Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 9, 2024

Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko, Davit Gasparyan, Christina Harward, Haley Zehrung, and George Barros

September 9, 2024, 8:10 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:15pm ET on September 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov attended the Russia–Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Joint Ministerial Meeting of Strategic Dialogue in Saudi Arabia on September 9, likely as part of Kremlin efforts to advance the creation of its envisioned “Eurasian security architecture.”[1] Lavrov held talks with GCC Secretary General Jasem Mohamed Al-Budaiwi, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan, and Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammad bin Salman on the sidelines of the Russia-GCC Strategic Dialogue and emphasized Russia’s interest in enhancing cooperation with Gulf states.[2] Lavrov and Saudi officials discussed strengthening trade, cultural relations, and bilateral investments, and Lavrov invited bin Salman to the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia in October 2024.[3] Lavrov claimed in July 2024 that Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) are advocating within the GCC for the creation of a Eurasian security architecture, and Lavrov likely used his meetings with Gulf state leaders to promote this agenda.[4] ISW previously assessed that Russia's proposal of a Eurasian security architecture is consistent with Russia's long-term strategic goal of disbanding Western unity, disbanding NATO from within, and destroying the current world order.[5]

Kremlin officials are likely trying to shape international peace mediation efforts in the war in Ukraine while demonstrating Russia's unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with Brazilian Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira and Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar on the sidelines of the Russia-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) meeting in Saudi Arabia on September 9.[6] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that Lavrov discussed the war in Ukraine with Vieira and Jaishankar but did not offer details.[7] Brazil and the People's Republic of China (PRC) have promoted their "Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis" six-point peace plan — whose key principles favor Russia — since May 2024.[8] Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi notably recently reaffirmed India's support for peace in Ukraine based on principles of international law such as respect for territorial integrity and the sovereignty of states.[9] Lavrov, however, reiterated boilerplate Kremlin narratives on September 9 demonstrating Russia's unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine, claiming that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's Peace Formula — which is indeed based on principles of international law — is an "ultimatum" and that Russia has never seriously considered the plan.[10] Ukrainian officials have openly invited a Russian representative to attend Ukraine's second peace summit later in 2024.[11]

The Kremlin leveraged Russian regional elections from September 6 to 8 to integrate trusted Russian military veterans of the war in Ukraine into the Russian government, likely as part of an ongoing attempt to appease Russian servicemembers, boost domestic support for the war, and build out a cadre of Kremlin-affiliated local officials. Acting Secretary of Russia's ruling United Russia political party Vladimir Yakushev stated on September 9 that 308 of the total 380 Russian veterans (or 81 percent) who ran for various positions in regional Russian elections won.[12] United Russia announced in July 2024 that it would nominate over 300 Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine, some of whom were participants of the Kremlin's "Time of Heroes" program to run in the elections, and Yakushev stated in August 2024 that United Russia's main priority was to support veteran candidates during the September 2024 election cycle.[13] Russian President Vladimir Putin launched the Time of Heroes program in February 2024 to prepare Russian veterans to serve in the Russian government, and ISW assessed that the program may also aim to incentive Russians to fight in Ukraine by portraying Russian military service as a pathway to a government career.[14]

The Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) announced on September 9 that former United Russia Secretary Andrei Turchak won the regional election in Altai Republic and officially became the head of the Altai Republic for the next five years.[15] The Kremlin reportedly originally tasked Turchak with expanding the Time of Heroes program before the Russian presidential election in March 2024.[16] Putin later demoted Turchak to acting head of Altai Republic — one of the most economically depressed regions in Russia over 4,000 kilometers from the Kremlin — possibly due to Putin's perception of Turchak's disloyalty in 2023 due to his prior affiliation with the Wagner Group and Turchak's failure to integrate veterans into the government.[17] Several Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers publicly celebrated Turchak’s electoral victory and highlighted his efforts to support the war.[18] Turchak’s electoral victory and the surrounding media campaign celebrating his accomplishments during Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine may be part of the Kremlin’s effort to advance the Time of Heroes program. The Kremlin may be attempting to rebrand United Russia as a leading party in veteran affairs to prepare Russian society for a long-term war effort by preempting the rise of alternative political parties or movements that could court Russian veterans. The Time of Heroes program also indicates that the Kremlin is increasingly militarizing its society and government, which may have long-term implications on Russian domestic and foreign policy.

The Kremlin refrained from replacing Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov during the Russian regional elections, likely in support of an ongoing effort to downplay the societal impacts of Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast. The Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) announced on September 9 that Smirnov won the Kursk Oblast gubernatorial election with over 65 percent of the vote.[19] Sources close to the Kremlin told Russian opposition outlet Meduza that the Kremlin did not consider canceling the Kursk Oblast gubernatorial and local elections because such an approach would create panic in the region and undermine the Kremlin’s efforts to condition Russians to accept the incursion as a ”new normal.”[20] CEC Chairperson Ella Pamfilova also claimed on September 7 that Kursk Oblast had one of the highest turnouts in the gubernatorial elections, likely as part of the Kremlin’s effort to convince Russians that Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast has not impacted Russian society.[21] Russian President Vladimir Putin similarly claimed on September 5 that Ukraine intended for the incursion to divide Russian society but that the incursion instead further unified Russia — likely to undersell the implications of the incursion on Russia’s territorial integrity and society.[22]

Ukrainian officials continue to warn that Russian forces are increasingly using chemical weapons in Ukraine. Ukraine's Support Forces Command reported on September 9 that Russian forces used ammunition equipped with dangerous chemicals and chemical agents 447 times in August 2024 and 4,035 times between February 15, 2023 and August 24, 2024.[23] The Ukrainian Support Forces Command stated that Russian forces are using K-51 and RG-VO gas grenades to deliver munitions containing banned chemical agents and are also using unidentified chemical compounds. Ukrainian officials, and a Russian military unit, have previously reported on increasingly common instances of Russian forces using chemical agents in combat that are banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a signatory.[24]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov attended the Russia-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Joint Ministerial Meeting of Strategic Dialogue in Saudi Arabia on September 9, likely as part of Kremlin efforts to advance the creation of its envisioned “Eurasian security architecture.”
• Kremlin officials are likely trying to shape international peace mediation efforts in the war in Ukraine while demonstrating Russia's unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine.
• The Kremlin leveraged Russian regional elections from September 6 to 8 to integrate trusted Russian military veterans of the war in Ukraine into the Russian government, likely as part of an ongoing attempt to appease Russian servicemembers, boost domestic support for the war, and build out a cadre of Kremlin-affiliated local officials.
• The Kremlin refrained from replacing Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov during the Russian regional elections, likely in support of an ongoing effort to downplay the societal impacts of Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast.
• Ukrainian officials continue to warn that Russian forces are increasingly using chemical weapons in Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently regained lost positions in Kursk Oblast amid continued Ukrainian offensive operations in the area on September 9.
• Russian forces recently advanced along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, near Siversk, near Pokrovsk, and southwest of Donetsk City, and Ukrainian forces recently regained positions near Siversk.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin expanded Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov’s powers on September 9 by allowing him to grant eligible parties within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) access to Russian state secrets (classified information).

