UA-69458566-1

Wednesday, May 14, 2025

Iran Update, May 14, 2025

 Andie Parry, Avery Borens, Katherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Ben Rezaei, Ben Schmida, and Annika Ganzeveld

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.

Syrian President Ahmed al Shara has continued to prioritize appeasing loyalists in his ruling coalition over reassuring minority groups that the government will protect them, which risks future instability. The Syrian Interior Ministry promoted Latakia Province General Security Service (GSS) Director Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Knefati to commander of the Interior Ministry Special Forces on May 13.[1] Knefati served as the Latakia Province GSS Director between December 2024 and May 2025, which included the spate of sectarian-motivated violence and insurgent activity in coastal Syria in March.[2] Some Latakia Province GSS personnel took part in the March 2025 massacres.[3] The committee charged with investigating the violence has yet to release its report.[4] Knefati, as the commander of forces that are accused of committing atrocities, bears responsibility for the actions of those forces and could be named in the report. The Alawite community remains deeply fearful of the new transitional government after the recent coastal massacres. A lack of transitional justice could stoke protests and increase distrust in the government, which risks future political instability. It would similarly disincentivize minority communities from disarming due to fears for their safety.

Ahmed al Shara has continued to elevate commanders of Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) factions in the Syrian military apparatus without requiring them to reform or restructure their forces. Syrian Deputy Defense Minister Fahim Issa met with several unspecified Ministry of Defense (MoD)-affiliated leaders near Ras al Ain, Hasakah Province, on May 13.[5] Issa previously commanded the Sultan Murad Division, which is an SNA faction, and has overseen the “northern region” within the Syrian MoD since April 2025.[6] The SNA currently controls Ras al Ain.[7] Shara likely calculates that he needs the support of these SNA commanders to avoid infighting among powerful factions, which would hinder his efforts to establish control over Syria. Shara almost certainly recognizes that alienating these factions or attempting to subordinate them by force would be too difficult a task for his relatively meager armed forces, especially without Turkish assistance. The networks that these individuals control could also rapidly destabilize certain areas of Syria if they chose to mobilize these networks against the Syrian government. The elevation of these individuals will likely reinforce the Kurdish minority’s skepticism of Damascus and further delay the implementation of integration agreements between the Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Forces and the transitional government.[8] Shara’s decision to pursue state building and power consolidation in this way will likely instill feelings of insecurity among members of the Kurdish, Druze, and Alawite communities, which may discourage these communities from cooperating with the government, despite their desire to be part of a unified Syria. Systemic issues that arise from choices that Shara makes to consolidate power may not have immediate implications, but they will likely weaken the Syrian state in the long term.

The Syrian Interior Ministry and Foreign Ministry appointed several Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-affiliated individuals to senior ministerial and security positions between May 10 and 13.[9] Unspecified Syrian security sources told Saudi media that these appointments are part of the foreign, defense, interior, and justice ministries’ new plans and procedures to enhance security, enforce the law, and restore public confidence.[10] The Syrian government’s appointment of HTS affiliates to key ministerial and security positions suggests that President Shara aims to maintain his and HTS’s influence within key ministries. Shara’s decision to position loyalists in these roles will enable him to shape the policies of the Syrian government and its security services. The newly-appointed individuals include:

  • Abdul Qader al Tahhan (Abu Bilal Quds) as Deputy Interior Minister for National Security Affairs.[11] Tahhan was previously the Aleppo sector commander in al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra and the HTS-led Fateh Mubin operations room that overthrew the Assad regime.[12] Tahhan also led the al Quds Battalion, an Aleppo-based Islamist opposition group, and commanded several battalions within Jaysh al Fatah.[13] Jaysh al Fatah was a coalition of Syrian Islamist opposition groups that formed in March 2015.[14]
  • Hakim al Deiri (Dia al Din al Omar) as GSS Director of Latakia Province.[15] Deiri previously served as the HTS-controlled Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) Public Security Spokesperson.[16] Deiri was also the Deir ez Zor Province GSS Director between December 2024 and May 2025.[17]
  • Muhammad Taha al Ahmad as Deputy Foreign Minister for Arab Affairs.[18] Ahmad served as SSG Minister of Economy from November 2017 to December 2019 and SSG Minister of Agriculture from December 2019 to December 2024.[19] Ahmad also served as the Director of Civil Administration in the Islamist opposition coalition Jaysh al Fatah prior to 2017.[20]

US President Donald Trump and Syrian President Ahmed al Shara met in Riyadh on May 14, marking a positive development in US-Syria relations.[21] This meeting marks the first time that US and Syrian heads of state have met in 25 years. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan attended the meeting remotely. Trump, Shara, and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman discussed the importance of lifting sanctions on Syria and the impact that lifting sanctions would have on regional stability.[22] Trump announced on May 13 that he intends to lift “all” sanctions on Syria, though there are several legal obstacles that Trump must overcome in order to be able to do so. Trump and Shara also discussed eliminating the influence of “non-state actors and non-Syrian armed groups.”[23] Shara is unlikely to meet this demand, given that he has already appointed several foreign fighters who are loyal to him to senior positions in the Syrian government in an effort to consolidate power.[24] Trump also encouraged Shara to sign the Abraham Accords with Israel.[25] Shara did not explicitly reject the proposal but reiterated his commitment to the 1974 disengagement agreement with Israel, which would require Israel to withdraw from the Syrian territory where it has operated since the fall of the Assad regime.[26] Trump praised Shara as a “young, attractive... [and] tough guy” following the meeting.

