UA-69458566-1

Thursday, November 7, 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 7, 2024

 Kateryna Stepanenko, Davit Gasparyan, Grace Mappes, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and Frederick W. Kagan

November 7, 2024, 7:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on November 7. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 8 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to shape US President-elect Donald Trump's foreign policy and achieve another Russia–US reset on Russia's terms. Putin addressed the 21st annual meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club on November 7 and advocated for a reset of US–Russia relations. Putin implied that that Trump’s presidential campaign expressed a "desire to restore relations with Russia, to help end the Ukrainian crisis" and later noted that Russia is open to the "possibility of restoring relations with the United States."[1] Putin attempted to blame the United States for undermining US–Russia relations, noting that the United States imposed sanctions and restrictions on Russia, and chose to support Kyiv  without mentioning that these measures were in response to Russia’s illegal and unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Putin's statement implies that Russia would only accept any reset in US–Russia relations if the US dropped sanctions and restrictions against Russia and stopped supporting Ukraine — effectively entirely on terms that benefit Russia at the expense of US interests. Putin reiterated the boilerplate narrative that NATO is a "blatant anachronism," accused the West of maintaining a bloc-oriented mentality, and deliberately misrepresented his invasion of Ukraine as NATO's efforts to remain relevant. Putin attempted to frame BRICS as a non-bloc alternative to NATO and falsely implied that Russia is not interested in becoming a hegemon, despite the fact that the Kremlin has been forming a new anti-Western bloc composed of Iran, North Korea, and China.

A recent failed Russian assault northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka prompted outrage from some Russian ultranationalist milbloggers over Russian command failures and the pervasive Russian military culture of exaggerating battlefield successes. Russian milbloggers claimed that the commander of the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps) ordered the brigade's 1st, 2nd, and 3rd motorized rifle battalions and 4th Tank Battalion to conduct a simultaneous frontal assault against Ukrainian positions near Bilohorivka without adequate fire support on November 2.[2] The milbloggers complained that the assault was unsuccessful and resulted in steep personnel, tank, and infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) losses. The milbloggers reiterated their long-standing critiques that Russian military field commanders produce "beautiful reports" and maps that deliberately inflate Russian frontline advances and send these false reports to senior Russian military leadership. Russian milbloggers claimed that field commanders send these false reports to secure promotions at the cost of Russian servicemen's lives and military equipment losses.[3] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) had claimed in late October 2024 that Russian forces had seized Serebryanka (just west of Bilohorivka), and Russian milbloggers may have been referring to this claim in their critiques.[4] Bilohorivka is a particular sore spot for the Russian ultranationalist community because Russian forces have impaled themselves on assaults to take the settlement since at least May 2022. The Russian military command most notably launched a catastrophic river crossing to take Bilohorivka in May 2022 that failed, resulting in significant Russian armored vehicle losses.[5]

A Russian brigade commander and a sniper platoon commander were reported killed in combat recently in the Kurakhove and Chasiv Yar directions. Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported on November 7 that Major General Pavel Klimenko, commander of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA]), was killed in combat in Ukraine.[6] Klimenko had reportedly served in occupied Crimea before Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022 and was promoted to Major General in May 2024. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported in August 2024 that soldiers under Klimenko's command had been involved in the torture of conscientious objectors and Russian personnel in an abandoned mine near Donetsk City.[7] ISW recently observed elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade fighting in the Kurakhove direction.[8] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 5 that Russian Deputy Commander of the Sniper Platoon of the 88th "Hispaniola" Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) Pavel Alexandrovich Apalkov, nicknamed "Joker," was killed in combat in the Chasiv Yar direction.[9]

Ukrainian authorities continue to report systematic Russian executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), noting a clear increase in such executions in 2024. Head of the Department for Combating Crimes Committed in Armed Conflict of the Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office Denys Lysenko stated on November 6 that Ukrainian authorities are investigating 49 criminal cases involving the Russian execution of 124 Ukrainian POWs.[10] Lysenko stated that the number of Russian forces' executions of Ukrainian POWs increased sharply since the end of 2023 and reached "unprecedented levels" in 2024. The highest numbers of executions occurred in Donetsk Oblast, where Russian forces executed 62 Ukrainian POWs in 17 separate incidents, followed by Zaporizhia and Kharkiv oblasts. ISW has extensively reported on previous footage and reports of Russian servicemembers executing Ukrainian POWs in violation of the Geneva Convention on the treatment of POWs and has observed a wider trend of Russian abuses against Ukrainian POWs across various sectors of the front that appeared to be enabled, if not explicitly endorsed, by individual Russian commanders and unpunished by Russian field commanders.[11]

Ukrainian strikes on Russia and Western sanctions are reportedly disrupting Russia's energy industry. The Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service reported on November 6 that Russian authorities partially halted operations of Russia's Volgograd; Ilsky, Krasnodar Krai; and Yaisky, Kemerovo Oblast oil refineries in October 2024 due to failure to complete scheduled repairs of damage caused by Ukrainian strikes.[12] The Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service stated that the shutdowns will reduce domestic Russian refining capacity, hinder exports, worsen fuel supply issues in Russia, and raise maintenance and modernization costs. The Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service noted that Russian authorities could not complete the repairs because they lacked the necessary Western equipment and components as a result of Western sanctions and failed import substitution efforts. The Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service reported that Russian manufacturers only supply 30 to 45 percent of the necessary components for Russian oil refineries and that the Russian reliance on Chinese equipment has proven problematic due to compatibility issues, which is increasing the repair costs. ISW previously reported on the effectiveness of Western sanctions and the need to strengthen them to prevent Russia form evading their impact via third parties, as well as the effectiveness of Ukrainian strikes on targets inside Russia.[13]

Key Takeaways:

  • Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to shape US President-elect Donald Trump's foreign policy and achieve another Russia–US reset on Russia's terms.
  • A recent failed Russian assault northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka prompted outrage from some Russian ultranationalist milbloggers over Russian command failures and the pervasive Russian military culture of exaggerating battlefield successes.
  • A Russian brigade commander and a sniper platoon commander were reported killed in combat recently in the Kurakhove and Chasiv Yar directions.
  • Ukrainian authorities continue to report systematic Russian executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), noting a clear increase in such executions in 2024.
  • Ukrainian strikes on Russia and Western sanctions are reportedly disrupting Russia's energy industry.
  • Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
  • Russian authorities are reportedly creating "fake" non-combat volunteer battalions in occupied Ukraine and merging them with existing Cossack organizations led by occupation administrations.


