Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Daria Novikov, Anna Harvey, Jessica Sobieski, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan
July 14, 2025, 9:30pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on July 14. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the July 15 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
US President Donald Trump
announced large-scale and rapid military aid supplies to Ukraine via the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and possible future secondary
tariffs against Russia. Trump stated on July 14 during a
meeting with NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte that the United States
will impose "severe" 100 percent secondary tariffs on Russia's trade
partners if there is no peace settlement to end Russia's war in Ukraine
within 50 days.[1] Trump
also announced that the United States will send "billions of dollars'
worth" of military equipment and weapons to NATO, that NATO will pay for
the US weapons, and that NATO will "quickly distribute" these weapons
to Ukrainian forces. Rutte stated that NATO will supply Ukraine with
"massive" amounts of military equipment, including air defenses,
missiles, and ammunition. Trump answered a question about whether the
United States was providing Patriot air defense batteries or just
missiles, stating that the United States will send "everything…a full
complement with the batteries." Trump stated that some Patriot systems
will arrive in Ukraine "within days" as unspecified NATO states give
Ukraine their own Patriot systems, after which the United States will
replace those systems. Trump stated that an unspecified state has "17
Patriots ready to be shipped" and that a "big portion of the 17 will go
to the war zone" in Ukraine "very quickly." It is unclear if Trump was
referring to 17 Patriot launchers or batteries.
Trump
is acting upon the reality that successful US efforts to bring Russian
President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table require that economic
instruments be coupled with Western military support to allow Ukraine to
increase pressure on Russia on the battlefield. Trump stated that the Russian economy is doing "very poorly" and that Russia is using its assets for war, not trade.[2]
Trump stated that Russia is wasting money and people on its war. Rutte
stated that Russian forces have suffered 100,000 deaths since January 1,
2025. ISW continues to assess that Russia's battlefield losses are the
key driver of Russia's economic woes as Russia suffers from the
consequences of increased and unsustainable war spending, growing
inflation, significant labor shortages, and reductions in Russia's
sovereign wealth fund.[3]
Increased pressure on Russian forces on the battlefield would risk
Putin's efforts to balance butter and guns and could force Putin to face
hard choices sooner than he would like. Forcing Putin either to make
unpopular decisions or to face a scenario in which Russia cannot
continue the war at the current tempo could bring Putin to the
negotiating table, ready to offer concessions to end the war on terms
acceptable to Ukraine and the United States.
Trump
noted that Russia has been delaying negotiations to end the war and
that the recent intensification of Russia's overnight drone and missile
strikes demonstrates that Russia is not interested in peace – in line
with ISW's longstanding assessment of Kremlin intentions. Trump stated that he is "disappointed" in Putin and that Trump has thought that a peace settlement was close "about four times."[4]
Trump noted that Russian strikes are hitting residences in Ukrainian
cities and that it will take Ukraine "years" to rebuild its damaged
energy infrastructure. Trump stated that Russian strikes against
Ukrainian cities show that Russia's "talk does not mean anything" and
that the United States needs to see actions and results, not just
"talk." Rutte added that the recent intensification of Russia's
overnight drone and missile strikes is not aimed at pursuing military
goals but trying to create panic in Ukraine. ISW has repeatedly assessed
in recent months that the Kremlin was pursuing various methods as part
of wider efforts to delay the negotiation process and prolong the war in
order to secure additional territorial gains on the battlefield.[5]
Trump said that European security benefits US interests and noted that Europe is committed to helping Ukraine defend itself. Trump stated that "having a strong Europe is a very good thing" and that Europe thinks supporting Ukraine is important.[6]
Rutte stated that Trump's July 14 announcements are building on the
June 2025 NATO summit in The Hague, in which NATO decided to "keep
Ukraine strong" and increase Europe's defense industrial production. The
joint declaration from the NATO summit highlighted that Ukraine's
security contributes to NATO's security.[7] Axios on
July 13 cited a source stating that Trump told French President
Emmanuel Macron following the call that Putin "wants to take all of
[Ukraine]."[8]
ISW continues to assess that a Russian victory in the war that results
in the conquest of all of Ukraine would bring combat experienced Russian
forces up to NATO's borders from the Black Sea to the Arctic Ocean such
that the United States would need to move large numbers of US forces
and commit a significant proportion of its fleet of stealth aircraft to
Europe.[9]
Additional
US military aid to Ukrainian forces will arrive at a dynamic, not
static, frontline characterized by ongoing Russian offensive operations
aimed at achieving slow maneuver and by Ukrainian counterattacks in key
frontline areas. Russian forces intensified offensive
operations throughout the theater in February and March 2025 and have
maintained pressure along the entire frontline over the last six months.