Western media and a Yemen analyst have reported somewhat different information about the formation of the recent US-Houthi ceasefire, though these reports are not mutually exclusive.[27] US officials told Western media that the Houthis approached the United States first through Omani mediators to request a ceasefire.[28] A Yemen analyst reported on May 7 that US officials submitted three demands to the Houthis. These demands included halting attacks on US vessels, stopping attacks targeting Israel, and re-engaging in peace talks within the Saudi-led roadmap.[29] This report is not inconsistent with the report that the Houthis approached the United States first, given that the United States could have proposed these demands following the initial Houthi request for a ceasefire.[30] The Houthis accepted the first demand, but they appear to have rejected the second demand, and it is unclear if they agreed to re-engage in peace talks. Senior Houthi officials, including Houthi Political Bureau member and spokesperson Mohammed al Bukhaiti, have told international media since April 10 that the Houthis would cease attacks on US vessels if the United States stopped its air campaign targeting the Houthis.[31] The Houthis have not attacked maritime shipping since November 2024, though they threatened to renew the attack campaign in March 2025.

The Houthis have not abandoned their October 7 War objectives and are, therefore, not defeated. The Houthis still seek to support Hamas in the Gaza Strip by imposing an “economic blockade” on Israel.[32] The Houthis attacked ships with reported ties to Israel between October 2023 and November 2024 to disrupt trade through Israeli ports.[33] The Houthis have continued to attack Israel since November 2024.[34] The Houthis launched three separate unsuccessful ballistic missile attacks targeting Ben Gurion Airport on May 12 and 13.[35] The Houthis announced on May 4 that they would focus their attacks on Ben Gurion Airport after Israeli air defense systems failed to intercept a Houthi ballistic missile that crashed in the airport’s parking lot.[36] The Houthi attacks on Ben Gurion Airport are meant to achieve the Houthis’ original October 7 War objective to support Hamas by hurting the Israeli economy and imposing an economic cost on Israel for its operations in the Gaza Strip.[37] The US-Houthi ceasefire has not rendered the Houthis unwilling or unable to continue to try to achieve this objective.

Iran is reportedly trying to get Arab countries, including Iraq, to encourage the United States to lift sanctions on Iran and conclude a nuclear deal. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani met with Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji in Baghdad on May 14 to encourage the Iraqi federal government to raise “Iranian desires” at the Arab Summit in Baghdad on May 17, according to an unspecified source speaking to Iraqi media.[38] Araji is a member of the Iranian-backed Badr Organization. Ghaani will reportedly meet with other Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians during his visit to Baghdad. The unspecified source stated that Iran “seeks Arab support” to remove international sanctions on Iran and “move toward a nuclear agreement more quickly.” Senior Iranian officials have repeatedly rejected US demands during the ongoing US-Iran nuclear negotiations for zero uranium enrichment and criticized the US maximum pressure campaign targeting Iranian oil exports.

Iran reportedly recently proposed forming a regional nuclear consortium with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to enrich uranium at Iranian facilities, likely to try to maintain some level of uranium enrichment. Emirati Foreign Affairs Minister Khalifa Shaheen al Marar and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman al Saud will attend the Arab Summit. It is possible that this proposal will be discussed at the summit.

Key Takeaways:

  • Government Formation and Consolidation of Power in Syria: Syrian President Ahmed al Shara has continued to prioritize appeasing loyalists in his ruling coalition over reassuring minority groups that the government will protect them, which risks future instability. The Syrian Interior Ministry promoted Latakia Province General Security Service (GSS) Director Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Knefati to commander of the Interior Ministry Special Forces on May 13. Knefati served as the Latakia Province GSS Director between December 2024 and May 2025, which included the spate of sectarian-motivated violence and insurgent activity in coastal Syria in March. Knefati, as the commander of forces that are accused of committing atrocities, bears responsibility for the actions of those forces and could be named in the report.
  • Government Formation and Consolidation of Power in Syria: Shara has also continued to elevate commanders of Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) factions in the Syrian military apparatus without requiring them to reform or restructure their forces. The elevation of these individuals will likely reinforce the Kurdish minority’s skepticism of Damascus and further delay the implementation of integration agreements between the Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Forces and the transitional government.
  • Government Formation and Consolidation of Power in Syria: The Syrian Interior Ministry and Foreign Ministry appointed several Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-affiliated individuals to senior ministerial and security positions between May 10 and 13. The Syrian government’s appointment of HTS affiliates to key ministerial and security positions suggests that President Shara aims to maintain his and HTS’s influence within key ministries.
  • Trump-Shara Meeting: US President Donald Trump and Syrian President Ahmed al Shara met in Riyadh on May 14, marking a positive development in US-Syria relations. This meeting marks the first time that US and Syrian heads of state have met in 25 years. Trump, Shara, and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman discussed the importance of lifting sanctions on Syria and the impact that lifting sanctions would have on regional stability.
  • US-Houthi Ceasefire: The Houthis have not abandoned their October 7 War objectives and are, therefore, not defeated. The Houthis still seek to support Hamas in the Gaza Strip by imposing an “economic blockade” on Israel.
  • US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations: Iran is reportedly trying to get Arab countries, including Iraq, to encourage the United States to lift sanctions on Iran and conclude a nuclear deal. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani met with Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji in Baghdad on May 14 to encourage the Iraqi federal government to raise “Iranian desires” at the Arab Summit in Baghdad on May 17, according to an unspecified source speaking to Iraqi media. The unspecified source stated that Iran “seeks Arab support” to remove international sanctions on Iran and “move toward a nuclear agreement more quickly.”

