Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 9, 2025

 Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson,
Daria Novikov, and Frederick W. Kagan with William Runkel and Nate Trotter

May 9, 2025, 6:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11am ET on May 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

[Note: The Ukrainian General Staff's 2200 May 8 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 2200 on May 8. The Ukrainian General Staff's 0800 May 9 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0800 on May 8 to 0800 on May 9. The Ukrainian General Staff's 1600 May 9 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 1600 on May 9. Any reports of Russian ground activity in these SITREPs are implicit accusations that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire.]

Click here to read ISW's in-depth coverage of Russia's May 9 Victory Day holiday.

US President Donald Trump explicitly called for a longer-term ceasefire in Ukraine that would precede peace negotiations — a sequence that Ukraine has consistently supported and that Russia has consistently rejected. Trump stated on May 8 that the United States calls for a 30-day unconditional ceasefire that “must ultimately build toward a peace agreement.”[1] Trump noted that he is committed to securing a Ukrainian-Russian peace with the Europeans. US Vice President JD Vance stated on May 8 that Russia asked for “too much” because Russia perceives that it is winning the war on the battlefield.[2] Vance stated that Russia cannot expect Ukraine to cede territory to Russia that Russian forces have not seized — in reference to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s demand that Ukraine cede territory in eastern and southern Ukraine that Russian forces do not currently occupy.[3] Vance reiterated that the United States wants Ukraine to remain a sovereign country. US President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 9 that he is working together with European states to achieve a ceasefire at least 30 days long.[4] Zelensky reported that his May 8 phone call with Trump demonstrated that the United States, Ukraine, and Europe are “on the same page” about the necessity of a full ceasefire. The Kremlin has consistently rejected Ukrainian and American proposals for 30-day ceasefires while blaming Ukraine for the lack of progress towards peace negotiations.[5]

Ukrainian resistance with Western support has prevented Russian forces from seizing any of their self-identified objectives in Ukraine over the past year, depriving Russian President Vladimir Putin of significant battlefield successes to celebrate on Victory Day. Putin did not discuss the battlefield situation in Ukraine during Russia’s Victory Day celebrations in Moscow on May 8 and 9 but claimed that all of Russia supports Russian servicemembers fighting in Ukraine.[6] Russian forces have not seized any significant towns in Ukraine since the seizure of Avdiivka in February 2024, and the only mid-sized settlement that Russian forces have seized in Ukraine since December 2024 is Velyka Novosilka (pre-war population of 5,000).[7] Ukrainian sources previously reported that Russian forces were trying to seize Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and the remaining area of Luhansk Oblast and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast by Victory Day on May 9.[8] Russian forces did not accomplish any of those objectives, and have in fact been trying to seize Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk for roughly a year.[9]

Ukrainian long-range strikes and improved integration of tactical drone operations with defensive operations and counterattacks — all enabled by Western military support — have slowed, and in some places stalled, Russian offensive operations in Ukraine. Ukraine’s successful integration of Ukrainian drone innovators and operators with ground forces appears to have stalled Russia’s offensive against Pokrovsk and Toretsk in 2024 and early 2025.[10] Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian ammunition depots, defense industry facilities, and oil and gas infrastructure have at times compromised Russia’s ability to supply frontline units and have compounded the rising costs of Russia’s war against Ukraine.[11] Ukrainian forces have also intentionally exacerbated other Russian vulnerabilities over the last year, including exacerbating Russia’s shortage of operational reserves by launching the incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024 and forcing the Russian military to redeploy troops from other frontline areas to defend against the incursion.[12]

The only recent military operation that Putin featured on Victory Day was the repulsion of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. Putin thanked and highlighted North Korean troops at the Victory Day parade on May 9, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov noted that high-ranking North Korean commanders who participated in recapturing Kursk Oblast attended the parade.[13] Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov declared that Russian forces pushed all Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast on April 26, after almost nine months of Russian operations to push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.[14] Russian officials have repeatedly platformed the recapture of Kursk Oblast as a significant military achievement, and ISW previously forecasted that Russian officials would highlight the Kursk operation as part of the Victory Day celebrations.[15] Russian officials’ praise of the Kursk operation ignores the fact that Putin reportedly initially tasked Russian forces with retaking Kursk Oblast by mid-October 2024 and Putin’s continued willingness to extend this timeline throughout Fall 2024 and Winter 2024-2025, prioritizing offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast over retaking Russian territory.[16] Russian officials are also ignoring recent Ukrainian attacks and advances into Tetkino, Kursk Oblast.[17]

