July 7, 2025, 5:45pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on July 7. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 8 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated the Kremlin's rejection of a ceasefire and unchanged demands, including demilitarization and regime change in Ukraine. Lavrov gave an interview to Hungarian outlet Magyar Nemzet published on July 7 and claimed that a settlement to the war must eliminate the "root causes" of the war, which Lavrov again defined as NATO's expansion and Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers.[1] Lavrov claimed that Russia is against a ceasefire as Ukraine and its allies would use the pause to regroup and reconstitute Ukraine's military. Lavrov explicitly highlighted Russia's demands for Ukraine's demilitarization and "denazification" (a phrase Russia uses to demand regime change in Ukraine), and these demands are notably Russia's original war goals. Lavrov also demanded international recognition of Russia's illegal annexation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea – including the areas of these four oblasts that Russian forces do not currently occupy – and called for a future settlement to include sanctions relief and the return of frozen Russian assets. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin remains uninterested in good-faith peace negotiations and any settlement to the war that does not acquiesce to its demands.[2]
Russia is leveraging its "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies to improve its theater-wide drone capabilities, including in priority frontline areas in Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian servicemembers operating in the Kostyantynivka direction told the New York Times in an interview published on July 7 that the recent arrival of drone operators of the Rubikon Center – Russia's recently formed drone training and innovation center – represented a "turning point" in Russia's tactical drone capacity.[3] Russia reportedly deployed Rubikon drone units to Kursk Oblast in early 2025, where Rubikon drone operators equipped with fiber optic drones played a significant role in eliminating the remaining Ukrainian salient.[4] Ukrainian servicemembers reported that Russia redeployed Rubikon units to the Kostyantynivka area in Spring 2025, which has allowed Russian forces to significantly complicate Ukrainian logistics in the area. Russian and Ukrainian use of the fiber optic drones that Rubikon introduced en masse in Kursk Oblast has played a key role in creating the 15- to 20-kilometer-wide kill zones between frontline Russian and Ukrainian positions.
Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy "Flash" Beskrestnov stated in May 2025 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) oversees Rubikon and prioritizes supplying and staffing the center.[5] Beskrestnov stated that Rubikon is organized into four parts: the center for unmanned systems and robotic ground complexes development; the center for teaching instructors to train military personnel to use innovative unmanned solutions; the center for analytics; and frontline combat units. Beskrestnov stated that Rubikon units operate various types of drones, including Lancet loitering munitions, Molniya strike drones, fiber optic drones, and long-range first-person view (FPV) drones, and that some units receive special training to operate against Ukrainian aircraft. Beskrestnov noted that some Rubikon units are still operating in the Sumy-Kursk direction, but that Russia redeployed various units to eastern Ukraine, mainly to Donetsk Oblast. The Russian MoD is reportedly forming five unmanned systems detachments under Rubikon to support combat operations in the five Russian groupings of forces operating in Ukraine.[6]
ISW has observed reports of Rubikon units operating in Kursk Oblast and throughout eastern Ukraine from the Borova direction in eastern Kharkiv Oblast to the Velyka Novosilka direction in western Donetsk Oblast.[7] ISW has not observed reports of Rubikon units operating in western Zaporizhia or Kherson oblasts as of this report, indicating that the MoD is likely still expanding Rubikon. ISW previously assessed that Rubikon appears to be the central thrust of the MoD's initiative to establish the educational and drone development infrastructure necessary for the establishment of Russia's new Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) and an effort to selectively reorganize and centralize unmanned systems detachments and assets.[8]
Russian forces have yet to reach parity with Ukraine's innovative and deeply integrated drone program, however. The Russian MoD is currently attempting to replicate Ukraine's drone programs via Russia's USF and Rubikon Center, but Russia's tendency towards centralization and bureaucratic ineptitude will likely lead to obstacles in this process. ISW previously assessed that Russia's centralization and restructuring efforts may degrade the effectiveness of Russian drone operations and slow the Russian unmanned systems innovation cycle.[9] Russia's efforts should not be dismissed, however, as a sufficiently trained and organized class of Russian drone operators spread across the frontline and integrated with Russian ground units in the future represents a long-term threat not only to Ukraine, but also to NATO.
