UA-69458566-1

Sunday, November 3, 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 3, 2024

Davit Gasparyan, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, William Runkel, and Fredrick W. Kagan

November 3, 2024, 8pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on November 3. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Incumbent Moldova President Maia Sandu has claimed victory in the Moldovan presidential runoff election held on November 3, 2024.[1] Preliminary results reported by the Moldovan Central Election Commission (CEC) show that Maia Sandu has won around 55 percent of the vote, defeating Kremlin-friendly presidential candidate Alexandr Stoianoglo.[2] The Moldovan CEC reported on November 3 that over 54 percent of the Moldovan electorate voted in the presidential runoff elections compared to the approximately 51 percent voter turnout during the first election round held on October 20, 2024. The reported voter turnout for the runoff election is also over the minimum legal turnout requirement of 20 percent.[3] ISW will cover the final result of the runoff Moldovan presidential elections on November 4 after the Moldovan CEC finishes counting all votes, including votes from the Moldovan diaspora voters whose votes take longer to count due to time zone differences.

Moldovan authorities reported extensive Russian interference and sabotage efforts during the runoff presidential elections held on November 3, 2024, in a likely effort to favor pro-Kremlin Stoianoglo. Sandu’s National Security Advisor Stanislav Secrieru warned on November 3 of significant Russian interference in the runoff election, noting the organization of voter transport in Transnistria (which is illegal under Moldovan law); the organization of buses and charter flights from Russia to polling stations in Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Belarus; the distribution of vouchers to Moldovan voters in Moscow; and cyberattacks against the Moldova CEC's voter education site.[4] Moldovan Independent Press Agency IPN reported on November 2 that Russian authorities preemptively transported 150 Moldovan citizens from Russia to Moldova via Turkey for free in a concerted effort to maximize the voter base of Kremlin-friendly Stoianoglo.[5] Moldovan authorities also notified numerous Western countries about Russian efforts to disrupt Moldovan diaspora voting abroad by creating false bomb threats at polling stations.[6]  The Moldovan diaspora notably largely favored Sandu in the first round of the presidential elections. Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean stated that Moldovans throughout the country had received anonymous “death threats” through phone calls, likely as part of a scare tactic to sway election results.[7] ISW previously reported on large-scale Russian intervention efforts in the first round of the 2024 Moldovan presidential elections in order to enhance the outcome in favor of Stoianoglo and against Moldova’s European Union (EU) referendum vote, which ultimately passed by a small margin.[8] Sandu stated on October 21 that "criminal groups" and "foreign forces" — likely referring to Russia and Kremlin-linked Moldovan opposition politician Ilan Shor — used tens of millions of euros to spread propaganda to destabilize Moldova.[9] Sandu also stated that Moldovan authorities had evidence that the criminal groups wanted to buy 300,000 Moldovan votes during the first round of presidential elections and that the scale of fraud was "unprecedented.”[10]

The Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) efforts to centralize control over informal Russian drone operation units may degrade the effectiveness of Russian drone capabilities. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii (iStories) gathered several accounts from Russian milbloggers complaining that the Russian military command is systematically disbanding informal Russian drone operation units and committing experienced drone operators to infantry assaults, resulting in high casualties among drone operators.[11] Some milbloggers explained that the Russian military command prioritizes attritional, infantry-led ”meat” assaults and lacks the manpower necessary to continue these assaults, and noted that some companies have 90 people of whom only 20 are regular assault personnel — with the rest being informal drone operators, communications specialists, and troops supporting evacuations of dead and wounded personnel. Some Russian milbloggers, however, connected the trend to the Russian MoD’s recent efforts to form “joint technical drone battalions” and the MoD’s “Rubikon” Center for Prospective Unmanned Technologies. A milblogger and advisor to the Kursk Oblast Governor claimed that the Russian military commanders seem to be afraid that the Russian MoD will deprive them of available manpower for assaults by reallocating drone operators from their current units to Russian MoD-operated “technical drone battalions,” and are instead committing these drone operators to assaults to sabotage this effort. Russian milbloggers also criticized the Russian MoD’s efforts to create separate, specialized “technical drone battalions,” citing the lack of a joint Russian communications system that would allow dedicated drone units to closely coordinate with assault units. Russian milbloggers also complained that it would take the Russian MoD a long time to establish communications between newly centralized drone units and assault units, which will result in Russian assault elements temporarily losing drone coverage. ISW recently reported on the milblogger backlash regarding the deaths of two Russian drone operators of the 87th Separate Rifle Regiment of the 1st "Slavic" Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA), Dmitry Lysakovsky (alias Goodwin) and Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Gritsai (alias Ernest), after both were committed to infantry assaults in Donetsk Oblast.[12] The reduction in Russian drone specialists may also at least temporarily inhibit Russian drone operations if the Russian MoD continues its centralization efforts.

Ukrainian Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets refuted a Russian information operation about prisoner of war (POW) exchanges aimed at destabilizing Ukrainian society and undermining Ukrainians' trust in their government.[13] Lubinets responded on November 2 to claims from Russian Human Rights Ombudsman Tatyana Moskalkova and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova falsely accusing Ukrainian authorities of attempting to sabotage the POW exchange processes and deliberately refusing to return all Ukrainian POWs from Russian captivity.[14] Lubinets directly called on Moskalkova to provide Ukraine with a list of all Ukrainian POWs whom Russia is willing to return and reiterated that Ukraine is ready to accept all lists of POWs from Russian authorities, accusing the Russian government of holding up the POW exchange processes.[15] Russia and Ukraine have engaged in more frequent POW exchanges since the start of Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024 following a months-long period of minimal POW exchanges, during which Ukraine had to reportedly construct a third POW camp for Russian POWs in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials also reported at the time that Russian authorities were the cause of the significant delays in POW exchanges.[16] Kremlin information operations centered around POWs also likely intend to distract from the Kremlin's own efforts to disrupt the POW exchange process and from consistent reports of Russian human rights abuses, including executions, against Ukrainian POWs.[17]

Key Takeaways:

  • Incumbent Moldova President Maia Sandu has claimed victory in the Moldovan presidential runoff election held on November 3, 2024.
  • Moldovan authorities reported extensive Russian interference and sabotage efforts during the runoff presidential elections held on November 3, 2024, in a likely effort to favor pro-Kremlin Stoianoglo.
  • The Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) efforts to centralize control over informal Russian drone operation units may degrade the effectiveness of Russian drone capabilities.
  • Ukrainian Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets refuted a Russian information operation about prisoner of war (POW) exchanges aimed at destabilizing Ukrainian society and undermining Ukrainians' trust in their government.
  • Ukrainian Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets refuted a Russian information operation about prisoner of war (POW) exchanges aimed at destabilizing Ukrainian society and undermining Ukrainians' trust in their government.
  • Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar in Donetsk Oblast.
  • A Ukrainian official reported that Russian naval infantry units cannot be considered “elite” due to a lack of specialized training for new recruits and because Ukrainian forces have destroyed the main core of the Russian professional army since the start of the Russian full-scale invasion.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Russian Technological Adaptations
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces reportedly recently advanced in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast amid continued fighting on November 3. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in fields north and northwest of Pogrebki (northwest of Sudzha) and near Novaya Sorochina (immediately south of Pogrebki), and captured a windbreak east of Malaya Loknya (immediately south of Novaya Sorochina), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[18] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also attacked southeast of Korenevo near Lyubimovka and Tolsty Lug.[19] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian counterattacks near Malaya Loknya, Novoivanovka (southeast of Korenevo), and Plekhovo (south of Sudzha) on November 2 and 3.[20]

 

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground fighting in Glushkovsky Raion (west of the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast) on November 3.

