Andie
Parry, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Johanna Moore, Siddhant
Kishore, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Avery Borens, Annika Ganzeveld, and
Brian Carter
Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET
The
Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and
the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which
provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that
undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.
We do not report in
detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in
Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are
assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of
armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity
even though we do not describe them in these reports.
NOTE: CTP-ISW
is adjusting its Middle Eastern coverage to focus more closely on Iran
and the Axis of Resistance in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. CTP-ISW is also
reducing its coverage of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and Lebanon.
This refocusing is in response to the continued expansion of the Iranian
nuclear program and the risk of an escalation in the coming months, as
well as the Israeli defeats of Hamas and Hezbollah. We will cover and
assess Axis of Resistance activities in the Palestinian territories and
Lebanon at a less granular level moving forward. We will continue to
publish analysis on other key US interests in the region, such as the
defeat of ISIS and Syrian stability. We will also continue to adjust our
Middle Eastern coverage and make those adjustments clear in response to
regional dynamics and priorities, just as we did immediately after
Hamas' October 7 attack on Israel and the fall of the Assad Regime.
The
Syrian Preparatory Committee does not plan to include the
Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) or its political wing,
the Democratic Union Party (PYD), in the National Dialogue Conference.[1]
This conference will reportedly facilitate the drafting of a new Syrian
constitution, and therefore, the composition of its attendees will
influence the trajectory of the post-Assad Syrian state. Preparatory
Committee spokesperson Hassan al Daghim told Turkish state media on
February 19 that the Syrian interim government expects armed groups to
disarm and integrate into the new Syrian army and for the political
wings of these armed groups to dissolve.[2]
Daghim called out the SDF and PYD specifically, arguing that the PYD
”must be dissolved“ because the SDF “operates outside the authority of
the Damascus government.”[3]
The PYD controls the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria
(AANES), which governs SDF-controlled areas in northeastern Syria.[4]
Daghim’s call for the PYD to ”dissolve” differs from recent reports
that Turkey wants to encourage Kurdish political parties, including the
PYD, to participate in the political system in Damascus.[5]
Daghim confirmed that the Preparatory Committee “has not and will not
communicate with the Syrian Democratic Forces or any other military
group” but that the interim government is continuing to negotiate disarmament terms with the SDF.[6]
There appear to be several outstanding issues in the negotiations
between the interim government and the SDF. An SDF commander stated that
the SDF and AANES agreed to merge their forces into the Syrian Defense
Ministry on February 17, suggesting that figures formerly associated
with the SDF could participate in the conference if the SDF dissolves
before the conference.[7]
The committee’s statements reflect the historic animosity between the SDF and Sunni Arab opposition factions.
The SDF fought Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)’s predecessor organizations
and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) throughout the 2010s
in Syria and had several political disagreements.[8] The PYD, for example, did not join Syrian opposition organizations.[9]
Sunni Arab opposition groups have accused the SDF of cooperating with
the Assad regime and have historically viewed the group with suspicion.[10]
The Preparatory Committee is mostly comprised of pro-HTS figures who
are loyal to Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara. Daghim previously
headed the SNA Moral Guidance Department and has previously criticized
the SDF.[11] Daghim stated on January 31 that the SDF is “one of the Syrian components and cannot be distinguished from other [components].”[12]
Daghim nonetheless appears to be distinguishing the PYD, a dominant
component of the SDF, from other Syrian components by calling for its
dissolution. The SDF’s leaders, many of whom are Kurdish, are likely
reluctant to integrate into an organization that includes groups that
have repeatedly committed human rights abuses against Kurds. SDF leaders
almost certainly recognize that ongoing Turkish and Turkish-backed
attacks in northern Syria pose a possibly existential threat to the SDF
and Kurds.[13] The SDF is therefore unlikely to willingly give up its ability to defend Kurdish areas against active attacks.
