may signal a tacit acceptance of his views, however.

PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi is scheduled to visit the UK on February 13 to hold talks with British Foreign Secretary David Lammy for the first UK-China Strategic Dialogue since 2018.[81] The UK under Conservative leadership experienced strained relations with the PRC over issues such as the Hong Kong crackdown and allegations of human rights abuses in Xinjiang.[82] The Labour Party has made improving relations with the PRC one of its main foreign policy objectives.[83] The party acted on this rhetoric by holding numerous meetings between top UK and PRC officials since Prime Minister Keir Starmer took power in July 2024. Lammy visited Beijing in mid-October where he met with Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang and Foreign Minister Wang Yi.[84] PRC President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Kier Starmer met at the G20 summit in November 2024, the first meeting between a British PM and Xi since 2018 — the press statement stated that talks would continue.[85] British finance minister Rachel Reeves visited Beijing in mid-January in an effort to revive economic and financial talks, which were last held in 2019.[86] PRC-UK relations appear to be warming as a result of increased diplomatic engagement, which contrasts with the appointment of Lu Shaye as special representative for European Affairs due to his combative approach to foreign policy. The PRC has previously criticized the UK’s participation in the Five Eyes and AUKUS alliances due to PRC beliefs that these alliances tools used by the United States to constrain PRC activity and prevent the PRC from achieving its strategic and foreign policy goals.[87] The UK is unlikely to halt its participation in Five Eyes or AUKUS, but the PRC could be attempting to create points of division between the US and its allies.

---

[1] https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202502100019

[2] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/02/04/2003831310

[3] https://www.taiwannews.com dot tw/news/6034502

[4] https://www.cna.com dot tw/news/aipl/202502050311.aspx

[5] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/02/05/2003831376, https://youtu.be/ZCyWe3Ib7DI?si=V8JyvLezx1h8xFwD

[6] https://newbloommag dot net/2025/01/28/tw-chinese-national-ids/

[7] https://selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/media/remarkstranscripts/chairman-gallaghers-remarks-ccps-transnational-repression-global-influence#:~:text=Welcome%20to%20United%20Front%20Work,of%20the%20Chinese%20Communist%20Party.

[8] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/02/05/2003831376

[9] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/02/05/2003831376, https://www.mac.gov dot tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=4F2E0C155DF44564&sms=2C46F5E37DC2E1D2&s=1403D3EA1BC2B0B9

[10] https://focustaiwan dot tw/cross-strait/202502060021

[11] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/02/05/2003831376

[12] ﷟HYPERLINK "https://www.taipeitimes"https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/01/17/2003830326

[13] https://www.ocac dot gov.tw/OCAC/Eng/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeid=329&pid=72121383

[14] https://globaltaiwan.org/2022/02/what-is-the-ccps-comprehensive-plan-for-resolving-the-taiwan-problem/

[15] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/01/15/2003830236

[16] https://english.www dot gov.cn/policies/latestreleases/202309/12/content_WS65004bc9c6d0868f4e8df605.html

[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/fact-sheet-kremlins-occupation-playbook-coerced-russification-and-ethnic-cleansing

[18] https://youtu.be/ZCyWe3Ib7DI?si=NHuwxl6P-9dh95bs

[19] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/02/10/2003831630

[20] https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1qbfYF0VgDBJoFZN5elpZwNTiKZ4nvCUcs5a7oYwm52g/edit?pli=1&gid=1489159516#gid=1489159516

[21] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/02/07/2003831501

[22] https://www.reuters.com/graphics/TAIWAN-CHINA/BALLOONS/lbpglrgwwvq/

https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/02/07/2003831501

[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-december-5-2024

[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-february-7-2025

https://x.com/MoNDefense/status/1886218047511556387/photo/3;  https://x.com/MoNDefense/status/1886942821036302430; https://x.com/MoNDefense/status/1888029990421205220/photo/2

https://x.com/MoNDefense/status/1889117151702691863/photo/3

[25] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-december-12-2024

[26] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-says-balloons-that-have-angered-taiwan-are-nothing-new-2024-01-31/

[27] https://www.reuters.com/graphics/TAIWAN-CHINA/BALLOONS/lbpglrgwwvq/

[28] https://www.reuters.com/graphics/TAIWAN-CHINA/BALLOONS/lbpglrgwwvq/

[29] https://interactives.lowyinstitute.org/features/one-china-contest-to-define-taiwan/

[30] https://www.economist.com/international/2025/02/09/chinas-stunning-new-campaign-to-turn-the-world-against-taiwan

[31] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202409/t20240905_11485993.html

[32] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-may-30-2024

[33] https://www.cac dot gov.cn/2025-02/08/c_1740714184323988.htm

[34] https://www.cac dot gov.cn/2025-02/08/c_1740714184366195.htm

[35] https://thediplomat.com/2024/12/j-36-assessing-chinas-new-generation-combat-aircraft/