We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Russian Technological Adaptations
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast southeast of Korenevo near Novoivanovka and Darino and south of Sudzha near Plekhovo on November 7, but there were no changes to the frontline.[14] Russian milbloggers described the frontline in Kursk Oblast on November 7 as largely inactive.[15] A Ukrainian brigade commander reportedly operating in the area stated that Russian forces field many fewer armored vehicles and have less artillery in Kursk Oblast than elsewhere on the frontline, especially in Donetsk Oblast.[16] A milblogger posted footage of Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position near Cherkasskoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha) with an alleged FAB-3000 glide bomb.[17]


Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in Glushkovsky Raion (west of the main Ukrainian salient) on November 7.

Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Starytsya (southwest of Vovchansk) on November 6 and 7 but did not advance.[18] A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction stated on November 7 that Ukrainian forces managed to recapture nearly 400 hectares of Ukrainian land and several important forest strips in northern Kharkiv Oblast in October 2024.[19]


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 7, but did not advance. Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and Kucherivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Kruhlyakivka, Kolisynkivka, and Lozova; southwest of Svatove near Druzhelyubivka and Hrekivka; northwest of Kremmina near Makiivka, and Katerynivka; and west of Kremmina near Torske and Terny; and southwest of Kreminna near Serebryanka and Dibrova on November 6 and 7.[20] Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Terny.[21]


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces recently advanced east of Siversk amid continued offensive operations on November 7. Geolocated footage published on November 7 shows that Russian forces advanced south of Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk), and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further south of Verkhnokamyanske.[22] Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Zolotarivka (east of Siversk) and advanced by 800 meters from the northern outskirts of Ivano-Darivka (southeast of Siversk).[23] ISW has not observed visual evidence supporting this claim. Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka, and south of Siversk near Pereizne on November 6 and 7.[24] Reconnaissance elements of the 123rd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic's Army Corps [LNR AC]) and artillery elements of the 2nd Guards Artillery Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating in the Siversk direction.[25]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in and around Chasiv Yar on November 7 but did not advance. Russian forces reportedly attacked in Chasiv Yar, south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Bila Hora, and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka on November 6 and 7.[26] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced by 1.5 kilometers in a park area southeast of Chasiv Yar, but ISW has not observed visual evidence confirming this claim.[27] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted that one to two battalions of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating in the Kramatorsk direction (likely referring to the Chasiv Yar direction).[28] Mashovets stated that it is strange that elements of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Brigade are fighting in the Kramatorsk direction given that the regiment had been fighting in the Kurakhove direction, and ISW had recently observed elements of the brigade operate on the outskirts of Kurakhove.[29] Mashovets added that Russian forces have deployed approximately 47,500 to 48,000 personnel, 210 to 212 tanks, and 832 to 834 armored vehicles to the Kramatorsk direction. Mashovets added that Russian operational reserves in this direction consist of one Airborne (VDV) regiment, which Mashovets assessed is likely the 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) minus one or 1.5 of its battalions; two unspecified motorized rifle regiments; up to three reserve battalions; 10 or fewer tanks; and 80 to 85 armored vehicles, of which half need to be repaired. Elements of the Russian 2nd assault company of the 331st VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division), drone operators of the "Okhotnik" Spetsnaz detachment (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic's [DNR] AC), and drone operators of the "Hispaniola" Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) continue to operate in the Chasiv Yar direction.[30]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction but did not advance on November 7. Russian forces reportedly attacked in Toretsk, north of Toretsk near Dylivka, and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on November 6 and 7.[31] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that poor weather had slowed down Russian advances in Toretsk.[32] Mashovets stated that Russian forces have up to 21,000 troops, up to 50 tanks, and about 235 to 240 armored vehicles in the Toretsk direction.[33] Mashovets noted that Russian forces only have a battalion of the 132nd Separate Motorized Riffle Brigade (51st CAA) in reserve and dismissed unconfirmed reports that Russian forces transferred two battalions of the 1st and 114th separate motorized rifle brigades (both of 51st CAA) to the reserves in Toretsk direction from prioritized frontlines in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions.[34]


Russian forces recently advanced south of Pokrovsk amid continued Russian offensive operations on November 7. Geolocated footage published on November 7 indicates that Russian forces likely seized Novooleksiivka (south of Pokrovsk and west of Selydove), and Russian sources credited a Russian motorized battalion of the 80th Tank Regiment (90th Guards Tank Division, 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) with seizing the settlement.[35] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) and west of Hryhorivka (west of Selydove), but ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims.[36] Russian forces continued assaults east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Promin; south of Pokrovsk near Novooleksiivka; and southeast of Pokrovsk near Selydove, Krutyi Yar, Novohrodivka, Sukhyi Yar, and Lysivka.[37]


Russian forces recently advanced north and northeast of Kurakhove amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on November 7. Geolocated footage published on November 7 shows that Russian forces advanced in northern Novoselydivka (north of Kurakhove) and in northern Illinka (northeast of Kurakhove).[38] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced in western Novodmytrivka (northwest of Kurakhove) and south of Kreminna Balka (north of Kurakhove), and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on November 7 that Russian forces seized Kreminna Balka, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[39] Russian forces continued to attack Kurakhove itself; northwest of Kurakhove near Novodmytrivka; north of Kurakhove near Kreminna Balka, Novoselydivka, and Sontsivka; northeast of Kurakhove near Illinka; and east of Kurakhove near Maksymilyanivka on November 6 and 7.[40] Elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Maksymilyanivka.[41]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Vuhledar direction but did not advance on November 7. Geolocated footage published on October 31 shows that Russian forces advanced northwest of Vodyane (northeast of Vuhledar), but this change to the frontline is not recent.[42] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA seized Antonivka (northeast of Vuhledar) and that Russian forces seized Maksymivka (northwest of Vuhledar) and advanced north of the settlement.[43] Russian forces reportedly continued offensive operations northeast of Vuhledar near Antonivka, Katerynivka, and Dalne; and northwest of Vuhledar near Trudove and Maksymivka on November 6 and 7.[44] Assault elements of the 2nd Battalion of the 39th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating south of Yelyzavetivka (northeast of Vuhledar).[45] Elements of the Russian 2nd Battalion of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Yelizavetivka (north of Vuhledar).[46] Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Antonivka.[47] Elements of the Russian 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Vremivka direction.[48]


Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces marginally advanced during localized ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 7. Geolocated footage published on November 7 indicates that Russian forces advanced to a windbreak northeast of Nesteryanka (northwest of Robotyne) following Russian milblogger claims of Russian advances west of Nesteryanka on November 5 and 6.[49] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued attacking northwest of Robotyne near Novoandriivka on November 6 and 7.[50]


The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Dnipro direction, likely referring to east (left) bank Kherson Oblast, on November 6 and 7 but did not advance.[51]


Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a large drone strike against Ukraine on the night of November 6 to 7. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 106 Shahed and other unidentified strike drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Crimea; and Kursk and Oryol oblasts.[52] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 74 drones over Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Sumy, Poltava, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr, Cherkasy, and Chernihiv oblasts, and that 25 drones were ”locally lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian sources reported that Russian drones caused minor damage to civilian infrastructure in six raions of Kyiv City and damaged a gas pipeline and residential buildings in Odesa City on November 7.[53] Russian milbloggers claimed on November 7 that Russian drones struck energy facilities in Rivne and Zhytomyr oblasts.[54] Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov reported that Russian forces hit civilian infrastructure with five glide bombs during the day on November 7, injuring 33 civilians in Zaporizhzhia City on November 7.[55]

Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat told CNN that Russian forces are widely using decoy drones with 3D-printed balls wrapped in foil to imitate warheads and fool radar systems.[56] Ihnat estimated that up to half of all Russian drones fired at Ukraine are decoys.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian media reported on November 7 that Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed former Republic of Komi Head Vladimir Uyba to be the Deputy Head of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) Medical Directorate following Uyba's resignation as Republic of Komi head on November 5.[57]

Russian authorities are reportedly creating "fake" non-combat volunteer battalions in occupied Ukraine and merging them with existing Cossack organizations led by occupation administrations.[58] The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated on November 7 that Russian authorities fund these the volunteer battalions, which the center noted primarily only exist on paper so that Russian authorities can claim to have the support of locals in occupied Ukraine. Russian occupation authorities have been using Cossack organizations likely to create Russian military reserves and paramilitary policing services from residents of occupied Ukraine.[59]

Russian federal subjects continue to increase one-time payments to Russians who assist in recruiting volunteers to support ongoing Russian crypto-mobilization efforts. Voronezh Oblast authorities increased one-time payments from 50,000 rubles to 75,000 rubles on November 6 for Voronezh Oblast residents who assist in recruiting other Voronezh Oblast residents into the Russian military.[60]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on November 7 that it has issued over 52,000 veterans status certificates to Russian military veterans of the war in Ukraine and received over 100,000 veterans status certificate requests since introducing a digital veterans-status verification system on November 1.[61]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues efforts to modernize Russian combat drones to counter Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW). Former Deputy Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff Lieutenant General Ihor Romanenko stated on November 7 that Russian forces began implementing both artificial intelligence (AI) and fiber optic cables into Russian drones in 2024 to allow Russian forces with alternate means of controlling the drones that Ukrainian EW does not affect.[62] Romanenko stated that Russian forces are switching to the use of tactical-level strike-reconnaissance systems in response to recent Ukrainian destruction of the Russian A-50 long range radar detection aircraft. Romanenko stated that Russian forces now to use tactical-level drones with ranges of more than 100 kilometers to conduct reconnaissance.

The Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and frontline Russian forces continue to innovate Russian drones and anti-drone means. Russian sources claimed on November 1 that Russian forces are fielding the new “Molot” anti-drone gun, which can reportedly fire a heat-seeking munition at drones flying within 200 meters of the user.[63] The Russian Unmanned Systems group announced on November 5 that it has developed a new aerial laser scanner for the Russian SuperCam reconnaissance drone with a range error of five millimeters and the ability to geolocate objects within a two-centimeter margin of error.[64] A Ukrainian military expert stated on November 7 that the Russian DIB increased production of unspecified long-range drones from 17 to 50 per day, and that the Russian DIB may be able to produce up to 90 long-range drones per day in the near future.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 7 that Russian forces in field laboratories are creating homemade munitions for Russian first-person view (FPV) drones, likely due to a shortage of munitions for Russian forces on the frontline.[66]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing reporting on activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.


[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/75521

[2] https://t.me/rybar/65163 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/56995; https://t.me/dva_majors/56981; https://t.me/svarschiki/10824; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18688

[3] https://t.me/rybar/65163 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/56995; https://t.me/dva_majors/56981; https://t.me/svarschiki/10824; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18688

[4] https://t.me/dva_majors/55755; https://t.me/rybar/64284; https://t.me/dva_majors/56981

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-14; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31

[6] https://zona dot media/news/2024/11/07/klimenko; https://vk dot com/donbass_h_russia?w=wall-191554677_312942; https://t.me/astrapress/67991; https://zona.media/news/2024/08/17/bentley

[7] https://t.me/astrapress/62085

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-23-2024

;

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-19-2024

;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2024

;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2024

[9] https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1854173260365046014 ; https://t.co/JphKfnNW7S

[10] https://suspilne dot media/874335-ogpu-v-ukraini-rozsliduut-49-karnih-sprav-pro-vbivstva-124-vijskovopolonenih/

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar100624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar100124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar090624 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122823 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-3-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar090424 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062324; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2024

[12] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/07/sankcziyi-praczyuyut-u-rf-zupynyayetsya-naftopererobka/; https://szru dot gov.ua/news-media/news/u-rf-zupynyaietsya-naftopererobka--sanktsii-pratsyuyut

[13] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putin-vulnerable-western-policy-masks-russian-weakness; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2024;

[14] https://t.me/rybar/65163; https://t.me/mod_russia/45457; https://t.me/dva_majors/56995

[15] https://t.me/rybar/65163 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/56995

[16] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/06/zayizhdzhaly-tygry-ta-bmp-ale-vony-duzhe-shvydko-zgoraly-kombat-genij-pro-boyi-na-kurshhyni/; https://youtu.be/JXr3lK5wJro

[17] https://t.me/dva_majors/57020

[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wxkfQWYowQNZBXxgTXfeLin2hBm7ZFBM1D3i9C3odbyEGxyfRHNSdff5snxoKjzyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hXmTbGG4uuVsZPRMe1KCUAtYZ1DEuUSiQ5DHGMVpGLMsRLw3imYV8oepe2p8y8cxl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Vgj4w3anhmR1geE4UYGiMhdd2cVEtnC6VLyY6gtwCDA6Ex79jC93sZ3kzS43fsupl

[19] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/07/400-gektariv-za-zhovten-rosiyan-povoli-vyshtovhuyut-z-harkivshhyny/

[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wxkfQWYowQNZBXxgTXfeLin2hBm7ZFBM1D3i9C3odbyEGxyfRHNSdff5snxoKjzyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hXmTbGG4uuVsZPRMe1KCUAtYZ1DEuUSiQ5DHGMVpGLMsRLw3imYV8oepe2p8y8cxl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Vgj4w3anhmR1geE4UYGiMhdd2cVEtnC6VLyY6gtwCDA6Ex79jC93sZ3kzS43fsupl; https://t.me/rybar/65163

