UA-69458566-1

Sunday, September 24, 2023

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 24, 2023

George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 24, 2023, 9:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 3pm ET on September 24. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

ISW is providing an assessment of a very dynamic situation in the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive near Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast. ISW emphasizes that the situation remains dynamic and unclear and that the tactical situation is likely changing rapidly. It is too early to forecast if Ukrainian forces will achieve an operational breakthrough in this sector of the front.

Elements of three Russian divisions are actively defending against Ukrainian assaults around the Ukrainian salient in the Orikhiv area in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are deployed and are defending at the southernmost point of the Ukrainian penetration and are engaging Ukrainian forces in Novoprokopivka (13km south of Orikhiv).[1] Elements of the Russian 76th Air Assault Division deployed to the Ukrainian salient’s western flank near Kopani (11km southwest of Orikhiv) towards Robotyne (10m south of Orikhiv) and are counterattacking there.[2] Elements of the 7th Air Assault Division are deployed on the Ukrainian salient‘s eastern flank near the Verbove-Novopokrovka line and are counterattacking there.[3] Sources affiliated with the Russian Airborne (VDV) Forces report that the 56th Air Assault Regiment (7th Air Assault Division) is deployed about 5km north of Verbove near Novofedorivka.[4]

A Russian source claimed that the 7th and 76th VDV Divisions were ordered to conduct an operational encirclement of the Ukrainian salient, but that they failed to do so and that the 7th VDV Division’s effectiveness significantly declined after a successful Ukrainian strike against the division headquarters on September 19.[5] ISW offers no assessment about these reported orders to encircle Ukrainian forces beyond noting that it would be a sound practice for Russian forces to conduct counterattacks against Ukrainian forces’ flanks within limits.  

 

 

Ukrainian forces are attacking along three directions within the Orikhiv salient as of September 24. Ukrainian forces are conducting attacks from Robotyne against Novoprokopivka.[6] Ukrainian forces are attacking directly into Verbove’s western side.[7] Ukrainian forces are also attacking north of Verbove.[8]

Russian sources report that Ukrainian forces broke into Verbove on September 22 and continued attacking the settlement with armored vehicles as of September 24. Geolocated combat footage posted on September 24 shows a Ukrainian BMP operating within Verbove’s westernmost village limits.[9] A VDV-affiliated source reported that Ukrainian forces entered Verbove for the first time on September 22 and continued pushing east.[10] The VDV source later reported that Ukrainian forces occupy half of Verbove as of September 24.[11] The VDV source accused the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) of trying to conceal Ukraine’s tactical progress in Verbove, rhetorically stating, “For how long can Shoigu’s MoD hide the breakthrough in Verbove?“[12] Several Russian sources reported on September 24 that Ukrainian forces continue deploying vehicles against Verbove, including Bradley infantry fighting vehicles.[13] Some Russian sources are vehemently denying any Ukrainian breakthrough in Verbove as of September 24.[14] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces captured new unspecified locations near Verbove on September 24.[15]

Ukrainian forces are attacking north of Verbove and could isolate the 56th VDV Regiment deployed in Novofedorivka from its sister regiments in the Verbove area according to Russian sources. A Russian VDV source warned that there is a “real threat” of Ukrainian forces reaching the 56th VDV Regiment’s rear near Novofedorivka on September 21.[16] The VDV source warned on September 22 that Ukrainian forces are within 7km of encircling the 56th VDV Regiment and that the regiment would be in a difficult position if its commander did not make a decision to withdraw from Novofedorivka to other previously prepared positions.[17] ISW does not assess that an encirclement of the 56th VDV Regiment is likely, though Ukrainian forces may isolate it from the rest of the 7th VDV Division if Ukrainians manage to outmaneuver it from Verbove’s north and the regiment inexplicably remains in its current positions.

Ukrainian military journalist Konstyantyn Mashovets reported on September 22 that Ukrainian forces are attempting to bypass Verbove from the north.[18] A prominent Kremlin-linked milblogger reported on September 24 that Ukrainian forces improved their positions near Novofedorivka’s flank.[19] Another prominent Russian milblogger reported on September 23 that Ukrainian forces attempted to attack an unspecified tactical height with an elevation of 136.7 meters near Verbove and that Ukrainian forces were deploying vehicles from the north to the south near Verbove.[20] ISW assesses that this tactical height of 136.7 meters is likely located approximately 3.5km northwest of Verbove based on an analysis of digital elevation data around Verbove. (It is customary in militaries to identify locations based on terrain elevations as marked on commonly used military maps, but ISW does not have access to the Russian maps to check for such markings.)

NASA FIRMS/VIIRS thermal anomaly data collected between September 22-24 shows an unusually intense cluster of heat anomalies north of Verbove. These anomalies, while not dispositive, are a supporting indicator of combat north of Verbove and support the Russian and Ukrainian reports of Ukrainian activity between Novofedorivka and Verbove. 

ISW cannot assess the extent of this Ukrainian attack north of Verbove and has not collected enough geospatial information to map it confidently at this time.

A Russian source affiliated with the VDV expressed panic at the prospect of significant Ukrainian advances in the Verbove area. A Russian milblogger, whose stated mission is to protect VDV Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky from removal or arrest, warned on September 22 and 23 that the 56th VDV Regiment was under imminent threat of encirclement following the reported Ukrainian advance into Verbove.[21] The milblogger asserted that the commander of the 56th VDV Regiment was unable to make any decision about withdrawal and called on the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to allow Teplinsky to remedy the situation.[22] The milblogger noted high losses and poor morale among the 56th VDV Regiment and claimed that more than half of the personnel of the 7th and 76th VDV Divisions are mobilized personnel.[23] Other Russian sources, including those with close ties to the VDV, have not yet described the situation in Verbove or among VDV forces as this dire. The Russian milblogger may be exaggerating the situation in the Verbove area to negatively portray the Russian military command and advocate for Teplinsky to have more control over tactical and operational decision-making.

The milblogger compared the poor morale in the 56th VDV Regiment to the general morale of the Soviet military during its invasion of Afghanistan and of the Russian military during its campaign in Chechnya. This level of poor morale may have significant impacts on the Russian defense in the area as relatively elite VDV units appear responsible for conducting counterattacks, which require high morale.[24]  It is less likely to affect the operations of units under direct attack, however, unless it reaches the point of causing surrenders, which is unlikely among VDV units even comprised of mobilized personnel.