Russian officials highlighted technological adaptations and innovations that Russian forces have integrated in Ukraine over the last three years during national and regional Victory Day celebrations. Russian state media posted footage on May 9 showing Russian forces displaying Orlan-10, Orlan-30, and Zala reconnaissance drones; Lancet-51 and Lancer-52 loitering munitions; and Geran and Garpiya long-range strikes drones during the Victory Day parade in Moscow City.[18] Russia state news outlet RIA Novosti posted footage showing Russian forces riding in Chinese-made all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and Russian-made buggies during a Victory Day parade in Khabarovsk City, Khabarovsk Krai.[19] Russian media also posted footage of Russian forces showcasing tanks equipped with counter drone netting at a Victory Day parade in Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast.[20] Russia’s use of counter drone netting, ATVs, buggies, and motorcycles are all tactical adaptations in response to Ukrainian drone operations. Russian forces have increasingly leveraged reconnaissance and strike drones to destroy frontline Ukrainian positions and damage Ukrainian cities throughout the war in Ukraine. Russian officials appear to be highlighting these weapons, vehicles, and counter-drone adaptations to the Russian public to frame these innovations as a form of “victory” in Ukraine. Russian officials’ willingness to highlight these adaptions during Victory Day parades suggests that the Russian military intends to preserve these adaptions in future military operations rather than reverting to pre-2022 forms of combat.

The Kremlin seized on Russia’s May 9 Victory Day celebrations to posture itself as having broad international support three years into its invasion of Ukraine and especially highlighted Russia’s growing partnerships with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and North Korea. The Kremlin indicated that heads of state and senior representatives of at least 30 states, the heads of the Palestinian Authority and Kremlin-backed separatist region of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the heads of several international organizations — including the Russia-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) — travelled to Russia for the Victory Day parade and subsequent events on May 9.[21] The Kremlin reported that 55 military units and over 11,500 military personnel in total participated in the parade in Moscow, including military personnel from Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Egypt, the PRC, Laos, Mongolia, and Myanmar.[22]

Russian officials specifically praised the PRC and North Korea for their support, including of the war in Ukraine. Putin gave a speech at the parade in Moscow highlighting the contribution of the “courageous people of China” in Russia’s victory in the Second World War, and Putin sat next to PRC President Xi Jinping at the Victory Day parade.[23] Putin and Xi issued a joint statement on May 8 that referenced Putin’s original war aims in Ukraine and called for the resolution of the war in Ukraine to eliminate the “root causes” of the war — a long-standing Russian talking point and demand for the installation of a pro-Russian government in Ukraine.[24] ISW noted that this joint statement was a notable inflection in PRC rhetoric. Putin expressed well-wishes to North Korean soldiers and hugged a North Korean military veteran at the parade, and Russian state media highlighted this gesture.[25] North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un, his daughter Kim Ju-ae, and several North Korean officials visited the Russian embassy in Pyongyang to commemorate the May 9 Victory Day holiday.[26] Russia is likely attempting to emphasize its deepening relationships with the PRC and North Korea in particular to posture itself as possessing broad international support, including for its war in Ukraine, to a domestic Russian audience and the wider international community.