Russian forces have established or are actively establishing at least
eight salients that Russian forces could leverage in mutually
reinforcing tactical- and operational-level envelopments along the
frontline. Recent Russian attacks in the Velykyi Burluk direction
indicate that the Russian military command intends to create a salient
from which Russian forces can threaten Ukrainian forces in the rear of
the Vovchansk and northern Kupyansk directions.[10]
Russian forces have also developed salients aimed at forcing Ukrainian
troops to withdraw from frontline towns and settlements under threat of
envelopment in the Kupyansk, Borova, Lyman, Siversk, Kostyantynivka,
Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka directions over the last year. ISW assessed
in late January 2025 that Russian forces were developing and
disseminating a doctrinal method of advance throughout the theater that
aims to conduct slow envelopments of frontline settlements at a scale
that is reasonable for Russian forces to conclude before culminating,
and Russian patterns of advance over the last six months are consistent
with this assessment.[11]
The Russian military command's apparent decision to bypass the
Ukrainian fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast and attempts at a multi-year
operation to envelop the southern half of the fortress belt further
underscores Russia's commitment to this new doctrinal method.[12]
Russian
forces' ability to advance deep enough into Ukraine's defenses to
establish these salients indicates that the Russian military command has
improved its ability to seize on opportunities to advance, but the rate
of Russian advances has not increased beyond foot pace. The
Russian military command appears to have improved its ability and
increased its willingness to plan and conduct multi-year
operational-level efforts. Russian forces have been pursuing the
envelopment of Kupyansk since at least January 2024, although Russian
forces did not make notable advances towards this goal until July 2024.[13]
Russian forces have thus been pursuing the envelopment of Kupyansk for
at least 18 months and have advanced roughly 454 square kilometers since
July 1, 2024 (roughly 1.2 square kilometers per day over the last
year). Russian forces have also aimed to push Ukrainian forces from the
east (left) bank of the Oskil River in the Borova and Lyman directions
since late 2023 or early 2024 and only began making significant advances
north of Lyman in early January 2025.[14]
Russian forces have advanced roughly 15 to 17 kilometers west of the
Zherebets River over the last six months as part of efforts to establish
the Russian salient north of Lyman. Russian forces renewed offensive
operations in the Toretsk area in mid-June 2024 and have focused on
expanding their salient south and southwest of Kostyantynivka over the
last nine months. Russian efforts south and southwest of Kostyantynivka
also reinforce and have coincided with the ongoing Russian effort to
envelop Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. Russian forces have advanced roughly 617
square kilometers in the Kostyantynivka direction and roughly 1,394
square kilometers in the Pokrovsk direction since November 1, 2024 - an
average of 2.4 square kilometers and 5.5 square kilometers per day for
the last nine months, respectively. The renewed Russian offensive in
Toretsk in June 2024 also coincided with intensified Russian mechanized
activity and armor usage throughout western Donetsk Oblast in summer and
fall 2024. Russian forces have since leveraged several envelopments to
seize Vuhledar, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka and are currently
establishing the southern and eastern flanks of a future Russian effort
to envelop Novopavlivka. Russian forces have advanced roughly 1,057
square kilometers in western Donetsk Oblast since January 2, 2025, or an
average of 5.5 square kilometers per day for the last seven months.
ISW
previously assessed that Russian forces have advanced at a rate of
roughly 14 to 15 square kilometers per day over the past six months,
indicating that Russian gains are spread across the frontline and not
concentrated in a single frontline area.[15]
Russian forces have largely relied on infantry to advance in Ukraine
since Russia's initial push at the start of its full-scale invasion, and
Russian forces have failed to restore their ability to conduct the kind
of mechanized maneuver that would enable more rapid Russian gains.
Three and a half years of war have only further degraded Russia's
ability to conduct armored assaults, due in part to significant Russian
armored vehicle losses in 2023 and early 2024 and the loss of the more
elite, well-trained servicemembers that comprised Russia's pre-war
professional military cadre. Russian forces have thus far been able to
offset the personnel losses they incur during these advances, although
high Russian casualty rates are perpetuating a cycle of loss that
further incentivizes Russia to rely on poorly trained and equipped
infantry to make advances. This cycle, in turn, is limiting Russia's
rate of advance in Ukraine.
