UA-69458566-1

Wednesday, July 30, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 30, 2025


Daria Novikov, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson, Justin Young, and Karolina Hird

July 30, 2025, 7:00 pm ET
 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15 am ET on July 30. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 31 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US President Donald Trump specified a deadline of no later than August 8 for Russian President Vladimir Putin to engage in meaningful negotiations for an end to Russia’s war against Ukraine. Trump stated on July 29 that he is “disappointed” in Putin and clarified that his previous deadline for Russia to meaningfully engage in negotiations to end the war by August 7 to 9 will now fall 10 days from July 29, on August 8.[1] Trump stated that he has not received “any response” from Putin regarding Trump’s previously articulated 50-day and August 7 to 9 deadlines and assessed that Putin aims to seize “the whole” of Ukraine and “probably” wants to “keep the war going.” Trump stated that he will impose tariffs and secondary sanctions against Russia’s economic partners on August 8 to pressure Russia into negotiations if Putin again fails to agree to negotiations. US Department of State Spokesperson Tammy Bruce stated on July 29 that Trump may choose to levy tariffs and secondary sanctions sooner than the August 8 deadline, as Trump “pretty much [knows] what the situation [is].”[2]

Trump announced on July 30 that the United States will impose a 25 percent tariff and unspecified additional economic penalties on India due to India’s continued purchases of Russian military equipment and energy since the start of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine.[3] ISW previously noted that India continues to pursue military cooperation and a strategic economic relationship with Russia while it simultaneously deepens ties with Western states.[4] India has benefitted from cheap Russian energy since February 2022 and has become one of the largest importers of Russian oil, signing a 10-year energy deal in December 2024 to receive roughly 500,000 barrels of Russian oil daily.[5] India also continued to procure and commission Russian-built military equipment until late 2024 and likely seeks to reduce but not eliminate its reliance on Russia for military equipment.[6] India notably purchased five S-400 air defense systems from Russia in September 2018, but Russia reportedly delayed the delivery of these systems in March 2024 until 2026 to support Russia's own war effort.[7] Russia also leverages its relationship with India to access critical electronic components and machinery for the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).[8]

Kremlin officials continued to posture economic strength in response to US President Donald Trump's proposed economic measures targeting Russia and rejected Trump's efforts to end the war in Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed in response to Trump's July 29 statements that the Russian economy has been operating under sanctions for "quite some time" and has developed "immunity" to further sanctions — effectively dismissing Trump."[9] Peskov's and other Kremlin officials' claims that Russia's economy is resilient and has been able to withstand sanctions and other economic measures throughout the war largely ignore Russia's reliance on its allies and partners, including the People's Republic of China (PRC), Iran, and North Korea, to support the Russian economy and defense industrial base (DIB).[10] Trump emphasized on July 30, for example, that the PRC is one of the largest buyers of Russian energy exports.[11] Russian Federation Council Chairperson Valentina Matviyenko claimed that Russia's war in Ukraine can only end after the elimination of the war's "root causes" — a common Kremlin reference to NATO expansion and Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers.[12] Russian State Duma Deputy from occupied Crimea Mikhail Sheremet claimed that the United States must engage with Russia "on equal terms" as Russia is a great power and that Russia is strong thanks to Russian President Vladimir Putin and the unity of Russia's population.[13] Sheremet claimed that Russia is not "servile" and will not betray its national interests.[14] Sheremet claimed that Trump's economic measures will not have the results that Trump expects but will instead hurt the global economy. Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Zhuravlev claimed that Trump's threats will not work with Russia and called on Russia to continue its "methodic" combat operations in Ukraine and not allow the United States to distract Russia from its war.[15] Duma International Affairs Committee Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed that Russia has consistently supported a ceasefire but that a ceasefire is only possible after establishing the "main conditions" of a peace agreement.[16] Chepa stated that Ukraine and the West are trying to secure a ceasefire in order to allow Ukraine to rearm, redeploy, and mobilize its forces to continue the war. Russia notably violated several Russian-imposed short-term frontline and strikes ceasefires in recent months, while accusing Ukraine of violating ceasefires to which both sides did not formally agree.[17] ISW continues to assess that Russia's previous attempts to manipulate ceasefires are an indicator of how Russia will likely exploit any future agreements.[18]

