Iran Update, May 14, 2025

 Andie Parry, Avery Borens, Katherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Ben Rezaei, Ben Schmida, and Annika Ganzeveld

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.

Syrian President Ahmed al Shara has continued to prioritize appeasing loyalists in his ruling coalition over reassuring minority groups that the government will protect them, which risks future instability. The Syrian Interior Ministry promoted Latakia Province General Security Service (GSS) Director Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Knefati to commander of the Interior Ministry Special Forces on May 13.[1] Knefati served as the Latakia Province GSS Director between December 2024 and May 2025, which included the spate of sectarian-motivated violence and insurgent activity in coastal Syria in March.[2] Some Latakia Province GSS personnel took part in the March 2025 massacres.[3] The committee charged with investigating the violence has yet to release its report.[4] Knefati, as the commander of forces that are accused of committing atrocities, bears responsibility for the actions of those forces and could be named in the report. The Alawite community remains deeply fearful of the new transitional government after the recent coastal massacres. A lack of transitional justice could stoke protests and increase distrust in the government, which risks future political instability. It would similarly disincentivize minority communities from disarming due to fears for their safety.

Ahmed al Shara has continued to elevate commanders of Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) factions in the Syrian military apparatus without requiring them to reform or restructure their forces. Syrian Deputy Defense Minister Fahim Issa met with several unspecified Ministry of Defense (MoD)-affiliated leaders near Ras al Ain, Hasakah Province, on May 13.[5] Issa previously commanded the Sultan Murad Division, which is an SNA faction, and has overseen the “northern region” within the Syrian MoD since April 2025.[6] The SNA currently controls Ras al Ain.[7] Shara likely calculates that he needs the support of these SNA commanders to avoid infighting among powerful factions, which would hinder his efforts to establish control over Syria. Shara almost certainly recognizes that alienating these factions or attempting to subordinate them by force would be too difficult a task for his relatively meager armed forces, especially without Turkish assistance. The networks that these individuals control could also rapidly destabilize certain areas of Syria if they chose to mobilize these networks against the Syrian government. The elevation of these individuals will likely reinforce the Kurdish minority’s skepticism of Damascus and further delay the implementation of integration agreements between the Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Forces and the transitional government.[8] Shara’s decision to pursue state building and power consolidation in this way will likely instill feelings of insecurity among members of the Kurdish, Druze, and Alawite communities, which may discourage these communities from cooperating with the government, despite their desire to be part of a unified Syria. Systemic issues that arise from choices that Shara makes to consolidate power may not have immediate implications, but they will likely weaken the Syrian state in the long term.

The Syrian Interior Ministry and Foreign Ministry appointed several Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-affiliated individuals to senior ministerial and security positions between May 10 and 13.[9] Unspecified Syrian security sources told Saudi media that these appointments are part of the foreign, defense, interior, and justice ministries’ new plans and procedures to enhance security, enforce the law, and restore public confidence.[10] The Syrian government’s appointment of HTS affiliates to key ministerial and security positions suggests that President Shara aims to maintain his and HTS’s influence within key ministries. Shara’s decision to position loyalists in these roles will enable him to shape the policies of the Syrian government and its security services. The newly-appointed individuals include:

• Abdul Qader al Tahhan (Abu Bilal Quds) as Deputy Interior Minister for National Security Affairs.[11] Tahhan was previously the Aleppo sector commander in al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra and the HTS-led Fateh Mubin operations room that overthrew the Assad regime.[12] Tahhan also led the al Quds Battalion, an Aleppo-based Islamist opposition group, and commanded several battalions within Jaysh al Fatah.[13] Jaysh al Fatah was a coalition of Syrian Islamist opposition groups that formed in March 2015.[14]
• Hakim al Deiri (Dia al Din al Omar) as GSS Director of Latakia Province.[15] Deiri previously served as the HTS-controlled Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) Public Security Spokesperson.[16] Deiri was also the Deir ez Zor Province GSS Director between December 2024 and May 2025.[17]
• Muhammad Taha al Ahmad as Deputy Foreign Minister for Arab Affairs.[18] Ahmad served as SSG Minister of Economy from November 2017 to December 2019 and SSG Minister of Agriculture from December 2019 to December 2024.[19] Ahmad also served as the Director of Civil Administration in the Islamist opposition coalition Jaysh al Fatah prior to 2017.[20]

