UA-69458566-1

Monday, July 28, 2025

Iran Update, July 28, 2025


Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Carolyn Moorman, Avery Borens, Katherine Wells, Ben Schmida, Nidal Morrison, Andie Parry, and Brian  Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

NOTE: CTP-ISW will publish the Iran Update Monday through Friday starting on July 25, 2025. CTP-ISW will resume seven-day coverage of the region should conditions warrant it and will notify our readers if we resume seven-day coverage.

The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) reiterated that it will trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism to reinstate UN Security Council sanctions on Iran if Iran fails to make progress towards a nuclear deal by the end of August 2025.[1] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran is unlikely to make concessions on key issues such as domestic uranium enrichment and limits to its ballistic missile program by the August deadline.[2] French Foreign Affairs Minister Jean-Noel Barrot told Western media on July 26 that the E3 will trigger the JCPOA snapback mechanism if Iran does not reach an agreement by the end of summer.[3] He stated that the E3 wants a "more comprehensive agreement" that includes limits to Iran's ballistic missile program and activities that destabilize the region, which refers to Iran's leading role in the Axis of Resistance. Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei stated on July 28 that Iran will not negotiate over its defense capabilities.[4] Iran sees its missile program and its proxies and partners as integral parts of its deterrence and therefore its defense. Senior Iranian officials repeatedly rejected demands during the US-Iran nuclear negotiations in April and May 2025 to limit Iran’s missile program and support for the Axis of Resistance because the missile program is Iran’s ”most reliable means of defense.”[5]

The Washington Post quoted an Israeli source on July 25 who reported Iran is "no longer a threshold nuclear state" following US and Israeli strikes.[6] The source stated that Iran will need at least one to two years to build a deliverable nuclear weapon, assuming it can do so undetected.[7] The source stated that Israel would very likely detect any Iranian efforts to test a nuclear weapon and launch an attack. Senior Israeli officials have repeatedly warned since the strikes that Israel would “almost certainly” detect any Iranian attempts to recover nuclear material and conduct renewed strikes to prevent Iran from accessing the material.[8] The source said that US and Israeli strikes destroyed the "logistical foundations" of Iran's nuclear program, which will hinder Iran's ability to weaponize.[9] The strikes destroyed the Uranium Metal Conversion Plant at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center, which Iran could have used to transform uranium gas into dense metal in a process called metallization.[10] This process is one of the last steps required to form the explosive core of an atomic bomb. The source also stated that the loss of nuclear scientists will significantly hinder Iran's ability to conduct ongoing nuclear weapons research, including research Iran was reportedly conducting on electromagnetic pulse weapons that target electronics in a target area.[11] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the destruction of Iran’s metallization process and the loss of several Iranian nuclear scientists would hinder Iran’s ability to transform weapons-grade uranium, or 90 percent enriched uranium, into a usable nuclear weapon.[12]

Israeli strikes also reportedly buried a site where Iran stored 400 kilograms of highly-enriched uranium (HEU), or uranium enriched up to at least 20 percent.[13] Western media previously reported that Israeli strikes blocked tunnel entrances to an underground complex at the ENTC that stores part of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile.[14] The International Atomic Energy Agency reported in May 2025 that Iran had 683.1 kilograms of HEU as of mid-May 2025.[15] The Institute for Science and International Security previously assessed that the Israeli campaign also rendered most, if not all, of Iran's operational centrifuges inoperable and "effectively destroyed" Iran's enrichment capacity.[16]

