Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, Jessica Sobieski, and George Barros
July 27, 2025, 5:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on July 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Siversk during a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault. Geolocated footage published on July 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Siversk during a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault.[1] The Ukrainian brigade that repelled the assault reported that Russian forces used six tanks, three armored personnel carriers (APCs), six MT-LB armored fighting vehicles (AFVs), an armored recovery vehicle, 12 civilian vehicles, two buggies, and 41 motorcycles.[2] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on July 26 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian motorized assault comprised of up to 80 unspecified pieces of armored and motorized vehicles northeast of Siversk, and the July 27 geolocated footage likely shows one wave of the July 26 assault.[3] Russian forces have long attempted to seize Siversk and have consistently attacked along the front line in the Siversk direction since at least Summer 2024. Russian forces conducted a series of battalion-sized mechanized assaults in the Siversk direction in November and December 2024 but have otherwise largely conducted slow, grinding infantry assaults in this direction.[4] Russian forces re-intensified offensive operations in the Siversk direction in early Summer 2025, and Russian milbloggers began claiming in late June 2025 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are operating in the eastern outskirts of Siversk.[5] Recent Russian advances northeast of Siversk indicate that Russian forces are within several kilometers of Siversk, and Russian forces may begin to launch more concerted attacks into the town in the near future.
Russian forces appear to be using armored vehicles more frequently in some tactical attacks after a decrease in the use of armor since Winter 2024-2025. Publicly available combat footage indicates that Russian forces have not conducted a company-sized or larger mechanized assault in Ukraine since April 2025 and have largely leveraged motorcycles and buggies to attack throughout Summer 2025.[6] Russian forces have recently marginally increased their use of armored vehicles against Ukrainian positions and have conducted a series of smaller platoon-sized mechanized assaults in Donetsk and Zaporizhia Oblast since early July 2025.[7] ISW has recently observed indications that Russia temporarily decreased its consumption of tanks and armored vehicles over the last six months, and that Russia appears to be slowly increasing its ability to refurbish Soviet-era armored vehicles while also replenishing armored vehicle supplies by not committing armored vehicles to highly attritional attacks.[8] Russian forces may be temporarily increasing their use of armor to test for weaknesses in Ukraine's drone-based defense in different frontline areas, or the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) may be able to sufficiently repair damaged frontline armor or resupply frontline Russian units with armor. Russian forces may have also recently increased their risk tolerance to use and lose armored vehicles, possibly as part of testing a new tactic or concept of operations, although it is unclear why Russian forces would recalculate this risk. ISW will continue to study the evolution of combat in Ukraine and provide an updated assessment of Russian armor usage.
The Kremlin reasserted its unchanged commitment to achieving its long-standing war aims in Ukraine that amount to nothing short of Ukraine's full capitulation, undermining Russia's diplomatic posturing. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on July 27 that Russia must first fulfill the tasks of its war in Ukraine before renewing bilateral relations with Ukraine.[9] Peskov claimed that Ukraine and the West have rejected Russia's proposals for dialogue. Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have continually rejected US, Ukrainian, and European overtures to progress the peace imitative through dialogue and comprehensive ceasefire agreements.[10] Russia unilaterally imposed short-term ceasefires in Spring 2025 that disproportionately benefited Russia during prominent political events that the Kremlin then weaponized to accuse Ukraine of ceasefire violations.[11] Russia has repeatedly articulated that it seeks regime change in Ukraine, a fundamental restructuring of NATO's open-door policy, and the reduction of Ukraine's military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself in the future. [12] ISW continues to assess that Russia aims to continue delaying the negotiation process so as to make additional gains on the battlefield and extract concessions from Ukraine and the West.
Ukrainian forces recently killed a Russian commander in the Velykyi Burluk direction. Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on July 26 that Ukrainian forces killed Russian Colonel Lebedev (first name not reported), commander of the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) operating in the Velykyi Burluk direction.[13] ISW recently observed reports of the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment redeploying likely from northwestern Belgorod Oblast to the Velykyi Burluk area.[14]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Siversk during a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault.
