Iran Update, October 6, 2024

Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Siddhant Kishore, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

 

Western and Middle Eastern outlets have suggested that Israel killed or injured Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani on October 4. Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah have been unable to contact Ghaani since Israel conducted an airstrike targeting Hashem Safi ed Din—the presumed successor to Hassan Nasrallah—in Beirut on October 4.[1] Ghaani was in Beirut at the time of the Israeli airstrike, according to the New York Times and Reuters. He was reportedly helping Hezbollah recover from recent Israeli attacks on the group.[2] An Iranian security official told Reuters that Ghaani was not meeting with Safi ed Din when the Israeli airstrike targeted the latter. Ghaani was last seen publicly when he visited the Hezbollah representative office in Tehran on September 29.[3] Ghaani has been notably absent from high-profile regime events since then. He was not seen at Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s Friday prayer sermon on October 4 or when Khamenei met with Iranian military leadership on October 6.[4]

Some Iranian officials and state-affiliated media have called on the regime to confirm whether Ghaani is alive. An Iranian parliamentarian claimed on October 6 that Ghaani was “in perfect health” and called on the IRGC to address the rumors of his death or injury in Beirut.[5] An outlet tied to former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaei similarly called on the regime to publish “news that our general is alive and well.”[6] An IRGC member stationed in Beirut told the New York Times that the regime's silence about Ghaani’s status has created “panic among rank-and-file members.”[7]

Israeli leaders have continued signaling that they will retaliate for the Iranian ballistic missile attack on Israel on October 1. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said during a visit to the IDF Nevatim airbase that Israel will respond to Iran at an appropriate place and time and in a manner of its choosing.[8] The Nevatim airbase was one of the sites that Iran targeted in its recent missile attack.[9] Several missiles hit the base, causing minor damage.[10] Gallant added that the Iranian attack “didn’t even scratch” the capabilities of the IDF Air Force.[11] Israeli President Isaac Herzog separately said that the Iranian attack “obviously deserves a response” in an interview with Saudi media.[12]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant will reportedly travel to Washington, DC, to meet with US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin on October 9.[13] Gallant and Austin are expected to discuss US-Israel security cooperation vis-a-vis Iran.[14]

Iran appears to be preparing for an Israeli retaliation amid reports that Israel may strike sensitive Iranian sites, such as energy and nuclear infrastructure.

• The Iranian State Civil Aviation Organization canceled all civilian flights in Iran from 2100 local time on October 6 to 0600 local time on October 7.[15] These times equate to 1400-2300 ET on October 6.
• The Iranian National Tanker Company has vacated empty oil tankers from the main Iranian oil export terminal on Kharg Island.[16] Many vessels that had been docked at Bandar Abbas have left as well.[17]
• Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad met with IRGC Navy officers in Bushehr City to discuss the security of the South Pars gas field, which is the largest Iranian gas field.[18] Paknejad also visited Kharg Island.[19]

The IDF continued clearing Hezbollah infrastructure around Maroun al Ras and Odaisseh in southern Lebanon. The IDF 188th Armored Brigade (36th Division) engaged Hezbollah Radwan special operations forces (SOF), killing some and destroying military headquarters and warehouses south of Bint Jbeil.[20] The brigade commander said that the IDF is focusing on destroying Hezbollah's surface and sub-surface infrastructure in order to prevent Hezbollah attacks into Israel.[21] The IDF 1st Golani Brigade (36th Division) destroyed tunnel shafts and ammunition depots near Maroun al Ras.[22] The IDF 35th Paratroopers Brigade (98th Division) seized ”hundreds” of weapons and a vehicle used by Hezbollah Radwan SOF.[23] An anti-aircraft gun was mounted atop the vehicle, according to an Israeli military correspondent.[24]

Israeli forces separately located a Hezbollah Radwan SOF warehouse and weapons storage facility in a tunnel complex beneath a civilian home in Odaisseh along the Israel-Lebanon border.[25]

The IDF created a third closed military zone in the Upper Galilee on October 6.[26] The new zone encompasses Malkia, Manara, and Yiftah, which is between the two existing closed zones. The IDF created closed military zones over the Metula area on September 30 and over the Dovev, Tzvion, and Malkia areas on October 1.[27] Hezbollah claimed that Israeli forces tried to cross into Blida, which is adjacent to Yiftah, on October 5.[28] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on October 6 indicates that Israeli forces operated near Blida. An Israeli military correspondent reported on October 4 that the IDF is preparing to expand its ground operations in southern Lebanon.[29]

The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson called on civilians to evacuate immediately from 25 towns and villages in southern Lebanon on October 6.[30] The spokesperson told residents that they should head north of the Awali River.[31]

The IDF launched a new clearing operation into Jabalia refugee camp, Gaza City, on October 6 in order to disrupt Hamas reconstitution efforts.[32] The IDF last operated in the area in May 2024, during which the IDF encountered significant resistance from three Hamas battalions.[33] Hamas has reportedly re-armed and reorganized itself in the four months since the IDF withdrew.[34] An Israeli military correspondent said that the IDF assesses that there are thousands of original Hamas fighters and thousands of new but poorly trained Hamas recruits in the northern Gaza Strip.[35] The IDF stated that it would operate around Jabalia for as long as required in order to thoroughly destroy Hamas infrastructure there.[36] The IDF Air Force struck dozens of militia sites around Jabalia as the IDF 401st and 460th armored brigades encircled the camp.[37] Israeli forces have engaged dozens of Palestinian fighters around Jabalia since entering the area.[38] The 401st and 460th armored brigades are operating under the command of the 162nd Division, which has been leading operations in Rafah since May 2024.[39] The IDF Gaza Division will now lead the Givati and Nahal brigades in clearing operations in Rafah.[40]