Russian
forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast near Hulyaipole –
the first tactically significant activity in this area of the frontline
since the Summer 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive. Geolocated
footage published on July 14 indicates that elements of the Russian
1466th Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment
(both subordinated to the 127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined
Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) recently seized
Malynivka (west of Hulyaipole).[16]
Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and a Russian milblogger
claimed that elements of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th
CAA, EMD) also participated in the seizure.[17] Russian forces intensified activity in the Hulyaipole direction in early May 2025 and advanced into Malynivka in late June.[18]
The
Russian military command likely intends to seize on recent advances in
western Donetsk Oblast in order to advance westward into Dnipropetrovsk
and Zaporizhia oblasts. Russian forces made a series of
tactically significant advances along the H-15 Kurakhove-Zaporizhzhia
City highway in mid-June 2025, especially southeast of Novopavlivka near
Bahatyr and Odradne and south of Novopavlivka near Komar.[19]
Russian forces have gradually advanced further west from Bahatyr and
north from Komar over the last month and advanced roughly 20 kilometers
from Bahatyr to Novokhatske (southwest of Novopavlivka) between June 14
and July 14, or about 670 meters a day on average in the past month.[20]
Geolocated evidence indicates that Russian forces have made marginal
advances into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in the direction of Novopavlivka,
but Russian forces have mainly concentrated their advances westward
toward Velykomykhailivka and Havrylivka (both southwest of
Novopavlivka).[21]
The Russian military command also recently redeployed elements of the
40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and the "Rubikon" Center for
Advanced Unmanned Technologies from the Kursk direction to western
Donetsk Oblast, indicating that the Russian military command is taking
some steps to reinforce the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces, possibly
ahead of a future push into southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[22]
The Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces currently oversees the frontline
from the Novopavlivka through the eastern Zaporizhia direction and
would likely command the forces involved in a Russian offensive into
southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian
forces may leverage advances in western Donetsk Oblast to launch an
offensive operation toward Pokrovske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, in pursuit
of Russia's long-standing desire to seize Zaporizhzhia City.
Russian forces have established a wide and mostly level frontline in the
Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia oblast border area that spans from
Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole) to Zelenyi Hai (southwest of
Novopavlivka) from which Russian forces could attack toward Hulyaipole,
Velykomykhailivka, and Havrylivka. The Russian military command may
intend to attack westward through Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts
if Russian commanders assess that most of Ukraine's frontline defensive
fortifications are oriented east to west against attacks from the south,
rather than north to south against attacks from the east. Russian
forces may attempt to leverage the H-15 Kurakhove-Zaporizhzhia City
highway to make rapid advances and establish convenient supply routes
from occupied Donetsk City. Russian forces advancing westward from
Zelenyi Hai will have to ford several rivers, including the Haichur,
Solona, Verkhnya Tersa, and Vovcha rivers.[23]
Russian forces will also need to cross the T-0408
Preobrazhenka-Novomykolaivka and T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highways
and seize several towns whose pre-war populations are comparable to that
of Chasiv Yar, which Russian forces have still yet to seize despite
ongoing offensive efforts since May 2024.[24]
Russian forces are extremely unlikely to advance rapidly across the
roughly 150 kilometers from their current positions in Novokhatske to
Zaporizhzhia City given the current rate of Russian advances, and
Russian forces would likely have to engage in a multi-year-long
offensive effort to advance to Zaporizhzhia City from the west. Russian
forces will likely also attempt to advance within tube artillery range
of Zaporizhzhia City from Kamyanske (roughly 35 kilometers south of
Zaporizhzhia City) but will likely face significant Ukrainian defenses.
Russian forces will also likely struggle to seize Zaporizhzhia City due
to the city’s size and near certainty that Ukrainian forces will
seriously defend the regional capital. Russian forces have not taken a
city this size since the initial push at the start of Russia's
full-scale invasion in early 2022. This assessment provides one possible
avenue the Russian military command may take to achieve its reported
objective to seize significant areas of southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
and the remainder of Zaporizhia Oblast in 2026.[25]
Ukrainian
forces are counterattacking in key areas of the front to slow Russian
advances and are inflicting significant costs on the Russian military,
however. Ukrainian forces conducted a series of limited
counterattacks into advancing Russian forces in the Kostyantynivka and
Pokrovsk directions in February and March 2025, which forced Russian
units to regroup and slowed Russian advances in these areas.[26]
Ongoing successful Ukrainian counterattacks and defensive operations in
the Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk directions appear to have forced the
Russian military command to reevaluate its plan for attacking
Kostyantynivka, prompting the recent prioritizing of Russian advances
that bypass the Ukrainian fortress belt from the southwest. Ukrainian
forces are also successfully counterattacking in the Kupyansk, Lyman,
and Siversk directions and have retaken limited positions in these
directions in recent days.[27] Ukrainian forces reportedly enveloped some Russian positions in northern Sumy Oblast because of recent counterattacks.[28]
Ukraine's
drone-based defense remains a key feature of Ukraine's ability to
constrain Russian advances. Ukrainian drone operators have created a
15-to-20 kilometer kill zone along the frontline that is currently
helping prevent rapid Russian advances and inflicting significant
manpower and materiel losses on Russia. The Economist recently
assessed that Russia has suffered between 900,000 and 1.3 million
personnel casualties since February 24, 2022, including between 190,000
and 350,000 killed-in-action (KIA), and Ukrainian drone operators have
inflicted a significant number of these losses.[29]
Russian adaptations aimed at countering Ukrainian drones, including
intensified usage of motorcycles, are likely also contributing to
increased KIA to wounded-in-action (WIA) ratios in Russian units, as
Russian forces attacking on motorcycles are poorly protected from
drones.[30]
Ukrainian counterattacks and drone operators have thus far succeeded in
keeping Russian advances to a slow crawl, although the Kremlin thus far
appears willing to accept these high costs for further gains.