Russian forces continue to expend significant combat power on counterattacking to hold their current positions and appear to be resisting the operationally sound course of action of falling back to prepared defensive positions further south. The Russian command constructed a multi-echeloned defense in southern Ukraine that would have allowed the Russian command to deploy defending Russian forces in depth throughout subsequent defensive layers. Russian forces have instead expended considerable amounts of manpower, materiel, and effort to hold the forwardmost defensive positions in southern Ukraine and have only withdrawn to subsequent defensive positions at the direct threat of Ukrainian advances.[25] Russian forces’ elastic defense requires that one echelon of Russian forces slows a Ukrainian tactical advance while a second echelon of forces counterattacks to roll back that advance. Counterattacking requires significant morale and relatively high combat capabilities, and the Russian military appears to rely on relatively elite units and formations to counterattack, likely at the expense of these forces’ degradation.[26] 

Some Russian and Ukrainian sources have acknowledged that some Russian counterattacks in the wider Robotyne area have been senseless.[27] A defense in depth should afford these units respite from further degradation through withdrawal to a subsequent defensive layer. This withdrawal would allow the Russian command to conserve critical combat power for more operationally significant counterattacks and efforts to attrit attacking Ukrainian forces, although the task of conducting an orderly withdrawal under fire or pursuit is quite challenging and risky. American military analysts Michael Kofman and Rob Lee recently assessed that Russian forces have underutilized the depth of their defense and have yet to execute “a true defense in depth” in which Russian forces trade “space for attrition” and that the Russian command’s decision to defend forward has allowed Ukrainian artillery units to attrit Russian forces.[28] ISW concurs with this assessment.  ISW has observed a concerted Ukrainian effort to attrit Russian forces even as Ukrainian forces make significant tactical gains, and the Russian resistance to withdrawing to defensive positions further south is likely compounding the asymmetric attrition gradient Ukrainian forces are trying to create. Russian counterattacks aimed at holding forward positions have been tactically significant, but it remains unclear if these counterattacks will have lasting operational importance.

The Russian military command may be ordering these counterattacks to buy time, but it is unclear how the Kremlin intends to use time bought at such a price. Russian forces appear to be unwilling to surrender tactical areas and are focusing instead on fighting for every meter instead of benefiting from the depth of their prepared defenses. Ukrainian military journalist Konstyantyn Mashovets observed that the Russian military command is achieving its objective of buying more time from these counterattacks but questioned what the Russian military command intends to do with this time.[29] Mashovets argued that the sacrifice of combat-ready forces and assets during defensive operations only makes sense in two situations: if it allows time to organize defensive systems at another prepared line or if it buys time for the organization of a more substantial counterattack or counteroffensive. Mashovets added that both scenarios assume that Russia has additional reserves and the ability to rapidly deploy these reserves to a new defensive line or an operational direction where it plans to carry out a new offensive.[30] Mashovets concluded that regardless of the Russian intent behind buying time, the Russian military command still needs additional reinforcements in the western Zaporizhia direction in addition to forces already concentrated on this frontline for Russian forces’ current counterattacks to be operationally sound.

The Russian sacrifice of combat power to hold every meter may alternatively be intended to support the Kremlin’s informational and hybrid warfare objectives. Russian President Vladimir Putin first acknowledged the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive on June 9 by emphasizing two key and persistent narratives: that Ukrainian forces will not achieve significant successes due to well-prepared Russian defenses and that the Ukrainian forces are suffering heavy losses in personnel and Western military equipment.[31] Putin and the Kremlin have been framing Russian defensive operations as a major battlefield victory, and persistent Russian counterattacks allow the Kremlin to claim these operations as individual victories amidst the general lack of Russian battlefield advances elsewhere. These efforts likely intend to erode support and trust in Ukrainian forces in Ukraine and the West. Putin may have ordered the Russian military command to hold all Russia’s initial defensive positions to create the illusion that Ukrainian counteroffensives have not achieved any tactical or operational effects despite substantial Western support. This informational undertaking can only succeed in the long run if Russian forces can actually prevent Ukrainian forces from breaking through and liberating large areas, however.

The Russian resistance to ceding ground may also be tied to Russian military commanders’ and officials’ attempts to use the counteroffensive to achieve political goals, or it could result from Putin’s micromanagement. A Kremlin insider source claimed that Putin reportedly gave Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu a deadline of one month until early October 2023 to improve the situation on the frontlines, stop Ukrainian counteroffensives, and have Russian forces regain the initiative to launch an offensive operation against a larger city.[32] The insider‘s claim, if true, may indicate that the Russian military command may be ordering relentless counterattacks in hopes of forcing the Ukrainian counteroffensive to culminate, even at a high cost to Russian military capabilities.  ISW has previously observed instances in which the Russian MoD, fearing the imminent loss of Putin’s favor, intensified its efforts to purge commanders who offered honest but negative views and advice and pursued unachievable military objectives at the expense of Russian forces.[33] The Russian MoD, for example, launched an unsuccessful and costly offensive on Vuhledar in February 2023 to undermine the domestic Russian informational effects of the Wagner Group’s progress in Bakhmut and maintain favor with Putin.[34] Russian insider sources and milbloggers who have advocated for Teplinsky claimed that Shoigu has been focusing on setting conditions to convince Putin to remove Teplinsky from command – which would likely be achievable if Shoigu is able to achieve Putin’s objectives during the counteroffensive.[35] One pro-Teplinsky channel even claimed that Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov had already removed Teplinsky from overseeing the defensive operation in southern Ukraine, although ISW cannot confirm the validity of this claim at this time.[36]

Ukrainian forces may be able to achieve an operationally significant breakthrough in the southern frontline if several key assumptions hold. A significant Ukrainian success will be more likely if:

1)     Russian forces do not have the necessary reserves or combat power to maintain Russian defenses in western Zaporizhia Oblast;

2)     Ukrainian forces retain enough combat power to continue pushing after exhausting Russian combat power; and

3)     Russian defensive positions behind the current battle area are not as heavily mined or well prepared as the fortifications that Ukrainian forces have breached.

This hypothesis is invalid if any of these assumptions are invalidated. There are indicators that these assumptions remain valid as of this writing. ISW continues to assess that the Russian military does not have sufficient forces deployed to western Zaporizhia Oblast to completely man its defenses in depth and that Ukrainian forces should be able to operate through Russian field fortifications more rapidly if they are not properly manned.[37] Ukraine’s operations in Bakhmut have kept Russian forces committed to eastern Ukraine and away from the southern front and helped deny the creation of a strategic reserve.[38] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated on September 22 that the Russian military deployed its “reserve army” (the 25th Combined Arms Army [CAA]) “roughly north of Bakhmut” to defend against Ukrainian counteroffensive efforts in eastern Ukraine.[39]  It remains unclear if Ukrainian forces have enough reserve forces and combat power to continue conducting offensive operations in the south until the Russian defenses break to effectively exploit an operational breakthrough.  It also remains unclear how heavily mined or well prepared the Russian positions south of the current battle area are.