US President Donald Trump and Syrian President Ahmed al Shara met in Riyadh on May 14, marking a positive development in US-Syria relations.[21] This meeting marks the first time that US and Syrian heads of state have met in 25 years. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan attended the meeting remotely. Trump, Shara, and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman discussed the importance of lifting sanctions on Syria and the impact that lifting sanctions would have on regional stability.[22] Trump announced on May 13 that he intends to lift “all” sanctions on Syria, though there are several legal obstacles that Trump must overcome in order to be able to do so. Trump and Shara also discussed eliminating the influence of “non-state actors and non-Syrian armed groups.”[23] Shara is unlikely to meet this demand, given that he has already appointed several foreign fighters who are loyal to him to senior positions in the Syrian government in an effort to consolidate power.[24] Trump also encouraged Shara to sign the Abraham Accords with Israel.[25] Shara did not explicitly reject the proposal but reiterated his commitment to the 1974 disengagement agreement with Israel, which would require Israel to withdraw from the Syrian territory where it has operated since the fall of the Assad regime.[26] Trump praised Shara as a “young, attractive... [and] tough guy” following the meeting.

Western media and a Yemen analyst have reported somewhat different information about the formation of the recent US-Houthi ceasefire, though these reports are not mutually exclusive.[27] US officials told Western media that the Houthis approached the United States first through Omani mediators to request a ceasefire.[28] A Yemen analyst reported on May 7 that US officials submitted three demands to the Houthis. These demands included halting attacks on US vessels, stopping attacks targeting Israel, and re-engaging in peace talks within the Saudi-led roadmap.[29] This report is not inconsistent with the report that the Houthis approached the United States first, given that the United States could have proposed these demands following the initial Houthi request for a ceasefire.[30] The Houthis accepted the first demand, but they appear to have rejected the second demand, and it is unclear if they agreed to re-engage in peace talks. Senior Houthi officials, including Houthi Political Bureau member and spokesperson Mohammed al Bukhaiti, have told international media since April 10 that the Houthis would cease attacks on US vessels if the United States stopped its air campaign targeting the Houthis.[31] The Houthis have not attacked maritime shipping since November 2024, though they threatened to renew the attack campaign in March 2025.

The Houthis have not abandoned their October 7 War objectives and are, therefore, not defeated. The Houthis still seek to support Hamas in the Gaza Strip by imposing an “economic blockade” on Israel.[32] The Houthis attacked ships with reported ties to Israel between October 2023 and November 2024 to disrupt trade through Israeli ports.[33] The Houthis have continued to attack Israel since November 2024.[34] The Houthis launched three separate unsuccessful ballistic missile attacks targeting Ben Gurion Airport on May 12 and 13.[35] The Houthis announced on May 4 that they would focus their attacks on Ben Gurion Airport after Israeli air defense systems failed to intercept a Houthi ballistic missile that crashed in the airport’s parking lot.[36] The Houthi attacks on Ben Gurion Airport are meant to achieve the Houthis’ original October 7 War objective to support Hamas by hurting the Israeli economy and imposing an economic cost on Israel for its operations in the Gaza Strip.[37] The US-Houthi ceasefire has not rendered the Houthis unwilling or unable to continue to try to achieve this objective.

Iran is reportedly trying to get Arab countries, including Iraq, to encourage the United States to lift sanctions on Iran and conclude a nuclear deal. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani met with Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji in Baghdad on May 14 to encourage the Iraqi federal government to raise “Iranian desires” at the Arab Summit in Baghdad on May 17, according to an unspecified source speaking to Iraqi media.[38] Araji is a member of the Iranian-backed Badr Organization. Ghaani will reportedly meet with other Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians during his visit to Baghdad. The unspecified source stated that Iran “seeks Arab support” to remove international sanctions on Iran and “move toward a nuclear agreement more quickly.” Senior Iranian officials have repeatedly rejected US demands during the ongoing US-Iran nuclear negotiations for zero uranium enrichment and criticized the US maximum pressure campaign targeting Iranian oil exports.

