Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 23, 2025

 Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 23, 2025, 4:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:50am ET on January 22. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 23 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russia is reportedly planning to deploy additional North Korean forces, missiles, artillery systems, and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) to Kursk Oblast to support Russian long-range fire operations. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov told The War Zone in an article published on January 22 that North Korea will deploy an unspecified number of additional missile and artillery troops to Kursk Oblast at an unspecified future time.[1] Budanov reported that North Korea is unlikely to deploy a large number of additional ground combat troops, however. Budanov stated that North Korea has provided Russia with roughly 120 M-1989 Koksan 170mm self-propelled artillery systems and 120 M-1991 240mm MLRS since November 2024 and will likely send at least 120 more of each system in the future. The GUR previously reported in November 2024 that North Korea had provided Russia with roughly 100 of each of these systems as of October 2024.[2] Budanov stated that North Korea plans to provide Russia with 150 additional KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles in 2025 and sent Russia 148 KN-23 missiles in 2024. Budanov noted that North Korean troops typically operate North Korean-provided weapons in Kursk Oblast and are also training Russian forces on these systems. A US senior defense official recently told the New York Times (NYT) that additional North Korean forces will arrive in Russian "within the next two months (roughly mid-March 2025)."[3]

The Kremlin appears to be growing increasingly concerned about perceptions of Russia's economic instability. Reuters, citing five sources with knowledge of the situation, reported on January 23 that Russian President Vladimir Putin is growing increasingly concerned about "distortions" in the Russian economy due to the war in Ukraine.[4] Two sources familiar with "thinking in the Kremlin" told Reuters that there is a camp within the Russian elite that views a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine as desirable and key to addressing Russia's economic issues. One source claimed that Putin recognizes the strain that the war is placing on the Russian economy and assesses that he has achieved his "key war goals" in Ukraine, including seizing land in southern Ukraine to connect Russia within occupied Crimea and weakening the Ukrainian military. The source did not speculate on Putin's willingness to end the war, however. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on January 9 — citing sources in the Russian presidential administration, State Duma, and wider Russian federal government and regional governments — that Russian elites are growing increasingly dissatisfied with the impact of the war on the Russian economy.[5] ISW noted on January 22 that the Kremlin recently launched an information operation that seeks to create the false impression that the Russia economy is performing well despite numerous continued indicators of macroeconomic distress.[6]

Russian forces recently executed at least six unarmed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian sources circulated footage on January 23 of Russian soldiers shooting unarmed Ukrainian POWs in an unspecified area of Ukraine.[7] Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lyubinets and the Ukrainian Attorney General's Office reported on January 23 that Ukrainian officials are investigating social media footage of Russian forces executing six captured and unarmed Ukrainian servicemembers in an unspecified area of Donetsk Oblast.[8] Lyubinets noted that the footage shows a seventh Ukrainian POW in this group but that it is unclear what happened to the seventh POW based on the footage. ISW has frequently reported that Russian forces are conducting frontline executions of Ukrainian POWs and continues to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or enabling their subordinates to conduct these executions.[9]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is reportedly planning to deploy additional North Korean forces, missiles, artillery systems, and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) to Kursk Oblast to support Russian long-range fire operations.
• The Kremlin appears to be growing increasingly concerned about perceptions of Russia's economic instability.
• Russian forces recently executed at least six unarmed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
• The Kremlin is reportedly taking measures to protect industrial facilities in Russian border regions from Ukrainian strikes.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces recently advanced in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast amid continued fighting in the area on January 23. Geolocated footage published on January 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Tolstiy Lug (northwest of Sudzha).[10] Russian milbloggers claimed on January 23 that Russian forces entered Guyevo (south of Sudzha) and Viktorovka (northwest of Sudzha).[11] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces reportedly continued attacks northwest of Sudzha near Pogrebki, Nikolskiy, and Krugkenkoye; and south of Sudzha near Kurilovka and Guyevo.[12] A Ukrainian reconnaissance group commander operating in Kursk Oblast reported on January 22 that Russian forces only attack during the day in this direction and usually conduct infantry assaults without equipment.[13] Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Pogrebki, and elements of the Chechen "Khokhla" Detachment of the 204th "Akhmat" Spetsnaz Regiment are reportedly operating in the Sudzha direction.[14]

A Ukrainian drone battalion posted footage on January 22 of the battalion striking a Russian Tor air defense system in Belgorod Oblast.[15]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kharkiv direction on January 23 but did not advance.[16] Russian milbloggers claimed on January 23 that positional fighting continues north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk. [17]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 23 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing in northern Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk), recently advanced 1.5 kilometers deep within western Dvorichna, and will attempt to reach Kutkivka (northwest of Dvorichna) from Zapadne (southwest of Dvorichna).[18] One milblogger noted that Russian forces need to establish stable logistics across the Oskil River to conduct significant advances, however.[19] A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence stated that Russian forces are trying to advance towards Dovhenke (northwest of Dvorichna), Zapadne, and Kindrashivka (northwest of Kupyansk and southeast of Dvorichna).[20] Russian forces also continued ground attacks east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on January 22 and 23.[21]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 23 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Lozova, Zeleny Hai, and Zahryzove; east of Borova near Pershotravneve and Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka on January 22 and 23.[22] The Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on January 23 that Russian forces attacked near Nova Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova) with armored vehicle support.[23]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on January 23 but did not advance. Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Lyman near Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Novolyubivka and Yampolivka; and east of Lyman near Zarichne and Kuzmyne and in the Serebryanske forest area on January 22 and 23.[24] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 23 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Lyman near Terny and Torske.[25]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on January 23 but did not advance.[26]

Russian forces continued ground attacks near and within Chasiv Yar on January 22 and 23 but did not make confirmed advances.[27] Russian milbloggers claimed on January 23 that Russian forces cleared Ukrainian forces from the Refractory Plant's workshops in central Chasiv Yar and are now fighting west of the first workshop.[28] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian pontoon crossing in Kostyantynivka (southwest of Chasiv Yar).[29] Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on January 23 that Ukrainian forces struck a concentration of 100 Russian military personnel in Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar) on January 9 after Russian forces transferred personnel to Kalynivka through the Siverskyi Donets Donbas Canal pipe south of Chasiv Yar.[30]

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Toretsk and southwest of the town amid ongoing offensive operations near Toretsk on January 23. Geolocated footage published on January 23 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced at the Toretska Mine in northern Toretsk and advanced west of Nelipivka (southwest of Toretsk).[31] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have seized at least half of the Toretska Mine and advanced in Krymske (north of Toretsk).[32] Russian forces continued assaults in Toretsk itself and north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Krymske on January 22 and 23.[33] Elements of the Russian "Sparta" Battalion and the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) are reportedly operating in Toretsk.[34]

Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Pokrovsk amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 23. Geolocated footage published on January 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Novoyelyzavetivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[35] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Novoandriivka, Nadiivka (both southwest of Pokrovsk), Kotlyne (west of Pokrovsk), and Leontovychi (south of Pokrovsk), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[36] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 23 that Russian forces seized Solone (southwest of Pokrovsk), but ISW assesses that Russian forces likely seized the settlement as of January 13.[37] Russian forces continued attacking near Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Vodyane Druhe, Zelene Pole, Myrolyubivka, Yelyzavetivka, Promin, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novyi Trud, Zvirove, Leontovychi, and Petropavlivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Novoserhiivka, Kotlyne, Uspenivka, and Sribne and in the direction of Hryshyne on January 22 and 23.[38]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Kurakhove on January 23 but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 23 that Russian forces cleared Ukrainian forces from positions near Yantarne, advanced past the T-0515 highway west of Petropavlivka (northwest of Kurakhove), and are advancing towards Ulakly (both southwest of Kurakhove).[39] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) recently repelled a reinforced platoon-sized Ukrainian assault near Kurakhove.[40] Russian forces continued assaults northwest of Kurakhove near Shevchenko and towards Andriivka; west of Kurakhove near Dachne; and southwest of Kurakhove near Ulakly, Zelenivka, Yantarne, Rozlyv and in the direction of Kostyatynopil on January 22 and 23.[41] Drone operators of the Russian 57th Spetsnaz Brigade and elements of the 381st Artillery Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating near Dachne.[42]