Putin used the Victory Day holiday to promote the development of a civic Russian identity at odds with Russian ultranationalist efforts to promote ethno-religious nationalism predicated on a Russian state mainly led by and comprised of ethnic Russians. Putin claimed on May 8 at a dinner with foreign delegations in Moscow that May 9 is a “sacred date” for the “multinational people” of Russia.[27] Putin also claimed on May 9 in a speech at the Victory Day parade that the Soviet Union’s “truly iron unity” prevented Nazi Germany from seizing the country.[28] Putin claimed that Russia defends the honor of all Red Army soldiers from different nationalities and that all of the republics in the Soviet Union bore a common burden in the Second World War. Putin additionally said that Central Asia and the South Caucasus made “enormous” contributions in the Second World War. Putin’s efforts to highlight Russia’s and post-Soviet countries’ diverse population as equal contributors to the Soviet war effort are part of an effort to promote an informal state ideology that supports a civic Russian identity and a multiethnic and religiously diverse population. Putin routinely attempts to posture Russia as an ethnically diverse and harmonious country in an attempt to balance among Russian ultranationalist demands for restrictions against migrants and assimilation of ethnic minorities.[29] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is trying to leverage migrants to offset labor shortages while also disproportionately targeting migrants and ethnic minorities in Russian military recruitment efforts.[30] Putin’s choice to promote multiculturalism at Russia’s largest national holiday demonstrates that Putin continues to support an informal state ideology that supports Russian civic nationalism. This manifestation of Russian nationalism is notably at odds with Russian ultranationalists’ attempts to create an ideology predicated on a Russian state mainly led by and comprised of ethnic Russians that defends and platforms Russian Orthodoxy.[31] Putin will likely continue to struggle to balance Russia’s need to leverage migrants to offset labor shortages and long-term demographic decline with placating the increasingly influential pro-war Russian ultranationalist community.

Delegations from 35 countries and the Council of Europe visited Lviv City on May 9 in celebration of Europe Day in Ukraine.[32] Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated that the delegations would hold a meetings of EU foreign ministers and the Core Group on the Establishment of a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine.[33] The Core Group announced on May 9 the creation of a special tribunal within the Council of Europe to investigate and prosecute Russian officials for the crime of aggression against Ukraine.[34]

Ukraine’s European allies continue to support the Ukrainian military and defense industrial base (DIB). The EU, Denmark, France, and Italy agreed on May 9 to transfer one billion euros (roughly $1.1 billion) from proceeds from frozen Russian assets to the European Peace Fund to purchase weapons from the Ukrainian DIB for the Ukrainian military.[35] Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announced that the EU also allocated 600 million euros-worth (roughly $675 million) of artillery and ammunition to Ukraine and more than 200 million euros (roughly $225 million) to strengthen Ukrainian air defenses.[36] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha noted on May 9 that the EU has committed to supply Ukraine with over 1.35 million artillery shells in 2025.[37]

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump explicitly called for a longer-term ceasefire in Ukraine that would precede peace negotiations — a sequence that Ukraine has consistently supported and that Russia has consistently rejected.
• Ukrainian resistance with Western support has prevented Russian forces from seizing any of their self-identified objectives in Ukraine over the past year, depriving Russian President Vladimir Putin of significant battlefield successes to celebrate on Victory Day.
• The only recent military operation that Putin featured on Victory Day was the repulsion of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.
• Russian officials highlighted technological adaptations and innovations that Russian forces have integrated in Ukraine over the last three years during national and regional Victory Day celebrations.
• The Kremlin seized on Russia’s May 9 Victory Day celebrations to posture itself as having broad international support three years into its invasion of Ukraine and especially highlighted Russia’s growing partnerships with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and North Korea.
• Putin used the Victory Day holiday to promote the development of a civic Russian identity at odds with Russian ultranationalist efforts to promote ethno-religious nationalism predicated on a Russian state mainly led by and comprised of ethnic Russians.
• Delegations from 35 countries and the Council of Europe visited Lviv City on May 9 in celebration of Europe Day in Ukraine.
• Ukraine’s European allies continue to support the Ukrainian military and defense industrial base (DIB).
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka directions and in Zaporizhia Oblast, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Alleged Ceasefire Violation
• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort — Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

See text below for reported violations.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast as Russian and Ukrainian sources accused each other of violating Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 9.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southwestern Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[38] ISW is unable to assess when this advance occurred.