The Ukrainian counteroffensive is in an extremely dynamic phase and ISW is not prepared to offer any confident forecast of events despite recent positive indicators. Recent promising reports of Ukrainian tactical progress, including breaking through some Russian field fortifications, in the Orikhiv area should not be read as a guarantee that Ukraine is on the cusp of a significant operational success. Observers should be patient with Ukraine's campaign design and should expect Ukraine’s counteroffensive to continue through winter 2023 and into spring 2024. Ukraine does not need to achieve a sudden and dramatic deep penetration to achieve success.

Key Takeaways:

  • Elements of three Russian divisions are actively defending against Ukrainian assaults around the Ukrainian salient in the Orikhiv area in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
  • Ukrainian forces are attacking along three directions within the Orikhiv salient as of September 24.
  • Russian sources report that Ukrainian forces broke into Verbove on September 22 and continued attacking the settlement with armored vehicles as of September 24.
  • Ukrainian forces are attacking north of Verbove and could isolate the 56th VDV Regiment deployed in Novofedorivka from its sister regiments in the Verbove area according to Russian sources.
  • Russian forces continue to expend significant combat power on counterattacking to hold their current positions and appear to be resisting the operationally sound course of action of falling back to prepared defensive positions further south.
  • The Russian military command may be ordering these counterattacks to buy time, but it is unclear how the Kremlin intends to use time bought at such a price.
  • The Russian sacrifice of combat power to hold every meter may alternatively be intended to support the Kremlin’s informational and hybrid warfare objectives.
  • The Russian resistance to ceding ground may also be tied to Russian military commanders’ and officials’ attempts to use the counteroffensive to achieve political goals, or it could result from Putin’s micromanagement.
  • Ukrainian forces may be able to achieve an operationally significant breakthrough in the southern frontline if several key assumptions hold.
  • Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 24.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on September 24 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Bilohorivka, Donetsk Oblast (33km south of Kreminna).[40] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash stated that Russian forces continue to transfer reserves to the Kupyansk and Lyman directions and noted that the Russian attack near Bilohorivka was the first Russian attack in these directions in “a long time.”[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces achieved unspecified tactical success near Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk) and Synkivka (9km northeast of Kupyansk) over the past week.[42] A Russian news aggregator claimed on September 23 that Russian forces are gradually taking control of Ukrainian positions near Synkivka and Petropavliva and recaptured a number of Ukrainian positions near Novoyehorivka (26km southwest of Svatove).[43]

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted ground attacks near Kreminna on September 24 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces improved their positions near Novoyehorivka.[44] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed on September 23 and 24 that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Torske (14km west of Kreminna) and the Serebryanske forest area (11km south of Kreminna).[45]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on Bakhmut’s southern flank and reportedly forced Russian troops to retreat behind the railway line east of Klishchiivka (6km southwest of Bakhmut).[46] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces are continuing assaults south of Bakhmut, and Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash reiterated that Ukrainian positions are approximately three kilometers away from the Russian ground line of communication (GLOC) on the T0513 highway.[47]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces captured Orikhovo-Vasylivka (10km northwest of Bakhmut) on September 24.[48] Russian sources claimed that elements of the Russian 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division seized Orikhovo-Vasylivka and that Russian forces are currently clearing the settlement, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[49] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger also noted that Russian forces carried out two simultaneous attacks from Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut) towards Hryhorivka (10km northwest of Bakhmut) and towards Orikhovo-Vasylivka.[50] A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian forces continued to attack Bakhmut’s northern flank on September 23 to push Ukrainian forces from heights near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Berkhivka (5km northwest of Bakhmut).[51] Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces counterattacked near Kurdyumivka (12km southwest of Bakhmut) and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[52] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults east of Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), southeast of Bila Hora (13km southeast of Bakhmut), and near Klishchiivka.[53]

 

A Ukrainian serviceman stated that Russian forces concentrated reserves and artillery systems in the Bakhmut direction to stop Ukrainian advances in the area.[54] The serviceman stated that Russian forces have more manpower and artillery system in the Bakhmut direction than Ukrainian forces and noted that Russian counterattacks are hard to repel. This reported relatively high concentration of Russian manpower and equipment in the Bakhmut area suggests that the Ukrainian counteroffensive operations are continuing to draw and fix a significant contingent of Russian forces in the Bakhmut direction, which is their stated purpose.[55]

Russian forces continued offensive operations on the Donetsk City-Avdiivka line on September 24, but did not advance. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attempted to restore lost positions in the Avdiivka area and conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Marinka (just west of Donetsk City) and Pobieda (5km southwest of Donetsk City).[56] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked on the southern approaches to Avdiivka and conducted assaults near Marinka and Krasnohorivka (6km west of Donetsk City).[57]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

A Russian news aggregator claimed on the evening of September 23 that Russian forces attacked near Mykilske (4km southeast of Vuhledar).[58]

Russian sources claimed on September 24 that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful limited attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area over the past week. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that small Ukrainian infantry groups occasionally conducted unsuccessful assaults on Russian positions in this area.[59] Another Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces recently retreated after conducting unsuccessful attacks along the Novodonetske-Novomayorske (12-18km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) line in the past week.[60]

Russian forces reportedly used a lull in fighting to repair Russian defenses in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on September 24. The Russian “Vostok” Battalion, operating in the area, claimed that Russian forces used a break in Ukrainian attacks to repair Russian defenses, particularly Russian minefields.[61] The “Vostok” Battalion claimed that the Russian defense in the area was “overloaded” during the fighting and that Russian forces now devote every day without fighting to reconstitution.[62]

 

Ukrainian forces continued attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 24 and advanced into Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv). Geolocated combat footage published on September 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced to Verbove’s western outskirts.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced near Verbove, approached the outskirts of Novoprokopivka (16km south of Orikhiv), and improved their positions near Novofedorivka’s (21km southeast of Orikhiv) flank.[64] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to advance towards Verbove and Novoprokopivka over the past week.[65] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian Forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction, pushed Russian forces from their positions near Verbove, and consolidated newly secured positions.[66] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued assaults near Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv), Verbove, and Novoprokopivka.[67] Most Russian sources continued to claim on September 23 and 24 that Ukrainian forces have not broken through the Russian defense along the Robotyne-Verbove (10km south to 18km southeast of Orikhiv) line and that Russian forces retain control over Verbove.[68] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 24 that elements of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) repelled a Ukrainian attack near Robotyne.[69]