[36] http://cpc.people dot com.cn/pinglun/n/2015/0128/c78779-26464541.html

[37] http://www.mod dot gov.cn/gfbw/sy/tt_214026/16354898.html

[38] http://theory.people dot com.cn/n/2012/1228/c353650-20044906.html

http://www.81 dot cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2024-12-11&paperNumber=06&articleid=945282

https://archive.ph/wyekb

[39] https://news.cctv dot com/2024/12/23/ARTIuneVKY4i9Kk1Bz9xLHXb241223.shtml

[40] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/02/united-states-japan-joint-leaders-statement/

[41] https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Trump-administration/Trump-tells-Ishiba-he-wants-to-eliminate-trade-deficit-with-Japan

[42] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/02/united-states-japan-joint-leaders-statement/

[43] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/fyrbt_673021/202502/t20250210_11552101.shtml

[44] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/02/united-states-japan-joint-leaders-statement/

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R42761/21

[45] https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/2025-01-07/senkaku-islands-china-japan-16401727.html

https://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/mission/senkaku/senkaku.html

[46] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/fyrbt_673021/202502/t20250210_11552101.shtml

[47] https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479

[48] https://www.dailynk dot com/20250205-1/

[49] https://koreapro dot org/2023/05/beijing-responds-to-yoons-criticism-over-north-korea-sanctions-enforcement/

[50] https://la.china-embassy.gov dot cn/eng/news/202502/t20250208_11551480.htm

[51] https://en.yna dot co.kr/view/AEN20250207010251320

[52] https://thediplomat dot com/2024/04/when-china-banned-korean-boy-bands/

[53] https://apnews.com/article/china-us-tariffs-timeline-trump-xi-08b5d468e61ba15e760563ef0186b2bb

[54] https://www.reuters.com/technology/artificial-intelligence/south-korea-spy-agency-says-deepseek-excessively-collects-personal-data-2025-02-10/

[55] https://www.reuters.com/technology/artificial-intelligence/south-koreas-industry-ministry-temporarily-bans-access-deepseek-security-2025-02-05/

[56] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202502/1327954.shtml

[57] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2025/2/6/which-countries-have-banned-deepseek-and-why

[58] https://www.chinalawtranslate dot com/en/what-the-national-intelligence-law-says-and-why-it-doesnt-matter/

[59] https://www.scmp dot com/week-asia/politics/article/3298319/china-cook-islands-and-new-zealands-struggle-influence-pacific; https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202502/t20250211_11552937.shtml

[60] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/fyrbt_673021/202502/t20250210_11552101.shtml

[61] https://www.pmoffice.gov dot ck/2025/02/05/media-release-state-visit-to-china-strengthening-the-cook-islands-global-partnerships/

[62] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/new-zealand-concerns-mount-cook-islands-pm-plans-sign-agreement-with-china-2025-02-10/

[63] https://www.ft.com/content/c74fb66e-b9e7-4063-91d3-d4795a6d6187

[64] https://www.ft.com/content/c74fb66e-b9e7-4063-91d3-d4795a6d6187

[65] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/new-zealand-concerns-mount-cook-islands-pm-plans-sign-agreement-with-china-2025-02-10/

[66] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-october-30-2024

[67] https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-03-24/draft-leak-chinese-military-base-solomon-islands/100937632

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-04-21/china-solomon-islands-agreement-australia/101005022

[68] https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-02-08/cook-islands-new-zealand-relations-china-passports/104909718

[69] https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_new-zealand-criticized-five-eyes-alliance-stance-china/6205205.html; https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2022/12/new-zealand-is-done-with-speaking-softly-to-china.html

[70] https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/01/new-zealands-new-pm-isnt-going-back-to-old-ways-on.html; https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/mfat-annual-reports/mfat-annual-report-2018-19/case-study-the-pacific-reset-a-year-on

[71] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3297897/eu-signals-pragmatic-tone-it-walks-fine-line-between-china-and-us

[72] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3297525/lu-shaye-chinas-controversial-ex-envoy-france-handed-new-role-europe?module=top_story&pgtype=section

https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/fyrbt_673021/202502/t20250206_11550287.shtml

[73] http://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_25_404

https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3266001/china-hawk-von-der-leyen-confident-new-term-europe-lurches-right

https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202502/1327889.shtml

https://www.rferl.org/a/32716770.html

[74] http://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_25_404  

[75] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn4zgx808g7o

[76] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/11/business/trump-tariffs-steel-european-union.html

[77] https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/united-states_en

[78] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/web/wjdt_674879/sjxw_674887/202405/t20240510_11302625.shtml

[79] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/zyxw/202302/t20230224_11030707.shtml

https://www.uscc.gov/research/chinas-position-russias-invasion-ukraine

[80] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/fyrbt_673021/202304/t20230424_11064751.shtml