The Russian Presidential Administration reportedly issued guidance to Russian state and pro-Kremlin media outlets and commentators to promote narratives aimed at weakening the United States-European Union (EU) alliance. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on July 30 that the Russian Presidential Administration's Department of Public Projects issued a manual to Russian state and pro-Kremlin media outlets and pro-government voices with instructions about how to frame their coverage and commentary about the July 27 US–EU trade deal.[19] The manual reportedly instructed Russian media and commentators to discuss the US–EU trade agreement as "questionable" and a "defeat" for the EU, to amplify international commentary supporting these rhetorical points, and to portray Germany as suffering the most from the agreement. The manual reportedly also instructed Russian media and commentators to highlight commentary, including from US officials, about the benefits of the deal for the United States. Meduza noted that prominent Russian state and pro-Kremlin media outlets and bloggers have already begun reporting according to the manual, including by using direct quotes from the manual in their articles.[20] A political strategist reportedly working with the Russian Presidential Administration told Meduza that the Kremlin needs to show the domestic Russian populace how "bad" the European economic situation is to distract Russians from rising domestic prices and other economic struggles.[21]

Russian officials are already amplifying the Russian Presidential Administration's talking points about the US–EU trade deal and likely intend to hinder US-European cooperation in support of Ukraine and collective European defense. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, and Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Head Leonid Slutsky all issued public statements since July 27 claiming that the US–EU trade deal is detrimental or humiliating for the EU, and Slutsky specifically criticized German Chancellor Frederich Merz.[22] The Kremlin has long attempted to drive wedges between the United States, Europe, and Ukraine as part of a wider reflexive control campaign aimed at deterring further Western support to Ukraine and efforts to bolster Europe's defensive capabilities.[23] The Kremlin likely aims to use these narratives to undermine ongoing US–European efforts to produce and purchase military equipment for Ukraine and to undermine the West's will to support Ukraine against Russia. The Kremlin also likely aims to leverage this rhetoric domestically by portraying European economies as struggling while falsely portraying the Russian economy as strong and resilient to Western sanctions.

The Kremlin continues to promote an informal state ideology centered on Russian nationalism that Russia may intend to use in justification of a protracted war in Ukraine and a future conflict against NATO. Kremlin newswire TASS reported on July 20 that it obtained a letter from Russian State Duma Deputy Vitaly Milonov appealing to the Russian Presidential Heraldic Council Master Herald Georgy Vilinbakhov to support an initiative that would create a special legal status for former state and historical symbols of Russia.[24] The Russian Presidential Heraldic Council advises the Russian president about heraldry, or the use and regulation of official state symbols such as coats of arms.[25] Milonov stated that the black-yellow-white imperial heraldic flag of the Russian Empire and the "Nikolaevsky flag of 1914" — possibly referring to the flag that the Russian Empire adopted in August 1914 after the outbreak of the First World War to emphasize the unity of Tsar Nicholas II and the people in the Russian Empire — are examples of symbols entitled to such legal status.[26] Milonov claimed that creating this legal status for historical Russian symbols would help protect Russian history from "manipulation." Milonov's initiative largely coheres with the Kremlin's wider efforts to create an informal state ideology that will shape and galvanize future generations in Russia and Russian-occupied Ukraine, likely to justify a protracted war in Ukraine and a future military conflict against NATO.[27] The Kremlin seeks to foster national exceptionalism and further isolate Russia from the West, including by portraying the West as the enemy with whom Russia is engaged in an existential conflict. Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly lauded the mythos of Russian history, including of the Russian Empire and the Second World War (referred to in Russia as the Great Patriotic War) to call for a return to Russia's strong traditional values based on Russia's "1,000-year-old statehood" and unity within Russian society.[28] The Kremlin has also used this mythos and ideology in an effort to persuade the Russian population that their increasingly social and economic sacrifices for Russia's war in Ukraine will result in Russia's victory.[29]