Russian sources continued ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 24 but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Robotyne.[70] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces attacked the western outskirts of the settlement but did not specify an outcome.[71] Another Russian milblogger posted footage claiming to show elements of the Russian 108th Guards Air Assault (VDV) Regiment (7th Guards VDV Division) operating along the Robotyne-Verbove line.[72]

 

Russian sources claimed that three Ukrainian HIMARS missiles struck Tokmak in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast on September 24.[73]

 

Russian sources continued to express concern over recent Ukrainian activity in the Dnipro River delta and on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on September 24, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims. A Russian milblogger claimed on September 24 that Ukrainian forces continued offensive actions on islands in the Dnipro River delta.[74] The milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces have created a “bridgehead” near Oleshky (7km southeast of Kherson City) and expanded their positions near Pidstepne (19km east of Kherson City) on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast in the past week.[75] Another Russian milblogger claimed on September 24 that Ukrainian forces expanded their positions on the southwestern part of Kozatskyi Island (northwest of Nova Kakhovka).[76] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated on September 24 that Russian forces have recently intensified aviation activity in the Kherson direction and conducted more than 20 strikes near Kherson City and Beryslav (64km northeast of Kherson City) over the last day.[77] The recent intensification of Russian air strikes in the area indicates that Russian military command may share the milbloggers’ concerns about limited Ukrainian activity along the Dnipro River.

 

A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on September 24 that Russian border guards repelled a Ukrainian attempt to land forces on Cape Tarkhankut (115 km northwest of Sevastopol) in occupied Crimea on the night of September 22 to 23 and another attempt on the night of September 23 to 34.[78]

Russian forces reportedly conducted a strike on Snake Island on September 24. Humenyuk and Ukrainian Operational Command South reported that Russian forces targeted Snake Island with four guided aerial bombs to prevent the development of the Ukrainian temporary corridor for civilian merchant vessels through the Black Sea.[79] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces struck Snake Island with two bombs and insinuated that Ukrainian forces used the island as a logistics base for the sabotage and reconnaissance groups that attempted to land on Crimea.[80]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Former Wagner personnel may become instructors for irregular people’s militias and territorial defense units in Rostov Oblast. Chairman of the Rostov Oblast combat veterans “Oplot” organization Valery Bova stated on September 24 that an unspecified number of former Wagner personnel will arrive in Rostov Oblast to train volunteers in Rostov Oblast people’s militias and territorial defense units.[81] Bova stated that former Wagner personnel will receive funds from ”Oplot” founders and that these volunteer formations will not receive arms until they receive permission from relevant Russian law enforcement agencies.[82] Seventy people have reportedly submitted applications to join “Oplot’s” territorial defense reserve since August, and “Oplot” reportedly plans to train 300 personnel within six months.[83] Wagner fighters have previously trained analogous people’s militias in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts starting in winter 2022-2023.[84]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation administrations in Ukraine officially elected acting occupation heads to their posts on September 23 following illegal regional elections. Occupation legislative assemblies elected acting Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo, acting Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky, acting Luhansk Oblast occupation head Leonid Pasechnik, and acting Donetsk Oblast occupation head Denis Pushilin as official heads of their respective occupation administrations.[85] Russian occupation officials used coercive efforts during regional elections in occupied Ukraine, and the Kremlin likely predetermined these electoral results.[86]

Pushilin reportedly signed a decree on September 18 that will regulate the movement of occupation employees under martial law, likely setting conditions for future Russian evacuation efforts.[87] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia personnel and civilian employees of the Donetsk Oblast occupation administration will have to submit planned travel to their managers no later than a month ahead of time.[88] The decree likely aims to allow Russian occupation administrations to decide when to allow occupation officials to evacuate and to discourage mass movement out of occupied territories.

Pushilin also signed a decree on September 18 banning large gatherings in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[89] The decree will forbid weekday gatherings on streets or in other public places between 2300 and 0400.[90] The decree likely aims to allow Russian occupation authorities to conduct mass crackdowns in the event of public resistance to Russian occupation.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Russian and Belarusian forces extended joint exercises through October 1. The Belarusian Hajun Project reported that joint exercises at the Borisov Combined Arms Training Ground in Minsk Oblast, the Brest Training Ground in Brest Oblast, and the Lepelsky Training Ground in Vitebsk Oblast will last until September 30.[91] Joint training exercises at the training ground of the Belarusian 6th Mechanized Brigade and the Neman Aviation Training Grounds in Grodno Oblast will reportedly last until September 29 and exercises at the Domanovo Training Ground of the Air Force and Air Defense Forces and the Obuz-Lesnovsky Combined Arms Training Ground in Brest Oblast will reportedly last until October 1.[92]

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 


Saturday, September 23, 2023

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 23, 2023

George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Christina Harward,
Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 23, 2023, 8:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 3pm ET on September 23. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

ISW is now prepared to assess that Ukrainian forces have broken through Russian field fortifications west of Verbove in western Zaporizhia Oblast. These fortifications are not the final defensive line in Russia’s defense in depth in western Zaporizhia Oblast, but rather a specific series of the best-prepared field fortifications arrayed as part of a near-contiguous belt of an anti-vehicle ditch, dragon's teeth, and fighting positions about 1.7 - 3.5 km west of Verbove.[1]

Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi stated in an interview with CNN published on September 23 that Ukrainian forces achieved a “breakthrough” on the left flank near Verbove and that Ukrainian forces continue advancing.[2] Combat footage posted on September 22 shows a destroyed Ukrainian Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) and BMP-2 operating slightly beyond Russia’s fighting positions trench line near Verbove, indicating continued Ukrainian progress in deploying more heavy equipment beyond Russia’s triune belt of the anti-vehicle ditch, dragon’s teeth, and fighting positions.[3] Commercially available satellite imagery indicates that Ukrainian forces have brought heavy equipment closer to Verbove over the past 96 hours in a manner consistent with Tarnavskyi’s statement.[4] The Wall Street Journal reported on September 21 that Ukrainian forces achieved a “limited breakthrough” west of Verbove citing an unnamed Ukrainian Air Assault Forces officer.[5]