Russian forces are intensifying offensive operations aimed at seizing Velyka Novosilka. Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported that Russian forces have launched over 80 attacks on Velyka Novosilka within the past day.[43] Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on January 23 that Russian forces have not completely encircled Ukrainian forces in the Velyka Novosilka area but noted there is a risk of Russian forces encircling Ukrainian forces in the area.[44] Trehubov also noted that the rivers near Velyka Novosilka – likely referring to the Mokri Yaly, Kashlahach, and Shaitanka rivers – are complicating the Ukrainian military's ability to maneuver in the area. Russian milbloggers, including a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger, claimed that Russian forces advanced along the T-0518 Pavlivka-Velyka Novosilka highway in central Velyka Novosilka, cut the settlement in half, and encircled a small Ukrainian group in southern Velyka Novosilka.[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing further in northeastern and eastern Velyka Novosilka and in several forested areas south of the settlement and hold positions along the Mokri Yaly and Kashlahach rivers.[46] ISW cannot independently confirm any of these claims. Russian forces continued attacking near Velyka Novosilka itself, just west of Velyka Novosilka near Vremivka, and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novodarivka on January 22 and 23.[47] Likely elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in Velyka Novosilka, and elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA) are reportedly operating north of Novyi Komar (north of Velyka Novosilka).[48]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 23. Drone operators of the Russian 1455th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Orikhiv, and drone operators of the 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA) are reportedly remotely mining Ukrainian logistics routes near Pyatykhatyky (northwest of Robotnye).[49]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Dnipro direction in Kherson Oblast on January 22 and 23.[50]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 22 to 23. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched four Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast against Zaporizhzhia City and 92 Shahed and decoy drones from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts.[51] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 57 drones over Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts; that 27 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that three drones remained in Ukrainian airspace as of 0930. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that drone debris damaged infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes killed one and injured 51 civilians in Zaporizhzhia City and that drone debris damaged residential buildings but no critical or residential infrastructure in Kyiv Oblast.[52]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin is reportedly taking measures to protect industrial facilities in Russian border regions from Ukrainian strikes. Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev met with a group representing the Bryansk Oblast Military Industrial Commission on January 23 and discussed increasing Russian air defense system production and protecting industrial and state storage facilities in the oblast.[53] Medvedev also visited the Bryansk Chemical Plant to "see what the situation was there" as the plant continues to fill the Russian state defense order following previous Ukrainian strikes against the plant. Ukrainian strikes in the Russian rear have largely targeted defense industrial base (DIB) and other facilities supporting Russia's war effort, including the Bryansk Chemical Plant.[54] The Kremlin may be increasingly interested in bolstering air defense capabilities to protect DIB facilities in particular as the state of the Russian domestic economy continues to deteriorate.

Russian federal subjects continue increasing financial incentives to recruit Russians into signing military service contracts. Republic of Tatarstan Head's Spokesperson Liliya Galimova stated on January 23 that Tatarstan increased one-time payments from 2.2 million rubles (around $22,000) to 2.8 million rubles (around $28,000) to those who sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[55]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

---

[1] https://www.twz.com/news-features/more-north-korean-artillery-troops-heading-to-russia-ukraine-intel-chief

[2] https://interfax.com dot ua/news/general/1030885.html ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2024

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-22-2025

[4] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-growing-concerned-by-russias-economy-trump-mulls-more-sanctions-2025-01-23/

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-9-2025; https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/01/09/zhdali-chto-voyna-zakonchitsya

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-22-2025

[7] Warning - graphic footage: https://t.me/ButusovPlus/16816 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/32515

[8] https://gp.gov dot ua/ua/posts/za-faktom-rozstrilu-vorogom-ukrayinskix-viiskovopolonenix-na-doneccini-rozpocato-rozsliduvannya; https://suspilne dot media/931631-armia-rf-rozstrilala-6-ukrainskih-vijskovopolonenih-lubinec-zvernuvsa-do-oon-ta-mkch/?utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/931641-okupanti-rozstrilali-sistoh-ukrainskih-vijskovopolonenih-na-doneccini/; https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/28450

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010925 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120324; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032724; https://isw.pub/UkrWar090624; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022524; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2024

[10] https://x.com/giK1893/status/1882387858599862774; https://t.me/ua_marines_36brigade/2668 https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8197

[11] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22826; https://t.me/dva_majors/63013

[12] https://t.me/dva_majors/62972; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22826; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85004

[13] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/22/drony-vse-bachat-na-kurshhyni-rosiyany-majzhe-vidmovylysya-vid-nichnyh-shturmiv/

[14] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85004; https://t.me/s/RKadyrov_95

[15] https://t.me/ua_42nd_ombr/807; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/22/taktyka-vypalenoyi-rosijskoyi-zemli-na-bilgorodshhyni-spalyly-vorozhu-rls/

[16] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20188

[17] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20413 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22823

[18] https://t.me/yurasumy/20728; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84974; https://t.me/notes_veterans/21545

[19] https://t.me/yurasumy/20728

[20] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/931563-znacna-castina-dvoricnoi-perebuvae-pid-kontrolem-rf-spivzasnovnik-deepstate/

[21] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20188; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20171; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20168 ; https://t.me/synegubov/12771

[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20188 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20171 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20168

[23] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4360

[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20188; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20171; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20168; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/24166; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22804

[25] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22804

[26] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20188

[27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20188 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20171 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20168

[28] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20413 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22812 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24409

[29] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22812

[30] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/23/zekonomyly-na-evakuacziyi-pid-chasovym-yarom-rosiyany-spalyly-bilya-sotni-svoyih-zagyblyh/

[31] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1882324798497534212; https://www.instagram.com/stories/highlights/18258307981259643/ ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1882449161221783840; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/430

[32] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22820 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20727 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20413

[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20188 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20171 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20168 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61626 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24409 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22820

[34] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84999

[35] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8194; https://www.facebook.com/groups/875241613663737/permalink/1330107578177136

[36] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61623 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85002

[37] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-13-2025

[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20188 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20171 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20168 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/297266 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/297267 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4360 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20726 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61613 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61614 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61619 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61623 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84980 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62972 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20413

[39] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61626 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61614

[40] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84961

[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20188 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20171 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20168 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61626

[42] https://t.me/sashakots/51452 ; https://t.me/sashakots/51463

[43] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4360

[44] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/23/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-sytuacziyu-na-pokrovskomu-ta-novopavlivskomu-napryamkah/

[45] https://t.me/rybar/67394 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61607 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61626 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61627 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/12940 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/12950 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20734 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152180

[46] https://t.me/rybar/67374 ; https://t.me/rybar/67372 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61607 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84962 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152238

[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20188 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20171 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20168 ; https://t.me/rybar/67372 ; https://t.me/rybar/67374 ; https://t.me/rybar/67394 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61607 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24409 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62972