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

Iran and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) will meet in Istanbul, Turkey, on May 16 to discuss the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.[39] The Iranian delegation will likely try to persuade the E3 not to impose snapback sanctions on Iran. Unspecified diplomats told Reuters on May 13 that the E3 may trigger snapback sanctions on Iran by August if Iran and the United States do not reach a “substantial deal” by then.[40] The E3 previously stated that Iran needed to conclude a new nuclear deal by June 2025.[41] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[42] The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) previously passed a censure resolution proposed by the E3 in November 2024 that requires the IAEA to produce a “comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities by spring 2025.[43] The IAEA has not released the report at the time of this writing. CTP-ISW previously assessed that the report will almost certainly confirm Iranian noncompliance with the JCPOA and lay the foundation for the E3 to impose snapback sanctions.[44] The snapback mechanism expires in October 2025.

Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi may lead the Iranian delegation. Ravanchi and Gharibabadi previously led the US-Iran technical talks in Oman on April 26.[45] Ravanchi was part of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team that helped conclude the 2015 nuclear deal and has recently met with senior Russian officials to discuss the Iranian nuclear program and US-Iran nuclear talks.[46] Gharibabadi has also recently coordinated with China and Russia on Iran’s nuclear program.[47] The Iran-E3 talks were originally scheduled for May 2 but were postponed after the fourth round of US-Iran nuclear talks was delayed.[48]

A group of Iranian parliamentarians echoed a senior Iranian military commander’s recent threat to close the Strait of Hormuz if Israel or the United States strikes Iranian energy infrastructure.[49] Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri threatened on May 13 to disrupt international commercial shipping if the United States “makes a mistake.”[50] Bagheri recently inspected military positions in southern Iran and approved the deployment of military assets to the Nazeat Islands in the Persian Gulf.[51] Bagheri also ordered the IRGC to implement a new operational plan around these islands to enhance missile and drone strike capabilities.[52]

Senior Iranian military officials are continuing to prepare for potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard visited the Shahid Khosravi Air Defense Group in northeastern Iran on May 14 to inspect the site’s operational readiness and capabilities.[53] Sabahi Fard inspected surface-to-air artillery positions and observation posts at the site. Senior Iranian commanders have recently conducted several inspections of air defense sites and military bases across Iran, likely to ensure that units remain prepared for a potential strike.[54]

The Iranian rial depreciated from 834,500 rials to one US dollar on May 13 to 836,000 rials to one US dollar on May 14.[55]

Syria

The Kurdish National Council (KNC) announced on May 14 that it will form a Kurdish delegation to negotiate with the Syrian government.[56] The KNC is a minority Kurdish political coalition that is dominated by the Syrian wing of the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).[57] KNC Spokesperson Faisal Youssef told Kurdish media that the delegation will hold talks with the Syrian government to “find a solution to the Kurdish issue.“[58] The KNC’s announcement comes amid tension between Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and Syrian Kurdish political parties over the form of governance in Syria.[59] Kurdish political parties, including the KNC and its longtime political rival, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), recently unified their position during the April 26 Kurdish Unity Conference.[60] The Kurdish parties called for a federal structure that would create a unified entity to administer all Kurdish-majority regions in northeastern Syria.[61] Shara rejected these demands on April 27, calling the push for federalism “divisive” and urging the PYD-controlled Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to preserve “national unity.”[62]

Unspecified individuals continue to conduct targeted killings across Syria. Unknown gunmen kidnapped an Alawite man near Jableh, Latakia Province, on May 14.[63] This and similar instances of sectarian violence could risk reviving a sectarian-based insurgency against the Syrian transitional government.[64] Syrian media separately reported on May 14 that unknown gunmen shot a GSS member in Aleppo City.[65]

The GSS raided a large Captagon laboratory in Qardaha, Latakia Province, on May 13.[66] Qardaha is former Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s hometown.[67] GSS forces seized industrial-grade manufacturing equipment and a large weapons cache in the laboratory.[68] Captagon, which is an addictive amphetamine, was previously one of the largest sources of income for the Assad regime and Iranian proxies such as Hezbollah.[69] The presence of a Captagon laboratory in Assad’s hometown underscores the former regime’s deep involvement in the narcotics trade. Captagon manufacturing is unlikely to cease completely following the fall of the Assad regime, given that some Syrians may still rely on this industry for income.

The GSS arrested several former Assad regime members in three separate operations across Syria on May 14. GSS forces targeted former regime members who refused to give up their weapons in the town of Talkalakh, western Homs Province.[70] The GSS arrested at least five individuals, seized several small arms, and recovered a large amount of currency.[71] GSS forces separately arrested a National Defense Forces (NDF) member in al Haffah, Latakia Province.[72] The NDF member was responsible for supervising several checkpoints in Damascus under the former Assad regime and has been accused of torture and extortion.[73] GSS forces also arrested a former Assad regime member in Damascus Province who reportedly ran an informant network for the Assad regime.[74] These arrests come amid a series of revenge killings that have targeted former Assad regime members. Revenge killings are caused in part by a lack of government-led transitional justice efforts to punish those responsible for crimes committed during the civil war.

