Jessica Sobieski, Jennie Olmsted, Olivia Gibson, Angelica Evans, and Kateryna Stepanenko
July 18, 2025, 6:15 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:00 pm ET on July 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
The European Council of the European Union (EU) approved its 18th sanctions package on July 19, mainly targeting Russian oil revenues and sanctions evasion schemes.[1] The EU announced a landmark oil cap to contain Russian oil prices at 15 percent of the average market price that will automatically adjust semi-annually, and noted that the current price cap is set at $47.60 per barrel – well below the previous $60 per barrel cap.[2] The EU imposed a full transaction ban on any transactions related to the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines, which will prevent the completion, maintenance, and operation of the pipelines. The EU also ended Czechia's exemptions for Russian oil imports. The EU sanctioned an additional 105 vessels of the Russian shadow fleet, increasing the overall number of sanctioned tankers to 444. The EU sanctioned Russian and international companies managing the shadow fleet, an oil refinery in India in which the Russian state oil company Rosneft is a main shareholder, the captain of a shadow fleet vessel, a private operator of an international flag registry, and one entity in the Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector. The EU also imposed an import ban on refined petroleum products made from Russian crude oil and imported from any third country, with the exception of Canada, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Russian government reportedly accounted for some decrease in oil and gas revenue as part of Russia's upcoming national budget, although the EU oil cap and shadow fleet sanctions will likely further degrade Russian oil revenues beyond what the Kremlin previously expected.[3] The EU measures target both Russia’s current ability to sell oil at advantageous pricing and undermines Russia's long-term ability to sell oil to Europe. The EU noted that oil revenues constitute one-third of Russia’s overall revenue, and that recent declines in Russia’s oil revenues in combination with a decrease in market earning potential poses a risk to the Russian federal budget.
The EU's new sanctions target Russia’s ability to engage with international markets. The EU fully banned EU-based specialized financial messaging services from conducting transactions with 22 Russian banks, in addition to the 23 previously sanctioned Russian banks already subject to the ban.[4] The European Union lowered the threshold for sanctioning third-country financial, credit, and crypto-asset service providers that are connected to the Russian Central Bank’s System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS) or generally supporting Russian sanctions evasion schemes. The EU banned any transaction with the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), its sub-funds and companies, and any companies investing in or owned by the RDIF. The EU also banned the sale, supply, transfer, and export of software management systems and banking and financial sector software to Russia. The EU sanctions target an existing vulnerability within the Russian banking and financial sector, decreasing Russia’s ability to maintain a strong presence in international trade and diversify its economy.
The EU's new sanctions package also targets actors directly supporting Russian military capabilities. The EU sanctioned three entities based in the People's Republic of China (PRC) and eight companies operating in Belarus that sell goods to the Russian military.[5] The EU also imposed a full transaction ban on Belarusian specialized financial messaging services and embargoed arms imports from Belarus. The EU tightened export restrictions on 26 entities involved in dual-use goods and technologies, including 11 entities in third countries other than Russia. The EU approved over 2.5 billion euros worth of other export bans on items that could support Russia's war effort, including computer numerical control machines and chemicals for propellants. The EU also sanctioned several individuals involved in indoctrinating Ukrainian children, crimes in occupied Ukraine, and spreading Russian propaganda.