Iraqi
nationalist Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr reportedly plans to return to
Iraqi politics, which could deepen fissures between the Shia
Coordination Framework parties ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary
elections in October 2025. The Shia Coordination Framework is a
relatively loose alliance of several small and major Iraqi parties,
some of whom could attempt to ally with Sadr prior to or after elections
to improve their political positions. Iraqi media reported on February
18 that Sadr’s Shia National Movement registered to participate in the
parliamentary elections.[14] Sadr called on his supporters to update their voter registration on February 19.[15] Sadr’s movement withdrew from Parliament in 2022 amid political deadlock following the October 2021 parliamentary elections.[16]
The movement’s withdrawal from politics enabled the Shia Coordination
Framework to form the largest bloc in parliament. Sadr maintains
significant support in the Iraqi Shia community. His return to politics
could therefore threaten the Shia Coordination Framework’s majority in
parliament, especially if he manages to co-opt smaller parties.
Iranian-backed
Iraqi Shia political parties are competing for the chairmanship of the
Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC), which is currently held by Faleh
al Fayyadh. The PMC is responsible for ensuring that militias
in the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) answer to the Iraqi federal
government.[17] The Iraqi parliament is scheduled to vote on the PMF Law in its next session.[18] The PMF Law would force some PMF commanders and leaders, including Fayyadh, to retire due to their age. Some Iranian-backed Shia
Coordination Framework members agreed on February 17 to add an
amendment to the law that enables the Iraqi prime minister to extend the
retirement age for PMF commanders and officials.[19]
This amendment would enable Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani to
postpone Fayyadh‘s retirement. Former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s
State of Law Coalition and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al
Haq’s Sadiqoun Bloc reportedly seek to quickly pass the PMF Law, even if
the passage of this law causes Fayyadh’s removal.[20]
Parliamentary sources told Iraqi media on February 19 that
parliamentarians from the Badr Organization and Sudani oppose Fayyadh’s
removal because they are concerned that a “hardline alternative” could
replace Fayyadh.[21]
It is not clear who the Badr Organization would consider a ”hardliner,”
though it may be a reference to more extreme Iranian-backed groups like
Kataib Hezbollah. The Shia Coordination Framework members who oppose
Fayyadh also reportedly believe that the retirement of veteran PMF
leaders could weaken the organization.
Fayyadh met with
Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and Iranian Supreme
National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian in Tehran on
February 18, which may indicate that Fayyadh sought Iranian support to
retain his position.[22]
Araghchi reaffirmed Iran’s support for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias,
likely including those that operate within the PMF, during his meeting
with Fayyadh.[23]
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei similarly stated during a meeting
with Sudani in Tehran in early January 2025 that the PMF must be
“further strengthened and preserved.”[24]
Some
elements of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba
appear to be increasingly frustrated over Iranian-backed Iraqi militias’
lack of “resistance” against the United States and Israel. A
group calling itself the al Burhan Special Combat Force and claiming to
be a part of Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba and the Islamic Resistance in
Iraq announced its formation on February 14.[25]
The group said that it would defend Iraqi territory and citizens from
“occupation inside and outside of Iraq,” presumably a reference to the
United States and Israel. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
Quds Force commander ordered Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to cease
attacks against US forces in January 2024. The Quds Force commander’s
order caused some apparent frustration among more extreme Iranian-backed
Iraqi militias like Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, which did not
”initially agree” to the directive.[26]
Some Nujaba fighters may be frustrated by the failure of Iranian-backed
groups to respond to reports that the Iraqi federal government may
reconsider the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq by the end of 2026.[27]
Iranian-backed
Iraqi groups similarly stopped attacks targeting Israel in November
2024 due to threats that Israel may strike Iraqi-backed groups in the
country, and some fighters may be increasingly frustrated about the lack
of attacks targeting Israel. The Islamic Resistance of Iraq—of which
Nujaba is a member—frequently said that its attacks targeted “our
occupiers” in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, a clear reference to
Israel.[28] Iran and its partners and proxies have claimed that Israeli intelligence organizations also operate in Iraqi Kurdistan.[29] The al Burhan Special Combat Force’s reference to ”occupation” inside Iraq could refer to these organizations.
