UA-69458566-1

Thursday, July 24, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 24, 2025

Olivia Gibson, Jessica Sobieski, Christina Harward, Jennie Olmsted, Grace Mappes, and George Barros

July 24, 2025, 9:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on July 24. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russia will likely implement new policies to augment its military administrative capacity to significantly expand the rate at which Russia can call up a larger volume of conscripts and reservists. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov introduced a bill to the Russian State Duma on July 22 that would change the Russian military conscription administrative process to a year-round cycle, as opposed to the current system, which only processes conscripts during Russia’s semi-annual spring and fall cycles.[1]  Kartapolov claimed that this change would streamline the work of military registration and enlistment offices, which would work year-round, and relieve emergency workload pressure that military registration and enlistment offices currently experience during the traditional semi-annual conscription selection periods in the spring and fall. This new system proposed in the bill does not institute new conscription cycles beyond Russia’s traditional spring and fall conscription cycle periods. Kartapolov added that the new model would ensure a uniform load on military registration and enlistment offices and make the process more convenient for Russian citizens, as conscripts would be able to undergo their medical examination, obtain military occupational specialty (MOS) assignments, and complete other necessary procedures throughout the year without rushing during the traditional three-month conscription periods. Kartapolov claimed that the new model would not make the Russian military increase its conscription quotas, although the Kremlin has been increasing conscription classes over the past three years.[2]

The bill would likely mitigate bureaucratic bottlenecks that complicate Russia's force generation efforts during large-scale involuntary call-ups. Russia’s military conscription registration and enlistment centers that process mobilized and conscripted personnel currently only operate for six months of the year in spring and fall to support Russia’s semi-annual conscription cycles. These offices and administrative personnel rush to call up, evaluate, and process a large number of military-aged men within the six months, reducing Russia’s ability to facilitate large-scale call-ups of reservists and conscripts outside of spring and fall. The law’s proposal to have these processing centers operate year-round would institute a permanent military administrative bureaucracy able to facilitate Russian reserve call-ups year-round to permanently augment Russia’s ability to process large numbers of mobilized personnel, regardless of the time of year. Keeping military processing centers and their staff working all year presents significant implications for the rate at which Russia can conduct mobilization, as the Russian military administration will have fewer constraints holding back the rate at which mobilized personnel can be processed and assigned to units.   

The Kremlin is setting other legal conditions to facilitate the streamlining of future larger conscriptions. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on April 21 that simplified conscription procedures for military-aged men who were selected for semi-annual conscription but did not dispatch for compulsory military service.[3] The law specifies that conscripts who underwent conscription processes, such as medical commissions, but were not assigned to military service, could be called up to military service within one year without needing to repeat the conscription procedures. The Russian military's transition to a year-round conscription structure coheres with Russia's broader strategic effort to augment and streamline its force generation capabilities – a move that will have far-reaching implications for its war in Ukraine and a possible broader confrontation with NATO.

Russia has planned the gradual expansion of the Russian military since 2022, and the proposed changes to Russia’s personnel processing system are likely intended to support ongoing efforts to increase the size of the Russian military. Structural problems with Russia's mobilization capacity and bureaucratic ability to process mass quantities of conscripts at one time severely complicated Russia's partial involuntary reserve call-up in September 2022.[4] Then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced in December 2022 that Russian military leadership planned to significantly expand the Russian military, including plans to increase the size of the Russian Armed Forces and to create new formations.[5] Russian military expansion requires an increase in the number of servicemembers, and Russia is likely pursuing efforts to increase its bureaucratic capacity to process and conscript Russians into military service. Putin ordered the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to increase Russia‘s military to 2.38 million people in 2025.[6] Putin has signed annual decrees increasing the size of the Russian military by 137,000 in 2022 to 170,000 in 2023 and 180,000 in 2024.[7] The Kremlin has also executed other measures since 2022 to expand the Russian military, including by reopening Soviet-era military academies to rebuild the officer corps, lowering the age of conscription, digitalizing draft summonses, increasing fines for draft dodgers, lowering conscription and volunteer eligibility requirements, and recruiting prisoners and those with health issues.[8]