Russian officials continued to falsely claim that sanctions do not have an impact on the Russian economy in response to the EU's new sanctions package. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that the EU's new sanctions package is illegal, that Russia has already gained immunity and adapted to life under restrictive measures, and that Russia will analyze the effects of the new package and minimize their effects.[6] Peskov added that each new sanctions package disadvantages those who authorized it. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev responded to the EU’s newest sanctions by claiming that the package will not change Russia’s position and that the Russian economy will survive and Russia will continue to fight Ukrainian forces.[7] Medvedev threatened to target Kyiv City and other Ukrainian cities with increasing force in response to the EU’s sanctions package. Medvedev claimed that Russia must learn to “hate” the EU and its “Russophobia” as much as Russia's ancestors did and that “how this ends for Europe is known.” CEO of the RDIF and Presidential Special Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries, Kirill Dmitriev, claimed that the EU’s newest sanctions package is hurting Europe more than Russia and limiting European energy supply by closing Russian markets to European companies.[8] Head of the Russian State Duma Committee on Financial Markets Anatoly Aksakov claimed that the new EU sanctions on Russia’s financial system are just a fluctuation in the air, as Russian banks have already been under restrictions from the EU.[9]
Select Russian officials are acknowledging the impact of sanctions on the Russian economy despite the Kremlin's efforts to disguise and dismiss such impacts. The Moscow Times reported on July 17 that Russian Energy Minister Sergei Tsivilev recently told the Russian Federation Council that Russian oil companies are struggling to procure parts to repair refineries due to Western sanctions.[10] Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina notably stated at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 19 that Russia has exhausted many of its “free resources“ since the start of Russia‘s full-scale war against Ukraine and needs to think of a new growth model.[11] Russia's Minister of Economic Development, Maxim Reshetnikov, stated at SPIEF that Russia is on the "brink of recession."[12] Russia's ongoing sanctions evasion schemes, including via the PRC, are a key aspect of the Kremlin's strategy to offset Western sanctions and relieve pressure on the Russian economy. Russia has created a network of actors to circumvent Western sanctions and is reconfiguring its economic policy and business models to withstand sanctions in the long term, although more extensive Western sanctions will complicate this effort. The EU's newest sanctions are a positive step, but wider Western compliance and enforcement are necessary to inflict maximum economic pressure on Russia.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed former Defense Minister Rustem Umerov as Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council on July 18.[13] Umerov stated that he will oversee the coordination of arms deliveries, joint production efforts, and defense partnerships, as well as advance Ukraine's negotiation track with Russia.[14]
The Kremlin continues to advance its long-term censorship efforts to assert greater control over the Russian online information space. First Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Committee on Information Policy Anton Gorelkin warned on July 18 that the popular WhatsApp messenger should prepare to leave the Russian market, as it is "highly likely" that it will fall under restrictive measures.[15] Gorelkin added that the Kremlin-controlled messaging platform MAX will become a replacement for WhatsApp's users. Russian State Duma Information Policy Committee member Anton Nemkin opined that WhatsApp's presence in Russia's digital space constitutes a breach in national security and proposed that Russia consider Telegram as an alternative, while admitting that MAX is the primary choice for replacing WhatsApp.[16] Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported that WhatsApp is the most popular messenger in Russia, with roughly 84 million daily users, and that two sources close to the Russian Presidential Administration stated that Russian authorities are almost guaranteed to ban WhatsApp.[17] Another source close to the Presidential Administration told Meduza that Russian authorities are likely to tolerate Telegram as it hosts many Kremlin-affiliated channels and the Kremlin has been able to establish an entire information infrastructure. WhatsApp is owned by Meta, which the Kremlin has designated as an extremist organization.[18] Russian President Vladimir Putin recently ordered the government to impose additional restrictions on the use of software from "unfriendly countries."[19]
ISW previously noted that the Kremlin planned to designate MAX as its national messenger and that the Kremlin may attempt to ban Telegram and other social media connected to the Western world in the medium- to long-term if the rollout of the new national messenger application is successful.[20] The Kremlin will very likely continue to implement increasingly repressive measures that aim to insulate and censor Russian citizens and promote the Kremlin's war efforts.
Key Takeaways:
- The European Council of the European Union (EU) approved its 18th sanctions package on July 19, mainly targeting Russian oil revenues and sanctions evasion schemes.
- Russian officials continued to falsely claim that sanctions do not have an impact on the Russian economy in response to the EU's new sanctions package.
- Select Russian officials are acknowledging the impact of sanctions on the Russian economy despite the Kremlin's efforts to disguise and dismiss such impacts.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed former Defense Minister Rustem Umerov as Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council on July 18.
