Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, Jessica Sobieski, Grace Mappes, Justin Young, and Karolina Hird
July 31, 2025, 8:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on July 31. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 31 that Russian forces completed the seizure of Chasiv Yar, although available geolocated footage does not support claims that Russian forces have yet advanced to the western administrative boundary of the town. Geolocated footage published on July 31 shows that Russian forces recently raised flags in western and southern Chasiv Yar and indicates that Russian forces have likely seized most of the settlement.[1] The Russian MoD and numerous Russian milbloggers credited elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 299th VDV Regiment, with the seizure of Chasiv Yar.[2] Tactical Russian advances westward in Chasiv Yar do not constitute an operationally significant development in this area, however, as Russian forces have held most of northern and central Chasiv Yar since late January 2025 and began advancing in southwestern Chasiv Yar in mid-June 2025.[3] Russian forces have been within tube artillery range of Ukraine's main logistics route through the fortress belt since late January 2025 and have held positions along the T-0504 Bakhmut-Kostyantynivka highway for several months, and have yet to significantly threaten Ukrainian positions in Kostyantynivka. ISW has yet to observe geolocated footage showing Russian forces operating in the westernmost outskirts of Chasiv Yar, and Russian forces will have to push Ukrainian forces from positions in these outskirts in order to complete the seizure of the town.
Russian forces have taken 26 months to advance 11 kilometers from the western boundary of Bakhmut, which Russian forces seized in May 2023, to western Chasiv Yar.[4] Russian forces began an intensified effort to seize Chasiv Yar in April 2024 after slowly advancing to the settlement's eastern outskirts and seizing Ivanivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar) between May 2023 and March 2024.[5] A Ukrainian source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence estimated in February 2025 that Russia sustained roughly 4,880 casualties in Chasiv Yar itself between April 2024 and February 2025, although the total number of Russian casualties sustained remains unclear, and the tempo of Russian attacks in this area has varied significantly over the last 26 months.[6] Russian forces advanced into Chasiv Yar in early April 2024 during a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault, but have rarely used armored vehicles while fighting in the urban areas of the settlement.[7] Russian forces have significantly leveraged air strikes and infantry infiltration tactics to make gains in Chasiv Yar, and as a result have suffered significant personnel losses for disproportionately small territorial gains in the ruins of Chasiv Yar. ISW currently assesses that Russian forces have seized roughly 7.81 square kilometers of the roughly 10 square kilometers within Chasiv Yar's administrative boundaries.
Russian forces will likely complete the seizure of Chasiv Yar in the coming days, which will open several possible avenues for Russian forces to attack Ukraine's fortress belt — a series of fortified cities that form the backbone of Ukraine’s defensive positions in Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces in the Chasiv Yar direction are roughly six to eight kilometers from the northeastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka and could leverage the seizure of Chasiv Yar to conduct a frontal assault on the city. Russian forces currently appear to be attempting to envelop Kostyantynivka from the southwest, however, and therefore may wait to conduct a frontal assault against Kostyantynivka until Russian forces advance closer to the city from the south via the Toretsk direction. Russian forces have established an operational pattern of partially enveloping a settlement before beginning street-by-street frontal assaults, and Russian forces may continue this pattern in a future operation to seize Kostyantynivka.[8] Russian forces could also attack directly westward of Chasiv Yar through fields and small settlements toward Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka and Druzhkivka in order to interdict the H-20 Kostyantynivka-Slovyansk highway and complicate Ukrainian egress routes and ground lines of communications (GLOCs) from Kostyantynivka, which would support long-standing Russian efforts to collapse and seize Ukraine's fortress belt.