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces recently regained lost positions in Kursk Oblast amid continued Ukrainian offensive operations in the area on September 9. Geolocated footage published on September 8 indicates that Russian forces recently regained lost positions west of Ulanok (southeast of Sudzha).[25] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked southwest of Korenevo near 10-y Oktyabr; south of Korenevo near Snagost; near Korenevo; east of Korenevo near Kremyanoye; north of Sudzha near Malaya Loknya, Pogrebki, and Cherkasskoye Porechnoye; northeast of Sudzha near Mikhailovka and Martynovka; and southeast of Sudzha near Cherkasskaya Konopelka on September 8 and 9.[26] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces regained full control over Komarovka and Vishnevka (both southwest of Korenevo), advanced east of Korenevo, and advanced up to 300 meters in the Malaya Loknya-Cherkassakoye Porechnoye area and in unspecified areas of southern Sudzha Raion.[27] Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet, Southern Military District [SMD]), 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade, the "Koshmar" Detachment, and the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz's "Aida" Detachment are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[28]

Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Fighting continued north and northeast of Kharkiv City on September 9, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russia milblogger claimed on September 8 and 9 that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian counterattacks north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City in Vovchansk.[29] Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Hlyboke, Vovchansk, Starytsya, and Tykhe (both northeast of Kharkiv City) on September 8 and 9.[30] Ukraine's Kharkiv Group of Forces reported that elements of the Russian 79th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are operating in the Kharkiv direction and that the Russian military command is replenishing losses within the 11th Tank Regiment (18^th Motorized Rifle Division) in order to resume offensive operation near Hlyboke.[31]

Russian milbloggers claimed on September 9 that the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) destroyed a bridge across the Vovcha River near Okhrimivka and Mala Vovcha, Kharkiv Oblast (both northeast of Vovchansk).[32]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line amid continued Russian offensive operations on September 9. Geolocated footage posted on September 9 showing Ukrainian forces striking Russian forces in central Makiivka (southwest of Svatove) and northwest of Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk) indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in these areas.[33] Russian milbloggers claimed on September 9 that Russian forces expanded their control in the vicinity of Synkivka (northeast of Kupyansk) and advanced near Nevske (southwest of Svatove).[34] Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov stated on September 9 that Synkivka remains a contested “gray zone.”[35] Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Hlushkivka, Stelmakhivka, and Lozova; west of Svatove near Myasozharivka; southwest of Svatove near Cherneshchyna; northwest of Kreminna near Nevske, Makiivka, and Novosadove; west of Kreminna near Torske; and south of Kreminna near Dibrova and the Serebryanske forest area on September 8 and 9.[36] Elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA] (Moscow Military District [MMD]) and the 1486th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely comprised of mobilized personnel) are operating in the Kupyansk direction.[37]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces recently regained positions and Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Siversk direction amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on September 9. Geolocated footage published on September 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently retook positions in eastern Ivano-Darivka (southeast of Siversk).[38] Geolocated footage published on September 8 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced northwest of Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[39] Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka; east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka and Spirne; and south of Siversk near Zvanivka and Pereizne on September 8 and 9.[40] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 9 that Russian forces conducted a mechanized assault of an unspecified echelon near Zvanivka.[41] Elements of the Russian "Sigiriya" Battalion of the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) are reportedly operating near Ivano-Darivka.[42]

Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar amid continued offensive operations in the area on September 9. Geolocated footage published on September 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar).[43] Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Chasiv Yar in the direction of Mayske; within Chasiv Yar in the Novyi and Zhovtnevyi microraions; north of Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka; south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne and Bila Hora; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Andriivka; on September 8 and 9.[44] Snipers of the Russian "Burevestnik" volunteer detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[45]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Toretsk on September 9 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in Toretsk and west of Niu York (south of Toretsk) toward Oleksandropil (southwest of Niu York), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims.[46] Russian forces continued ground attacks near Toretsk; east of Toretsk near Druzhba and Pivnichne; southeast of Toretsk near Zalizne; and south of Toretsk near Niu York and Nelipivka on September 8 and 9.[47] Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA] [formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue operating in the Toretsk direction and in the Pokrovsk direction.[48]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on September 9. Geolocated footage published on September 6 and 9 showing Ukrainian forces striking Russian forces operating west of Mykhailivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) indicates that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the northern outskirts of Hirnyk and south of Ukrainsk (both southeast of Pokrovsk), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims.[50] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 8 that Russian forces seized Memryk (southeast of Pokrovsk) — a claim that Russian milbloggers have made since August 27 — although ISW has not observed visual confirmation that Russian forces seized the settlement.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that intense fighting is ongoing in Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk), although ISW has yet to observe definitive confirmation of Russian forces operating in the town.[52] Russian forces continued ground attacks east of Pokrovsk near Zelene Pole, Vozdvyzhenka, and Hrodivka and southeast of Pokrovsk near Novohrodivka, Selydove, Mykhailivka, Marynivka, Dolynivka, Ukrainsk, and Halytsynivka and in the direction of Novotroitske on September 8 and 9.[53] Drone operators of the Russian "Black Knife Division" are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[54]

Russian forces reportedly advanced west of Donetsk City on September 9, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Krasnohorivka and advanced north and west of the settlement, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[55] Russian forces continued attacking near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka on September 9.[56]

Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on September 9. Geolocated footage published on September 9 showing a Russian soldier waving a Russian flag at the Pivdennodonbaska Mine No. 1 (northeast of Vuhledar) indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the area.[57] Additional geolocated footage published on September 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Prechystivka (west of Vuhledar).[58] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced northwest of Prechystivka.[59] Russian milbloggers claimed on September 9 that Russian forces seized Vodyane and advanced south of the settlement.[60] ISW has not observed confirmation of these Russian claims, however. Russian forces continued ground attacks near Vodyane, Vuhledar, Shakhtarske, and Zolota Nyva on September 9.[61]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on September 9.

Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 9, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Positional engagements continued near Robotyne and Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne) on September 8 and 9.[62] Elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[63]

Russian forces reportedly advanced on the islands of the Dnipro River Delta amid continued positional engagements in east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on September 9.[64] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to southern Kruhlyk Island (south of Kherson City), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[65] Elements of the Russian 80th Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[66]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 8 to 9. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched three Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from airspace over Kursk Oblast and occupied Donetsk Oblast and eight Shahed-136/131 drones from Kursk Oblast.[67] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down two of the missiles and six drones; that two drones did not reach their targets, probably due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW); and that unspecified Ukrainian countermeasures prevented one missile from reaching its target.