Anonymous Iraqi officials claimed that the United States sent “strongly worded” messages to the Iraqi federal government following an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attack targeting a US diplomatic facility in Baghdad.[41] An Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacked the US Diplomatic Support Complex near Baghdad International Airport on October 1.[42] The Iraqi officials claimed that the United States threatened to attack Iranian-backed militias if they continued to attack US positions or escalated further against Israel.[43] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has increased its rate of attacks targeting Israel since September 17.[44]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Western and Middle Eastern outlets have suggested that Israel killed or injured IRGC Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani in an airstrike in Beirut. Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah have reportedly been unable to contact Ghaani since the airstrike.
• Iran: Israeli leaders have continued signaling that they will retaliate for the recent Iranian ballistic missile attack. Iran appears to be preparing for an imminent Israeli strike, possibly targeting Iranian energy and nuclear infrastructure.
• Lebanon: The IDF continued clearing Lebanese Hezbollah infrastructure around Maroun al Ras and Odaisseh. The IDF also created a third military zone in the Upper Galilee, amid Israeli reports that the IDF will expand its ground operations into Lebanon.
• Gaza Strip: The IDF launched a new clearing operation into the Jabalia refugee camp in order to disrupt Hamas reconstitution efforts. The IDF last operated in the area in May 2024 and encountered significant resistance from three Hamas battalions.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Five Palestinian militias, including Hamas, defended against Israeli advances into Jabalia on October 6.[45] The militias conducted combined attacks using several types of weapons systems, indicating that the militias retain some ability to coordinate operations and access diverse weapons stockpiles. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) snipers fired on Israeli forces in and on the way to Jabalia.[46] PIJ fired thermobaric rockets targeting an IDF headquarters in Jabalia refugee camp.[47] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting an Israeli tank advancing into Jabalia camp.[48] PIJ and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine fighters targeted Israeli armored personnel carriers with anti-tank shells.[49]

The IDF Air Force struck four Hamas command-and-control sites in the central and northern Gaza Strip on October 5 and 6.[50] The IDF struck two schools, a mosque, and a UNRWA headquarters that Hamas fighters were using to plan attacks targeting Israeli forces. The IDF stated that it took steps to minimize civilian casualties in the airstrikes.[51] The Hamas-run Health Ministry reported that the strikes in the central Gaza Strip killed 26 people.[52] An Israeli military correspondent said that Israeli security officials believe that Hamas is preserving its governance role in the Gaza Strip by offering services and aid from shelters, schools, and hospitals in the northern Gaza Strip.[53] Junior Hamas field commanders reportedly direct efforts to regenerate and reorganize Hamas forces from these shelters, schools, and hospitals.[54]

Two Palestinian militias mortared Israeli forces around the Netzarim Corridor on October 6.[55] The IDF 252nd Division operates along the corridor.[56]

The IDF expanded the al Mawasi humanitarian zone eastward into central Khan Younis City on October 6.[57] The IDF stated that the expanded zone includes field hospitals, tent encampments, and supplies of food, water, medicine, and medical equipment.[58] The IDF also released a new evacuation map system for the northern Gaza Strip that groups ”blocks” into larger areas that the IDF stated that it will use to ”issue evacuation orders as necessary to wider areas.”[59] The IDF did not issue specific evacuation orders for the northern Gaza Strip on October 6 but called the entire northern Gaza Strip a dangerous combat zone.[60]

PIJ fired three rockets from the northern Gaza Strip targeting Ashkelon, southern Israel, on October 6.[61]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

An Arab Israeli individual shot and killed an Israeli Border Police officer in Beersheba in southern Israel on October 6.[62] The gunman also wounded ten other civilians before Israeli security forces killed him.[63] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the attacker was a resident of Negev and had a criminal record.[64] Palestinian militias praised the attack, however, no group has taken responsibility for it at the time of this writing.[65]

An Israeli Army Radio correspondent revealed that Hamas fighters crossed into Israel from the West Bank through a breach point in the Israel-West Bank border to conduct the shooting attack in Jaffa on October 1.[66] The correspondent said that there are “hundreds” of breach points along the border and that “thousands” of Palestinians cross into Israel every day illegally without supervision.[67] In September 2024, at least 1,100 Palestinians reportedly crossed into Israel illegally through these breach points, and only 190 of them were caught. Israeli security officials have pushed Israeli civil authorities to secure the Israel-West Bank border by addressing the breach points.[68]

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least three locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 5.[69] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms and detonated IEDs targeting Israeli forces in Jenin Governorate.[70] The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement claimed that it fired small arms targeting Israeli civilians and security personnel in Jenin on October 6.[71]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Northern Israel and Lebanon

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least 15 attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 5.[72] Hezbollah conducted a four-wave rocket attack targeting an IDF position in Manara.[73] Hezbollah also launched one-way attack drones targeting an IDF position and ammunition depot near Haifa.[74] Hezbollah separately fired one-way attack drones targeting Israeli forces in Maalot Tarshiha.[75] Hezbollah claimed that it launched rockets targeting Israeli civilian sites in Safed.[76]

The IDF continued its air campaign targeting Hezbollah's capabilities, infrastructure, and leadership. The IDF struck Hezbollah sites, including underground complexes and weapons storage facilities, in southern Lebanon on October 5 and 6.[77] The IDF also conducted an airstrike that killed a Hezbollah company commander in Kfar Kila.[78] The IDF separately conducted at least 30 airstrikes targeting Hezbollah positions in Beirut.[79]

This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on October 5 to 2:00pm ET on October 6. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.