Iran reportedly recently proposed forming a regional nuclear consortium with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to enrich uranium at Iranian facilities, likely to try to maintain some level of uranium enrichment. Emirati Foreign Affairs Minister Khalifa Shaheen al Marar and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman al Saud will attend the Arab Summit. It is possible that this proposal will be discussed at the summit.

Key Takeaways:

• Government Formation and Consolidation of Power in Syria: Syrian President Ahmed al Shara has continued to prioritize appeasing loyalists in his ruling coalition over reassuring minority groups that the government will protect them, which risks future instability. The Syrian Interior Ministry promoted Latakia Province General Security Service (GSS) Director Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Knefati to commander of the Interior Ministry Special Forces on May 13. Knefati served as the Latakia Province GSS Director between December 2024 and May 2025, which included the spate of sectarian-motivated violence and insurgent activity in coastal Syria in March. Knefati, as the commander of forces that are accused of committing atrocities, bears responsibility for the actions of those forces and could be named in the report.
• Government Formation and Consolidation of Power in Syria: Shara has also continued to elevate commanders of Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) factions in the Syrian military apparatus without requiring them to reform or restructure their forces. The elevation of these individuals will likely reinforce the Kurdish minority’s skepticism of Damascus and further delay the implementation of integration agreements between the Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Forces and the transitional government.
• Government Formation and Consolidation of Power in Syria: The Syrian Interior Ministry and Foreign Ministry appointed several Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-affiliated individuals to senior ministerial and security positions between May 10 and 13. The Syrian government’s appointment of HTS affiliates to key ministerial and security positions suggests that President Shara aims to maintain his and HTS’s influence within key ministries.
• Trump-Shara Meeting: US President Donald Trump and Syrian President Ahmed al Shara met in Riyadh on May 14, marking a positive development in US-Syria relations. This meeting marks the first time that US and Syrian heads of state have met in 25 years. Trump, Shara, and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman discussed the importance of lifting sanctions on Syria and the impact that lifting sanctions would have on regional stability.
• US-Houthi Ceasefire: The Houthis have not abandoned their October 7 War objectives and are, therefore, not defeated. The Houthis still seek to support Hamas in the Gaza Strip by imposing an “economic blockade” on Israel.
• US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations: Iran is reportedly trying to get Arab countries, including Iraq, to encourage the United States to lift sanctions on Iran and conclude a nuclear deal. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani met with Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji in Baghdad on May 14 to encourage the Iraqi federal government to raise “Iranian desires” at the Arab Summit in Baghdad on May 17, according to an unspecified source speaking to Iraqi media. The unspecified source stated that Iran “seeks Arab support” to remove international sanctions on Iran and “move toward a nuclear agreement more quickly.”

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

Iran and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) will meet in Istanbul, Turkey, on May 16 to discuss the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.[39] The Iranian delegation will likely try to persuade the E3 not to impose snapback sanctions on Iran. Unspecified diplomats told Reuters on May 13 that the E3 may trigger snapback sanctions on Iran by August if Iran and the United States do not reach a “substantial deal” by then.[40] The E3 previously stated that Iran needed to conclude a new nuclear deal by June 2025.[41] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[42] The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) previously passed a censure resolution proposed by the E3 in November 2024 that requires the IAEA to produce a “comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities by spring 2025.[43] The IAEA has not released the report at the time of this writing. CTP-ISW previously assessed that the report will almost certainly confirm Iranian noncompliance with the JCPOA and lay the foundation for the E3 to impose snapback sanctions.[44] The snapback mechanism expires in October 2025.

Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi may lead the Iranian delegation. Ravanchi and Gharibabadi previously led the US-Iran technical talks in Oman on April 26.[45] Ravanchi was part of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team that helped conclude the 2015 nuclear deal and has recently met with senior Russian officials to discuss the Iranian nuclear program and US-Iran nuclear talks.[46] Gharibabadi has also recently coordinated with China and Russia on Iran’s nuclear program.[47] The Iran-E3 talks were originally scheduled for May 2 but were postponed after the fourth round of US-Iran nuclear talks was delayed.[48]