[21] https://t.me/s/vysokygovorit/17904; https://t.me/s/vysokygovorit/17910; https://t.me/s/epoddubny/21547

[22] https://t.me/rubpak54/222; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7434; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29256

[23] https://t.me/tass_agency/283892; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18717

[24] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hXmTbGG4uuVsZPRMe1KCUAtYZ1DEuUSiQ5DHGMVpGLMsRLw3imYV8oepe2p8y8cxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Vgj4w3anhmR1geE4UYGiMhdd2cVEtnC6VLyY6gtwCDA6Ex79jC93sZ3kzS43fsupl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wxkfQWYowQNZBXxgTXfeLin2hBm7ZFBM1D3i9C3odbyEGxyfRHNSdff5snxoKjzyl ; l https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/07/protyvnyk-namagavsya-shturmuvaty-bilogorivku-zsu-vidbyly-ataky/; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/22478

[25] https://t.me/epoddubny/21546; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/143511

[26] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wxkfQWYowQNZBXxgTXfeLin2hBm7ZFBM1D3i9C3odbyEGxyfRHNSdff5snxoKjzyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hXmTbGG4uuVsZPRMe1KCUAtYZ1DEuUSiQ5DHGMVpGLMsRLw3imYV8oepe2p8y8cxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Vgj4w3anhmR1geE4UYGiMhdd2cVEtnC6VLyY6gtwCDA6Ex79jC93sZ3kzS43fsupl

[27] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18724

[28] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2326

[29] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2024

[30] https://t.me/dva_majors/57009; https://t.me/nm_dnr/12945; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18686

[31] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wxkfQWYowQNZBXxgTXfeLin2hBm7ZFBM1D3i9C3odbyEGxyfRHNSdff5snxoKjzyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hXmTbGG4uuVsZPRMe1KCUAtYZ1DEuUSiQ5DHGMVpGLMsRLw3imYV8oepe2p8y8cxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Vgj4w3anhmR1geE4UYGiMhdd2cVEtnC6VLyY6gtwCDA6Ex79jC93sZ3kzS43fsupl

[32] https://t.me/wargonzo/23006

[33] ttps://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2327 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2328

[34] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2327 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2328

[35] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7432; https://t.me/gostrikartuzy/678; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/22065 https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7430; https://t.me/motopatriot/29261; https://t.me/motopatriot/29261 ; https://x.com/strategicbakery/status/1854429427968381346; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29249; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29242; https://t.me/motopatriot/29277

[36] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18677

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wxkfQWYowQNZBXxgTXfeLin2hBm7ZFBM1D3i9C3odbyEGxyfRHNSdff5snxoKjzyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hXmTbGG4uuVsZPRMe1KCUAtYZ1DEuUSiQ5DHGMVpGLMsRLw3imYV8oepe2p8y8cxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Vgj4w3anhmR1geE4UYGiMhdd2cVEtnC6VLyY6gtwCDA6Ex79jC93sZ3kzS43fsupl; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1854207677166944318 ; https://x.com/strategicbakery/status/1854216446311555156; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/06/snaryad-odyn-a-okupantiv-pyat-znyshhennya-shturmovoyi-grupy-rosiyan-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/; https://t.me/fifthbrUA/584

[38] https://t.me/kozakgyluntv/19730; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7433; https://t.me/aeronavtyua/2948; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/22062; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7429; https://x.com/markito0171/status/1854423793428525478; https://x.com/strategicbakery/status/1854432361506656535; https://x.com/geschlittert/status/1854481070395211899

[39] https://t.me/motopatriot/29278; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29223; https://t.me/sashakots/50012 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/59998; https://t.me/motopatriot/29274; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19353

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wxkfQWYowQNZBXxgTXfeLin2hBm7ZFBM1D3i9C3odbyEGxyfRHNSdff5snxoKjzyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hXmTbGG4uuVsZPRMe1KCUAtYZ1DEuUSiQ5DHGMVpGLMsRLw3imYV8oepe2p8y8cxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Vgj4w3anhmR1geE4UYGiMhdd2cVEtnC6VLyY6gtwCDA6Ex79jC93sZ3kzS43fsupl

[41] https://t.me/nm_dnr/12944

[42] https://x.com/davincibat/status/1852030787656307109; https://t [dot] me/davincibat/388; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29239

[43] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18728; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29239; https://t.me/dva_majors/56995; https://t.me/rybar/65163; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18728

[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wxkfQWYowQNZBXxgTXfeLin2hBm7ZFBM1D3i9C3odbyEGxyfRHNSdff5snxoKjzyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hXmTbGG4uuVsZPRMe1KCUAtYZ1DEuUSiQ5DHGMVpGLMsRLw3imYV8oepe2p8y8cxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Vgj4w3anhmR1geE4UYGiMhdd2cVEtnC6VLyY6gtwCDA6Ex79jC93sZ3kzS43fsupl

[45] https://t.me/rybar/65163 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/56987 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/29266

[46] https://t.me/voin_dv/11686 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/11717; https://t.me/rybar/65163 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/56987 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/29266

[47] https://t.me/dva_majors/57021

[48] https://t.me/voin_dv/11685

[49] https://t.me/ngu_war_for_peace/21966%20 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7435 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5-2024

[50]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hXmTbGG4uuVsZPRMe1KCUAtYZ1DEuUSiQ5DHGMVpGLMsRLw3imYV8oepe2p8y8cxl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Vgj4w3anhmR1geE4UYGiMhdd2cVEtnC6VLyY6gtwCDA6Ex79jC93sZ3kzS43fsupl

[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wxkfQWYowQNZBXxgTXfeLin2hBm7ZFBM1D3i9C3odbyEGxyfRHNSdff5snxoKjzyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wxkfQWYowQNZBXxgTXfeLin2hBm7ZFBM1D3i9C3odbyEGxyfRHNSdff5snxoKjzyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Vgj4w3anhmR1geE4UYGiMhdd2cVEtnC6VLyY6gtwCDA6Ex79jC93sZ3kzS43fsupl

[52] https://t.me/kpszsu/22478

[53] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/07/u-kyyevi-dron-vluchyv-u-zhytlovyj-budynok/; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/9216 ; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/9227 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/07/naslidky-udariv-dronamy-po-kyyevu-v-misti-palayut-budynky-poshkodzheno-medzaklad-ta-biznes-czentr/; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/9224 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/3727 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/07/10-godyn-pid-atakoyu-ulamky-poshkodyly-pryvatnyj-sektor-na-kyyivshhyni/; https://t.me/kyivoda/22195 ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/874511-nicna-ataka-bpla-na-odesu-poskodzeni-bagatopoverhivki-travmovana-odna-ludina/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/7417; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/07/vorozhi-drony-v-odesi-poshkodzheno-budynky-ta-avtomobili-ye-poraneni/