[48] https://t.me/rybar/67394 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/12953

[49] https://t.me/dva_majors/62956 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62996 ; https://t.me/poisk_in_ua/33160

[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20168 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20171

[51] https://t.me/kpszsu/27421

[52] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/15506 ; https://t.me/kyivoda/24630

[53] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/22956339

[54] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-9-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2025

[55] https://www.business-gazeta dot ru/news/660882

Iran Update, January 22, 2025

Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braverman, Ria Reddy, Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Ben Rezaei, Katherine Wells, Avery Borens, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

CTP-ISW did not record verifiable reports of kinetic activity in the Gaza Strip or reports of attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since the last data cut off on January 21.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) announced the formation of joint operations rooms in the West Bank on January 22 with Hamas and al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades’ fighters.[1] The PIJ statement claimed the joint operations rooms would coordinate and develop ”field work” and ”joint action.” The joint operations rooms will be comprised of fighters from PIJ’s al Quds Brigades, Hamas’ al Qassem Brigades, and al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades’ ”Youth of Revenge and Liberation” branch.[2] The ”Youth of Revenge and Liberation” branch, which is one of the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades many branches based in various locations throughout the West Bank, was active in Tulkarm in summer 2024.[3] It is unclear at this time where the joint operations rooms will be based, or which subgroup or groups of the ”Youth of Revenge and Liberation” branch will be involved. Hamas, the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, and PIJ previously established a combined operations room known as ”the Hornets’ Nest” that was based in Jenin and active from 2022-2024. The Hornets’ Nest also included the military wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, among others.[4] PIJ, Hamas, and the “Youth of Revenge and Liberation” claimed to fire small arms and detonate improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in a combined operation targeting the IDF in Jenin on January 22.[5]

Iraq may attempt to integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi army after the withdrawal of US forces, which would not satisfy US demands to dissolve the militias. A senior Iraqi diplomat claimed on January 22 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will only integrate into the Iraqi army after US forces completely withdraw from Iraq.[6]  The outgoing Biden administration reportedly pressured the Iraqi government to dissolve the Iranian-backed Iraq militias.[7] The integration of the militias would instead increase their influence within the army, which is deeply problematic given the backgrounds and loyalties of many of these groups. Many of these groups have committed acts of sectarian cleansing dating back to the 2000s, which would destroy the national character of the Iraqi army if the government reflagged entire militia units as Iraqi army units.[8] Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and the Badr Organization, swear allegiance to the Iranian supreme leader, not the Iraqi state.[9] The state-recognized wings of these groups within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) already answer to militia chains of command—not the Iraqi prime minister—and there is no reason to believe that these groups would adhere to an Iraqi army chain of command if reflagged as Iraqi army units. The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that the remaining troops would withdraw by the end of 2026.[10] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani told Saudi outlet al Elaph in January 2025 that the Iraqi government is actively trying to integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias within Iraq’s legal and institutional framework.[11]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba head Akram al Kaabi threatened to resume rocket and missile attacks targeting US forces in Iraq if the United States extends its presence past the September 2025 withdrawal date or makes “sudden moves.”[12] Kaabi added that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will increase the pace of attacks targeting US forces if the United States delays its withdrawal from Ain al Asad airbase.[13] It is notable that US-led international coalition forces will withdraw from some areas in Iraq, including the Ain al Asad airbase, by September 2025 but will not withdraw completely from Iraq until the end of 2026.[14]

Unspecified Western officials told The Financial Times on January 22 that two Iranian cargo vessels carrying a large amount of chemical precursor for solid missile propellant will travel from China to Iran over the next few weeks.[15] The officials expect the vessels to arrive at Bandar-e Abbas port in southern Iran and deliver the material to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). The ships are expected to carry more than 1,100 tons of sodium perchlorate, which can be converted to slightly over 1000 tons of ammonium perchlorate, the main component for solid propellant for missiles. Ammonium perchlorate needs to be mixed with other components to create solid fuel propellant for missiles. The unspecified officials estimated that 1000 tons of ammonium perchlorate can—if converted to solid fuel propellant—fuel up to 260 mid-range Iranian ballistic missiles, including the Kheybar Shekan and Haj Qassem. Iran used Kheybar Shekan missiles in both April and October 2024 missile attacks on [16]

Israeli damage estimates from the IDF strikes on Iran in October 2024 suggest that Iran’s missile production capabilities likely remain limited, however. Unspecified Israeli sources reported that the IDF strikes hit 12 planetary mixers used to produce solid fuel for ballistic missiles.[17] Iran can reportedly not produce the mixers domestically and remanufacturing the mixers could take at least a year. Iran needs these mixers to combine various components, including ammonium perchlorate, and create solid propellant for missiles. It is not clear if Iran has mixing facilities at other locations but the loss of 12 mixers has likely significantly degraded Iran’s ability to produce missiles and mount a large-scale attack on Israel soon, regardless of Iran’s supply of ammonium perchlorate.

Iran has previously used ammonium perchlorate for internal missile production and exported it to members of the Axis of Resistance. Iran engaged in secret negotiations with China and Russia in April 2023 to acquire a Chinese supply of ammonium perchlorate for its solid-fueled missiles.[18] The US Navy also interdicted an IRGC shipment of 70 tons of ammonium perchlorate en route from Iran to the Houthis in November 2024. The Houthis could use ammonium perchlorate as a precursor for solid fuel propellant, but there is currently no evidence that the Houthis can manufacture solid fuel. The ammonium perchlorate can also be used to make explosives.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: CTP-ISW did not record verifiable reports of kinetic activity in the Gaza Strip or reports of attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since the last data cut off on January 21.
• West Bank: Palestinian Islamic Jihad announced the formation of joint operations rooms in the West Bank on January 22 with Hamas and al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades’ fighters.
• Iraq: Iraq may attempt to integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi army after the withdrawal of US forces, which would not satisfy US demands to dissolve the militias. The integration of the militias would instead increase their influence within the army, which is deeply problematic given the backgrounds and loyalties of many of these groups.
• Iran: Unspecified Western officials told The Financial Times on January 22 that two Iranian cargo vessels carrying a large amount of chemical precursor for solid missile propellant will travel from China to Iran over the next few weeks. Israeli damage estimates from the IDF strikes on Iran in October 2024 suggest that Iran’s missile production capabilities likely remain limited, however.
  