Russian officials claimed that Russian forces downed 16 drones near Novoshakhtinsk, Kamensk, and Ust-Donetsk, Rostov Oblast overnight on November 2 and 3.[21] Russian opposition outlet Astra published footage of a large fire allegedly from a drone strike near Novocherkassk, Rostov Oblast.[22]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Hatyshche (northwest of Vovchansk) on November 2 and 3 but did not advance.[23] A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction stated that Russian forces are taking advantage of deteriorating weather to advance, conduct small infantry assaults, and fortify positions north of Kharkiv Oblast before the cold season begins, especially north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi where the ground has begun to freeze.[24] Dehtyarov reported that Russian forces have been using civilian vehicles instead of armored vehicles in recent assaults and that Ukrainian forces are preparing anti-tank fortifications in case Russia is accumulating forces and means for future offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[25]


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced west of Svatove and northwest of Kreminna amid continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 3. Geolocated footage published on November 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced on the eastern outskirts of Andriivka (west of Svatove) and in northern Terny (northwest of Kreminna).[26] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 2 and 3 that Russian forces advanced half a kilometer in depth within Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk) and cleared a forest area near Stelmakhivka (west of Svatove), and another milblogger denied other claims that Russian forces entered Serebryanka (northwest of Kreminna).[27] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Kupyansk near Holubivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Kolisnykivka, Kruhlyakivka, Lozova, Stepova Novoselivka, Zahryzove, Berestove, and Pishchane;  west of Svatove near Vyshneve, Pershotravneve, and Zelenyi Hai; southwest of Svatove near Druzhelyubivka and Hrekivka; west of Kremmina near Yampolivka, Torske, and Terny; and southwest of Kremmina near Dibrova and in the Serebryanske forest area on November 2 and 3.[28] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 3 that Ukrainian forces  counterattacked near Kolisynkivka and Kruhlyakivka.[29] A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces are conducting assaults with wounded personnel to maintain the intensity of infantry assaults.[30]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces recently launched a battalion-sized mechanized assault southeast of Siversk and marginally advanced. Geolocated footage published on November 2 shows Ukrainian forces repelling a Russian battalion-sized mechanized assault involving around 120 Russian servicemen, seven tanks, 13 infantry fighting vehicles (BMPs), and two MT-LB amphibious armored personnel carriers northeast of Vesele and south of Ivano-Darivka (both southeast of Siversk).[31] The geolocated footage indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced in the areas northeast of Vesele and south Ivano-Darivka. The Ukrainian brigade involved in repelling the assault reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed six Russian tanks and nine BMPs and killed 19 Russian personnel while wounding 23.[32] Russian forces also continued offensive operations southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka and Vyimka on November 2.[33] Elements of the Russian 85th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) and artillery elements of the 2nd Guards Artillery Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating in the Siversk direction.[34]

Russian forces reportedly continued assaults in Chasiv Yar and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechnyne  on November 2 and 3 but did not advance.[35] Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces continue to cross the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal in small assault groups and hide in Chasiv Yar’s urban area but have not secured enduring positions west of the canal.[36] The head of a Ukrainian brigade’s electronic warfare (EW) service stated that Russian forces are using a large number of newly developed EW rifles that have not been effective against Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drones.[37] The EW service head added that Russian forces appear to be transferring experienced drone operators from different frontlines to reinforce prioritized operational directions, and that Russian drone capabilities in the Chasiv Yar direction had worsened given the low quality of Russian drone operators in the area.[38] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne Division are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction, and elements of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd AC) are operating near Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar).[39]

 

Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Russian forces seized Leonidivka (southwest of Toretsk) on November 1, but ISW cannot independently verify these claims.[40] Russian forces continued to attack in eastern Toretsk and southwest of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on November 2 and 3.[41] Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Anastasiya Bobovnikova reported that Ukrainian forces stabilized the frontline in eastern Toretsk but noted that Russian forces are bringing up reserves and equipment and are mounting EW systems on military equipment likely to intensify offensive operations in the area.[42]

 

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced south and southeast of Pokrovsk on November 2 and 3, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to the eastern part of Novooleksiivka (south of Pokrovsk and west of Selydove) and southeast of Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[43] The Russian MoD claimed on November 3 that Russian forces seized Vyshneve (west of Selydove), although ISW has not observed Russian forces operating in the northwestern part of the settlement as of this publication.[44] Russian forces continued assaults east of Pokrovsk near Mykolaivka, Promin, Sukha Balka, and Myrolyubivka; south of Pokrovsk near Vyshneve; and southeast of Pokrovsk near Krutyi Yar, Selydove, Sukhyi Yar, and Novohrodivka.[45]

 

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Kurakhove on November 2 and 3. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast and southeast of Novodmytrivka and southeast of Novoselydivka (both north of Kurakhove).[46] Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Kurakhove near Novoselydivka, Novodmytrivka, and Kreminna Balka; northeast of Kurakhove near Hostre, Vovchanka, and Illinka; and east of Kurakhove near Maksymilyanivka.[47] A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade reported that Russian forces continue to launch mechanized assaults in the Kurakhove direction and that Ukrainian defensive operations have become significantly harder since Summer 2024.[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are reprioritizing offensive operations from the south in the Kurakhove direction after Russian forces seized Vuhledar.[49] Elements of the Russian ”Bashkirskiye Volki” (Bashkir Wolves) detachment are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction.[50]

Russian forces recently advanced northeast and northwest of Vuhledar amid continued offensive operations on November 2 and 3. Geolocated footage published on November 2 showed that elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) advanced in eastern Antonivka (northeast of Vuhledar), and that elements of the 36th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Maksymivka (northwest of Vuhledar).[51] Geolocated footage published on November 3 also shows that Russian forces seized Katerynivka (northeast of Vuhledar) and advanced towards a bridge east of Yelyzavetivka (northwest of Katerynivka).[52] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced in the fields between Maksymivka and Yasna Polyana (southwest of Maksymivka), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[53] Russian forces continued assaults north of Vuhledar near Trudove; northeast of Vuhledar near Antonivka, Katerynivka, and Kostyantynivka; and northwest of Vuhledar near Maksymivka on November 2 and 3.[54]

 

Ukrainian and Russian sources did not report fighting in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on November 3.