A group of Iranian parliamentarians echoed a senior Iranian military commander’s recent threat to close the Strait of Hormuz if Israel or the United States strikes Iranian energy infrastructure.[49] Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri threatened on May 13 to disrupt international commercial shipping if the United States “makes a mistake.”[50] Bagheri recently inspected military positions in southern Iran and approved the deployment of military assets to the Nazeat Islands in the Persian Gulf.[51] Bagheri also ordered the IRGC to implement a new operational plan around these islands to enhance missile and drone strike capabilities.[52]

Senior Iranian military officials are continuing to prepare for potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard visited the Shahid Khosravi Air Defense Group in northeastern Iran on May 14 to inspect the site’s operational readiness and capabilities.[53] Sabahi Fard inspected surface-to-air artillery positions and observation posts at the site. Senior Iranian commanders have recently conducted several inspections of air defense sites and military bases across Iran, likely to ensure that units remain prepared for a potential strike.[54]

The Iranian rial depreciated from 834,500 rials to one US dollar on May 13 to 836,000 rials to one US dollar on May 14.[55]

Syria

The Kurdish National Council (KNC) announced on May 14 that it will form a Kurdish delegation to negotiate with the Syrian government.[56] The KNC is a minority Kurdish political coalition that is dominated by the Syrian wing of the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).[57] KNC Spokesperson Faisal Youssef told Kurdish media that the delegation will hold talks with the Syrian government to “find a solution to the Kurdish issue.“[58] The KNC’s announcement comes amid tension between Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and Syrian Kurdish political parties over the form of governance in Syria.[59] Kurdish political parties, including the KNC and its longtime political rival, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), recently unified their position during the April 26 Kurdish Unity Conference.[60] The Kurdish parties called for a federal structure that would create a unified entity to administer all Kurdish-majority regions in northeastern Syria.[61] Shara rejected these demands on April 27, calling the push for federalism “divisive” and urging the PYD-controlled Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to preserve “national unity.”[62]

Unspecified individuals continue to conduct targeted killings across Syria. Unknown gunmen kidnapped an Alawite man near Jableh, Latakia Province, on May 14.[63] This and similar instances of sectarian violence could risk reviving a sectarian-based insurgency against the Syrian transitional government.[64] Syrian media separately reported on May 14 that unknown gunmen shot a GSS member in Aleppo City.[65]

The GSS raided a large Captagon laboratory in Qardaha, Latakia Province, on May 13.[66] Qardaha is former Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s hometown.[67] GSS forces seized industrial-grade manufacturing equipment and a large weapons cache in the laboratory.[68] Captagon, which is an addictive amphetamine, was previously one of the largest sources of income for the Assad regime and Iranian proxies such as Hezbollah.[69] The presence of a Captagon laboratory in Assad’s hometown underscores the former regime’s deep involvement in the narcotics trade. Captagon manufacturing is unlikely to cease completely following the fall of the Assad regime, given that some Syrians may still rely on this industry for income.

The GSS arrested several former Assad regime members in three separate operations across Syria on May 14. GSS forces targeted former regime members who refused to give up their weapons in the town of Talkalakh, western Homs Province.[70] The GSS arrested at least five individuals, seized several small arms, and recovered a large amount of currency.[71] GSS forces separately arrested a National Defense Forces (NDF) member in al Haffah, Latakia Province.[72] The NDF member was responsible for supervising several checkpoints in Damascus under the former Assad regime and has been accused of torture and extortion.[73] GSS forces also arrested a former Assad regime member in Damascus Province who reportedly ran an informant network for the Assad regime.[74] These arrests come amid a series of revenge killings that have targeted former Assad regime members. Revenge killings are caused in part by a lack of government-led transitional justice efforts to punish those responsible for crimes committed during the civil war.

The leader of the Israeli Druze community, Sheikh Muwaffaq Tarif, announced a halt to interference in the Syrian Druze community, reversing his past calls to action.[75] Tarif stated that he is in contact with Syrian Druze sheikhs to assist the Syrian Druze community without interfering in its internal decision-making. He reaffirmed the Syrian Druze community’s right to self-determination without external influence.[76] Tarif likely directed these statements, in part, at the Israeli government, which has emphasized that it seeks to protect the Druze community in Syria. Tarif’s statements come shortly after the Syrian transitional government and Druze armed faction leaders reached a joint security agreement in Suwayda Province.[77] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the transitional government likely concluded this agreement to build support for Damascus within the Syrian Druze community.[78] Tarif’s statements may reflect that relations between the Syrian Druze community and the Syrian transitional government are gradually improving.

Iraq

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
• Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
• Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

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[1] https://x.com/Levant_24_/status/1922220001399869449

[2] https://x.com/Levant_24_/status/1922220001399869449 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/understanding-syria%E2%80%99s-emerging-insurgency

[3] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/czxnwrqey4go ; https://snhr.org/blog/2025/03/11/803-individuals-extrajudicially-killed-between-march-6-10-2025/

[4] https://english.enabbaladi dot net/archives/2025/05/two-months-in-coastal-investigation-committee-yields-no-results-amid-accusations-of-deliberate-delay ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate041125

[5] https://x.com/Sy_Defense/status/1922329344065585422 ; https://x.com/AhmadBetar7/status/1921994954911461881

[6] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1911122576555855994 ; https://www.syria dot tv/عودة-الحلف-القديم-وتفعيل-قرارات-اجتماع-تركيا-فهيم-عيسى-قائداً-للفيلق-الثاني ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-14-2025

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-8-2025

[8] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-reaches-deal-integrate-sdf-within-state-institutions-presidency-says-2025-03-10/

[9] https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/122423 ; https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1922126461575565522 ; https://t.me/damascusv011/31286 ; https://x.com/Levant_24_/status/1922220001399869449

[10] https://x.com/AsharqNewsSYR/status/1922260542938333303

[11] https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/122423 ; https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/تعيينات-أمنية-جديدة-في-سورية ; https://www.syria dot tv/الداخلية-السورية-تُجري-تعيينات-أمنية-جديدة-في-عدد-من-المحافظات

[12] https://nabd dot com/s/154711610-bf15bc/عبد-القادر-طحان-قائد-جهاز-الأمن-العام-هل-يغسل-التاريخ-الجهادي-بالمنصب؟>

[13] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/تعيينات-أمنية-جديدة-في-سورية

[14] https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/02/world/middleeast/syria-russia-airstrikes-rebels-army-conquest-jaish-al-fatah.html

[15] https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1922126461575565522

[16] https://x.com/Levant_24_/status/1922157722188874023

[17] https://www.facebook.com/groups/1611247285852843/posts/3914019755575573 ; https://x.com/Wolveri07681751/status/1885429497878516009

[18] https://t.me/damascusv011/31286

[19] https://syrianmemory.org/archive/figures/5e663c1fef8f6f0001972dab

[20] https://x.com/pressrahhal/status/1921231738954457555 ; https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/02/world/middleeast/syria-russia-airstrikes-rebels-army-conquest-jaish-al-fatah.html

[21] https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2025/05/14/trump-syria-saudi-arabia-sharaa-assad-sanctions/4b174694-308c-11f0-8498-1f8214bba2d2_story.html ; https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/may/14/trump-meets-syria-president-after-lifting-us-sanctions#:~:text=Trump%20later%20travelled%20to%20Doha%2C%20where%20he,for%20Syria's%20reintegration%20into%20the%20international%20arena. ; https://t.me/SyPresidency/990 ; https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/832

[22] https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2025/05/14/trump-syria-saudi-arabia-sharaa-assad-sanctions/4b174694-308c-11f0-8498-1f8214bba2d2_story.html ; https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/832

[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-13-2025

[24] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-26-2025 ; https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/832

[25] https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2025/05/14/trump-syria-saudi-arabia-sharaa-assad-sanctions/4b174694-308c-11f0-8498-1f8214bba2d2_story.html

[26] https://www.axios.com/2025/05/14/trump-meets-syria-president-sharaa

[27] https://www.reuters.com/world/houthi-ceasefire-followed-us-intel-showing-militants-sought-off-ramp-2025-05-13 ; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/12/us/politics/trump-houthis-bombing.html?searchResultPosition=3 ; https://x.com/SanaaCenter/status/1920023268079124862 ; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/06/us/politics/trump-houthis-bombing.html

[28] https://www.reuters.com/world/houthi-ceasefire-followed-us-intel-showing-militants-sought-off-ramp-2025-05-13

[29] https://x.com/SanaaCenter/status/1920023268079124862

[30] https://www.reuters.com/world/houthi-ceasefire-followed-us-intel-showing-militants-sought-off-ramp-2025-05-13

[31] https://www.dropsitenews.com/p/houthi-united-states-strikes-gaza-blockade-israel-shipping

[32]https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/01/middleeast/israel-says-it-thwarted-attacks-from-yemens-houthis-intl-hnk/index.html

[33] https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/756ca769315d4b879ca7fdd6bd4a82be

[34] https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/756ca769315d4b879ca7fdd6bd4a82be

[35] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/houthi-missile-likely-aimed-at-israel-falls-short/;

https://t.me/army21ye/2964?single ;

https://t.me/army21ye/2972 ;

https://x.com/idfonline/status/1922328548146069872;https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1922433178284769622

[36] https://t.me/army21ye/2923

[38] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5--%D9%82%D8%A7-%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AC-%D8%B1%D8%BA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9

[39] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/24/3312693

[40] https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-europeans-hold-nuclear-talks-friday-diplomatic-sources-say-2025-05-13/

[41] https://jewishinsider dot com/2025/02/uk-ambassador-israel-simon-walters-inss-iran-nuclear-talks-sanctions/

[42] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/122460/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal.pdf

[43] https://english.alarabiya dot net/News/middle-east/2024/11/21/iran-says-west-resolution-will-weaken-disrupt-iaea-interactions ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-21-2024

[44] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-14-2025

[45] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-25-2025 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/06/329

[46] https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/09/world/middleeast/iran-united-nations-ambassador.html ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-3-2025

[47] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-8-2025 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-17-2025 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-23-2024 ; https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/220980/Gharibabadi-to-appointed-as-Iran-s-top-nuclear-negotiatior?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[48] https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-uk-france-germany-hold-nuclear-talks-friday-2025-04-30/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-1-2025

[49] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/24/3312838

[50] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/745973/

[51] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/745973/

[52] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/23/3311610

[53] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/24/3313099

[54] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-24-2025 ;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-1-2025 ;

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-8-2025 ;

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-9-2025

[55] www.bon-bast.com

[56] https://x.com/rudaw_arabic/status/1922536008593117235

[57] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-25-2025 ; https://www.rudaw dot net/english/middleeast/syria/24032025

[58] https://npasyria dot com/213046

[59] https://x.com/SDCPressT/status/1900460888781439061

[60] https://npasyria dot com/213046

[61] www dot npasyria.com/211587

[62] https://t.me/SyPresidency/875

[63] https://x.com/AlawiteMediaLab/status/1922636380468842853 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1922657368736752030

[64] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/alawite-insurgents-seek-use-sectarian-violence-destabilize-interim-government-syria ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-12-2025 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1921497035770831336; https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/122375; https://t.me/almougahid313/600 ; https://x.com/AlekhbariahSY/status/1921339210092384632 ;

[65] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1922624569707237882

[66] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1922389386303250838 ; https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1922553755792269667 ; https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/57049

[67] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1922389386303250838 ; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qardaha

[68] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1922389386303250838

[69] https://www.dw dot com/en/syrias-dictator-is-gone-but-his-drug-dealers-are-still-busy/a-72033154

[70] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1922625016274751823 ; https://t.me/HomsGov1/2659 ; https://x.com/AlekhbariahSY/status/1922614254647058931 ; https://x.com/Levant_24_/status/1922607192013754660

[71] https://t.me/HomsGov1/2659 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1922625016274751823

[72] https://t.me/LatakiaGov1/4475 ;https://x.com/Levant_24_/status/1922646827314110477 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/142562 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1922736171693527445 ;

[73] https://t.me/LatakiaGov1/4475 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1922736171693527445 ;

[74] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1922674262957080951

[75] https://english.enabbaladi dot net/archives/2025/05/muwaffaq-tarif-calls-for-a-unified-syria/

[76] https://x.com/joetruzman/status/1895897759775146078?s=46&t=OYTvR5h_qYY_4fPQ5FKbFA

[77] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-5-2025

[78] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-5-2025