Iran
likely attempted to sell as much oil to China as it could before US
President Donald Trump reinstated his “maximum pressure” policy on Iran.[30] Bloomberg
reported on February 18 that Iranian oil exports to China increased by
82 percent between January 1 and February 1, citing data from
intelligence firm Kpler.[31]
Iranian oil exports to China previously peaked just before US President
Donald Trump imposed “maximum pressure“ sanctions on Iran for the first
time in 2018.[32]
Unspecified traders in the oil market told Bloomberg that Iran and
China have increasingly used “ship-to-ship transfers” and “alternative
receiving terminals” to confront logistical issues caused by US
sanctions.[33]
US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated on February 14 that the
United States aims to reduce Iranian oil exports by more than 90
percent.[34]
Iran
seeks to increase economic cooperation with Russia to mitigate the
impact of US sanctions on the Iranian economy, but it is unclear whether
this cooperation will meaningfully improve Iranian economic conditions.
Iranian Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin met with
Russian Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina in Yekaterinburg,
Russia, on February 18 to discuss monetary and banking cooperation.[35] The officials will discuss exchange rates and the implementation of the second and third phases of the Mir-Shetab banking system.[36] Iran and Russia implemented the first phase of the Mir-Shetab system in November 2024 to circumvent the SWIFT system, which is based on the US dollar.[37]
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian separately met with Russian Deputy
Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk in Tehran on February 18 to discuss the
implementation of the Russo-Iranian comprehensive strategic agreement.[38]
Iranian Roads and Urban Development Minister Farzaneh Sadegh and
Russian Transport Minister Roman Vladimirovich Starovoyt also signed the
2025 Roadmap for Transport and Transit Cooperation in Tehran on
February 18.[39]
The agreement includes the completion of the Rasht-Astara Railway,
which is part of the International North-South Transport Corridor
(INSTC).[40]
Iran and Russia have discussed the construction of the Rasht-Astara
Railway for several years, and it is unclear whether this agreement will
accelerate the construction of the railway.[41]
The
Syrian interim government asked Russian officials to pressure Iran to
stop trying to destabilize Syria, according to unspecified Syrian
diplomatic sources speaking to Syrian media on February 19.[42]
The sources denied Iraqi media reports that the Syrian interim
government asked Iran to resume relations. CTP-ISW has previously
assessed that Iran is trying to stoke sectarian tension in Syria and
exploit such tension to rebuild the Axis of Resistance in Syria.[43]
Key Takeaways:
- Syrian Constitution: The
Syrian Preparatory Committee does not plan to include the
Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) or its political wing,
the Democratic Union Party (PYD), in the National Dialogue Conference.
The committee’s statements reflect the historic animosity between the
SDF and Sunni Arab opposition factions.
- Shia Iraqi Politics: Iraqi
nationalist Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr reportedly plans to return to
Iraqi politics, which could deepen fissures between the Shia
Coordination Framework parties ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary
elections in October 2025.
- Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces: Iranian-backed
Iraqi Shia political parties are competing for the chairmanship of the
Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC), which is currently held by Faleh
al Fayyadh.
- Iraqi Militia Friction: Some
elements of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba
appear to be increasingly frustrated over Iranian-backed Iraqi militias’
lack of “resistance” against the United States and Israel.
- Iranian Oil Exports: Iran
likely attempted to sell as much oil to China as it could before US
President Donald Trump reinstated his “maximum pressure” policy on Iran.
Syrian Stabilization:
The Syrian interim government asked Russian officials to pressure Iran
to stop trying to destabilize Syria, according to unspecified Syrian
diplomatic sources speaking to Syrian media on February 19. CTP-ISW has
previously assessed that Iran is trying to stoke sectarian tension in
Syria and exploit such tension to rebuild the Axis of Resistance in
Syria.
Syria
HTS-led
General Security Forces entered Jarabulus along the Syria-Turkey border
on February 18 to assume control of security in the town.[44] Jarabulus
is less than three kilometers from SDF positions that Turkey and the
Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) have struck in recent days.