Latvian National Armed Forces Commander Lieutenant General Leonids Kalnins stated on September 9 that the Russian drone that crashed in eastern Latvia on September 7 was a Shahed drone carrying explosives but that the drone was not targeting Latvia.[68]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian President Vladimir Putin expanded Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov’s powers on September 9 by allowing him to grant eligible parties within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) access to Russian state secrets (classified information). Putin signed a presidential decree stating that the Russian defense minister, with subsequent approval from the Federal Security Service (FSB), can establish the procedure through which the Russian MoD and its organizations can obtain access to state secrets.[69] Putin previously signed a decree in May 2024 requiring all individuals with access to Russian state secrets to notify the FSB and the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) 30 days before travelling abroad.[70]

The Russian military reportedly recruited 166,200 Russians for military service in Ukraine in the first half of 2024 — roughly 27,700 per month — as the Kremlin continues to expand the Russian volunteer recruitment campaign to the federal level.[71] Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii (iStories) reported that Russian federal budget data suggests that 92,800 Russians received one-time enlistment bonus payments for signing a contract for military service between April and June 2024 — a sixfold increase from recruitment rates in 2023. Vazhnye Istorii noted that only 26,700 Russians signed contracts in the first half of 2023. Russian federal subjects (regions) and Kremlin officials began offering one-time enlistment bonuses of millions of rubles to recruits in 2024, which likely incentivized more volunteers to sign military contracts.[72] Russian officials are also continuing to recruit Ukrainians to fight in Ukraine and are recruiting FSB personnel to enhance Russian security in occupied Crimea. Ukraine's Presidential Representative for Crimea reported that Russian occupation officials prepared 1,000 plots of land in occupied Kerch Raion, Crimea in July 2024 to distribute to volunteers who have signed military service contracts — even if these volunteers are not officially registered as residents of Crimea.[73] The FSB’s Border Department is recruiting volunteers to join the FSB in occupied Simferopol, Sevastopol, Yevpatoria, Yalta, and Dzhankoi, likely in an effort to strengthen internal security in occupied Crimea.[74]

The Kremlin is continuing efforts to militarize Russian youth via military-patriotic programs, likely in support of long-term force generation efforts. A Pskov Oblast local outlet reported on September 9 that teachers of the newly created “Fundamental of Security and Defense of Motherland” class in Russian schools will participate in practical military training exercises at the training ground of the 76th Airborne (VDV) Division from September 13 through September 15.[75] Organizers of the training program reportedly claimed that teachers will train ”in the most realistic conditions” using modern military techniques and equipment.[76] The outlet added that Russian officials are planning to involve Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine in the teaching of the “Fundamental of Security and Defense of Motherland” class, which the Kremlin introduced to the Russian school curriculum on September 1.[77] Elements of the Russian 76^th VDV Division — notably of the 234^th Guards Air Assault Regiment — participated in summary executions and other war crimes against Ukrainian civilians in Bucha, Kyiv Oblast in March 2022.[78]

Russian fitness clubs are reportedly trying to secure federal funding to rehabilitate Russian servicemen. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Dmitry Chernyshenko instructed the Russian Ministry of Sports to consider rehabilitating Russian servicemen and their relatives in fitness clubs.[79] Russian state outlet RBC reported that the Russian National Fitness Community, which includes more than three thousand fitness clubs in Russia, approached the Russian MoD with the proposal to allow fitness clubs to provide free rehabilitation services for active and mobilized Russian servicemen in exchange for federal sponsorship.

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy announced on September 9 it will participate in the “Northern United-2024" joint naval and air drills with Russia in the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk on an unspecified date in September.[80]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian company Synergy Design Bureau claimed on September 9 that Russian forces will soon test the plastic “Asya” reconnaissance drone in Ukraine.[81] The drone reportedly has a ”tailsitter” configuration and is made entirely from plastic, which makes it invisible to radar and air defense systems. Synergy Design Bureau claimed that it can 3D print the drone at a lower cost than similar models. The device reportedly has a flight time of one hour, a flight range of up to 30 kilometers, and a payload of one kilogram.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is suspending publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts until further notice.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian occupation officials are continuing to create and use youth movements to promote long-standing, false Kremlin justifications for its war in Ukraine to garner support for the Russian war effort in Ukraine. Occupied Donetsk Oblast-based organization “Molodaya Respublika” alongside occupied Donetsk Oblast-based youth and sports organization “Narodnaya Druzhyna” held an event in Donetsk City aimed at continuing the false narrative that Ukraine attacked Donbas in 2014.[82] Russian occupation officials have been increasingly involving Ukrainian youth in similar messaging campaigns and organizations likely in an effort to raise domestic support for the Russian war effort and further indoctrinate Ukrainian children into accepting Russian occupation. Ukraine's Presidential Representative for Crimea observed that Russian occupation authorities increased advertisements for Russian video platform Rutube in occupied Crimea, which the Kremlin uses to advance messaging campaigns online.[83]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

State Secretary of the Belarusian Security Council Alexander Volfovich claimed on September 9 that Russia and Belarus will adopt a new Union State security concept and treaty on security guarantees in 2025.[84] Volfovich claimed that a draft of the concept establishes joint Russian-Belarusian "resistance" to US, NATO, and European Union (EU) policies, and Russian state media reported that the draft concept contains a provision about "NATO's destructive activities" in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) area.

Volfovich claimed on September 8 that Belarusian forces have concentrated 4,500 personnel near Belarus’ border with Ukrainian but do not threaten Ukraine.[85]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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[1] https://www.aa.com dot tr/en/world/russian-foreign-minister-meets-saudi-crown-prince-in-riyadh/3325648; https://t.me/MID_Russia/44997; https://t.me/MID_Russia/45008 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/45013

[2] https://t.me/tass_agency/271497; https://t.me/tass_agency/271540 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/271568 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/271580 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/44997; https://t.me/MID_Russia/45008 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/45013 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/45016; https://t.me/MID_Russia/45021

[3] https://t.me/MID_Russia/44997; https://t.me/MID_Russia/45008 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/45013 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/45016; https://t.me/MID_Russia/45021; https://t.me/MID_Russia/45022 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/45023 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/45025 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/45028 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/45029 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/45030 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/45035; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1968600/ ; https://t.me/tass_agency/271540 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/271568 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/271580; https://t.me/MID_Russia/45021

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071824

[5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024

[6] https://t.me/MID_Russia/45022; https://t.me/MID_Russia/45022

[7] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1923598/ ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/45025

[8] https://www.gov dot br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/05/brazil-and-china-present-joint-proposal-for-peace-negotiations-with-the-participation-of-russia-and-ukraine ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar090324

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082324

[10] https://ria dot ru/20240909/lavrov-1971638995.html

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072524

[12] https://t.me/tass_agency/271403 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/271478

[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2024

[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061524

[15] https://t.me/tass_agency/271415

[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061524; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060524

[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061524; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060524

[18] https://t.me/wargonzo/21999 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22015

[19] https://ria dot ru/20240909/smirnov-1971504035.html

[20] https://meduza dot io/feature/2024/08/21/v-kremle-schitayut-chto-boi-v-kurskoy-oblasti-prodlyatsya-neskolko-mesyatsev-i-hotyat-ubedit-rossiyan-chto-eto-novaya-normalnost

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-7-2024

[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-5-2024

[23] https://www.facebook.com/KSP.ZSU/posts/pfbid02cRfTxhtB9Tn3WLCt8TcsgaswH5EPGUKjwbphdcjZhxTkd36vQ2vNRXxfoYF3fPQml

[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-5-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122323 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24-2023 ; ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar013024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011324

 

 

[25] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/19798; https://t.me/pride_group_2_80/24

[26] https://t.me/mod_russia/43155; https://t.me/rybar/63354; https://t.me/rybar/63375; https://t.me/dva_majors/51935; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/183656; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/15160

[27] https://t.me/mash/57405; https://t.me/dva_majors/51953; https://t.me/rusich_army/17030

[28] https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1833121831668122064 ; https://t.me/OSHB_225/4697 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/52006; https://t.me/wargonzo/22018; https://t.me/milinfolive/130197

[29] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/15163; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/15175

[30]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VEoso84RZKyp4jpMBNb8fK9wV2mEaDoKnX1fUGNTEsaicujtxiYpAG51RsbgA79Vl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ntSHjBjGSSciuufHftQYqiAQkT4Kzz9kbchHdsBZhcerM72GJv8MFQjb6BZDWrCFl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ESJu3AzF5Qy7RiHncv417UHLbSBdJP99zdKtBSVD8PdrABvnxVSZUCHUywtP1nugl; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/15163; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/15181

[31] https://t.me/otukharkiv/1206

[32] https://t.me/dva_majors/52001 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/10710

[33] Pishchane: https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6717; https://t.me/Pivnenko_NGU/1522; Makiivka: https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6722; https://t.me/seekservice/1794

[34] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58906 https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58906

[35] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/832057-sinkivka-sira-zona-tam-situacia-osoblivo-ne-zminilasa-obstanovka-na-kupanskomu-napramku-na-9-veresna/

[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ntSHjBjGSSciuufHftQYqiAQkT4Kzz9kbchHdsBZhcerM72GJv8MFQjb6BZDWrCFl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ESJu3AzF5Qy7RiHncv417UHLbSBdJP99zdKtBSVD8PdrABvnxVSZUCHUywtP1nugl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VEoso84RZKyp4jpMBNb8fK9wV2mEaDoKnX1fUGNTEsaicujtxiYpAG51RsbgA79Vl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ntSHjBjGSSciuufHftQYqiAQkT4Kzz9kbchHdsBZhcerM72GJv8MFQjb6BZDWrCFlf ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ESJu3AzF5Qy7RiHncv417UHLb

[37] https://t.me/dva_majors/51982 ;https://t.me/boris_rozhin/136687 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/17245

[38] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1832903627293282741; https://t.me/BattalionSIGIRIYA/103

[39] https://t.me/sowaFm/511; https://x.com/Ryan72101/status/1833188218755555656

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VEoso84RZKyp4jpMBNb8fK9wV2mEaDoKnX1fUGNTEsaicujtxiYpAG51RsbgA79Vl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ntSHjBjGSSciuufHftQYqiAQkT4Kzz9kbchHdsBZhcerM72GJv8MFQjb6BZDWrCFl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ESJu3AzF5Qy7RiHncv417UHLbSBdJP99zdKtBSVD8PdrABvnxVSZUCHUywtP1nugl ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58906

[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VEoso84RZKyp4jpMBNb8fK9wV2mEaDoKnX1fUGNTEsaicujtxiYpAG51RsbgA79Vl

[42] https://t.me/BattalionSIGIRIYA/103; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1832903627293282741

[43] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6723; https://t.me/sarmat21ompb3/265

[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VEoso84RZKyp4jpMBNb8fK9wV2mEaDoKnX1fUGNTEsaicujtxiYpAG51RsbgA79Vl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ntSHjBjGSSciuufHftQYqiAQkT4Kzz9kbchHdsBZhcerM72GJv8MFQjb6BZDWrCFl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ESJu3AzF5Qy7RiHncv417UHLbSBdJP99zdKtBSVD8PdrABvnxVSZUCHUywtP1nugl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22001 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/76638 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/27223 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/15180

[45] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/136660

[46] https://t.me/wargonzo/22001 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58906 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/51935; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/183656

[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VEoso84RZKyp4jpMBNb8fK9wV2mEaDoKnX1fUGNTEsaicujtxiYpAG51RsbgA79Vl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ntSHjBjGSSciuufHftQYqiAQkT4Kzz9kbchHdsBZhcerM72GJv8MFQjb6BZDWrCFl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ESJu3AzF5Qy7RiHncv417UHLbSBdJP99zdKtBSVD8PdrABvnxVSZUCHUywtP1nugl ;

[48] https://t.me/wargonzo/22017 ; https://rutube dot ru/video/8d678be05323302ec3bf2abfaba29796/?r=a/

[49] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/9921; https://t.me/karadag15brop/44; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6718; https://t.me/ngu_war_for_peace/20497; https://x.com/Danspiun/status/1833214890787656088

[50] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/76625 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58891

[51] https://t.me/mod_russia/43152 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/136709 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2024

[52] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/76660 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/51935; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/183656 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22001

[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VEoso84RZKyp4jpMBNb8fK9wV2mEaDoKnX1fUGNTEsaicujtxiYpAG51RsbgA79Vl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ntSHjBjGSSciuufHftQYqiAQkT4Kzz9kbchHdsBZhcerM72GJv8MFQjb6BZDWrCFl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ESJu3AzF5Qy7RiHncv417UHLbSBdJP99zdKtBSVD8PdrABvnxVSZUCHUywtP1nugl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/51935; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58906 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/51953 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22001 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/76625

[54] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/136701

[55] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/136723; https://t.me/nm_dnr/12682 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/76625

[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VEoso84RZKyp4jpMBNb8fK9wV2mEaDoKnX1fUGNTEsaicujtxiYpAG51RsbgA79Vl

[57] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6724; https://t.me/atlant_Z/3031

[58] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6720; https://t.me/rusich_army/16987. The following sources were not used for ISW’s shapefile expansion but are still part of the edit’s overall assessment: https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5241; https://t.me/val40obrmp/123

[59] https://t.me/z_arhiv/28034

[60] https://t.me/dva_majors/51957; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28034 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/136685 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/21001

[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VEoso84RZKyp4jpMBNb8fK9wV2mEaDoKnX1fUGNTEsaicujtxiYpAG51RsbgA79Vl ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58906 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/76664

[62]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VEoso84RZKyp4jpMBNb8fK9wV2mEaDoKnX1fUGNTEsaicujtxiYpAG51RsbgA79Vl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ntSHjBjGSSciuufHftQYqiAQkT4Kzz9kbchHdsBZhcerM72GJv8MFQjb6BZDWrCFl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ESJu3AzF5Qy7RiHncv417UHLbSBdJP99zdKtBSVD8PdrABvnxVSZUCHUywtP1nugl; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid031cazdo5orV9HmPmhBFgtLJAopvqMJN5f9uQcDejfvom7YPMy3Ndui8MZGikzoFuXl

[63] https://t.me/motopatriot/27207

 

[64]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VEoso84RZKyp4jpMBNb8fK9wV2mEaDoKnX1fUGNTEsaicujtxiYpAG51RsbgA79Vl; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid031cazdo5orV9HmPmhBFgtLJAopvqMJN5f9uQcDejfvom7YPMy3Ndui8MZGikzoFuXl

[65] https://t.me/z_arhiv/28036

[66] https://t.me/dva_majors/51960

[67] https://t.me/kpszsu/19064 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wiQxKHvidoGbZpaG6HULJZ7niB79iJk6MaSr4NYuscdyEb5JBDP2nHhjSY5JUMnHl

[68] https://www.delfi dot ee/artikkel/120320648/laupaeval-lendas-valgevenest-latti-lohkeainet-kandnud-vene-droon-shahed ; https://www.lsm dot lv/raksts/zinas/latvija/09.09.2024-nbs-rezeknes-novada-nokritusais-krievijas-sahed-drons-bija-aprikots-ar-spragstvielu.a568086/ ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/09/09/upavshiy-na-territorii-latvii-bespilotnik-byl-nachinen-vzryvchatkoy

[69] https://regnum dot ru/news/3914850

[70] https://regnum dot ru/news/3890186

[71] https://t.me/istories_media/7510

[72] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58914

[73] https://www.facebook.com/ppu.gov.ua/posts/pfbid02wdVrcx4hRfYa3PTikXp7EbSfdJcuKwsMHd6kqez37taVwfE3Xuhd255Aue49rDpRl

[74] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/15179

[75] https://pg-queo1iedig dot global.e-cloud.ch/news/uchiteley-novogo-shkolnogo-predmeta-osnovy-bezopasnosti-i-zaschity-rodiny-budut/

[76] https://t.me/severrealii/27130 ; https://pg-queo1iedig.global dot e-cloud.ch/news/uchiteley-novogo-shkolnogo-predmeta-osnovy-bezopasnosti-i-zaschity-rodiny-budut/

[77] https://www.severreal dot org/a/uchiteley-osnov-bezopasnosti-i-zaschity-rodiny-budut-gotovit-na-poligone-pskovskoy-divizii/33113083.html

[78] https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/27/us/politics/a-russian-military-unit-killed-dozens-in-bucha-our-investigation-shows.html; https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/22/video/russia-ukraine-bucha-massacre-takeaways.html

[79] https://www.rbc dot ru/business/09/09/2024/66d8429d9a794733eacad2c8?from=from_main_3; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/09/09/pravitelstvo-rf-poruchilo-rassmotret-vozmozhnost-reabilitatsii-uchastnikov-voyny-v-ukraine-i-ih-rodstvennikov-v-fitnesah-klubah

[80] https://apnews.com/article/china-russia-drills-military-pacific-72ece848adec1684326f12b6d03183fe

[81] https://t.me/tass_agency/271428, https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/21810237

[82] https://t.me/Mrespublika/16967

[83] https://www.facebook.com/ppu.gov.ua/posts/pfbid02wdVrcx4hRfYa3PTikXp7EbSfdJcuKwsMHd6kqez37taVwfE3Xuhd255Aue49rDpRl

[84] https://ria dot ru/20240909/bezopasnost-1971502026.html

[85] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/21807761

Iran Update, September 9, 2024

Annika Ganzeveld, Kelly Campa, Ria Reddy, Andie Parry, Siddhant Kishore, Kathryn Tyson, Carolyn Moorman, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Iran recently delivered over 200 Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia, according to Ukrainian intelligence.[1] An unspecified Ukrainian military source told British media on September 6 that Russia transported the missiles to an unspecified Caspian Sea port on September 4.[2] Iran has previously transferred weapons from its Amirabad and Anzali ports on the Caspian Sea to Astrakhan, Russia, on the Volga River.[3] Iran and Russia previously signed an agreement in December 2023 for Iran to send Fateh-360 missiles and Ababil close-range ballistic missiles to Russia.[4] European intelligence sources told Reuters in August 2024 that Russian military personnel are training in Iran to operate Fateh-360 missiles.[5] Fateh-360 missiles have a range of up to 120 kilometers and can carry a payload of 150 kilograms.[6] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russian forces will likely use the Iranian-supplied missiles to target Ukrainian energy, military, and civilian infrastructure in the coming months.[7]

The Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Ministry summoned the Iranian charge d’affaires in Ukraine, Shahriar Amouzegar, on September 9 following recent reports that Iran delivered hundreds of ballistic missiles to Russia.[8] The Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Ministry harshly warned Amouzegar about the “devastating and irreparable consequences” for Ukrainian-Iranian relations if recent reports about Iran sending ballistic missiles to Russia prove true.[9] Ukraine previously “downgraded” its diplomatic ties with Iran in September 2022 after Iran began supplying Russia with drones for its invasion of Ukraine.[10]

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Raphael Grossi discussed ongoing increases in Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles and noted that Iran has not resolved outstanding safeguards issues with the IAEA on September 9 in Vienna, Austria.[11] IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi highlighted an ongoing increase in Iran's 20% and 60% enriched uranium reserves, citing the IAEA’s May 2024 report on Iran’s nuclear program.[12] His statements are consistent with an unreleased International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report which reportedly noted that Iran’s stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium has increased by 22.6 kilograms (15.90 percent) since the IAEA's last report in May 2024.[13] Grossi added that Iran has taken no steps in the last 15 months to implement an agreement to cooperate with the IAEA and allow the IAEA to "implement further appropriate verification and monitoring activities" on a voluntary basis.[14] Grossi said that "there has been no progress in resolving the outstanding safeguards issues" with Iran and that the IAEA has limited awareness of the current locations of Iran's nuclear material and equipment.[15] Grossi stated that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian agreed to a bilateral meeting to resume "dialogue and cooperation between the [IAEA] and Iran." Grossi previously indicated that the meeting would be in the “near future.”[16]

Iran continues to deny that its nuclear program is violating any agreements.[17] Iran’s representation in the United Nations Office in Vienna called the IAEA’s report on Iran’s undeclared nuclear materials "fake and invalid." The note said the IAEA "did not provide Iran with credible documents" to back its claims and that Iran has no obligation to answer the IAEA's questions.[18]

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander said on September 8 that Iran would take “revenge” for Israel’s “evils” in a “different” way. Israel’s “evils” probably refers to the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and other Axis of Resistance leaders.[19] IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami said that Israel is "shaken" by the "nightmare of Iran's decisive action" and that "Israelis will taste the bitter taste of revenge."[20] Salami’s comments are notable because he is a senior operational commander in the IRGC chain of command, meaning he and his subordinates would be responsible for the planning and execution of an attack on Israel. Salami’s comments reiterated recent claims from the Iranian military establishment that emphasize that the Iranian delay is intentional for its psychological effect on the Israeli population.[21] Salami also noted that the attack would "definitely be different," which is consistent with statements from other Iranian officials, including IRGC Quds Force officers.[22] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran could modify its April 2024 attack model in several ways, including by increasing the volume of projectiles it fires at Israel or changing the number of locations in Israel that it targets, to increase the likelihood of inflicting serious damage on Israel.[23]

The Jordanian truck driver that killed three Israeli civilian at the Allenby Bridge border crossing between Jordan and the West Bank on September 8 likely acted alone. The Jordanian truck driver arrived at the Israeli-controlled side of the border crossing, exited his vehicle, and opened fire at Israeli forces working there.[24] The Jordanian Foreign Affairs and Expatriates spokesperson said that initial investigations confirmed the attack “was an individual act.”[25] The attacker was a former Jordanian Armed Forces soldier and a member of a powerful tribe aligned with the Jordanian monarchy. Both of these links suggest that he was not linked to Hamas or Shia militia groups.[26] The attacker’s tribe also released a statement stating that he had no party or political affiliations.[27]

It is notable that the attacker likely operated alone given that the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah congratulated the “Islamic Resistance in Jordan” on September 8 for the shooting attack at Allenby Bridge.[28] Kataib Hezbollah spokesperson Hussein Moanes, also known as Abu Ali al Askari, said in April 2024 that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed militias—has prepared to “equip” 12,000 “Islamic Resistance in Jordan” fighters with a significant supply of weapons.[29] CTP-ISW has not observed any evidence that supports the idea that the ”Islamic Resistance in Jordan” exists and operates in Jordan. CTP-ISW assessed in April that Moanes’ declaration was likely aspirational and did not accurately represent Kataib Hezbollah’s reach in Jordan.[30] Other Axis of Resistance groups and anti-Israel factions in Jordan also attempted to capitalize on the Allenby Bridge border crossing attack. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad both called the attack a confirmation of the Arab world’s rejection of Israeli ”crimes” and ”massacres.”[31] A Jordanian civil society group that organized protests in spring 2024 held a demonstration attended by thousands of Jordanians in Amman celebrating the attack.[32] The civil society group also released a statement in response to the attack that called on the Jordanian monarchy to end normalization with Israel and withdraw from the 1994 Wadi Araba Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan.[33]

The Biden administration is reportedly re-examining its ceasefire-hostage proposal amid Israeli and US pessimism over the feasibility of a ceasefire-hostage deal. Unspecified US officials said Hamas’ execution of six hostages and demands to release 100 more Palestinian prisoners led to “significant pessimism” within the White House over the feasibility of Hamas and Israel agreeing to a new proposal.[34] US officials said that President Biden does not want to “reward” Hamas with concessions after it killed the hostages and pushed for more demands.[35] A senior Israeli official told Israeli media that the US is re-considering whether its negotiators will introduce another bridging proposal at all.[36] Four unspecified senior Israeli officials said that the US and Israel recently attempted to organize another round of negotiations in Cairo but Egypt did not allow talks to move forward after expressing displeasure with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after Netanyahu said that Egypt enabled weapons smuggling along the Philadelphi Corridor.[37] The Biden administration’s focus has reportedly shifted to encouraging the Egyptian and Qatari mediators to pressure Sinwar to concede some of Hamas’ demands.[38]

The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting a major Syrian weapons facility as part of the Israeli campaign to interdict weapons and supplies flowing to Lebanese Hezbollah. The IDF likely conducted several airstrikes into Syria on September 8, including one targeting a Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) site in Masyaf, Hama Governorate, used to produce advanced weapons including precision guided munitions.[39] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent called the strike “exceptional” and large, adding that the strike hit an underground weapons facility at the SSRC site. FIRMS data showed significant fires in southern Masyaf and in a valley southwest of Masyaf that holds an underground facility and tunnel network.[40] The airstrikes killed 16 people and injured 43 others.[41] Iran reportedly uses the SSRC site in Masyaf to develop weapons for the members of the Axis of Resistance, including the Lebanese Hezbollah.[42] The Iranian Foreign Ministry condemned the airstrikes but denied the presence of any Iran-operated military site in the area.[43]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran-Russia: Iran recently delivered over 200 Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia, according to Ukrainian intelligence. An unspecified Ukrainian military source told British media on September 6 that Russia transported the missiles to an unspecified Caspian Sea port on September 4. Iran has previously transferred weapons to Russia from its Amirabad and Anzali ports on the Caspian Sea to Astrakhan, Russia, on the Volga River.
• Jordan: The Jordanian truck driver that killed three Israeli civilian at the Allenby Bridge border crossing between Jordan and the West Bank on September 8 likely acted alone. It is notable that the attacker likely operated alone given that the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah congratulated the “Islamic Resistance in Jordan” on September 8 for the shooting attack at Allenby Bridge.
• Iranian Nuclear Program: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General discussed ongoing increases in Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles and noted that Iran has not resolved outstanding safeguards issues with the IAEA on September 9 in Vienna, Austria.
• Iranian Retaliation: The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander said on September 8 that Iran would take “revenge” for Israel’s “evils” in a “different” way. Israel’s “evils” probably refers to the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and other Axis of Resistance leaders.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: The Biden administration is reportedly re-examining its ceasefire-hostage proposal amid Israeli and US pessimism over the feasibility of a ceasefire-hostage deal.
• Syria: The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting a major Syrian weapons facility as part of the Israeli campaign to interdict weapons and supplies flowing to Lebanese Hezbollah.
• Lebanon: A veteran Israeli war correspondent said that Israeli deliberations over an offensive in southern Lebanon are “mainly in relation to [the] scope” of the operation, though the “political and security echelon” has not decided to conduct an operation.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The IDF 252nd Division continued operations around the Netzarim Corridor on September 9. The IDF said that the 16th Jerusalem Brigade (Res.) continued to operate in Zaytoun, in southern Gaza City north of the Netzarim Corridor.[44] The 16th Brigade raided militia targets, killed dozens of fighters, and destroyed militia infrastructure, including a tunnel shaft used by fighters in the area.[45] Israeli forces also located machinery for manufacturing weapons.[46] CTP-ISW assessed in June 2024 that Hamas was establishing small weapons manufacturing sites across the Gaza Strip in an effort to rebuild its weapons production capacity and reconstitute its military forces.[47] It is unclear if this weapons manufacturing site was currently in operation, but the destruction of these facilities disrupts Hamas’ ability to reconstitute.

Palestinian sources reported that Israeli forces also continued to operate south of the Netzarim Corridor on September 9.[48] A Palestinian journalist reported that Israeli armor made a “limited incursion” on Salah ad Din Street northeast of Nuseirat camp.[49] The journalist also reported small arms fire and shelling in the area.[50] The IDF has operated around the Netzarim Corridor in recent weeks in order to expand IDF control over territory along the corridor.

CTP-ISW has not observed any claimed Palestinian militia attacks targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip since its last data cutoff on September 8.

The IDF issued evacuation orders for the northern Gaza Strip on September 9 following rocket fire from the area.[51] PIJ launched two rockets from the northern Gaza Strip targeting Ashkelon and its surrounding towns on September 8.[52] The IDF intercepted one rocket and said that the other landed off the coast of Ashkelon.[53] The IDF issued evacuation orders for the Beit Lahia, as Salateen, and Atatra areas on September 9 and told residents that the area is considered “dangerous combat zone.”[54] Israeli media recently reported that the IDF’s recent approach of immediately evacuating Gazan residents in areas from which rockets are fired before targeting the rocket launch sites has led to a significant decrease in the rate of Palestinian militia rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip.[55] CTP-ISW has observed rocket launches from the Gaza Strip into Israeli territory decrease significantly since June 2024, which is consistent with the reporting of this new Israeli approach.[56]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli security forces disrupted a Palestinian militia attack plot on September 9.[57] Israeli security forces detained three Palestinian fighters in Israel and the West Bank planning the attack.[58] Israeli police forces intercepted a vehicle carrying 13 Palestinians on Route 6 in central Israel and detained one Palestinian passenger who had entered Israel illegally. The Israeli security forces reported that the detainee was planning an attack inside Israel alongside two other Palestinians who were detained by the IDF in Hebron.[59] The IDF acted on intelligence from the interrogation of the first detainee to detain the two additional cell members.[60] The IDF also confiscated at least one M4/M16-type rifle during the raid in Hebron that the cell likely planned to use in an attack inside Israel.[61]

The Israeli security forces conducted overnight raids in five locations in the West Bank on September 8 and 9.[62] The IDF detained one wanted person and captured small arms (including an M16 rifle), ammunition, and other military equipment in raids in two towns near Ramallah.[63] The IDF separately conducted raids in Deir Abu Mashal, Baqa, and Hebron to detain three wanted persons and confiscate an unspecified amount of ammunition.[64]

The IDF thwarted a car ramming attack targeting the IDF in Kharsa, near Hebron, on September 8.[65] The IDF fired small arms targeting the suspects in the vehicle and detained them. The IDF did not sustain any casualties during the attempted attack.[66]

Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in two locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on September 8.[67] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fired small arms and detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) targeting Israeli forces in Tulkarm refugee camp.[68] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades engaged Israeli forces in Balata refugee camp in Nablus.[69]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least nine attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on September 8.[70] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on September 9 that a Hezbollah drone struck a residential building in Nahariya.[71] IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi said that the attack on Nahariya is a “serious incident“ and that the IDF is “ready for any mission required.“[72] Jamaa al Islamiya, a Sunni Muslim Brotherhood-linked group in southern Lebanon, claimed a rocket attack targeting Israeli forces in a barracks near Kiryat Shmona on September 9.[73]

US CENTCOM Commander General Michael Kurilla met with IDF commanders on September 8 to discuss the threats from Iran and Lebanon against northern Israel.[74] Kurilla met separately with IDF Chief of Staff Major General Herzi Halevi and Northern Command Commander Uri Gordin.[75] Gordin presented the IDF’s operational plans in Lebanon to Kurilla.[76] The IDF said that it will continue to work with the US Army to strengthen coordination in the region.[77]

A veteran Israeli war correspondent said that Israeli deliberations over an offensive in southern Lebanon are “mainly in relation to [the] scope” of the operation, though the “political and security echelon” has not decided to conduct an operation.[78] The correspondent reported that there are currently two main considerations facing Israeli decisionmakers. First, Israeli decisionmakers remain concerned that Hezbollah can target Israeli infrastructure and civilian sites deep into Israel in the event of a large operation. Second, the Israeli decisionmakers remain concerned about the possibility that Iran will support Hezbollah in a war. A security official told the correspondent that Israel will require US support in order to conduct either a military operation or successful diplomatic negotiations.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias reiterated their willingness to target US forces in Iraq and Syria despite the US and Iraqi governments reportedly agreeing to a plan for all US-led coalition troops to withdraw from Iraq by the end of 2026.[79] US, coalition, and Iraqi officials told Reuters on September 6 that “hundreds” of coalition forces will withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and remaining troops will withdraw by the end of 2026.[80] A leader within the Islamic Resistance of Iraq told Lebanese outlet al Akhbar that the United States only understands “the language of weapons,” and that withdrawal plans are ”lies” by the United States.[81] This statement echoes previous militia threats to target US forces in Iraq and Syria over US ”procrastination” in negotiating the withdrawal of coalition forces from Iraq.[82] Unidentified Iranian-backed militias last attacked US forces in Syria on August 13, while an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia last attacked US forces in Iraq on August 5.[83] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq attacked US forces over 170 times between October 2023 and January 2024, but it has not claimed an attack targeting US forces in Syria or Iraq since February 4.[84] These militias may attack at a lower rate or with less sophistication than they did prior to the pause in attacks in early February. Such a model would allow the groups to signal their resistance laurels to their supporters while avoiding any serious risk.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi held a phone call with new Houthi Foreign Affairs Minister Jamal Amer to discuss regional tensions and cooperation between Iran and the Houthis on September 7.[85] Amer stressed the Houthis’ continued support for Palestine and Araghchi praised the Houthis for their actions “defending” Palestine. Araghchi and Amer also discussed the expansion of bilateral ties between Iran and the Houthis in "economic and development fields." Araghchi invited Amer to visit Tehran. Amer, who was appointed as foreign affairs minister in the new Houthi government in mid-August, reportedly “has the ear” of Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik al Houthi.[86]

Iranian Ambassador to Armenia Mehdi Sobhani met with Armenian National Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan to discuss Iran's concerns regarding the Zangezur corridor on September 7.[87] Grigoryan stated that "no force can cut off the territorial connection between Iran and Armenia." He stressed that the Iran-Armenia border is a border of peace and friendship. This meeting follows comments from senior Iranian officials criticizing efforts to redraw borders, likely responding to a statement by Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov in which Lavrov stated his support of Azerbaijan and Turkey‘s Zangezur corridor project.[88] The Iranian regime has historically opposed Azerbaijani and Turkish efforts to establish the Zangezur corridor between Azerbaijan proper and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic because such a corridor would sever Iranian land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia.[89]

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Hossein Salami appointed Brigadier General Second Class Sebahan Tavar as commander of the 16th Quds Operational Division on September 8.[90] The 16th Quds Operational Division is headquartered in Rasht, Gilan Province, and operates under the Ghadir Operational Base.[91] Tavar previously commanded the Mirza Kuchek Khan Special Forces Brigade, which is headquartered in Langaroud, Gilan Province.[92] Colonel Seyyed Hadi Mousavi replaced Tavar as commander of the Mirza Kuchek Khan Special Forces Brigade.[93] IRGC Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Pak Pour claimed that Israel supports “sabotage teams” along Iran’s borders during an inauguration ceremony for Mousavi on September 8.[94] Pak Pour also claimed that foreign intelligence services backed recent terrorist attacks in southern Iran. CTP-ISW has previously noted an uptick in anti-regime militancy and unrest in southeastern Iran since December 2023.[95]

Iranian media reported on September 8 that the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan evacuated its headquarters in Iraq near the Iranian border as part of the March 2023 security agreement between Iran and Iraq.[96] The March 2023 agreement requires Iraqi authorities to disarm and relocate members of Kurdish opposition groups away from the Iran-Iraq border.[97] Iranian media reported that the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan moved its headquarters to the city of Dokan in Sulaymaniyah Province, Iraqi Kurdistan Region.[98] Iran has historically accused anti-regime Kurdish militant groups and Israel of jointly using Iraqi Kurdistan to facilitate operations into Iran.[99] Iranian media also claimed on September 9 that the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan has come under the “full supervision” of the Iraqi federal government.[100] These reports come ahead of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s first foreign visit to Iraq on September 11.[101] Iranian media reported that Pezeshkian will sign security cooperations agreements with Iraqi officials during his visit.[102]

Tehran Mayor Ali Zakani traveled to Damascus on September 4 to attend the annual Syrian Exports Exhibition.[103] Approximately 600 companies participated in the exhibition, which took place between September 4 and 8.[104] Zakani discussed provincial cooperation in the fields of transportation, tourism, and renewable energy with Syrian Prime Minister Hussein Arnous on September 5.[105] Zakani also met with Damascus Governor Mohammad Tariq Kreishati on the sidelines of the exhibition.[106]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) destroyed three Houthi drones and two Houthi missile launchers in Yemen on September 8.[107]

---

[1] https://www.thetimes.com/uk/defence/article/ballistic-clmpm3d7m

[2] https://www.thetimes.com/uk/defence/article/ballistic-clmpm3d7m

[3] https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/26/europe/iran-russia-shipments-caspian-sea-intl-cmd/index.html

[4] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/iran-deliver-hundreds-ballistic-missiles-russia-soon-intel-sources-say-2024-08-09/

[5] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/iran-deliver-hundreds-ballistic-missiles-russia-soon-intel-sources-say-2024-08-09/

[6] https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-export-ballistic-missile-russia/33080369.html

[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-6-2024

[8] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-summons-uks-charge-daffaires-tehran-over-recent-sanctions-isna-says-2024-09-03/

[9] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-summons-uks-charge-daffaires-tehran-over-recent-sanctions-isna-says-2024-09-03/

[10] https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-regrets-ukraines-downgrading-ties-over-reported-supply-drones-2022-09-24/

[11] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-generals-introductory-statement-to-the-board-of-governors-9-september-2024