[54] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/143576 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/143566

[55] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/13106; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/874873-armia-rf-zavdala-pat-udariv-po-zaporizzu-e-poraneni/; https://armyinform dpt com.ua/2024/11/07/vorog-zavdav-5-aviaudariv-po-zaporizhzhyu-ye-vluchannya-po-budynkah-i-likarni/; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/13105 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/11/07/voyska-rf-nanesli-massirovannyy-aviaudar-po-zaporozhyu-odin-chelovek-pogib-18-raneny-povrezhdeny-zhilye-doma-i-bolnitsa ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/13128

[56] https://www.cnn.com/2024/11/07/europe/russia-ukraine-kyiv-drone-record-intl/index.html ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80258

[57] https://t.me/tass_agency/283918 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/52320 ; https://meduza.io/news/2024/11/07/tass-byvshiy-glava-komi-vladimir-uyba-poluchil-dolzhnost-v-minoborony

[58] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/07/vorog-planuye-integruvaty-kozakiv-do-fejkovyh-dobrovolchyh-bataljoniv-na-tot/; https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/vorog-planuye-integruvaty-kozakiv-do-fejkovyh-dobrovolchyh-bataljoniv-na-tot/

[59] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-19-2024

[60] https://t.me/sotaproject/89510 ; https://t.me/govvrn36/18878

[61] https://t.me/mod_russia/45464

[62] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/07/vijna-v-nebi-ekspert-rozpoviv-pro-novi-rozrobky-voroga-u-galuzi-bpla/

[63] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18673 ; https://topwar dot ru/253077-vystrelil-zabyl-v-rossii-sozdali-novyj-kompleks-molot-dlja-porazhenija-dronov-protivnika-kineticheskim-perehvatchikom.html

[64] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/22312703 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18730

[65] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80233 ; https://ctrana dot one/news/474799-v-rossii-uvelichili-proizvodstvo-dalnobojnykh-bespilotnikov.html

[66] https://t.me/dva_majors/57029

Iran Update, November 7, 2024

Annika Ganzeveld, Ria Reddy, Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei,
Victoria Penza, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Hezbollah executed a prepared but limited defense of Khiam in southeastern Lebanon against the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) from October 28 to 31.[1] Hezbollah’s Operations Room claimed that the group prevented an Israeli force from seizing and controlling terrain in Khiam by executing a “fire defense,“ which likely refers to a prepared but limited defense that involved pre-registering targets for indirect fire while committing only a small amount of infantry.[2] This requires a certain level of preparation by Hezbollah but it is limited because a small amount of infantry could not hope to hold Khiam against an Israeli mechanized assault. Hezbollah fighters conducted 70 attacks over the IDF’s three-day advance towards Khiam. Most of these attacks were indirect fire attacks using rockets, thus supporting the theory that Hezbollah planned a defense centering on indirect fire.[3] Hezbollah did not claim small arms engagements with Israeli forces during this period, suggesting that Hezbollah commanders used light infantry fighters sparingly, if at all. Lebanese sources reported small arms engagements between Hezbollah fighters and the IDF but did not specify at what range the engagements occurred.[4] The low number of small arms engagements suggests that Hezbollah commanders were either unwilling or unable to deploy many infantrymen during the IDF advance into Khiam and preferred to deplete stocks of rockets, anti-tank guided missiles, and mortar shells.

Hezbollah’s prepared fire-heavy defense also suggests that Hezbollah commanders were focused on inflicting casualties rather than holding ground. This would be consistent with a defense that prioritizes the attrition of enemy forces and thus the enemy’s will to fight over holding ground. The IDF advanced at least five kilometers from Israel towards and into Khiam during the three-day operation. Hezbollah claimed that the IDF withdrew into northern Israel from Khiam on October 31 but did not provide additional evidence.[5]

Hezbollah’s defense of Khiam has been the most organized defense of a southern Lebanon village since the IDF began its ground operation in Lebanon in early October. Hezbollah commanders may have chosen to defend this area given that Khiam is located on high ground from which Hezbollah could fire into northern Israel. Khiam, moreover, grants Hezbollah a vantage point from which it could observe Israeli forces and other targets around the Galilee Panhandle. The IDF never confirmed that it operated in Khiam and did not publicize Hezbollah equipment or infrastructure seized there. Geolocated footage posted on November 6 showed the IDF 8th Armored Brigade (res.) (91st Division) operating in Khiam in recent days, however.[6]  Israeli forces destroyed firing points aimed toward northern Israeli towns and located and destroyed weapons, including Kornet missiles, grenades, and explosives in Khiam.[7] The IDF killed the commander of Hezbollah’s local unit in Khiam unit on November 3 after the IDF withdrew from the town.[8] The IDF continued artillery shelling of Khiam and its outskirts post-withdrawal.[9]  The fact that Hezbollah’s tactical command echelons near Khiam managed to execute a defense is not a strong indicator that Hezbollah’s higher command echelons have recovered from the severe degradation caused by Israeli air and ground operations. The defense of Khiam could be planned and executed at a relatively low echelon of command.


Recent statements by senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders suggest that the IRGC may conduct a direct attack on Israel from Iranian territory in response to the October 25 Israeli strike targeting Iran. These IRGC commanders have warned in recent days that Iran will conduct a third “True Promise Operation” against Israel. “True Promise Operation” refers to the previous large-scale Iranian drone and missile attacks on Israel in April and October 2024, which Iranian officials refer to as True Promise Operation 1 and True Promise Operation 2, respectively.[10] Senior IRGC commanders, including IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ali Fadavi and IRGC Second Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Ali Fazli, have recently warned that Iran will “certainly” launch a third “True Promise Operation” against Israel.[11]

Iran may conduct a smaller-scale direct attack on Israel than it did in April and October 2024 in order to preserve its diminishing long-range missile stockpile. Iran used a total of around 300 long-range ballistic missiles in its attacks on Israel earlier this year.[12] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) damaged mixing equipment and facilities used to produce long-range ballistic missiles in its strikes into Iran on October 25, which will likely disrupt Iran’s ability to manufacture ballistic missiles.[13] This disruption could cause the Iranian regime to refrain from conducting a large-scale missile attack on Israel since it might currently lack the capability to readily replace the missiles it would use in such an attack. Iran could conduct a joint attack with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias against Israel in order to preserve its long-range missile stockpile, however. Unspecified US and Israeli officials told Axios on November 5 that the IRGC has been transferring drones and ballistic missiles to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias since the Israeli strikes on October 25.[14]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei described the features a future supreme leader should embody during his first public meeting with the Assembly of Experts on November 7.[15] Khamenei stated that the Assembly should select a leader who embodies the revolution and carries it forward to maintain the revolution’s “main goal” of “implementing the religion of Islam in the country and in people‘s lives.”[16] Khamenei notably did not reveal any specific details about his successor. The Assembly of Experts is the regime body constitutionally responsible for monitoring and selecting the supreme leader. The newest Assembly was elected in March 2024 and will serve until 2032.[17] This iteration of the Assembly will likely be the Assembly that chooses the next Supreme Leader following Khamenei’s death.

Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi stated on November 7 that the reelection of former US President Donald Trump does not impact the Houthis’ campaign against shipping or Israel.[18] Abdulmalik said that Houthi fighters will continue to attack merchant vessels and US and Royal (UK) Navy vessels transiting through the Red Sea.[19] He also said that the Houthis would continue direct attacks on Israel. Abdulmalik added that they have experienced Trump before.[20] CTP-ISW has observed over 270 Houthi attacks targeting commercial vessels since November 2023.[21]

Key Takeaways:

  • Hezbollah Operations in Lebanon: Hezbollah executed a prepared but limited defense of Khiam in southeastern Lebanon against the IDF from October 28 to 31. The group said that it prevented an Israeli force from seizing and controlling terrain in Khiam by executing a “fire defense,“ which likely refers to a prepared but limited defense that involved pre-registering targets for indirect fire while committing only a small amount of infantry.
  • Iranian Retaliation Against Israel: Recent statements by senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders suggest that the IRGC may conduct a direct attack on Israel from Iranian territory in response to the October 25 Israeli strike targeting Iran. Iran may conduct a smaller-scale direct attack on Israel than it did in April and October 2024 to preserve its diminishing long-range missile stockpile.
  • Iran: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei described the features a future supreme leader should embody during his first public meeting with the Assembly of Experts on November 7.
  • Houthi Response to US Election: Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi stated on November 7 that the reelection of former US President Donald Trump does not impact the Houthis’ campaign against shipping or Israel. Abdulmalik said that Houthi fighters will continue to attack merchant vessels, US and Royal (UK) Navy vessels transiting through the Red Sea, and Israel itself.


Gaza Strip:

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip on November 6.[22] The IDF killed approximately 50 Palestinian fighters in Jabalia. Commercially available satellite imagery published on November 6 and a local Palestinian journalist‘s report indicates that the IDF conducted clearing operations near al Sikka Street, east of Jabalia.[23] Hamas detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting Israeli forces in Jabalia.[24]

The IDF issued new evacuation orders for areas west of Beit Lahia in the northern Gaza Strip on November 7.[25] The IDF evacuation orders come after the IDF expanded its clearing operations there on November 6.[26] The IDF confirmed that elements of the IDF 900th Infantry Brigade operated around Beit Lahia after receiving credible intelligence indicating that Hamas fighters continue to operate in the area.[27] CTP-ISW has observed almost daily Palestinian militia attacks in the areas west of Beit Lahia during the past week, which is consistent with the IDF’s assessment of militia presence in the area.[28] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson stated that Palestinian fighters have used the areas under the IDF’s latest evacuation zone to conduct rocket attacks into Israel.[29] The IDF is also facilitating the evacuation of Gazans from Beit Lahia through established routes amid the ongoing clearing operations in the area.[30]

Hamas fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) targeting an Israeli bulldozer conducting clearing operations west of Beit Lahia in the northern Gaza Strip on November 6.[31]   

The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting a Hamas command-and-control site inside a compound previously used as a school in the al Shati refugee camp in the northern Gaza Strip on November 7.[32] Reuters reported that the IDF conducted an airstrike targeting a UN-run school compound in al Shati refugee camp in the northern Gaza Strip.[33]  The airstrike killed at least 12 Palestinian civilians, according to a Palestinian journalist.[34]

Gazans protested price gouging of humanitarian aid and goods for the fourth consecutive day as protests expanded to the northern Gaza Strip on November 7.[35] A local Palestinian journalist reported that Gazans carried out demonstrations in several markets in eastern Zaytoun.[36] Gazans have been separately protesting in the central Gaza Strip since November 5.[37]

The IDF 99th Division began operations in the central Gaza Strip on November 7 after its deployment along the Netzarim corridor on November 6.[38] Palestinian media reports reported IDF gunfire around Nuseirat and Maghazi refugee camps in the central Gaza Strip.[39]

The IDF 143rd Division continued operations around Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip on November 7.[40] The IDF killed an unspecified number of fighters and destroyed militia infrastructure in the area. The IDF also conducted an airstrike that killed a Palestinian fighter in Rafah.[41]

The IDF reported on November 7 that the IDF 143rd Division located and destroyed two tunnel systems in an unspecified location in the southern Gaza Strip.[42] The IDF 261st Infantry Brigade located the tunnel systems and conducted a “targeted operation” above and below ground in recent weeks to destroy the system.[43] The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting Hamas’ positions and observation posts in the area before destroying the tunnels. The IDF located approximately twenty exit shafts belonging to the two-kilometer-long tunnel system. Palestinian fighters had booby-trapped some of the tunnel shafts. The IDF also engaged and killed several Palestinian fighters through ground and air engagements during the operation.  



Palestinian militias conducted three rocket attacks targeting two locations in southern Israel on November 6 and 7.[44] The IDF intercepted one projectile that crossed over into Netiv Haasara from the Gaza Strip.[45]


West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  •  Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

The IDF conducted a raid in Tulkarm on November 7 as part of its large-scale counterterrorism operation in the northern West Bank to dismantle Palestinian militia networks there. IDF troops targeted armed Palestinian fighters operating in and around Tulkarm refugee camp.[46] Palestinian militias, including PIJ and the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, engaged IDF forces in small arms clashes and detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) around Tulkarm in at least twelve engagements on November 7.[47] The IDF Air Force conducted a drone strike targeting a group of gunmen in Tulkarm.[48] The IDF announced the conclusion of its counterterrorism operation in the northern West Bank shortly after publicizing its drone strike.[49] The northern West Bank has long been a hotspot for Palestinian militancy, and Israeli forces focused counterterrorism efforts in the northern West Bank in late Summer and Fall 2024.