Russian forces could also attempt to expand their salient northwest of Chasiv Yar toward Kramatorsk and Slovyansk. Russian forces may redeploy elements to attack along the E-40 Bakhmut-Slovyansk highway to set conditions to attack the fortress belt from the northeast. The Russian military command may pursue this avenue of advance if the Russian military command assesses that Russian forces will be able to seize and leverage new positions northeast of Slovyansk, such as near Siversk, to attack the fortress belt. Russian forces will have to contend with a series of tactical water features west and northwest of Chasiv Yar, which would likely complicate their ability to advance toward Kramatorsk and Slovyansk directly from Chasiv Yar and make advances from the Siversk-Lyman direction more attractive, particularly during the upcoming Fall 2025 muddy season. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged on July 31 that Russian forces will likely be unable to reach Ukraine's fortress belt by the end of 2025, which is consistent with ISW's assessment that seizing the fortress belt would be a multi-year-long operational effort.[9] Seizing Chasiv Yar will open a series of operationally significant avenues of advance for Russian forces, although Russian forces must maintain their combat capabilities, avoid culmination, and advance in a series of other areas of Donetsk Oblast to fully exploit these opportunities in the medium term. Russian forces have historically struggled to transform tactical victories into wider operational successes.
Russia has launched a simultaneous kinetic and cognitive response to US President Donald Trump's efforts to end Russia's war in Ukraine. Russia has used strikes largely affecting civilian areas in Kyiv City as well as threats and other rhetorical efforts in order to Trump that Russia continues rejecting Trump's demand that the Kremlin meaningfully engage in negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched eight Iskander-K cruise missiles from Kursk City and 309 Shahed-type and decoy drones from Bryansk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai on the night of July 30 to 31.[10] This strike package is significantly larger than the average Russian strike prior to May 2025. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces mainly targeted Kyiv City and that Ukrainian forces downed three Iskander-K cruise missiles and 288 drones. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that five cruise missiles and 21 drones struck 12 locations and that missile and drone debris struck 19 locations, primarily in Kyiv City. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strike killed at least 11 people, injured at least 135 people in Kyiv City alone, and extensively damaged residential and civilian infrastructure in Kyiv City and Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Mykolaiv oblasts.[11] Russia's ever-growing nightly strikes against Ukraine have been and remain a clear Russian rejection of Trump's calls for peace in Ukraine.
The Kremlin's nuclear threats and rhetorical efforts to delay peace negotiations are part of a broader cognitive campaign to undermine US-led efforts to end Russia's war in Ukraine. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev responded to a statement by US President Donald Trump on both his English- and Russian-language Telegram accounts on July 31 and threatened that Russia is "doing everything right" and will continue along its own path, presumably referring to the war in Ukraine and Russia's general anti-Western posturing.[12] Medvedev also alluded to Russia's automatic or semi-automatic nuclear weapons control system, referred to as the "Dead Hand" or the "Perimeter," in response to Trump. The Kremlin regularly uses Medvedev to inject inflammatory rhetoric, often including nuclear blackmail, into the information space to spread fear among Western decision-makers and discourage future military aid to Ukraine.[13] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin claimed that Russia is ready to continue negotiations with Ukraine but that discussions about a high-level Russo-Ukrainian meeting are "premature," in order to downplay the Trump administration's efforts to secure negotiations.[14] Kremlin newswire RIA Novosti published op-eds on July 30 entitled "There is no other option: no one should remain alive in Ukraine," and "Noted: Ukraine will end very soon," further showcasing the Kremlin's long-standing commitment to conquering all of Ukraine and increasingly aggressive rhetorical line in response to President Trump's efforts to compel Russia to engage constructively in the peace process.[15] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains fully committed to conquering Ukraine and protracting the negotiation process to buy time for further battlefield gains and extract concessions from Ukraine and the West.[16]