Forcing
Putin to abandon his current theory of victory and agree to end the war
on reasonable terms requires Ukrainian forces to stop Russian advances
and begin to retake operationally significant areas. Western aid
provided in support of this effort is essential to hastening an end to
the war. Ukrainian forces have been successful in holding
Russian advances along the frontline to a foot pace while inflicting
significant casualties on Russian forces. Putin has
demonstrated throughout the past year, however, that he believes in a
theory of victory that posits that indefinite Russian gains – no matter
how slow or how costly – will allow Russia to achieve his goals in
Ukraine.[31]
Putin's theory assumes that the Russia can outlast and overcome Western
military assistance to Ukraine and that Ukrainian forces will be unable
to liberate any significant territory that Russian forces seize. Putin
is operating under the assumption that Ukraine will not be able to
acquire and sustain the manpower and materiel required to prevent
creeping but indefinite Russian advances or to contest the initiative
and conduct counteroffensive operations at some scale to liberate
territory. Western military aid to Ukraine's ground forces is required
to enable Ukrainian forces to stop Russian advances and then push
Russian forces back in critical areas. Such successes will invalidate
Putin's assumptions that Russian forces can continue gradual advances
indefinitely and that Russian forces will be able to hold any territory
they seize. Only significant Ukrainian battlefield gains will prompt
changes in his calculus and force Putin to discard his efforts to
prolong the war, come to the negotiating table, and agree to a peace
settlement on acceptable terms to bring about Trump's desired just and
lasting end to the war.
Timely and reliable
Western military assistance to Ukraine coupled with increased economic
pressure is necessary to bring about an end of the war on terms
satisfactory for the United States, Europe, and Ukraine. Well-provisioned
Ukrainian forces have previously demonstrated their ability to prevent
Russian forces from making even marginal gains and to retake significant
territory despite Russian manpower and materiel advantages.[32]
Western military aid to Ukraine will enable Ukrainian forces to
maintain, if not increase, their ability to inflict the significant
materiel and personnel losses on the battlefield that are straining
Russia's economy. Western provisions of air defense systems to Ukraine
will protect Ukraine's people and enable Ukraine's defense industrial
base (DIB) to flourish and increasingly meet Ukraine's long-term
national security needs. Ukraine's DIB has proven critical for
maintaining Ukraine's drone-based defenses that are limiting Russian
forces to creeping advances at high costs, and the West will continue to
benefit from Ukrainian innovations and industrial capacity in the
long-term. Economic pressure, in the form of both Western sanctions and
enduring labor shortages and demographic issues brought on by losses in
Ukraine, will further strain the Russian economy and reduce the funds
available to Moscow for its protracted war effort.
Putin
remains committed to his original war aims over 1,200 days into his
full-scale invasion and is trying to avoid making concessions at any
cost, including those that would risk the long-term security of the
Russian state and the stability of Putin's regime.[33]
Putin is deliberately protracting the war in Ukraine, believing that
time is on Russia's side. Putin has chosen not to enact socially
unpopular policies that would boost Russia's war effort in a sustainable
way and continues to bet that the West will abandon Ukraine long before
he must. The Trump administration has set the stage to seize on this
critical moment, via both military aid to Ukraine and expanded economic
pressure on Russia, to exploit Russia's weaknesses and negotiate a deal
that maximizes US, European, and Ukrainian interests.
Key Takeaways:
- US
President Donald Trump announced largescale and rapid military aid
supplies to Ukraine via NATO and possible future secondary tariffs
against Russia.
- Trump is acting upon the
reality that successful US efforts to bring Russian President Vladimir
Putin to the negotiating table require that economic instruments be
coupled with Western military support to allow Ukraine to increase
pressure on Russia on the battlefield.
- Trump
noted that Russia has been delaying negotiations to end the war and that
the recent intensification of Russia's overnight drone and missile
strikes demonstrates that Russia is not interested in peace – in line
with ISW's longstanding assessment of Kremlin intentions.
- Trump said that European security benefits US interests and noted that Europe is committed to helping Ukraine defend itself.
- Additional
US military aid to Ukrainian forces will arrive at a dynamic, not
static, frontline characterized by ongoing Russian offensive operations
aimed at achieving slow maneuver and by Ukrainian counterattacks in key
frontline areas.
- Russian forces' ability to
advance deep enough into Ukraine's defenses to establish these salients
indicates that the Russian military command has improved its ability to
seize on opportunities to advance, but the rate of Russian advances has
not increased beyond foot pace.
- Russian forces
recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast near Hulyaipole – the
first tactically significant activity in this area of the frontline
since the Summer 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive.
- The
Russian military command likely intends to seize on recent advances in
western Donetsk Oblast in order to advance westward into Dnipropetrovsk
and Zaporizhia oblasts.
- Russian forces may
leverage advances in western Donetsk Oblast to launch an offensive
operation toward Pokrovske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, in pursuit of
Russia's long-standing desire to seize Zaporizhzhia City.
