Iran Update, May 7, 2025

 Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Kelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Schmida, Avery Borens, Andie Parry, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.

The Houthis will likely exploit the ceasefire with the United States to reconstitute themselves while continuing to target Israel. US airstrikes from March 15 to May 5 targeted Houthi weapons and ammunition depots, sites related to missiles and drones, and Houthi leadership.[1] It is unclear how much the US airstrikes degraded Houthi capabilities, however. A Saudi news outlet said that some US assessments report that US airstrikes destroyed 80 percent of the Houthis’ missile stockpile.[2] An Israeli war correspondent assessed on May 6 that the Houthis still have dozens of ballistic missiles and hundreds of drones, which can reach Israel.[3] CNN reported that an unspecified US official said that the air campaign had only “limited” effects, however. The air campaign will only have temporary effects, regardless of the degree to which the campaign degrades Houthi capabilities. The Houthis can replenish their drone and missile arsenal through a combination of shipments from Iran and domestic production using goods purchased on the international market.[4] US airstrikes have also targeted and killed mid-level Houthi commanders and technical experts, which presumably temporarily disrupted the Houthi chain of command.[5] The Houthis are a well-entrenched military and political organization with decades of wartime experience, which will make it possible for the Houthis to rapidly replace dead commanders and experts.[6] Iran, Axis of Resistance partners, and surviving Houthi commanders and experts can train and develop less experienced replacements.

Houthi officials have clarified that their ceasefire with the United States does not include Israel, and that they will continue to attack Israel in support of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.[7] The Houthis launched three drones targeting Eilat Airport in southern Israel and an Israeli military target in the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area on May 7 after the US ceasefire took effect.[8] The Israel Defense Force (IDF) intercepted one of these drones.[9] These attacks likely represent a continuation of the Houthis' effort to ”blockade” Israel, but the Houthis have decided to target Israeli airports rather than Israeli shipping. Attacks targeting Israel use different weapon systems than the attacks targeting maritime shipping. Attacks targeting Israel require medium-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and long-range drones, while maritime shipping attacks can use shorter-range drones and anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles. This means that the Houthis can rebuild their anti-ship missile stockpile that they will need for future campaigns in the Red Sea.[10]

The Houthis will almost certainly resume attacks targeting international shipping again in the future and can do so for reasons and at a time of their choosing. An unspecified Houthi spokesperson separately told Al Jazeera on May 7 that the Houthis will continue to target Israeli ships until Israel transfers aid into the Gaza Strip.[11] The Houthi spokesperson also said that they will assess any future US support for Israel and determine their position accordingly.[12] The Houthis initiated their campaign in October 2023 to impose an ”economic blockade” against Israel by targeting vessels that entered Israeli ports.[13] This campaign frequently targeted vessels that had no clear ties to Israel, however.[14] The Houthis could launch a similar campaign in the future when they want and for reasons they choose. The Houthis will have internalized the lessons learned during this round of escalation, which could make their attacks more effective in the future.

The Houthi-US ceasefire is reportedly a “verbal understanding” rather than a formal agreement, and the conditions remain ambiguous.[15] An unspecified US official told Al Jazeera on May 7 that the ceasefire was a “verbal understanding” instead of a formal agreement.[16] Neither US nor Houthi officials have explained the specific terms of this ceasefire.[17] Anonymous Iranian officials also told the New York Times and Amwaj media separately that Iran used its influence over the Houthis to convince the Houthis to agree to a ceasefire.[18] It is unclear why Iran would have needed to convince the Houthis to take this ceasefire. The Houthis are required only to stop attacks targeting maritime shipping, something they have not done since November 2024. The United States, in return, ceases its air campaign.