Northern Israel and Lebanon

Lebanese Hezbollah objectives:

  • End Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Survive the October 7 War as a capable political and military organization with control over Lebanon

A Hezbollah-affiliated correspondent and local media reported heavy machine gunfire engagements between Hezbollah and Israeli forces in the Sheeba Farms area on November 7.[50] Local media separately reported artillery shelling in the area.[51]  Lebanese sources last reported engagements in this area on November 5.[52] The IDF 810th Mountain Brigade (210th Division) has conducted several “targeted raids” from Mount Dov into the mountainous terrain north of the Israeli-controlled Shebaa Farms since early October.[53] The IDF last announced the brigades’ operations on October 15, however.[54]


The IDF 36th Division continued operations in southeastern Lebanon.[55] Israeli forces killed Hezbollah fighters and destroyed militia infrastructure, including a military warehouse and a rocket launch site that posed a threat to Israeli forces. Hezbollah claimed on November 2 that it had confronted Israeli forces advancing towards Houla by firing anti-tank guided missiles at armored bulldozers that were leading a column of forty Israeli vehicles.[56] Israeli forces withdrew to the eastern outskirts of Houla under Israeli artillery cover, according to Hezbollah. Hezbollah then targeted Israeli forces in the eastern outskirts of Houla with multiple, large rocket salvos.[57]

Israeli forces continued to operate near Maroun al Ras and Yaroun on November 7. Hezbollah claimed seven rocket attacks targeting Israeli forces on the outskirts of Maroun al Ras, southeastern Lebanon.[58] A Hezbollah-affiliated correspondent reported on November 4 that Israeli forces have been “stationed” in Maroun al Ras’ eastern outskirts.[59] Hezbollah fighters separately engaged Israeli infantry attempting to advance towards Yaroun on November 7.[60]  Hezbollah claimed to kill and wounded the Israeli infantry force but provided no evidence for the claim. Lebanese media reported artillery shelling on the western side of Yaroun earlier on November 7.[61]

Lebanese media reported small arms clashes between Israeli forces and Hezbollah near Aita al Shaab, southern Lebanon, on November 7.[62]

Israeli forces continued operations in southwestern Lebanon near Alma al Shaab since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 6. Lebanese media reported that the IDF shelled  Alma al Shaab on November 4 and 5.[63] Hezbollah claimed on November 6 that Israeli forces withdrew from multiple towns in southern Lebanon and failed to conduct a “siege” on Naqoura, southwestern Lebanon within the past week.[64] Lebanese media reported multiple instances of artillery shelling in Naqoura and areas leading to it during the past week.[65]


The IDF chief of staff reiterated that the IDF will prepare plans to expand military operations in Lebanon on November 7.[66]  IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi met with officials from towns in northern Israel and said that Israel “need[s] to prepare organized plans and ensure that it will be better [in northern Israel] than it was before the war.”[67] Halevi said on November 6 that the IDF will prepare plans to expand military operations in Lebanon but noted that these plans will be formulated alongside efforts to pursue a diplomatic agreement.[68]


The IDF continued its air campaign targeting Hezbollah capabilities, fighters, and infrastructure on November 7. The IDF Air Force struck more than 110 Hezbollah targets, including weapons warehouses, launchers, and military infrastructure throughout Lebanon.[69] The IDF struck a missile platform used by Hezbollah fighters to launch rockets toward the Mount Carmel area in northwestern Israel.[70]The IDF also struck a Hezbollah Unit 127 command-and-control complex in Tyre, southwestern Lebanon.[71] The IDF stated that Hezbollah Unit 127 used the position for planning and launching one-way drones towards Israel.[72]

The IDF continued its airstrikes targeting Hezbollah sites in Beirut’s southern suburbs.[73] The IDF Air Force struck command centers and military infrastructure in the southern suburbs of Beirut.[74] The Hezbollah Beirut regional command is responsible for this area.[75] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued evacuation notices to the residents of Ouzai, Haret Hreik, Tahwitat al Ghadeer, and Hadath in Beirut’s southern suburbs before conducting airstrikes in the area.[76]

The IDF Air Force struck at least 20 Hezbollah targets in the Baalbek area and north of the Litani River.[77]The IDF reported that its airstrikes killed at least 60 Hezbollah fighters.[78] Lebanon’s Health Ministry reported that the Israeli strikes killed at least 40 people.[79] The IDF also struck Hezbollah command-and-control compounds in Nabatieh, southern Lebanon.[80] The IDF stated that Hezbollah fighters used these facilities to promote terrorist activities.[81] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued an evacuation notice to the residents of Nabatieh before conducting airstrikes in the area.[82]


This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on November 6 to 2:00pm ET on November 7. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.

Hezbollah has conducted at least 16 drone and rocket attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's data cutoff on November 6.[83] Hezbollah conducted seven of its 15 attacks on Israeli military sites.[84] Hezbollah launched one-way attack drones at the 98th Division’s Bilo Base, south of Tel Aviv.[85] Elements of the IDF 98th Division were recently conducting clearing operations in Kafr Kila, southeastern Lebanon.[86] Hezbollah claimed on October 12 that its fighters continued to target IDF rear positions in northern Israel and “support lines” as part of its defense against Israel’s ground operation in southern Lebanon.[87] Attacks on IDF support elements are meant to degrade the IDF’s ability to conduct effective ground operations, though it is unclear what military effect these attacks will have if any at all.


Iran and the Axis of Resistance

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah denied reports that Iran is transferring weapons to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and preparing to attack Israel from Iraqi territory. Kataib Hezbollah released a statement claiming that these reports are part of an Israeli effort to obtain more US support prior to an Iranian response to Israel’s October 25 strikes targeting Iran.[88] Kataib Hezbollah emphasized that Iran did not ask for Iranian-backed Iraqi militia involvement in its response. The statement added that if Israel attacks a member of the Axis of Resistance, that member will respond individually and without support from other members. Kataib Hezbollah added that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would respond ”firmly” to an Israeli strike in Iraq. Kataib Hezbollah’s statement follows multiple reports that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may attack Israel in retaliation for the recent Israeli strikes on Iran.[89]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed two attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 6. The claims include the following:

  • A drone attack targeting an unspecified military target in the Jordan Valley.[90]
  • A drone attack targeting an unspecified military target in Israel.[91]

Iranian officials continue to voice opposition to a proposed Azerbaijani transport corridor that would cut off Iranian trade routes through Armenia to Europe.[92] Iranian Ambassador to Armenia Mehdi Sobhani told reporters on November 7 that Iran’s position on the Zangezur corridor has not changed and that Iran is against anything that leads to geopolitical changes in the Caucasus region.[93] Sobhani added separately that Iran and Armenia’s cooperation over transport and trade on the Persian Gulf-Black Sea corridor is set to increase.[94] Sobhani stated that the 32km section of the Agarak-Kajaran North-South corridor tunnel is complete.[95] This tunnel is part of the North-South Armenia Road Corridor linking Georgia, Armenia, and Iran.[96] Sobhani also emphasized that a new bridge on the Azerbaijani-Iranian border should be built alongside the Aras Bridge to facilitate more trade.[97]

Iranian Deputy Defense Minister Brigadier General Hojatollah Qureishi visited Pakistan on November 7 to discuss strengthening bilateral cooperation in security, border management, and military exchanges.[98] Qureishi and the Iranian delegation are scheduled to meet with high-ranking Pakistani defense and military officials in Islamabad over the next two days.[99]

Anti-Houthi media in Yemen reported that US-UK airstrikes in Yemen have killed at least 45 Houthi fighters in Yemen since January 2024.[100] CTP-ISW has recorded at least 119 US and UK airstrikes on Houthi targets in Yemen between January 2024 and October 2024.[101] These targets consist mostly of weapons depots and launch sites.