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces reportedly marginally advanced during localized ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 3. Russian milbloggers claimed on November 3 that Russian forces advanced northeast and 1.5 kilometers in width northwest of Robotyne, northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne), and 1.2 kilometers deep along a five-kilometer wide front southwest of Novopokrovka (northeast of Robotyne).[55] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these Russian claims, however. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Robotyne, Yurkivka (northwest of Robotyne), Novodanylivka (north of Robotyne), and Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne) on November 2 and 3.[56] Elements of the Russian 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[57]

 

Russian forces conducted localized ground attacks in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on November 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted offensive operations in east bank Kherson Oblast and in the Dnipro River delta near Kozachi Laheri, Dnipryany, and Kozatskyi Island on November 2 and 3.[58] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 2 that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful counterattacks on islands in the Dnipro River delta.[59] Elements of the Russian 18th Combined Arms Army ([CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Dnipro River delta area.[60]

 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine during the day on November 2 and on the night of November 2 to 3. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on November 3 that Russian forces launched one Kh-59/69 guided air missile from airspace over Kursk Oblast and 96 Shahed-type and other unspecified strike drones from Bryansk Oblast, Kursk Oblast, and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[61] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 66 drones and one Kh-59/69 guided air missile over Kyiv, Sumy, Khmelnytskyi, Zhytomyr, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kharkiv oblasts; that 27 drones were “locally lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; that one drone crossed into Belarusian airspace; and that two drones remained in Ukrainian airspace 0900 local time.[62]  Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Head Serhii Lysak reported that a Russian missile strike damaged railway infrastructure and injured eight civilians in Dniprovskyi Raion, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast during the day on November 2.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian force used an Iskander ballistic missile to strike a train with Ukrainian military equipment in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, but ISW cannot verify this claim.[64] Kyiv City Military Administration reported on November 3 that Russian drone debris in Kyiv damaged a road in the Shevchenkivskyi Raion; fell on an open area in Holosiivskyi Raion and resulted in a fire; and fell on an open area in Desnyanskyi Raion.[65] Sumy City Mayor Mykola Noha reported on November 3 that Russian forces struck Shostka, Sumy Oblast with eight drones targeting civilian infrastructure.[66]

Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yurii Ihnat explained on November 3 that the Ukraine shoot down rate of Shahed drones has not decreased and that over the past two months (September and October 2024) Russian forces have been using drones of “unidentified type.” Ihnat stated that these unidentified drones are inexpensive imitations of Shahed drones instead of real ones. Ihnat stated that half of these imitation drones become designated as locally “lost.”[67]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on November 3 that Russia launched 900 bombs, 30 missiles, and nearly 500 Shaheds drones over the past week with most of these targeting Ukrainian civilian infrastructure.[68] Zelensky noted on November 2 that Russian forces launched more than 2,000 Shahed drones in October and that these drones have more than 170,000 components from China, the US, and Europe and advocated for more stringent monitoring of sanctions compliance and Russian imports.[69]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk  reported on November 2 that the Russian naval infantry units cannot be considered “elite” due to lack of specialized training for new recruits and because Ukrainian forces have destroyed the main core of the Russian professional army since the start of the Russian full-scale invasion.[70] Pletenchuk highlighted that the composition of Russian naval infantry forces does not significantly differ from other units, implying that formerly elite naval infantry forces are now operating like other infantry or mechanized infantry units due to lack of specialized training, as ISW has long assessed.

Russian authorities incentivize foreign nationals to join the Russian war effort in Ukraine by offering Russian citizenship to foreign recruits. Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) Spokesperson Iryna Volk claimed on November 3 that Russian President Vladimir Putin granted Russian citizenship to 3,344 foreign nationals who fought alongside Russian forces in Ukraine since the start of 2024.[71]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published announced on November 2 that 200 students of the St. Petersburg Nakhimov Naval School’s Mariupol branch took an oath of allegiance to Russia before starting their studies.[72] The Russian MoD claimed that students of ”over 30 Russian regions” participated in the oath ceremony, likely including students from occupied Ukrainian territories.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Kremlin newswire TASS, citing a source in the Russian defense industry, claimed on November 3 that Russian specialists are testing a technology that would allow Russian forces to use decommissioned NATO satellites still in orbit for voice communications when electronic warfare (EW) systems block ground-based communication capabilities.[73]

A Ukrainian source posted footage on November 2 reportedly showing that Russian forces have started to use new reconnaissance drones equipped with a camera and artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities that detect approaching drones and make sharp maneuvers to avoid being struck.[74]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing reporting on activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 


[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/moldova-holds-presidential-runoff-election-amid-claims-russian-meddling-2024-11-03/; https://x.com/sandumaiamd/status/1853209669390516499

[2] https://pv.cec dot md/cec-presidential-results-tour2.html

[3] https://www.aa.com dot tr/en/europe/voting-ends-in-moldovas-presidential-runoff-with-turnout-of-over-54-/3383180; https://pv.cec.md/; https://t.me/tass_agency/283265; https://t.me/tass_agency/283274; https://www.pravda.com dot ua/eng/news/2024/11/3/7482765/

[4] https://x.com/StasSecrieru/status/1853040491224330412; https://www.zdg dot md/stiri/video-randuri-la-sectiile-de-votare-din-minsk-si-istanbul-cu-drapele-ale-r-moldova-gagauziei-si-rusiei-exista-unele-indicii-de-turism-electoral/4; https://tv8 dot md/ru/2024/11/03/politsiya-fiksiruet-organizovannii-podvoz-izbiratelei-v-turtsii-azerbaidzhane-i-belarusi/268838; https://point dot md/ru/novosti/obschestvo/nabliudateli-soobshchaiut-o-nezakonnykh-priamykh-transliatsiiakh-s-uchastkov-v-italii-i-estonii/; https://newsmaker dot md/rus/novosti/eto-deja-vu-spiker-igor-grosu-obvinil-kriminalnye-gruppirovki-v-podvoze-izbirateley/; https://t.me/tass_agency/283291; https://t.me/tass_agency/283304 

[5] https://suspilne dot media/871589-dzerela-ipn-150-gromadan-moldovi-bezplatno-povernulisa-z-rf-naperedodni-viboriv/; https://www.ipn dot md/ro/moldovenii-se-intorc-din-rusia-cu-transport-gratuit-pentru-a-participa-la-aleger-8013_1108645.html

[6] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/moldova-claims-russia-plans-disrupt-expatriate-voting-sundays-runoff-2024-11-02/  ; https://www.ipn dot md/ro/rusia-vrea-sa-intrerupa-votul-in-diaspora-prin-alerte-7978_1108677.html

[7] https://apnews.com/article/moldova-presidential-election-russia-corruption-fraud-5886447779a4a818e9f30fdadcb8bbe5

[8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-21-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/possible-russian-gains-georgia-and-moldova; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/top-moldovan-court-recognises-eu-referendum-results-2024-10-31/

[9] https://newsmaker dot md/ro/dimensiunea-fraudei-este-fara-precedent-maia-sandu-dupa-afisarea-primelor-rezultatele/; https://x.com/sandumaiamd/status/1848130004028125266

[10] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/moldova-votes-election-eu-referendum-shadow-alleged-russian-meddling-2024-10-20/; https://www.rferl.org/a/moldova-police-accuse-shor-russia-oligarch-39m-vote-buying/33172951.html;

[11] https://t.me/RSaponkov/9590 ; https://t.me/ramzayiegokomanda/18657; https://t.me/istories_media/8014; https://t.me/mod_russia/44389; https://t.me/Alekhin_Telega/11968; https://t.me/ramzayiegokomanda/18657 ; https://t.me/zhivoff/17745

[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22-2024

[13] https://t.me/dmytro_lubinetzs/7116; https://suspilne dot media/871615-ataka-na-kiiv-vijska-rf-obstrilali-zaliznicnu-stanciu-na-dnipropetrovsini-984-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1730620564&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ;

[14] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/989965; https://t.me/MID_Russia/47441; https://t.me/tass_agency/283214; https://t.me/tass_agency/283216; https://t.me/tass_agency/283226; https://t.me/bbcrussian/72323; https://t.me/tass_agency/283215

[15] https://t.me/dmytro_lubinetzs/7116; https://suspilne dot media/871615-ataka-na-kiiv-vijska-rf-obstrilali-zaliznicnu-stanciu-na-dnipropetrovsini-984-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1730620564&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ;

[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-19-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-14-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2024; https://www.radiosvoboda dot org/a/news-tabir-dlia-viyskovopolonenykh/32971023.html; https://t.me/currenttime/35393