- Ukrainian
forces are counterattacking in key areas of the front to slow Russian
advances and are inflicting significant costs on the Russian military,
however.
- Forcing Putin to abandon his current
theory of victory and agree to end the war on reasonable terms requires
Ukrainian forces to stop Russian advances and begin to retake
operationally significant areas. Western aid provided in support of this
effort is essential to hastening an end to the war.
- Timely
and reliable Western military assistance to Ukraine coupled with
increased economic pressure is necessary to bring about an end of the
war on terms satisfactory for the United States, Europe, and Ukraine.
- Ukrainian
forces recently advanced near Lyman and Novopavlivka and in western
Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy and
Zaporizhia oblasts and near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole.
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian forces continued offensive operations in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 13 and 14 but did not advance.[34]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
(Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine
along the international border and approach to within tube artillery
range of Sumy City)
Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 14 indicates
that Russian forces recently advanced in western Yunakivka (northeast of
Sumy City).[35]
Unconfirmed
claims: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that
Ukrainian forces bypassed Russian positions near Oleksiivka (north of
Sumy City) from the east and northeast and broke through to
Novomykolaivka (northeast of Oleksiivka).[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division seized Yunakivka.[37]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in Kindrativka
(north of Sumy City) and Ryzhivka and near Beszalivka (both northwest
of Sumy City near the international border).[38]
Russian
forces attacked northwest of Sumy City near Beszalivka and Ryzhivka;
north of Sumy City near Andriivka and Kindrativka; and northeast of Sumy
City near Yunakivka on July 13 and 14.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka and Andriivka.[40]
Mashovets
stated on July 14 that the Russian military command introduced reserves
into battle in the Bilovody and Vodolahy directions (north of Sumy
City) in an attempt prevent Ukrainian forces from encircling Russian
forces in Oleksiivka.[41]
Order
of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the 51st VDV Regiment
(106th VDV Division) and 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black
Sea Fleet) are operating near Loknya (northeast of Sumy City).[42]
Mashovets stated that elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade
(Pacific Fleet) and 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle
Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are
operating near Kindrativka.[43] Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly operating near Kindrativka.[44]
Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to
the BARS-25 Anvar Volunteer Detachment) are reportedly striking
Ukrainian positions near Esman, Katerynivka, Novovasylivka, and Prohres
(all northwest of Sumy City near the international border).[45]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 14 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced
within fields west of Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[46]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Zelene on July 13 and 14.[47]
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on July 14 that Russian forces are more active in Vovchansk.[48]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk
direction stated that Russian forces operating in the Vovchansk
direction conduct up to 10 assaults and lose on average 100 personnel
per day.[49]
The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are using motorcycles and
buggies more frequently due to favorable summer weather conditions and
are leveraging first-person-view (FPV) drones, including those with
fiber optic cables, more than during Winter 2024-2025. The spokesperson
stated that the largest "kill zone" in the area is five kilometers deep.
The spokesperson also stated that Russian forces are unsuccessfully
trying to build crossings over the Vovcha River and cross the river in
watercraft.
Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that
elements of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps
[AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are operating in Vovchansk.[50]
Mashovets stated that elements of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division
(11th AC, LMD) are operating near Hlyboke and Zelene (both northeast of
Kharkiv City).[51]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 14 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west
and south of Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[52]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove on July 13 and 14.[53]
A
Russian milblogger claimed that Russian attacks near Dehtyarne
(northeast of Velykyi Burluk) are aimed at creating a "buffer zone" and
stretching Ukrainian reserve[54][55]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 14 but did not advance.
Russian
forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka, Holubivka, and
Radkivka; northwest of Kupyansk near Myrove; northeast of Kupyansk near
Synkivka, Kamyanka, and Stroivka; east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka;
and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pishchane
on July 13 and 14.[56]
A
Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on July 13 that reports of
serious Russian advances toward Kupyansk and Russian attacks against the
settlement are premature and that the complex Russian logistics
measures required to accumulate Russian forces on the Oskil River’s west
(right) bank, terrain, and Ukrainian drone operations will complicate
Russian attempts to seize the settlement.[57]
Another Russian milblogger claimed that there is no evidence supporting
claims that Russian forces entered Myrove or Sobolivka (west of
Kupyansk) and complained about the Russian military command’s continued
exaggeration of Russian advances.[58]
The milblogger claimed that reports that Russian forces have almost
encircled Kupyansk by seizing Myrove and Sobolivka are premature.[59]
The
Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office stated on July 14 that Russian
forces launched a Geran-2 type drone against Hrushivka (southwest of
Kupyansk).[60]
Order
of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that
elements of the Russian 1st Tank Regiment and 27th Separate Motorized
Rifle Brigade (both of the 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military
District [MMD]) are operating in the Kupyansk direction.[61]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 14 but did not advance.
Russian
forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Kolisnykivka and
toward Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Kopanky; and southeast of
Borova near Hrekivka and toward Cherneshchyna and Novoserhiivka on July
13 and 14.[62]
Order
of Battle: Mashovets stated on July 14 that elements of the Russian 3rd
Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) are
operating in the Hrekivka-Druzhelyubivka direction (southeast of
Borova).[63]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on July 14 but did not advance.