The Iranian regime is facing a broad set of internal security challenges, including insurgency and anti-regime activities, which could constrain its ability to rebuild military capabilities following the Israel–Iran war. The Iranian Ministry of Intelligence released a comprehensive report on July 28 detailing its efforts during and after the 12-Day Israel-Iran War to secure Iran. The report emphasized the scale and complexity of the threats Iran faced.[17] The ministry described the war as a coordinated campaign by the “American-Zionist front” involving military strikes, sabotage, “cognitive warfare,” and efforts to trigger internal unrest through armed groups, separatists, and political dissidents.[18] Iranian officials use the term “cognitive warfare” to characterize what they claim are enemy-led psychological operations aimed at spreading distrust and hopelessness among the Iranian public to weaken the regime.[19] The ministry claimed that it arrested three Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) commanders and 50 ”takfiri” fighters inside Iran as part of its counterintelligence efforts, seized suicide vests and advanced weapons, and disrupted the infiltration of 300 foreign fighters allegedly ”mobilized by Israel” under an entity called the “United Baluchistan Front.”[20] The statement is likely referring to Jaish al Adl, a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militant group that frequently attacks Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran. The Iranian regime has previously accused Israel of supporting Jaish al Adl.[21] The report also cited operations in Sistan and Baluchistan and Kerman provinces that led to the seizure of rocket-propelled grenades, grenades, and light arms intended for use in terror attacks.[22] These claims underscore the regime’s growing concern that internal threats are increasing at a time when it cannot address them all simultaneously.

These internal security challenges will naturally limit Iran’s ability to reinvest in its external security. Iran will very likely prioritize its internal security challenges over rebuilding the Axis of Resistance or its external capabilities beyond the level necessary to deter attacks. Iranian officials would prioritize these internal security challenges because they remain concerned about regime stability over the long term.

Jaish al Adl fighters attacked the Sistan and Baluchistan Provincial Courthouse in Zahedan on July 26.[23] Iranian security officials reported that three attackers disguised as civilians attempted to enter the building, threw a grenade inside, and opened fire.[24] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Operational Base in Zahedan and the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) confirmed that six civilians died and 22 others suffered injuries, with several of the injured in critical condition.[25] The Iranian LEC stated that security forces killed all three attackers during the operation and found suicide vests on them.[26] Jaish al Adl said that it conducted the attack in response to death sentences, arrests of ”youth and clerics,” and orders to ”demolish mosques and homes.”[27] Jaish al Adl conducted its most complex and coordinated attack in April 2024 when over 160 fighters attacked multiple IRGC and police sites across Sistan and Baluchistan Province in a 13-hour operation.[28] Unspecified attackers separately killed a Basij Organization commander in Zahedan on July 27.[29] Jaish al Adl has not commented on the killing of the Basij commander at the time of this writing.

This attack and others like it seek to disrupt Iranian regime activities to create opportunities for Jaish al Adl to gain the support of local Baloch civilians. Jaish al Adl justified the attack in defensive terms, which suggests the attacks are part of an effort to build the group’s popularity as a defender of local Balochi civilians. The courthouse attack follows a broader pattern of insurgents targeting LEC and IRGC personnel and judicial institutions in southeastern Iran since 2012.[30] Iranian security forces have taken steps to target anti-regime militant groups following an uptick in anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran since December 2023.[31]

Syria will hold its first parliamentary elections through provincial subcommittees between September 15 and 20, 2025.[32] The new parliament will probably not act as a check on executive power because the executive appoints one-third of its members and the executive influences the appointments of the other two-thirds of the parliament‘s members. The Supreme Committee for People’s Assembly Elections also announced that it would request to increase the number of seats in Parliament from 150 to 210.[33] It is unclear at this time how the committee will distribute the additional seats among the provinces. Provincial subcommittees, which were created by Supreme Committee members, will select 140 representatives to the 210-seat People’s Assembly in these elections.[34] Each provincial subcommittee will elect People’s Assembly members from within the subcommittee.[35] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara will personally select the other 70 representatives, or one-third of the body.[36] Shara appointed the Supreme Committee‘s members, which thus enables him to influence the appointment of the provincial subcommittees and then the remaining 140 representatives.