[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2024

[18] https://t.me/rybar/65017; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/143145; Malaya Loknya

[19] https://t.me/rybar/65017

[20] https://t.me/mod_russia/45284

[21] https://t.me/golubev_vu/1614

[22] https://t.me/astrapress/67657

[23] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PGXygxMCC26Su5tvxX5ZHbCKwLihKBZM3mPgMQxQa7ghVtzP46fadgZV2cUxco1Kl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Qu13pGCFEKZ9K7qKMdTAFJGcpiBp5ZkPTYPBQN7LdDwe1XXHKpGwZg5jcNhKwePel ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0czZvRRWcWHZFAGC581Nm2MVeuhUeWYEkVdgmBojyxLr6VoUd8BpeXioXNtLMii1al

[24] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/03/grunt-pidmerzaye-na-harkivshhyni-vorogu-dopomagayut-shvydshe-zakopatysya-na-toj-svit/; https://youtu.be/aDXWlQ2K0dM

[25] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/03/voseny-rosiyan-polichyly-ale-vzhe-ne-vylikuyut-zhovtnevi-vtraty-okupantiv-pidrahuvaly-v-hartiyi/; https://youtu.be/aDXWlQ2K0dM

[26] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7357; https://t.me/zsu44ombr/193 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7356; https://t.me/OMIBr_60/594 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7358 ; https://t.me/OMBr67/1706

[27] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18503  ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/143097

[28]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PGXygxMCC26Su5tvxX5ZHbCKwLihKBZM3mPgMQxQa7ghVtzP46fadgZV2cUxco1Kl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Qu13pGCFEKZ9K7qKMdTAFJGcpiBp5ZkPTYPBQN7LdDwe1XXHKpGwZg5jcNhKwePel ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0czZvRRWcWHZFAGC581Nm2MVeuhUeWYEkVdgmBojyxLr6VoUd8BpeXioXNtLMii1al ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PGXygxMCC26Su5tvxX5ZHbCKwLihKBZM3mPgMQxQa7ghVtzP46fadgZV2cUxco1Kl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Qu13pGCFEKZ9K7qKMdTAFJGcpiBp5ZkPTYPBQN7LdDwe1XXHKpGwZg5jcNhKwePel  ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0czZvRRWcWHZFAGC581Nm2MVeuhUeWYEkVdgmBojyxLr6VoUd8BpeXioXNtLMii1al

[29] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18503

[30] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/03/kalich-polky-rosiyany-prymushuyut-poranenyh-ity-v-bij/

[31] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/21937; https://t.me/edelweiss10tg/1464; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7351; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1852837870400086374https://x.com/moklasen/status/1852803407276564549; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1852845378338427151; https://t.me/OGSHB_109/796;  https://t.me/z_arhiv/29120; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/03/zgority-pid-trykolorom-rosiyany-nachepyly-na-tehniku-svoyi-prapory-ale-navit-pidijty-do-nashyh-pozyczij-ne-zmogly/

[32] https://t.me/OGSHB_109/796;  https://t.me/z_arhiv/29120; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/03/zgority-pid-trykolorom-rosiyany-nachepyly-na-tehniku-svoyi-prapory-ale-navit-pidijty-do-nashyh-pozyczij-ne-zmogly/

[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0czZvRRWcWHZFAGC581Nm2MVeuhUeWYEkVdgmBojyxLr6VoUd8BpeXioXNtLMii1al ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/143145

[34] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/143126; https://t.me/sashakots/49935

[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0czZvRRWcWHZFAGC581Nm2MVeuhUeWYEkVdgmBojyxLr6VoUd8BpeXioXNtLMii1al; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Qu13pGCFEKZ9K7qKMdTAFJGcpiBp5ZkPTYPBQN7LdDwe1XXHKpGwZg5jcNhKwePel; https://t.me/wargonzo/22937

[36] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/03/armiya-nor-ta-pidvaliv-rosiyany-shukayut-bud-yaki-pidzemni-ukryttya-shhob-hovatysya-vid-droniv/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/02/vstygnuty-do-holodiv-okupanty-zoseredyly-zusyllya-na-zahoplenni-toreczka-ta-chasovogo-yaru/; https://youtu.be/aDXWlQ2K0dM https://armyinform.dot com.ua/2024/11/02/cze-nagaduye-zombi-rezhym-v-call-of-duty-koly-ty-vbyvayesh-a-vony-vse-lizut-naczgvardiyecz-pro-boyi-pid-chasovym-yarom/

[37] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/02/cze-nagaduye-zombi-rezhym-v-call-of-duty-koly-ty-vbyvayesh-a-vony-vse-lizut-naczgvardiyecz-pro-boyi-pid-chasovym-yarom/

[38] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/02/perekaty-drony-rosiyany-vykorystovuyut-dronshhykiv-gastroleriv-na-napryamku-golovnogo-udaru/

[39] https://t.me/dva_majors/56707; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/143126

[40] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18511; https://www.1tv dot ru/news/2024-11-01/491221-rossiyskie_voyska_osvobodili_ot_vsu_leonidovku_v_dnr

[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PGXygxMCC26Su5tvxX5ZHbCKwLihKBZM3mPgMQxQa7ghVtzP46fadgZV2cUxco1Kl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Qu13pGCFEKZ9K7qKMdTAFJGcpiBp5ZkPTYPBQN7LdDwe1XXHKpGwZg5jcNhKwePel; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0czZvRRWcWHZFAGC581Nm2MVeuhUeWYEkVdgmBojyxLr6VoUd8BpeXioXNtLMii1al; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/02/sytuacziyu-v-toreczku-vdalosya-stabilizuvaty-de-zupynyly-voroga/; https://youtu.be/aDXWlQ2K0dM; https://t.me/tass_agency/283316

[42] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/02/sytuacziyu-v-toreczku-vdalosya-stabilizuvaty-de-zupynyly-voroga/; https://youtu.be/aDXWlQ2K0dM  

[43] https://t.me/motopatriot/29235; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18520

[44] https://t.me/mod_russia/45282; https://t.me/sashakots/49931; https://t.me/vrogov/17852; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79971; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/59929 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/283285; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/143140; https://t.me/notes_veterans/20313

[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PGXygxMCC26Su5tvxX5ZHbCKwLihKBZM3mPgMQxQa7ghVtzP46fadgZV2cUxco1Kl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Qu13pGCFEKZ9K7qKMdTAFJGcpiBp5ZkPTYPBQN7LdDwe1XXHKpGwZg5jcNhKwePel; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0czZvRRWcWHZFAGC581Nm2MVeuhUeWYEkVdgmBojyxLr6VoUd8BpeXioXNtLMii1al  

[46] https://t.me/motopatriot/29226; https://t.me/motopatriot/29235; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29130

[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PGXygxMCC26Su5tvxX5ZHbCKwLihKBZM3mPgMQxQa7ghVtzP46fadgZV2cUxco1Kl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Qu13pGCFEKZ9K7qKMdTAFJGcpiBp5ZkPTYPBQN7LdDwe1XXHKpGwZg5jcNhKwePel; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0czZvRRWcWHZFAGC581Nm2MVeuhUeWYEkVdgmBojyxLr6VoUd8BpeXioXNtLMii1al; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18466

[48] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/871585-oborona-nadvazka-recnik-33-brigadi-pro-situaciu-na-kurahivskomu-napramku-ta-poblizu-maksimilianivki/; https://youtu.be/IosjO-EMqHM  