Persistent energy shortages have fueled public frustration and strained the Iranian economy, which may pose a growing threat to regime stability. Power outages have increased in Iran in recent days due to the energy crisis in Iran. Traders at the Tehran Province iron market went on strike on May 5, alongside other small protests across Iran in recent days over the repeated power outages.[19] The Iranian Interior Ministry ordered all provincial governors on May 7 to open all government offices, banks, and municipal offices nationwide from 6 am to 1 pm starting May 10 to reduce electricity consumption.[20] The ministry also announced that Thursdays will be an official holiday across all provinces until September 22 to further ease strain on the energy grid. The Iranian Management of Electric Power Generation and Transmission Organization (Tavanir) cut electricity to approximately 700 banks in Tehran Province for exceeding consumption limits and warned that high-usage customers who ignore warning messages will face additional power cuts.[21] It remains unclear how the regime will address the worsening shortages and the mounting economic losses caused by outages and the subsequent business closures. Iranian officials stated that electricity shortages have caused around 20 billion US dollars in losses to Iranian industries nationwide.[22] New blackouts also could trigger protests. Natural gas cuts in January 2023 sparked demonstrations in northeastern Iran, and nationwide blackouts during the June 2021 heatwave fueled widespread public unrest.[23] Small protests and strikes over the energy crisis in Iran could escalate into anti-regime protests, similar to how demonstrations against increasing gas prices morphed into anti-regime protests in 2017 and 2018.[24]

Key Takeaways:

• Houthi Ceasefire: The Houthis will likely exploit the ceasefire with the United States to reconstitute themselves while continuing to target Israel. The air campaign will only have temporary effects, regardless of the degree to which the campaign degrades Houthi capabilities. The Houthis can replenish their drone and missile arsenal through a combination of shipments from Iran and domestic production using goods purchased on the international market. The Houthi-US ceasefire is reportedly a “verbal understanding” rather than a formal agreement, and the conditions remain ambiguous.
• Houthis and Attacks on Israel: Houthi officials have clarified that their ceasefire with the United States does not include Israel, and that they will continue to attack Israel in support of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. The Houthis will almost certainly resume attacks targeting international shipping again in the future and can do so for reasons and at a time of their choosing. An unspecified Houthi spokesperson separately told Al Jazeera on May 7 that the Houthis will continue to target Israeli ships until Israel transfers aid into the Gaza Strip.
• Iranian Internal Unrest: Persistent energy shortages have fueled public frustration and strained the Iranian economy, which may pose a growing threat to regime stability. Traders at the Tehran Province iron market went on strike on May 5, alongside other small protests across Iran in recent days over repeated power outages. Small protests and strikes over the energy crisis in Iran could escalate into anti-regime protests, similar to how demonstrations against increasing gas prices morphed into anti-regime protests in 2017 and 2018.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

The Iranian rial depreciated from 825,500 rials to one US dollar on May 6 to 828,500 rials to one US dollar on May 7.[25]

Syria

Druze factions that have consistently cooperated with Damascus have retained their weapons and control internal security in Suwayda Province. The Men of Dignity, Ahrar Jabal al Arab Gathering, and the Sheikh of Dignity forces now make up roughly 80 percent of the General Security Service (GSS) in Suwayda Province. The leaders of these factions have maintained open lines of communication with Damascus throughout the transition.[26] These groups cooperated with the Assad regime when needed for the Druze community’s well-being, but the groups were not Assad supporters or in positions of authority under the former regime.[27] Men of Dignity and Ahrar al Jabal leaders supported a year-long popular protest movement against the Assad regime in Suwayda, for example.[28] Despite the Suwaydawi GSS’s current composition of anti-Assad Druze, an amendment to the agreement between the transitional government and Druze leaders will reinstate dismissed police officers, even if they were in positions of power under the Assad regime.[29] The GSS forces in Suwayda will retain their weapons that Druze leaders have promised will not be used outside of Suwayda Province.[30] Druze who live outside of the main Syrian Druze enclave in Suwayda have negotiated their own security solutions and will maintain security within their own communities by retaining weapons.[31]

The Druze integration into the Syrian state demonstrates that most Druze factions, while they distrust the new government, believe that cooperation with the government will better protect their communities than confrontation. The Druze cooperation further indicates that the Israeli campaign to protect the Druze against the transitional government by pressuring the government into stopping confessional violence perpetrated by extremists is based on flawed assumptions about the Druze position in Syria and the government's position towards the Druze.[32] Men of Dignity leaders have called handing over weapons to the Syrian state “suicide,” but the group’s negotiations with Damascus have enabled them to retain their weapons and formalized already existing militia structures and groups within Suwayda Province.[33] The Syrian Defense Ministry and Interior Ministry continue to attempt to limit weapons to those authorized by the state, meaning that the formalization of these terms with the Druze was essential to both maintain Druze security and ensure that weapons remained only in the hands of the state across the country.[34]

The Syrian transitional government has reportedly engaged in talks with Israel through several channels, likely in part to honor US requirements that Syria does not become a “source of threat[s]” to Israel. Unspecified Syrian sources told Reuters on May 7 that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has facilitated talks between Israel and Syria on security, counterterrorism, and confidence-building measures.[35] The UAE reportedly established the channel after Syrian President Ahmed al Shara met with Emirati President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan on April 13, which “assuaged” Emirati concerns about Shara.[36] A senior Syrian security source said that the channel is "strictly" limited in scope and is not used to discuss IDF activity in Syria.[37] Syrian intelligence officials, former Israeli intelligence officials, and Emirati security officials are reportedly involved in the channel.[38] The scope of the UAE-facilitated channel between Syria and Israel suggests that it is related in part to Syrian efforts to obtain sanctions relief from the United States. A Syrian-Israeli channel that is designed to discuss counterterrorism and confidence-building measures most likely concerns Palestinian or other Iranian-backed activity in Syria. The United States gave Syrian officials a list of “confidence-building” conditions for partial US sanctions relief on March 18, including that the Syrian government ban Palestinian militias and political activities in order to “assuage Israeli fears.”[39] The Syrian government responded that it would not ”allow Syria to become a source of threat to any party, including Israel."[40] The government has since taken tangible steps to honor this, including by detaining several prominent Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) leaders in Syria and forming a committee to monitor Palestinian activities.[41]

Israeli and Syrian officials have also reportedly communicated through several other non-UAE facilitated channels to discuss other discrete security issues. Shara acknowledged on May 7 that Syria had engaged in indirect talks with Israel to “calm the situation," likely referring to recent tensions between Syria and Israel after attacks on Druze communities.[42] Israeli media also reported that a Syrian defense official and officials from Quneitra Province visited Israel and met with Israeli defense officials in late April, citing an unspecified Syrian source.[43]

Syrian President Ahmed al Shara conducted his first official visit to Europe in an effort to obtain sanction relief.[44] President Shara and Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani met with French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris on May 7.[45] Shara, Shaibani, and Macron discussed sanctions, security issues, and Syrian reconstruction.[46] Shara’s visit comes as the European Union (EU) prepares for its annual review of the sanctions targeting Syrian individuals and entities, which are due to expire on June 1.[47] The Syrian government and civil society organizations also called on the EU not to renew these sanctions in a May 7 joint statement.[48] Macron confirmed after meeting with Shara that France will seek to gradually lift the EU’s sanctions on Syria.[49] Macron also outlined several conditions for the Syrian government to meet before lifting sanctions, including cooperation with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and holding perpetrators of recent inter-confessional violence accountable.[50] France’s conditions are very similar to the conditions that the United States gave Syria in mid-March in return for partial sanction relief.[51] The Syrian government had addressed a majority of these similar conditions as of April 26.[52] The French decision to demand that Syria hold the perpetrators of recent inter-confessional violence accountable indicates that the Syrian government will need to take additional steps related to the recent violence, however.

Unknown armed groups have continued to target Alawites in Syria and could reignite sectarian tensions. Unidentified gunmen killed four farm workers in the Alawite village of Ain al Jawza, Latakia Province, on May 6.[53] Syrian media reported that the same gunmen likely killed two more Alawite field workers in the village of Tal Sekkin, Hama Province, on May 6, less than 50 kilometers from the first attack.[54] These assassinations occurred in areas that were previously hotbeds of the Alawite insurgency and risk reviving a sectarian-based insurrection against the Syrian transitional government.[55]

The Salafi-Jihadi group Saraya Ansar al Sunnah assassinated an Assad regime soldier in Hama Province, emphasizing the need for transitional justice. Three Saraya Ansar al Sunnah members killed former National Defense Forces (NDF) leader Khaled al Omar in Taybat al Imam, Hama Province, on May 7.[56] Omar led a group of NDF fighters between 2014 and 2015.[57] The opportunity for such revenge killing is due in part to a lack of transitional justice to punish those responsible for atrocities during the civil war.