Russian forces appear to be reprioritizing offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction over the Kostyantynivka direction after several weeks of unsuccessful activity aimed at advancing toward Kostyantynivka. Geolocated footage published on July 6 and 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Novoekonomichne (east of Pokrovsk) and in southern Novoekonomichne during a platoon-sized mechanized assault.[10] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced northwest of Koptieve, west of Myrne (both northeast of Pokrovsk), and southwest of Myrolyubivka (east of Pokrovsk).[11] Russian forces appear to be refocusing their attention on the area northeast of Pokrovsk in the direction of Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk) after renewing assaults in this area in May 2025.[12] ISW recently assessed that these advances support both the envelopment of Pokrovsk and the establishment of a salient to allow Russian forces in the longer term to try to envelop Kostyantynivka and Ukraine's wider fortress belt — a series of fortified cities that form the backbone of Ukraine’s defensive positions.[13] Russian forces have not made significant gains in the area west of Toretsk toward Kostyantynivka since early June 2025, and the Russian military command is likely temporarily deprioritizing that effort in favor of more opportunistic advances in the Pokrovsk direction.[14] One Russian milblogger noted that Russian forces previously unsuccessfully attempted to advance into Novoekonomichne from the east near Malynivka, but that Russian forces were able to advance into the settlement from the south.[15] Russian forces have struggled to advance into Novoekonomichne over the last two months in the face of ongoing Ukrainian defensive operations and counterattacks in the area.[16] Russian forces will likely attempt to leverage these gains to advance toward Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk and northeast of Novoekonomichne) and force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) under threat of encirclement before refocusing on the Kostyantynivka direction.
Russian Minister of Transport and former Kursk Oblast Governor Roman Starovoit reportedly recently committed suicide after Russian President Vladimir Putin removed Starovoit from his position, likely due in part to the Ministry of Transport's role in Russian failures that enabled Ukraine's Operation Spider Web in June 2025. Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed Starovoit on July 7.[17] The Russian Investigative Committee claimed that unspecified actors found Starovoit's body on July 7 in his car with a gunshot wound and that Starovoit's preliminary cause of death is suicide.[18] Deputy Head of the Ministry of Transport's Property Management Department Andrei Korneichuk also reportedly died on July 7 at the Ministry of Transport in Moscow of a heart attack.[19] Ukraine's Operation Spider Web was able to transport drones into Russia and strike major Russian military airfields by storing the drones in cargo containers transported throughout the country.[20] Putin appointed Deputy Minister of Transport Andrei Nikitin to replace Starovoit as the acting minister, and Nikitin emphasized during his July 7 meeting with Putin that the ministry is taking measures to monitor cargo moving in Russia and to identify unmanned systems – suggesting that Putin is laying part of the blame for Operation Spider Web on the Ministry of Transport.[21]
Putin may have planned to punish Starovoit by arresting him on charges related to his time as the governor of Kursk Oblast in order to avoid acknowledging the Kremlin's failure to prevent Operation Spider Web. Russian business outlet Kommersant reported that former Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov, whom Russian authorities arrested in April 2025 on fraud charges, testified against Starovoit in the case on the theft of at least one billion rubles (about $12.7 million) allocated for the construction of defensive structures on the Russian-Ukrainian border in Kursk Oblast.[22] Smirnov's arrest was likely part of a wider Kremlin effort to scapegoat Kursk Oblast officials for Russia's failure to respond to Ukraine's August 2024 incursion into Kursk Oblast, and Starovoit was the governor of Kursk Oblast before Smirnov from October 2018 to May 2024.[23] Putin has been unwilling to acknowledge Russia's failures in preventing Operation Spider Web and may have planned to use charges related to the defense of Kursk Oblast to punish Starovoit.
Ukrainian forces continue to conduct long-range strikes against Russia's defense industrial base (DIB). The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 7 that Ukrainian forces, including elements of the Unmanned Systems Forces, conducted a drone strike against the Russian Krasnozavodsk Chemical Plant in Moscow Oblast on the night of July 6 to 7.[24] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that the plant produces pyrotechnics, ammunition, and thermobaric warheads for Shahed-type drones. Geolocated footage published on July 7 shows smoke and fires at the Krasnozavodsk Chemical Plant.[25] Ukrainian intelligence sources told Ukrainian outlet Suspline that Ukrainian forces also struck the Ilsky Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai on July 7 and damaged a technical workshop and the refinery itself.[26] The sources stated that the Ilsky Oil Refinery processes and stores hydrocarbon raw materials and is directly involved in the Russian DIB. Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko previously reported that the Ilsky Oil Refinery has an annual refining capacity of roughly 6.6 million tons; specializes in producing fuel, mazut, bitumen, and gas oil; and supplies Russian forces, particularly in southern Russia and occupied Ukraine.[27]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated the Kremlin's rejection of a ceasefire and unchanged demands, including demilitarization and regime change in Ukraine.