Iran and the Axis of Resistance

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed on October 6 that it conducted three drone attacks targeting three separate unspecified locations in the Golan Heights.[80] The IDF reported on October 5 that it intercepted two drones launched from the east over the northern Mediterranean Sea and one drone launched from the east off the coast of Tel Aviv.[81]

The IDF reportedly continued to strike Axis of Resistance logistical networks in western Syria. Local Syrian media reported an IDF drone strike targeting a car at the Lebanon-Syria border crossing near al Qusayr, Syria, on October 5.[82] Local Syrian media separately claimed that an IDF airstrike hit three cars in Hasiya Industrial City, south of Homs, on October 6.[83] Local media also stated that an IDF airstrike hit an unspecified number of weapons depots off the Homs-Salamiyah road in western Syria later on October 6.[84]

 

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[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-quds-force-chief-out-contact-since-beirut-strikes-two-iranian-officials-2024-10-06/

[2] https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/10/06/world/israel-iran-hezbollah-lebanon?smid=url-share#iranian-news-media-asks-where-is-top-quds-forces-commander-general-esmail-ghaani

[3] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-29-2024

[4] https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1842878457455259972 ;

https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/27679

[5] https://x.com/Entekhab_News/status/1842870925500330049 ;

https://www.iranintl.com/202410069743

[6] https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/10/06/world/israel-iran-hezbollah-lebanon?smid=url-share#iranian-news-media-asks-where-is-top-quds-forces-commander-general-esmail-ghaani ;

https://www.mei.edu/publications/concerns-iran-over-trumps-possible-irgc-designation

[7] https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/10/06/world/israel-iran-hezbollah-lebanon?smid=url-share#iranian-news-media-asks-where-is-top-quds-forces-commander-general-esmail-ghaani

[8] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/after-iranian-missiles-hit-base-gallant-says-attack-didnt-even-scratch-air-force/

[9] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-1-2024

[10] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-assesses-damage-from-irans-missile-barrage-27c26e5e

[11] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/after-iranian-missiles-hit-base-gallant-says-attack-didnt-even-scratch-air-force/

[12] https://x.com/yanircozin/status/1842928881722114259

[13] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1842961326697853237 ; https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1842959025098706985

[14] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15202

[15] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1403071512053

[16] https://www.cnbc.com/2024/10/04/iran-oil-tankers-disappear-from-local-port-amid-israel-attack-fears-satellite-images-show.html

[17] https://x.com/sentdefender/status/1842624895353499926 ;

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[18] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85619118

[19] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85619118

[20] www dot idf.il/237400

[21] www dot idf.il/237400

[22] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1842892430275698803

[23] www dot idf.il/237330 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1842912099418116379

[24] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15179

[25] www dot idf.il/237431

[26] https://x.com/sentdefender/status/1842977861033992377 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1842976415496785927

[27] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1841175121001664560 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1840808915816022375 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1841175586406088708

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[31] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1842866906841170108

[32] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1842805439525691762

[33] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1796085942945489080 ; https://www dot jpost.com/israel-hamas-war/article-813365

[34] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15149

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[36] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1842805480441196879

[37] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1842805467778519157 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1842805476699902130

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[42] https://x.com/USAmbIraq/status/1841107559576449043

[43] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7-%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B0%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%BA%D9%88%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9

[44] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-26-2024

[45] https://t.me/sarayaps/18624 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/18622 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7618 ; https://t.me/darebmojahden/5208

[46] alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8131/%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%83%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D9%86%D8%B5-%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%B5%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%AA-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/18617 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/18622

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[48] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7618

[49] https://t.me/sarayaps/18624 ; https://t.me/abualiajel/414

[50] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1842885970925892065 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1842717051754062030 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1842717054706589784 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1842654897205903525

[51] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1842885973991985281 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1842717057328005508

[52] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/10/06/israel-iran-lebanon-hezbollah-war-news-gaza/#link-5XFPJA7SPNBSDGR6JCZHP63JIY

[53] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15149

[54] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15149

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[56] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1842092426074132678 ; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1832737575565398358

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[58] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1842793292242858427

[59] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1842791821409149136

[60] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1842791821409149136

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[62] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15192 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/15175

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[64] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15175

[65] https://t.me/abualiajel/413 ; https://t.me/alwya2000/6938 ; https://t.me/mojahdeenpal/4817

[66] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1842834006296973419 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-2-2024

[67] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1842834006296973419

[68] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1842834006296973419

[69] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7612 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7616 ; https://t.me/darebmojahden/5210

[70] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7612

[71] https://t.me/darebmojahden/5210

[72] https://t.me/mmirleb/7620 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7621 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7623 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7627 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7628 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7629 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7631 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7632 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7633 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7635 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7636 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7637 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7638 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7642 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7643

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[74] https://t.me/mmirleb/7636 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7637