The People's Republic of China (PRC) is a decisive enabler of devastating long-range Russian strikes against the Ukrainian rear. A Russian milblogger claimed on July 30 that Russian forces launched up to 200 Geran-2 drones (the Russian iteration of the Iranian Shahed-136 drone) and Garpiya-A1 kamikaze drones (reportedly another Shahed drone variant that Russia produces with primarily PRC-produced components) in the strike against Kyiv City.[17] Reuters recently reported that PRC companies deliberately falsely label drone engines shipped to Russia for use in Garpiya drones as "industrial refrigeration units" to hide their actual military purpose, and Russia also uses PRC components in other Shahed-type drones, including a decoy and reconnaissance variant.[18] ISW has observed reports indicating that Russian defense manufacturer Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant Kupol increased its annual production of Garpiya-A1 drones from 2,000 to over 6,000, largely due to a steady supply of PRC-made L550E engines.[19] The PRC is an indispensable supplier for the broader Russian drone industry, as ISW has routinely assessed.[20] Russia will continue relying heavily on the PRC to support the expansion of its long-range strike capabilities and may incorporate more Garpiya drones in strike packages in the coming weeks and months as Russia seeks to conduct regular strikes consisting of up to 2,000 drones, likely by November 2025.[21]
European and US sanctions appear to be degrading Russian revenues from third-country importers of Russian oil. Bloomberg reported on July 28 that Indian oil refineries are diversifying crude oil imports and increasingly buying from Azerbaijan, Nigeria, and the United Arab Emirates after Europe intensified sanctions on Russian oil exports.[22] Bloomberg reported on July 29 that the Russian-backed Nayara Energy oil refinery in west India is struggling to receive crude imports and export processed fuels due to European sanctions.[23] Bloomberg reported that the Russian state oil company Rosneft owns 49.13 percent of Nayara Energy and that the oil refinery funds Russia’s war in Ukraine. Bloomberg reported that the refinery is currently operating at 70 to 80 percent of its capacity of 400,000 barrels per day. The European Union’s July 2025 18th sanctions package specifically targeted the Nayara Energy oil refinery and other facets of Russia’s oil revenue.[24] ISW previously assessed that the European sanctions package would likely degrade Russian oil revenues beyond what the Kremlin previously expected, posing a potential risk to the Russian federal budget and earmarked defense spending.[25] US sanctions that target countries that purchase Russian oil will further hinder Russia’s ability to fund its war in Ukraine.
Russia continues to look to its small coalition of international partners to lend legitimacy to its illegal occupation and annexation of Ukraine. Nicaraguan co-presidents Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo issued a statement to Russian President Vladimir Putin expressing support and "full recognition" of Russia's occupation and annexation of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts and characterized these regions as an "integral part" of Russia.[26] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev expressed gratitude for Nicaragua's support of Russia's occupation of Ukraine and described the recognition as "truly friendly."[27] The Nicaraguan statement largely mirrors the Kremlin's own justifications for its war in Ukraine and advances several Russian rhetorical lines falsely portraying the war as existential for Russia.[28] Russia's close partners have adopted similar rhetoric in support of Russia's war and occupation of Ukraine, including Venezuela and North Korea, which Russia uses to legitimize its continued aggression and occupation of Ukraine.[29] The UN General Assembly held a vote in October 2022 to condemn the Russian sham annexation referenda in newly occupied Ukraine in September 2022, and the only states to vote against the resolution were Russia, Belarus, North Korea, Syria, and Nicaragua.[30] Russia has pursued increasing cooperation with Nicaragua throughout the war and will likely further intensify relations in the wake of the July 30 statement.[31]
Ukrainian forces continue to innovate technical solutions to offset Russian strike adaptations. The Ukrainian National Guard's 1st Azov Corps announced on July 31 that it formed a dedicated "anti-Shahed" drone unit that will detect, triage, and down long-range Russian drones targeting Ukrainian deep rear areas, including with interceptor drones.[32] Ukraine's well-demonstrated ability to rapidly innovate and implement solutions that optimize flexibility within a theater characterized by a dramatically shortened innovation cycle remains integral to Ukraine's ability to effectively counter Russian innovations.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a law on July 31 designed to safeguard the independence of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAP).[33] The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) passed the bill earlier on July 31, and Zelensky reiterated that ”Ukraine is a democracy” that listens to the voice of its population.[34] Zelensky submitted the draft law in response to public backlash against a law subordinating the NABU and SAP to the Ukrainian Prosecutor General that Zelensky signed on July 22.[35]
Key Takeaways:
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 31 that Russian forces completed the seizure of Chasiv Yar, although available geolocated footage does not support claims that Russian forces have yet advanced to the western administrative boundary of the town.