Anti-SDF media claimed that a Turkish army convoy entered Jarabulus,
north of Manbij, from Turkey and headed toward the Manbij countryside in
January 2025.[45]
Turkish aircraft targeted the SDF along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River on February 19. Turkish aircraft struck SDF tunnels east of Jarabulus.[46]
Turkey continued to target SDF positions near the Qara Qozak Bridge on February 19.
Turkish aircraft struck several SDF positions near Sarrin, likely to
isolate SDF units operating at the bridgehead west of the Qara Qozak
Bridge.[47]
Anti-SDF
media claimed that Turkish aircraft struck SDF positions near Maskanah
and Deir Hafer, southeast of Manbij, on February 18.[48]
Anti-SDF
media reported on February 19 that SNA reinforcements deployed to the
Tishreen Dam, which is a contested territory in northern Syria.[49] The SNA has engaged the SDF near the dam since December 2024.[50]
HTS-led
General Security Forces arrested individuals in al Qatifah, Rif
Dimashq, southern Syria, on February 19 who attempted to smuggle weapons
to Lebanese Hezbollah.[51]
HTS-led Syrian security forces have worked with the Lebanese Armed
Forces in recent weeks to interdict weapons shipments to Hezbollah.[52]
Iran has historically used Syria to transport funds and weapons to
Hezbollah, and Hezbollah has used Syria to store and manufacture
weapons. The fall of the Assad regime and subsequent flight of numerous
Iranian-backed actors from Syria disrupted the ground lines of
communication in Syria that Iran previously used to transport weapons,
personnel, and materiel to its proxies. It is unlikely that these
networks have fully collapsed, however. Syrian border forces recently
seized a weapons shipment to Hezbollah in Rif Dimashq on January 25.[53]
Syrian
media reported on February 19 that the Syrian Defense Ministry
appointed Brigadier General Jamil al Saleh as commander of the 74th
Division.[54] Saleh
defected from the Syrian Arab Army early in the Syrian Civil War and
subsequently served as a commander in the HTS-allied Jaysh al Izza.[55] The Syrian Defense Ministry has not confirmed Saleh’s appointment at the time of this writing.
The
IDF Air Force conducted a series of airstrikes targeting former Assad
regime military equipment in Sasa, Rif Dimashq Province, on February 19.[56] Syrian media reported that the IDF destroyed several armored vehicles and tanks.[57]
An Israeli military correspondent reported that the interim Syrian
government did not seize the equipment after the fall of the Assad
regime.[58]
Iraq
Axis of Resistance objectives:
Iraqi
National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji discussed political
cooperation with Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi
al Ameri on February 19.[59] Araji is a member of the Badr Organization and had been rumored as a possible prime minister candidate in 2022.[60]
The
Turkish Defense Ministry announced on February 19 that Turkey killed
nine Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighters in Duhok Province, Iraqi
Kurdistan.[61] Iraqi media reported that Turkey struck PKK positions in the Matin Mountains, Duhok Province.[62]
Arabian Peninsula
Axis of Resistance objectives:
Nothing significant to report.
The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon
Axis of Resistance objectives:
The Gaza Strip
A
senior Hamas official claimed on February 19 that Hamas is willing to
release all remaining Israeli hostages in a single exchange during the
second phase of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement.[63] Israeli
Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer will lead the Israeli delegation
in negotiations for the second phase of the agreement.[64]
Lebanon
An
Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on February 19 that the IDF
recently established an observation post on a ridge along the
Markaba-Houla Road in southern Lebanon.[65] The
ridge overlooks Margaliot in northern Israel and is one of the five
strategically significant positions in southern Lebanon that the IDF
will continue to hold after its withdrawal on February 18 under the
ceasefire agreement.[66]
West Bank
Nothing Significant to Report.
Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy
The
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces concluded the
second phase of the “Great Prophet 19” military exercise in southwestern
Iran on February 19.[67] The IRGC Ground Forces paratroopers conducted a jump from an Antonov-74 aircraft.[68]
The IRGC Ground Forces also unveiled a tank protection system that is
reportedly equipped with cage armor and an electronic warfare system
designed to counter missile and drone attacks.[69]
The IRGC Ground Forces have probably observed the use of cage armor in
Ukraine, but the Russians could also provide the IRGC Ground Forces with
lessons learned to improve these capabilities. CTP-ISW cannot verify
these claims, and Iranian officials have previously exaggerated Iran’s
military capabilities.
Senior Iranian officials
met with Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad al Thani in Tehran on February 19
to discuss bilateral ties and regional issues.[70]
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei blamed the United States for
blocking the transfer of Iranian funds from South Korea to Iran via
Qatar during a meeting with Thani. Khamenei urged Qatar to resist US
pressure and transfer the funds to Iran. Iranian President Masoud
Pezeshkian emphasized the need to accelerate the implementation of
bilateral agreements and stated that Iran seeks to enhance economic
cooperation with Qatar.[71]
Iran and the United States reached an agreement in August 2023 in which
the United States would release $6 billion worth of frozen Iranian
assets and several Iranian prisoners in exchange for the release of five
US nationals detained in Iran. The outbreak of the October 7 War in
October 2023 delayed the release of the frozen Iranian assets.[72]
The
Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored
activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US
forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the
stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical
Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the
Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly
based on regional events.
CTP-ISW defines the
“Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has
cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power
in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state,
and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective
interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and
its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of
financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree
of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies
that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are
partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the
Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which
include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the
Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these
objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have
become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.
[1] https://www.aa
dot
com.tr/ar/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%b1/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d8%ba%d9%8a%d9%85-%d9%85%d8%a4%d8%aa%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ad%d9%88%d8%a7%d8%b1-%d9%84%d9%86-%d9%8a%d9%82%d8%a8%d9%84-%d8%a8%d8%a3%d9%8a-%d9%82%d8%b6%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%aa%d9%87%d8%af%d8%af-%d8%ac%d9%8a%d8%b1%d8%a7%d9%86-%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%a7-%d9%85%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%a8%d9%84%d8%a9/3486375
[2] https://www.aa
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[3]
https://www.aa dot
com.tr/ar/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%b1/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d8%ba%d9%8a%d9%85-%d9%85%d8%a4%d8%aa%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ad%d9%88%d8%a7%d8%b1-%d9%84%d9%86-%d9%8a%d9%82%d8%a8%d9%84-%d8%a8%d8%a3%d9%8a-%d9%82%d8%b6%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%aa%d9%87%d8%af%d8%af-%d8%ac%d9%8a%d8%b1%d8%a7%d9%86-%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%a7-%d9%85%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%a8%d9%84%d8%a9/3486375
[4] https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2021/the-ypgpyd-during-the-syrian-conflict/summary/
[5] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/what-turkeys-vision-kurds-syria
; https://www.aa dot
com.tr/ar/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%b1/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d8%ba%d9%8a%d9%85-%d9%85%d8%a4%d8%aa%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ad%d9%88%d8%a7%d8%b1-%d9%84%d9%86-%d9%8a%d9%82%d8%a8%d9%84-%d8%a8%d8%a3%d9%8a-%d9%82%d8%b6%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%aa%d9%87%d8%af%d8%af-%d8%ac%d9%8a%d8%b1%d8%a7%d9%86-%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%a7-%d9%85%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%a8%d9%84%d8%a9/3486375
[6]
https://www.aa dot
com.tr/ar/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%b1/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d8%ba%d9%8a%d9%85-%d9%85%d8%a4%d8%aa%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ad%d9%88%d8%a7%d8%b1-%d9%84%d9%86-%d9%8a%d9%82%d8%a8%d9%84-%d8%a8%d8%a3%d9%8a-%d9%82%d8%b6%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%aa%d9%87%d8%af%d8%af-%d8%ac%d9%8a%d8%b1%d8%a7%d9%86-%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%a7-%d9%85%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%a8%d9%84%d8%a9/3486375
[7] https://x.com/abo_omar_idleb/status/1891746244030054851 https://x.com/SDF_Syria/status/1891844163886514205; https://x.com/SDF_Syria/status/1891851341602971818 ;