[75] https://t.me/mmirleb/7638

[76] https://t.me/mmirleb/7642

[77] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1842892430275698803 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1842773671749804154

[78] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1842867424661545260

[79] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1842773671749804154 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/15135

[80] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1311

[81] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1842749755228659828

[82] https://t.me/damascusv011/24286 ;

https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1842980389125763283

[83] https://t.me/damascusv011/24295 ;

https://x.com/SAMSyria0/status/1842887992186167502

[84] https://t.me/damascusv011/24307; https://x.com/nourabohsn/status/1842983855458066560; https://x.com/nourabohsn/status/1842985111626629391; https://x.com/OALD24/status/1842995100844240987;

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 6, 2024

Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, Riley Bailey, and George Barros

October 6, 2024, 10:45am ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 9:30 am ET on October 6. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 7 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

Russian forces have reportedly lost at least five divisions’ worth of armored vehicles and tanks in Pokrovsk Raion since beginning their offensive operation to seize Avdiivka in October 2023 and during intensified Russian offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast in Summer 2024. An open-source X (formerly Twitter) user tracking visually confirmed Russian vehicle and equipment losses in Ukraine stated on October 4 that the user has confirmed that Russian forces have lost 1,830 pieces of heavy equipment in Pokrovsk Raion since October 9, 2023.[1] The X user stated that Russian forces have lost a total of 539 tanks (roughly a division and a half's worth of Russian tanks) and 1,020 infantry fighting vehicles (roughly four to five mechanized infantry divisions’ worth of vehicles) during offensive operations in Pokrovsk Raion and specified that Ukrainian forces destroyed 381 of the 539 Russian tanks and 835 of the 1,020 armored vehicles. The X user noted that Russian forces have also lost 26 infantry mobility vehicles, 22 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), 11 towed artillery systems, and 92 unarmored trucks. The X user noted that he confirmed that Russian forces lost 25 tanks and 59 armored vehicles (roughly two battalions' worth of mechanized equipment) in Pokrovsk Raion since September 6, 2024. Russian forces launched an intensified four-month-long offensive operation to seize Avdiivka in October 2023 and later continued assaults west of Avdiivka and west and southwest of Donetsk City in spring and summer 2024, and the user's data should reflect Russian vehicle losses accrued during these offensive efforts.[2] The X user’s assessment based on visually confirmed vehicle losses is likely conservative given that not all Russian vehicle losses are visually documented. The actual number of Russian vehicle losses in the Pokrovsk area is likely higher than reported.

The Russian military command may not be willing or able to accept the current scale and rate of vehicle loss in the coming months and years given the constraints in Russia's defense industrial production, limits to Russia’s Soviet-era vehicle stockpiles, and the Russian military's failure to achieve operationally significant territorial advances through mechanized maneuver. Russian forces expended a significant number of armored vehicles during the first weeks of their offensive effort to seize Avdiivka in October 2023 and later limited their armored vehicle usage while fighting within Avdiivka's administrative boundaries.[3] Russian forces appear to have limited their armored vehicle use in the area immediately west of Avdiivka in recent months, although Russian forces have simultaneously intensified their offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk city and frequently conduct largely unsuccessful platoon- and company-sized mechanized assaults in the area.[4] Russian forces have conducted several battalion-sized mechanized assaults in western Donetsk Oblast since July 2024, the majority of which resulted in significant armored vehicle losses in exchange for marginal territorial advances.[5] The commander of a Ukrainian bridge operating in the Donetsk direction recently reported that Russian forces are losing up to 90 percent of the vehicles used in mechanized assaults in the Donetsk direction.[6] The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) think tank previously estimated that Russian forces were losing over 3,000 armored fighting vehicles annually as of February 2024, although Russia's current rate of armored vehicle losses may be higher given that the X user's data notably does not account for Russian equipment losses throughout the entire frontline.[7] Russian forces have only advanced about 40 km in the Avdiivka/Pokrovsk operational direction since October 2023 and a loss of over five divisions’ worth of equipment for such tactical gains is not sustainable indefinitely without a fundamental shift in Russia‘s capability to resource its war.

Russian forces have likely accumulated a large amount of equipment for these assaults, although the medium- to long-term constraints of Russia's armored vehicle stocks and production rates alongside mounting equipment losses may force the Russian military to rethink the benefit of intensified mechanized activity in this sector over Russia's longer-term war effort in Ukraine.[8] The Russian military command's willingness to pursue limited tactical advances in exchange for significant armored vehicle losses will become increasingly costly as Russian forces burn through finite Soviet-era weapons and equipment stocks in the coming months and years.[9] Russia will likely struggle to adequately supply its units with materiel in the long term without transferring the Russian economy to a wartime footing and significantly increasing Russia's defense industrial production rates — a move that Russian President Vladimir Putin has sought to avoid thus far.[10]

Ukrainian officials continue to document and prosecute Russian war crimes committed against Ukrainian forces. Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office Head Oleksandr Filchakov announced on October 5 that his office has initiated a pre-trial investigation into the execution of four Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) ordered by Russian commanders at the Vovchansk aggregate plant in Summer 2024.[11] Filchakov noted that Russian POWs provided testimony about the executions during interrogations in Ukrainian detention. Filchakov suggested that Ukrainian forces might already have the perpetrator in custody, allowing for a fair trial and sentencing regarding the crime.