[81] https://www.reuters.com/world/chinas-foreign-minister-visit-uk-talks-with-lammy-guardian-reports-2025-01-26/

[82] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-foreign-minister-visit-britain-thursday-talks-2025-02-10/

https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/uk-government-policy-towards-china/

https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/china-allegations-of-human-rights-abuses/

[83] https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/britain-pares-back-secretive-china-strategy-review-seeking-closer-ties-2024-12-16/

[84] https://apnews.com/article/uk-china-foreign-secretary-lammy-visit-b6f7da40b721b069e7469fc7cf55eb6b

[85] https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/uk-government-policy-towards-china/

https://apnews.com/article/uk-china-starmer-xi-g20-brazil-b1314c8aabf33db8fbf8e2af58d54ac9

https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2024/nov/18/keir-starmer-discusses-human-rights-concerns-with-xi-jinping-at-g20

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0rgx9vrv18o

[86] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-foreign-minister-visit-britain-thursday-talks-2025-02-10/

[87] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3089564/why-five-eyes-intelligence-alliance-beijings-cross-hairs

 

Iran Update, February 12, 2025

Annika Ganzeveld, Siddhant Kishore, Kelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, Katherine Wells, Johanna Moore, Ria Reddy, Alexandra Braverman, Davit Gasparyan, Victoria Penza, Avery Borens, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara formed a preparatory committee on February 12 that is mostly comprised of pro-HTS individuals who are loyal to Shara.[1] The composition of this committee suggests that it will likely make decisions that align with Shara’s views and objectives. Shara announced on January 30 that he would form a preparatory committee to facilitate “deliberations” and “consultations” about the National Dialogue Conference.[2] The National Dialogue Conference will reportedly represent all segments of Syrian society and facilitate the drafting of a new Syrian constitution.[3] It is unclear what role the preparatory committee will play in organizing and overseeing the conference. Shara also stated on January 30 that the Syrian interim government would unveil a “Constitutional Declaration” after the formation of a preparatory committee.[4] The preparatory committee is comprised of five males and two females and does not appear to include representatives of the Alawite, Druze, Kurdish, and Shia communities. The committee includes the following individuals:

• Yousef al Hajer: Hajer is from al Shuhail, Deir ez Zor Province, which was a Jabhat al Nusra stronghold until ISIS declared the formation of a caliphate in June 2014.[5] Hajar was injured in an April 2024 attack that targeted Abu Maria al Qahtani, one of the founders of Jabhat al Nusra.[6] Hajer previously served as the head of the HTS Political Bureau and as a member of the HTS-controlled Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) Shura Council in northwestern Syria.[7]
• Hassan al Daghim: Daghim is Sunni and previously headed the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army’s (SNA) Moral Guidance Department.[8] Daghim and other SNA members met with Shara in late December 2024 to discuss the integration of armed groups into the new Syrian Defense Ministry.[9] Daghim stated on January 31 that the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is “one of the Syrian components and cannot be distinguished from other [components].”[10] Daghim was previously a strong critic of Shara but reconciled with Shara in 2024.[11]
• Hind Qabawat: Qabawat is a Christian who has spent years promoting interfaith tolerance, women’s rights, and conflict resolution in Syria.[12] Qabawat serves as the director of interfaith peacebuilding at George Mason University’s Center for World Religions, Diplomacy, and Conflict Resolution. Qabawat is also a member of the High Negotiations Committee for Syria in Geneva. Qabawat founded the Syrian Center for Dialogue, Peace, and Reconciliation in Toronto.
• Maher Alloush: Alloush is Sunni and close to Ahrar al Sham, which is an Islamist opposition group that has been close to HTS and its predecessor organizations since the mid-2010s.[13] Alloush previously mediated an internal dispute in Ahrar al Sham that resulted in the appointment of Abu Obeida as leader of Ahram al Sham in January 2019.[14] Alloush met with Shara in December 2024.[15]
• Mustafa Musa: Musa is a member of HTS and served as the head of the SSG Shura Council from April 2020 until the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[16] Musa, who is a trained pharmacist, also previously headed the SSG Shura Council health committee.[17]
• Mohammad Mastat: Mastat previously served as the director of primary healthcare in the SSG Health Ministry.[18] Mastat is affiliated with Faylaq al Sham, which is a Muslim Brotherhood-influenced Islamist militia that has been a longtime HTS partner.[19]
• Huda al Attasi: Attasi is a Turkish citizen and is the co-founder and director of International Humanitarian Relief.[20] Attasi has spent years helping Syrian women, orphans, and displaced individuals. Attasi is a founding member of the Syrian Association for Citizens’ Dignity, which advocates for the rights of displaced Syrians.[21]
  
  