Unconfirmed claims: A Ukrainian drone company reported on May 9 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in central Gornal (south of Sudzha along the international border).[39] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 8 that Russian forces regained lost positions in Tetkino.[40]

The Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia's ceasefire and attacked in undefined areas of Kursk Oblast on May 8 and 9.[41]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 9 that Ukrainian forces violated Russia's ceasefire by attacking in Kursk Oblast.[42] Russian milbloggers claimed on May 8 and 9 that Ukrainian forces attacked near Tetkino and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino along the international border) and that fighting continues near Tetkino.[43]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Grom-Kaskad" drone brigade and the “Storm” detachment of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[44]

The Russian MoD accused Ukrainian forces of violating Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking in Belgorod Oblast on May 9.[45]

Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko posted imagery on May 9 from Japanese OSINT analysts showing Russian decoy S-300 and S-400 air defense systems in an unspecified area of Russia’s Far East.[46] Kovalenko stated that Russia had roughly 24 S-400 systems and 12 S-300 systems in the Far East but moved an unspecified number of these air defense assets to western Russia, including to Ust-Luga, Leningrad Oblast; Engels Air Base in Saratov Oblast; Savasleyka Air Base in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast; and Moscow Oblast.

Russian Supporting Effort — Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian milbloggers implied that Russian forces violated Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire in Sumy Oblast on May 9.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 9 that elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) seized Marine (east of Sumy City along the Sumy-Belgorod Oblast border).[47]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone crew operating in Sumy Oblast reported on May 9 that Russian forces have intensified artillery and guided glide bomb strikes along the international border of Sumy and Kursk oblasts and are using unspecified North Korean weapons.[48] The commander noted that Russian forces are using all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and between 40 and 50 motorcycles a day during attacks but that Russian assault tactics using small infantry groups have not changed. The commander stated that Russian forces are using donkeys and horses to transport ammunition.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian “Anvar Spetsnaz” detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Sumy Oblast.[49]

Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian sources accused Russian forces in northern Kharkiv Oblast of violating Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 9.

The Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire and attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on May 8 and 9.[50]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian and Ukrainian sources accused each other of violating Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire in the Kupyansk direction on May 9.

The Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia’s ceasefire by attacking northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and east of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on May 8 and 9.[51]

A Russian milblogger accused Ukrainian forces of violating Russia’s ceasefire by attacking in unspecified areas in the Kupyansk direction, including across the international border north of Kupyansk near Bereznyky.[52]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian “121st Regiment” (reportedly 68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD] are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[53]

Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire in the Borova direction on May 9.

The Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia's ceasefire and attacked northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Nadiya; and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka and Hrekivka on May 8 and 9.[54]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 9 that Ukrainian forces violated Russia’s ceasefire by attacking near Novoyehorivka.[55]

Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire in the Lyman direction on May 9.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on May 9 that Russian forces advanced northeast of Novomykhailivka, within eastern Kolodyazi (both northeast of Lyman), and north and northwest of the Kolodyazi.[56]

The Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia's ceasefire and attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Lypove, Zelena Dolyna, and Novyi Mir; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Novomykhailivka; and east of Lyman near Torske on May 8 and 9.[57] Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on May 9 that Russian forces continue attacks in the Lyman direction.[58] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated on May 9 that Russian forces continue to attack in small infantry groups in violation of Russia’s ceasefire.[59]

The Russian MoD claimed on May 9 that Ukrainian forces violated Russia’s ceasefire by attacking near Lypove and Ridkodub.[60]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on May 9 that Russian forces are attacking in small infantry groups with artillery support and occasionally attack in groups of three to four personnel on motorcycles.[61]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

The Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking in the Siversk direction near Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk) and Fedorivka (south of Siversk) on May 8 and 9.[62]

Ukrainian sources accused Russian forces in the Chasiv Yar direction of violating Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 9.

The Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia's ceasefire by attacking near Chasiv Yar itself, south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora, and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka on May 8 and 9.[63]

Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on May 9 that Russian forces are attacking from Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar) toward central Chasiv Yar with drone support.[64]

Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire in the Toretsk direction on May 9.

The Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia's ceasefire and attacked near Toretsk itself, northeast of Toretsk near Dyliivka, Dachne, and Krymske, west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka, and southwest of Toretsk near Oleksandropil on May 8 and 9.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting continues southwest of Toretsk near Sukha Balka.[66]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused Ukraine of violating Russia's ceasefire near Toretsk and southwest of Toretsk near Romanivka and Novoolenivka on May 9.[67]

Zaporozhets reported on May 9 that Russian forces are intensifying their use of first-person view (FPV) and fiber-optic drones near Leonidivka (southwest of Toretsk), likely to support intensified Russian offensive operations near Sukha Balka (southwest of Toretsk).[68]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 8 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into central Zvirove (southwest of Pokrovsk).[69]

The Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia's ceasefire by attacking east of Pokrovsk near Hrodivka, Promin, and Yelyzavetivka, southeast of Pokrovsk near Novotorestke, south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske, and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Kotlyarivka, and Zvirove on May 8 and 9.[70] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on May 8 that Russian forces conducted a motorized assault consisting of 14 motorcycles and civilian vehicles in the Pokrovsk direction.[71]

The Russian MoD accused Ukraine of violating Russia's unilateral ceasefire near Myrolyubivka and Myrne (both east of Pokrovsk).[72]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Kotlyarivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[73]

The Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia's ceasefire and attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novooleksandrivka and toward Novomykhailivka, east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka, and southwest of Novopavlivka near Preobrazhenka and toward Troitske on May 8 and 9.[74]

The Russian MoD accused Ukraine of violating Russia's unilateral ceasefire near Novooleksandrivka and Troitske (southeast of Novopavlivka).[75]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction as Russian and Ukrainian sources accused each other of violating Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 9.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Likarniana Street in central Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove).[76]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed on May 8 and 9 that Russian forces violated Russia’s ceasefire by advancing into Bahatyr and Oleksiivka, and near Odradne, and toward Komar (all west of Kurakhove) on May 8 and 9.[77] Another milblogger claimed on May 8 that Russian forces advanced east of Bahatyr and near Odradne (west of Kurakhove) prior to the start of Russia’s ceasefire on May 8.[78]

The Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia's ceasefire and attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Bahatyr, and Odradne, and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on May 8 and 9.[79]

The Russian MoD claimed on May 9 that Ukrainian forces violated Russia’s ceasefire by attacking near Oleksiivka (west of Kurakhove).[80]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction before the start of Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 7 indicates that Russian forces advanced southeast of Dniproenerhiya (north of Velyka Novosilka).[81]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 8 and 9 that Russian forces advanced toward Komar (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and further north of Dniproenerhiya.[82]

The Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia's ceasefire and attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Burlatske, Vilne Pole, and Pryvilne; west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and toward Zelene Pole; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil and Novopil on May 8 and 9.[83]

The Russian MoD accused Ukrainian forces of violating Russia’s ceasefire on May 9 by attacking near Vesele (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[84] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 8 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele and Feodorivka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) but did not specify when the counterattacks occurred.[85]

Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in western Zaporizhia before Russia’s unilateral Victory Day ceasefire as Ukrainian sources accused Russian forces of violating Russia’s ceasefire on May 9.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 6 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in western Stepove (southwest of Orikhiv).[86]

The Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, and Shcherbaky on May 8 and 9.[87]

Geolocated footage published on May 8 shows Ukrainian forces recently striking a Russian Buk-M3 air defense system near Stepove (southwest of Orikhiv in Russia’s near rear).[88]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian BARS-3 "Rodina" Battalion (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[89] Elements of the Russian BARS-11 "Kuban" detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[90]

Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire in the Kherson direction on May 9.