The expansion of Russia’s administrative capacity to process conscripts and mobilized personnel would allow Russia to mobilize forces faster and more efficiently both during a protracted war in Ukraine and a possible future war against NATO. Russian citizens who have previously deferred or were ineligible for conscription may be eligible for conscription at a later date should Russian conscription legislation change. Kartapolov's July 22 bill for a permeant conscription bureaucracy that works year-round and the April 2025 law to simplify conscription procedures will significantly reduce the bureaucratic hurdles that Russian authorities would face to process these citizens' renewed conscription more quickly. Russia's efforts to reduce the bureaucratic bottlenecks hindering the conscription process will affect Russia's force generation mechanisms in the war in Ukraine. Putin has so far been reluctant to conduct another partial involuntary reserve call-up due to the risk of severe societal backlash, but these reforms to Russia's conscription processes would allow Russian authorities to process another potential call-up in the future more smoothly and efficiently than the one in September 2022, getting soldiers from the military enlistment and registration offices to the frontline more quickly and thus mitigating societal backlash from poor bureaucratic procedures.[9] These reforms will also put the necessary administrative infrastructure in place year-round, allowing the Kremlin to conduct another call-up at any time of the year without having to mobilize additional bureaucratic resources that would slow down the conscription process.

Reductions in the bottlenecks in the Russian conscription process would also impact Russia's ability to wage future wars. ISW continues to assess that Russia's military reforms, including the restructuring of the Western Military District (WMD) into the Leningrad and Moscow military districts (LMD and MMD), demonstrate Russia's longer-term preparation for a possible future conflict with NATO.[10] Russia's ability to more quickly conduct large-scale call-ups will have significant implications for NATO and its ability to deter or even defend against future Russian aggression.

Kremlin officials continued to signal Russia's unwillingness to engage substantively in efforts to establish a lasting peace in Ukraine during the third round of bilateral talks in Istanbul. Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov stated on July 23 that the Ukrainian delegation outlined three key priorities at the third round of Istanbul negotiations: a full and unconditional ceasefire, including halting all strikes on civilian and critical infrastructure; organizing a summit between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Russian President Vladimir Putin, US President Donald Trump, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, preferably by the end of August 2025; and the return of all Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), civilians, and illegally deported children.[11] Umerov stated that the Russian delegation agreed to return POWs who have been in Russian captivity for more than three years, the seriously wounded, and young people, and to exchange over 1,200 people.[12] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky, who led the Russian delegation in Istanbul, stated that Russia's and Ukraine’s positions remain far apart and that Russia proposed continued negotiations at the working group level.[13] Medinsky claimed that Russia proposed to establish virtual working groups to handle political, humanitarian, and military issues and to discuss possible short-term humanitarian ceasefires, lasting between 24 to 48 hours, to collect dead and wounded soldiers from the battlefield.[14] Medinsky asserted that Russian and Ukrainian leaders - referring to Putin and Zelensky - cannot meet until Russia and Ukraine agree on a full peace settlement and a full ceasefire is in effect.[15] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov similarly claimed that Russia’s proposals were ”concrete and constructive” but maintained that a meeting between Putin and Zelensky before the end of August 2025 is unlikely due to the differences in the two sides' negotiation positions.[16] Russia's rejection of a presidential summit before a permanent peace settlement is a continuation of Kremlin efforts to dictate the terms and timing of peace negotiations, as Russia did in early 2025 by rejecting Ukraine's and the United States' calls for a longer-term ceasefire to precede peace negotiations.[17] Russia's proposal to establish virtual working groups is likely part of efforts to posture itself as a proactive, engaged negotiator while not committing to any substantive measures to meaningfully progress the peace process.[18] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains committed to delaying the negotiation process so as to continue making gains on the battlefield and extract concessions from Ukraine and the West – in stark contrast to Ukraine's continued willingness to engage in the negotiation process to end the war.[19]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky submitted a draft bill to the Ukrainian parliament on July 24 aimed at bolstering the independence of Ukraine's anti-corruption agencies in response to public backlash against the controversial bill that Zelensky signed on July 22. Zelensky submitted to the Verkhovna Rada (parliament) draft law No. 13533, which is designed to safeguard the independence of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAP).[20] The bill would limit the Prosecutor General's Office's ability to give instructions to SAP prosecutors and require that the deputy prosecutor general, who is also the head of SAP, approve all the Prosecutor General's Office's written administrative orders regarding SAP's activities.[21] The bill would additionally require NABU personnel with access to classified information to undergo a polygraph test within six months; prohibit most foreign travel for NABU employees during martial law; authorize NABU to receive more cases from other law enforcement bodies; enable SAP to transfer NABU cases that may jeopardize NABU's objectivity to other agencies; and authorize SAP prosecutors to give written instructions to NABU detectives and discipline NABU detectives who refuse these orders. NABU's and SAP's press services reported that the bill would restore all procedural powers and guarantees of independence and called on the Verkhovna Rada to adopt the bill.[22]

The US State Department approved two Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Ukraine totaling $322 million. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) announced on July 23 that the US State Department approved an FMS to Ukraine for Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and maintenance and repair equipment valued at $150 million, and that the agency has notified Congress.[23] The US State Department also approved an FMS to Ukraine valued at $172 million for equipment and services related to the HAWK Phase III missile system, including MIM-23 HAWK missile spare parts, five-ton cargo trucks, HAWK system spare parts, refurbishment and system overhaul of HAWK air defense fire units, tool kits, test and support equipment, and US Government and contractor technical assistance.[24]

Ukraine and Russia conducted their ninth prisoner of war (POW) exchange on July 23, in accordance with agreements reached during the June 2 bilateral negotiations in Istanbul. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that Ukraine and Russia exchanged 250 POWs each on July 23.[25] Zelensky stated that Ukraine has brought back more than 1,000 Ukrainian POWs since the beginning of the exchanges in accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements and noted that the majority of the Ukrainian POWs returned on July 23 had been in Russian captivity for more than three years.[26] The Russian MoD reported that Ukraine also returned two wounded Russian POWs on July 23.[27]

Key Takeaways:

  • Russia will likely implement new policies to augment its military administrative capacity to significantly expand the rate at which Russia can call up a larger volume of conscripts and reservists.

  • Russia has planned the gradual expansion of the Russian military since 2022, and the proposed changes to Russia’s personnel processing system are likely intended to support ongoing efforts to increase the size of the Russian military.

  • The expansion of Russia’s administrative capacity to process conscripts and mobilized personnel would allow Russia to mobilize forces faster and more efficiently both during a protracted war in Ukraine and a possible future war against NATO.

  • Reductions in the bottlenecks in the Russian conscription process would also impact Russia's ability to wage future wars.

  • Kremlin officials continued to signal Russia's unwillingness to engage substantively in efforts to establish a lasting peace in Ukraine during the third round of bilateral talks in Istanbul.

  • Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky submitted a draft bill to the Ukrainian parliament on July 24 aimed at bolstering the independence of Ukraine's anti-corruption agencies in response to public backlash against the controversial bill that Zelensky signed on July 22.

  • The US State Department approved two Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Ukraine totaling $322 million.

  • Ukraine and Russia conducted their ninth prisoner of war (POW) exchange on July 23, in accordance with agreements reached during the June 2 bilateral negotiations in Istanbul.

  • Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Kupyansk, Borova, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.




We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population, and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity, even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 24.

Russian forces conducted attacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 23 and 24.[28]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Machine Gun Artillery Division, 68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 119th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[29]

Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against oil infrastructure in Krasnodar Krai on the night of July 23 to 24. Ukrainian Center for Combatting Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian drone strikes, reported on July 24 that there was an explosion at an oil depot in Sochi, Krasnodar Krai.[30] Geolocated footage published on July 23 and 24 shows an explosion at the Sochi Airport and the Lukoil oil depot near Sirius, Krasnodar Krai (immediately southeast of Sochi).[31] Sirius Federal Territory Head Dmitry Plishkin claimed on July 23 that a drone hit an oil depot on Tavricheskaya Street – likely referring to the Lukoil oil depot, and Krasnodar Krai Governor Veniamin Kondratev claimed that drone debris fell on an oil depot.[32] Sochi Mayor Andrey Proshunin claimed on July 24 that drone debris fell on Aviatsionnaya Street near the Sochi Airport, starting a fire.[33]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City).[34]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Sadky (northeast of Sumy City).[35]

Russian forces attacked in northern Sumy Oblast, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and Yunakivka, on July 23 and 24.[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka (north of Sumy City).[37]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces complained that the current leading cause of death of Russian forces attacking near Sadky (northeast of Sumy City) is dense minefields that Russian forces laid when Ukrainian forces withdrew from Kursk Oblast as part of efforts to prevent Ukrainian forces from crossing the border again.[38] The milblogger claimed that the second leading cause of death in northern Sumy Oblast is friendly fire incidents and that elements of the Russian 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) and 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) recently fired upon each other. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces in the area are struggling to coordinate their areas of responsibility (AoRs) and that Russian elements are competing to be the first to seize Sadky. The milblogger implied that North Korean forces are moving from Rylsk (north of Glushkovo) toward Zvannoye (just northwest of Glushkovo) after claiming on July 23 that roughly a battalion's worth of North Korean forces arrived in Rylsk.[39] The milblogger claimed on July 23 that the North Korean forces would relieve Russian forces currently in Rylsk, allowing these Russian forces to deploy to the frontline.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Bezsalivka (northeast of Sumy City), and drone operators of the 83rd Separate VDV Brigade are reportedly operating in northern Sumy Oblast.[40] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kindrativka, and drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces along the Sumy Oblast international border.[41]

 

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[42]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on July 23 and 24.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Synelnykove (just southwest of Vovchansk).[44]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City).[45]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 24 but did not advance.[46]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Milove.[47]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Radkivka (north of Kupyansk) and likely seized the settlement.[48]

Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and Kutkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Dvorichna and Kamyanka and toward Petro-Ivanivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Pishchane on July 23 and 24.[49]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kupyansk Vuzlovyi (east of Kupyansk), and drone operators of the Russian Anvar Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Synkivka (northeast of Kupyansk).[50]



Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Olhivka (southeast of Borova).[51]

Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Borova near Zelenyi Hai, Zahryzove, Bohuslavka, and Borivska Andriivka; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Druzhelyubivka and Cherneshchyna on July 23 and 24.[52]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Lyman direction on July 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued ground assaults northwest of Lyman toward Shandrylohove, Serednie, and Karpivka; north of Lyman near Novyi Mir; northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka, Kolodyazi, and Zelena Dolyna; and east of Lyman near the Serebryanske forest area on July 23 and 24.[53]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka and northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, Shypylivka, and Serebryanka on July 23 and 24.[54]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Serebryanka.[55]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced toward the southern outskirts of Maiske (northwest of Chasiv Yar) and within southeastern and southwest of Chasiv Yar.[56]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and Stupochky on July 23 and 24.[57]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[58]

 

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 24 shows Russian forces raising a flag in eastern Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk), indicating that Russian forces likely seized the settlement.[59] A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) with seizing the settlement.[60]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment advanced into Oleksandro-Kalynove (northwest of Toretsk) from Yablunivka.[61] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Poltamy vka, Yablunivka, Popiv Yar, and Rusyn Yar (all northwest of Toretsk); , and southwest of Toretsk near Romanivka.[62]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; and northwest of Toretsk near Oleksandro-Kalynove, Rusyn Yar, Popiv Yar, and Poltavka, and toward Stepanivka and Berestok on July 23 and 24.[63]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Toretsk-Kostyantynivka direction.[64] Elements of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are operating in Poltavka.[65] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Poltavka.



Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on July 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk) and Zvirove (southwest of Pokrovsk).[66] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into central Leontovychi (just southwest of Pokrovsk), and Russian sources claimed that Russian forces, reportedly elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD), advanced into southwestern Pokrovsk, and that fighting is ongoing in Pokrovsk itself.[67]

Russian forces attacked toward Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk toward Rodynske and Sukhetske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrne, Novotoretske, Volodymyrivka, Mayak, Pankivka, Sukhetske, Mykolaivka, and Novoekonomichne and toward Zatyshok; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka and toward Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Novokostyantynivka, Udachne, and Kotlyne on July 23 and 24.[68] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Molodetske (southwest of Pokrovsk).[69]

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on July 24 that over 100,000 Russian forces are operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[70] Trehubov stated that the Russian military command seeks to bypass Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad to the east and that Russian forces are renewing their efforts to advance west of Pokrovsk. An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on July 24 that Russian forces are using more motorcycles due to a fear of using armored vehicles.[71] The spokesperson of a different Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are moving in groups of two to four personnel along windbreaks for ground assaults.[72]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating near Volodymyrivka.[73] Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Hrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[74]

 

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 23 indicates that Russian forces likely seized Dachne (south of Novopavlivka).[75]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Novopavlivka near Oleksiivka, south of Novopavlivka near Dachne and Yalta, and southwest of Novopavlivka near Oleksandrohrad, Tovste, and Voskresenka.[76]

Russian forces conducted ground assaults south of Novopavlivka near Dachne, Zirka, and Zaporizhzhia; southeast of Novopavlivka near Oleksiivka; southwest of Novopavlivka toward Oleksandrohrad near Piddubne, Voskresenka and Maliivka on July 23 and 24.[77]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 24 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Shevchenko (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and west of Zelene Pole (west of Velyka Novosilka).[78]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and Vilne Pole and toward Komyshuvakha and west of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole and toward Temyrivka on July 23 and 24.[79]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on July 24.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1466th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and drone operators of the 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces near Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole).[80]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced in central and north of Plavni, northeast of Shcherbaky, and north of Kamyanske (all west of Orikhiv).[81]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and Bilohirya and west of Orikhiv near Stepove, Shcherbaky, Kamyanske, and Plavni and toward Stepnohirsk on July 23 and 24.[82]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on July 23 that Russian forces are intensifying drone strikes against Ukrainian forces' ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that run from Mykolaiv City to Kherson City.[83]

 

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on July 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast of Kherson City toward Sadove and Prydniprovske and southwest of Kherson City toward Dniprovske on July 23 and 24.[84]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) reportedly continue to operate in the Kherson direction.[85]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russia conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 23 to 24. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched four Iskander-K cruise missiles and 103 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk and Kursk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Cape Chauda and Hvardiiske, occupied Crimea.[86] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed and suppressed one Iskander-K cruise missile and 90 Shahed-type and decoy drones in northern, eastern, southern, and central Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that over 30 Russian drones damaged Primorsky Boulevard - a UNESCO World Heritage site - and a market, a gas station, and multi-story residential buildings in Odesa City.[87] Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov reported that Russian drone strikes damaged residential areas in Zaporizhzhia City.[88] Cherkasy City and Oblast officials reported that four Russian cruise missiles, presumably Iskander-K missiles, damaged educational, healthcare, and residential areas in Cherkasy City and injured 12 people.[89] Kharkiv City and Oblast officials reported that Russian Geran-2 (Russian-made equivalent of Shahed drones) and guided glide bomb strikes against Kharkiv City damaged residential areas.[90]

The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported on July 24 that Russian forces struck Kharkiv City with two guided glide bombs equipped with a new modification of the universal joint glide munition (UMPB), referred to as the UMPB-5, and that the UMPB-5s have an approximate range of 100 kilometers.[91] Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes injured 42 civilians and damaged a multi-story residential building. Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office Spokesperson Spartak Borisenko stated that the UMPB-5 weighs 250 kilograms and has a thicker metal casing than Russian D-30 glide bombs.[92]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/22/07/2025/687fc0419a79479f70d91a1b ; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/24581547; https://sozd dot duma.gov.ru/bill/973851-8

[2] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c36718p52eyo; https://kyivindependent dot com/putin-orders-compulsory-military-draft-of-160-000-men-the-largest-in-14-years/

[3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-30-2025

[4] https://isw.pub/RusCampaignSept22; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-21

[6] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-orders-russian-army-grow-by-180000-soldiers-become-15-million-strong-2024-09-16/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-11-2025

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-25 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-1-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2024;

[8] https://united24media dot com/latest-news/russia-overhauls-military-education-system-to-train-for-future-conflicts-9711; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-21; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-18-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-20-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-4-2025

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071725; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2025

[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020525; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2025

[11] https://www.facebook.com/rustemumerov.ua/posts/pfbid0Pedmec8ev6GkVdCxHVy4WLcJ4xVvrwfuPoGowoDBev2RZFNdNwq96fmdNEQjekqQl?__cft__[0]=AZWh2XUlqyHca0kIEa2DBzOTdujF8hiAGOa8dNbl8J5Ti42tB85DpEerTRFWQnnkGhpUz-fqCdvMsxJAuWcMnoEISqNSZFFZKaX8ilheOw-rRJR9SEW4YgAFZn-TiyPRLtMHiQ4VhSrb8Z5MUYP2gV6TpouUvsdcM28Yz9wh7KW9Ew&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/24/peregovory-u-stambuli-ukrayina-nazvala-try-priorytety/

[12] https://suspilne dot media/1074055-ukraina-zaproponuvala-rf-provesti-zustric-lideriv-do-kinca-serpna-umerov/

[13] https://t.me/tass_agency/326926 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/326931 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/326933 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/326935 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/62968 ;

[14] https://t.me/MID_Russia/62968

[15] https://t.me/tass_agency/326926 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/326931 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/326933 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/326935 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/62968

[16] https://ria dot ru/20250724/peskov-2031091677.html

[17] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022625

[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060525

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar053025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051925

[20] https://itd.rada.gov dot ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/56899

[21] https://suspilne dot media/1074901-zelenskij-vnis-do-radi-zakon-pro-posilenna-povnovazen-nabu-i-sap/ ; https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-polytics/4018519-deputati-zareestruvali-zakonoproekt-pro-zmicnenna-povnovazen-sap-ta-zahist-nezaleznosti-nabu.html

[22] https://t.me/nab_ukraine/3302

[23] https://www.dsca.mil/Press-Media/Major-Arms-Sales/Article-Display/Article/4253473/ukraine-bradley-infantry-fighting-vehicles-and-maintenance-repair-and-overhaul

[24] https://www.dsca.mil/Press-Media/Major-Arms-Sales/Article-Display/Article/4253428/ukraine-hawk-phase-iii-missile-system-and-sustainment

[25] https://t.me/mod_russia/54931 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1948104337177092563

[26] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1948104337177092563

[27] https://t.me/tass_agency/326722; https://t.me/mod_russia/54905

[28] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oNu9ie3SdoNjPVezZu4ELoB26t7QE85MpdxGWPwyNKAYVtjsw5MrETfY3iArWCbtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02v5aX7w9LhhxRvRwFC2gYQYFsMLykWHr2befb8jnVKVdqYQP5iddYQbrrX7PNz7V6l

[29] https://t.me/severnnyi/4643

[30] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9559

[31] https://x.com/Archer83Able/status/1948150667794903471; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/10540; https://t.me/plishkin_ds/1604 ; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/1948163712441028727; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1948341682333700536 ; https://t.me/supernova_plus/41726

[32] https://t.me/plishkin_ds/1604; https://t.me/kondratyevvi/9141

[33] https://t.me/agproshunin/2216

[34] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/29829; https://t.me/skala425/627

[35] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/10419

[36] ttps://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oNu9ie3SdoNjPVezZu4ELoB26t7QE85MpdxGWPwyNKAYVtjsw5MrETfY3iArWCbtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02v5aX7w9LhhxRvRwFC2gYQYFsMLykWHr2befb8jnVKVdqYQP5iddYQbrrX7PNz7V6l; https://t.me/rybar/72366 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75936 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28028; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/10419

[37] https://t.me/dva_majors/75936 ; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/10419

[38] https://t.me/severnnyi/4646

[39] https://t.me/severnnyi/4648; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2025

[40] https://t.me/severnnyi/4643; https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/31543 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/24162

[41] https://t.me/dva_majors/75956 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173462

[42] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/10419

[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oNu9ie3SdoNjPVezZu4ELoB26t7QE85MpdxGWPwyNKAYVtjsw5MrETfY3iArWCbtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02v5aX7w9LhhxRvRwFC2gYQYFsMLykWHr2befb8jnVKVdqYQP5iddYQbrrX7PNz7V6l; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14342; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/10419

[44] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/10419

[45] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173462

[46] https://t.me/wargonzo/28028

[47] https://t.me/wargonzo/28028

[48] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9653; https://www.facebook.com/114TerritorialDefenceBrigade/videos/1245858349970558/

[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oNu9ie3SdoNjPVezZu4ELoB26t7QE85MpdxGWPwyNKAYVtjsw5MrETfY3iArWCbtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14342

[50] https://t.me/voin_dv/16130; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173462

[51] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9650; https://t.me/Ci4team_4mb/402

[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oNu9ie3SdoNjPVezZu4ELoB26t7QE85MpdxGWPwyNKAYVtjsw5MrETfY3iArWCbtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14342

[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oNu9ie3SdoNjPVezZu4ELoB26t7QE85MpdxGWPwyNKAYVtjsw5MrETfY3iArWCbtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14342

[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02v5aX7w9LhhxRvRwFC2gYQYFsMLykWHr2befb8jnVKVdqYQP5iddYQbrrX7PNz7V6l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14342

[55] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39326

[56] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173495 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66163 ; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/10419

[57] ttps://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02v5aX7w9LhhxRvRwFC2gYQYFsMLykWHr2befb8jnVKVdqYQP5iddYQbrrX7PNz7V6l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14342

[58] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31659 ;

[59] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9651; https://t.me/dva_majors/75986; https://t.me/osintpen/1487

[60] https://t.me/dva_majors/75986 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75987  

[61] https://t.me/milinfolive/153480  ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75987 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28028 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173530 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66166 ;

[62] https://t.me/rybar/72355 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32102 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/153480 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66166 ;

[63] ttps://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02v5aX7w9LhhxRvRwFC2gYQYFsMLykWHr2befb8jnVKVdqYQP5iddYQbrrX7PNz7V6l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14342 ; https://t.me/rybar/72366 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75936 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28028 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66166

[64] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96418

[65] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39401

[66] https://t.me/mod_russia/54954

[67] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66148; https://t.me/tass_agency/327017 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39387 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96461

[68] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oNu9ie3SdoNjPVezZu4ELoB26t7QE85MpdxGWPwyNKAYVtjsw5MrETfY3iArWCbtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02v5aX7w9LhhxRvRwFC2gYQYFsMLykWHr2befb8jnVKVdqYQP5iddYQbrrX7PNz7V6l; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14342; https://t.me/dva_majors/75936; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66148

[69] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66148

[70] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/24/u-rosiyan-ye-ambicziya-obijty-poblyzu-pokrovska-vorog-zibrav-stotysyachne-ugrupovannya/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg

[71] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/24/duzhe-ne-spodobavsya-nash-pryjom-poblyzu-pokrovska-teplo-zustrily-chergovyh-motoshturmovykiv/

[72] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/24/tupi-shturmy-vidverto-kazhuchy-bilya-pokrovska-protyvnyk-probuye-vykorystovuvaty-bronetehniku/

[73] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14098

[74] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173543

[75] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1948278352273354861; https://t.me/vog_vsemogytnij/95

[76] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32108; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32111; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32114

[77] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oNu9ie3SdoNjPVezZu4ELoB26t7QE85MpdxGWPwyNKAYVtjsw5MrETfY3iArWCbtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02v5aX7w9LhhxRvRwFC2gYQYFsMLykWHr2befb8jnVKVdqYQP5iddYQbrrX7PNz7V6l; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14342

[78] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32108

[79] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oNu9ie3SdoNjPVezZu4ELoB26t7QE85MpdxGWPwyNKAYVtjsw5MrETfY3iArWCbtl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02v5aX7w9LhhxRvRwFC2gYQYFsMLykWHr2befb8jnVKVdqYQP5iddYQbrrX7PNz7V6l; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14342

[80] https://t.me/voin_dv/16149 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/16142

[81] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66153 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/327152 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32105 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173495 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66153 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28028 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96430 ; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/10419

[82] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oNu9ie3SdoNjPVezZu4ELoB26t7QE85MpdxGWPwyNKAYVtjsw5MrETfY3iArWCbtl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02aVaKBnPfoaU7Z2fzNMREHVKfRMdCT5v6NKGYKNEk8M4uBDT2UiyhDfmjsXc2GxSkl ; https://t.me/rybar/72355 ; https://t.me/rybar/72366 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75936 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66153

[83] https://suspilne dot media/1073165-zelenskij-pidpisav-zakonoproekt-sodo-nabu-ta-sap-umerov-ocolit-delegaciu-ukraini-na-peremovinah-z-rf-1246-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1753289691&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[84] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02v5aX7w9LhhxRvRwFC2gYQYFsMLykWHr2befb8jnVKVdqYQP5iddYQbrrX7PNz7V6l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zwo8G2fR5dceCHkCEG2CuaTLdL57uG9fzFyumTxy3Afr1LdVZzre2XqiZfeaDjNgl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oNu9ie3SdoNjPVezZu4ELoB26t7QE85MpdxGWPwyNKAYVtjsw5MrETfY3iArWCbtl

[85] https://t.me/dva_majors/75954; https://t.me/dva_majors/75955

[86] https://t.me/kpszsu/39131

[87] https://t.me/odeskaODA/10635 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02aVaKBnPfoaU7Z2fzNMREHVKfRMdCT5v6NKGYKNEk8M4uBDT2UiyhDfmjsXc2GxSkl ; https://od.gp dot gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_c=view&_t=rec&id=395419; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1074257-prokuratura-vidkrila-provadzenna-pisla-ataki-na-odesu-ponad-30-droniv-cetvero-poranenih-i-poskodzenna-v-seredmisti/ ; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9559

[88] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/22757

[89] https://t.me/bondmerche/3099 ; https://t.me/cherkaskaODA/14706 ; https://t.me/cherkaskaODA/14683

[90] https://t.me/synegubov/15960 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15984 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15994 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15995 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15998 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2855

[91] https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/24121 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1074641-rosia-atakuvala-harkiv-aviabombami-novoi-modifikacii/;

[92] https://newsukraine.rbc dot ua/news/russia-may-have-hit-ukraine-s-kharkiv-with-1753360027.html

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