The Syrian interim government has continued to attempt to consolidate its control over groups in southern Syria that have not yet joined the Defense Ministry. Syrian Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra met with southern military commanders Naseem Abu Ara and Ali Bash in Damascus on February 12.[22] Ali Bash is the deputy of Ahmed al Awda, the current Southern Operations Room commander who previously led the Eighth Brigade, a group comprised of former opposition fighters who reconciled with the Assad regime and reorganized themselves as the ”Eighth Brigade.”[23] Abu Ara is an Eighth Brigade commander.[24] An unspecified source told southern Syria-based media that Abu Ara and Bash agreed to hold future meetings with Damascus to ”follow up” on steps to integrate Southern Operations Room fighters into the Syrian Defense Ministry. Qasra recently told the Wall Street Journal that Awda had resisted attempts to bring his units under the Defense Ministry.[25] Abu Ara denied Qasra’s allegations in a video statement on February 10 and argued that the people of the south were among the first to call for the Defense Ministry’s establishment.[26] Qasra’s meeting with Abu Ara and Ali Bash suggests that southern leaders, such as Awda, will continue to discuss their integration into the Defense Ministry, although it does not appear that Awda or his subordinates have made any explicit commitments.

The HTS-led Department of Military Operations also deployed to western Suwayda Province for the first time on February 12.[27] The government forces deployed to “contain tensions” following the murder of a Syrian man in al Thaala.[28] This is the Syrian government’s first official deployment in Suwayda Province.[29] The Wall Street Journal reported that the Men of Dignity Movement--a prominent Druze militia based in Suwayda--has thus far prevented the entry of HTS-led forces into Suwayda Province.[30] The head of the Men of Dignity Movement, Sheikh Abu Hassan Yahya al Hajjar, announced that the movement will cooperate with the Interior Ministry’s new police and security forces.[31] It is unclear if Damascus and the Men of Dignity or another group coordinated the deployment of the Military Operations Department. The Syrian interim government likely seeks to cultivate goodwill among Suwayda residents by showing its abilities to ensure security in the region, however.

Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara held his first official call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on February 12, suggesting that Syria seeks to maintain a future relationship with Russia even as Russia withdraws its military assets from Syria. The Kremlin reported that Putin and Shara discussed recent negotiations over Russian basing rights in Syria between the Syrian government and the Russian delegation that visited Damascus on January 28.[32] This delegation failed to reach an agreement with the Syrian government.[33] It does not appear that Shara’s call with Putin led to any agreement on Russia's continued military presence at Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus. The direct communication between Shara and Putin, however, suggests that the Syrian interim government will continue to attempt to maintain a relationship with the Russian government and that negotiations over Russia’s presence in Syria have not concluded. Senior Syrian officials have adopted a more positive position towards Russia in recent days, even as Russian forces have continued to withdraw from Syrian territory.[34] Shara stressed Syria’s “strong strategic relationship“ with Russia during the phone call with Putin, according to an official Syrian government report, and Interim Syrian Defense Minister Marhaf Abu recently suggested that Syria is open to Russian air and naval bases in Syria if there are “benefits” for Syria.[35]  Syrian officials’ public posture towards Russia suggests that Syria will continue to engage with Russia, particularly as Syrian officials hope Western countries will lift sanctions imposed upon the Assad regime. Putin stressed the need to lift economic sanctions on Syria during the call, echoing a recent call from Russian Deputy Foreign Minister and Special Presidential Representative for the Middle East and North Africa Mikhail Bogdanov on several unspecified countries to lift all unilateral sanctions imposed on Syria.[36] Syria could use its continued engagement with Russia as leverage with the West as Syria attempts to secure sanctions relief from the West.

Egyptian state media reported on February 12 that mediators from Egypt and Qatar are “intensifying” diplomatic efforts to prevent the breakdown of Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement.[37] Unspecified Egyptian sources told Reuters that Qatar and Egypt discussed efforts to prevent the collapse of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire on February 12.[38] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu threatened on February 11 to resume military operations in the Gaza Strip after Hamas said it would postpone the planned release of Israeli hostages on February 15, which would violate the ceasefire.[39] A third IDF division entered the buffer zone along the Israel-Gaza Strip boundary on February 11, and the IDF recalled reservists as part of preparations for resumed operations in the Gaza Strip.[40] Israeli officials have indicated that Israel will continue to meet its obligations under the first phase of the ceasefire if Hamas releases Israeli hostages on February 15, however.[41]

Jordanian King Abdullah II agreed to accept 2,000 sick Gazan children but refused to host additional Palestinian refugees during a meeting with US President Donald Trump in Washington, DC, on January 11.[42] King Abdullah II stated that "everyone“ should prioritize rebuilding the Gaza Strip.[43] Egypt and Jordan are developing a plan to rebuild the Gaza Strip without relocating Gazans.[44]

Key Takeaways:

• Syrian Transition: Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara formed a preparatory committee on February 12 that is mostly comprised of pro-HTS individuals who are loyal to Shara. The composition of this committee suggests that it will likely make decisions that align with Shara’s views and objectives.
• Syrian Defense Ministry: The Syrian interim government has continued to attempt to consolidate its control over groups in southern Syria that have not yet joined the Defense Ministry. The HTS-led Department of Military Operations also deployed to western Suwayda Province for the first time on February 12.
• Syria-Russia Relations: Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara held his first official call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on February 12, suggesting that Syria seeks to maintain a future relationship with Russia even as Russia withdraws its military assets from Syria.
• Gaza Strip: Egyptian state media reported on February 12 that mediators from Egypt and Qatar are “intensifying” diplomatic efforts to prevent the breakdown of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement.
  