The Ukrainian General Staff implied that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking in the Kherson direction on May 8 and 9.[91]

Russian milbloggers claimed on May 8 and 9 that Ukrainian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire by attacking Russian forces on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River near the Antonvisky Bridge and striking Russian positions near Nova Kakhovka (northeast of Kherson City) and on the Kinburn Spit (in Mykolaiv Oblast).[92]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces did not conduct long-range drone or missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 8 to 9 or during the day on May 9.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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[1] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114474136794655068

[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O0nQrKiZWRs ; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/05/08/dzhey-di-vens-rossiya-v-peregovorah-po-ukraine-prosit-bolshe-razumnogo-ey-ne-otdadut-territorii-kotorye-ona-dazhe-ne-zavoevala

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-17-2025

[4] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1920818331143074113

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031325

[6] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76879

[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar123124

[8] https://newsukraine.rbc dot ua/news/russian-army-plans-to-reach-dnipropetrovsk-1746538770.html ; https://euromaidanpress dot com/2025/05/05/russias-deadly-innovations-cost-40-of-all-casualties-in-pokrovsk-as-putins-races-to-dnipropetrovsk-border-ahead-of-sacred-holiday/ ; https://24tv dot ua/ru/gde-usilitsja-nastuplenie-rossii-do-9-maja-24-kanal_n2803301; https://24tv dot ua/ru/boi-fronte-karta-kakie-goroda-hotjat-zahvatit-rossijane-pered_n2809699

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine

[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine ; https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/03/18/frontline-report-ukraines-youngest-general-stabilizes-pokrovsk-front/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2025

[11] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar092424 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2024 ; https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-strikes-russia-economy-oil/33361997.html

[12] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment

[13] https://x.com/clashreport/status/1920757028621819939 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/314260 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/314262 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/23899627; https://t.me/tass_agency/314322

[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042625

[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825

[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar091924

[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050825 ; https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1920574295832502372; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1920393710593868164; https://t.me/control_sigma/41614

[18] https://ria dot ru/20250509/parad-2015972889.html ; https://t.me/milinfolive/147948 ; https://x.com/RT_com/status/1920759506864132479

[19] https://t.me/rian_ru/293018 ; https://t.me/rian_ru/293022 ; https://x.com/RALee85/status/1920693481447547293

[20] https://t.me/e1_news/183776 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/97546

[21] http://kremlin dot ru/supplement/6312 ; https://www.themoscowtimes dot com/2025/05/09/russia-holds-80th-anniversary-victory-day-parade-on-red-square-a89026; https://novayagazeta dot eu/articles/2025/05/09/kto-priekhal-v-moskvu-9-maia-v-2025-godu-i-20-let-nazad

[22] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76879

[23] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76879; https://t.me/tass_agency/314211

[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525

[25] https://iz dot ru/1883779/2025-05-09/putin-peredal-nailuchshie-pozhelaniia-boitcam-kndr; https://ria dot ru/20250509/putin-2015981677.html; https://www.gazeta dot ru/army/news/2025/05/09/25739330.shtml; https://t.me/tass_agency/314260;https://t.me/tass_agency/314262]

[26] https://kcnawatch dot org/newstream/1746781443-192707492/dprk-fm-makes-public-press-release-on-v-day-of-russia-felicitated-by-supreme-leadership-of-state/; http://www.vok.rep dot kp/index.php/revo_de/getDetail/ien250509008/en; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/23896877

[27] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76877

[28] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76879

[29] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121824 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2024-0 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2024

[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-26-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-4-2023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121123; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2024

[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2025

[32] https://suspilne dot media/1013885-u-lvovi-z-vizitom-perebuvaut-kallas-i-golovi-mzs-krain-evrosouzu/

[33] https://suspilne dot media/1013885-u-lvovi-z-vizitom-perebuvaut-kallas-i-golovi-mzs-krain-evrosouzu/

[34] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/europe-throws-support-behind-ukraine-special-tribunal-prosecute-russia-2025-05-09/ ; https://mfa dot gov.ua/en/news/lvivska-zayava-shchodo-zavershennya-roboti-koaliciyi-derzhav-zi-stvorennya-specialnogo-tribunalu-shchodo-zlochinu-agresiyi-proti-ukrayini

[35] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/3991126-es-domovivsa-spramuvati-1-milard-vid-zamorozenih-aktiviv-rosii-na-zakupivlu-ukrainskoi-zbroi.html