Ukrainian forces have not overcome all of the prepared Russian defensive positions near Verbove. Ukrainian forces’ rate of advance near their breakthrough remains unclear. Russian forces likely still control segments of the long trench line of Russian fighting positions between Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) and Verbove, especially near the tactical high ground to the south. Russian forces have reportedly established prepared fighting positions in almost every tree line that Ukrainian infantry are slowly and systematically fighting through. Russian forces have more field fortifications beyond Verbove; there are more anti-vehicle trenches and fighting positions north of Ocheretuvate (26km southeast of Orikhiv), for example. It is unclear the extent to which those positions are manned, however. ISW continues to assess that the Russian military does not have sufficient forces deployed to this sector of the front to completely man its defenses in depth and that Ukrainian forces should be able to operate through Russian field fortifications more rapidly if they are not properly manned.[6]

Ukrainian forces are deepening their penetration in Zaporizhia Oblast and are assaulting Novoprokopivka – a frontline village 1.5 km immediately south of Robotyne. Geolocated combat footage posted on September 23 shows elements of the Russian 70th Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) ambushing and killing two Ukrainian infantrymen in Novoprokopivka’s northeastern outskirts, indicating that Ukrainian forces have likely cleared Russian positions between Robotyne and Novoprokopivka.[7] Multiple Russian sources reported that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack against northern Novoprokopivka on September 22.[8] This is the first confirmed Ukrainian ground attack in the immediate vicinity of Novoprokopivka.

Ukrainian military officials stated that the Ukrainian counteroffensive would continue in the winter. Tarnavskyi told CNN that he expected a major Ukrainian breakthrough after Ukrainian forces reach Tokmak (a major Russian stronghold in western Zaporizhia) and that it is important that Ukrainian forces not lose the initiative they currently hold.[9] Tarnavskyi also stated that Ukrainian operations will continue through the winter as Ukrainian forces are mostly advancing on foot without vehicles and that inclement weather will thus not have a major negative effect on the Ukrainian counteroffensive.[10] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov echoed a similar assessment about continued Ukrainian winter operations in an interview with The War Zone published on September 22.[11] ISW has previously assessed that, while seasonal weather can slow ground movements and challenge logistics, it will not impose a definite end to Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.[12] The culmination of the Ukrainian counteroffensive will likely depend rather on the Russian and Ukrainian balance of forces as well as on Western aid to Ukraine.

The Ukrainian counteroffensive in western Zaporizhia Oblast has likely destroyed the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet). Budanov stated in his interview with The War Zone published on September 22 that the 810th Brigade was “completely defeated” in southern Ukraine.[13] Budanov stated that the 810th Brigade has withdrawn and that Russian airborne (VDV) units replaced them on the front. Budanov‘s description of the status of the 810th Brigade corresponds most closely to the US military‘s doctrinal definition of the tactical mission task of “destroy”: “physically render[ing] an enemy force combat-ineffective until reconstituted.”[14] Elements of the 810th Brigade have reportedly been operating in the Zaporizhia direction since March 2023 and in western Zaporizhia Oblast since June 2023.[15] ISW previously observed the 810th Brigade in October 2022, when it was reportedly operating in Kherson Oblast, and the unit was likely reconstituting in the rear in the interim before assuming positions in Zaporizhia Oblast.[16] The 810th Brigade has repeatedly suffered significant losses, and Ukrainian forces have destroyed the unit in the past, following which the Russian military has reconstituted it. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 19, 2022, that the 158 soldiers of the 810th Brigade had been killed and about 500 wounded.[17] GUR Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated on July 31, 2022, that 200 servicemen of the 810th Brigade refused to return to the war in Ukraine, and the Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 12, 2022, that the 810th Brigade lost more than 85% of its personnel in the Kherson direction and that many again refused to return to combat.[18]

A senior Ukrainian official explicitly confirmed that Ukraine’s objective in Bakhmut is to fix Russian forces. Ukraine’s fixing of Russian forces in Bakhmut may be alleviating pressure on the Kupyansk frontline. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated that Ukrainian forces achieved their objective of pinning Russian forces in Bakhmut and preventing their transfer to other areas of the theater – such as southern Ukraine – in a September 22 interview.[19] Budanov also stated that the Russian military deployed the recently created and not fully formed 25th Combined Arms Army (CAA) of the Eastern Military District “roughly north of Bakhmut.”[20] Budanov previously reported on August 31 that the Russian military deployed elements of the 25th CAA to replace elements of the 41st CAA (Central Military District) in the Kupyansk direction as elements of the 41st CAA began a "slow” redeployment to southern Ukraine.[21] The Russian deployment of elements of the 25th CAA to Bakhmut instead of Kupyansk will likely disrupt Russian efforts to fix Ukrainian forces in the Kupyansk direction, as Russian forces need these troops to continue assaults in place of the 41st CAA. Ukrainian officials and Russian sources have indicated that the tempo and the intensity of Russian offensives on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line has significantly decreased in recent weeks as Russian forces are continuing to regroup and rotate personnel in this direction, and the redirection of the deployment of 25th CAA may have alleviated some of the pressure from this frontline.[22] Budanov’s statement supports ISW’s recent assessment that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations on Bakhmut’s southern flank have fixed a large amount of Russian combat power in Bakhmut that would otherwise be available to reinforce Russian defenses in the south — or, in this case, to attempt to force Ukrainian forces to redeploy to defend against Russian assaults around Kupyansk.[23]

Ukraine’s simultaneous counteroffensives in Bakhmut and southern Ukraine are impeding Russia’s long-term force generation efforts as Russia redeploys its new reserves to defend against Ukrainian advances. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) formed a “reserve army” at the end of June, likely referencing the 25th CAA among other formations, which began recruiting personnel from the Russian Far East in mid-May.[24] The formation of the 25th CAA was likely part of Shoigu’s announced intent to conduct large-scale force restructuring by 2026, and the use of these forces in combat and defensive operations will likely expend reserves intended for the long-term reconstitution and expansion of Russia’s military.[25] The Russian military command has also likely been unable to fully staff or properly train the 25th CAA at this time. Budanov specified that the unfinished 25th CAA has about 15,000 troops, whereas the Russian military had reportedly hoped to recruit 30,000 contract personnel for the 25th CAA.[26] Ukrainian military officials assessed that the 25th CAA would not be combat effective until at least 2024.[27] Russia had previously attempted to form the 3rd Army Corps over the summer of 2022 as a reserve force but had deployed and expended much of this ill-prepared formation defending against Ukrainian counteroffensives in the fall of 2022.[28]