  

Syria

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Reestablish ground lines of communication through Syria to Lebanon
• Reestablish Iranian influence in Syria
  
  

Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) concentrated attacks around the Tishreen Dam against the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The US-sanctioned Suleiman Shah Brigade, which is an SNA formation, posted footage on January 21 in which its forces fired artillery and rockets at SDF positions around the Tishreen Dam.[19] Anti-SDF media circulated footage from the SNA Dawn of Freedom Operations Room in which SNA fighters fired an anti-tank-guided munition at an SDF position near the Tishreen Dam.[20]

Turkey and the SNA continued attacks on SDF positions along possible lines of advance. Anti-SDF media claimed that Turkey conducted a drone strike targeting an SDF position near the Mabaqir base in Tal Tamr, Hasakah.[21] Anti-SDF media also claimed that Turkey conducted an airstrike on an SDF position in Bir Hasso, south of Kobani.[22] Turkish and SNA forces have deployed to the Turkey-Syria border at Kobani and along the line of control near Ain Issa and Tal Tamr, which CTP-ISW assessed may be in preparation for a three-pronged assault to collapse SDF defenses along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River.[23]

The HTS-led Department of Military Operations arrested at least 20 people in Lajat, Daraa Province, on January 20 for various reasons, including participation in drug trafficking, the former Assad regime, and Lebanese Hezbollah.[24] Syrian media reported on January 20 that the Department of Military Operations and Southern Operations Room launched a large-scale security campaign in several villages in the Lajat region.[25] Security forces seized numerous weapons in the area and transferred the detainees to Damascus.[26]

The IDF continued to operate in southern Syria near the Golan Heights on January 22. Syrian sources reported that Israeli forces destroyed former Assad regime positions in eastern and central Quneitra.[27] IDF armor also reportedly entered and withdrew from a town in southern Quneitra.[28]

Syria Interim Foreign Minister Asaad Shaibani called for countries to lift sanctions on Syria at the Davos World Economic Forum in Switzerland on January 22.[29] The US Treasury Department issued a general license for energy sales and personal remittances to Syria on January 6.[30] The general license will last for six months and does not lift existing sanctions on Syria.[31]

Iraq

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and society
• Harden the Iraqi government against internal dissent
  
  

The Iraqi Parliament Security and Defense Committee head told Iraqi media on January 22 that Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani withdrew a draft law on PMF military service and retirement submission for a vote due to Popular Mobilization Commission objections.[32] Mashhadani and his two deputy speakers are responsible for “jointly” determining the parliamentary agenda.[33] The Popular Mobilization Commission oversees a range of administrative, planning, and training responsibilities for the PMF.[34] A Sadiqoun bloc parliamentarian called for Mashhadani to add the draft law to the parliamentary agenda on January 21.[35] Sadiqoun represents Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq.[36] Multiple Asaib Ahl al Haq units are part of the PMF.

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
• Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
• Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

The Houthis released the 25-member crew of the British-owned and Japanese-operated Galaxy Leader to Oman on January 22. The Houthis had held the crew hostage since the group hijacked the ship in November 2023.[37] The Houthis said that they made the decision after a meeting with Hamas and with Omani assistance.[38] The Houthis noted that the release is a sign of support for the ceasefire agreement. Hamas Representative to Yemen Moaz Abu Shamala also confirmed the release of the hostages and thanked the Houthis for their support on January 22.[39] Shamala met with the Houthi Foreign Affairs Minister Jamal Amer at the Houthi Defense Ministry in Sanaa on January 21.[40]

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip
• Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern Lebanon
• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel
  
  

The Gaza Strip

An IDF official assessed that the Israel-Egypt border will likely present a renewed but low-level security threat due to smuggling attempts.[41] The IDF 512th Territorial Brigade (80th Division) Commander stated on January 22 that the IDF had intercepted several weapons and drug smuggling attempts from Egypt into Israel over the past year. Egyptian smugglers improved their smuggling capabilities by using quadcopter drones, adapting to the IDF’s use of lethal force along the Israel-Egypt border. The IDF intercepted two smuggling attempts using small quadcopters that carried small arms as the drones crossed into Israel from Egypt in late 2024.[42]

Lebanon

The IDF 810th Mountain Brigade (210th Division) recently destroyed Hezbollah weapons during a raid in the Mount Dov area, in southwestern Lebanon.[43] Israeli forces destroyed anti-tank launchers, rocket launchers, machine guns, and missiles aimed at Israeli territory.[44] Israeli forces have recently operated in Kfar Chouba, Hasbaya District, adjacent to Mount Dov.[45] The IDF 810th Mountain Brigade previously conducted a brigade-level operation in the Syrian Mount Hermon area in early January.[46]

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and UNIFIL backfilled IDF positions in Kfar Chouba, Hasbayah District, on January 22.[47] The LAF reported that it deployed to ”several points” in Kfar Chouba town. Lebanese media previously reported IDF artillery shelling in Kfar Chouba on January 20.[48] The LAF and UNIFIL must backfill all IDF positions south of the Litani River by 4 am local time on January 26, according to the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement.[49] The IDF has withdrawn from six additional areas in southern Lebanon, including Khiam and most of its positions in southwestern Lebanon, as of January 22.[50] The LAF has redeployed to over 50 positions across Lebanon as of January 18 according to the UN.[51]

Lebanese and Hezbollah-affiliated media reported on January 22 that Israeli forces detonated explosives in seven villages along the Israel-Lebanon border.[52] 

 

An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on January 22 that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, via Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer, submitted a request for the IDF to remain in several unspecified outposts in southern Lebanon to US President Donald Trump.[53] Israeli officials have recently indicated that the IDF will likely extend its deployment in southern Lebanon if the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement conditions are not met.[54] According to the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement, the IDF must withdraw from areas south of the Litani River by January 26.[55]  Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem previously stated on January 4 that Hezbollah will allow the Lebanese state to fulfill the ceasefire, but implied that Hezbollah’s patience” may run out.”[56] Hezbollah has not explicitly stated whether it will resume attacks on Israel or Israeli forces if the IDF remains in southern Lebanon after January 26.

West Bank

Israeli forces continued their counterterrorism “Operation Iron Wall” in Jenin city targeting militia fighters and infrastructure on January 22.[57] The IDF “struck” more than ten fighters in Jenin since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on January 21. The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting militia infrastructure and destroyed improvised explosive devices (IEDs) planted on the roads. The IDF instructed Palestinians to remain inside an unspecified hospital in Jenin while it cleared IEDs planted on the roads near the hospital but stated it did not enter the hospital.[58] Hamas released a statement condemning the Palestinian Authority security forces' alleged participation in the operation in Jenin.[59] PA forces reportedly withdrew from the Jenin refugee camp area on January 21 before the IDF began its operation.[60] Hamas called on all Palestinian militias and fighters to target the IDF across the West Bank. PIJ, Hamas, and al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades detonated IEDs and fired small arms targeting the IDF in Jenin on January 22.[61] The IDF previously assessed that Hamas will likely try to conduct attacks in the West Bank despite the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[62]

The IDF “neutralized” a drone rigged with a pipe bomb near Yitzhar settlement, south of Nablus, on January 22.[63] No militia has claimed this improvised drone attack at the time of this writing.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s emphasis on leveraging BRICS financial mechanisms is part of an effort to reduce dependency on Western economies. Khamenei praised the progress of the Iranian private sector during a meeting with Iranian entrepreneurs, investors, and economic activists in Tehran on January 22.[64] Khamenei urged government agencies to amend restrictive laws and change obstructive regulations for domestic investors. Khamenei claimed that Iran can achieve 8% economic growth without foreign investment and urged government officials not to argue that Iran needs foreign investment to achieve economic growth. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian previously stated in August 2024 that Iran must attract 200 to 250 billion US dollars of foreign investment to address energy, banking, and budget imbalances to reach the 8% growth target.[65] Khamenei also highlighted Iran's participation in BRICS, urged diplomatic efforts to maximize the benefits of BRICS, and described the BRICS financial system as a significant opportunity that enables trade in member states’ currencies.[66] Khamenei may be trying to encourage preemptive measures to counter sanctions, in anticipation of a second Trump "maximum pressure“ campaign and potential E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) snapback sanctions.[67]

Expediency Discernment Council member and former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaei stated that “Syrians will soon join the Axis of Resistance.”[68] Rezaei emphasized "Iran’s commitment to Syria’s sovereignty" and the need for "an inclusive government in Syria” during an interview with Hezbollah-affiliated Al Mayadeen on January 22. Rezaei’s remarks echo Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s calls for Syrian youth to mobilize against “foreign occupiers" in which Khamenei likened Syria’s present situation to Iraq in the 2000s, when Iran-backed militias secured Iran’s influence.[69] Khamenei and other Iranian officials have consistently framed the post-Assad Syrian landscape as an opportunity for Iran to shape events in Syria through grassroots mobilization.[70] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran is trying to stoke sectarian tension in Syria and exploit such tension to rebuild the Axis of Resistance in Syria.

International Atomic Energy Agency Director Raphael Grossi stated on January 22 that Iran is currently producing at least 30 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% every month.[71] Grossi previously stated in December 2024 that Iran's production of 60% enriched uranium would increase by  "seven, eight times more, maybe, or even more" than Iran’s production levels in December 2024, which were 5 to 7 kg of 60% enriched uranium a month.[72]

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

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[1] https://t.me/sarayaps/19079

[2] https://www.longwarjournal.org/westbankterrorgroups

[3] https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/1799564116350378153

[4] https://www.danielegarofalomonitoring.com/p/the-palestinian-joint-operations ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-21-2024

[5] https://t.me/sarayajneen/2006

[6] https://x.com/LawkGhafuri/status/1882038756351644094

[7] https://almadapaper dot net/389291/

[8] https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/badr-organization/report

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces

[10] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-iraq-deal-would-see-hundreds-troops-withdraw-first-year-sources-say-2024-09-06/

[11] https://elaph dot com/Web/News/2025/01/1559003.html

[12] https://x.com/LawkGhafuri/status/1882041272350961875

[13] https://x.com/NujabaTv/status/1881731624632811772

[14] https://www.reuters.com/world/coalition-military-mission-iraq-end-by-sept-2025-us-iraq-say-2024-09-27/

[15] https://www.ft.com/content/f0bc9fcc-11b3-4615-bd24-163f8938f2a5

[16] https://www.hudson.org/defense-strategy/mena-defense-intelligence-digest-assessing-political-military-scope-israels-can-kasapoglu

[17] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/26/israel-strike-iran-missile-production ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/consequences-idf-strikes-iran

[18] https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-ukraine-war-xi-jinping-china-russia-in-secret-talks-to-supply-iran-missile-propellant/ ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-12-2023

[19] https://x.com/abo33amsha/status/1881839548877140181

[20] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/133875

[21] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/133889

[22] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/133887

[23] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-8-2025

[24] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1881369430933852490; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1881416461719416837

[25] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1881332110356795644

[26] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1881369430933852490

[27] https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1881951683351323043

[28] https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1881971838009651426 ; https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1881987155393925447

[29] https://www.ft.com/content/43746784-4e14-4c70-a6be-1aa849cd66ee ; https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250122-syria-fm-says-scrapping-sanctions-key-to-country-s-stability

[30] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2770

[31] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2770

[32] https://www.ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?key=1181523

[33] https://iq.parliament dot iq/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A/

[34] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces

[35] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/politics/513662/%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86 %D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%82%D8%AF %D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%85%D8%A9 %D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85

[36] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-asaib-ahl-al-haq-0

[37] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1882097566063702132 ; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1882077533954564302 ; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1882059309070327995 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-19-2023

[38] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1882059309070327995

[39] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1882122398755115181

[40] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-21-2025

[41] https://www.zman dot co.il/556769/

[42] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-20-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-31-2024

[43] https://t dot co/7AFqFH3lhW

[44] https://t dot co/7AFqFH3lhW

[45] Iran Update, January 20, 2025 | Institute for the Study of War

[46] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-5-2025

[47] https://x.com/UNIFIL_/status/1882094582164550050 ; https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1882085831558447386

[48] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/127849

[49] https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/01/briefing-on-the-un-interim-force-in-lebanon-unifil-and-the-un-disengagement-observer-force-undof.php

[50] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/01/19/lebanon-ceasefire-israel-destruction/ ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/idf-confirms-withdrawal-from-southern-lebanons-khiam-in-accordance-with-ceasefire/

[51] https://unifil.unmissions.org/un-secretary-generals-press-conference-beirut-lebanon-18-january-2025

[52] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/111835; https://t.me/alichoeib1970/13145; https://t.me/alichoeib1970/13145; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/111838; https://t.me/almanarnews/191808; https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/128030; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/111874

[53] https://t.me/moriahdoron/18671

[54] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-5-2025

[55] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/full-text-of-the-hostage-ceasefire-agreement-reached-between-israel-and-hamas/

[56] https://www.almanar dot com.lb/12993917

[57] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1881984201689591980

[58] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-tells-palestinians-in-jenin-hospital-to-stay-inside-as-it-clears-suspected-bombs/

[59] https://hamasinfo dot info/2025/01/22/5123/

[60] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-838565

[61] https://t.me/sarayajneen/2005 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/2006 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/8185 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/2014

[62] https://t.me/moriahdoron/18598 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-19-2025

[63] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1882122082261377400 ; https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-838782

[64] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/speech-content?id=59052

[65] https://president dot ir/fa/153869

[66] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/speech-content?id=59052

[67] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-12-2024;

https://www.reuters.com/world/europeans-tell-un-ready-snap-back-iran-sanctions-if-needed-2024-12-11/

[68] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/03/3242786 ;

https://www.almayadeen dot net/episodes-tv/2025/1/21/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A---%D8%B9%D8%B6%D9%88-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%B6-%D9%85%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86/%D8%AA%D8%BA%D8%B7%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%A9?utm_source=mango-searchx&utm_medium=exact_title&utm_campaign=%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%86%20

[69] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-3-2025;

https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/news-content?id=58831

[70] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-11-2024;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-3-2025;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-7-2025

[71] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-has-about-200-kg-uranium-enriched-near-bomb-grade-grossi-says-2025-01-22/

[72] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-dramatically-increasing-enrichment-near-bomb-grade-iaea-chief-2024-12-06/

 

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 22, 2025

Davit Gasparyan, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson, Angelica Evans, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and George Barros

January 22, 2025, 7:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 pm ET on January 22. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 23 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Kremlin has launched an information operation that seeks to create the false impression that the Russian economy is performing well despite numerous continued indicators of macroeconomic distress. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed during a meeting on economic issues on January 22 that 2024 was a "strong year" for the Russian economy.[1] Putin claimed that Russia has a manageable budget deficit of 1.7 percent and achieved a 26 percent increase in non-oil-and-gas revenue to 25.6 trillion rubles (approximately $257.9 billion) in 2024 and announced a retroactive 9.5 percent increase in insurance and military pensions to address rising Russian inflation. Bloomberg reported on January 21 that the Russian Finance Ministry released a report projecting economic strength and suggesting that Russian budget revenue in December 2024 reached a record high of over 4 trillion rubles (about $40 billion) — a 28 percent increase compared to December 2023 and the highest level recorded since 2011.[2] The data fails to account for Russia's unsustainable levels of defense spending, rampant inflation, a growing deficit and the erosion of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, however.[3] ISW continues to observe macroeconomic data that directly contradict the Kremlin's claims that the Russian economy is performing well. The Kremlin has recently adopted policies aimed at increasing defense spending all while Russian society faces labor shortages, broader demographic issues, declining savings, and increasing reliance on bailouts as the Russian economy faces rising interest rates, inflated salaries, and deteriorating production capacity.[4] These economic realities suggest that the Kremlin's efforts to posture economic strength are largely an information operation aimed at reassuring domestic audiences and posturing Russian strength abroad while masking the true challenges Russia's economy is facing, particularly heightened due to its war against Ukraine.

Russia continues long-term efforts to build out its manpower reserve with All-Russian Cossack Society organizations and create a willing and well-trained prioritized pool designed to buffer the Kremlin from potential blowback in the event of a possible future partial call up of Russian reservists. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's northwestern Russia service Sever Realii reported on January 22 that Russian organizations have allocated a total of 11.4 million rubles (roughly $114,880) for territorial defense training for 100 officers within the "Great Don Army" branch of the All-Russian Cossack Society, including 5.6 million rubles (approximately $56,400) from the Russian Presidential Grant Fund and 5.7 million rubles (approximately $57,400) from the "Great Don Army" organization.[5] The training will include drone piloting training and tactical, medical, and fire training. A separate portion of the training will be devoted to organizing defense and interacting with political authorities in "wartime conditions." The Kremlin's efforts to expand the All-Russian Cossack societies, following the March 2024 law enrolling members of the All-Russian Cossack Society into the Russian military's mobilization reserve, are likely an effort to expand the number of well-trained troops in Russia's active reserve pools that the Kremlin can call up to fight in Ukraine or elsewhere during a possible future partial call up of Russian reservists.[6]

North Korea will reportedly deploy new military personnel to Russia by mid-March 2025, likely to maintain the current pace and intensity of attritional, infantry-led assaults in Kursk Oblast. The New York Times (NYT) reported on January 22 that a US senior defense official stated that additional North Korean forces will arrive in Russia "within the next two months," (roughly mid-March 2025).[7] The NYT did not specify the number of troops or whether North Korea is rotating forces or increasing the size of its total force grouping in Russia, however. The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff reported on December 23 that North Korea may be preparing to deploy an unspecified number of additional forces to Ukraine and military equipment to Russia, either as a rotation or additional deployment of forces.[8] Western officials told the BBC on January 22 that North Korean forces have suffered roughly 1,000 killed in action and 3,000 missing or wounded in action as of mid-January 2025, roughly 33 to 40 percent of the 11,000 to 12,000 total North Korean personnel already in Russia.[9] ISW recently assessed that the entirety of the North Korean contingent in Russia may be killed or wounded in action by about mid-April 2025 at their current casualty rate, and a new North Korean deployment — whether intended to increase the current grouping or rotate out existing forces — is likely intended to sustain Russia’s tempo of operations despite heavy losses of about 30,000 - 45,000 causalities (combined killed and wounded) per month.[10] North Korean forces reportedly spent at least a month training in eastern Russia before deploying to Kursk Oblast for further training in near rear areas in November 2024 and joining combat operations at least as of early December 2024.[11] This timeline roughly coheres with the possibility that a fresh contingent of North Korean forces could undergo training and replace the shrinking North Korean group in Kursk Oblast by mid-April 2025, assuming the reported next batch of North Korean troops will train for the same duration as their predecessors, and deploy to Russia imminently in late January or early February 2025.

These fresh North Korean forces are unlikely to decisively improve Russian operations and will likely face the same high casualty rates and complications operating with Russian forces as the current North Korean contingent, provided the Russian command continues to use North Korean forces the same way as it has thus far. US officials and Ukrainian soldiers told the NYT that North Korean and Russian forces continue to struggle with communications and cohesion and that Russian and North Korean forces have "clashed" at least twice due to troop identification errors.[12] A Ukrainian commander told the NYT that North Korean assault groups now include a translator who speaks Russian but that these groups are still not very effective. Ukrainian soldiers reported that North Korean forces continue conducting mass infantry assaults and that North Korean soldiers do not retreat even if injured. Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO) published footage on January 22 of North Korean forces massing for an infantry assault and reported that Ukrainian forces killed 21 and wounded 40 North Korean soldiers during the eight-hour long combat engagement.[13] Ukrainian soldiers told the NYT that Russian forces are still attempting to conceal the presence of North Koreans on the battlefield by conducting drone strikes against wounded North Korean troops as Ukrainian forces attempt to take them prisoner.[14] ISW continues to assess that North Korea's high casualty rate and interoperability difficulties with Russian forces will affect the lessons that the North Korean military command will learn from fighting in Russia's war.[15]

Russian milbloggers complained and expressed concern over recent claims that the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government in Syria suspended Russian investment and financial involvement in the port of Tartus as Russia's long-term military presence in Syria remains unclear. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on January 22 that the Russian government, via a Russian military official based in Turkey, recently reached an unspecified agreement with HTS that appears to have included permission for Russian vessels to dock in the port of Tartus.[16] Marine Traffic, a shipping tracking website, shows that the Russian Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships are docked in the port of Tartus as of January 22, and these ships are likely supporting the Russian military's evacuation of military equipment from the port. The milblogger claimed that the Russian and HTS-led governments continue to negotiate about the future of Russia's presence at the Tartus and Khmeimim military bases and noted that it is unclear if any other third-party might be interested in using the port of Tartus in the future.[17] Other Russian milbloggers expressed confusion over the situation in Syria and accused unspecified actors of spreading rumors about Russia's supposed agreement with the HTS-led government.[18] Syrian Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra stated on January 22 that Russian and Syrian officials have not reached a final solution in the negotiations about future Russian military bases in Syria.[19]

A Russian state media outlet reported that Russia may resume direct gas deliveries to Transnistria despite recent discussions about sourcing non-Russian gas to the region. Russian business outlet Kommersant, citing its own sources, reported on January 22 that Russia may resume gas supplies to Transnistria via the TurkStream pipeline, using the Cyprus-based company Obzor Enterprises as an intermediary.[20] Kommersant, citing data from the European Union (EU)'s Regional Booking Platform (RBP) for natural gas transmission, reported that Obzor Enterprises booked the TurkStream pipeline on January 20 to transit 3.1 million cubic meters of gas per day to the Strandzha-2 entry point from February 1 to March 1, volumes which Kommersant assessed align with Transnistria's estimated humanitarian needs. Kommersant reported that authorities are discussing extending these supplies through mid-April and that Russia would pay roughly $160 million to purchase the gas. Kommersant's sources noted that Russia is prioritizing efforts to transfer the gas to Transnistria through the Trans-Balkan pipeline, which runs through Bulgaria and Romania before reaching Transnistria. Russian and Transnistrian authorities have recently been exploring the possibility of sourcing Russian-funded European gas to Transnistria through the European spot market, but Moldovan President Maia Sandu has stated that only Moldovan gas company Moldovagaz has the authority to deliver gas to Transnistria and that Moldovagaz can only work with companies that do not violate Moldovan law or international sanctions.[21] Ukrainian and Moldovan officials have noted how Russia is trying to leverage the manufactured gas crisis to affect Moldovan public opinion before the Summer 2025 Moldovan parliamentary elections.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin has launched an information operation that seeks to create the false impression that the Russian economy is performing well despite numerous continued indicators of macroeconomic distress.
• Russia continues long-term efforts to build out its manpower reserve with All-Russian Cossack Society organizations and create a willing and well-trained prioritized pool designed to buffer the Kremlin from potential blowback in the event of a possible future partial call up of Russian reservists.
• North Korea will reportedly deploy new military personnel to Russia by mid-March 2025, likely to maintain the current pace and intensity of attritional, infantry-led assaults in Kursk Oblast.
• These fresh North Korean forces are unlikely to decisively improve Russian operations and will likely face the same high casualty rates and complications operating with Russian forces as the current North Korean contingent, provided the Russian command continues to use North Korean forces the same way as it has thus far.
• Russian milbloggers complained and expressed concern over recent claims that the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government in Syria suspended Russian investment and financial involvement in the port of Tartus as Russia's long-term military presence in Syria remains unclear.
• A Russian state media outlet reported that Russia may resume direct gas deliveries to Transnistria despite recent discussions about sourcing non-Russian gas to the region.
• Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions near Toretsk.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russia and Uzbekistan are deepening military cooperation.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Significant Activity in Belarus
  