- Russian forces have taken 26 months to advance 11 kilometers from the western boundary of Bakhmut, which Russian forces seized in May 2023, to western Chasiv Yar.
- Russian forces will likely complete the seizure of Chasiv Yar in the coming days, which will open several possible avenues for Russian forces to attack Ukraine's fortress belt — a series of fortified cities that form the backbone of Ukraine’s defensive positions in Donetsk Oblast.
- Russia has launched a simultaneous kinetic and cognitive response to US President Donald Trump's efforts to end Russia's war in Ukraine.
- The Kremlin's nuclear threats and rhetorical efforts to delay peace negotiations are part of a broader cognitive campaign to undermine US-led efforts to end Russia's war in Ukraine.
- The People's Republic of China (PRC) is a decisive enabler of devastating long-range Russian strikes against the Ukrainian rear.
- European and US sanctions appear to be degrading Russian revenues from third-country importers of Russian oil.
- Russia continues to look to its small coalition of international partners to lend legitimacy to its illegal occupation and annexation of Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces continue to innovate technical solutions to offset Russian strike adaptations.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a law on July 31 designed to safeguard the independence of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAP).
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast and near Lyman and Velykomykhailivka. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian forces continued offensive operations in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 31.[36]
Ukrainian forces struck a Russian defense industrial enterprise in Penza City overnight on July 30 to 31. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that Ukrainian drones struck Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec's subsidiary Radiozavod, which produces mobile control systems, automated combat control systems, and radio stations for the Russian military.[37] Sources in Ukrainian special services confirmed the strike to Ukrainian outlet Suspilne and stated that the strike caused at least 11 explosions and a large fire at the Radiozavod plant.[38] Geolocated imagery published on July 31 shows a smoke plume rising from the plant in Penza City, and Penza Oblast Governor Oleg Melnichenko claimed that Ukrainian forces struck an industrial enterprise but did not cause any casualties or significant damage.[39]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 30 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that elements of the Russian 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade partially withdrew from Varachyne (northeast of Sumy City).[40] The milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 234th VDV Regiment (76th VDV Division) advanced in Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City) but are disorganized, and that Ukrainian forces conducted a tactical encirclement of some Russian forces in Yunakivka.[41] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Myropillya (northeast of Sumy City).[42]
Russian forces continued attacks north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, Kostyantynivka, and Myropillya.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conduct daily counterattacks near Yunakivka.[44]
The Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the Russian military command redeployed the 1st Battalion and an assault detachment of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment, which ISW previously assessed was operating in the Sumy direction, to occupied Bilovodsk, Luhansk Oblast.[45] The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command is also redistributing personnel from the regiment's 1st Battalion to its 2nd and 3rd battalions and accused the command of the regiment of "criminal behavior" for ordering attritional, casualty-heavy infantry assaults and claimed that only 140 personnel of 2,200 total personnel survived offensive operations.[46]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Kostyantynivka.[47] Elements of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) and 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) are reportedly operating near Kindrativka.[48] Elements of the 51st VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Sadky (northeast of Sumy City).[49]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Prylipka on July 30 and 31 but did not advance.[50]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 116th Special Purpose Brigade (Rosgvardia) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Vovchansk, and elements of the Bati Group of Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[51]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 31 but did not advance.
Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Khatnie, Zarubynka, and Milove.[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zarubynka.[53]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 30 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked in the direction of Kupyansk itself; northwest of Kupyansk near Myrne; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and Krasne Pershe and toward Kolodyazne (near the international border); and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on July 30 and 31.[54]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 30 but did not advance.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Olhivka on July 30 and 31.[55]
Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 30 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Dibrova (east of Lyman).[56]
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 31 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Zelena Dolyna (northeast of Lyman) and in southern Torske (east of Lyman).[57]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed on July 31 that Russian forces advanced near Karpivka (north of Lyman).[58]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman toward Shandryholove and Serednie; north of Lyman near Novyi Myr, Ridkodub, and Karpivka; northeast of Lyman near Myrne and Yampolivka; east of Lyman near Dibrova; and southeast of Lyman near the Serebryanske forest area and toward Yampil on July 30 and 31.[59]
A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces lose 25-30 soldiers daily in assaults.[60] The servicemember added that Russian difficulties with logistics in the Lyman direction prevent Russian forces from rapidly transferring heavy equipment to the front.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[61]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 31 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Serebryanka (northeast of Siversk) and north of Vyimka (southeast of Siversk).[62]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk toward Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka; east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka and toward Zvanivka on July 30 and 31.[63]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.