The leader of the Israeli Druze community, Sheikh Muwaffaq Tarif, announced a halt to interference in the Syrian Druze community, reversing his past calls to action.[75] Tarif stated that he is in contact with Syrian Druze sheikhs to assist the Syrian Druze community without interfering in its internal decision-making. He reaffirmed the Syrian Druze community’s right to self-determination without external influence.[76] Tarif likely directed these statements, in part, at the Israeli government, which has emphasized that it seeks to protect the Druze community in Syria. Tarif’s statements come shortly after the Syrian transitional government and Druze armed faction leaders reached a joint security agreement in Suwayda Province.[77] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the transitional government likely concluded this agreement to build support for Damascus within the Syrian Druze community.[78] Tarif’s statements may reflect that relations between the Syrian Druze community and the Syrian transitional government are gradually improving.

Iraq

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
  • Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
  • Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.


[1] https://x.com/Levant_24_/status/1922220001399869449

[2] https://x.com/Levant_24_/status/1922220001399869449 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/understanding-syria%E2%80%99s-emerging-insurgency

[3] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/czxnwrqey4go ; https://snhr.org/blog/2025/03/11/803-individuals-extrajudicially-killed-between-march-6-10-2025/

[4] https://english.enabbaladi dot net/archives/2025/05/two-months-in-coastal-investigation-committee-yields-no-results-amid-accusations-of-deliberate-delay ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate041125

[5] https://x.com/Sy_Defense/status/1922329344065585422 ; https://x.com/AhmadBetar7/status/1921994954911461881

[6] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1911122576555855994 ; https://www.syria dot tv/عودة-الحلف-القديم-وتفعيل-قرارات-اجتماع-تركيا-فهيم-عيسى-قائداً-للفيلق-الثاني ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-14-2025

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-8-2025

[8] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-reaches-deal-integrate-sdf-within-state-institutions-presidency-says-2025-03-10/

[9] https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/122423 ; https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1922126461575565522 ; https://t.me/damascusv011/31286 ; https://x.com/Levant_24_/status/1922220001399869449

[10] https://x.com/AsharqNewsSYR/status/1922260542938333303

[11] https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/122423 ; https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/تعيينات-أمنية-جديدة-في-سورية ; https://www.syria dot tv/الداخلية-السورية-تُجري-تعيينات-أمنية-جديدة-في-عدد-من-المحافظات

[12] https://nabd dot com/s/154711610-bf15bc/عبد-القادر-طحان-قائد-جهاز-الأمن-العام-هل-يغسل-التاريخ-الجهادي-بالمنصب؟>

[13] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/تعيينات-أمنية-جديدة-في-سورية

[14] https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/02/world/middleeast/syria-russia-airstrikes-rebels-army-conquest-jaish-al-fatah.html

[15] https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1922126461575565522

[16] https://x.com/Levant_24_/status/1922157722188874023

[17] https://www.facebook.com/groups/1611247285852843/posts/3914019755575573 ; https://x.com/Wolveri07681751/status/1885429497878516009

[18] https://t.me/damascusv011/31286

[19] https://syrianmemory.org/archive/figures/5e663c1fef8f6f0001972dab

[20] https://x.com/pressrahhal/status/1921231738954457555 ; https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/02/world/middleeast/syria-russia-airstrikes-rebels-army-conquest-jaish-al-fatah.html

[21] https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2025/05/14/trump-syria-saudi-arabia-sharaa-assad-sanctions/4b174694-308c-11f0-8498-1f8214bba2d2_story.html ; https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/may/14/trump-meets-syria-president-after-lifting-us-sanctions#:~:text=Trump%20later%20travelled%20to%20Doha%2C%20where%20he,for%20Syria's%20reintegration%20into%20the%20international%20arena. ; https://t.me/SyPresidency/990 ; https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/832

[22] https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2025/05/14/trump-syria-saudi-arabia-sharaa-assad-sanctions/4b174694-308c-11f0-8498-1f8214bba2d2_story.html ; https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/832

[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-13-2025

[24] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-26-2025 ; https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/832

[25] https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2025/05/14/trump-syria-saudi-arabia-sharaa-assad-sanctions/4b174694-308c-11f0-8498-1f8214bba2d2_story.html

[26] https://www.axios.com/2025/05/14/trump-meets-syria-president-sharaa

[27] https://www.reuters.com/world/houthi-ceasefire-followed-us-intel-showing-militants-sought-off-ramp-2025-05-13 ; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/12/us/politics/trump-houthis-bombing.html?searchResultPosition=3 ; https://x.com/SanaaCenter/status/1920023268079124862 ; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/06/us/politics/trump-houthis-bombing.html

[28] https://www.reuters.com/world/houthi-ceasefire-followed-us-intel-showing-militants-sought-off-ramp-2025-05-13

[29] https://x.com/SanaaCenter/status/1920023268079124862

[30] https://www.reuters.com/world/houthi-ceasefire-followed-us-intel-showing-militants-sought-off-ramp-2025-05-13