Russian forces continue to systematically violate the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which it is a signatory. The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on July 30 that it has documented over 10,000 instances of Russian forces using ammunition equipped with chemical agents, which the CWC prohibits, since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022.[30] The SBU noted that Russian forces frequently use ampoules filled with chloropicrin and aerosol grenades equipped with chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS) and chloroacetophenone (CN) — both of which are types of riot control (RC) agents. The SBU stated that Russian forces most often use drones to drop chemical munitions on Ukrainian positions along the frontline in order to dislodge Ukrainian soldiers from fortified positions. The SBU recorded the largest number of incidents in Nikopol, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (southwest of Zaporizhzhia City and across the Kakhovka Reservoir from Russian positions in occupied Enerhodar, Zaporizhia Oblast). ISW has observed reports that Russian forces have coated Shahed-type drones in poisonous substances, likely as part of the Kremlin's efforts to inflict greater casualties on Ukrainian civilians.[31]

Key Takeaways:

  • US President Donald Trump specified a deadline of no later than August 8 for Russian President Vladimir Putin to engage in meaningful negotiations for an end to Russia’s war against Ukraine.
  • Kremlin officials continued to posture economic strength in response to US President Donald Trump's proposed economic measures targeting Russia and rejected Trump's efforts to end the war in Ukraine.
  • The Russian Presidential Administration reportedly issued guidance to Russian state and pro-Kremlin media outlets and commentators to promote narratives aimed at weakening the United States–European Union (EU) alliance.
  • Russian officials are already amplifying the Russian Presidential Administration's talking points about the US–EU trade deal and likely intend to hinder US–European cooperation in support of Ukraine and collective European defense.
  • The Kremlin continues to promote an informal state ideology centered on Russian nationalism that Russia may intend to use in justification of a protracted war in Ukraine and a future conflict against NATO.
  • Russian forces continue to systematically violate the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which it is a signatory.
  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 29 and 30 but did not make confirmed advances.[32]

A Russian milblogger reportedly associated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Obukhovka (southwest of Glushkovo).[33]

A Russian milblogger reportedly associated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces claimed on July 30 that an unspecified number of North Korean troops recently arrived in Markovo, Kursk Oblast (northeast of Glushkovo and approximately five kilometers from the international border).[34] The milblogger previously claimed on July 23 that a battalion's worth of North Korean forces arrived in Rylsk (north of Glushkovo) and claimed on July 24 that the North Korean forces had begun moving toward Zvannoye (northwest of Glushkovo).[35]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Sumy

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Myropillya (northeast of Sumy City).[36]

Russian forces attacked in northern Sumy Oblast, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka.[37] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy City near Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City near Sadky and Yunakivka.[38]

Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy "Flash" Beskrestnov reported on July 29 that Russian forces are testing Italmaz strike drones against Sumy City and that Ukrainian forces are currently struggling to counter these drones.[39]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Shostkinskyi Raion (northwest of Sumy City).[40] Elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating near Kindrativka; elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Kindrativka, Stepne (northwest of Kindrativka), and Kostyantynivka (north of Kindrativka); and elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City).[41] Drone operators of the 106th Airborne (VDV) Division and 11th Separate VDV Brigade and elements of the 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Sumy direction.[42]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)



Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on July 30 but did not advance.[43]

A Russian milblogger claimed on July 29 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vovchansk and Tykhe (northeast of Vovchansk).[44]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 116th Rosgvardia Special Purpose Brigade are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Vovchansk.[45]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove on July 30 but did not make confirmed advances.[46]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 400 meters north of Ambarne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[47]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk).[48]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northwest of Kupyansk near Myrne; north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka, Zapadne, and Holubivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka (near the international border) and Krasne Pershe; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane on July 29 and 30.[49]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the 153rd Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Pishchane.[50]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and southeast of Borova toward Olhivka on July 30 but did not advance.[51]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