[49] https://t.me/dva_majors/56692; https://t.me/dva_majors/56654

[50] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79987

[51] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7354; https://t.me/gimbatov34/3844; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7352; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/143056; https://t.me/dva_majors/56638; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29101 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/29233  ; https://t.me/dva_majors/56648

[52] https://x.com/OSINTua/status/1853104188055760988; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1853143052040257545; https://x.com/OSINTua/status/1853104301490483232; https://x.com/OSINTua/status/1853104507493712318

[53] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/143056; https://t.me/motopatriot/29235

[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PGXygxMCC26Su5tvxX5ZHbCKwLihKBZM3mPgMQxQa7ghVtzP46fadgZV2cUxco1Kl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Qu13pGCFEKZ9K7qKMdTAFJGcpiBp5ZkPTYPBQN7LdDwe1XXHKpGwZg5jcNhKwePel; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0czZvRRWcWHZFAGC581Nm2MVeuhUeWYEkVdgmBojyxLr6VoUd8BpeXioXNtLMii1al; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79974

[55] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79963 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29123  

[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PGXygxMCC26Su5tvxX5ZHbCKwLihKBZM3mPgMQxQa7ghVtzP46fadgZV2cUxco1Kl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Qu13pGCFEKZ9K7qKMdTAFJGcpiBp5ZkPTYPBQN7LdDwe1XXHKpGwZg5jcNhKwePel ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0czZvRRWcWHZFAGC581Nm2MVeuhUeWYEkVdgmBojyxLr6VoUd8BpeXioXNtLMii1al

[57] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/143100 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/143132

[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Qu13pGCFEKZ9K7qKMdTAFJGcpiBp5ZkPTYPBQN7LdDwe1XXHKpGwZg5jcNhKwePel ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0czZvRRWcWHZFAGC581Nm2MVeuhUeWYEkVdgmBojyxLr6VoUd8BpeXioXNtLMii1al

[59] https://t.me/rusich_army/18163

[60] https://t.me/dva_majors/56696

[61] https://t.me/kpszsu/22298

[62] https://t.me/kpszsu/22298

[63] https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/871499-vijska-rf-atakuvali-dniprovskij-rajon-poraneno-patoh-ludej/; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/17162; https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/6216  ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/17170

[64] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/143135

[65] https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/9128 ; https://suspilne dot media/871615-ataka-na-kiiv-vijska-rf-obstrilali-zaliznicnu-stanciu-na-dnipropetrovsini-984-den-vijni-onlajn/; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/9120 ; https://suspilne dot media/871615-ataka-na-kiiv-vijska-rf-obstrilali-zaliznicnu-stanciu-na-dnipropetrovsini-984-den-vijni-onlajn/?; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/9118; https://suspilne dot media/871615-ataka-na-kiiv-vijska-rf-obstrilali-zaliznicnu-stanciu-na-dnipropetrovsini-984-den-vijni-onlajn/?;

[66] https://www.facebook.com/noha.mykola.petrovych/posts/pfbid0mVKmdrsjJy1dQfnskDSCjPJThtLiqdZCtuDJ2PhsjQQTqbRJNN23dKL2Zmy3ZYtpl ; https://suspilne dot media/871615-ataka-na-kiiv-vijska-rf-obstrilali-zaliznicnu-stanciu-na-dnipropetrovsini-984-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1730618435&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[67] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/03/zlipleni-z-lajna-ta-palok-u-povitryanyh-sylah-poyasnyly-pro-lokaczijno-vtracheni-bpla-voroga/; https://www.facebook.com/yuriy.ignat/posts/pfbid02CMmhihR1DRFureY784ybA4ZArMk5qiTsgUbCJXF8DNYyG1R8VX5JCzMLvZaxHHezl?locale=ru_RU 

[68] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/12313; https://suspilne dot media/871581-zelenskij-za-zovten-z-sahedami-v-ukrainu-zaletili-ponad-170-000-komponentiv-so-mali-buti-zablokovani-dla-rf/

[69] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/12313; https://suspilne dot media/871581-zelenskij-za-zovten-z-sahedami-v-ukrainu-zaletili-ponad-170-000-komponentiv-so-mali-buti-zablokovani-dla-rf/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/02/rosiya-vykorystovuye-zahidni-komponenty-dlya-udariv-po-ukrayini-prezydent/

[70] https://armyinformdot com.ua/2024/11/02/prosto-z-vulyczi-u-morpihy-na-shho-peretvorylas-rosijska-morska-pihota/; https://youtu.be/j5TqaWCCdUg

[71] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/990028; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18514; https://t.me/IrinaVolk_MVD/2833

[72] https://t.me/mod_russia/45256

[73] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/22302743; https://t.me/tass_agency/283252

[74] https://armyinform.dot com.ua/2024/11/02/shtuchnyj-intelekt-proty-nebesnogo-rusorizu-rosiyany-namagayutsya-zberegty-svoyi-kryla/; https://t.me/oko_gora/13498 

 

 

 
 

Iran Update, November 3, 2024

Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

The Israeli Defense Minister emphasized that Iran is “pouring everything [it] can” into the West Bank, indicating that Iran will very likely attempt to pursue a different strategy when rebuilding Palestinian militias to fight Israel again.[1] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said that Iran is looking for additional routes to destabilize Israel and incite terrorism, particularly utilizing the West Bank, due to the IDF's degradation of Iran’s Axis of Resistance. Iran and Hamas have observed the military degradation of Hamas’ units in the Gaza Strip. Hamas, however, is likely trying to reconstitute regardless of how badly the IDF defeated it as defeat is a temporary condition.[2] It does not follow that Iran and Hamas will decide to rebuild Hamas and other Palestinian militias in the same way again. Iran and Hamas have almost certainly learned many lessons from the October 7 War, including the difficulty of rearming and rebuilding militias in an area that can be easily isolated, such as the Gaza Strip. Hamas’ severe degradation in the Gaza Strip and the difficulty in rebuilding Hamas’ military wing isolated there could cause Iran and Hamas to redouble their efforts to strengthen Hamas and Palestinian military organizations elsewhere, including in the West Bank. Iran has increased its efforts to smuggle weapons and other materiel into the West Bank in recent years.[3] Iran’s efforts have so far had only limited success.

The IDF captured a Syrian man who was collecting intelligence on Israeli border arrangements during a ground raid in southern Syria. This Iranian-led intelligence effort is likely an attempt to gather information on Israeli border security that Iranian-backed militias could use to undertake small-scale infiltrations into the Golan Heights.[4] The IDF said on November 3 that the Egoz Unit captured Ali Suleiman al Asi in Saida, Daraa Province, in recent months.[5] The IDF said that al Asi collected intelligence on Israeli operations along the Syrian border with the Golan Heights for “future terror activity” on behalf of Iran.[6] The IDF “closely monitor[ed]” al Asi before his capture.[7] The IDF did not specify when the raids took place, but Israeli special operations forces (SOF) have conducted numerous covert raids into Lebanon to disrupt Hezbollah border infrastructure since October 2023.[8] The IDF said that Aadi’s capture prevented a future attack and exposed Iranian attempts to gather intelligence on the Syria-Golan Heights border.[9]

Iran’s intelligence collection about Israeli border movements on the Syrian-Golan Heights border is consistent with previous Iranian-backed efforts to gather intelligence to inform future ground attacks. Hamas undertook similar intelligence-gathering exercises ahead of the October 7 attacks.[10] Hezbollah observers on the Israel-Lebanon border likely monitored Israeli border patrols and movements in planning Hezbollah’s ground infiltration into Israel.[11] The intelligence collection effort on the Syrian border could support future ground attacks or small-scale incursions, including the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that Israel needs to push Hezbollah north of the Litani River “with or without an agreement” to achieve Israel's stated war aims.[12] Israel’s stated war aim is to return residents of northern Israel to their homes under safe conditions.[13] Current Israeli operations in southern Lebanon are unlikely to achieve these war aims, though it does not follow that future Israeli operations will fail to achieve the Israeli objectives. Netanyahu made these remarks during a visit to the Israel-Lebanon border on November 3 to meet with IDF commanders.[14] Israel has designed its current ground operations to dismantle border infrastructure and prevent Hezbollah from conducting direct fire and ground attacks into Israel.[15] These operations do not seek to physically push Hezbollah fighters north of the Litani River and have not done so.