[31] https://www.dropsitenews.com/p/houthi-united-states-strikes-gaza-blockade-israel-shipping

[32]https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/01/middleeast/israel-says-it-thwarted-attacks-from-yemens-houthis-intl-hnk/index.html

[33] https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/756ca769315d4b879ca7fdd6bd4a82be

[34] https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/756ca769315d4b879ca7fdd6bd4a82be

[35] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/houthi-missile-likely-aimed-at-israel-falls-short/;

https://t.me/army21ye/2964?single ;

https://t.me/army21ye/2972 ;

https://x.com/idfonline/status/1922328548146069872;https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1922433178284769622

[36] https://t.me/army21ye/2923

[38] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5--%D9%82%D8%A7-%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AC-%D8%B1%D8%BA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9

[39] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/24/3312693

[40] https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-europeans-hold-nuclear-talks-friday-diplomatic-sources-say-2025-05-13/

[41] https://jewishinsider dot com/2025/02/uk-ambassador-israel-simon-walters-inss-iran-nuclear-talks-sanctions/

[42] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/122460/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal.pdf

[43] https://english.alarabiya dot net/News/middle-east/2024/11/21/iran-says-west-resolution-will-weaken-disrupt-iaea-interactions ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-21-2024

[44] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-14-2025

[45] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-25-2025 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/06/329

[46] https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/09/world/middleeast/iran-united-nations-ambassador.html ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-3-2025

[47] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-8-2025 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-17-2025 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-23-2024 ; https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/220980/Gharibabadi-to-appointed-as-Iran-s-top-nuclear-negotiatior?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[48] https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-uk-france-germany-hold-nuclear-talks-friday-2025-04-30/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-1-2025

[49] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/24/3312838

[50] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/745973/

[51] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/745973/

[52] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/23/3311610

[53] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/24/3313099

[54] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-24-2025 ;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-1-2025 ;

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-8-2025 ;

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-9-2025

[55] www.bon-bast.com

[56] https://x.com/rudaw_arabic/status/1922536008593117235

[57] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-25-2025 ; https://www.rudaw dot net/english/middleeast/syria/24032025

[58] https://npasyria dot com/213046

[59] https://x.com/SDCPressT/status/1900460888781439061

[60] https://npasyria dot com/213046

[61] www dot npasyria.com/211587

[62] https://t.me/SyPresidency/875

[63] https://x.com/AlawiteMediaLab/status/1922636380468842853 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1922657368736752030

[64] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/alawite-insurgents-seek-use-sectarian-violence-destabilize-interim-government-syria ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-12-2025 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1921497035770831336; https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/122375; https://t.me/almougahid313/600 ; https://x.com/AlekhbariahSY/status/1921339210092384632 ;

[65] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1922624569707237882

[66] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1922389386303250838 ; https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1922553755792269667 ; https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/57049

[67] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1922389386303250838 ; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qardaha

[68] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1922389386303250838

[69] https://www.dw dot com/en/syrias-dictator-is-gone-but-his-drug-dealers-are-still-busy/a-72033154

[70] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1922625016274751823 ; https://t.me/HomsGov1/2659 ; https://x.com/AlekhbariahSY/status/1922614254647058931 ; https://x.com/Levant_24_/status/1922607192013754660

[71] https://t.me/HomsGov1/2659 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1922625016274751823

[72] https://t.me/LatakiaGov1/4475 ;https://x.com/Levant_24_/status/1922646827314110477 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/142562 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1922736171693527445 ;

[73] https://t.me/LatakiaGov1/4475 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1922736171693527445 ;

[74] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1922674262957080951

[75] https://english.enabbaladi dot net/archives/2025/05/muwaffaq-tarif-calls-for-a-unified-syria/

[76] https://x.com/joetruzman/status/1895897759775146078?s=46&t=OYTvR5h_qYY_4fPQ5FKbFA

[77] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-5-2025

[78] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-5-2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 14, 2025

 Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Olivia Gibson, and Karolina Hird with William Runkel and Nate Trotter

May 14, 2025, 5:10 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15 am ET on May 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian officials continue to reiterate Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent call to base future negotiations with Ukraine on the early 2022 Istanbul protocols that included Russian demands for Ukraine's complete capitulation. Russian Ambassador-at-Large and former Russian occupation official, Rodion Miroshnik, claimed on May 14 that the April 2022 draft Istanbul protocols could be the basis for an agreement to end Russia's war in Ukraine.[1] Miroshnik is echoing Putin's May 11 call to "resume" the 2022 Istanbul direct negotiations in response to the May 10 joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal for a 30-day minimum general ceasefire.[2] Miroshnik noted that Russia and Ukraine could make "adjustments" to the 2022 Istanbul protocols to account for changes in the past three years, but specifically insisted that Russia's April 2022 demands that Ukraine significantly reduce its military capabilities and amend its constitution to add a neutrality provision that would ban Ukraine from joining any military alliances — including NATO — remain unchanged. Putin and Miroshnik are deliberately reiterating Russia's terms in the Istanbul protocols because the protocols included terms that would have amounted to Ukraine's surrender and left Ukraine helpless to defend against potential future Russian aggression — aims that the Kremlin continues to pursue.[3] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and the New York Times (NYT) reported in March and June 2024 that they both obtained several versions of the draft protocols from the April 2022 Ukrainian-Russian peace negotiations in Istanbul.[4] The draft protocols also would have banned Ukraine from hosting foreign military personnel, trainers, or weapon systems in Ukraine. Russia demanded that it, the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), the People's Republic of China (PRC), France, and Belarus serve as security guarantors of the agreement. Russia demanded that the guarantor states “terminate international treaties and agreements incompatible with the permanent neutrality [of Ukraine]," including military aid agreements. Russia demanded that Ukraine limit its military to 85,000 soldiers, 342 tanks, and 519 artillery systems as part of the Istanbul protocols. Russia additionally demanded that Ukrainian missiles be limited to a range of 40 kilometers (25 miles), a range that would allow Russian forces to deploy critical systems and materiel close to Ukraine without fear of strikes.