- The Kremlin continues to advance its long-term censorship efforts to assert greater control over the Russian online information space.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Pokrovsk.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 18.
Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 17 and 18.[21] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked toward Glushkovo and Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and toward Novyi Put (east of Tetkino) from Pavlivka, Sumy Oblast (south of Novyi Put).[22]
Ukrainian open-source intelligence group CyberBoroshno published satellite imagery on July 17 that shows damage at Russia's Energiya chemical and weapons component plant, indicating that Ukrainian forces likely struck the plant during a drone strike in Yelets, Lipetsk Oblast, on July 15.[23]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)
Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 18 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Varachyne (northeast of Sumy City).[24]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced farther southwest of Varachyne than July 18 geolocated footage indicated.[25] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into northeastern Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[26]
Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and Varachyne on July 17 and 18.[27] Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka and Andriivka, and northeast of Sumy City near Sadky and Yablunivka.[28]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Sumy direction stated on July 17 that Russian forces are sending sabotage and reconnaissance groups to Ukrainian rear areas to interdict Ukrainian logistics routes.[29] The spokesperson noted that Russian drone operators drop supplies and ammunition to the sabotage and reconnaissance groups once the groups establish positions in the rear, and then the Russian military command deploys “disposable” assault groups to pressure Ukrainian defenses and disrupt their logistics.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[30]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 18 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[31]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Starytsia, and Zelene on July 17 and 18.[32]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Kanada Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Kozacha Lopan (northwest of Kharkiv City).[33] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the direction of Vovchansk.[34]
Russian forces continued limited assaults in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 18 but did not advance.
A Russian miblogger claimed that Russian forces continue attacking in the Velykyi Burluk direction and Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) and that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Milove.[35]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 18 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northwest of Kupyansk near Radkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pishchane on July 17 and 18.[36]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 18 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, Nova Kruhlyakivka, and Zelenyi Hai and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka and Hrekivka and toward Cherneshchyna and Druzhelyubivka on July 17 and 18.[37]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on July 18 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman toward Shandryholove, Korovii Yar, and Serednie; north of Lyman near Kaprivka, Novyi Myr, and Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on July 17 and 18.[38]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 18 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka on July 17 and 18.[39]
A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported that the intensity of Russian offensive operations in the brigade's area of responsibility (AoR) has noticeably declined due to Ukrainian forces destroying better-trained Russian forces.[40] The NCO reported that Russian forces are training new units and that the situation remains tense. The NCO reported that Russian forces are using large numbers of motorcycles across the entire frontline but noted that 90 percent of Russian motorcycles are of poor quality and from the People's Republic of China (PRC).
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 18 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, northeast of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora, Predtechyne, and Stupochky on July 17 and 18.[41]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have developed effective tactics for downing Ukrainian drones in the Chasiv Yar direction, thereby reportedly enabling Russian forces to advance despite Ukrainian drone superiority in the area.[42]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 299th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th Airborne Division) reportedly continue to operate in Chasiv Yar.[43]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on July 18 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced near Popiv Yar (northwest of Toretsk) and Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[44]
Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; northwest of Toretsk near Rusyn Yar, Oleksandro-Kalynove, Popiv Yar, and Poltavka, and toward Nelipivka, Stepanivka, Katerynivka, and Pleshchiivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Novospaske on July 17 and 18.[45]
A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported on July 17 that Russian forces are constantly attacking despite sustaining high casualties.[46] The servicemember reported that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Novospaske and that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are attempting to raise Russian flags on the outskirts of the settlement to falsely claim control of the settlement.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC] Eastern Military District [EMD]), including its 2nd Separate Artillery Battalion, are reportedly operating near Popiv Yar.[47]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 17 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) and likely seized the settlement.[48]
Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Volodymyrivka, Novotoretske, Myrolyubivka, and Novoekonomichne and toward Rodynske; east of Pokrovsk toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka and Zvirove; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and Udachne, and toward Molodetske on July 17 and 18.[49]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions north and northeast of Pokrovsk.[50] Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk).[51] Drone operators of the Typhoon Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Pokrovsk direction.[52]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently retook Yalta (south of Novopavlivka).[53] Additional geolocated footage published on July 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced southwest of Komar (south of Novopavlivka).[54] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that Ukrainian forces recently retook Yalta and Voskresenka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[55] ISW previously noted that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in key frontline areas to slow Russian advances.[56]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) advanced in an area one kilometer in depth and two kilometers wide southwest of Piddubne (southwest of Novopavlivka).[57]
Russian forces continued attacks toward Novopavlivka; northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Dachne, and Oleksiivka; south of Novopavlivka toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zirka, Piddubne, Myrne, and Voskresenka and toward Oleksandrohrad on July 17 and 18.[58]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) reportedly struck Ukrainian positions near Oleksandrohrad.[59]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 18 but did not advance.