  

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on January 22 but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces reached the outskirts of Guyevo (south of Sudzha), but ISW has not observed evidence of this claim.[23] Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Sudzha near Pogrebki and south of Sudzha near Makhnovka and in and west of Kurilovka.[24] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Makhnovka and northwest of Sudzha near Kruglenkoye.[25] Elements of the Chechen "Zapad-Akhmat" Battalion are reportedly conducting reconnaissance operations near Russia's international border with Sumy Oblast.[26] Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating a TOS-1A thermobaric artillery system in Kursk Oblast.[27]

 

Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on January 22 that GUR first person view (FPV) strike drones struck a piece of Russian satellite equipment near Tetkino, Kursk Oblast on January 17.[28] The GUR reported that the equipment supported Russia's use of the Yamal-401, Yamal-402, and Yamal-300K communications satellites in the area.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on January 21 and 22 but did not advance.[29] Elements of the Chechen “Zapad-Akhmat” Battalion and Rosgvardia’s 116th Special Purpose “Stalhaya" Brigade are reportedly operating in Kharkiv Oblast.[30]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 22 but did not make confirmed advances. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 22 that Russian forces seized Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[31] Russian milbloggers claimed on January 22 that Russian forces advanced both north and south of Zapadne and south of and in central Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk).[32] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kupyansk near Dvorichna and Kutkivka and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on January 21 and 22.[33] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 22 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Vilshana (northeast of Kupyansk).[34] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on January 22 that Russian forces are attempting to cross the Oskil River near Dvorichna with small vessels - particularly small rubber boats - under the cover of night.[35] Trehubov noted that Ukrainian drones are targeting Russian forces attempting to cross the Oskil River and hiding in windbreaks. Trehubov also stated that Russian forces conduct assaults on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River, have accumulated an unspecified amount of personnel, and have not established logistics across the Oskil River as the water has not frozen. A Ukrainian drone battalion commander operating in the Kupyansk direction stated on January 22 that Russian commanders are forcing infantry to attack despite poor weather conditions preventing the proper use of drone or armored vehicle support.[36] The Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on January 22 that Russian forces used an unspecified number of armored vehicles to conduct recent assaults in the Petropavlivka direction (east of Kupyansk) and near Lozova (northeast of Borova).[37] Drone operators of the Russian Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly continue operating in the Kupyansk direction.[38]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 22 but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 22 that Russian forces advanced southwest of Lozova (northeast of Borova) and west of Nadiya (east of Borova).[39] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim, however. Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Borova near Lozova, Nova Kruhlyakivka, and Zahryzove; east of Borova near Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka and Novoserhiivka on January 21 and 22.[40]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on January 22 but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 22 that Russian forces advanced southwest of Terny (northeast of Lyman), northwest and west of Ivanivka (northeast of Lyman), and north and east of Kolodyazi.[41] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Lyman near Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Kuzmyne, Terny, and Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near the Serebryanske forest area on January 21 and 22.[42] Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue operating in the Lyman direction.[43]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on January 21 and 22 but did not advance.[44]

 

Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 22. Geolocated footage published on January 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Zaliznychna Street in northwestern Chasiv Yar and recently marginally advanced north and northwest of the Chasiv Yar Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further along Tsentralna Street in central Chasiv Yar, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[46] Russian forces continued ground attacks near Chasiv Yar itself and north of Chasiv Yar in the direction of Fedorivka on January 21 and 22.[47] Snipers of the Russian 299th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Chasiv Yar itself, and elements of the Russian 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Chasiv Yar itself.[48]

 

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 22. Geolocated footage published on January 22 shows drone operators of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) striking Ukrainian forces in western Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in the area.[49] Geolocated footage published on January 11 and geolocated on January 22 indicates that Russian forces advanced along Kachalova and Puzanova streets in northern Toretsk.[50] The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Toretsk direction stated on January 22 that Ukrainian forces are defending in limited positions in Toretsk and trying to contain Russian forces in the settlement.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed on January 21 and 22 that Russian forces advanced to a field between Toretsk and Petrivka (west of Toretsk) and that Russian forces advanced east of the Toretska Mine waste heap in northern Toretsk, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[52] Russian forces continued ground attacks within Toretsk itself on January 21 and 22.[53]

 

Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Pokrovsk amid ongoing offensive operations near Pokrovsk on January 22. Geolocated footage published on January 22 indicate that Russian forces recently advanced in the fields northeast of Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk) and within the northeastern part of the settlement.[54] Russian milbloggers reiterated claims that Russian forces advanced near Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk), seized Baranivka (northeast of Pokrovsk and north of Vozdvyzhenka) and Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk), advanced 3.6 kilometers in depth west of Vovkove (southwest of Pokrovsk), and within Nadiivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian military command recently introduced reserve forces into combat east of Pokrovsk and that these forces participated in the supposed seizure of Baranivka.[56] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces recently introduced elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) to offensive operations south of Pokrovsk, indicating that Russian forces continue to prioritize the envelopment of Pokrovsk from the southwest.[57] Mashovets assessed that Russian advances south and east of Pokrovsk have slowed in recent weeks. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[58] Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Pokrovsk near Vodyane Druhe, Zelene Pole, Myrolyubivka, Yelyzavetivka, Promin, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novyi Trud, Zvirove, and Petropavlivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Novoserhiivka, Kotlyne, Uspenivka, and Sribne and in the direction of Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) on January 21 and 22.[59]

 

Russian forces recently advanced west of Kurakhove amid continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on January 22. Geolocated footage published on January 21 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the fields south of Dachne (west of Kurakhove).[60] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced along windbreaks southwest of Slovyanka (northwest of Kurakhove) and two kilometers towards Kostyantynopil (west of Kurakhove) and that Russian forces are clearing Ukrainian forces from the area west of the Kurakhivske Reservoir (west of Kurakhove).[61] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, however. Mashovets stated on January 22 that elements of the Russian 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) have struggled to advance towards Andriivka (west of Kurakhove) from the south since their last advance as of January 12 despite being reinforced with elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA).[62] Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Kurakhove near Slovyanka and Shevchenko; west of Kurakhove near Dachne, Andriivka, and Kostyantynopil; and southwest of Kurakhove near Ulakly and Yantarne on January 21 and 22.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka and Zelenivka (southwest of Kurakhove).[64]

 

Russian forces recently advanced near and within Velyka Novosilka amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 22. Geolocated footage published on January 21 and 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along a road west of Rozdolne (northeast of Velyka Novosilka) and along Horizhnia Street in northeastern Velyka Novosilka.[65] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Vremivka (west of Velyka Novosilka) and further within eastern Velyka Novosilka and reiterated claims that Russian forces have partially enveloped Ukrainian forces in Velyka Novosilka from the north, east, and south.[66] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA) are attacking in southeastern Velyka Novosilka and that elements of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, EMD) are attacking in the southwestern part of the settlement.[67] Mashovets noted that elements of the Russian 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are advancing near the northern outskirts of Velyka Novosilka.[68] Russian forces continued ground assaults near Velyka Novosilka and just west of Velyka Novosilka near Vremivka on January 21 and 22.[69] Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD) are reportedly operating within Velyka Novosilka.[70]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks northwest of Robotyne near Kamyanske on January 21 and 22 but did not advance.[71] Drone operators of the Russian "Smuglyanka" Detachment are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[72]