Russia demanded these terms in the first and second months of the full-scale invasion when Russian troops were advancing on Kyiv City and making gains throughout northeastern, eastern, and southern Ukraine. Russia is now attempting to reiterate these same demands after three years of war, despite the fact that Ukrainian forces have since successfully forced Russia to withdraw from northern Ukraine, liberated significant swaths of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts, and blunted the Russian rate of advance across the theater. Miroshnik's observation that Russia and Ukraine could adjust aspects of the Istanbul protocols to reflect the changes in the war over the past three years is an attempt to frame the Kremlin as willing to negotiate, which obfuscates the fact that Russia has actually maintained its long-term goal of total Ukrainian surrender. Putin, Miroshnik, and other Russian officials continue to demand Ukraine's full surrender in an attempt to secure Russia's strategic goals by drawing out negotiations while continuing to make battlefield gains.[5]

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov also reiterated the Kremlin's demands that any resolution to the war must result in regime change in Ukraine and restrictions against the West ahead of negotiations in Istanbul. Ryabkov stated on May 13 that the upcoming Istanbul discussions would need to address the "primary sources" of the war in order to achieve a sustainable end to the war, likely alluding to Russia's continued demand that any peace agreement address the war's "root causes."[6] Ryabkov also reiterated the claim that Ukraine must continue to "denazify." Russian officials repeatedly invoke the term "denazification" to demand regime change in Ukraine and the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv.[7] Russian officials have defined the "root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[8] Ryabkov's statements reflect the Kremlin's long-standing effort to achieve its pre-war demands that call for NATO to abandon its open-door policy and for the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv, despite recent Kremlin efforts to feign interest in good-faith negotiations.

Polling from early May 2025 indicates that the majority of Ukrainians support Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the legitimate leader of Ukraine and are against holding elections before a final end to the war — in accordance with Ukrainian law and the Ukrainian Constitution. The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) published a survey conducted from May 2 to 12 that showed that 74 percent of respondents trust Zelensky — an increase from 69 percent in March 2025.[9] The May 2025 KIIS poll showed that 71 percent of respondents do not support holding elections after a ceasefire, even if Ukraine receives security guarantees, and instead think that Ukraine should hold elections only after the establishment of a final peace agreement and a complete end to the war. KIIS noted that the majority of respondents in all regions of Ukraine support Zelensky and do not support holding elections until after the end of the war. The poll's majority opinion that elections should not occur until after the end of the war is in line with Ukraine's law on martial law and the Ukrainian Constitution, which stipulate that Ukraine cannot hold elections during martial law and cannot lift martial law while "the threat of attack or danger to the state independence of Ukraine and its territorial integrity" remains.[10] The Kremlin has repeatedly tried to weaponize Zelensky's alleged "illegitimacy" to reject and delay ceasefire proposals and negotiations and to set conditions to renege on any future agreements Russia may sign with Ukraine.[11] The Kremlin has also repeatedly attempted to justify its invasions of Ukraine by claiming that large portions of eastern and southern Ukraine want to join Russia.[12] The KIIS poll — the results of which were relatively consistent across all regions of Ukraine - undermines these Kremlin narratives.

Key Takeaways:

  • Russian officials continue to reiterate Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent call to base future negotiations with Ukraine on the early 2022 Istanbul protocols that included Russian demands for Ukraine's complete capitulation.
  • Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov also reiterated the Kremlin's demands that any resolution to the war must result in regime change in Ukraine and restrictions against the West ahead of negotiations in Istanbul.
  • Polling from early May 2025 indicates that the majority of Ukrainians support Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the legitimate leader of Ukraine and are against holding elections before a final end to the war — in accordance with Ukrainian law and the Ukrainian Constitution.
  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Alleged Ceasefire Violation
  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

There are no active ceasefires in Ukraine.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on May 14.