Russian authorities reportedly arrested the administrator of the Russian Telegram channel Thirteenth, who has previously criticized the Kremlin and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), on October 5. Russian milbloggers and Russian opposition media stated on October 5 that Russian police detained Thirteenth administrator Yegor Guzenko at a concert in Novopavlovsk, Stavropol Krai.[12] Russian sources speculated that Russian authorities may have arrested Guzenko due to his refusal to undergo drug tests or after an altercation with Russian police.[13] Several Russian sources claimed that Russian authorities placed Guzenko under house arrest in 2021 but that Guzenko later violated house arrest in March 2022, causing Russian authorities to place him on the Russian and international wanted list.[14] Guzenko has frequently criticized Russian authorities, and his arrest may be part of the ongoing Kremlin effort to crack down against critical voices within the Russian ultranationalist information space while encouraging a culture of self-censorship among the pro-war information space.[15] It is not yet clear whether Guzenko's arrest is directly related to the Kremlin's effort to exert control over the pro-war ultranationalist information space, however.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces have reportedly lost at least five divisions’ worth of armored vehicles and tanks in Pokrovsk Raion since beginning their offensive operation to seize Avdiivka in October 2023 and during intensified Russian offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast in Summer 2024.
• The Russian military command may not be willing or able to accept the current scale and rate of vehicle loss in the coming months and years given the constraints in Russia's defense industrial production, limits to Russia’s Soviet-era vehicle stockpiles, and the Russian military's failure to achieve operationally significant territorial advances through mechanized maneuver.
• Ukrainian officials continue to document and prosecute Russian war crimes committed against Ukrainian forces.
• Russian authorities reportedly arrested the administrator of the Russian Telegram channel Thirteenth, who has previously criticized the Kremlin and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), on October 5.
• Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces reportedly continued assaults in Glushkovsky Raion west of the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast including south of Glushkovo near Novyi Put and Veseloye on October 5 and 6 but did not make confirmed advances.[16]

Russian forces reportedly continued assaults in Glushkovsky Raion west of the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast including near Novyi Put on October 6 but did not make confirmed advances.[17] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 6 that elements of the Russian 83rd Air Assault (VDV) Brigade are advancing near Veseloye (south of Glushkovo), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[18] Russian forces are also attacking southeast of Glushkovo near Medvezhye.[19]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations within the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on October 6, but Ukrainian forces did not make any confirmed advances in the area. Ukrainian forces reportedly attacked near Lyubimovka (southeast of Korenevo) and Plekhovo (southeast of Sudzha).[20]

Russian forces recently advanced in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on October 6. Geolocated footage published on October 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Kremyanoye and southeast of Zhuravli (both east of Korenevo).[21] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Plekhovo, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[22] Russian forces continued assaults southeast of Korenevo near Daryino and Nikolayevo-Darino and near Lyubimovka and Plekhovo.[23] Drone operators of the Russian "Smuglyanka" Detachment reportedly continue to operate near Kremyanoye (east of Korenevo).[24]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 6 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Starytsya on October 5 and 6.[25] Ukraine's Kharkiv Group of Forces reported that Russian forces are conducting individual personnel rotations near Hlyboke and are engineering positions near Lukyantsi (north of Kharkiv City).[26] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction stated on October 6 that the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) is staffed mostly with convicts with little training, although they are equipped with sufficient technology, including electronic warfare (EW) systems.[27]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on October 6 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the southeastern outskirts of Hlushkivka and up to Kruhlyakivka (both southeast of Kupyansk), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[28] Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; east of Kupyansk near Kucherivka and Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Kruhlyakivka, Kolisnykivka, Hlushkivka, Stepova Novoselivka, Novoosynove, Pishchane, and Lozova; west of Svatove in the direction of Borova; southwest of Svatove near Hrekivka, Makiivka, and Nevske; northwest of Kreminna near Novosadove; west of Kreminna near Torske; southwest of Kreminna near Dibrova; and south of Kreminna near Hryhorivka on October 5 and 6.[29] Elements of the Russian 12th Tank Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue operating in the Kupyansk direction.[30] Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) reportedly continue operating near Novosadove, Terny, and Nevske.[31]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on October 5 and 6, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area.[32]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar, north of Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka and Hryhorivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Bila Hora on October 5 and 6.[33] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate near Chasiv Yar.[34]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Toretsk on October 6 but did not make any confirmed gains in the area. A Russian milblogger claimed on October 5 that Russian forces recently made marginal advances near the intersection of Rudnychna and Shakhtariv streets in central Toretsk, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[35] Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Toretsk near Dachne, near Toretsk itself, and southwest of Toretsk in the direction of Shcherbynivka on October 5 and 6.[36]

Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Pokrovsk and reportedly made further gains in the area as of October 6. Geolocated footage published on October 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along a country road southwest of Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[37] Russian milbloggers claimed on October 5 and 6 that Russian forces operating southeast of Pokrovsk also advanced further west within Tsukuryne and seized the entire administrative boundaries of the settlement, although ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[38] Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad, Novotoretske, and Promin and southeast of Pokrovsk near Krutyi Yar, Lysivka, Selydove, Novohrodivka, Tsukuryne, Hirnyk, Novoselydivka, Izmailivka, and Zhelanne Druhe on October 5 and 6.[39] A Ukrainian officer operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on October 5 that Russian forces have resumed using armored vehicles as a part of small reconnaissance-in-force attacks south of Selydove from Tsukuryne in the past week.[40] The officer stated that Russian forces are preparing to further use armored vehicles in the Pokrovsk direction and are intensifying artillery fire and first-person view (FPV) drone operations.[41] The officer added that Russian forces are conducting unspecified rotations and transferring reinforcements to the Selydove direction.[42]