Russian
forces attacked northwest of Lyman toward Serednie and Shandryholove;
north of Lyman near Karpivka, Novomykhailivka, Ridkodub, and Zelena
Dolyna and toward Novyi Myr; and east of Lyman near Torske on July 13
and 14.[64] Mashovets stated on July 14 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Ridkodub and Katerynivka (north of Lyman).[65]
The
spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction
stated on July 14 that Russian forces are increasing the tempo of their
assaults.[66] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces attack in groups of five to 10 people, sometimes on motorcycles.
Order
of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 1st and 15th
motorized rifle regiments (both of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st
GTA, MMD) and 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are
operating near Karpivka and Zelena Dolyna.[67]
Mashovets stated that elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Regiment
(67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th CAA, Central Military District
[CMD]) are operating in Torske.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed
territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.
Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage posted on July 14 indicates that
Ukrainian forces advanced in the Serebryanske forest area northeast of
Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[68]
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near
Serebryanka and Hryhorivka; east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; and
southeast of Siversk near Vyimka and Ivano-Darivka on July 13 and 14.[69]
Order
of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that
elements of the Russian 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th Combined
Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are operating near
Serebryanka.[70]
Elements of the 14th Separate Tank Battalion (possibly a reconstituted
Soviet unit) (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk
People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD])
are reportedly operating in the Serebryanske forest area.[71]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 14 but did not advance.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora, Stupochky, and Predtechyne on July 13 and 14.[72]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated published on July 9 indicates that Russian
forces recently advanced northwest of Dachne (north of Toretsk).[73]
Geolocated footage published on July 14 indicates that Russian forces
recently advanced in western Novospaske (just west of Toretsk).[74]
Geolocated footage published on July 14 indicates that Russian forces
recently advanced along Leninska Street in central Yablunivka (northwest
of Toretsk).[75]
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced
further northwest of Dachne, southeast of Katerynivka, east of Rusyn Yar
(northwest of Toretsk), and north of Yablunivka.[76]
Russian
forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka;
and northwest of Toretsk near Rusyn Yar, Popiv Yar, Yablunivka,
Oleksandro-Kalynove, and Poltavka and toward Stepanivka and Pleshchiivka
on July 13 and 14.[77] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Oleksandro-Kalynove.[78]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating west of Dyliivka.[79]
Drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (20th
Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking
Ukrainian forces near Stepanivka.[80]
Drone operators of the Kaira Detachment of the 39th Motorized Rifle
Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly
striking Ukrainian positions near Sofiivka (northwest of Toretsk).[81]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 14 indicates
that Russian forces recently advanced in northeastern Fedorivka,
southwest of Razine (both northeast of Pokrovsk), and in northeastern
Novoekonomichne (east of Pokrovsk).[82]
Unconfirmed
claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers
claimed that Russian forces seized Fedorivka and Mayak (northeast of
Pokrovsk).[83]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of
Fedorivka, toward Volodymyrivka, in central Boykivka (both northeast of
Pokrovsk), west of Razine, and west of Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk).[84]
Russian
forces attacked toward Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk toward
Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Razine, Novotoretske,
Novoekonomichne, Myrne, Fedorivka, and Myrolyubivka and toward
Volodymyrivka; east of Pokrovsk near Mykolaivka and Promin and toward
Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near
Vidrodzhennya and Shevchenko; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove 13
and 14.[85]
The
Russian MoD reported on July 14 that the Russian Chief of the General
Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov inspected the Central Grouping of
Forces in the Pokrovsk direction.[86]
Russian
milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are attacking west of Razine
toward Rodynske in order to cut off Ukrainian ground lines of
communication (GLOCs) along the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Dobropillya road.[87]
Order
of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade
(51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are
reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novoekonomichne.[88]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.
Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 14 indicates
that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in eastern Tovste and in western
Piddubne (both southwest of Novopavlivka).[89]
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced toward
Voskresenka and Oleksandrohrad and west of Shevchenko (all southwest of
Novopavlivka).[90]
Russian
forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka
near Novoserhiivka and Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka;
southeast of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Kut and Oleksiivka; south of
Novopavlivka near Zaporizhzhia, Myrne, Dachne, and Komar and toward
Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Novokhatske, Zelenyi Hai,
Piddubne, and Voskresenka on July 13 and 14.[91]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic
Fleet), 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD), 5th Tank Brigade
(36th CAA), and 30th Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 36th CAA) are
reportedly operating near Voskresenka.[92] Elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Yalta (south of Novopavlivka).[93]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 14 but did not advance.
Russian
forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and
Shevchenko and toward Komyshuvakha, west of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene
Pole and toward Temyrivka, and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near
Rivnopil on July 13 and 14.[94]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment
(127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating
in the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area.[95]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
(Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas
against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of
Zaporizhzhia City)
See topline text for reports of assessed Russian advances in the Hulyaipole direction.