  

Syria

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) executive committee member Murat Karayilan said that the PKK must hold a conference to discuss disarmament before imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan can call on the PKK to disarm.[45] Ocalan is expected to make an imminent “historic” call for the PKK to disarm on February 15.[46] Karayilan’s statement conflicts with Turkey’s theory that Ocalan will call for disarmament on February 15 and that the call will pressure the SDF to integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry. CTP-ISW assessed on January 28 that the SDF is unlikely to willingly give up its ability to defend Kurdish areas against active Turkish-backed military attacks, regardless of Ocalan’s position.[47]

Turkey continued to target SDF positions along the western bank of the Euphrates River on February 12.[48] Turkish aircraft struck several SDF positions along the western bank of the Euphrates River on February 12.[49] Turkish aircraft also struck SDF positions near the Qara Qozak Bridge and Tishreen Dam, likely to isolate SDF units operating at the bridgehead.[50]

Anti-SDF media reported that Turkey and the SNA continued to target SDF positions with airstrikes and rockets along the Peace Spring frontlines.[51] Turkish aircraft struck a reported SDF position at a power station near Ain Issa on February 12.[52] The SNA also fired rockets targeting SDF positions west of Tal Abyad on February 12.[53]

ISIS fighters may have attacked an SDF-affiliated municipality center near al Karamah, Raqqa Province, on February 11.[54] The SDF deployed forces to the area following the attack.[55] This is the third time that unspecified individuals attacked SDF positions in al Karamah since February 7.[56] ISIS has long had a presence around Al Karamah. The SDF arrested an ISIS smuggler in al Karamah in November 2023, for example.[57]  

Syrian media reported on February 12 that Syrian interim government forces started to seize checkpoints at the entrance to Afrin, an area that the Turkish-backed SNA previously controlled.[58] Interim government security forces deployed to Afrin and Jandairis, north of Aleppo, on February 6.[59] The SNA has controlled and administered these areas since 2018.[60] CTP-ISW assessed on February 6 that these interim government deployments will likely continue as former opposition groups integrate into the Syrian Ministry of Defense.[61]

The IDF continued to operate along the Golan Heights in southern Syria. Syrian media reported that Israeli forces entered Saida to establish checkpoints along the Syria-Israel border on February 11.[62] Syrian media also reported that the IDF advanced toward Kodna, Quneitra Province.[63]

Two leading Syrian opposition groups agreed to dissolve and join the Syrian interim government on February 11.[64] The Syrian National Coalition and the Syrian Negotiation Commission agreed to dissolve and work with the Syrian interim government after meeting with Shara. A Turkish analyst reported that Shara had declined to meet with Syrian National Coalition head Hadi al Bahra “for a while.”[65] The Syrian National Coalition has long worked with various opposition groups and umbrella organizations of opposition groups.[66] The Syrian National Coalition announced its willingness to work with the HTS-led interim government in December 2024.[67] The Syrian Negotiation Commission is an umbrella institution created to negotiate on behalf of the Syrian opposition with the Assad regime within the framework of UNSCR 2254.[68]

Iraq

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and society
• Harden the Iraqi government against internal dissent
  
  

Unspecified fighters detonated an adhesive improvised explosive device (IED) that they had attached to a vehicle in al Qaim, Anbar Province, Iraq, on February 12, possibly as part of an internal dispute among Iraqi smuggling groups.[69] The attack targeted Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Tribal Mobilization 1st al Qaim Regiment Commander Salam Suleiman al Mahlawi.[70] The Iraqi government formed the Tribal Mobilization forces as part of the PMF in 2014. Sunnis and other minority groups make up the Tribal Mobilization.[71] Iraqi police arrested a relative of Mahlawi in June 2024 for smuggling after the police discovered weapons, ammunition, and narcotics in his home.[72] The al Qaim border crossing is a major smuggling route used by Iranian-backed militias and other actors to transport goods and narcotics to the Gulf states and to Europe.[73]

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
• Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
• Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip
  
  

Houthi Foreign Minister Jamal Amer said on February 2 that the Houthis did not cause the explosion on a Hong Kong-flagged container ship in the Red Sea on January 28, 2025.[74] Amer said that the Houthis will not resume attacks on vessels in the Red Sea unless the Israel-Hamas ceasefire collapses.[75] Amer added that the ship was carrying 1290 tons of unspecified hazardous material to Jeddah Port in Saudi Arabia and suggested that the material caused the explosion. Amer also called on the international community to conduct a transparent investigation into the incident. An unspecified maritime source also told Reuters on January 29 that the cause of the fire was the hazardous cargo on board.[76] The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Joint Maritime Information Center has only reported one non-attack-related incident for vessels transiting the Red Sea since the start of 2025, which is likely this incident.[77] CTP-ISW has not observed any Houthi attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea since November 2024.[78]

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip
• Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern Lebanon
• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel
  
  

The Gaza Strip

See the topline section.