Russian forces continued assaults northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and Shevchenko and toward Komyshuvakha and west of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole and Novopil and toward Temyrivka on July 17 and 18.[60]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are operating toward Maliivka and Sichneve (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[61] Drone operators of the 30th Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 36th CAA) and the 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA) are reportedly also operating near Sichneve.[62]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on July 18 but did not advance.
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces intensified fighting near Marfopil (southwest of Hulyaipole).[63]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 17 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Orikhiv near Bilohiria, south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka, and southwest of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka and Stepove.[64]
Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske on July 17 and 18.[65]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division, including drone operators of its 108th VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[66]
Russian forces continued limited attempts to cross the Dnipro River in the Kherson direction on July 18 but did not advance.
Russian forces attempted to cross the Dnipro River northeast of Kherson City toward Sadove, Prydniprovske, and Kozatsky Island and southwest of Kherson City toward Dniprovske and Hola Prystan on July 18.[67]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 17 to 18. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 29 Shahed drones and six decoy drones from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and targeted Ukrainian frontline positions in eastern Ukraine.[68] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 11 drones and that six decoy drones were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck locomotives and civilian infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, killing one person.[69]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Russia continues to rely on Belarusian defense companies to produce weapons components for Russia's war effort and to evade sanctions. Ukrainian TV channel Kanal 24 reported on July 17 that Russian defense companies are increasingly using Belarusian-made microcircuits, capacitors, stabilizers, and other components in Russian missiles, including Kh-101 and Kh-69 cruise missiles and Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles, and S-300 and S-400 air defense systems.[70] Kanal 24 obtained a letter from the Russian Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade Kirill Lusogorsky to the Belarusian State Military-Industrial Committee Head Dmitry Pantus requesting Belarusian defense companies, namely the Minsk-based Integral and Peleng facilities, supply microelectronics to Russia. Kanal 24 reported that Russia also uses Belarusian microchips in guided glide bombs and unguided missiles.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/07/18/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-18th-package-of-economic-and-individual-measures/
[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eus-new-russia-sanctions-aim-more-effective-oil-price-cap-2025-07-18/; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-07-18/eu-backs-revised-russia-oil-price-cap-and-new-russia-sanctions
[3] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-09-23/russia-sees-oil-and-gas-revenue-shrinking-for-next-three-years
[4] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/07/18/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-18th-package-of-economic-and-individual-measures/
[5] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/07/18/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-18th-package-of-economic-and-individual-measures/
[6] https://t.me/tass_agency/325915
[7] https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/598; https://t.me/medvedev_telegramE/87
[8] https://t.me/kadmitriev/163
[9] https://t.me/tass_agency/325956
[10] https://www.moscowtimes dot ru/2025/07/17/vrossii-iz-za-sanktsii-nachalis-problemi-sremontom-npz-a169109
[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925
[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925
[13] https://www.president dot gov.ua/documents/4962025-55709
[14] https://x.com/rustem_umerov/status/1946125164158070960 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15175
[15] https://t.me/webstrangler/4310
[16] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/24548611
[17] https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/07/18/99-chto-eto-sluchitsya-1-ostavim-na-malo-li-chto ; https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/07/18/voyna
[18] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/24548299 ; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/16427317
[19] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/24543571
[20] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2025
[21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772
[22] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31421;