The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.


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[2] https://t.me/mmirleb/8787

[3] https://t.me/mmirleb/8787

[4] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/98367 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/98065 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/98035 ;

[5] https://t.me/mmirleb/8787

[6] https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/1854124982273806767 ; https://x.com/kann_news/status/1854120434750443980

[7] www dot idf.il/245553

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-3-2024 ; www dot idif.il/244886

[9] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/118544 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/98860 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/98874

[10] https://iranwire.com/en/politics/134574-operation-true-promise-2-high-costs-big-lies-and-unclear-gains/

[11] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/13/3192789 ;

https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/704023

[12] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/04/17/iran-israel-attack-drones-missiles/ ;

https://www.axios.com/2024/10/01/iran-missile-attack-israel

[13] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/26/israel-strike-iran-missile-production

[14] https://www.axios.com/2024/11/05/us-iraq-iran-israel-attack-warning

[15] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/27777

[16] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/news-content?id=58256

[17] https://apnews.com/article/iran-parliamentary-election-protests-mahsa-amini-64c628103ff5d193da974c25a13fbb12 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-1-2024#_ednf8771f050e6e6afa4ff71fb427f8cd151

[18] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3393392.htm

[19] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3393392.htm

[20] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3393392.htm

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-4-2024

[22] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1854389816701444298

[23] https://t.me/hamza20300/309033

[24] https://t.me/almanarnews/180568

[25] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1854518006581199092

[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-6-2024

[27] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1854400118033731851 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1854389816701444298

[28] Data available upon request

[29] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1854518006581199092

[30] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1854389820103041392

[31] https://t.me/almanarnews/180563

[32] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/more-families-stream-out-north-gaza-tanks-push-deeper-2024-11-07/

[33] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/more-families-stream-out-north-gaza-tanks-push-deeper-2024-11-07/

[34] https://x.com/ytirawi/status/1854511688977977528

[35] https://t.me/hamza20300/309052 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/309056

[36] https://t.me/hamza20300/309052 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/309056

[37] https://t.me/hamza20300/308968 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-5-2024

[38] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1854389826205766138 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-6-2024

[39] https://t.me/hamza20300/309097 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/308889

[40] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1854389822875644340

[41] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1854389822875644340

[42] https://t.me/idfofficial/12267

[43] https://t.me/idfofficial/12267

[44] https://t.me/pflpgaza1/14804 ; https://t.me/nedalps/4488 ; https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4460

[45] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1854473206557503653

[46] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16312

[47]  https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/812 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7838 ; https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/813 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7841 ; https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/815 ; https://t.me/alredalsrey/780 ; https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/817 ; https://t.me/alredalsrey/781 ; https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/819 ; https://t.me/alredalsrey/782 ; https://t.me/alredalsrey/783 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7844

 

 

 

 

[48] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1854395709061026008

[49] https://www.idf dot il/245945

[50] https://t.me/alichoeib1970/11856 ; https://t.me/Aitarounmediaplatform/56216

[51] https://t.me/Aitarounmediaplatform/56254

[52] https://t.me/dahieh4all/45027

[53] www dot idf.il/240248

[54] www dot idf.il/240248

[55] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1854389812385481001

[56] https://t.me/mmirleb/8787

[57] https://t.me/mmirleb/8787

[58] https://t.me/mmirleb/8783 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8784 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8785 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8795 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8796 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8797 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8813

[59] https://t.me/alichoeib1970/11801

[60] https://t.me/mmirleb/8820

[61] https://x.com/Lebanon24/status/1854409779642319044

[62] https://t.me/Aitarounmediaplatform/56199

[63] https://t.me/alichoeib1970/11825 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/99807

[64] https://t.me/mmirleb/8787

[65] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/100317 ; https://t.me/alichoeib1970/11825 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/99807 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/98650

[66] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1854583379749925071

[67] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1854583379749925071

[68] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1854202026458325272

[69] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1854559181853819144 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1854389771075748213; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1854389731879985475

[70] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1854561197678293376

[71] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1854561197678293376

[72] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1854561197678293376

[73] https://x.com/Lebanon24/status/1854420474022822203; https://x.com/Lebanon24/status/1854426829517451508; https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/118732; https://x.com/Lebanon24/status/1854297647026454631; https://x.com/Lebanon24/status/1854298716242428405; https://x.com/Lebanon24/status/1854299164475002892; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/100192

[74] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1854444273241907596 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1854441532058652737

[75] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1852284537293668429 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1852290874778014087

[76] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1854273072473457025

[77] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1854470021877047509 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1854389731879985475

[78] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1854389731879985475

[79] https://p.dw dot com/p/4mj88

[80] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1854470021877047509 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1854267190423478280

[81] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1854470021877047509 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1854267190423478280

[82] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1854068964038529366

[83] https://t.me/mmirleb/8781 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8782 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8801 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8802 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8803 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8804 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8806 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8807 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8808 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8809 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8812 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8815 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8816 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8817 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8818 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8819

[84] https://t.me/mmirleb/8781 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8782 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8806 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8812 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8817 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8818 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8819

[85] https://t.me/mmirleb/8781

[86] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-29-2024

[87] https://t.me/mmirleb/7797

[88] https://www.kataibhezbollah dot me/news/3423

[89] https://www.axios.com/2024/11/05/us-iraq-iran-israel-attack-warning ; https://www.axios.com/2024/10/31/israel-iran-planning-attack-iraq

[90] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1477

[91] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1480

[92] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/198478;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-18-2024 ;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-4-2024;

https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2024/09/04/3153204/russia-advised-to-give-up-plan-for-so-called-zangezur-corridor

[93] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/198478

[94] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/198478

[95] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/198478;

https://iranpress dot com/iran-armenia-to-construct-agarak-kajaran-north-south-road-corridor

[96] https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-documents//42145-01-arm-tacr.pdf

[97] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/198478;

https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-19

https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/215686/Development-of-Aras-Corridor-between-Iran-Azerbaijan

[98] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/17/3195370

[99] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6281431

[100] https://www.yemenfuture dot net/news/27164

[101] Data available upon request