Lebanon

Lebanese media reported that the IDF has destroyed infrastructure in seven towns in southern Lebanon since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 11.[79]

Lebanese media reported on February 12 that the IDF shelled unspecified targets in the Shebaa Valley.[80]

Lebanese media reported on February 12 that the IDF established a “military center” near Houla.[81]

Lebanon main

An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on February 12 that the IDF is establishing a new territorial brigade along the Israel-Lebanon border ahead of the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon.[82] This brigade will be larger than brigades that previously served on the border before the Israel-Lebanon war. The extended ceasefire agreement requires Israel to withdraw by February 18.[83]

IDF Northern Command Commander Major General Ori Gordin stated on February 12 that he believes the IDF will withdraw from southern Lebanon by February 18.[84] IDF Northern Command is responsible for maintaining border security on the Israel-Lebanon border.[85] Gordin separately stated that the IDF severely damaged Hezbollah’s intelligence-gathering capabilities and ability to rearm itself through Syria.[86] Gordin stated that the IDF eliminated the ”serious threat” posed by Hezbollah to residents of northern Israel. Gordin stressed that the biggest challenge the IDF faces in northern Israel is to maintain the current security status quo.

West Bank

The IDF continued its counterterrorism operation in the northern West Bank on February 12.[87] The IDF continued to destroy Palestinian militia infrastructure and seize weapons. Israeli forces clashed with militia fighters in Nour Shams refugee camp and killed one fighter in Tulkarm.[88] The IDF stated that fighters injured an Israeli soldier.[89] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades attacked Israeli forces in Tulkarm and Jenin governorates with small arms and improvised explosive devices (IED) on February 12.[90] PIJ, Hamas, and the al Aqsa Martyrs‘ Brigades claimed that they conducted combined small arms attacks targeting the IDF in Tulkarm on February 11 and 12.[91] PIJ announced on January 22 the formation of joint operations rooms in the West Bank with Hamas and al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fighters.[92]

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

US sanctions on Iranian entities and vessels involved in Iranian oil shipments to China have made it more difficult for Iran to export oil to China. Reuters reported that Iran has struggled to acquire new vessels to replace those sanctioned by the United States.[93] A British shipbroker reported that the United States has sanctioned 57 percent of the 126 oil tankers involved in Iranian crude oil trade to China.[94] China's Shandong Port Group also banned sanctioned tankers from ports in Shandong Province on January 6, where many of the sanctioned vessels unloaded Iranian oil.[95] This has made it impossible for Iran to trade tens of millions of barrels of oil and has left the oil in floating storage. This situation may worsen under US President Donald Trump’s ”maximum pressure” policy, which targets Iranian oil sales.[96] These oil shipment disruptions have caused Iranian crude oil prices to rise. One of the attractions of Iranian oil to China is its cheap cost.[97] A decrease in Iranian oil exports to China could badly damage the Iranian economy, which relies heavily on oil exports.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s rejection of direct negotiations with the United States may have caused further devaluation of the rial. Iranian opposition media reported that Iran’s currency fell to its lowest value, reaching nearly 940,000 rials per USD on February 10, after Khamenei’s recent speech on February 7 about negotiations with the United States.[98]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei visited the Iran Armed Forces exhibition “Eghtedar 1403” in Tehran on February 12.[99] The exhibition displayed equipment and new technologies in air defense, ballistic and cruise missiles, drones, and naval vessels. Khamenei emphasized the importance of continuous innovation in defense.[100] Khamenei separately met with officials and experts in the defense industry and emphasized the importance of national defense and security. Khamenei’s visit likely highlights Iranian efforts to address air defense vulnerabilities and reinforce military capabilities amid potential external threats, particularly in light of recent setbacks for the Axis of Resistance.[101]

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

---

[1] https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/494

[2] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/122251

[3] https://www.alarabiya.net/arab-and-world/syria/2024/12/29/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%82%D8%AF-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%BA%D8%B1%D9%82-4-%D8%B3%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA- ;

https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2024/12/30/%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B6%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A8-%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%A4%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1

[4] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/122252

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/JN%20Final.pdf; https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1889698791453843780

[6] https://mei.edu/publications/long-rise-and-sudden-death-jihadist-leader-abu-maria-al-qahtani