Israel is currently engaged in indirect negotiations with Hezbollah to obtain a ceasefire deal that may require Hezbollah military forces to withdraw north of the Litani.[16] The language of the deal from a recently leaked draft stipulates that Lebanese army “forces, infrastructure and weapons will be the only armed groups and assets deployed” south of the Litani River following the ceasefire.[17] It is unclear if Hezbollah will accept a deal that would call for its forces to move north. Hezbollah has not fulfilled its obligations under UNSC Resolution 1701, which required its forces to withdraw from areas south of the Litani River. The implementation of a large-scale Hezbollah withdrawal is extremely complicated, particularly given that many Hezbollah fighters were born and raised in the area that they would then need to leave.

UK-based Saudi outlet Elaph reported that Israel warned the Iraqi government that if Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continue to attack Israel from Iraqi territory, Israel may strike predetermined targets in Iraq.[18] Unspecified Israeli sources stated that the IDF has identified more than thirty “legitimate targets” in Iraq should Israel decide to launch an attack against the militias. Unspecified Israeli sources told Axios on October 31 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may attack Israel in response to Israel’s recent strikes on Iran using a large volume of drones and ballistic missiles in the coming days.[19] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has increased its rate of attacks, in particular drone attacks, targeting Israel since mid-September 2024.[20] CTP-ISW recorded that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq increased its rate of attacks by approximately 106 percent between September and October 2024.[21]

Unspecified military officials told Elaph that Israel and the United States have been using satellites to monitor Iranian attempts to transfer ballistic missiles and other unspecified but related equipment from Iran to Iraqi territory.[22] Iran began supplying Iranian-backed Iraqi militias with short-range ballistic missiles, including Zelzal, Fateh-110, and Zolfaghar missiles, in 2018, but the militias have not used ballistic missiles to attack Israel in the October 7 War thus far.[23]

The United States warned Iran against launching another attack on Israel in retaliation for Israel’s strikes into Iran on October 25 because the United States would not be able to restrain Israel’s response.[24] An anonymous US official told Axios that the United States sent this message to Tehran through the Swiss diplomats, adding that the United States cannot confirm that Israel’s next attack will be as ”calibrated and targeted” as before. The Iranian regime is continuing to signal that it will respond to the recent Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes into Iran on October 25, although the regime does not appear to have decided how it will respond.[25]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that B-52 strategic bombers arrived in the Middle East on November 3.[26] This is part of a larger US military effort to increase its presence in the Middle East ahead of the departure of the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group from the region in the next few months.[27]

US CENTCOM Commander General Michael Kurilla met with IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi in Israel between November 2 and November 3.[28] The IDF stated that the assessment focused on joint preparations against regional threats, especially against threats from Iran. Kurilla toured the US THAAD missile defense system battery during his trip to Israel.

Key Takeaways:

  • West Bank: The Israeli Defense Minister emphasized that Iran is “pouring everything [it] can” into the West Bank, indicating that Iran will very likely attempt to pursue a different strategy when rebuilding Hamas to fight Israel again.
  • Syria: The IDF captured a Syrian man who was collecting intelligence on Israeli border arrangements during a ground raid in southern Syria. This Iranian-led intelligence effort is likely an attempt to gather information on Israeli border security that Iranian-backed militias could use to undertake small-scale infiltrations into the Golan Heights.
  • Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: The Israeli prime minister stated that Israel needs to push Hezbollah north of the Litani River “with or without an agreement” to achieve Israel's stated war aims, which is to return residents of northern Israel to their homes under safe conditions. Current Israeli operations in southern Lebanon are unlikely to achieve these war aims, though it does not follow that future Israeli operations will fail to achieve the Israeli objectives
  • Iranian Retaliation against Israel: UK-based Saudi outlet Elaph reported that Israel warned the Iraqi government that if Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continue to attack Israel from Iraqi territory, Israel may strike predetermined targets in Iraq.
  • US Diplomatic Efforts: The United States warned Iran against launching another attack on Israel in retaliation for Israel’s strikes into Iran on October 25 because the United States will not be able to restrain Israel’s response.
  • US Posture in the Middle East: US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that B-52 strategic bombers arrived in the Middle East on November 3. US CENTCOM Commander General Michael Kurilla met with IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi in Israel between November 2 and November 3.
  • Saudi Arabia: The Islamic Resistance in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques, an Iranian-backed militia claiming to operate in Saudi Arabia, claimed its second attack since announcing its existence.



Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The IDF announced on November 3 that the IDF Air Force struck and killed the assistant to the Hamas Nukhba commander in the Khan Younis Brigade in the southern Gaza Strip sometime in the past week.[29] The IDF said Raafat Ibrahim Mahmoud Aqdih participated in the attack in Nir Oz on October 7.[30]

The IDF 162nd Brigade continued clearing operations near Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip on November 3. Israeli forces killed dozens of Palestinian fighters in Jabalia on November 3.[31] The IDF 900th Infantry Brigade directed an airstrike targeting a militia cell that posed a threat to Israeli forces.[32] Unspecified fighters detonated an IED on the outskirts of Jabalia camp on October 2, killing two soldiers in the 401st Armored Brigade.[33] The same incident wounded three other soldiers. Hamas separately fired a rocket-propelled grenade targeting an Israeli tank in northern Jabalia on October 2.[34] The IDF said that Israeli forces have killed over 900 Palestinian militia fighters and detained over 700 Palestinians, including 300 confirmed militia members, since launching a new clearing operation into Jabalia refugee camp on October 6.[35]

The IDF said that Israeli military police are investigating the death of an Israeli soldier after a grenade detonated on the night of November 1-2 in the northern Gaza Strip.[36] The IDF did not specify if the incident was combat or non-combat-related, but the initiation of an investigation run by the military police suggests that the incident was not combat-related.