A Ukrainian drone group operating in the Zaporizhia direction posted footage on January 22 showing a Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drone strike against a Russian Buk-M3 air defense system likely in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[73]

 

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Dnipro direction on January 21 and 22 but did not advance.[74] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have intensified drone and HIMARS strikes against the Russian rear in occupied Kherson Oblast.[75] Drone operators of the Russian 10th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Main Military Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[76]

 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 21 to 22. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 99 Shahed and other strike and decoy drones from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol oblasts; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[77] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 65 drones over Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kyiv, Khmelnytskyi, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts; that 30 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that drone strikes damaged institutions, industrial enterprises, farm buildings, residential homes, and apartment buildings in Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv, Cherkasy, Sumy, and Khmelnytskyi oblasts. Ukrainian official sources reported that Russian drone strikes hit a residential home and an administrative building in Mykolaiv Oblast and a residential home in Sumy Oblast.[78]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russia and Uzbekistan are deepening military cooperation. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met with Uzbek Defense Minister Shukhrat Halmukhamedov in Tashkent on January 22 and signed a joint Russian-Uzbekistan military cooperation plan for 2025 and a strategic military partnership plan for 2026-2030.[79] Belousov stated that the delegation also discussed bilateral military-technical cooperation and regional security issues and claimed that Russian-Uzbek cooperation has a significant impact on regional security in Central Asia. Belousov also met with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev on January 22.[80]

Russia continues efforts to improve state monitoring processes and streamline force generation mechanisms. Moscow City Military Recruitment Head Maxim Loktev announced on January 21 that regional officials will send text messages to boys turning 17 years old in 2025 regarding automatic registration for military service.[81] The Kremlin adopted a law in 2023, implemented in Fall 2024, which authorized authorities to dispatch automatic summons via electronic methods, thereby boosting the state's visibility among recruitment pools and automating recruitment notices, and Loktev's announcement appears to be part of this effort.[82]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to grapple with unprofessionalism and abuse among Russian commanders. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on January 22 that Luhansk Oblast occupation authorities arrested the commander of a Russian assault company of the 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) for crimes ranging from embezzlement to creating a private prison to punish his subordinates.[83] The milblogger claimed that this is the second scandal in two days for the unit and that occupation officials recently arrested a military police officer for beating a contract soldier. The milblogger noted that such beatings are common and have a negative impact on Russian society and force generation efforts. The milblogger called on Russian military officials to make an example of such individuals.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

---

[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76145

[2] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-01-21/russia-s-budget-revenue-surges-to-record-in-december-despite-sanctions

 

[3] https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-national-wealth-fund-38-billion-deficit/32229281.html; https://www.aa dot com dot tr/en/economy/russias-national-wealth-fund-reserves-down-117b/3452503

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates-june-1-september-30-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-29-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-4-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-30-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2024

[5] https://vsko dot ru/ ; https://t.me/severrealii/29287

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2024

[7] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/22/world/europe/north-korea-soldiers-ukraine.html

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23-2024

[9] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c87djeezjxeo

[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011625

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112124; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111324; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110524; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102824; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-26-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-18-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20November%2021%2C%202024%20PDF.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-30-2024

[12] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/22/world/europe/north-korea-soldiers-ukraine.html

[13] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/22/sso-pokazaly-zapeklyj-bij-svoyih-operatoriv-bpla-z-vijskovymy-kndr/

[14] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/22/world/europe/north-korea-soldiers-ukraine.html

[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011125

[16] https://t.me/rybar/67364

[17] https://t.me/rybar/67366 ; https://t.me/rybar/67364

 

[18] https://t.me/rustroyka1945/19885 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62940 ; https://t.me/Mestb_Dobroj_Voli/14188; https://t.me/dva_majors/62941 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61604

 

[19] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/22944889

[20] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7445089

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2025; https://newsmaker dot md/ro/recean-si-serebrian-califica-drept-schema-contractul-asumat-de-vicol-doar-moldovagaz-poate-livra-gaz-in-stanga-nistrului/; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/22921917; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011425

[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011425

[23] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31572

[24] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22731; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22771; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61595

[25] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61595; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22771; . https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61595

[26] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5440

[27] https://t.me/mod_russia/48135; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84939

[28] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/rozvidnyky-znyshchyly-vorozhe-suputnykove-obladnannia.html

[29]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l ; https://t.me/synegubov/12756

[30] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5439

[31] https://t.me/mod_russia/48130

[32] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84927; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30650; https://t.me/notes_veterans/21526 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22774

[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l

[34] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22774

[35] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/22/okupanty-na-gumovyh-chovnah-pereplyvayut-oskil-ale-yih-zustrichayut-nashi-dronari/

[36] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/21/stymulyuvannya-rozstrilamy-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-vorog-pidtrymuye-rytm-shturmiv-stratamy/

[37] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4309

[38] https://t.me/epoddubny/22231

[39] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30647 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30647

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4309

[41] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30644; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30644

[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l

[43] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18626

[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4309

[45] https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/1882013082530238489; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24878; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1882092705913930238; https://t.me/Rarog_24OMBr/392

[46] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30656 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30659

[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l; https://t.me/dva_majors/62896; https://t.me/wargonzo/24387

[48] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22735

[49] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1882076801478078537; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13287

[50] https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/582; https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/573; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8189; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1882067413816275303; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8188

[51] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/22/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-sytuacziyu-u-toreczku/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg

[52] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22724; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152093

[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/22/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-sytuacziyu-u-toreczku/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg

[54] https://t.me/ssternenko/39091; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8193

[55] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30640 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61599 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61585 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84923 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/3158 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22762 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22769 ; https://t.me/vrogov/18848 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152093

[56] https://t.me/yurasumy/20711

[57] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2508

[58] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61592

[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61599; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20709

[60] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8185; https://t.me/AFUStratCom/27774

[61] https://t.me/dva_majors/62896; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22731

[62] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2509

[63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l; https://t.me/dva_majors/62896; https://t.me/yurasumy/20706

[64] https://t.me/yurasumy/20706

[65] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24867; https://t.me/ombr_110/420; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8192

 

[66] https://t.me/yurasumy/20705 ; https://t.me/sashakots/51449 ; https://t.me/smotri_z/39304 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/22233 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84900 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62937 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152093

[67] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2509

[68] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2510

[69] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l

[70] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84900 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/12929

[71]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l

[72] https://t.me/dva_majors/62900

[73] https://t.me/Ronins44_65/431; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/22/zrubaly-chergovyj-buk-nashi-dronari-vidznachylysya-na-pivdni/

[74]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l

[75] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22770

[76] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1892

[77] https://t.me/kpszsu/27392

[78] https://t.me/senkevichonline/11293; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/12895; https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/924153-zagroza-bezpilotnikiv-u-mikolaevi-prolunali-vibuhi/ ; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/01/22/rossiyskiy-dron-popal-v-shestietazhnyy-dom-v-nikolaeve-chastichno-razrushen-verhniy-etazh; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/37268 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/37268

[79] https://t.me/mod_russia/48119

[80] https://t.me/mod_russia/48132

[81] https://www.rbc dot ru/society/21/01/2025/678f6f419a794753e2dea007

[82] https://www.rbc dot ru/society/14/04/2023/64399bbf9a79473c8e25e2ec ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2024

[83] https://t.me/rybar/67368