- Russia is leveraging its "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies to improve its theater-wide drone capabilities, including in priority frontline areas in Donetsk Oblast.
- Russian forces have yet to reach parity with Ukraine's innovative and deeply integrated drone program, however.
- Russian forces appear to be reprioritizing offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction over the Kostyantynivka direction after several weeks of unsuccessful activity aimed at advancing toward Kostyantynivka.
- Russian Minister of Transport and former Kursk Oblast Governor Roman Starovoit reportedly recently committed suicide after Russian President Vladimir Putin removed Starovoit from his position, likely due in part to the Ministry of Transport's role in Russian failures that enabled Ukraine's Operation Spider Web in June 2025.
- Putin may have planned to punish Starovoit by arresting him on charges related to his time as the governor of Kursk Oblast in order to avoid acknowledging the Kremlin's failure to prevent Operation Spider Web.
- Ukrainian forces continue to conduct long-range strikes against Russia's defense industrial base (DIB).
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 7.
Russian forces continued attacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 6 and 7.[28] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked toward Glushkovo and Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[29]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating near Gornal (south of Sudzha near the international border).[30] Elements of the 11th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[31]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)
Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[32]
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Bezsalivka (east of Tetkino along the international border) and advanced south of the settlement.[33] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on July 7 that Ukrainian forces advanced at least 2.5 kilometers between Kindrativka and Kostyantynivka (both north of Sumy City).[34] Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces advanced up to 3.4 kilometers east of Oleksiivka (east of Kindrativka) and entered Novomykolaivka (northeast of Oleksiivka). A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Kindrativka and northwest of Pershe Travnia (northwest of Kindrativka).[35]
Russian forces attacked in Sumy Oblast, including near Yunakivka, on July 6 and 7.[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka, Andriivka (north of Sumy City), Oleksiivka, Yunakivka, Yablunivka, and Sadky (the latter two are northeast of Sumy City).[37]
Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) and 40th and 155th naval infantry brigades (both of the Pacific Fleet) are operating near Kindrativka and Kostyantynivka.[38] Mashovets reported that elements of the 83rd and 11th separate airborne (VDV) brigades, reinforced by elements of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th AC, LMD), are operating near Novomykolaivka, and that elements of 76th VDV Division and 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are operating near Yunakivka and Sadky. Drone operators of the "Anvar" Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment), the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division), and the 106th VDV Division reportedly continue to operate in the Sumy Oblast border area.[39] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly operating near Kindrativka.[40]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 7 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Zelene on July 6 and 7.[41]
The chief of staff of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported that Russian forces are attempting to find weak points in Ukrainian defenses and then attack in pairs or groups of up to eight servicemembers.[42] The chief of staff reported that Russian forces are using drones equipped with eight to 10 kilograms of explosives and fiber optic cables up to 30 kilometers long. The chief of staff forecasted that Russian drones will soon use fiber optic cables up to 50 kilometers long, which would help Russian forces disrupt Ukrainian logistics.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Anvar" Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kharkiv Oblast border areas.[43]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 7 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced more than 700 meters near Milove (north of Kupyansk along the international border).[44]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe and Kamyanka and toward Novovasylivka; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and toward Kutkivka, Ambarne, and Khatnie; and northwest of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka and Moskovka on July 6 and 7.[45]
A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on July 7 that Russian forces continue to attack constantly in small groups with the aim of infiltrating, accumulating, and assaulting Ukrainian positions.[46] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces have a manpower advantage in the area and are not suffering from ammunition shortages. The spokesperson noted that fighting in the area in the past few months has largely been drone engagements.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 7 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Borova near Zelenyi Hai and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Olhivka, Chervonyi Stav, and Druzhelyubivka on July 6 and 7.[47]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on July 7, but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Hlushchenkove, northwest of Ridkodub, in eastern Karpivka, and southwest of Zelena Dolyna (all north of Lyman).[48] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces recaptured half of Ridkodub and entered Katerynivka (east of Ridkodub).[49]
Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Hlushchenkove, Ridkodub, Zelena Dolyna, Karpivka, and Novyi Myr and east of Lyman near Torske and the Serebryanske forest area on July 6 and 7.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Shandryholove (northwest of Lyman).[51]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 7 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka and Vyimka on July 6 and 7.[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Serebryanka.[53]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Siversk direction.[54]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 7 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, north of Chasiv Yar near Markove and Novomarkove, and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and Predtechnye on July 6 and 7.[55]
A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kramatorsk (Chasiv Yar) direction reported that Russian forces are capitalizing on warm temperatures to attack when Ukrainian reconnaissance drones cannot operate as long or as efficiently and using foliage for concealment.[56]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) and Sever-V Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[57]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Dyliivka (north of Toretsk).[58]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces recaptured Popiv Yar.[59]
Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself, north of Toretsk near Dyliivka, and toward Pleshchiivka, and northwest of Toretsk near Yablunivka, Popiv Yar, Poltavka, and Rusyn Yar on July 6 and 7.[60]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Katerynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[61] Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka (Toretsk) direction.[62]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
See topline text for reports of assessed Russian advances and unconfirmed claims in the Pokrovsk direction.