See topline text for assessed Russian advances in the Chasiv Yar direction.
Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 30 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Oleksandro-Kalynove (northwest of Toretsk).[64]
Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and northwest of Toretsk near Oleksandro-Kalynove, Volodymyrivka, Poltavka, Popiv Yar, and Rusyn Yar and toward Pleshchiivka and Stepanivka on July 30 and 31.[65]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[66] Drone operators of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment, 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, and the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Regiment (possibly a reformed Soviet unit) are reportedly operating near Katerynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[67] Artillery elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating near Shcherbynivka.[68]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into central Pokrovsk from the south, likely during limited sabotage and reconnaissance missions.[69] ISW observed Russian claims of Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups advancing in southern and central Pokrovsk on July 25 and 30, and one milblogger criticized Russian sources on July 30 for overstating the presence and nature of the Russian groups operating in Pokrovsk – indicating that Russian forces likely do not have enduring positions within Pokrovsk.[70]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, likely sabotage and reconnaissance groups, continued to advance in central Pokrovsk, farther than the available geolocated footage indicated.[71] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), east of Nove Shakhove, and north and west of Fedorivka (both northeast of Pokrovsk).[72]
Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Razine, Fedorivka, Novoekonomichne, Boykivka, Nykanorivka, and Krasnyi Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and toward Myrnohrad and Promin; south of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Zvirove and Kotlyne and toward Molodetske and Novopidhorodne on July 30 and 31.[73]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on July 31 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Piddubne, west of Voskresenka (both south of Novopavlivka), north of Zelenyi Hai, and toward Andriivka-Klevtsove (both southwest of Novopavlivka).[74]
Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Dachne; and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya, Zaporizhzhia, Zirka, Perebudova, Piddubne, Fedorivka, Komar, and Tovste on July 30 and 31.[75]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions near Novopavlivka.[76]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.
Confirmed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 29 and which ISW geolocated on July 31 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently recaptured Maliivka (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[77] ISW observed geolocated footage to assess that Russian forces had initially seized Maliivka by July 26.[78]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Oleksandrohrad (northeast of Velykomykhailivka), northwest of Maliivka, and toward Komyshuvakha (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[79]
Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka toward Oleksandrohrad and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Maliivka, Shevchenko, Vilne Pole, and Novosilka on July 30 and 31.[80]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Dibrova (north of Velykomykhailivka) and Novosilka.[81] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Sichneve (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[82]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 31 and geolocated by ISW indicates that Ukrainian forces recently recaptured Temyrivka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[83]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Zelene Pole and southwest of Novopil (both northeast of Hulyaipole).[84]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Temyrivka, Zelene Pole, and Novopil on July 30 and 31.[85]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade and 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Olhivske (northeast of Hulyaipole).[86]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 31 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Mali Shcherbaky, Plavni, and Stepnohirsk on July 30 and 31.[87] The Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces denied that Russian forces have seized Kamyanske (west of Orikhiv) but noted that fighting is ongoing in the settlement.[88]
Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[89]
Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of the Kherson direction on July 30 and 31 but did not advance.[90]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kherson direction.[91] Drone operators of the 127th Reconnaissance Brigade (18th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and of the 31st VDV Brigade are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[92]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