[12] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-generals-introductory-statement-to-the-board-of-governors-9-september-2024 ; https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/24/06/gov2024-26.pdf

[13] https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-enriched-uranium-stockpile-9c86e5788a8bb45eab1337d5f6c10121

[14] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-generals-introductory-statement-to-the-board-of-governors-9-september-2024 ; https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/joint-statement-by-the-atomic-energy-organization-of-iran-aeoi-and-the-international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea

[15] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-generals-introductory-statement-to-the-board-of-governors-9-september-2024

[16] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/186789/

[17] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/815662/

[18] https://www.iranintl dot com/202409083876

[19] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/689528

[20] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/689528/ ; https://sepahnews dot ir/fa/news/20609/

[21] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate090224 ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate082224 ;

[22] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate090424 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/18/3155224 ; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/689528

[23] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-4-2024

[24] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1832687907473064206 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1832676392053375075 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/13579

[25] https://twitter.com/ForeignMinistry/status/1832888267600957606

[26] https://www dot alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B0-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%81%D8%B9%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/two-wounded-shooting-attack-near-jordan-border-israeli-authorities-say-2024-09-08/

[27] https://twitter.com/zaeem16064429/status/1833059644744290796 ; https://www dot alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B0-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%81%D8%B9%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84

[28] https://t.me/centerkaf/4565

[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-2-2024

[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-2-2024

[31] https://t.me/mihwar_almuqawama/64094 ; https://t.me/mihwar_almuqawama/64087

[32] https://twitter.com/tajammo3_jo/status/1832781145148359060 ; https://twitter.com/tajammo3_jo/status/1833041143199625481 ; https://twitter.com/tajammo3_jo/status/1832886305199689996 ; https://twitter.com/tajammo3_jo/status/1832880879183524141

[33] https://twitter.com/tajammo3_jo/status/1832743348958093381

[34] https://www.axios.com/2024/09/08/us-gaza-hostage-ceasefire-deal-israel-hamas-skepticism

[35] https://www.axios.com/2024/09/08/us-gaza-hostage-ceasefire-deal-israel-hamas-skepticism

[36] https://t.me/moriahdoron/13617

[37] https://t.me/moriahdoron/13617

[38] https://www.axios.com/2024/09/08/us-gaza-hostage-ceasefire-deal-israel-hamas-skepticism

[39] https://t.me/moriahdoron/13594 ; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/syria-says-israeli-strikes-killed-16-amid-widening-tensions-b8b31c80

[40] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1833078464724783156

[41] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-air-defences-confront-aggression-central-region-2024-09-08/

[42] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/syria-says-israeli-strikes-killed-16-amid-widening-tensions-b8b31c80

[43] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-air-defences-confront-aggression-central-region-2024-09-08/ ; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/syria-says-israeli-strikes-killed-16-amid-widening-tensions-b8b31c80v

[44] www dot idf.il/229420

[45] www dot idf.il/229420

[46] www dot idf.il/229420

[47] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-24-2024

[48] https://t.me/hamza20300/291290; https://t.me/hamza20300/291321; https://t.me/hamza20300/291225

[49] https://t.me/hamza20300/291225

[50] https://t.me/hamza20300/291290; https://t.me/hamza20300/291321; https://t.me/hamza20300/291225

[51] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1833079119011078357

[52] https://t.me/sarayaps/18573; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1832847952781709784; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1832842275317043383

[53] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1832847952781709784

[54] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1833079119011078357

[55] https://www.mako dot co.il/news-military/2024_q3/Article-8352552d2e2c191026.htm; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-6-2024; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1827971103131685255; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1825059706374701182; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1824713305090400293; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1824330194594750598

[56] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-6-2024

[57] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1833210823021322253

[58] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1833210823021322253

[59] https://t.me/moriahdoron/13605

[60] https://t.me/moriahdoron/13605

[61] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1833210823021322253

[62] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1833090043465900212 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1833090054027145421

[63] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1833090043465900212

[64] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1833090054027145421

[65] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1832869368050471173

[66] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1832869368050471173

[67] https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/665 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7479

[68] https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/665 ; https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/666

[69] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7479

[70] https://t.me/mmirleb/6696; https://t.me/mmirleb/6694; https://t.me/mmirleb/6699; https://t.me/mmirleb/6701; https://t.me/mmirleb/6703; https://t.me/mmirleb/6705; https://t.me/mmirleb/6706; https://t.me/mmirleb/6708; https://t.me/mmirleb/6710

[71] https://t.me/moriahdoron/13599; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1833062108201984454

[72] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1833148568229544323

[73] https://t.me/mihwar_almuqawama/64196

[74] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/s1qtmshna; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1833077465826140300

[75] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1833077465826140300; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1833077473816281568

[76] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1833077473816281568

[77] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1833077473816281568

[78] https://www.ynet dot co.il/news/article/bklkqffnr#autoplay

[79] https://www.al-akhbar dot com/Palestine/386691/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%AF-%D9%82-%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7-%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/us-iraq-deal-would-see-hundreds-troops-withdraw-first-year-sources-say-2024-09-06/

[80] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-iraq-deal-would-see-hundreds-troops-withdraw-first-year-sources-say-2024-09-06/

[81] https://www.al-akhbar dot com/Palestine/386691/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%AF-%D9%82-%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7-%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7

[82] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-20-2024

[83] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-14-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-6-2024

[84] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/954 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-28-2024; https://apnews.com/article/iraq-kataib-hezbollah-us-strikes-militias-e2d31a579001f62a12b55b4cbf16ab48

[85] https://mfa.gov dot ir/portal/newsview/752931

[86] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1823731188554424465

[87] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/815641/

[88] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-5-2024#_ednf22783afc1d30864c02f01cb44000eb119 ; https://x.com/araghchi/status/1831683974684389824 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-30-2024#_edn580b870071224cb93cd8cb4a6daa806037 ; https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/489741/Tehran-strongly-opposes-proposed-Zangezur-corridor-Raisi-says

[89] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-5-2024#_ednf22783afc1d30864c02f01cb44000eb119 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-30-2024#_edn580b870071224cb93cd8cb4a6daa806037 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-3-2024

[90] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6218484 ;

https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/18/3154780

[91] https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Irans-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf?x85095, Page 16

[92] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/18/3154780

https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Irans-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf?x85095, Page 16

[93] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/18/3154780

[94] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/18/3154780

[95] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-2-2024 ;

https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-august-14-2024

[96] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/18/3155004

[97] https://almadapaper dot net/view.php?cat=299491; https://amwaj.media/media-monitor/deep-dive-iran-inks-security-accord-with-iraq-as-regional-diplomacy-revved-up

[98] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/18/3155004

[99] https://amwaj.media/article/deep-dive-inside-iran-s-move-to-subdue-kurdish-foes-in-iraq

[100] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/19/3155509

[101] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/18/3154847

[102] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/18/3154847

[103] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/220680/Tehran-mayor-visits-Damascus-to-boost-coop-with-Damascus

[104] https://syrianobserver dot com/society/expo-syria-2024-a-showcase-of-resilience-and-economic-revival.html ;

https://iranpress dot com/iran-s-ambassador--tehran-s-envoy-visit-syria-expo-2024

[105] http://syriatimes dot sy/arnous-and-tehran-mayor-hold-talks-on-cooperation-between-sy-ria-and-iranian-provinces/

[106] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/06/18/3155175

[107] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1832856726846030143