Both Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 13 indicates
that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northwestern Kamyanske
(southwest of Orikhiv).[96]
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 14 indicates
that Russian forces recently advanced along Molodizhna Street in
northern Kamyanske.[97]
Russian
forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Plavni, southwest of Orikhiv near
Mali Shcherbaky and Kamyanske, and southeast of Orikhiv toward
Novodanylivka on July 13 and 14.[98]
The
commander of a Ukrainian drone company operating in the Zaporizhia
direction stated on July 14 that Russian forces are increasing the
intensity of their strikes with fiber optic drones, guided glide bombs,
and artillery.[99]
Order
of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 4th Military Base (58th
Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are
reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Orikhiv.[100]
Drone operators of the BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose
Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment, subordinated to Airborne
Forces) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[101]
Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Kherson direction on July 13 and 14 but did not advance.[102]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 104th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[103]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian
forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine
on the night of July 13 to 14. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that
Russian forces launched 136 strike and decoy drones, up to 90 of which
were Shahed-type drones, and four S-300/400 air defense missiles from
the directions of Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov
Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Donetsk Oblast.[104]
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 61
Shahed-type drones and that 47 decoy drones were "lost" or suppressed by
Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force
reported that 28 Russian drones hit 10 locations in Ukraine and that
downed drone debris fell in four locations. Ukrainian officials reported
that the Russian strikes damaged industrial infrastructure in Kharkiv
and Kyiv oblasts.[105]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Belarusian
President Alexander Lukashenko appointed Colonel Pavel Shebeko as
Deputy Commander of the Belarussian Northwestern Operational Command on
July 14.[106]
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://rollcall.com/factbase/trump/transcript/donald-trump-remarks-bilat-mark-rutte-nato-july-14-2025/; https://thehill.com/policy/defense/5399744-watch-live-trump-meets-nato-secretary-general/
[2] https://rollcall.com/factbase/trump/transcript/donald-trump-remarks-bilat-mark-rutte-nato-july-14-2025/; https://thehill.com/policy/defense/5399744-watch-live-trump-meets-nato-secretary-general/
[3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage
[4] https://rollcall.com/factbase/trump/transcript/donald-trump-remarks-bilat-mark-rutte-nato-july-14-2025/; https://thehill.com/policy/defense/5399744-watch-live-trump-meets-nato-secretary-general/
[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060125; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040425
[6] https://rollcall.com/factbase/trump/transcript/donald-trump-remarks-bilat-mark-rutte-nato-july-14-2025/; https://thehill.com/policy/defense/5399744-watch-live-trump-meets-nato-secretary-general/
[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025
[8] https://www.axios.com/2025/07/14/trump-ukraine-weapons-missiles-russia
[9]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/high-price-losing-ukraine-part-1-%E2%80%94-military-strategic-financial-implications-russian
[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071225
[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2025
[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070525
[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis
[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010625
[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071025
[16] https://x.com/voin_dv/status/1944676994098110945; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1944680190086729906; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1944685952913613175; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9579; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32006 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95765
[17] https://t.me/mod_russia/54668; https://t.me/voin_dv/15973
[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4-2025; https//t.me/z_arhiv/31858; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65040; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9430; https://t.me/banditskiy_nestor/5125
[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070625; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2025
[20] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-12-2025
[21] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060925 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2025
[22] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2794; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2804; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-10-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070725
[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9
[24] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-has-failed-break-ukraine
[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060625
[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-9-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-2-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-7-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-3-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-15-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-8-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-9-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-10-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-11-2025
[27]https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825; https://isw.pub/InitialRusCampaignAssessment; https://isw.pub/UkrWar123023; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031824; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052424
[28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2025;
[29] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071025
[30] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060525 ; https://isw.pub/RussianForceGen050725
[31] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2025
[32] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2024;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar021324%C2%A0;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-29-2024
[33]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2025;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041325 ;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825;
https://isw.pub/InitialRusCampaignAssessment;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar123023; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031824;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar052424
[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26641; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26614; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26612
[35] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9588; https://t.me/OMBR156/781
[36] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2858
[37] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38823
[38] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65868; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65870; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31254; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172392; https://t.me/dva_majors/75327; https://t.me/wargonzo/27838; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172425; https://t.me/dva_majors/75328
[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26641; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26614; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26612; https://t.me/wargonzo/27838; https://t.me/dva_majors/75327; https://t.me/dva_majors/75328
[40] https://t.me/dva_majors/75327
[41] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2858
[42] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2858
[43] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2858
[44] https://t.me/dva_majors/75318
[45] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172370
[46] https://t.me/wargonzo/27838