See topline text.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Belarusian Deputy Prime Minister Natalya Petkevich and Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk met in Moscow on July 30 to discuss deepening bilateral economic cooperation, trade, and integration in the Union State framework.[93]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9689; https://t.me/EnotHersonVDV/7615; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1950861213690425766; https://t.me/osintpen/1522
[2] https://t.me/tass_agency/328388 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/55143; https://t.me/mod_russia/55136; https://t.me/epoddubny/24220; https://t.me/epoddubny/24217; https://t.me/sashakots/55216 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/55146 ; https://t.me/EnotHersonVDV/7615; https://t.me/voin_dv/16255 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96896 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32163 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39819
[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-19-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2025
[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut
[5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-4-2024
[6] https://english.nv dot ua/russian-war/why-russia-s-assault-on-chasiv-yar-is-losing-momentum-according-to-a-ukrainian-soldier-50496007.html ; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21337 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-has-failed-break-ukraine
[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-4-2024
[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071425 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2025
[9] https://t.me/rybar/72542 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625
[10] https://t.me/kpszsu/39572
[11] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15373 ; https://t.me/synegubov/16203 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/31/vorog-byv-po-harkivshhyni-raketamy-kabamy-ta-shahedamy-naslidky-obstriliv/ ; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1546 ; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1079505-armia-rf-atakuvala-kiiv-bezpilotnikami-zafiksovano-padinna-ulamkiv/ ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/5079 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/31/raketnyj-udar-po-kyyevu-zagybla-i-ponad-20-postrazhdalyh-zrujnovano-pidyizd-budynku/ ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/5086 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/47086; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/31/u-kyyevi-zrosla-kilkist-zagyblyh-cherez-ataku-rf-2/
[12] https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/600 ; https://t.me/medvedev_telegramE/89
[13] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070825
[14] https://tass dot ru/politika/24672907
[15] https://ria dot ru/20250730/ukraina-2032235759.html ; https://ria dot ru/20250730/ukraina-2032148351.html
[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072725 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072425
[17] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/22308
[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-july-30-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2024
[19] https://defence-blog.com/russia-ramps-up-kamikaze-drone-production-with-chinese-help/
[20] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-july-30-2025
[21] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072625 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2024
[22] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-07-28/indian-refiners-look-more-widely-for-oil-after-eu-s-russia-curbs
[23] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-07-29/india-s-nayara-trims-crude-processing-rates-after-eu-sanctions
[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071825
[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071825
[26] https://www.el19digital dot com/articulos/ver/166982-mensaje-de-respaldo-y-solidaridad-a-la-federacion-de-rusia-en-su-lucha-contra-el-neonazismo-ucraniano
[27] https://tass dot ru/politika/24679987
[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051825 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032125
[29] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060525 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2024
[30] https://www.voanews dot com/a/un-general-assembly-rejects-russia-s-referenda-annexation-in-ukraine-/6787420.html
[31] https://www.el19digital dot com/articulos/ver/166982-mensaje-de-respaldo-y-solidaridad-a-la-federacion-de-rusia-en-su-lucha-contra-el-neonazismo-ucraniano
[32] https://t.me/azov_media/7104
[33] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1950902199363444819; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15387
[34] https://t.me/verkhovnaradaukrainy/82689
[35] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072425
[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27272; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02bPEajXVse4AbYetqNeMRnVRCXn7xBm9QgA7uRmEyEEwVFf8ctkEt6a5pBgZPKwoTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Xn6e6epZeaJrv3Tn8xPKjmP3xD12M7ZWWYkT93nLYxSwH4UUKpaAMzC8uKSM7x3yl