The way that the parliament is selected suggests that it will probably follow the executive’s lead on policy and exert very little legislative power. The People’s Assembly is a legislative body that will propose, adopt, and amend Syrian laws according to the Syrian Constitutional Declaration.[37] The process for securing a majority to pass laws that run contrary to Shara’s preferences will be extremely difficult because it will require votes from 106 of the 140 representatives that Shara did not appoint, assuming all the Shara-appointed members vote according to his wishes.

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani recently met with several Shia Coordination Framework leaders in Baghdad to discuss the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections and unspecified “regional developments.”[38] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Ghaani reportedly held separate meetings with State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki, Wisdom Movement head Ammar al Hakim, Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri, and Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq head Humam Hamoudi.[39] Iran has previously urged unity among Shia Coordination Framework leaders ahead of the elections to improve the likelihood that Iranian-backed parties will maintain control of the Iraqi government.[40] The Shia Coordination Framework currently plans to run across multiple lists in the elections, which will divide vote shares between Iranian-backed candidates.[41]

It is notable that Ghaani’s visit occurred amid an ongoing debate in Iraq over the potential dissolution of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The PMF is an Iraqi state service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. The Iraqi federal government has reportedly drafted a plan to dissolve the militias in the PMF, integrate militia members into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and offer key leadership positions in the next Iraqi cabinet to the militia political heads.[42] A Shia Coordination Framework member told a Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)-affiliated journalist on July 20 that the Iraqi federal government shared this plan with unspecified Iranian governmental figures.[43]

Key Takeaways

  • Iran: The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) reiterated that it will trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism to reinstate UN Security Council sanctions on Iran if Iran fails to make progress towards a nuclear deal by the end of August 2025. The E3 also wants a "more comprehensive agreement" that includes limits to Iran's ballistic missile program and activities that destabilize the region.
  • Iran: The Iranian regime is facing a broad set of internal security challenges, including insurgency and anti-regime activities that could constrain its ability to rebuild military capabilities following the Israel–Iran war. These internal security challenges will limit Iran’s ability to reinvest in its external security.
  • Iraq: Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani recently met with several Shia Coordination Framework leaders in Baghdad to discuss the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections and unspecified “regional developments.” Iran has previously urged unity among Shia Coordination Framework leaders ahead of the elections to improve the likelihood that Iranian-backed parties will maintain control of the Iraqi government.
  • Iran: An Israeli source told the Washington Post that Iran is "no longer a threshold nuclear state" following US and Israeli strikes. The source stated that Iran will need at least one to two years to build a deliverable nuclear weapon, assuming it can do so undetected.
  • Syria: Syria will hold its first parliamentary elections through provincial subcommittees in September 2025. The new parliament is unlikely to act as a check on executive power because the executive appoints one-third of its members and the executive influences the appointments of the other two-thirds of the parliament‘s members.

Iran

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Brigadier General Majid Ibn al Reza as deputy defense and armed logistics minister on July 26.[44] Defense and Armed Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh proposed that Reza replace former deputy Defense and Armed Logistics Minister Hojatollah Ghoreishi, who was appointed in January 2024 under former Defense and Armed Logistics Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani.[45] It is unclear what position Ghoreishi will hold, if any. Reza had served as the chief executive officer of the Armed Forces Social Security Organization (SATA) since 2022.[46] The Defense and Armed Logistics Ministry established SATA in 2009 to provide social security for veterans.[47]

Iraq

Several Kataib Hezbollah members attempted to prevent the work of an Iraqi agriculture official, prompting engagements with Iraqi Federal Police officers in Dora, Baghdad, on July 27, killing one civilian and one Federal Police officer.[48] Several Kataib Hezbollah PMF fighters storming a Department of Agriculture building in Baghdad’s Dora district on July 27 as the new director was being sworn in, which spurred the fighting.[49] Unspecified security sources and three unidentified department employees told Al Arabiya on July 27 that the fighters aimed to stop the replacement of the former director by attacking the building.[50] Baghdad Province Deputy Governor Ali Zaidan dismissed Kataib Hezbollah-affiliated Department of Agriculture Director Iyad Kazim Ali on July 23 and replaced him with Osama Hassan Saloumi.[51] Iraq’s Joint Operations Command announced on July 27 the arrest of 14 members of the PMF’s 45th and 46th Brigades for their suspected involvement in the attack.[52] The 45th and 46th PMF brigades are controlled by the Iranian-backed militia Kataib Hezbollah.[53] The Ministry of Interior announced on July 28 the arrest of the former Department of Agriculture Director for his ”direct involvement” in the incident.[54]