 

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 30 indicates that Russian forces advanced southwest of Zelena Dolyna (north of Lyman).[52]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman toward Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Karpivka, Ridkodub, Novyi Myr, and toward Serednie; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Yampolivka; east of Lyman near Torske and Dibrova; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area, near Dronivka, and toward Yampil on July 29 and 30.[53]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 30 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Siversk itself; northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka; and south of Siversk near Fedorivka on July 29 and 30.[54] A Ukrainian brigade posted footage on July 30 of a Russian motorized assault consisting of at least 13 motorcycles in the Siversk direction.[55]

Ukrainian 11th Army Corps Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on July 30 that Russian forces in the Siversk direction have increased the number of artillery strikes and are using aviation and Shahed-type drones to strike Slovyansk (west of Siversk).[56] Zaporozhets provided additional details about Russia’s July 27 mechanized assault northeast of Siversk, noting that Russian forces attacked in three waves over three hours in the daytime.[57]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Mykolaivka (west of Chasiv Yar).[58]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Chasiv Yar itself; northeast of Chasiv Yar toward Bondarne; north of Chasiv Yar toward Minkivka and Novomarkove; and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and Oleksandro-Shulytne on July 29 and 30.[59]

A Russian source claimed on July 30 that Russian forces have cut off Ukraine's main ground lines of communication (GLOCs) near Chasiv Yar.[60]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 661st Separate Engineer-Sapper Battalion, are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[61]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on July 30 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; northwest of Toretsk near Poltavka, Popiv Yar, and Oleksandro-Kalynove; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on July 29 and 30.[62]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Ivanopillya (northwest of Toretsk).[63]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

 

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[64]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Volodymyrivka (northeast of Pokrovsk) and repelled Russian forces near the southern outskirts of Shakhove (just north of Volodymyrivka).[65] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central and eastern Zapovidne (formerly Nykanorivka, northeast of Pokrovsk).[66] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[67]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk toward Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Fedorivka, Novoekonomichne, Chervonyi Lyman, Volodymyrivka, and Boikivka and toward Zapovidne; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad, Promin, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne and toward Novopidhorodne and Molodetske on July 29 and 30.[68] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novoekonomichne, Zapovidne, Volodymyrivka, and Skhakove.[69]

A signalman in a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are changing their tactics in the area, storming in small groups up to a detachment in size and using motorcycles, including those with sidecars, mostly for logistics.[70] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces approaching Pokrovsk are employing tactics similar to those that Russian forces used to seize Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk) in 2024, such as attacking in small groups of two to three personnel to find holes in Ukrainian defenses to advance into the settlement.[71] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are using small group tactics to conduct sabotage within Pokrovsk.[72]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on July 30 but did not advance.

 

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne and toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Tovste, Zelenyi Hai, and Novokhatske on July 29 and 30.[73]

Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces reported on July 30 that Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against a Russian Buk-M1 air defense system in the Novopavlivka direction, disabling the launcher and damaging the radar antenna.[74] The commander of a Ukrainian tank company operating in the Novopavlivka direction stated that Russian forces are trying to establish a foothold in this area to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[75] The commander stated that Russian forces are attacking in fireteams of four to six personnel in the direction of Komyshuvakha (southeast of Novopavlivka) and are constantly replenishing losses.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novopavlivka.[76] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly conducting glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian forces near Andriivka-Klevtsove (southwest of Novopavlivka).[77]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 30 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Maliivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[78]

 