Russian forces attacked toward Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrne, Razine, and Malynivka and toward Volodymyrivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Promin, and Novoekonomichne; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Mykolaivka and toward Novopavlivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka and Shevchenko; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Kotlyne, and Zvirove and toward Molodetske on July 6 and 7.[63]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are conducting highly attritional, infantry-led assaults, sometimes without weapons, in order to divert Ukrainian attention from well-equipped groups attacking on the flanks.[64] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces are using summer foliage as camouflage against Ukrainian drones.
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Typhoon" Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[65]
Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Dachne (southeast of Novopavlivka).[66]
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to southern Tovste (formerly Tolstoi, south of Novopavlivka).[67]
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD), seized Dachne.[68] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast and west of Tovste and south and northwest of Myrne (south of Novopavlivka).[69]
Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka, Novoserhiivka, and Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Novoukrainka, Oleksiivka, and Dachne; south of Novopavlivka near Piddubne, Yalta, Myrne, Fedorivka, Zirka, Zaporizhzhia, Komar, and toward Filiya; and southwest near Voskresenka on July 6 and 7.[70] DNR Head Denis Pushilin claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Dachne.[71]
Ukraine's Donetsk Operational-Tactical Group reported on July 7 that Russian forces have not seized Dachne, but that fighting is ongoing.[72] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov also denied the Russian MoD's claimed seizure of Dachne. A Ukrainian brigade operating near Dachne reported that Russian forces are deploying infantry in an effort to evade Ukrainian drones more effectively than with light vehicles.
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Myrne.[73] Elements of the 43rd Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 29th CAA, EMD) and the 200th Artillery Brigade (29th CAA) are reportedly operating west of Piddubne.[74] Drone operators of the "Snegiri" Reconnaissance Group (37th Motorized Rifle Brigade) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions along the Voskresenka-Myrne line.[75] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Zelenyi Hai (southwest of Novopavlivka).[76]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 7 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and Shevchenko and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and Novopil on July 6 and 7.[77]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (VKS and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Komyshuvakha (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and near Temyrivka (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[78] Elements of the 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[79]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on July 7 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on July 6 and 7.[80]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Hulyaipole direction.[81]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast on July 7 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv) and west of Stepove (west of Orikhiv).[82]
Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv toward Mala Tokmachka and southwest of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky, Stepove, and Kamyanske on July 7.[83]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Shaman" Detachment of the 1455th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv).[84] Drone operators of the 4th Military Base (58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly supporting assaults near Kamyanske, Mala Tokmachka, and Novodanylivka.[85]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on July 7.