- Russian forces appear to be using armored vehicles more frequently in some tactical attacks after a decrease in the use of armor since Winter 2024-2025.
- The Kremlin reasserted its unchanged commitment to achieving its long-standing war aims in Ukraine that amount to nothing short of Ukraine's full capitulation, undermining Russia's diplomatic posturing.
- Ukrainian forces recently killed a Russian commander in the Velykyi Burluk direction.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity, even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian forces conducted limited attacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 26 and 27.[15]
A Russian milblogger claimed on July 27 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked east of Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[16] Russian milbloggers claimed on July 26 and 27 that Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions in Ryzhivka (just south of Tetkino) and in southern Novy Put (east of Tetkino).[17]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 27 but did not advance.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently withdrew from positions in Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City) in fear that Ukrainian forces would encircle the settlement.[18] The milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) withdrew from Oleksiivka and abandoned elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) in the area. Russian milbloggers reiterated claims that Ukrainian forces retook Kindrativka (north of Sumy City) and that limited elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD) are withdrawing from the area for reconstitution.[19]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking northwest of Sumy City near Bezsalivka; north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka, Andriivka, and Kindrativka; and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka.[20]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces did not properly guard the operational security of Russian electronic warfare (EW) positions in northern Sumy Oblast, which allowed Ukrainian forces to identify and strike EW systems in the area.[21]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast, and elements of the 104th VDV Regiment (76th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Yunakivka.[22] Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly struck Ukrainian positions in Korchakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[23]
Ukrainian drones reportedly struck an electrical substation in Volgograd Oblast on July 26. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on July 26 that Ukrainian forces struck an electrical substation near a railway station near Oktyabrysky, Volgograd Oblast.[24] Russian officials acknowledged that a Ukrainian drone strike delayed passenger trains near Zhutovo Station in Oktyabrsky.[25] A Ukrainian reserve officer reported that the substation strike disrupted power to the nearby Petrov, Kirov, and Erman factories involved in Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) and the Kotelnikovo Airbase.[26]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on July 27 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northwest of Kharkiv City toward Kozacha Lopan and northeast of Kharkiv City near Zapadne, Vovchansk, and Starytsia on July 26 and 27.[27]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Bati Spetsnaz Group reportedly continue to operate in the Kharkiv direction.[28]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 27 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove and Chuhunivka and toward Khatnie on July 27.[29]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the pro-Russian Chechen Sheikh Mansur volunteer battalion are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Milove.[30]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 27 but did not advance.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Kamyanka (northeast of Kupyansk near the international border), north of Krasne Pershe (northeast of Kupyansk), and north of Myrne (northwest of Kupyansk).[31]
Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk near Novovasylivka, Krasne Pershe, and Fyholivka; north of Kupyansk near Radkivka and Holubivka; and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on July 26 and 27.[32]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kupyansk direction.[33]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 27 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Bohuslavka and Zahryzove, east of Borova near Zelenyi Hai, and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on July 26 and 27.[34]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on July 27 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on July 26 that Russian forces advanced in the Serebryanske forest area.[35]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman toward Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Novyi Myr and Karpivka; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Torske on July 26 and 27.[36]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Serebryanske forest area.[37]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.
See topline text for assessed Russian advances in the Siversk direction.
Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself, northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on July 26 and 27.[38]
The head of the press department of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported on July 26 that Russian forces have resorted to employing a broad range of tactics, such as deploying small infantry groups and tanks and lightly armored vehicles in an effort to overcome the increasingly complex battle dynamics despite the high risk of Ukrainian drone strikes.[39] The Ukrainian official noted that Russian forces are conducting nearly continuous drone strikes.