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Tetkino and toward Novyi Put (both southwest of Glushkovo).[13]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 234th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (76th VDV Division) and "Aida" Group of the Chechen 204th "Akhmat" Spetsnaz Regiment are reportedly operating near Tetkino.[14]

A Russian milblogger claimed on May 14 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Popovka in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast.[15]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on May 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Loknya (northeast of Sumy City) and to the southern outskirts of Bilovody (north of Sumy City).[16]

Ukraine's Siversk Group of Forces Spokesperson Vadym Mysnyk stated that Russian forces are attacking in small infantry groups in the Sumy direction.[17]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on May 13 and 14 but did not make confirmed advances.[18]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Vovchansk.[19]

The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on May 14 that Russian forces are trying to accumulate personnel in the Kharkiv direction.[20]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[21]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk along the international border near Topoli and Petrivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Hlushkivka on May 13 and 14.[22]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Kontora” Detachment of the 375th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[23]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Zelenyi Hai (east of Borova).[24]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, Bohuslavka, and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Novoyehorivka; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka, Novoserhiivka, Tverdokhlibove, and Olhivka on May 13 and 14.[25]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on May 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 254th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) marginally advanced near Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[26]

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Lypove, and Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi, Lozova, Yampolivka, and Novomykhailivka; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on May 13 and 14.[27]

Drone operators of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Lyman direction reported on May 13 that Russian forces have reduced their use of armored vehicles in combat in this direction and are increasingly using motorized civilian vehicles, likely due to Ukrainian drones destroying Russian armored vehicles.[28]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction near Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk) on May 13 and 14 but did not advance.[29]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on May 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Chasiv Yar and northwest of Ozaryanivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar).[30]

Russian forces attacked near and within Chasiv Yar, north of Chasiv Yar near Hryhorivka, south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora, and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka on May 13 and 14.[31] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported on May 13 that Ukrainian forces repelled an at least platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault and destroyed three infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs).[32]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[33]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 13 and 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Toretsk and west of Yablunivka (southwest of Toretsk).[34] Additional geolocated footage published on May 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Zorya (southwest of Toretsk).[35]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further north of Toretsk than available geolocated footage indicated.[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Oleksandropil and near Romanivka (both southwest of Toretsk).[37]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself, north of Toretsk near Krymske and Dyliivka, and toward Bila Hora; and southwest of Toretsk near Stara Mykolaivka, Nova Poltavka, Novoolenivka, Romanivka, Yelyzavetivka, and towards Zorya, Hnativka, and Yablunivka on May 13 and 14.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Romanivka.[39]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating on the western flanks of Toretsk.[40] Drone operators from the Russian "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Stepanivka (northwest of Toretsk).[41]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 13 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Myrne (east of Pokrovsk) and in central Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[42]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 14 that Russian forces seized Mykhailivka (east of Pokrovsk).[43] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Malynivka (east of Pokrovsk), although other milbloggers claimed that Russian forces only advanced in the central part of the settlement.[44] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast, north, and northwest of Myrne (east of Pokrovsk) and toward Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk).[45]

Russian forces attacked east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Malynivka, Myrne, Myrolyubivka, and Novotoretske and toward Mykolaivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne on May 13 and 14.[46]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Vega" Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[47] Drone operators of the 80th "Sparta" Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating near Malynivka.[48]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on May 14 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[49]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka, Novomykolaivka, Novoserhiivka, and Novooleksandrivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Troitske, Horikhove, and Bohdanivka on May 13 and 14.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kotlyarivka.[51]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove).[52]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove).[53] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces occupy two-thirds of Bahatyr.[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Kurakhove near Bahatyr, Kostyantynopil, Andriivka, and Oleksiivka, and southwest of Kurakhove near Odradne on May 13 and 14.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked northwest of Bahatyr.[56]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Zelene Pole (west of Velyka Novosilka).[57]

Unconfirmed claims: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on May 13 that Russian forces advanced further east of Zelene Pole than the available geolocated footage indicates, as well as northwest of Zelene Pole and east of Novopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[58]

Russian forces continued attacking north of Velyka Novosilka near Skudne; northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele, Komar, Vilne Pole, Pryvilne, and Shevchenko; west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and Zelene Pole; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil and Rivnopil on May 13 and 14.[59]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on May 13 that Russian forces have concentrated assault units of four unspecified Russian regiments in the Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[60]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 656th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske direction (east of Velyka Novosilka).[61]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 14 but did not advance.
 
Russian forces attacked southeast of Orkihiv towards Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv towards Novodanylivka; and southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, Shcherbaky, and Kamyanske on May 13 and 14.[62]

The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Zaporizhia direction reported on May 14 that Russian forces are increasing the number of first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) while decreasing the number of glide bomb strikes in the Zaporizhia direction.[63]

Russian forces continued attacks in the Kherson direction on May 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced on an island in the Dnipro River delta north of Dnipriany (east of Kherson City).[64]

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction and east of Kherson City towards Sadove on May 13 and 14.[65]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Kakhovka (northeast of Kherson City), and elements of the naval detachment of the Russian 88th "Hispaniola" Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating drones over unspecified areas of the Black Sea.[66]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 13 to 14. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missile from occupied Crimea and 145 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[67] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 80 Shahed drones over eastern, northern, western, and central Ukraine and that Ukrainian forces lost sight of 42 decoy drones. Official Ukrainian sources reported that Russian drones damaged civilian, critical, and industrial infrastructure in Sumy, Kharkiv, Odesa, Donetsk, Rivne, Ternopil, and Kirovohrad oblasts.[68]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.