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Maliivka.[79]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Myrne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka and Oleksandrohrad; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Maliivka, Komyshuvakha, and Vilne Pole on July 29 and 30.[80]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) are reportedly operating near Maliivka.[81] Drone operators of the 5th Tank Brigade and the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Sichneve (east of Velykomykhailivka).[82]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on July 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into eastern Obratne and west and southwest of Temyrivka (both northeast of Hulyaipole).[83]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Zelene Pole, Temyrivka, and Novopil and east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on July 29 and 30.[84]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Hulyaipole.[85] Elements of the 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue to operate in Temyrivka.[86]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

 

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[87]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and west of Orikhiv near Plavni, Stepnohirsk, and Prymorske on July 29 and 30.[88]

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on July 29 that he visited Ukrainian positions in the Zaporizhia direction.[89] Syrskyi reported that there are relatively fewer combat engagements in the Zaporizhia direction than in other areas of the front but that Russian forces are increasing offensive activity near Kamyanske (west of Orikhiv), deploying small assault groups and striking Ukrainian positions with guided glide bombs, artillery, and drones. Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on July 29 that Russian forces are attempting to establish a “death strip” with drone and artillery strikes along the Dnipro River in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts to reduce the number of buildings and structures available to Ukrainian forces as defensive positions along the riverbank.[90] Voloshyn stated that Russian forces field up to 200 first-person view (FPV) drones per day in the Zaporizhia direction.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Stepnohirsk.[91]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on July 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

 

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of positions near the Antonivsky railway bridge (east of Kherson City and the Antonivsky roadway bridge).[92]

Russian forces attacked in unspecified parts of the Kherson direction on July 29 and 30.[93]

Voloshyn stated that Russian forces field up to 250 FPV drones per day in the Kherson direction.[94] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on July 29 that GUR forces conducted a raid against the Tendrivska Spit (southwest of Kherson City) on July 28.[95] GUR reported that GUR special forces destroyed Russian positions, a Zont electronic warfare (EW) system, and a Rosa radar system.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 31st Separate VDV Brigade are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River.[96]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on July 29 to 30. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 78 Shahed-type strike and decoy drones from the directions of Oryol and Kursk cities and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea, including up to eight jet-type drones equipped with jet or rocket engines.[97] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed or suppressed 51 drones and that 27 drones struck areas in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian Shahed-type drones struck rail infrastructure in Pavlohrad, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; agricultural and private enterprises in Marhanets and Pokrovska hromadas in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; residential areas in Kharkiv City; and a warehouse in Vasyshcheve, Kharkiv Oblast.[98] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces also struck Kharkiv City with Molniya-2 strike drones; Slovyansk, Donetsk Oblast with Geran-2 drones (the Russian analogue of Iranian Shahed-136 drones); and the Sumy Oblast Administration building and a critical infrastructure facility in Sumy City with unspecified strike drones.[99]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) reported on July 29 that Belarus is accelerating the production of electronics and components used in Russian cruise missiles and drones to aid Russia's war effort in Ukraine.[100] The SZRU noted that the Belarusian government is prioritizing investments in its defense industrial base (DIB) at the expense of civilian initiatives and assessed that most DIB facilities will be operational by the end of 2026.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

[1] https://rollcall.com/factbase/trump/transcript/donald-trump-interview-miranda-devine-podcast-july-29-2025/; https://rollcall.com/factbase/trump/transcript/donald-trump-press-gaggle-air-force-one-july-29-2025/

[2] https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-july-29-2025/#post-642212-RussiaUkraine

[3] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114942106248731470

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120324; https://isw.pub/UkrWar090524; https://isw.pub/UkrWar090424; https://isw.pub/UkrWar082324; https://isw.pub/UkrWar091924; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070924; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071224

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121224

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121024;

[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032324; https://www.defensenews.com/land/2018/09/28/india-approves-s-400-buy-from-russia-amid-expectations-for-more-bilateral-deals/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2024

[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar090424

[9] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/30/07/2025/6889f9be9a79476938c1e980