[7] https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2025/2/12/%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9; https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1889693212916457517 ; https://x.com/MohammedHawaidi/status/1889635861630799900; https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/197-the-best-of-bad-options%20.pdf

[8] https://english dot enabbaladi.net/archives/2022/09/two-movements-in-national-army-consensus-only-in-statements-eyes-on-tahrir-al-sham/

[9] https://mustakbalsuria dot com/?p=11924

[10] https://x.com/AlMayadeenNews/status/1885445974174138559

[11] https://x.com/WaelEssam77/status/1865489796929327487 ;

https://x.com/OmerOzkizilcik/status/1889646091764736435 ;

https://x.com/OAjjoub/status/1889631547294150787

[12] https://crdc.gmu.edu/hind-kabawat/ ;

https://www.mei.edu/profile/hind-kabawat ;

https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20150513/103454/HHRG-114-FA00-Bio-KabawatH-20150513.pdf

[13] https://x.com/maherallosh/status/632400763889786880 ;

https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Backgrounder_IslamicAllianceEmerges_11Oct.pdf ;

https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Syrian%20Opposition%20Guide_0.pdf

[14] https://www.syria dot tv/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%AE-%D8%A3%D8%A8%D9%88-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%85

[15] https://x.com/maherallosh/status/1873352127956803986

[16] https://syrianobserver dot com/foreign-actors/salvation-government-elects-new-shura-council-president.html ;

https://www.alquds.co.uk/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B6%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84/

[17] https://www.enabbaladi.net/739082/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%84-%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B6%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%80%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B7/#

[18] https://www.alquds.co dot uk/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B6%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84/

[19] https://www.alquds.co dot uk/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B6%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84/ ;

https://x.com/SY_plus/status/1889643544052162982 ;

https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Backgrounder_IslamicAllianceEmerges_11Oct.pdf ;

https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Syrian%20Opposition%20Guide_0.pdf

[20] https://lb.linkedin.com/in/huda-atassi ;

https://x.com/mohammadakta/status/1889670504942104764

[21] https://x.com/SyrianACD ;

https://x.com/HoudaAtassi

[22] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1889616857549906277; https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1889637595136577834

[23] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/637198/%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B4-%D8%B0%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85/ 

[24] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/738752/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B6%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AC-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B2/

[25] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/02/06/syria-defense-minister-russia-bases/

[26] https://www.facebook.com/daraa24.24/videos/8768074253296461/?rdid=vhi4MSfEkPKGoq9N#; https://www.enabbaladi dot net/738752/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B6%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AC-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B2/

[27] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1889625860702900324; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1889630059318649280; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1889675759951720768

[28] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1889770226755182802

[29] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1889625860702900324

[30] https://www.wsj.com/opinion/syria-has-a-new-governmentor-does-it-al-sharaa-hts-islamist-0f938cc5?mod=opinion_lead_pos12

[31] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1886768092673347951 ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7GvONDElz7c

[32] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76258; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-29-2025

[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-29-2025

[34] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-receiving-positive-messages-russia-iran-foreign-minister-says-2025-02-12/ ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/02/06/syria-defense-minister-russia-bases/ 

[35] https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/497 ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/02/06/syria-defense-minister-russia-bases/  

[36] https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/497;  www dot tass dot com/politics/1911303; https://t.me/damascusv011/28670

[37] https://alqaheranews dot net/news/116854/%D9%88%D9%81%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D9%8A%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B0-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9

[38] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/egypt-qatar-intensify-efforts-save-gaza-ceasefire-egypt-tv-says-2025-02-12/

[39] https://x.com/IsraeliPM/status/1889377668677718474

[40] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/senior-arab-officials-warn-that-trump-gaza-plan-would-inflame-middle-east-2025-02-12/  ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-11-2025

[41] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/report-israel-will-adhere-to-ceasefire-if-hamas-releases-sixth-round-of-hostages-saturday/ ; https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1889735087840751997

[42] https://x.com/KingAbdullahII/status/1889396977064145105 ; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trump-wants-jordans-help-with-gaza-its-king-is-looking-for-a-way-to-say-no-0958ad69?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2

[43] https://x.com/KingAbdullahII/status/1889396977064145105

[44] https://x.com/MfaEgypt/status/1889447692553633962 ; https://x.com/ForeignMinistry/status/1889449832873378272 ; https://x.com/ForeignMinistry/status/1889412876726899157

[45] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1889582778678698432

[46] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate012825

[47] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate012825

[48] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-11-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-10-2025

[49] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135706; https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/119964

[50] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135711; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1889658404391563533

[51] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1889748414688067591; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1889676439269621949; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-10-2025

[52] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1889676439269621949

[53] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1889748414688067591

[54] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1889389056393404714

[55] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1889400589676663158

[56] https://t.me/nahermedia/44779;https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1887915202982588532