A Ukrainian intelligence chief stated that the September 22 Ukrainian strike on the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) Command headquarters in Sevastopol injured senior Russian commanders. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov told Voice of America (VOA) in an interview published on September 23 that the Ukrainian strike on the BSF Command headquarters wounded the commander of the Russian grouping of forces in the Zaporizhia direction, Colonel General Alexander Romanchuk, who is in “very serious condition” and the commander of the 200th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (Northern Fleet), Lieutenant General Oleg Tsekov, who is “unconscious.”[29] Budanov also reported that the strike killed at least nine and injured 16 Russian personnel.[30] VOA reported that the GUR has no information about the alleged death of BSF commander Admiral Viktor Sokolov.[31] Ukrainian Special Operations Forces reported that Ukrainian forces “precisely” struck the BSF Command headquarters during a meeting of senior BSF leadership.[32] Satellite imagery published on September 22 showing the BSF Command headquarters before and after the strike indicates that Ukrainian forces conducted a precision strike.[33]

Imagery of the strike against the Black Sea Fleet Headquarters. September 23, 2023.

Imagery courtesy of Planet Labs PBC.

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 22 to 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed 14 of 15 Shahed-131/136 drones and that Russian forces launched four missiles.[34] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted a missile attack on Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast.[35] Several Russian sources claimed that the Russian forces conducted a retaliatory strike on Kremenchuk airfield after the Ukrainian strike on the BSF Command headquarters.[36]

Zaporizhia Oblast occupation governor Yevgeny Balitsky appointed former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and ultranationalist figure Dmitry Rogozin as a Russian Federation Council senator representing occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[37] Rogozin is affiliated with the “Tsarskiye Volky” (Tsar’s Wolves) volunteer battalion but has not held a position in the Russian government since his dismissal as head of Roskosmos in July 2022.[38] A Russian insider source claimed that Rogozin has ties to the “Convoy” private military company (PMC) and advocated for its use in Africa and Nagorno-Karabakh to Russian Presidental Administration Head Anton Vaino.[39] ISW previously reported that Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov formed a “Convoy” with Wagner-affiliated Konstantin Pikalov.[40] The insider source claimed that unspecified Russian officials forced Rogozin to go on a “business trip (exile)” to defense industrial base enterprises in Belarus after multiple meetings with Vaino.[41] Rogozin’s appointment as occupied Zaporizhia Oblast Federation Council senator may be indicative of his ties to Russian occupation officials and his attempts to secure a new position in the Russian government.

A Russian insider source argued that the Russian military should reintroduce military officers for political affairs (zampolits) to address the Russian military’s problems with political and ideological commitment — a problem that Russian military thinkers identified in September 2018. The insider source claimed that GRU political officers are using an outdated “Soviet template” to conduct information operations against the enemy and are failing to provide political support to Russian military personnel.[42] The insider source noted that Russian political officers must resolve the contradictions between senior Russian political leaders‘ slogans and reality to ensure that military personnel can distinguish between possible and impossible objectives. The insider source claimed that Russian military-political work encourages blind repetition of phrases and orders, which prevents Russian military personnel from understanding and communicating Russian political decisions to their subordinates or explaining contradictions in political leadership messaging. Chairman of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee Colonel General Andrey Kartapolov identified similar issues in his September 2018 essay justifying the creation of the Russian Military-Political Directorate.[43] Kartapolov stated that Russian military-political leadership should adapt Soviet structures to new content. Kartapolov also argued that Russia must ensure the “information protection” of military personnel and create a stable conviction in both the military and broader society about why they must serve Russia. This insider’s argument suggests that the Russian military has not solved the problem that Kartapolov identified over the past five years.

Disjointed Wagner Group contingents reportedly returning to fight in Ukraine are likely to have a marginal impact on Russian combat capabilities without bringing the full suite of effectiveness Wagner had had as a unitary organization under financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s and founder Dmitry Utkin’s leadership. Former Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai stated on September 23 that Wagner personnel are operating in Luhansk Oblast and across different sectors of the frontline.[44] Haidai also stated that he did not know the number of Wagner personnel or the organization under which these Wagner personnel are operating in Ukraine.[45] A Wagner-affiliated source claimed that about 500 Wagner personnel including those who refused to participate in the Wagner rebellion on June 24 have joined a new unspecified organization organized by the former Wagner personnel department head and will likely return to Ukraine to fight on the southern flank of Bakhmut.[46] ISW previously observed reports that the Wagner personnel department head (previously referred to as Vadim V. “Khrustal”) is attempting to recruit Wagner fighters for a new PMC for operations in Africa.[47] These reports indicate that Wagner forces are fragmented and are unlikely to organize into a cohesive fighting force or have an impact on Russian combat capabilities if they return to fighting in Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

  • ISW is now prepared to assess that Ukrainian forces have broken through Russian field fortifications west of Verbove in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
  • Ukrainian forces have not overcome all prepared Russian defensive positions near Verbove.
  • Ukrainian forces are deepening their penetration in Zaporizhia Oblast and are assaulting Novoprokopivka – a frontline village 1.5 km immediately south of Robotyne.
  • Ukrainian military officials stated that the Ukrainian counteroffensive would continue in the winter.
  • The Ukrainian counteroffensive in western Zaporizhia Oblast has likely destroyed the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet).
  • A senior Ukrainian official explicitly confirmed that Ukraine’s objective in Bakhmut is to fix Russian forces. Ukraine’s fixing of Russian forces in Bakhmut may be alleviating pressure on the Kupyansk frontline.
  • Ukraine’s simultaneous counteroffensives in Bakhmut and southern Ukraine are impeding Russia’s long-term force generation efforts as Russia redeploys its new reserves to defend against Ukrainian advances.
  • A Ukrainian intelligence chief stated that the September 22 Ukrainian strike on the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) Command headquarters in Sevastopol injured senior Russian commanders.
  • Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 22 to 23.
  • Zaporizhia Oblast occupation governor Yevgeny Balitsky appointed former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and ultranationalist figure Dmitry Rogozin as a Russian Federation Council senator representing occupied Zaporizhia Oblast
  • A Russian insider source argued that the Russian military should reintroduce military officers for political affairs (zampolits) to address the Russian military’s problems with political and ideological commitment– a problem that Russian military thinkers identified in September 2018.
  • Disjointed Wagner Group contingents reportedly returning to fight in Ukraine are likely to have a marginal impact on Russian combat capabilities without bringing the full suite of effectiveness Wagner had had as a unitary organization under financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s and founder Dmitry Utkin’s leadership.
  • Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in western Donetsk Oblast, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any confirmed advances on September 23.
  • Russian authorities are reportedly embezzling funds from military facilities near the border of Ukraine.
  • Russian government programs continue to forcibly deport children in occupied Ukraine to Russia.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces reportedly conducted offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on September 22 but did not advance. A Russian milblogger claimed on September 22 that Russian forces conducted a ground attack near Novoyehorivka (15km southwest of Svatove) but did not specify an outcome.[48] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued consolidating their positions near Synkivka and that there were no significant changes in the Serebryanske forest area near Kreminna.[49]

Ukrainian officials did not report any Russian ground attacks on the Kreminna-Svatove line on September 23. Former Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai stated on September 23 that Russian forces in Luhansk Oblast have decreased the volume of their artillery fire because they are rotating personnel.[50]

Russian sources retracted claims that Russian forces occupy Synkivka (6km northeast of Kupyansk). The Russian MoD reported that Russian forces struck Ukrainian forces near Synkivka on September 23.[51] A prominent Russian milblogger reported that Ukrainian forces control Synkivka as of September 23.[52] Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces had partially encircled Synkivka and captured the northern part of the settlement in mid-August 2023.[53]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on Bakhmut’s southern flank on September 23, but did not make new territorial gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued to conduct offensive operations in an unspecified area south of Bakhmut.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are repelling Ukrainian attacks at Kurdyumivka (12km southwest of Bakhmut).[55] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash stated that Ukraine’s recent liberation of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut) enables Ukrainian forces to strike Russian rear positions and target Russian control points.[56] Yevlash added that Ukrainian positions are approximately three kilometers away from the Russian ground line of communication (GLOC), likely referring to Russian logistics line on the T0513 highway. Russian sources, including the Russian MoD, continued to claim that Ukrainian forces are not in full control of Klishchiivka and are continuing to fight for the settlement.[57]

Russian forces continued to counterattack on Bakhmut’s northern and southern flanks but did not achieve any confirmable advances on September 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully conducted ground attacks near Minkivka (13km northwest of Bakhmut), Orikhovo-Vasylivka (10km northwest of Bakhmut), Hryhorivka (9km northwest of Bakhmut), Klishchiivka, and Andriivka.[58] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger similarly stated that Russian forces are counterattacking in the Klishchiivka and Andriivka areas and are engaged in fierce battles over the heights on Bakhmut’s northern flank that stretches to the eastern outskirts of Berkhivka (3km north of Bakhmut).[59] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces still control most of the heights in the area.[60]

A Russian milblogger amplified information about a claimed encounter with mobilized servicemen of the 11th Separate Air Assault (VDV) Brigade in August 2023, which revealed that elements of this elite unit likely deployed in the Bakhmut area lack artillery support.[61] The milblogger received a message from one of his subscribers who claimed to have encountered newly arrived mobilized personnel of the 11th VDV Brigade who were committed to daily assaults on an unspecified frontline. ISW previously observed elements of the 11th VDV Brigade deploying to Bakhmut and participating in combat starting in June and July 2023.[62] The subscriber noted that elements of the 11th VDV Brigade launched assaults without proper artillery support and that the Russian Armed Forces failed to introduce additional reserves to reinforce the brigade’s unspecified 300-meter advance – resulting in numerous Russian deaths.

Russian forces launched offensive operations on the Donetsk City-Avdiivka line on September 23 but did not advance. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Avdiivka, Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), Marinka (directly west of Donetsk City), Pobieda (5km southwest of Donetsk City), and Krasnohorivka (6km west of Donetsk City).[63] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued to attack Marinka and resumed offensives on the approaches to Krasnohorivka.[64]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

A Russian milblogger claimed on September 23 that Russian forces attacked Ukrainian positions from the Mykilske direction (4km southeast of Vuhledar) but did not advance.[65]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area on September 23. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled five Ukrainian attacks in unspecified areas in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[66] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks west of Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[67]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area on September 23 and did not make confirmed advances. The Russian “Vostok” Battalion, reportedly operating in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area, claimed that Russian forces regained unspecified positions previously lost in the Velyka Novosilka area and that elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) advanced in an unspecified area.[68] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces counterattacked near Novodonetske (12km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) and Novomayorske (18km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[69] Footage published on September 23 purportedly shows elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) operating near Rivnopil (10km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[70]

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 23 and advanced. Geolocated imagery published on September 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Novoprokopivka (14km south of Orikhiv).[71] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces are pushing Russian forces out of their positions Verbove area (18km southeast of Orikhiv).[72] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi stated in an interview with CNN published on September 23 that Ukrainian forces achieved a “breakthrough” on the left flank of Verbove and that Ukrainian forces continue to advance.[73] Russian milbloggers widely denied reports of a Ukrainian “breakthrough” near Verbove and Ukrainian advances in northern Novoprokopivka.[74] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Verbove and Robotyne.[75] Russian milbloggers also claimed that fierce fighting is ongoing on the western outskirts of Robotyne.[76]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 23 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attacked near Mala Tokmachka (7km southeast of Orikhiv) and Robotyne.[77] Geolocated footage published on September 22 shows elements of the Russian “Osman” Spetsnaz unit operating west of Verbove.[78] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated that Russian forces have been using Storm-Z units in the past week in attempts to recapture positions near Robotyne.[79]

Russian sources continue to claim that Ukrainian forces conduct cross-river raids in the Dnipro River delta. The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attempted to establish positions on islands and on the left bank of the Dnipro River.[80] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces continue operating on islands in the Dnipro River delta.[81]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian authorities are reportedly embezzling funds from military facilities near the border of Ukraine. The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated on September 23 that aerial reconnaissance images reportedly showing Russian military locations in Kursk Oblast indicate that Russian strongholds in the area near the border with Ukraine are unmanned, lacking equipment, and overgrown with vegetation.[82] The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated that there is evidence that unspecified actors embezzled from these military facilities and are falsely “imitating” the construction of defenses near the Ukrainian border.[83]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian government programs continue to forcibly deport children in occupied Ukraine to Russia. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration stated on September 22 that 90 children from occupied Kherson Oblast recently went to Moscow as part of the Russian Ministry of Culture’s “Cultural Map” program.[84] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration stated that Russian authorities will send “thousands” more children from occupied territories in Ukraine to Moscow and St. Petersburg by the end of 2023.[85]