Order of Battle: Elements of the 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Siversk direction.[40]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 27 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky, Bila Hora, Predtechnye, and Oleksandro-Shultyne; and west of Chasiv Yar toward Mykolaivka, Stinky, Virolyubivka, and Chervone on July 26 and 27.[41]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Poltavka (northwest of Toretsk).[42] Additional geolocated footage published on July 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Rusyn Yar (northwest of Toretsk).[43]
Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; northwest of Toretsk near Novoolenivka, Poltavka, Yablunivka, and Oleksandro-Kalynove and toward Katerynivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on July 26 and 27.[44]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on July 27 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on July 26 that Russian forces advanced northwest of Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[45]
Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and toward Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne, Razine, Volodymyrivka, Koptieve, Shevchenko Pershe, Novotoretske, and Zapovidne and toward Krasne Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Myrnohrad, and Yelyzavetivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and from Novohrodivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka and Vidrozdennya; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, Molodetske, Pishchane, and Kotlyne and toward Novopidhorodne and Hryshyne on July 26 and 27.[46]
A serviceman of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are using up to 150 first-person view (FPV) drones per day and that Ukrainian forces are jamming 70 to 85 percent of Russian drones with electronic warfare (EW) systems.[47]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Dachne, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (south of Novopavlivka).[48]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to eastern Andriivka-Klevtsove (formerly Iskra, southwest of Novopavlivka).[49]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Oleksiivka and from Andriivka; south of Novopavlivka near Zaporizhzhia and from Komar; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai, Piddubne, Tovste, Novokhastke, Voskresenka, and Myrne and toward Filiya and Andriivka-Klevtsove on July 26 and 27.[50]
Order of battle: Drone operators of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Sichneve (southwest of Novopavlivka).[51] Drone operators of the 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st Combined Arms Army, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps, Southern Military District) are reportedly operating near Filiya.[52]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 27 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Maliivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, west of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole and toward Temyrivka, Zaporizhia Oblast, and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novodarivka on July 26 and 27.[53]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on July 27.
Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to southern Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[54] Russian forces are currently seven kilometers from Primorske (northwest of Stepnohirsk) and 11 kilometers from Beselyanka (north of Stepnohirsk), and advances approximately five kilometers closer toward or into either of these settlements would place Russian forces within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Plavni (both west of Orikhiv).[55]
Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk, Plavni, and Kamyanske on July 26 and 27.[56]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 108th and the 247th airborne (VDV) regiments (both of the 7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Kamyanske.[57]
Russian forces continued limited assaults in the Kherson direction on July 27 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction, including near the Antonivskyi Bridge (northeast of Kherson City) and the islands of Bilohrudyi, Zabych, and Velykyi Potemkin (all located southwest of Kherson City), on July 26 and 27.[58]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces conducted a drone strike against Ukraine on the night of July 26 to 27. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 83 Shahed-type and decoy drones from Kursk and Bryansk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[59] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 78 Shahed-type drones and that five drones struck three unspecified locations and drone debris struck two unspecified locations. Kharkiv Oblast and City officials reported that Russian forces launched 35 Shahed drones and 11 Geran-2 drones (the Russian-made analogue of the Iranian-origin Shahed-136 drones) against Kharkiv Oblast.[60]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1949480912330047545 ; https://t.me/rubpak54/320
[2] https://t.me/rubpak54/320
[3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-26-2025 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14467
[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-15-2024
[5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2025
[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar04172025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-14-2025
[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-5-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-26-2025
[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061625
[9] https://tass dot ru/politika/24621171
[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052325 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050125
[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060925 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050825
[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072025
[13] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14503
[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071225
[15] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27085; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27065; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0297kZS8kKgeioqjC7JB6sL8e5iuocgKVWXJhhdgJWGVAcKzfptQsTWCPJiERTXDp6l
[16] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31721
[17] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31709; https://t.me/rusich_army/24880
[18] https://t.me/severnnyi/4669
[19] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173824 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4666
[20] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96635 ; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/58486 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/76128 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28088 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/24892 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4665