[57] https://baladi-news dot com/ar/articles/99232; https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1727775031579586988?s=20; https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1727775031579586988?s=20

[58] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1889656441620828458

[59] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135186 ;  https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135181 ; https://x.com/EuphratesPost/status/1887441282697425204 ; https://t.me/nahermedia/44664 ; https://x.com/NPA_English/status/1887498708771590349 ; https://x.com/Military_OSTX/status/1887452402930098337

[60] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/turkish-military-and-allied-rebels-in-total-control-of-syrias-afrin-erdogan/2018/03/18/875e6b29-5a4b-439d-9b99-a92ad82264dc_story.html

[61] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-6-2025

[62] https://t.me/damascusv011/28709 ; https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/119958

[63] https://t.me/damascusv011/28737

[64] https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/492 ; https://www.newarab dot com/news/syrias-temp-government-forms-national-dialogue-committee

[65] https://x.com/ragipsoylu/status/1889424468633612384

[66] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-opposition-leader-says-lebanon-truce-opened-door-aleppo-assault-2024-12-02/

[67] https://www.middleeastmonitor dot com/20241218-syrian-coalition-calls-for-comprehensive-non-sectarian-transitional-government/

[68] https://www.newarab dot com/news/syrias-temp-government-forms-national-dialogue-committee

[69] https://aljeebal dot com/posts/3603 ; https://x.com/Omdoha15/status/1889755051549196410 ; https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1889658698311627110

[70] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1889658698311627110 ; https://x.com/AlArabiya_Iraq/status/1889615460045303850

[71] https://euaa.europa dot eu/country-guidance-iraq-2022/12-popular-mobilisation-forces-and-tribal-mobilisation-militias

[72] https://eyeofeuphrates dot com/ar/news/2024/06/09/11395

[73] https://alfasselnews dot com/en_GB/articles/gc1/features/2024/02/14/feature-01 ; https://en.majalla dot com/node/322827/business-economy/how-iraq-became-key-conduit-global-drug-trade

[74] https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid02pP215FD7RpBmMFFSVhzEvmA3NEsGvoZuwqyz4bpe6LMGbLb77wJxfNsLCz75T4Enl&id=100000612691633&rdid=RUqTp7ZBSJypCPdr ;

https://www.reuters.com/world/crew-abandon-hk-flagged-container-ship-red-sea-after-fire-sources-say-2025-01-28/

[75] https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid02pP215FD7RpBmMFFSVhzEvmA3NEsGvoZuwqyz4bpe6LMGbLb77wJxfNsLCz75T4Enl&id=100000612691633&rdid=RUqTp7ZBSJypCPdr

[76] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/ship-fire-red-sea-not-linked-houthi-attacks-maritime-center-says-2025-01-29/

[77] https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/jmic-week-06-dashboard-02---08-feb-2025.pdf?rev=deb327b4d39344cd9868528ad92c1381

[78] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-4-2024

[79] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/129579 ; https://www dot nna-leb dot gov dot lb/en/justice-law/758535/israeli-enemy-burns-houses-in-south-lebanon-s-mark ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/113902 ; https://www.nna-leb dot gov dot lb/en/justice-law/758736/israeli-enemy-burns-homes-conducts-explosions-in-s ; https://www.nna-leb dot gov dot lb/en/justice-law/758775/israeli-forces-open-fire-near-bint-jbeil-detonate ; https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/129626

[80] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/129613

[81] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/129635

[82] https://x.com/amirbarshalom/status/1889582915845013871

[83] https://www.axios.com/2025/01/26/israel-lebanon-ceasefire-extended-trump-white-house

[84] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1889676719855944080

[85] https://www.idf dot il/en/mini-sites/regional-commands/northern-command/northern-command/

[86] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1889704056140009547

[87] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1889648190137221164

[88] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1889648200014803279

[89] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1889648204553023858

[90] https://t.me/sarayajneen/2096 ; https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/982 ; https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/983 ; https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/984 ; https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/987 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/827

[91] https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/981 ; https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/988 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/8268

[92] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-22-2025

[93] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-sanctions-strand-iran-russia-oil-tankers-driving-up-crude-costs-2025-02-12/ ; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2758; https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241203; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2644

[94] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-sanctions-strand-iran-russia-oil-tankers-driving-up-crude-costs-2025-02-12/

[95] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/chinas-shandong-port-group-blacklists-us-sanctioned-oil-vessels-say-traders-2025-01-07/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-13-2024; https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2024-iran-south-china-sea-oil-trade/

[96] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-sanctions-strand-iran-russia-oil-tankers-driving-up-crude-costs-2025-02-12/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-4-2025

[97] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/chinas-cheap-iranian-oil-supply-risk-tighter-trump-sanctions-2024-11-06/

[98] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202502117959 ;

https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-7-2025

[99] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/24/3256809

[100] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/27980

[101] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/consequences-idf-strikes-iran