The Russian United Russia party is attempting to assimilate Ukrainian children in occupied territories into Russia. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration stated that representatives of the United Russia party gave a Russian history lecture to over 100 children in Skadovsk Raion, Kherson Oblast, and that United Russia’s “Historical Conversations” project has already hosted over 1,500 similar lectures in Kherson Oblast.[86]

The Russian Republic of Mordovia continues to expand its patronage network in occupied Kherson Oblast. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration stated on September 23 that the Russian Republic of Mordovia supplied schools in Kalanchak Raion, Kherson Oblast, with textbooks and equipment.[87] ISW has previously reported on the recent expansion of the patronage network between the Republic of Mordovia and occupied Kherson Oblast.[88]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

A combined Belarusian air defense and anti-air rocket forces contingent returned to Belarus on September 23 after training in the Russian Far East.[89] Elements of the Belarusian 1st Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment, the 377th Guards Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment, and the 15th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade conducted tactical live fire exercises with S-300 air defense systems at the Russian Telemba Training Ground in Buryatia.[90] It is unclear if these Belarusian elements exercised with Russian counterparts or simply trained at Russian training grounds. This training likely helps develop the joint Russian-Belarusian regional air defense system which effectively subordinates Belarus’ Air and Air Defense command to Russia’s Western Military District.[91]

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.


[1] https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1705258291197026678

[2] https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/23/europe/ukraine-biggest-counteroffensive-t...

[3] https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1705310868848742706; https://t.me/zadesaatnikov/5344; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/53537

[4] Based on acquired commercially available 50cm electro optical imagery around September 20-23, 2023, at 47.43161, 35.94326 and 47.4318, 35.93499.

[5] https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/ukrainian-armored-vehicles-breach-russi...

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[7] https://twitter.com/giK1893/status/1705679700490674376; https://t.me/vo... https://twitter.com/giK1893/status/1705679700490674376 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/5105 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/10982 ; https://x.com/VigorousFalcon/status/1705551461533249773?s=20 ; https://t.me/BOBRMORF/268

[8] https://t.me/rusich_army/10982; https://t.me/dva_majors/26094; https:/... https://t.me/readovkanews/66527

[9] https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/23/europe/ukraine-biggest-counteroffensi...

[10] https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/23/europe/ukraine-biggest-counteroffensi...

[11] https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/exclusive-interview-with-ukraines-...

[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[13] https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/exclusive-interview-with-ukraines-...

[14] https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/exclusive-interview-with-ukraines-...

[15] https://t.me/milinfolive/97935 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/97950 ; ht...

[16] https://t.me/rybar/40242 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/68216; https://t...

[17] https://www.facebook.com/100069092624537/posts/298021502510935/

[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[19] https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/exclusive-interview-with-ukraines-...

[20] https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/exclusive-interview-with-ukraines-...

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive...

[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[23] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-operations-b...

[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[25] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[29] https://www.holosameryky dot com/a/7280435.html

[30] https://www.holosameryky dot com/a/7280435.html

[31] https://www.holosameryky dot com/a/7280435.html

[32] https://t.me/ukr_sof/748

[33] https://x.com/bradyafr/status/1705324205170971010?s=20

[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YyBAv2aJ2S2Fn6DTN9B...

[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xSG6mtaQhpJQJb57Ui...

[36] https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/3697 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/5791 ; ...

[37] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/1787

[38] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[39] https://t.me/vchkogpu/40474 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/40506

[40] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[41] https://t.me/vchkogpu/40872

[42] https://t.me/arbat/1705

[43] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Hybrid%20...

[44] https://t.me/serhiy_hayday/10210

[45] https://t.me/serhiy_hayday/10210

[46] https://t.me/grey_zone/20707

[47] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[48] https://t.me/readovkanews/66527

[49] https://t.me/readovkanews/66527

[50] https://t.me/serhiy_hayday/10210

[51] https://t.me/mod_russia/30740

[52] https://t.me/dva_majors/26094

[53] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive...

[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tapPbDearVjGMe36fGN...

[55] https://t.me/dva_majors/26094

[56] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/09/23/zvilnennya-klishhiyivky-ta-andriyivky-daye-zmogu-ukrayinskym-pidrozdilam-zavdavaty-udariv-shhe-glybshe-v-tylu-protyvnyka-illya-yevlash/

[57] https://t.me/mod_russia/30739; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/38095

[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tapPbDearVjGMe36fGN...

[59] https://t.me/wargonzo/15226

[60] https://t.me/wargonzo/15226

[61] https://t.me/voin_dv/5088

[62] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-operatio...

[63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YyBAv2aJ2S2Fn6DTN9B...

[64] https://t.me/wargonzo/15226

[65] https://t.me/wargonzo/15226

[66] https://t.me/mod_russia/30740

[67] https://t.me/voin_dv/5083

[68] https://t.me/batalyon_vostok/195

[69] https://t.me/dva_majors/26094

[70] https://t.me/dva_majors/26133

[71] https://twitter.com/giK1893/status/1705679700490674376 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/5105 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/10982 ; https://x.com/VigorousFalcon/status/1705551461533249773?s=20 ; https://t.me/BOBRMORF/268

[72] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YyBAv2aJ2S2Fn6DTN9B...

[73] https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/23/europe/ukraine-biggest-counteroffensi... https://suspilne dot media/578745-najbilsij-proriv-bude-pisla-tokmaka-tarnavskij/; https://t.me/otarnavskiy/248

[74] https://t.me/rybar/52259 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/15226 ; https://t.m... https://t.me/rusich_army/10982 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/26094 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/26089

[75] https://t.me/mod_russia/30740

[76] https://t.me/wargonzo/15226 ; https://t.me/sashakots/42352

[77] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/53543 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/15226

[78] https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1705310868848742706; https://t.me/zadesaatnikov/5344; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/53537

[79] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/09/23/okupanty-styaguyut-rezervy-na-tavrijskyj-napryamok-oleksandr-shtupun/

[80] https://t.me/mod_russia/30741

[81] https://t.me/dva_majors/26094

[82] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/rosiyany-imituyut-budivnytstvo-oboronnyh-sporud-na-kurshhyni/

[83] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/rosiyany-imituyut-budivnytstvo-oboronnyh-sporud-na-kurshhyni/

[84] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/14067

[85] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/14067

[86] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/14065

[87] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/14080

[88] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[89] https://t.me/modmilby/32288

[90] https://t.me/modmilby/32288

[91] https://www.sb dot by/articles/pyat-voprosov-o-vazhnom.html; https://web.archive.org/web/20170814091843/https://www.mid.ru/foreign_po... https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep25716?refreqid=excelsior%3A8298b1fc5a...