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) and 81st Artillery Regiment (70th Motorized Rifle Division, 18th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[86] Drone operators of the "Tuman" Drone Group are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Havrylivka (northeast of Kherson City).[87]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 6 and 7. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched four S-300/400 air defense missiles from Kursk Oblast and 101 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[88] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 58 drones and that 17 were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian infrastructure in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Zaporizhia cities and caused civilian casualties.[89] Geolocated footage published on July 7 shows a drone striking a residential building in Kharkiv City. [90]Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian strikes targeted high-rise residential buildings in Kharkiv City and killed one person in Odesa City.[91] The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported on July 7 that the strikes in Kharkiv City injured 33 people, including three children.[92] Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office Head Amil Omarov reported that preliminary investigations indicate that Russian forces may have used Geran-2 drones (the Russian analogue of the Iranian Shahed-136 drone) with thermobaric warheads in the overnight strike against Kharkiv City.[93]
Ukraine's Ground Forces reported that Russian forces struck Ukrainian military registration and enlistment offices in Kharkiv and Zaporizhia cities on July 7, marking the fourth and fifth strikes against Ukrainian recruitment offices since June 30.[94] The Ground Forces reported that the strike against the office in Kharkiv City injured three people.[95] Ukraine's Ground Forces Spokesperson Vitaly Sarantsev stated that the strike against the office in Zaporizhia City injured 11 servicemembers.[96] Former Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) Militia Spokesperson Eduard Basurin claimed that Russian forces are systematically and deliberately conducting "precision strikes" against Ukrainian registration and enlistment offices and that Russia's increased drone production capabilities will allow it to continue to strike these offices.[97] ISW continues to assess that Russian strikes against Ukrainian military registration and enlistment offices likely aim to disrupt Ukrainian recruitment efforts.[98]
Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported to Radio Svoboda on July 7 that Russia is increasingly relying on Chinese drone components and that 60 to 65 percent of the components in Geran-2 drones are Chinese.[99]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Belarus recently unveiled a jointly produced Russian-Belarusian modernized armored personnel carrier. Ukrainian military-focused outlet Militarnyi reported on July 7 that the Belarusian 140th Repair Plant coordinated with an unspecified Russian defense industrial enterprise to produce a modernized BTR-60MB3 armored personnel carrier that features enhanced firepower, an upgraded powertrain, and a modernized troop compartment equipped with advanced electronics and surveillance cameras.[100] Militarnyi noted that the armored personnel carrier still suffers from insufficient armor protection, a difficult dismount, and an underpowered engine. Militarnyi reported that the Russian Ministry of Defense-run TV network Zvezda claimed that the modernized vehicle is intended for foreign customers.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://magyarnemzet dot hu/oroszul/2025/07/lavrol-oroszul-exkuziv-magyar-nemzet
[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060325 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021225
[3] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/07/world/europe/ukraine-war-russia-donetsk.html
[4] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/07/world/europe/ukraine-war-russia-donetsk.html ; https://t.me/serhii_flash/5682
[5] https://t.me/serhii_flash/5682
[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-efforts-centralize-drone-units-may-degrade-russian-drone-operations
[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-5-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2025
[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112924 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-efforts-centralize-drone-units-may-degrade-russian-drone-operations
[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-efforts-centralize-drone-units-may-degrade-russian-drone-operations
[10] https://t.me/optb_91/115 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9530 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9533 ; https://www.facebook.com/share/v/16vL5qJX43/; https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1942184883696120267; https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1942185969345601898; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1942189684383248792
[11] https://t.me/rybar/71960 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65707 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38195
[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2025
[13] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-5-2025
[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2025
[15] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38207
[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2025
[17] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/07/07/2025/686b667c9a79476596c4f53b
[18] https://t.me/tass_agency/324277
[19] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/society/news/2025/07/07/1122679-umer-aleksei-korneichuk; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/07/07/mash-baza-i-112-v-ministerstve-transporta-rf-vo-vremya-soveschaniya-umer-chinovnik
[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-1-2025
[21] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/07/07/2025/686b73809a79478209e3d98b; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77376
[22] https://meduza dot io/en/feature/2025/04/17/russia-has-arrested-the-kursk-region-s-ex-governor-he-oversaw-the-construction-of-anti-tank-barriers-which-later-crumbled-from-rain-and-snow; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7871214?from=top_main_1
[23] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7871214?from=top_main_1; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-16-2025
[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26367