[10] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage

[11] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114942106248731470

[12] https://t.me/MID_Russia/63258

[13] https://ria dot ru/20250729/gosduma-2032232929.html

[14] https://tass dot ru/politika/24660755?ysclid=mdpfte28l7601558248

[15] https://news dot ru/vlast/v-gosdume-otvetili-na-nachalo-otscheta-ultimatuma-trampa?ysclid=mdpkrbwxz4921933471

[16] https://news dot ru/vlast/v-gosdume-obyasnili-pochemu-rossiya-ne-otvetila-na-ultimatum-trampa

[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050825

[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031925

[19] https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/07/30/porazhenie-evropy-tak-kreml-posovetoval-provlastnym-smi-i-blogeram-nazyvat-torgovuyu-sdelku-ssha-i-evrosoyuza;

[20] https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/07/28/le-pen-nazvala-torgovuyu-sdelku-es-i-ssha-troynym-fiasko/; https://www.mk dot ru/politics/2025/07/28/fiasko-le-pen-obyasnila-pochemu-zaklyuchennaya-s-ssha-sdelka-stala-katastrofoy-es.html%C2%A0; https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/07/27/vo-frantsii-otsenili-sdelku-es-s-trampom-slovami-prosto-raskatali/; https://t.me/vneshpol/1752

[21] https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/07/30/porazhenie-evropy-tak-kreml-posovetoval-provlastnym-smi-i-blogeram-nazyvat-torgovuyu-sdelku-ssha-i-evrosoyuza;

[22] https://t.me/tass_agency/327801; https://t.me/tass_agency/327797; https://t.me/tass_agency/328092

[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072325

[24] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/24661239

[25] http://www.en.kremlin dot ru/structure/councils

[26] https://web.archive.org/web/20220316000738/https://www.dissercat.com/content/gosudarstvennaya-geraldika-v-rossii-teoriya-i-praktika ; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/24661239

[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050825

[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052225

[29] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050825

[30] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/30/rosiya-zdijsnyla-ponad-10-tysyach-himatak-po-sylam-oborony-ukrayiny-z-2022-roku/ ; https://ssu.gov dot ua/novyny/sbu-zadokumentuvala-ponad-10-tysiach-khimatak-rf-proty-syl-oborony-ukrainy-z-pochatku-povnomasshtabnoi-viiny-video

[31] https://isw.pub/UkrWar04172025

[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27224 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27187 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27184

[33] https://t.me/severnnyi/4692

[34] https://t.me/severnnyi/4695

[35] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2025

[36] https://t.me/wargonzo/28162?single ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96779

[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27224 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27187 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27184 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96779 https://t.me/wargonzo/28162 ?single ; https://t.me/dva_majors/76369

[38] https://t.me/dva_majors/76369 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28162?single ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4692

[39] https://t.me/serhii_flash/5991

[40] https://t.me/epoddubny/24203

[41] https://t.me/severnnyi/4694

[42] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31828

[43] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14760 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27184 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27187 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27224 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/76369 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4692

[44] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31815

[45] https://t.me/epoddubny/24212

[46] https://t.me/dva_majors/76369

[47] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31815

[48] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39813

[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27224; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27187; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27184; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14760; https://t.me/wargonzo/28162

[50] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39813

[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27224

[52] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9685; https://t.me/OMIBr_60/1131

[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27224; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27187; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27184; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14760

[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27224; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27187

[55]https://t.me/edelweiss10tg/2036 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14786

[56] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/30/pershoyi-doby-vidminusuvaly-117-na-siverskomu-napryamku-vidbyvaly-masshtabnyj-broneshturm/

[57] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/30/pershoyi-doby-vidminusuvaly-117-na-siverskomu-napryamku-vidbyvaly-masshtabnyj-broneshturm/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-27-2025

[58] https://t.me/wargonzo/28162

[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27224; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27187; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27184; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14760; https://t.me/wargonzo/28162

[60] https://tass dot ru/politika/24662105

[61] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31828

[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27224; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27187; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27184; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14760; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27224; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27187; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27184; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14760

[63] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1950195593713692867 ; https://t.me/shock3OA/1648