Palestinian fighters seriously wounded a combat engineering officer from the 401st Armored Brigade in the northern Gaza Strip on November 3.[37]

The IDF 252nd Division continued operations in the central Gaza Strip on November 3. Israeli forces destroyed weapons depots and killed Palestinian fighter cells that posed a threat to Israeli forces.[38] Israeli forces also identified and destroyed a weapons manufacturing facility in an underground tunnel near Zaytoun, southern Gaza City.[39] The tunnel contained lathes and hundreds of pieces used to manufacture rockets, shells, and hand grenades.[40] Israeli forces also found diving equipment intended to use for the infiltration of Israel by sea. Israeli forces located several long-term living quarters in the tunnel. These living quarters contained an oven, cooking utensils, food, beds, and desks.[41]

Multiple Palestinian militias fired rockets targeting Israeli positions near the Netzarim Corridor since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 2.[42]

The IDF 143rd Division continued to operate in the southern Gaza Strip on November 3, locating weapons and killing Palestinian fighters.[43] Israeli forces destroyed weapons depots and killed fighter cells that posed a threat to Israeli forces.[44]


 



Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fired rockets targeting Sderot, Meflasim, and other settlements in southern Israel on October 2.[45] The IDF identified two rockets launched from the northern Gaza Strip that fell into open areas.[46]

 

The World Health Organization (WHO) and UNICEF continued the third phase of the polio vaccination campaign in the northern Gaza Strip on November 2, vaccinating over 55,000 children.[47] The WHO postponed the third and final phase of the campaign on October 23 due to ongoing Israeli operations in the north and the subsequent evacuation of Palestinians from the area.[48] The WHO administered the first doses to Palestinian children across the Gaza Strip in September 2024 and the second doses to children in the central and southern Strip in October.[49] The WHO and UNICEF claimed on November 1 that their original goal of administering the second dose to around 119,000 children in the north is “now unlikely” due to access constraints, the security situation, and constant population movement.[50]  The WHO separately reported that an Israeli airstrike on a health care center in Gaza City on Saturday where the vaccination campaign was ongoing injured six people.[51] The IDF said its initial review determined that the IDF Air Force did not strike in the area at the specified time.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least two locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW’s last data cut off on November 2.[52] PIJ fired small arms from the West Bank at IDF targets in Meirav, Israel, on the border of Israel and the West Bank.[53] PIJ also fired small arms targeting IDF targets in Jalbun, in the West Bank.[54] Jalbun, in the West Bank, and Meirav, in northern Israel, share a border. PIJ fired small arms targeting Israeli forces and vehicles near the Shaked settlement in the West Bank in two separate instances on November 3.[55]



Northern Israel and Lebanon
Lebanese Hezbollah objectives:

  • End Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Survive the October 7 War as a capable political and military organization with control over Lebanon

Israeli Army Radio reported that senior Hezbollah naval official Imad Amhaz surrendered without resistance to Israeli special forces in central Lebanon on November 1.[56] Israeli naval special operations forces reportedly captured Amhaz in Batroun, central Lebanon, on November 1 to gather intelligence on Hezbollah’s naval activities.[57] Israeli intelligence officials had reportedly monitored Amhaz for a long time.[58] The IDF did not intend to take responsibility for the operation but decided to claim the raid after Lebanese media published a video of the operation.[59]

The IDF Air Force killed the commander of the Nasr Unit's missile and rocket unit in an airstrike in  Jouaiyaa, southern Lebanon, on November 3.[60] The IDF said that Jafar Khader Faour was responsible for Hezbollah’s fire into northern Israel from the Nasr Unit’s area of responsibility in southeastern Lebanon.[61] Faour gave the order to fire Hezbollah‘s first projectiles of its year-long campaign into Israel on October 8, 2023, and was responsible for numerous attacks that killed Israeli citizens, including in Majdal Shams, Kibbutz Ortal, and, most recently, Metula.[62] A Nasr Unit drone unit commander was also killed in the same strike.[63]

The IDF Air Force killed a Hezbollah drone specialist from Unit 127 on November 3.[64] Unit 127 is responsible for Hezbollah‘s drone production, maintenance, and operations.[65] The IDF said that Ali Barakat worked in Hezbollah’s Unit 127 for over 10 years and executed dozens of drone attacks into Israeli territory.[66] Barakat also developed drones and cruise missiles for Hezbollah.[67] It is unclear if Barakat was killed in the same airstrike as Faour. The IDF has targeted members of Unit 127 with increasing frequency since Hezbollah’s October 13 attack on an IDF base in Binyamina, Israel, that killed four Israeli soldiers.[68]

The IDF 91st Division and Air Force killed the commander of Hezbollah’s local unit in Khiam unit on November 3.[69] The IDF killed Farouk Amin al Ashi, who was responsible for conducting numerous attacks targeting the Galilee panhandle from Khiam.[70] The IDF also killed a company commander in Khiam’s Radwan SOF unit.[71]

Israeli forces continued ground operations in Khiam. Geolocated footage posted by IDF reservist and Knesset member Yitzik Kroizer on November 2 showed Israeli forces clearing residential areas in southern Khiam.[72] Lebanese sources reported that Israeli forces conducted clearing operations in Khiam amid heavy artillery shelling in the area on November 3.[73]

The IDF 91st Division continued operations in southeastern Lebanon on November 3.[74] The IDF 769th Territorial Brigade raided several buildings overnight and located rockets, rocket launchers, and small arms—including rocket-propelled grenades and Kalashnikov rifles—in a residential house.[75] Hezbollah fighters had barricaded themselves in the building.[76] Israeli forces also located tactical equipment, combat gear, and intelligence documents in the same house.[77] The 769th Territorial Brigade killed Hezbollah fighters in airstrikes and ground encounters and destroyed other weapons storage facilities in the area.[78]

Hezbollah fired three barrages of rockets targeting Israeli forces in Mays al Jabal.[79]


 

The IDF 36th Division continued operations in southern Lebanon on November 3.[80] The 36th Division engaged Hezbollah and Radwan SOF fighters and killed them in close-quarters combat and airstrikes.[81] The IDF naval special operations unit Shayetet 13, Yahalom combat engineers, and Oketz canine unit raided a compound in southern Lebanon that Hezbollah used to plan and conduct infiltration attacks.[82] Israeli forces engaged and killed Hezbollah fighters in a tunnel at the compound.[83] Israeli forces located dozens of weapons, including Kalashnikov rifles, anti-tank guided missiles, surface-to-air missiles, mortars, and a rocket launcher aimed to fire at northern Israel.[84] Israeli forces demolished the compound.[85] Geolocated footage posted on November 3 showed the demolition of a tunnel underneath a hill northwest of Ramyeh.[86] It is unclear if this is the same underground infrastructure that Shayetet 13 and the Yahalom engineers raided.

 

 



Local Lebanese and Syrian sources reported that Israel struck infrastructure near several border crossings between Syria and Lebanon on November 2. The IDF struck a road on the Syrian side of the Akum crossing in northern Lebanon.[87] Lebanese sources also reported that the IDF conducted an airstrike targeting the Jarmash-Qald al Sabaa crossing between Lebanon and Syria.[88] The IDF Air Force has consistently struck targets near the Lebanon-Syria border to interdict Hezbollah weapon transfers and degrade infrastructure affiliated with Unit 4400, which is responsible for the transfer of funds and weapons from Iran to Hezbollah.[89]

Lebanese sources reported that the IDF conducted five airstrikes targeting sites in Baalbek and Douris on November 3.[90] The IDF has recently targeted sites in Baalbek to degrade Unit 4400’s infrastructure in the area.[91]


This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on November 2 to 2:00pm ET on November 3. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.