[21] https://t.me/severnnyi/4666
[22] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96622 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31708
[23] https://t.me/mod_russia/55017
[24] https://t.me/astrapress/87770 ; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/drone-attack-targets-railway-electrical-substation-in-volgograd-region/
[25] https://t.me/tass_agency/327628 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/40987 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/327681
[26] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1949310328946434185 ; https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1949414390626975884
[27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27065 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0297kZS8kKgeioqjC7JB6sL8e5iuocgKVWXJhhdgJWGVAcKzfptQsTWCPJiERTXDp6l ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13686 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4665 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14524
[28] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5869
[29] https://t.me/severnnyi/4665 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28088
[30] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5866
[31] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32134 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173894
[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27085 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27065 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0297kZS8kKgeioqjC7JB6sL8e5iuocgKVWXJhhdgJWGVAcKzfptQsTWCPJiERTXDp6l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14524
[33] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96621
[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27085 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27065 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0297kZS8kKgeioqjC7JB6sL8e5iuocgKVWXJhhdgJWGVAcKzfptQsTWCPJiERTXDp6l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14524
[35] https://t.me/milinfolive/153602 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96617
[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27085 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27065 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0297kZS8kKgeioqjC7JB6sL8e5iuocgKVWXJhhdgJWGVAcKzfptQsTWCPJiERTXDp6l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14524
[37] https://t.me/voin_dv/16191
[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27085 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27065 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0297kZS8kKgeioqjC7JB6sL8e5iuocgKVWXJhhdgJWGVAcKzfptQsTWCPJiERTXDp6l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14524
[39] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/26/tanky-kaby-motoczykly-na-siverskomu-napryamku-vorog-kydaye-v-bij-use-shho-maye/
[40] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39741
[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27085 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27065 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0297kZS8kKgeioqjC7JB6sL8e5iuocgKVWXJhhdgJWGVAcKzfptQsTWCPJiERTXDp6l ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66211 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28088 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/24891 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/24899
[42] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9671 ; https://t.me/fakhivtsi/382 ; https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1949376550765547862
[43] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1949209455943426442; https://t.me/ua_marines_36brigade/3407
[44] https://t.me/rusich_army/24891 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66211 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0297kZS8kKgeioqjC7JB6sL8e5iuocgKVWXJhhdgJWGVAcKzfptQsTWCPJiERTXDp6l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27065 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27085
[45] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66212
[46] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66212; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27085; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27065; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0297kZS8kKgeioqjC7JB6sL8e5iuocgKVWXJhhdgJWGVAcKzfptQsTWCPJiERTXDp6l; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14524
[47] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/27/kolosalna-kilkist-droniv-postijni-shturmy-i-motoczykly-yak-vorog-atakuye-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aR4y_VyDZTc
[48] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1949191928047951878; https://t.me/oaembr46/1620
[49] https://t.me/epoddubny/24177
[50] https://t.me/epoddubny/24177; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27085; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27065; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0297kZS8kKgeioqjC7JB6sL8e5iuocgKVWXJhhdgJWGVAcKzfptQsTWCPJiERTXDp6l; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14524
[51] https://t.me/voin_dv/16184
[52] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14113
[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27085 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27065 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0297kZS8kKgeioqjC7JB6sL8e5iuocgKVWXJhhdgJWGVAcKzfptQsTWCPJiERTXDp6l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14524
[54] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1949477112257376590; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1949447333349040358; https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1949420145337827494
[55] https://t.me/wargonzo/28088; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32131
[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27065; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0297kZS8kKgeioqjC7JB6sL8e5iuocgKVWXJhhdgJWGVAcKzfptQsTWCPJiERTXDp6l ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02HUeNXDQmVAR7wjRzCQnuNxs7ubkMZnJZ7BnztgeyQLzKfRWaK3ankRZNh3E2WZKCl; https://t.me/wargonzo/28088
[57] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31727
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27085; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27065; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0297kZS8kKgeioqjC7JB6sL8e5iuocgKVWXJhhdgJWGVAcKzfptQsTWCPJiERTXDp6l; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02HUeNXDQmVAR7wjRzCQnuNxs7ubkMZnJZ7BnztgeyQLzKfRWaK3ankRZNh3E2WZKCl
[59] https://t.me/kpszsu/39321
[60] https://t.me/synegubov/16107 ; https://t.me/synegubov/16056 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2879 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1075985-vibuhi-u-harkovi-26-lipna-kerovani-aviabombi-vpali-u-kiivskomu-rajoni/ ; https://www.facebook.com/DSNSKHARKIV/posts/1173165904852901?ref=embed_post