Kataib Hezbollah denied on July 28 any involvement in the Iraqi Federal Police attack.[55] A member of Kataib Hezbollah’s political party, Harakat Hoquq, described the clashes between Kataib Hezbollah militants and Iraqi Federal Police as “friendly fire” and a “mistake.”[56] The Shia Coordination Framework also condemned the attack on July 27.[57] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Iran-backed Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. The PMF’s Popular Mobilization Commission stated on July 27 that it will not “tolerate” any individual who violates orders or security procedures.[58] Kataib Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have tried to distance themselves from the incident, which occurred amid discussions on restricting arms to the state and dissolving the PMF.

Iraqi media reported on July 28 that at least four one-way attack drones crashed in Erbil, Duhok, and Kirkuk provinces.[59] Iraqi media reported on July 28 that at least two one-way attack drones crashed in Erbil Province.[60] One landed near Korgosk village, and the other hit a popular cafe in Rizgari Subdistrict.[61] Shafaq News reported on July 28 that a drone crashed in Bardarash District, Duhok Province.[62] Iraqi media also reported on July 28 that a drone fell near Hihawa village in Kirkuk Province.[63] It is unclear what these drones were targeting because the crashes appear to be the result of a technical malfunction rather than precise targeting. This reporting coincides with Iraqi National Security Advisor Qasim al Araji’s visit to Erbil to discuss recent drone attacks targeting oil fields in Iraqi Kurdistan with the Kurdistan Regional Government.[64] Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi actors conducted at least nine one-way drone attacks targeting seven oil fields in Iraqi Kurdistan between July 14 and 17.[65]

The Iraqi state-run State Organization for Marketing Oil (SOMO) called on Iraqi authorities on July 28 to halt “widespread” oil smuggling operations in Iraqi territorial waters.[66] SOMO’s statement came after the United States reportedly threatened in July 2025 to sanction SOMO and therefore block $350 million of Iraqi oil revenue if the Iraqi federal government failed to prevent Iranian crude oil smuggling.[67] Iran oversees an oil smuggling network in Iraq that generates around a billion dollars annually for Iran and its Axis of Resistance.[68] The United States sanctioned on July 3 six entities and four vessels involved in smuggling Iranian oil. The sanctioned entities included a network of companies run by an Iraqi businessman.[69]

Syria

French, US, and UK officials are mediating stalled integration talks between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian transitional government. The SDF and Shara’s government have not fully negotiated the integration of Kurdish-majority northeastern Syria into the transitional government despite a March agreement that outlined a framework and set of principles.[70] French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot met with SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi in Paris on July 25 to confirm future negotiations between the Syrian transitional government and the SDF and facilitated by US and French mediators to to implement the March 10 agreement, but did not provide a date for talks.[71] Barrot met with Abdi after a joint meeting between himself, US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack, and Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Shaibani, which focused on stability concerns in Syria, including the situation in Suwayda and integration negotiations with the SDF.[72]

Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) Foreign Relations Department co-chair Ilham Ahmed attributed the failure to implement the March 10 agreement on July 27 to interpretive disputes from both sides regarding integration, participation, and unity in the new Syrian state.[73] Ahmed clarified the SDF’s position on integration into the state when she emphasized that “airports, passports, and identity cards are sovereign issues that must be managed centrally,” while “services, education, culture, and internal security must be managed decentralized to ensure genuine participation by local communities.”[74]