Hezbollah has conducted at least twenty-four attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 2.[92] Hezbollah launched rockets targeting Israeli forces in Metula in three separate attacks on November 3.[93] Hezbollah launched rockets targeting the Israeli Air Force Technical School in Haifa for the first time on November 3.[94] The IDF reported that a Hezbollah drone it failed to intercept caused a fire in the Wadi Ara area in northern Israel.[95] An IDF Navy boat separately shot down a Hezbollah drone off the coast of Caesarea before it entered Israeli airspace.[96] Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s vacation home is in Caesarea, and Hezbollah previously targeted the home on October 19.[97] The IDF estimated that Hezbollah launched over 100 rockets at Israel on the morning of November 3.[98]



Iran and the Axis of Resistance

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed three attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 2. The claims include the following:

  • A drone attack targeting an unspecified "vital target" in the Golan Heights.[99]
  • Two separate drone attacks targeting unspecified “vital targets” in the Jordan Valley.[100]

The IDF reported on November 3 that it identified a drone in the southern Golan Heights that did not cause any damage or casualties.[101] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent noted that the drone entered the Golan Heights airspace from Syria for ten minutes before likely crashing.[102]

The Islamic Resistance in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques, an Iranian-backed militia claiming to operate in Saudi Arabia, claimed that it launched a drone attack targeting an unspecified target in the Jordan Valley on October 31.[103] This is the second claim by this militia CTP-ISW has observed since it began operating in October 2024.[104]

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

 


[1] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/with-hezbollah-and-hamas-weakened-gallant-says-iran-looking-to-ignite-terror-in-west-bank/

[2] https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Carter_Hamas_View_War.pdf?x85095

[3] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-august-21-2024 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-august-14-2024 ; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/09/world/middleeast/iran-west-bank-weapons-smuggling.html

[4] www dot idf.il/244999

[5] www dot idf.il/244999

[6] www dot idf.il/244999

[7] www dot idf.il/244999

[8]  https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-sends-troops-into-lebanon-escalating-fight-against-hezbollah-1dbcee03?msockid=31724c4845486561027c583141486b0b

[9] www dot idf.il/244999

[10] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/30/world/middleeast/israel-hamas-attack-intelligence.html

[11] www dot ynetnews.com/article/bjvhbyj11ke; https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1841096315259818482

[12] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16192; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/at-northern-border-netanyahu-vows-to-restore-security-in-north-with-or-without-an-agreement/

[13] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/return-of-displaced-northern-residents-to-their-homes-becomes-an-official-war-goal/

[14] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/at-northern-border-netanyahu-vows-to-restore-security-in-north-with-or-without-an-agreement/

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-16-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-21-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/hezbollah%E2%80%99s-military-forces-are-failing-lebanon

[16] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/hochstein-and-mcgurks-meetings-with-top-israeli-officials-on-gaza-and-lebanon-were-constructive-us-official-says/

[17] www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/politic/818729/ ;

 https://x.com/suleimanmas1/status/1851687885470102001?s=46&t=EGYcIyXosW6lVJmixq2r5Q

[18] https://elaph dot com/Web/News/2024/11/1552254.html

[19] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/31/israel-iran-planning-attack-iraq

[20] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-30-2024

[21] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-30-2024

[22] https://elaph dot com/Web/News/2024/11/1552254.html

[23] https://www.reuters.com/article/world/exclusive-iran-moves-missiles-to-iraq-in-warning-to-enemies-idUSKCN1LG0W7/ ; https://www.forbes.com/sites/pauliddon/2024/10/01/houthis-and-iraqi-militias-target-israel-amidst-lebanon-escalation/

[24] https://www.axios.com/2024/11/02/us-warn-iran-attack-israel-nuclear-oil-sites ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-26-2024

[25] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-2-2024

[26] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1852847593153294451

[27] https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3954442/statement-from-pentagon-press-secretary-maj-gen-pat-ryder-on-middle-east-force/

[28] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/centcom-chief-kurilla-meets-halevi-tours-thaad-missile-defense-battery-deployed-in-israel-by-us/ ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853002810339533174

[29] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852943159900115025 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852943210324066768

[30] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852943210324066768

[31] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852943210324066768

[32] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852943226392506698   ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-2-2024

[33] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16175

[34] https://x.com/TwistyCB/status/1852814447120699398

[35] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1852766746693742595 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-6-2024

[36] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852923916102337020

[37] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853014715640742265

[38] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852943226392506698 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852943231404662809

[39] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1852748146964603320

[40] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1852748146964603320

[41] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1852748146964603320

[42] https://t.me/mojahdeenpal/4893 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7788

[43] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852943226392506698

[44] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852943231404662809

[45] https://t.me/sarayaps/18769

[46] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852794395017269733

[47] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/11/03/israel-iran-war-news-lebanon-gaza-palestine/#link-BO62PRUDNVGMVKG4QV7CX6LEOA

[48] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-23-2024

[49] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-23-2024

[50] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/11/03/israel-iran-war-news-lebanon-gaza-palestine/#link-BO62PRUDNVGMVKG4QV7CX6LEOA

[51] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/11/03/israel-iran-war-news-lebanon-gaza-palestine/#link-BO62PRUDNVGMVKG4QV7CX6LEOA

[52] https://t.me/sarayajneen/1704 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1705

[53] https://t.me/sarayajneen/1705

[54] https://t.me/sarayajneen/1705

[55] https://t.me/sarayajneen/1704 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1706

[56] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16190

[57] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1852699213349478635; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/02/world/middleeast/israel-naval-commandos-hezbollah.html

[58] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16190

[59] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16190

[60] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852770974770360653; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1852773388483207296

[61] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852770978901741907

[62] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852770978901741907; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852770981787414593

[63] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852770974770360653

[64] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1853130338735903067

[65] www dot timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/after-deadly-drone-strike-israel-aims-to-wipe-out-hezbollahs-uav-unit-changes-siren-protocols

[66] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853128257530380692

[67] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853128257530380692

[68] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-14-2024; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-24-2024

[69] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852943086004965566

[70] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852943086004965566

[71] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852943099191791829

[72] https://x.com/MiddleEastBuka/status/1853089559803785524; https://x.com/yair_kraus/status/1852810197208875097

[73] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/98860; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/98874

[74] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852943099191791829

[75] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1853046347475132839

[76] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1853046347475132839 

[77] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1853046347475132839 

[78] www dot idf.il/244886

[79] https://t.me/mmirleb/8684;

https://t.me/mmirleb/8685;

https://t.me/mmirleb/8686

[80] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852943111783154025

[81] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852943111783154025

[82] www dot idf.il/244967

[83] www dot idf.il/244967 

[84] www dot idf.il/244967 

[85] www dot idf.il/244967 

[86] https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/1853103869129318536

[87] https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1852784763913871442; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/98835; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/98833

[88] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/98835

[89] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-30-2024

[90] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/99048

[91] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-30-2024

[92] https://t.me/mmirleb/8650 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8655 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8655

; https://t.me/mmirleb/8657 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8658 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8659 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8660 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8661 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8662

; https://t.me/mmirleb/8663 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8664 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8665

; https://t.me/mmirleb/8672 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8672https://t.me/mmirleb/8674

; https://t.me/mmirleb/8675 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8676 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8679

; https://t.me/mmirleb/8682 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8683 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8688

; https://t.me/mmirleb/8690 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8694 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853132034316575126 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852978134796145129

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[94] https://t.me/mmirleb/8694

[95] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-says-hezbollah-drone-sparked-fire-in-north-after-it-failed-to-shoot-it-down/

[96] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-says-hezbollah-drone-sparked-fire-in-north-after-it-failed-to-shoot-it-down/

[97] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/bedroom-window-at-netanyahus-home-was-hit-in-saturdays-hezbollah-drone-strike/

[98] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-says-hezbollah-has-fired-over-100-rockets-from-lebanon-at-israel-today/

[99] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1447

[100] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1448 ; https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1450

[101] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852938542298595698 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/16188

[102] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16188

[103] https://t.me/Almoqawamabeladalharamaen/5

[104] https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/1850195344576913453 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-26-2024#_edn988bbd2c52081da3e9e924914e24998f12