[23] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/satellite-confirms-strike-on-protected-building-at-russia-s-energia-plant/#google_vignette; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/11765?single
[24] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1945984391978643768; https://www.instagram.com/reel/DMNSSx5iYfU/; https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1946005382461014242
[25] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31439
[26] https://t.me/wargonzo/27900
[27] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31439; https://t.me/dva_majors/75601; ttps://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772
[28] https://t.me/dva_majors/75601; https://t.me/wargonzo/27900
[29] https://t.me/OSHP_225/5044; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/17/spochatku-dyversanty-potim-myaso-nova-taktyka-rosiyan-na-sumskomu-napryamku/
[30] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31414
[31] https://t.me/wargonzo/27900
[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964
[33] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5845
[34] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96034
[35] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31405 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75601
[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964
[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964
[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66007
[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964
[40] https://www.youtube.com/live/ZVMUSS0B0yo?si=SQi52gl6yTizHiXb ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1069955-na-doneccini-54-brigada-fiksue-spad-nastupalnogo-potencialu-rf/
[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/24765
[42] https://t.me/rusich_army/24765
[43] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31414
[44] https://t.me/rybar/72241 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27900 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/325820
[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964
[46] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/17/dyversijna-grupa-namagalasya-vstanovyty-prapor-poblyzu-toreczka-shturmy-pochynayutsya-o-tretij-nochi/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSS0B0yo
[47] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14057
[48] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1945974942522036545 https://t.me/echo_2_25/612; https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1945991088646312173
[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75601 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75602 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31429 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27900
[50] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14058
[51] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172771
[52] t.me/motopatriot78/39004
[53] https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1946108213516005661 ; https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1946113299575099569 https://youtu.be/MyYW6wXLkHk?si=Qr9fjJm0dPq1_RK5 https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1945929547091763686; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9612; https://www.facebook.com/20armycorps/videos/1359756871756913/
[54] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9618; https://t.me/burpobeda/13844
[55] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/18/syly-oborony-ukrayiny-vstanovyly-prapory-u-voskresenczi-ta-yalti/ ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1359756871756913&rdid=q1PZmeBdtVjMSlo4
[56] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071425
[57] https://t.me/voin_dv/16048
[58] https://t.me/dva_majors/75601 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl
[59] https://t.me/voin_dv/16046
[60] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13964 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26772 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl
[61] https://t.me/voin_dv/16048
[62] https://t.me/voin_dv/16045 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/16042
[63] https://t.me/wargonzo/27900
[64] https://t.me/wargonzo/27900
[65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TDhDQDdeE6o8EpryrJ1Nr4x854ocJYNUJRpAN7sysEoeMQMxjHBQDmYaNtyhz9Ukl ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02m2vteSHE6k2VBHQxBmQwYMm4HvugsTYCaT4ize8Sonn34wMxewHqJeFc6vdtp3Eyl ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12756 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl
[66] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31414 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/153139
[67] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CcssfWX2DWUNpcXEjtv6k46D3iy5v9WDDZZ7vBnmHtsQQ7SsWjuWkd6AQNZvWprTl
[68] https://t.me/kpszsu/38692
[69] https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/7110; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22975; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/18/rosijski-drony-atakuvaly-dnipropetrovshhynu-zagynuv-mashynist-potyaga/;
[70] https://24tv dot ua/bilorus-prichetna-do-obstriliv-ukrayini-yak-vigotovlyaye-mikroshemi_n2870664 ; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/investigation-belarusian-defense-industry-aids-russia-in-missile-production/