[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20Pitfalls%20of%20Relying%20on%20Kurdish%20Forces%20to%20Counter%20ISIS.pdf
[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/syrian-kurds-and-democratic-union-party-pyd
[10] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-battle-for-raqqa-and-the-challenges-after-liberation/
[11]
https://english dot
enabbaladi.net/archives/2022/09/two-movements-in-national-army-consensus-only-in-statements-eyes-on-tahrir-al-sham/
[12] https://x.com/AlMayadeenNews/status/1885445974174138559
[13] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1699
[14] https://www.nrttv dot com/detail/45935
[15] https://baghdadtoday
dot
news/268291-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%AF%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AB-%D8%B3%D8%AC%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%B1-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86%D9%87.html
[16]
https://www.shafaq dot
com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%BA%D9%84%D9%82-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%87-%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9
[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces
[18] https://www.alsumaria
dot
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[21] https://www.kurdistan24
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; https://www dot
presstv.ir/Detail/2025/02/18/743033/Iran%E2%80%99s-top-security-official-meets-Hashd-al-Sha%E2%80%99abi-chief-
; https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/851372
[23] https://x.com/shahokurdy/status/1891936329073676317
[24] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/27900
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Disavows Alleged Combat Unit Formed to Confront ”Occupation,” February
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[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-18-2024
[27] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-iraq-deal-would-see-hundreds-troops-withdraw-first-year-sources-say-2024-09-06/
[28] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1549 ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tracking-anti-us-and-anti-israel-strikes-iraq-and-syria-during-gaza-crisis
[29] https://www.rudaw dot net/english/kurdistan/150120241
[30] https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-set-reimpose-maximum-pressure-iran-official-says-2025-02-04/
[31] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-02-19/oil-flows-from-iran-to-china-jump-as-traders-work-around-curbs?sref=RR1m1tD8
[32] https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R46213.html
[33] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-02-19/oil-flows-from-iran-to-china-jump-as-traders-work-around-curbs?sref=RR1m1tD8
[34] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-qmO-d2V4u4 7:00-8:00;
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-02-19/oil-flows-from-iran-to-china-jump-as-traders-work-around-curbs?sref=RR1m1tD8
[35] https://x.com/GhamariVafa/status/1892074853638750489
[36] https://x.com/GhamariVafa/status/1892074853638750489 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-12-2024
[37] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-12-2024
[38] https://president dot ir/fa/157594
[39] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6383470/
[40] https://en.irna dot ir/news/85756327/Russia-to-begin-studies-for-Rasht-Astara-railway-Minister
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dot
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[44] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1891940139485516194 ; https://x.com/ALBADIA24/status/1891972862682050771 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/136243 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/136200
[45] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/133616
[46] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/136262
[47] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1892166375486980113 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/136232
[48] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1891936816401404347
[49] https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/1933cb1d315f4db3a4f4dcc5ef40753a ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/136244
[50] Iran Update, December 17, 2024 | Institute for the Study of War
[51] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1892139477075694023
[52] https://t.me/damascusv011/27633
[53] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1883437468126748911
[54] https://x.com/ALBADIA24/status/1892181978578817470 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/136248
[55] https://x.com/poptop084593715/status/1874044947986595958
[56] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1891955165911027917 ; https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1891984964918644931 ; https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1892145003717083542
[57] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1892137670291185694
[58] https://t.me/moriahdoron/19602
[59] https://www.alsumaria
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[65] https://t.me/moriahdoron/19611
[66] https://t.me/moriahdoron/19560 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-17-2025
[67] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1403120100612/
[68] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6384454/
[69] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6384446;
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[70] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6384544
[71] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6384544
[72] https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-signals-iran-wont-access-its-6-bln-qatar-any-time-soon-2023-10-12/