[25] https://x.com/Vijesti11111/status/1942087557346476263; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/9979; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/9975; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1942070964545818846; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/1942049368942490026; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/1942056090172305732
[26] https://suspilne dot media/1060095-zelenskij-pidpisav-novij-sankcijnij-paket-proti-rf-v-odesi-lunaut-vibuhi-1230-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1751888885&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021725 ; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8831
[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26366 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26337 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027ur38K5whY7Sz4mTUW5VSRWnRAuHWhABXUpxWTPcH1fjp3trD6gBDa7U45PwmEWFl
[29] https://t.me/dva_majors/74846
[30] https://t.me/rybar/71979
[31] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30895
[32] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9535; https://t.me/OMBR156/749
[33] https://t.me/mod_russia/54466; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38188; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38203; https:// t.me/RVvoenkor/95304
[34] https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid0A7jRrrnCFWvDj3b7ydJDRaqHAy69L3B5x5dLPycjwXPYabx1FSb4hKHVFV1S8uezl
[35] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38208
[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26366 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26337 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027ur38K5whY7Sz4mTUW5VSRWnRAuHWhABXUpxWTPcH1fjp3trD6gBDa7U45PwmEWFl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74846
[37] https://t.me/dva_majors/74846
[38] https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid0A7jRrrnCFWvDj3b7ydJDRaqHAy69L3B5x5dLPycjwXPYabx1FSb4hKHVFV1S8uezl
[39] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171572 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30895
[40] https://t.me/dva_majors/74828 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74870
[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26366 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26337 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027ur38K5whY7Sz4mTUW5VSRWnRAuHWhABXUpxWTPcH1fjp3trD6gBDa7U45PwmEWFl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13299
[42] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSS0B0yo ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/07/mozhut-klasty-10-kilogramiv-trotylu-na-harkivshhyni-byutsya-proty-vorozhyh-shturmovykiv-i-droniv/
[43] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95274
[44] https://t.me/dva_majors/74846
[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26366 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26337 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027ur38K5whY7Sz4mTUW5VSRWnRAuHWhABXUpxWTPcH1fjp3trD6gBDa7U45PwmEWFl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13299
[46] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/07/cze-chysto-dronova-vijna-poblyzu-kupyanska-bezpilotnykamy-vidbyvayut-80-atak/
[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027ur38K5whY7Sz4mTUW5VSRWnRAuHWhABXUpxWTPcH1fjp3trD6gBDa7U45PwmEWFl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26337 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13299 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65693
[48] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38189 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38190 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65706
[49] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38189 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38190
[50] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65693 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65706
[51] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65693
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26337 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027ur38K5whY7Sz4mTUW5VSRWnRAuHWhABXUpxWTPcH1fjp3trD6gBDa7U45PwmEWFl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13299
[53] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65690
[54] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95293 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54459
[55]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26366 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26337 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171614 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27731
[56] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSS0B0yo ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/07/legshe-maskuvatysya-bo-potuzhna-teplova-sygnatura-na-kramatorskomu-napryamku-vorog-atakuye-pid-sonczem/
[57] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95275 ;https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30895 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38199 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/5445
[58] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1942000366096093402; https://t.me/BabaYaga_152orr/299
[59] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38211
[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26366 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26337 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027ur38K5whY7Sz4mTUW5VSRWnRAuHWhABXUpxWTPcH1fjp3trD6gBDa7U45PwmEWFl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13299 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74846 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38211
[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38220
[62] https://t.me/dva_majors/74831 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74854
[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26366 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26337 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027ur38K5whY7Sz4mTUW5VSRWnRAuHWhABXUpxWTPcH1fjp3trD6gBDa7U45PwmEWFl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13299 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171614
[64] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSS0B0yo ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/07/bere-v-ruchky-i-jde-z-nym-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-vorog-ne-zabuvaye-pro-svoyu-ulyublenu-taktyku/
[65] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38192
[66] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1941922927579902269; https://x.com/p6060083/status/1941902951297036417; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/29469
[67] https://t.me/OVMBr_5/188; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9532
[68] https://t.me/mod_russia/54470 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38201 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38205 ;