Syrian Foreign Ministry Director for US Affairs Qutaiba Idlibi said on July 25 that the March 10 agreement ”does not require months to be implemented but rather requires a genuine desire to implement it” and that there has been no progress in implementing the agreement so far.[75] The implementation of the March 10 agreement requires genuine desire for implementation from both sides, and it is notable that the Syrian government has so far failed to implement the first stipulation, which calls for the inclusion of all Syrian ethnic and religious groups in the political process. The transitional government has included minorities only in less-significant political positions, and the Shara-led government has centralized control over the legislative branch, as noted above. Idlibi claimed that ”a lack of unified vision within the SDF’s leadership” has hindered negotiations.[76]

SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi met with SDF generals, local council leaders, and tribal leaders from Deir ez Zor Province on July 27 in al Shaddadi, Hasakah Province, to discuss plans for an eventual SDF withdrawal from Deir ez Zor. [77]A source that attended the meeting told Syrian media that the purpose of the meeting was to agree on the withdrawal of the SDF from all of Deir ez Zor Province to allow the Syrian transitional government to assume administration for the entire province.[78] The source claimed that the SDF decided to withdraw from Deir ez Zor after US pressure.[79] The SDF has controlled half of Deir ez Zor Province since it completed its campaign against ISIS in Deir ez Zor with US support.[80] Syrian media reported that the transitional government will assume control of Deir ez Zor Province within two to three months, though Kurdish media denied this claim.[81]



Syrian security forces dismantled an Assadist cell that participated in the March 2025 coastal violence. The General Security Services (GSS) arrested four Assadist insurgents in Jableh, Latakia Province, on July 26.[82] The Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI) said in a statement on July 26 that it had dismantled a ”terrorist cell” led by Maher Hussein Ali, who attacked GSS forces on March 6 during a coordinated wave of Alawite insurgency in coastal Syria. The cell had planned future attacks on the transitional government.[83] The MoI claimed that Ali’s cell coordinated with Bashar al Assad’s brother Maher, the commander of the ”Mazkun Regiment”, and with Lebanese Hezbollah as part of a plot to destabilize the coastal region.[84] The GSS also arrested Wadah Suhail Ismail, the commander of the ”Mazkun Regiment,” on July 26, after transitional government forces dismantled Ali's cell in Jableh and received additional intelligence on Assadist activity.[85] The Mazkun Regiment is an Assadist insurgent group on the Syrian coast that created a social media presence on May 21 after the height of the coastal insurgency in March.[86] The GSS also arrested an Assadist Republican Guard Colonel on July 26, who was the commander of the ”Coastal Operation Room” that oversaw Assadist attacks on March 6.[87] The GSS arrested the colonel after it received intelligence from Ali’s cell.[88]

Arabian Peninsula

The Houthis said that they plan to expand their attack campaign on international shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, likely to put pressure on Israel to stop its war in the Gaza Strip.[89] The Houthis announced on July 27 that they entered the ”fourth stage“ of their attack campaign against Israel and will attack any vessel tied to Israel, regardless of the flag the vessel is sailing under.[90] The Houthis’ announcement comes after Israel and the United States withdrew from ceasefire talks with Hamas on July 25.[91] The Houthis have tied their campaign against international shipping to Israel’s war in the Gaza Strip since October 2023.[92]

The Houthis published a propaganda video on July 28 interviewing Eternity C crewmembers under duress in an attempt to portray the Houthis as a responsible actor.[93] The Houthis blamed the crew’s captain and the shipping company for the sinking of the Eternity C and the death of four crewmembers. The Houthis initiated the attack on Eternity C and thus bear the responsibility for the deaths and damage.[94] The Houthis prompted one crewmember to warn shipping companies against trading with Israel to avoid being hijacked and their crew taken hostage.[95] The Houthis forced crewmembers to say that the Houthis rescued and provided shelter for the crew.[96] The Houthis also took the Eternity C crew hostage in international waters, which is an act of piracy under international law.[97]

The Houthis launched three drones targeting Eilat, Ashkelon, and Hadera and a missile targeting a “sensitive” site in Beer Sheva in southern Israel on July 24.[98] The IDF Air Force intercepted a Houthi drone before it crossed into Israeli territory on July 24.[99] The Houthis have launched hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles targeting Israel since the Houthis began their campaign to enforce an economic blockade on Israel in October 2023.[100]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

 

[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gladOoktj6Q ; https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-call-with-e3-leaders-26-july-2025

[2] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-25-2025-68841c28e9371

[3] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gladOoktj6Q

[4] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6543867/

[5] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/iran-s-ballistic-missile-program-non-negotiable-president-hassan-rouhani-n1251072  ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-28-2025 ;

[6] https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/07/25/israel-us-attack-irans-nuclear-program-destroyed/

[7] https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/07/25/israel-us-attack-irans-nuclear-program-destroyed/

[8] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/10/us/politics/iran-attacks-damage.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare  ; https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/new-us-assessment-finds-american-strikes-destroyed-only-one-three-iran-rcna218761

[9] https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/07/25/israel-us-attack-irans-nuclear-program-destroyed/

[10] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/28/science/iran-nuclear-uranium-metal.html

[11] https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/07/25/israel-us-attack-irans-nuclear-program-destroyed/

[12] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-special-report-june-28-2025

[13] https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/07/25/israel-us-attack-irans-nuclear-program-destroyed/

[14] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iaea-says-entrances-tunnels-irans-isfahan-site-hit-by-us-strike-2025-06-22/

[15] https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/25/06/gov2025-24.pdf

[16] https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/post-attack-assessment-of-the-first-12-days-of-israeli-strikes-on-iranian-nuclear-facilities

[17] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/06/3363782/

[18] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/06/3363782/

[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-29-2025

[20] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/06/3363782/

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-9-2025 ;

https://farhikhtegandaily dot com/news/196929/

[22] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/06/3363782/

[23] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/04/3362088

[24] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/04/3362088

[25] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/04/3362088

[26] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/04/3362088

[27] https://t.me/mediaadl/648

[28] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/01/16/3063220;

https://t.me/mediaadl/342 ;

https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/01/16/3063029 ;

https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1775840050342682790

[29] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/06/3363924

[30] https://www.dni.gov/nctc/terrorist_groups/jaa.html ;

https://www.israeldefense dot co.il/en/node/37476 ;

https://www.bbc.com/persian/iran-56249392 ;

https://www.tabnak dot ir/fa/news/1267983 ;

https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/cl5qk32k271o ;

https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/09/24/3006762;

https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/cxxlgkd8048o ;

https://parsi.euronews.com/2023/05/21/five-border-guards-killed-in-attack-of-jaish-al-adl-on-the-saravan-border-post

[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-19-2025 ;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-18-2025  ;

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-28-2025  ;

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-10-2025

[32] https://t.me/sana_gov/134575 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-expected-hold-parliamentary-election-september-2025-07-27/

[33] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-expected-hold-parliamentary-election-september-2025-07-27/

[34] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-expected-hold-parliamentary-election-september-2025-07-27/

[35] https://english dot enabbaladi.net/archives/2025/06/election-of-syrian-peoples-assembly-faces-challenge-of-competence-and-representation-demands/

[36] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-expected-hold-parliamentary-election-september-2025-07-27/

[37] https://www.aljazeera dot net/encyclopedia/2025/3/14/نص-الإعلان-الدستوري-لسوريا-2025

[38] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/في-زيارة-خاطفة-استمرت-10-ساعات-قا-ني-يلتقي-ربعة-قيادات-شيعية-دون-السوداني

[39] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/في-زيارة-خاطفة-استمرت-10-ساعات-قا-ني-يلتقي-ربعة-قيادات-شيعية-دون-السوداني

[40] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate043025

[41] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate052725

[42] https://x.com/LawkGhafuri/status/1946996593653076228

[43] https://x.com/LawkGhafuri/status/1946996597708988569 ; https://x.com/LawkGhafuri/status/1946996578885026280

[44] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/04/3362682/

[45] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85353533

[46] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1401031812375

[47] https://web.archive dpt org/web/20211221181209/https://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/135743

[48] https://english.alarabiya dot net/News/middle-east/2025/07/27/iraqi-police-clash-with-paramilitary-fighters-who-stormed-government-building 

[49] https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/ول-تعليق-من-هي-ة-الحشد-على-حداث-الدورة ;

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraqi-police-clash-with-paramilitary-fighters-who-stormed-government-building-2025-07-27/ ;

[50] https://english.alarabiya dot net/News/middle-east/2025/07/27/iraqi-police-clash-with-paramilitary-fighters-who-stormed-government-building

[51] https://alssaa dot com/post/show/37103-%D8%A5%D8%B9%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B5%D8%A8%D9%87 

[52] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/security/535011/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%87%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%82%D9%8F%D8%AA%D9%84-%D8%A8%D9%80%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%AD%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF

[53] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces

[54] https://almadapaper dot net/409332/

[55] https://t.me/centerkaf/5117

[56] https://x.com/thestevennabil/status/1949550837245890792

[57]

[58] https://www.al-mirbad dot com/detail/186084

[59] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/كوردســتانيات/سقوط-طا-رتين-مسيرتين-في-حدود-ربيل ;

https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/كوردســتانيات/بيان-مني-من-كوردستان-الطا-رة-التي-سقطت-في-اربيل-مفخخة-ولا-صابات ;

https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/security/535052/%D8%B3%D9%82%D9%88%D8%B7-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%81%D8%AE%D8%AE%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%84 ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/كوردســتانيات/سقوط-طا-رة-مسيرة-مجهولة-الهوية-شمالي-دهوك ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/سقوط-طا-رة-مسيرة-في-حدى-قرى-الحويجة-بكركوك

[60] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/كوردســتانيات/سقوط-طا-رتين-مسيرتين-في-حدود-ربيل ;

https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/كوردســتانيات/بيان-مني-من-كوردستان-الطا-رة-التي-سقطت-في-اربيل-مفخخة-ولا-صابات ;

https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/security/535052/%D8%B3%D9%82%D9%88%D8%B7-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%81%D8%AE%D8%AE%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%84

[61] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/كوردســتانيات/سقوط-طا-رتين-مسيرتين-في-حدود-ربيل;

https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/كوردســتانيات/بيان-مني-من-كوردستان-الطا-رة-التي-سقطت-في-اربيل-مفخخة-ولا-صابات ; https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/security/535052/%D8%B3%D9%82%D9%88%D8%B7-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%81%D8%AE%D8%AE%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%84

[62] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/كوردســتانيات/سقوط-طا-رة-مسيرة-مجهولة-الهوية-شمالي-دهوك

[63] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/سقوط-طا-رة-مسيرة-في-حدى-قرى-الحويجة-بكركوك

[64] https://ina dot iq/ar/political/239604-.html

[65] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-15-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-16-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-17-2025

[66] https://almadapaper dot net/409304/

[67] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ckb/story/851317

[68] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/fuel-oil-smuggling-network-rakes-1-billion-iran-its-proxies-2024-12-03/ ; https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/07/sanctions-on-oil-smugglers-exporting-iranian-oil/

[69] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/07/sanctions-on-oil-smugglers-exporting-iranian-oil/

[70] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-10-2025

[71] https://www.diplomatie.gouv dot fr/fr/dossiers-pays/syrie/evenements/actualites-2025/article/syrie-entretien-du-ministre-avec-le-commandant-des-forces-democratiques

[72] https://www.diplomatie.gouv dot fr/fr/dossiers-pays/syrie/evenements/actualites-2025/article/syrie-entretien-du-ministre-avec-le-commandant-des-forces-democratiques ; https://x.com/syrianmofaex/status/1948715748894871854

[73] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/interview/27072025

[74] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/interview/27072025

[75] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/766087/%d8%af%d9%85%d8%b4%d9%82-%d9%84%d8%a7-%d8%aa%d9%82%d8%af%d9%85-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%aa%d9%86%d9%81%d9%8a%d8%b0-%d8%a7%d8%aa%d9%81%d8%a7%d9%82-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b4%d8%b1%d8%b9-%d8%b9%d8%a8%d8%af%d9%8a/

[76] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/766087/%d8%af%d9%85%d8%b4%d9%82-%d9%84%d8%a7-%d8%aa%d9%82%d8%af%d9%85-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%aa%d9%86%d9%81%d9%8a%d8%b0-%d8%a7%d8%aa%d9%81%d8%a7%d9%82-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b4%d8%b1%d8%b9-%d8%b9%d8%a8%d8%af%d9%8a/

[77] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/766526/%d8%a7%d8%ac%d8%aa%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%b9-%d9%8a%d8%a8%d8%ad%d8%ab-%d8%a7%d9%86%d8%b3%d8%ad%d8%a7%d8%a8-%d9%82%d8%b3%d8%af-%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%af%d9%8a%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b2%d9%88%d8%b1/

[78] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/766526/%d8%a7%d8%ac%d8%aa%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%b9-%d9%8a%d8%a8%d8%ad%d8%ab-%d8%a7%d9%86%d8%b3%d8%ad%d8%a7%d8%a8-%d9%82%d8%b3%d8%af-%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%af%d9%8a%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b2%d9%88%d8%b1/

[79] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/766526/%d8%a7%d8%ac%d8%aa%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%b9-%d9%8a%d8%a8%d8%ad%d8%ab-%d8%a7%d9%86%d8%b3%d8%ad%d8%a7%d8%a8-%d9%82%d8%b3%d8%af-%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%af%d9%8a%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b2%d9%88%d8%b1/

[80] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/sdfs-insurgency-challenge-deir-ez-zor

[81] https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1949536571474215039 ; https://npasyria dot com/218694/

[82] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1949217711285735685

[83] https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1B97vLKqNX/ ;

[84] https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1B97vLKqNX/

[85] https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1B97vLKqNX/

[86] https://www.facebook.com/zl.almqdad

[87] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1949222462136414308 ; https://www.facebook.com/zl.almqdad

[88] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1949222462136414308

[89] https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1949573062262759840

[90] https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1949573062262759840

[91] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/netanyahu-trump-appear-abandon-gaza-ceasefire-negotiations-with-hamas-2025-07-25/

[92] https://t.me/army21ye/3227; https://t.me/army21ye/1399

[93] https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1949902614063435929 ;  https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/20250709-ukmto_warning_incident_027-25-update-004.pdf?rev=334cdc3dd34b4e5287ac77b784c9c1fa ; https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1942961976340062717;

[94] https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/20250709-ukmto_warning_incident_027-25-update-004.pdf?rev=334cdc3dd34b4e5287ac77b784c9c1fa ; https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1942961976340062717;

[95] https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1949902614063435929 from 3:40 min.

[96] https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1949902614063435929 from 5:50 min.

[97] https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/20250709-ukmto_warning_incident_027-25-update-004.pdf?rev=334cdc3dd34b4e5287ac77b784c9c1fa ; https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1942961976340062717; https://www.imo.org/en/ourwork/security/pages/piracyarmedrobberydefault.aspx

[98] https://t.me/army21ye/3220?single

[99] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1948505036956287189

[100] https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2024/12/briefing-on-developments-related-to-houthi-attacks-on-israel.php ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-says-houthis-have-launched-40-missiles-320-drones-at-israel-since-start-of-war/

 

 

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