[36] https://x.com/Denys_Shmyhal/status/1920805192901030055

[37] https://mfa dot gov.ua/news/andrij-sibiga-za-rezultatami-zustrichi-u-lvovi-derzhavi-yes-vzhe-zobovyazalisya-nadati-ukrayini-shchonajmenshe-135-mln-snaryadiv-do-kincya-roku

[38] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1920574295832502372 ; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1920393710593868164 ; https://t.me/control_sigma/41614

[39] https://t.me/rugby_team_army/102

[40] https://t.me/yurasumy/22853

[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24067 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24049 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24047

[42] https://t.me/mod_russia/52448

[43] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35609; https://t.me/rybar/70249; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91374; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35647; https://t.me/dva_majors/70840; https://t.me/rusich_army/23284; https://t.me/wargonzo/26405; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91388; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91403; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28334

[44] https://t.me/wargonzo/26403 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70876

[45] https://t.me/mod_russia/52448

[46] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9231; https://x.com/AS_22im/status/1920426188918386721

[47] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91410; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91409; https://t.me/yurasumy/22872

[48] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1013675-intensivnist-stala-silnisa-komandir-ekipazu-pro-situaciu-v-kurskij-oblasti-rf-na-kordoni-z-sumsinou/

[49] https://t.me/epoddubny/23380

[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24067; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24049; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24047

[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24049; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24047

[52] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91414; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91371

[53] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91371

[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24067;https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24049; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24047

[55] https://t.me/mod_russia/52448

[56] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31473; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31470

[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24067;https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24049; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24047

[58] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1013811-akbi-nihto-ne-ogolosuvav-pro-akes-peremira-mi-b-pro-nogo-ne-znali-recniki-rozpovili-pro-situaciu-na-fronti/

[59] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/09/my-z-tamaroyu-hodymo-paroyu-poblyzu-lymana-zhodnyh-oznak-peremyrya-lyshe-shturmy-malymy-grupamy/

[60] https://t.me/mod_russia/52448

[61] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/09/ataky-v-styli-kobayasi-maru-poblyzu-lymana-drony-kosyat-rosijskyh-shturmovykiv-na-motoczyklah

[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24049 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24047 ;

[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24067 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24049 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24047 n

[64] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1013811-akbi-nihto-ne-ogolosuvav-pro-akes-peremira-mi-b-pro-nogo-ne-znali-recniki-rozpovili-pro-situaciu-na-fronti/

[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24067 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24049 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24047

[66] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35607

[67] https://t.me/mod_russia/52448

[68] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1013811-akbi-nihto-ne-ogolosuvav-pro-akes-peremira-mi-b-pro-nogo-ne-znali-recniki-rozpovili-pro-situaciu-na-fronti/

[69] https://t.me/UMBRELLA_32_OMBR/82; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9104; https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1920574313255616789

[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24067 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24049 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24047

[71] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9611

[72] https://t.me/mod_russia/52448

[73] https://www.facebook.com/72.black.brigade/videos/695920133418373/?rdid=18K8BFI0wp4vg6LA#; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/28056 ; https://x.com/hizzo_jay/status/1920820288989675605

[74] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24067 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24049 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24047

[75] https://t.me/mod_russia/52448

[76] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1920871584543224153 ; https://t.me/pidrozdilshadowoficial/682 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9108

[77] https://t.me/yurasumy/22854; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164121; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164123

[78] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64103

[79] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24067; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24049; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24047

[80] https://t.me/mod_russia/52448

[81] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1920644970731745334; https://x.com/RALee85/status/1920226913395626228; https://www.facebook.com/61573845209927/videos/1215029306922099

[82] https://t.me/yurasumy/22854

[83] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24067; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24049; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24047

[84] https://t.me/mod_russia/52448

[85] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64103

[86] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1920574311150072137; https://x.com/LloydUkrYT/status/1920501749099450383; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua

[87] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24067 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24049 ;https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24047

[88] https://t.me/RUBAK_65/358; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/28049

[89] https://t.me/bars3rodina/1432 ; https://t.me/rybar/70272

[90] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91382

[91] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24067; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24049;https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24047

[92] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28292 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70840