[64] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9685; https://t.me/OMIBr_60/1131

[65] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66273; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66278

[66] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66278

[67] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96791

[68] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14760; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27184 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27187; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27224; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66278; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66279; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96791

[69] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66278; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66278; https://t.me/rusich_army/24950

[70] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/30/modernizovanyj-variant-kavaleriyi-budonnogo-poblyzu-pokrovska-rosiyany-vlashtovuyut-haotychni-shturmy/

[71] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66290

[72] https://t.me/rusich_army/24950

[73] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14760; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27184 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27187; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27224

[74] https://t.me/usf_army/749

[75] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/30/namagayutsya-stvoryty-placzdarm-rosiyany-ne-prypynyayut-atakuvaty-aby-vyjty-za-adminmezhi-donechchyny/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QK4EAcQXlMo

[76] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14122

[77] https://t.me/voin_dv/16237

[78] https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1950269199072580070; https://t.me/Tsaplienko/78092

[79] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66275

[80] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27224; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27187; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27184; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14760

[81] https://t.me/voin_dv/16241

[82] https://t.me/voin_dv/16239; https://t.me/voin_dv/16244; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/174218

[83] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66275

[84] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27224; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27187; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27184; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14760

[85] https://t.me/voin_dv/16236

[86] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/174140

[87] https://t.me/wargonzo/28162

[88] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27224; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27187; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27184; https://t.me/wargonzo/28162; https://t.me/dva_majors/76369; https://t.me/vrogov/21299; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66291

[89] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27177; https://t.me/osirskiy/1230; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1078529-sirskij-vidvidav-pidrozdili-aki-vedut-oboronu-na-zaporizzi/

[90] https://strana dot today/news/489014-vojska-rf-sozdajut-polosu-smerti-vdol-dnepra-pod-zaporozhem-i-khersonom.html

[91] https://t.me/rogozin_do/7374

[92] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/174225; https://t.me/rogozin_do/7377

[93] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27224; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27187; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27184;

[94] https://strana dot today/news/489014-vojska-rf-sozdajut-polosu-smerti-vdol-dnepra-pod-zaporozhem-i-khersonom.html

[95] https://t.me/DIUkraine/6528

[96] https://t.me/mod_russia/55120

[97] https://t.me/kpszsu/39508

[98] https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1078687-vijska-rf-atakuvali-zaliznicnu-infrastrukturu-na-dnipropetrovsini-poskodzenij-vokzal-kolii-ta-kontaktna-mereza/; https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/7139; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/23257; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/46963; https://t.me/synegubov/16189 ; https://t.me/synegubov/16190

[99] https://t.me/grigorov_oleg/333; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/30/okupanty-znovu-vdaryla-po-budivli-sumskoyi-oda-ye-poraneni/; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1079063-ataka-bpla-na-sumi-30-lipna-so-vidomo/; https://t.me/kobzarartemsn/4809; https://t.me/police_su_region/29804; httphttps://suspilne dot media/1079333-rosijski-vijska-vdarili-bezpilotnikom-po-sumskij-oda-suspilne-videonovini/; https://t.me/synegubov/16186; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1079063-ataka-bpla-na-sumi-30-lipna-so-vidomo/; https://t.me/kobzarartemsn/4809; https://t.me/police_su_region/29804; https://t.me/grigorov_oleg/333; https://suspilne dot media/1079333-rosijski-vijska-vdarili-bezpilotnikom-po-sumskij-oda-suspilne-videonovini/; https://t.me/grigorov_oleg/333; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/30/okupanty-znovu-vdaryla-po-budivli-sumskoyi-oda-ye-poraneni/

[100] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/foreign-intelligence-service-belarus-is-increasing-defense-production-for-russia-s-needs/#google_vignette ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/83546; https://szru dot gov dot ua/news-media/analitics/bilorus-naroshchuie-oboronne-vyrobnytstvo-dlya-potreb-rosiiskoho-vpk

 

Posted by at