[37] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9583 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/31/drony-atakuvaly-zavod-elektroniky-u-penzi-shho-vyroblyaye-obladnannya-dlya-rosijskoyi-armiyi/;
[38] https://suspilne dot media/1079783-droni-sbu-vrazili-zavod-radioelektroniki-u-penzi/
[39] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/6379 ; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/11823 ; https://t.me/supernova_plus/42108; https://t.me/omelnichenko/6416 ;
[40] https://t.me/severnnyi/4703
[41] https://t.me/severnnyi/4700 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4701 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4703
[42] https://t.me/wargonzo/28181
[43] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31873; https://t.me/severnnyi/4700 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4701 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4703
[44] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31873
[45] https://t.me/severnnyi/4697
[46] https://t.me/severnnyi/4699
[47] https://t.me/severnnyi/4703
[48] https://t.me/severnnyi/4703
[49] https://t.me/severnnyi/4703
[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27272; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02bPEajXVse4AbYetqNeMRnVRCXn7xBm9QgA7uRmEyEEwVFf8ctkEt6a5pBgZPKwoTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Xn6e6epZeaJrv3Tn8xPKjmP3xD12M7ZWWYkT93nLYxSwH4UUKpaAMzC8uKSM7x3yl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Xn6e6epZeaJrv3Tn8xPKjmP3xD12M7ZWWYkT93nLYxSwH4UUKpaAMzC8uKSM7x3yl; https://t.me/dva_majors/76441; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31855; https://t.me/severnnyi/4700;
[51] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13714; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5875
[52] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31855; https://t.me/dva_majors/76441; https://t.me/severnnyi/4700
[53] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31855
[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27272; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02bPEajXVse4AbYetqNeMRnVRCXn7xBm9QgA7uRmEyEEwVFf8ctkEt6a5pBgZPKwoTl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Xn6e6epZeaJrv3Tn8xPKjmP3xD12M7ZWWYkT93nLYxSwH4UUKpaAMzC8uKSM7x3yl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14817; https://t.me/wargonzo/28181
[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02bPEajXVse4AbYetqNeMRnVRCXn7xBm9QgA7uRmEyEEwVFf8ctkEt6a5pBgZPKwoTl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Xn6e6epZeaJrv3Tn8xPKjmP3xD12M7ZWWYkT93nLYxSwH4UUKpaAMzC8uKSM7x3yl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14817; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02bPEajXVse4AbYetqNeMRnVRCXn7xBm9QgA7uRmEyEEwVFf8ctkEt6a5pBgZPKwoTl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Xn6e6epZeaJrv3Tn8xPKjmP3xD12M7ZWWYkT93nLYxSwH4UUKpaAMzC8uKSM7x3yl
[56] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1950833557695549527; https://t.me/operationall_space/5482; https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1950833683222380583
[57] https:// t.me/WarArchive_ua/29935; https:// t.me/ombr_63/1298; https:// t.me/creamy_caprice/9691; https:// t.me/creamy_caprice/9695; https:// t.me/shalenishershni115/48; https:// t.me/creamy_caprice/9694; https:// t.me/shalenishershni115/53
[58] https://t.me/tass_agency/328385
[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27272; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02bPEajXVse4AbYetqNeMRnVRCXn7xBm9QgA7uRmEyEEwVFf8ctkEt6a5pBgZPKwoTl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Xn6e6epZeaJrv3Tn8xPKjmP3xD12M7ZWWYkT93nLYxSwH4UUKpaAMzC8uKSM7x3yl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14817
[60] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/31/vazhko-znajty-pole-chy-posadku-bez-til-poblyzu-lymanu-vorog-shhodenno-vtrachaye-vzvod-shturmovykiv/
[61] https://t.me/voin_dv/16263; https://t.me/Secrets_of_Vinakos/9172
[62] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32167; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/174365
[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27272; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02bPEajXVse4AbYetqNeMRnVRCXn7xBm9QgA7uRmEyEEwVFf8ctkEt6a5pBgZPKwoTl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Xn6e6epZeaJrv3Tn8xPKjmP3xD12M7ZWWYkT93nLYxSwH4UUKpaAMzC8uKSM7x3yl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14817
[64] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1950651772256895174; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4dPeMG-JV7w
[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27272; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02bPEajXVse4AbYetqNeMRnVRCXn7xBm9QgA7uRmEyEEwVFf8ctkEt6a5pBgZPKwoTl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Xn6e6epZeaJrv3Tn8xPKjmP3xD12M7ZWWYkT93nLYxSwH4UUKpaAMzC8uKSM7x3yl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14817; https://t.me/wargonzo/28181
[66] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96867
[67] https://t.me/dva_majors/76419; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1950716836619887049
[68] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1950711081305047123; https://t.me/ZParaBellumMD/20768