[69] https://t.me/rybar/71961b ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65707; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38195; https:// t.me/rybar/71961; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38195
[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26366 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26337 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027ur38K5whY7Sz4mTUW5VSRWnRAuHWhABXUpxWTPcH1fjp3trD6gBDa7U45PwmEWFl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13299 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171614 ; https://t.me/rybar/71961 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65707 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27731 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38186 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38195 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74846
[71] https://t.me/tass_agency/324149
[72] https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1055343-ukrainski-vijskovi-sprostuvali-okupaciu-sela-dacne-na-dnipropetrovsini/
[73] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38195 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15858
[74] https://t.me/voin_dv/15875
[75] https://t.me/voin_dv/15865
[76] https://t.me/voin_dv/15859
[77] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26366 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26337 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027ur38K5whY7Sz4mTUW5VSRWnRAuHWhABXUpxWTPcH1fjp3trD6gBDa7U45PwmEWFl ;
[78] https://t.me/voin_dv/15877 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15864
[79] https://t.me/voin_dv/15874
[80] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26366; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26337; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027ur38K5whY7Sz4mTUW5VSRWnRAuHWhABXUpxWTPcH1fjp3trD6gBDa7U45PwmEWFl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13299; https://t.me/dva_majors/74846
[81] https://t.me/voin_dv/15863
[82] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95258; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38191; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30895; https://t.me/wargonzo/27731
[83] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26366 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74846
[84] https://t.me/vrogov/21020
[85] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95261
[86] https://t.me/dva_majors/74853; https://t.me/dva_majors/74868
[87] https://t.me/dva_majors/74873
[88] https://t.me/kpszsu/37873
[89] https://t.me/synegubov/15539 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2762 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/07/harkiv-zaznav-vorozhogo-udaru-shahedy-vluchyly-u-bagatopoverhivky-postrazhdaly-17-osib/; https://t.me/synegubov/15564; https://t.me/synegubov/15562; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2788; https://t.me/synegubov/15555; https://t.me/synegubov/15562; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1060103-armia-rf-atakuvala-kiiv-bezpilotnikami-so-vidomo-2/ ; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1429 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/07/vybuhy-nad-kyyevom-ulamky-droniv-poshkodyly-infrastrukturu-u-dvoh-rajonah/; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4971 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12702 ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1060139-nicnij-udar-bpla-po-odesi-e-rujnuvanna-ta-zagiblij/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/45598 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/07/v-odesi-vnaslidok-rosijskoyi-ataky-zagynula-lyudyna/; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02ysQh8jMT3QfwoNgeAy2DCj9P4qM8uRVk8EUVv2Fw2kBhxatgwCKzgQRfxVGEHxMnl?__cft__[0]=AZVsV5Mk_wYUoySNZKoR_4eOjDzG8WYiwn56UZhdzmtkGYXkJ6fPyU7pPFqvoSulwDo6FAWG2VgP1jSZvE2I9ikxvHx3nhBjJCswlUdoSUQ8T6DfJHy_b92ULLWpm1VKbviAd4RB4dmeIUO3mBwciX60px6c_N8VcyU0FXcgvT_KHmKK2mCGeC4BNFUvcjaicIxUtbSg9_wm3-x6f0MFsbbH&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12703; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/21856 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/07/udar-po-zaporizhzhyu-kilkist-postrazhdalyh-zrosla-do-17/; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/21835; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/45051; https://t.me/milinfolive/152526; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/21832
[90] https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1942220374277591400; https://x.com/BohuslavskaKate/status/1942187481379545196; https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1942219556551856398; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1942190015112495229; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/45606
[91] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15011; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1942133353383080394 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15012
[92] https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/23904 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/07/33-postrazhdalyh-cherez-udar-droniv-po-harkovu-sered-poranenyh-dity/
[93] https://suspilne dot media/1060095-zelenskij-pidpisav-novij-sankcijnij-paket-proti-rf-v-odesi-lunaut-vibuhi-1230-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1751891955&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[94] https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/24835 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/07/rosijski-drony-atakuvaly-oblasni-tczk-u-harkovi-ta-zaporizhzhi-poraneni-vijskovi/; https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/24835 ; https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/24835 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1060323-rosia-zavdala-udaru-po-budivli-oblasnogo-tck-ta-sp-u-harkovi/ ; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1060333-armia-rf-atakuvala-dronom-poblizu-otck-ta-sp-u-zaporizzi-e-poranenij-vijskovosluzbovec/ ; https://t.me/astrapress/85869
[95] https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/24835
[96] https://unn dot ua/en/news/11-servicemen-of-the-tcc-and-sp-were-wounded-as-a-result-of-the-shelling-of-zaporizhzhia-sarantsev
[97] https://t.me/basurin_e/19762
[98] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-6-2025
[99] https://www.radiosvoboda dot org/a/kytays%CA%B9ka-elektronika-u-shakhedakh-syahaye-65-hur/33464954.html ; https://suspilne dot media/1060397-kitajska-elektronika-vitisnae-zahidnu-z-rosijskih-droniv-gur/
[100] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/belarus-russia-develop-btr-60-upgrade-project/