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26641; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26614; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26612; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13750
[48] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2858
[49] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1066185-na-vovcanskomu-napramku-rosiani-sodna-vtracaut-u-serednomu-do-100-vijskovih-brigada-gart/
[50] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2859
[51] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2859
[52] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95726; https://t.me/wargonzo/27838; https://t.me/dva_majors/75328
[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26614; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95726
[54] https://t.me/dva_majors/75327
[55] https://t.me/dva_majors/75327
[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26641; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26614; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26612; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13750; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2859
[57] https://t.me/rybar/72129
[58] https://t.me/dva_majors/75323
[59] https://t.me/dva_majors/75327
[60]
https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/23993; https://suspilne dot
media/kharkiv/1065865-na-kupansini-vnaslidok-udaru-geran-2-buli-poraneni-dvoe-colovikiv/
[61] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2859
[62]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26641; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26614;
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26612; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13750
[63] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2860
[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26641; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26614; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26612; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13750
[65] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2860
[66]
https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2025/07/14/mozhut-buty-poodynoki-vershnyky-poblyzu-lymanu-vorozha-tehnika-zhyve-ne-bilshe-20-hvylyn/
[67] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2860
[68] https://t.me/shock3OA/1436; https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1944680312170025101
[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26641; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26614; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26612; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13750
[70] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2860
[71] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1944680312170025101; https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1944680347771261404 ; https://t.me/shock3OA/1436; https://tankoved34 dot livejournal.com/74612.html
[72]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26641; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26614;
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26612; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13750
[73] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9586; https://t.me/ombr_28/2412 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1942473791822602429 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1944559679486513599
[74] https://t.me/dva_majors/75374; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1944796792929067470; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1944800884120039778; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9591
[75] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9593; https://t.me/dva_majors/75376
[76] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65864 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172416
[77]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26641; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26614;
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26612; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13750
[78] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65864
[79] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172416
[80] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14034
[81] https://t.me/milinfolive/152874
[82]
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9590; https://t.me/ssternenko/46337 ;
https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95723 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9589;
https://t.me/argus38/633; https://x.com/InBigall/status/1944714541784277244; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9578; https://www.instagram.com/reel/DMFEGr1KN7B/?igsh=MTAzYzc0dnlwZWI4
[83] https://t.me/mod_russia/54662; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65873 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95723
[84] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65864 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65873; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95723; https://t.me/dva_majors/75327
[85]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26641; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26614;
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26612; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13750
[86] https://t.me/mod_russia/54661; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172391
[87] https://t.me/sashakots/54908; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172365; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65886
[88] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14035
[89] https://x.com/MaxximOSINT/status/1944637442901889479; https://x.com/MaxximOSINT/status/1944636940810125703; https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1944658513013191046; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1944661080208249090; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/29631; https://t.me/OVMBr_5/205
[90] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65869; https://t.me/wargonzo/27838
[91]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26641; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26614;
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26612; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13750
[92] https://t.me/voin_dv/15983; https://t.me/voin_dv/15986
[93]
https://www.facebook.com/reel/766571112605540; https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2025/07/13/skynulys-na-drony-otrymaly-minomet-mobilizovanyj-rosiyanyn-rozpoviv-pro-proval-pid-yaltoyu/
[94]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26641; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26614;
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26612; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13750
[95] https://t.me/voin_dv/15971
[96] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1944614854972547256; https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1944614929929269341; https://t.me/frontbird/23788
[97] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9587; https://t.me/krulaomegu/706
[98] https://t.me/wargonzo/27838
[99]
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2025/07/14/piloty-pereryvaly-kabeli-optovolokna-na-pivdennomu-fronti-maksymalna-aktyvnist-vorozhyh-droniv/
[100] https://t.me/dva_majors/75360
[101] https://t.me/dva_majors/75360
[102] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26641; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26614; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26612; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid023wk9ueFp2C5ZhAxHxyEkPgVwVtu4FFzeiKS3EfqtxAhMFi6NVPPBokbNMyohG8sbl?__cft__[0]=AZXKvdozHP3wBNtYO6wX4-gTgDDgUJ6h-m6FTi2X2MV_KtETdOJyFqZi1iz6_qdlzF1khuUIcTr8M4wEbHLrBc-ie91jbZPT6UYrAgVXiGDxMgYyt39AEcJej5bUntQkGpeLZoN7g9HjkLLuSGNluKJarPR-kDltGVCSCWzqksnyKA&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
[103] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31240
[104] https://t.me/kpszsu/38403
[105] https://t.me/GalinaMinaeva/4958; https://suspilne
dot
media/1065769-ssa-gotuut-novi-postavki-zbroi-dla-ukraini-zsu-vidpovidatimut-dalekobijnimi-udarami-na-ataki-rf-1237-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1752445364&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps;
https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/6270; https://suspilne dot
media/kyiv/1064695-naslidki-rosijskoi-ataki-zafiksuvali-u-dvoh-rajonah-kiivsini-kalasnik/;
[106] https://t.me/pul_1/17527; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/323728; https://belta
dot
by/president/view/pavel-shebeko-naznachen-zamkomandujuschego-vojskami-severo-zapadnogo-operativnogo-komandovanija-726341-2025/