[69] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1950632457310527778; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1950630246174355701; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9687; https://t.me/Airborne1126/28358; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9686; https://t.me/Airborne1126/28521
[70] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2025; https://t.me/rybar/72533 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32157; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66315; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96853; https://t.me/notes_veterans/24457; https://t.me/dva_majors/76441
[71] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32157; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66315
[72] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32160; https://t.me/rybar/72533
[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27272; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02bPEajXVse4AbYetqNeMRnVRCXn7xBm9QgA7uRmEyEEwVFf8ctkEt6a5pBgZPKwoTl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Xn6e6epZeaJrv3Tn8xPKjmP3xD12M7ZWWYkT93nLYxSwH4UUKpaAMzC8uKSM7x3yl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14817 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/174264; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66297; https://t.me/sashakots/55220; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32157 ; https://t.me/rybar/72533; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96853 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/76441 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28181;
[74] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32151 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/76441
[75] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Xn6e6epZeaJrv3Tn8xPKjmP3xD12M7ZWWYkT93nLYxSwH4UUKpaAMzC8uKSM7x3yl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02bPEajXVse4AbYetqNeMRnVRCXn7xBm9QgA7uRmEyEEwVFf8ctkEt6a5pBgZPKwoTl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27272
[76] https://t.me/voin_dv/16249 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/14130
[77] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1036006418366324; https:// t [dot] me/Tsaplienko/78092
[78] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-26-2025
[79] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32148 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/76441
[80] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Xn6e6epZeaJrv3Tn8xPKjmP3xD12M7ZWWYkT93nLYxSwH4UUKpaAMzC8uKSM7x3yl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02bPEajXVse4AbYetqNeMRnVRCXn7xBm9QgA7uRmEyEEwVFf8ctkEt6a5pBgZPKwoTl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27272 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14817 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28181
[81] https://t.me/voin_dv/16249
[82] https://t.me/voin_dv/16256
[83] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1088510299903509
[84] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32148
[85] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27272 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02bPEajXVse4AbYetqNeMRnVRCXn7xBm9QgA7uRmEyEEwVFf8ctkEt6a5pBgZPKwoTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Xn6e6epZeaJrv3Tn8xPKjmP3xD12M7ZWWYkT93nLYxSwH4UUKpaAMzC8uKSM7x3yl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14817
[86] https://t.me/voin_dv/16259
[87] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27272 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02bPEajXVse4AbYetqNeMRnVRCXn7xBm9QgA7uRmEyEEwVFf8ctkEt6a5pBgZPKwoTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Xn6e6epZeaJrv3Tn8xPKjmP3xD12M7ZWWYkT93nLYxSwH4UUKpaAMzC8uKSM7x3yl; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0ycF6KJpAJ5R47oXhsGubrmVRt5gy9NJtro39XMzmUTkxNSwwY5REDusnFdauEhNwl ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12789 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28181 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/76441 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/174365
[88] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/31/syly-oborony-pivdnya-zapevnyly-shho-vorog-ne-zahopyv-kam%ca%bcyanske-na-zaporizhzhi/; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12791 ; https://suspilne dot media/1079491-sili-oboroni-vidkinuli-rosian-na-zaporizzi-smigal-kaze-so-v-ukraini-5-10-vidmov-vid-mobilizacii-1254-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1753954551&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[89] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31878
[90] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27272 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02bPEajXVse4AbYetqNeMRnVRCXn7xBm9QgA7uRmEyEEwVFf8ctkEt6a5pBgZPKwoTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Xn6e6epZeaJrv3Tn8xPKjmP3xD12M7ZWWYkT93nLYxSwH4UUKpaAMzC8uKSM7x3yl; ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12789
[91] https://t.me/dva_majors/76435
[92] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/8811 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31866
[93] https://belta dot by/economics/view/petkevich-i-overchuk-obsudili-uglublenie-integratsii-v-sg-i-prioritety-v-ramkah-eaes-729250-2025/