Geolocated footage published on October 5 shows Ukrainian forces striking a reported Russian command post in Avdiivka.[43] The Ukrainian General Staff reported earlier on October 5 that the Ukrainian military recently conducted Storm Shadow missile and GMLRS strikes on military command posts of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD), 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD), and the 2nd CAA – elements of which ISW has recently observed operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[44]

Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Donetsk City near Maksymilyanivka, Hostre, and Ostrivske on October 5 and 6 but did not make any confirmed advances.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are close to seizing all of Ostrivske, although ISW has only observed confirmation of Russian forces operating on the eastern outskirts of the settlement.[46] Another Russian milblogger claimed on October 5 that Russian forces advanced up to 400 meters within Maksymilyanivka, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[47] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction (west and southwest of Donetsk City) stated on October 5 that Russian forces generally accumulate personnel and armored vehicles for a week or two weeks to conduct intensified assaults against Ukrainian positions that last for a day or two.[48] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces have recently accumulated more personnel and armored vehicles in the Kurakhove direction but that the combat quality of Russian personnel in the area has declined in recent months.[49] The spokesperson added that elements of the Russian 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating in the Kurakhove direction.[50]

Russian forces continued offensive operations southwest of Donetsk City on October 6 but did not make any confirmed gains. Russian milbloggers claimed on October 5 and 6 that Russian forces continued to advance north of Vuhledar towards Bohoyavlenka, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[51] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction posted footage on October 6 showing Ukrainian forces recently repelling a roughly company-sized Russian mechanized assault near Kostyantynivka and reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed two tanks and six armored vehicles and damaged another tank.[52] Russian forces continued offensive operations near Katerynivka, Kostyantynivka, Antonivka, Vuhledar, Bohoyavlenka, and Zolota Nyva on October 5 and 6.[53] Elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Katerynivka.[54] Donetsk Oblast occupation head Denis Pushilin awarded on October 5 servicemembers of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment, and the 91st and 95th rifle regiments (29th CAA, EMD) for their participation in the seizure of Vuhledar.[55]

Russian sources speculated about the cause of the downing of a Russian S-70 heavy stealth fixed-wing drone near Kostyantynivka on October 5. Some Russian sources claimed that Russian forces accidentally downed the drone in a friendly fire accident, while other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces purposefully shot the drone down to prevent Ukrainian forces from acquiring the more advanced drone technology after Russian operators lost control of the S-70.[56] Select Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces later struck the crash site of the S-70 drone with an Iskander-M ballistic missile to prevent Ukrainian specialists from studying the drone, but ISW cannot independently verify these claims.[57]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 6 that Russian forces conducted ground assaults in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Novodarivka and Poltavka (both southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[58]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast including north of Robotyne in the direction of Novodanylivka on October 5 and 6, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[59] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated that Russian forces have recently conducted fewer assaults in the Zaporizhia direction but noted that fresh Russian assault groups are concentrating near Robotyne, likely in preparation to launch renewed assaults in the area in the coming days.[60] Voloshyn noted that Russian forces rarely use armored vehicles during assaults in southern Ukraine and are instead relying on small assault groups with unarmored, high-speed vehicles such as motorcycles, buggies, and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) to quickly attack Ukrainian positions in the area while avoiding nearby minefields.[61] Elements of the Russian 4th Military Base (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Kamyanske (northwest of Robotyne).[62]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 6 that Russian forces conducted two assaults in unspecified areas of the Kherson direction, likely referring to areas of east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.[63]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a large series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 5 to 6. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Kh-59/69 cruise missile, two Iskander-M ballistic missiles, an Iskander-K cruise missile, and 87 Shahed-136/131 drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and Oryol and Kursk oblasts.[64] The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Ukrainian forces downed two unspecified missiles and 56 Shahed-136/131 drones over Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kyiv, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, Chernihiv, Poltava, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, Zaporizhia, Zhytomyr, and Kharkiv oblasts; 25 Shahed drones were “lost” due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that four Shahed drones remained in Ukrainian airspace as of the morning of October 6. Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper reported on October 6 that Russian forces targeted Odesa City with drones and ballistic missiles on the night of October 5 to 6, striking a trade equipment warehouse causing fire, causing a gas leak in an unspecified location, and damaging a civilian cargo ship.[65] Russian milbloggers claimed on October 5 and 6 that Russian forces struck an ammunition depot where Ukrainian forces stored long-range missiles, an oil depot, the Odesa Shkilnyi airfield, and port infrastructure in Odesa City.[66]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Head of the Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation, Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, stated on October 5 that a small number of North Korean military personnel, mainly engineering personnel, are operating in occupied Donetsk Oblast and are repairing or somehow improving the quality of a large amount of the low-quality ammunition that North Korea provided to the Russian military for use in Ukraine.[67] Kovalenko stated that North Korean engineering personnel are helping Russian forces transport cargo, recording ammunition shortages, and monitoring the Russian military's use of ammunition.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian milbloggers amplified footage on October 5 purportedly showing Russian forces striking Ukrainian forces with the new “Prince Vandal Novogorodsky” kamikaze drone in Kursk Oblast.[68] The “Prince Vandal Novogorodsky” kamikaze drone is reportedly controlled via a fiber-optic cable, making it resistant to electronic warfare (EW) suppression at lower altitudes at the expense of the drone's range.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is suspending coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts until further notice.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not reporting on activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Nothing significant to report.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

The Belarusian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) reportedly detained a Belarusian civilian for posting footage of a falling Russian Shahed drone on the internet.[69] The Belarusian MVD stated on October 4 that it detained a resident of Kalinkovichi, Gomel Oblast for cooperating with ”extremist resources" by providing information, images, and footage to "destructive Telegram channels."[70] This is the first instance that ISW has observed of Belarusian authorities detaining a civilian for publishing footage of Russian Shahed drones in Belarusian airspace.

 

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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[1] https://x.com/naalsio26/status/1842341054428700784 ; https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1NKsPyUhtaVer8RBbUPOeyD5LL_Clu77FyBxBBEOSPrg/edit?gid=1002650519#gid=1002650519

[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar101223 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021724 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040524; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040324 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13-2024

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar102023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122623

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar090524

[5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar073024 ;

[6] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13-2024

[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050824

[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar100324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar092724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar091324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar090524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar091524

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar073024

[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040424; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020224

[11] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/05/okupanty-stratyly-chotyroh-ukrayinskyh-vijskovyh-u-vovchansku-prokuratura/; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/848439-rosiani-stratili-cotiroh-ukrainskih-vijskovih-na-agregatnomu-zavodi-u-vovcansku-vlitku-2024-roku-prokuratura/

[12] https://meduza dot io/news/2024/10/05/v-stavropolskom-krae-zaderzhali-z-blogera-egora-guzenko ; https://www.rbc dot ru/society/05/10/2024/67015ce99a7947878c39064b ; https://ura dot news/news/1052826018 ; https://t.me/Alekhin_Telega/11805 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/54447 ; https://t.me/akashevarova/7533

[13] https://meduza dot io/news/2024/10/05/v-stavropolskom-krae-zaderzhali-z-blogera-egora-guzenko ; https://t.me/istories_media/7764 ;

[14] https://meduza dot io/news/2024/10/05/v-stavropolskom-krae-zaderzhali-z-blogera-egora-guzenko; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/06/10/2024/67024c119a79472e1bf6734d ; https://t.me/dva_majors/54447 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/31883 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/31885 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/31886 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/132166

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-14-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-20-2024

[16] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/78213 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/54477 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22482 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/44207

[17] https://t.me/mod_russia/44207

[18] https://t.me/rusich_army/17531

[19] https://t.me/dva_majors/54477

[20] https://t.me/rusich_army/17531 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/54477 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/44207

[21] https://x.com/fGr6JW3waJ1FKMN/status/1842816157038129523; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1842862028186058993; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1842865998111613039; https://t.me/ombr41/841; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7027 ; https://x.com/fGr6JW3waJ1FKMN/status/1842816157038129523; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1842862028186058993; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1842865998111613039; https://t.me/ombr41/841

[22] https://t.me/dva_majors/54477

[23] https://t.me/mod_russia/44207

[24] https://t.me/dva_majors/54474

[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0x1nxR5BAqByuQZjR4utTNHP3UQW6KQp8GMArzPio7YWeJsA5WkuTnXHNRRGTqyWnl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0s84iTJjb66qeYcHfDhdVTnPvFGFQSDk32NrmTz6RNhU494yqvj6CRgDHBnfv67apl ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/1865 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22482

[26] https://t.me/otukharkiv/1865

[27] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/06/vorog-prokladaye-pidzemni-marshruty-ta-formuye-polk-iz-zekiv/

[28] https://t.me/motopatriot/28282 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/54477 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/16662

[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0x1nxR5BAqByuQZjR4utTNHP3UQW6KQp8GMArzPio7YWeJsA5WkuTnXHNRRGTqyWnl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0s84iTJjb66qeYcHfDhdVTnPvFGFQSDk32NrmTz6RNhU494yqvj6CRgDHBnfv67apl ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11519 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/78262 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/54477 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/16659

[30] https://t.me/voin_dv/11173

[31] https://t.me/z_arhiv/28421 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/17556

[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0s84iTJjb66qeYcHfDhdVTnPvFGFQSDk32NrmTz6RNhU494yqvj6CRgDHBnfv67apl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0x1nxR5BAqByuQZjR4utTNHP3UQW6KQp8GMArzPio7YWeJsA5WkuTnXHNRRGTqyWnl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EFjK75mL24VXgWsLoa1Ztj4ePx6ZqBAitkWzp5hUGz4v4DW7bLeDxZ7ALQvxApcml

[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0x1nxR5BAqByuQZjR4utTNHP3UQW6KQp8GMArzPio7YWeJsA5WkuTnXHNRRGTqyWnl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0s84iTJjb66qeYcHfDhdVTnPvFGFQSDk32NrmTz6RNhU494yqvj6CRgDHBnfv67apl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EFjK75mL24VXgWsLoa1Ztj4ePx6ZqBAitkWzp5hUGz4v4DW7bLeDxZ7ALQvxApcml

[34] https://t.me/voin_dv/11181

[35] https://t.me/z_arhiv/28424

[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0x1nxR5BAqByuQZjR4utTNHP3UQW6KQp8GMArzPio7YWeJsA5WkuTnXHNRRGTqyWnl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0s84iTJjb66qeYcHfDhdVTnPvFGFQSDk32NrmTz6RNhU494yqvj6CRgDHBnfv67apl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EFjK75mL24VXgWsLoa1Ztj4ePx6ZqBAitkWzp5hUGz4v4DW7bLeDxZ7ALQvxApcml

[37] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7020; https://t.me/shershni68/294

[38] https://t.me/z_arhiv/28428 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/28289 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/139794 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/139794 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/139781 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/54477 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/16656

[39] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/139794 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/139794 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/139781 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/54477 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0s84iTJjb66qeYcHfDhdVTnPvFGFQSDk32NrmTz6RNhU494yqvj6CRgDHBnfv67apl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0x1nxR5BAqByuQZjR4utTNHP3UQW6KQp8GMArzPio7YWeJsA5WkuTnXHNRRGTqyWnl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EFjK75mL24VXgWsLoa1Ztj4ePx6ZqBAitkWzp5hUGz4v4DW7bLeDxZ7ALQvxApcml

[40] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/05/na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-vorog-znovu-aktyvno-zastosovuye-bronetehniku-dlya-shturmiv/

[41] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/05/na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-vorog-znovu-aktyvno-zastosovuye-bronetehniku-dlya-shturmiv/

[42] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/05/na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-vorog-znovu-aktyvno-zastosovuye-bronetehniku-dlya-shturmiv/

[43] https://t.me/c/1433922609/7990154; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1842664423728492922

[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Y9mjECt4LBMS8ErSMxcwn7FMKK4ZGeG86FYFGTugBxYb5g9tG2wRmvabkpbKcQ6Yl ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2024

[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0x1nxR5BAqByuQZjR4utTNHP3UQW6KQp8GMArzPio7YWeJsA5WkuTnXHNRRGTqyWnl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0s84iTJjb66qeYcHfDhdVTnPvFGFQSDk32NrmTz6RNhU494yqvj6CRgDHBnfv67apl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/54477

[46] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/139794 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/139794

[47] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/78262

[48] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/05/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-bezuspishni-ataky-voroga-na-kurahivskomu-napryamku/

[49] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/05/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-bezuspishni-ataky-voroga-na-kurahivskomu-napryamku/

[50] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/05/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-bezuspishni-ataky-voroga-na-kurahivskomu-napryamku/

[51] https://t.me/dva_majors/54477 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22482 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/139741 ;

[52] https://t.me/odshbr79/392

[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0x1nxR5BAqByuQZjR4utTNHP3UQW6KQp8GMArzPio7YWeJsA5WkuTnXHNRRGTqyWnl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0s84iTJjb66qeYcHfDhdVTnPvFGFQSDk32NrmTz6RNhU494yqvj6CRgDHBnfv67apl ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/139794 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/54477 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22482 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/59424 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EFjK75mL24VXgWsLoa1Ztj4ePx6ZqBAitkWzp5hUGz4v4DW7bLeDxZ7ALQvxApcml

[54] https://t.me/voin_dv/11165

[55] https://t.me/PushilinDenis/5227

[56] https://t.me/motopatriot/28277 ; https://t.me/rybar/64147 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/132152 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/40282 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/132152 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/132153 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/19868 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/54439 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/54446

[57] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/139863 ; https://t.me/Mestb_Dobroj_Voli/12936

[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EFjK75mL24VXgWsLoa1Ztj4ePx6ZqBAitkWzp5hUGz4v4DW7bLeDxZ7ALQvxApcml

[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0x1nxR5BAqByuQZjR4utTNHP3UQW6KQp8GMArzPio7YWeJsA5WkuTnXHNRRGTqyWnl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0s84iTJjb66qeYcHfDhdVTnPvFGFQSDk32NrmTz6RNhU494yqvj6CRgDHBnfv67apl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22482

[60] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/05/na-zaporizkomu-napryamku-zmenshylas-kilkist-shturmiv-ale-intensyvnist-udariv-ne-spadaye/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/05/u-zsu-poyasnyly-zaczikavlenist-rosiyan-u-dvoh-naselenyh-punktah-pivdnya/

[61] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/05/vijskovi-rozpovily-yaku-taktyku-vykorystovuye-vorog-na-pivdni/

[62] https://t.me/dva_majors/54480 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/54485

[63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EFjK75mL24VXgWsLoa1Ztj4ePx6ZqBAitkWzp5hUGz4v4DW7bLeDxZ7ALQvxApcml

[64] https://t.me/kpszsu/20705

[65] https://t.me/odeskaODA/6943 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/10/06/rossiya-atakovala-odesskuyu-oblast-dronami-i-raketami-pod-udar-popali-sklady-gazoprovod-i-suhogruz

[66] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/16686; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/78249 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/132184; https://t.me/epoddubny/21257

[67] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8030 ; https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/na-donbasi-vijskovi-kndr-slidkuyut-za-peredanymy-boyeprypasamy-tspd-rnbo/

[68] https://t.me/dva_majors/54466

[69] https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/u-bilorusi-zatrymaly-zhinku-yaka-znyala-padinnya-shaheda/

[70] https://t.me/vvmvdrb/46518 ; https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/u-bilorusi-zatrymaly-zhinku-yaka-znyala-padinnya-shaheda/