[1] https://tass dot ru/politika/23940079

[2] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-11-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2025

[3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-23-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/fact-sheet-istanbul-protocol-draft-document-april-15-2022

[4] https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-ukraine-peace-deal-2022-document-6e12e093 ; https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/06/15/world/europe/ukraine-russia-ceasefire-deal.html ; https://static01.nyt.com/newsgraphics/documenttools/a456d6dd8e27e830/e279a252-full.pdf

[5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-11-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040325

[6] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1025391

[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042025

[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525

[9] https://kiis dot com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1529&page=1

[10] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2024

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012425

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032225; http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/69465

[13] https://t.me/wargonzo/26519; https://t.me/dva_majors/71152; https://t.me/dva_majors/71159

[14] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35785; https://t.me/iamsniper/13148

[15] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13136

[16] https://t.me/wargonzo/26519; https://t.me/dva_majors/71152; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31551

[17] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1017539-na-sumsini-zbilsilasa-sira-zona-deepstate/

[18] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9966

[19] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28558; https://t.me/alehingennadiy/5451

[20] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/14/vorog-vtratyv-polovynu-roty-za-dva-tyzhni-poblyzu-harkova-nyshhat-i-pihotu-i-bronetehniku/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg

[21] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9140; https://t.me/Ochi151/75

[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9966

[23] https://t.me/brussinf/9492 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164650

[24] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35789

[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9966

[26] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35796

[27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9966

[28] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/13/katayut-na-czyvilnij-tehniczi-bez-zahystu-ukrayinski-drony-proridzhuyut-avtopark-rf-na-lymanskomu-napryamku/ ; https://t.me/umftteam/486

[29] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9966 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248

[30] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35777 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31545

[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9966 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35777

[32] https://t.me/official24ombr/1064 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/14/sproba-proryvu-na-bmd-pid-chasovym-yarom-minus-try-korobochky-ta-desant-syly-oborony-daly-vidsich-okupantam/

[33] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28574

[34] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9137 ; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/1098 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9138 ; https://t.me/ua_marines_36brigade/2982

[35] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9143 ; https://t.me/osirskiy/1159

[36] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31545

[37] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64228 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22950 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91649 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28559 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91688 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35790 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71152 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31548

[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9966

[39] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28559

[40] https://t.me/rybar/70374

[41] https://t.me/mod_russia/52648 ; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/195 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91653

[42] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1922421080381128983; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1922188582057328737; https://t.me/mod_russia/52605 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9139 ; https://t.me/ChervonaKalynaBrigade/2884

[43] https://t.me/mod_russia/52655 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52656

[44] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91649 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22950

[45] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64228 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35790 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91649

[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9966 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71155 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71152

[47] https://t.me/sashakots/53664

[48] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164639 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13802

[49] https://t.me/dva_majors/71152

[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9966 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28565 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35779

[51] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64234

[52] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9144; https://t.me/hunterfpv/84

[53] https://t.me/voin_dv/14928

[54] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164610

[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9966; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164610; https://t.me/wargonzo/26519

[56] https://t.me/voin_dv/14928

[57] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1922421076132241729; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1922230887250272355; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1922227925505413537

[58] https://t.me/rybar/70362

[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9966

[60] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/13/shturmy-mayut-harakter-navaly-na-novopavlivskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-atakuyut-sylamy-chotyroh-polkiv/

[61] https://t.me/voin_dv/14918

[62]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71152

[63] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/14/uskladnyuyut-logistychni-pidyizdy-na-zaporizkomu-napryamku-tryvaye-obmin-udaramy-po-tylah/

[64] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164526

[65]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216

[66] https://t.me/dosye_shpiona/676 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1922637945451770329 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71155 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71156

[67] https://t.me/kpszsu/34334

[68] https://t.me/kpszsu/34334 ; https://suspilne dot media/1017173-es-planue-uhvaliti-18-j-paket-sankcij-proti-rf-na-peremovini-v-tureccinu-pribude-derzsekretar-rubio-1176-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1747198848&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://kh.dsns.gov dot ua/operational-information/xarkivska-oblast-operativna-informaciia-stanom-na-0700-14-travnia-2025-roku; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1017255-lozivskij-rajon-harkivsini-zaznav-rosijskogo-udaru-postrazdali-troe-ludej/ ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2506 ; https://t.me/synegubov/14270 ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1EDS6DfZFD/ ; https://suspilne dot media/kropyvnytskiy/1017211-masovana-dronova-ataka-na-kirovogradsinu-castinu-bezpilotnikiv-zbili/ ; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1017231-vnoci-armia-rf-atakuvala-vorozbu-poskodzeno-obekti-kriticnoi-infrastrukturi/; https://www.facebook.com/100064542380040/posts/1115780313916704/?rdid=fnDe16J5JqHwTMpG ; https://t.me/kobzarartemsn/4576; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1017755-armia-rf-vdarila-po-obektu-promislovoi-infrastrukturi-v-sumah/ ; https://www.facebook.com/hryhorov.sumska.ova/posts/pfbid0skzZWbioJVpWWsLvhVUTx5zk2tj5vFyPjk3PqKYdifZio87G6Hbgkbk1pLMEdrtnl ; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/35563 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/14/raketnyj-udar-po-sumah-odna-lyudyna-zagynula-semero-poraneni-sered-nyh-troye-u-krytychnomu-stani/ ; https://t.me/suspilnerivne/28611; https://suspilne dot media/rivne/1017209-sili-ppo-pracuvali-na-rivnensini-dvoe-ludej-zaznali-poranen/ ; https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61564854669117; https://suspilne dot media/1017173-es-planue-uhvaliti-18-j-paket-sankcij-proti-rf-na-peremovini-v-tureccinu-pribude-derzsekretar-rubio-1176-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1747205825&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps