Jennie Olmsted, Daria Novikov, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Lea Corticchiato, and George Barros
July 20, 2025, 4:15 pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on July 20. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the July 21 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
Russian officials continue to
publicly reiterate that Russia is uninterested in a near-term solution
to ending the war in Ukraine that does not acquiesce to Moscow’s
demands. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on July 20
that Russia is ready to "move quickly" with peace negotiations to end
the war in Ukraine but that Russia must achieve its goals, which Peskov
claimed are “obvious” and “do not change.”[1]
Kremlin officials have consistently claimed that any peace settlement
must eliminate the alleged "root causes" of the war and repeated
Russia's original war aims to "denazify" and "demilitarize" Ukraine –
terms the Kremlin has used throughout the war to call for regime change
in Ukraine, Ukrainian neutrality, changes to NATO's open-door policy,
and the removal of Ukraine's ability to defend itself against future
Russian aggression.[2]
Peskov’s July 20 statements underline the Kremlin's continued
uninterest in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine and efforts rather to
prolong the war — as ISW continues to assess.[3]
German
and Ukrainian officials assessed that Russia continues to expand its
production of Shahed-type drones in order to launch even larger
long-range drone strike packages that include up to 2,000 drones in a
single night. Russian forces may be able to strike Ukraine with up to
2,000 drones in a single night by November 2025 should the current
pattern of growth in nightly Russian drone usage continue. The
head of the German Ministry of Defense's Planning and Command Staff,
Major General Christian Freuding, assessed on July 19 that Russia plans
to further increase its drone production capacity with the goal of
launching 2,000 drones in one overnight strike package against Ukraine.[4]
Freuding stated that Ukraine and its international partners must
consider cost-effective ways of countering Russia's large strike
packages, as traditional air defense methods, such as those that use
expensive Patriot interceptors, are not well-suited as an anti-drone air
defense strategy. Commander of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces
Major Robert Brovdi stated on July 4 that Russia could launch 1,000
drones in a single strike package due to increased production and
stockpiles.[5]
Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) assessed on June
9 that Russian can produce roughly 170 Shahed-type drones per day and
that Russia plans to increase production capacity to 190 drones per day
by the end of 2025.[6]
Russia has been rapidly increasing the number of Shahed-type strike
drones and decoy drones in its overnight strike packages in recent
weeks, with Russia's largest drone strike package thus far including 728
drones on the night of July 8 to 9.[7]
Russia's increased production capacities in recent months have allowed
Russia to dramatically increase its strike packages in a relatively
short period of time. Russia rarely launched more than 200 drones per
night between January and May 2025 but then increased the peak number of
drones launched in one night from 250 in late May 2025 to over 700 in
early July 2025. Russia’s use of one-way attack drones in nightly strike
packages grew at an average monthly rate of 31 percent in both June and
July 2025. ISW assesses that Russia may be able to launch up to 2,000
drones in one night by November 2025, should this current growth trend
in drone usage continue. This forecast will be invalidated if the
monthly Russian drone usage growth rate either increases or decreases
from 31 percent. Russian forces will likely not be able to sustain such
large strike packages every night but will likely launch large strike
packages followed by days of smaller packages as they are now. Western
investment in Ukraine's interceptor drone development and production
remains critical for Ukraine's ability to counter large-scale Russian
strike packages and protect its civilian population.
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev reiterated demands for Russia to take responsibility for the December 2024 downing of an Azerbaijan Airlines plane, an incident that continues to create tension in the Russian-Azerbaijani relationship. Aliyev stated during a media forum on July 19 that he wants Russia to publicly acknowledge responsibility for downing the Azerbaijan Airlines plane in December 2024, punish those responsible, and compensate victims' families and Azerbaijan Airlines.[8] Aliyev stated that Azerbaijan knows "exactly what happened" and "can prove it" and that Azerbaijan has not received any response from Russian officials in the past seven months. Aliyev denied the possibility that a Ukrainian drone struck the plane and stated that Azerbaijan's Prosecutor General regularly requests Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin to provide updates on Russia's internal investigation into the downing. Aliyev stated that Azerbaijan is willing to wait 10 years for answers — a reference to the 10-year investigation into Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17, which pro-Russian proxies downed using a Buk missile system belonging to the Russian 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade over occupied Donetsk Oblast in July 2014.[9] Aliyev reiterated his support for Ukraine and stated that Ukraine should "never accept occupation." Russian-Azerbaijani relations have deteriorated over a number of smaller-scale incidents in July 2024 that have inflamed the unresolved disputes over the December 2024 downing.[10]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian officials continue to publicly reiterate that Russia is uninterested in a near-term solution to ending the war in Ukraine that does not acquiesce to Moscow’s demands.
- German and Ukrainian officials assessed that Russia continues to expand its production of Shahed-type drones in order to launch even larger long-range drone strike packages that include up to 2,000 drones in a single night. Russian forces may be able to strike Ukraine with up to 2,000 drones in a single night by November 2025 should the current pattern of growth in nightly Russian drone usage continue.
- Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev reiterated demands for Russia to take responsibility for the December 2024 downing of an Azerbaijan Airlines plane, an incident that continues to create tension in the Russian-Azerbaijani relationship.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Sumy and Zaporizhia oblasts and near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Lyman and Novopavlivka.
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian forces conducted limited attacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 19 and 20.[11]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
(Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine
along the international border and approach to within tube artillery
range of Sumy City)
Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.
Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 20 indicates
that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in eastern Kindrativka (north of
Sumy City).[12]
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 20 shows
Ukrainian forces striking Russian forces south of Yablunivka (northeast
of Sumy City), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the
settlement.[13]
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west
of Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City) and west of Yablunivka.[14]
Russian
forces attacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and northeast of
Sumy City near Yablunivka, Yunakivka, and Varachyne on July 19 and 20.[15] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka and Yunakivka.[16]
A
Ukrainian reserve officer reported that elements of the Russian 40th
and 155th naval infantry brigades (both of the Pacific Fleet), 810th
Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), 177th Naval Infantry Regiment
(Caspian Flotilla), 76th and 106th airborne (VDV) divisions, and the
11th and 83rd separate VDV brigades are operating in the Sumy direction
and assessed that the Russian military command typically deploys these
more elite units to areas that it expects Russian forces to advance
given these units' superior combat capabilities relative to other
regular Russian units.[17]
The Ukrainian reserve officer assessed that the presence of these
elements in the Sumy direction indicates that the Russian military
command is not simply trying to pin and stretch Ukrainian forces in the
area.
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian and
Ukrainian forces are constantly attacking in Kindrativka and that both
maintain positions in the settlement.[18]
The milblogger claimed that there are many contested “gray zones” in
the settlement that both Ukrainian and Russian forces try to penetrate
and that it is "impossible" to assess the situation on the ground.
Order
of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are
reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kindrativka.[19] Elements of the 76th VDV Division are reportedly operating in Yunakivka.[20]
Elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle
Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and
810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade are reportedly operating in
Kindrativka.[21]
Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to
the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking
Ukrainian positions along the Sumy Oblast border.[22]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 20 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Tykhe (northeast of Kharkiv City).[23]
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations north of Kharkiv City toward
Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Starytsya on
July 19 and 20.[24] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vovchansk.[25]
Order
of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Detachment (possibly
referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly
striking Ukrainian positions near Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City)
and Huryev Kazachok (northwest of Kharkiv City).[26]
A
Russian milblogger claimed on July 19 that Ukrainian forces
unsuccessfully counterattacked in the Velykyi Burluk direction near
Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[27]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 20 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west
of Topoli (northeast of Kupyansk) and toward Kutkivka (north of
Kupyansk).[28]
Russian
forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northeast along the international
border near Stroivka and toward Boholivka; and north of Kupyansk near
Kindrashivka, Radkivka, and Holubivka on July 19 and 20.[29]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 20 but did not advance.
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near
Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on July 19 and 20.[30]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA] (Moscow
Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions
near Bohuslavka (northeast of Borova).[31]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 20 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Lypove (north of Lyman).[32]
Russian
forces attacked northwest of Lyman toward Shandryholove; north of Lyman
near Novyi Myr, Karpivka, and Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman near
Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman in the
Serebryanske forest area on July 19 and 20.[33]
The
spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction
reported that Russian forces are now conducting infantry assaults, in
contrast to 2024 when Russian forces would conduct mechanized assaults.[34]
The spokesperson reported that Russian forces have a manpower advantage
but that most of the forces are ill-prepared for assaults.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 20 but did not advance.
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near
Serebryanka, Bilohorivka, and Hryhorivka and southeast of Siversk near
Vyimka on July 19 and 20.[35]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 20 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers
claimed that Russian forces seized Bila Hora (south of Chasiv Yar).[36]
A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 77th Motorized
Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 7th Military Base, 49th Combined Arms
Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) with the claimed seizure,
but another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions
in the settlement.[37] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced west and northwest of Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar).[38]
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself and south
of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky, Predtechyne, and Bila Hora on July 19 and
20.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Predtechyne.[40]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd
CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], SMD)
and 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd AC) are reportedly operating near
Bila Hora.[41]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.
Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 20 indicates
that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Oleksandro-Kalynove
(northwest of Toretsk).[42]
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized
Yablunivka and advanced west of Popiv Yar (both northwest of Toretsk)
and west of and within Oleksandro-Kalynove.[43]
A Russian source claimed that elements of the Russian 20th Motorized
Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD), including elements of its 57th Motorized
Rifle Regiment, seized Yablunivka.[44]
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of
Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Rusyn Yar, Poltavka,
and Popiv Yar and toward Katerynivka and Nelipivka; and west of Toretsk
near Shcherbynivka on July 19 and 20.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Yablunivka.[46]
Ukrainian
Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro
Zaporozhets stated that Russian forces are attacking in small infantry
groups and that two to three personnel in the group often carry wooden
ladders in order to cross anti-tank ditches.[47]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on July 20 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that there are unconfirmed reports
that Russian forces advanced to Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[48]
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations toward Pokrovsk itself; north of
Pokrovsk toward Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Fedorivka and
Novotoretske and Krasnyi Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne,
Mykolaivka, and Myrolyubivka and toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk
near Sukhyi Yar and Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove,
Udachne and toward Molodetske on July 19 and 20.[49]
Ukrainian
Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated
that Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction are using more drones and
actively conducting guided glide bomb strikes in order to soften
Ukrainian positions and create chaos, allowing Russian forces on
motorcycles to try to gain a foothold.[50]
Order
of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 255th Motorized Rifle
Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and Typhoon
Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle
Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly
operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[51]
Drone operators of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern
Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near
Shakhove (northeast of Pokrovsk).[52]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 19 indicates
that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Zelenyi Hai (southwest
of Novopavlivka).[53]
A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 36th
Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are advancing near Zelenyi Hai.[54]
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced
northeast, north, and west of Yalta (south of Novopavlivka) and south of
Zelenyi Hai.[55]
Russian
forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka
near Novoserhiivka and Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove
and Oleksiivka; south of Novopavlivka near Dachne, Yalta, and
Zaporizhzhia and toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near
Myrne, Tovste, Zelenyi Hai, and Voskresenka and toward
Andriivka-Klevtsove (formerly Iskra) and Oleksandrohrad on July 19 and
20.[56]
A
Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Novopavlivka direction stated
on June 20 that Russian forces have intensified assaults in recent days
and have not used equipment or motorcycles in assaults over the last
seven to 10 days (since July 10 to 13).[57]
The servicemember and Trehubov reported that Russian units are
submitting inaccurate reports to their commanders claiming that Russian
forces seized settlements – a systemic issue among Russian forces.[58]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD)
are reportedly operating in the Novopavlivka direction.[59]
Elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are
reportedly operating near Piddubne (southwest of Novopavlivka), Myrne,
and Oleksandrohrad.[60]
Drone operators of the 14th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade (Main Directorate
of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces [GRU]) are reportedly
striking Ukrainian forces near Yanvarske (southwest of Novopavlivka).[61]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 20 but did not advance.
Russian
forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and Vilne
Pole and toward Maliivka and Komyshuvakha and west of Velyka Novosilka
near Zelene Pole and Novopil and toward Temyrivka on July 19 and 20.[62]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
(Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas
against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of
Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on July 20 but did not advance.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on July 19 and 20.[63]
Ukrainian
Volunteer Army's Southern Group of Forces Spokesperson Serhiy Bratchuk
reported on July 20 that Malynivka is a contested "gray zone."[64]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 20 but did not advance.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 20 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently regained positions in northwestern Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv).[65]
Russian
forces attacked south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; southwest of
Orikhiv near Stepove and Kamyanske; and west of Orikhiv near Plavni on
July 19 and 20.[66]
Bratchuk
reported that Russian attacks are less intense in the Zaporizhia
direction but that Russian forces are submitting false reports to their
superiors about their advances.[67]
Bratchuk stated that a newly formed Russian motorized rifle regiment
based in Chechnya recently arrived in the Zaporizhia direction and that
members of the regiment are frequently deserting their positions.
Order
of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 4th Military Base (58th
Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are
reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[68]
Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of the Kherson direction, including on the islands in the Dnipro River, on July 19 and 20 but did not advance.[69]
Order
of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade
(Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[70]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian
forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night
of July 19 to 20. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces
launched 57 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk
and Oryol cities: Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk,
Krasnodar Krai.[71]
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 18
drones and that seven drones were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian
electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that
the Russian strikes primarily targeted Zaporizhzhia City and frontline
areas in Donetsk, Kharkiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. Ukrainian
officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure in
Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Sumy oblasts.[72]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1]https://t.me/tass_agency/326203; https://t.me/tass_agency/326204; https://t.me/tass_agency/326205; https://t.me/tass_agency/326206; https://t.me/tass_agency/326214; https://t.me/tass_agency/326223; https://t.me/zarubinreporter/4179 ; https://ria dot ru/20250720/peskov-2030253279.html
[2] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051825
[3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062225
[4] https://suspilne dot media/1070947-rosia-planue-zapuskati-po-ukraini-do-2000-bpla-odnocasno-nimeckij-general/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KtgNJqp-6BA; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russia-may-launch-2-000-drones-simultaneously-on-ukraine-german-general/
[5] https://www.facebook.com/Brovdi.Art/posts/pfbid02SGrww2LoeDuTrg6gn5w6sfNqW6unW9UM1QJsqEwYFS4fRjDZpyUK8EDgrzrPsmnql?rdid=FpSUA9lEOr4PkOjr#
[6] https://mezha dot media/oboronka/chi-bude-1000-shahediv-za-nich-302439/
[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062925
[8] https://president dot az/en/articles/view/69421
[9] https://www.britannica.com/event/Malaysia-Airlines-flight-17
[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070125 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2025
[11] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26862; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26845; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26843
[12] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1946939806673486221; https://t.me/morpex_V/5303; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/10305
[13] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1946954017856168029; https://t.me/skala425/625
[14] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39073; https://t.me/wargonzo/27954; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96144; https://t.me/wargonzo/27954
[15] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39100; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96144; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66039; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39053; https://t.me/wargonzo/27954; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39091
[16] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96144; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39053
[17] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1946586755836068094
[18] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39100
[19] https://t.me/dva_majors/75714; https://t.me/dva_majors/75718
[20] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39053
[21] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1946939806673486221; https://t.me/morpex_V/5303; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/10305; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39100
[22] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173084 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173091
[23] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66037
[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26862; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26845 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26843; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14114
[25] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66037
[26] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173084 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173091
[27] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66037
[28] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32074 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27954
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26862 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26845 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26843 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14114 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39054
[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26845 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26843 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14114
[31] https://t.me/voin_dv/16077
[32] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/29741 ; https://t.me/ombr66/1873
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26862 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26845 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26843 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14114
[34] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HeIpue9cK-8 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/20/yak-targany-lizut-na-lymanshhyni-vorog-vidmovyvsya-vid-tehniky-j-perejshov-do-myasnyh-shturmiv/
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26862; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26845 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26843; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14114
[36] https://t.me/tass_agency/326209; https://t.me/mod_russia/54837; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96180
[37] https://t.me/yurasumy/24027; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39075; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39076
[38] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32059
[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26862; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26845 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26843; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14114; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31516
[40] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39079
[41] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39076; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39079
[42] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1946898059612352884 ; https://t.me/IronHelmets/4449
[43] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96155; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32065 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66040; https://t.me/wargonzo/27954; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39064
[44] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39064
[45] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14114; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26862; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26845; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26843; https://t.me/wargonzo/27954
[46] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66040
[47] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1071141-armia-rf-vikoristovue-drabini-sob-perepravlatis-cerez-protitankovi-rvi-na-napramku-ablunivki-ta-oleksandro-kalinovogo/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-mwW_smfVas&ab_channel=%D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8
[48] https://t.me/rusich_army/24778
[49] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14114; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26862 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26845; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26843; https://t.me/wargonzo/27954; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39083; https://t.me/rusich_army/24778
[50] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1071043-informacijni-fejki-ta-ataki-dronami-ak-rf-namagaetsa-prorvati-oboronu-zsu-na-doneccini-osuv-hortica/
[51] https://t.me/dva_majors/75678; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39056 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39080
[52] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14062
[53] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/29738; https://t.me/sicariofly/69
[54] https://t.me/voin_dv/16076
[55] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39070
[56] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14114 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26862 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26845 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26843 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66038 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/16063 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/24778
[57] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1070967-poloneni-majze-sodna-na-novopavlivskomu-napramku-rf-aktivizuvala-pihotni-sturmi-bez-tehniki-ale-z-dronami/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSS0B0yo&ab_channel=%D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8
[58] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1071043-informacijni-fejki-ta-ataki-dronami-ak-rf-namagaetsa-prorvati-oboronu-zsu-na-doneccini-osuv-hortica/ ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1070967-poloneni-majze-sodna-na-novopavlivskomu-napramku-rf-aktivizuvala-pihotni-sturmi-bez-tehniki-ale-z-dronami/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSS0B0yo&ab_channel=%D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10-2024
[59] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96153
[60] https://t.me/voin_dv/16067 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39085
[61] https://t.me/voin_dv/16072
[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26862 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26845 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26843 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14114 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/16063
[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26845 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02phZdGjfj9piR7z32dVceNHDyHZKFaFUyQ9TFo15gKTxGXxNJ3Ntc6SLBN9WXwAEpl?__cft__[0]=AZX4AnAMFKGBILGyLZKvny2TE2CkdBpsbeuO40TY00-_BXdGDoezXbNi2Q8319u6YhTLdP7H0rMre3PTMsKDWvE9Sj3_py3yhbySecR9k1heoTdo-alo7FXsLBouRTJEvmOhxkFNrf_JhQQWXlQQeqF6q-3U4jYET194tbn8NDSx8PtGsMFf2B7v7KxolBXHoRc&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14114
; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26843
[64] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HeIpue9cK-8 ; https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/07/20/pivnichnokavkazka-rodzynka-kadyrivczi-znykayut-i-tikayut-odrazu-pislya-prybuttya-na-zaporizhzhya/
[65] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1946932349096153481 https://t.me/frontbird/23988
[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26845; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02phZdGjfj9piR7z32dVceNHDyHZKFaFUyQ9TFo15gKTxGXxNJ3Ntc6SLBN9WXwAEpl?__cft__[0]=AZX4AnAMFKGBILGyLZKvny2TE2CkdBpsbeuO40TY00-_BXdGDoezXbNi2Q8319u6YhTLdP7H0rMre3PTMsKDWvE9Sj3_py3yhbySecR9k1heoTdo-alo7FXsLBouRTJEvmOhxkFNrf_JhQQWXlQQeqF6q-3U4jYET194tbn8NDSx8PtGsMFf2B7v7KxolBXHoRc&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26843 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27954
[67] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HeIpue9cK-8 ; https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/07/20/pivnichnokavkazka-rodzynka-kadyrivczi-znykayut-i-tikayut-odrazu-pislya-prybuttya-na-zaporizhzhya/
[68] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96148
[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26845; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02phZdGjfj9piR7z32dVceNHDyHZKFaFUyQ9TFo15gKTxGXxNJ3Ntc6SLBN9WXwAEpl?__cft__[0]=AZX4AnAMFKGBILGyLZKvny2TE2CkdBpsbeuO40TY00-_BXdGDoezXbNi2Q8319u6YhTLdP7H0rMre3PTMsKDWvE9Sj3_py3yhbySecR9k1heoTdo-alo7FXsLBouRTJEvmOhxkFNrf_JhQQWXlQQeqF6q-3U4jYET194tbn8NDSx8PtGsMFf2B7v7KxolBXHoRc&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26843 ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HeIpue9cK-8 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/20/pivnichnokavkazka-rodzynka-kadyrivczi-znykayut-i-tikayut-odrazu-pislya-prybuttya-na-zaporizhzhya/
[70] https://t.me/dva_majors/75698
[71] https://t.me/kpszsu/38872
[72] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=593683207134618; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1070929-rosijska-armia-atakuvala-slovansk-sahedami-zaginula-ludina/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/15880 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/20/nichna-ataka-shahediv-na-harkivshhynu-shestero-poranenyh-poshkodzheno-budynky-ta-avto/ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/20/vorog-znovu-bye-po-izyumu-poraneni-dvi-zhinky-poshkodzheni-budynky-j-pidpryyemstvo/ ; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1071097-zaginula-moa-mama-78-rokiv-meskanci-orlivki-na-sumsini-rozpovili-pro-rosijsku-ataku-sahedami/