Gunmen on motorcycles continue to conduct assassinations across Syria, underscoring the transitional government’s continued challenges in maintaining security. Unidentified gunmen on motorcycles killed three men outside a car dealership in Azaz, Aleppo Province, on May 7.[58] The GSS announced a ban on armed motorcycle riders in Homs City on May 4, after a spate of attacks using motorcycles there.[59] The transitional government has not yet expanded this ban to other provinces, even though gunmen continue to use motorcycles to engage in sectarian violence and conduct revenge killings across Syria.[60]

Iraq

A parliamentarian from former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s State of Law Coalition announced on May 7 that he will join a rival bloc aligned with National Wisdom Movement head Ammar al Hakim ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in November 2025.[61] The parliamentarian, Thaer Makhif, won the second highest number of votes behind an independent candidate in the 2021 parliamentary elections.[62] This parliamentarian's announcement is notable given that Maliki and Hakim have clashed over Maliki’s outsized influence in the Shia Coordination Framework in recent months.[63] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Hakim attempted to form a political party with former Prime Minister Haider al Abadi in 2020 that would have supported then-Prime Minister Mustafa al Khadimi and opposed Iranian-backed groups.[64] Iran reportedly urged unity amongst Shia Coordination Framework leaders on April 30, likely to improve the likelihood that Iranian-backed parties will maintain control of the Iraqi government.[65]

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
• Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
• Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

See topline section.

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing Significant to Report.

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

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[1] https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/25/politics/houthis-target-drones-hampering-trump-mission/index.html

[2] https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1920167357755875750

[3] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1919797587336474791

[4] https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/missile-dialogue-initiative/2025/04/made-in-yemen-assessing-the-houthis-arms-production-capacity/ ; https://www.alarabiya dot net/arab-and-world/american-elections-2016/2025/05/02/%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%87-%D9%8A%D8%B5%D8%B9%D9%91%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%81-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B5%D9%91%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A8; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1912212572347965827 ; https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/c4eae92382c7456cae8c607af9d03794 ; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/13/us/politics/yemen-houthi-drones-report.html ; https://www.sabanew dot net/story/ar/126709

[5] https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2025/5/7/%d9%85%d8%b3%d8%a4%d9%88%d9%84-%d8%a3%d9%85%d9%8a%d8%b1%d9%83%d9%8a-%d9%85%d8%a7-%d8%aa%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%88%d8%b5%d9%84-%d8%a5%d9%84%d9%8a%d9%87-%d9%85%d8%b9; https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/25/politics/houthis-target-drones-hampering-trump-mission/index.html ;

https://x.com/A_ALGABARNI/status/1920083142360072417 ; https://www.defenseliney dot net/posts/255

[6] https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/02/13/yemen-houthis-recruit-more-child-soldiers-october-7; https://www.saba dot ye/en/news3460472.htm; https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/s1prrn61ee; https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/03/19/houthi-yemen-trump-iran-hezbollah-assad-gaza-airstrikes/

[7] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1919828903524483215 ; https://x.com/alejri77/status/1919850095601725516 ; https://x.com/abdusalamsalah/status/1919929348540248492; https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2025/5/7/%d9%85%d8%b3%d8%a4%d9%88%d9%84-%d8%a3%d9%85%d9%8a%d8%b1%d9%83%d9%8a-%d9%85%d8%a7-%d8%aa%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%88%d8%b5%d9%84-%d8%a5%d9%84%d9%8a%d9%87-%d9%85%d8%b9

[8] https://t.me/army21ye/2938

[9] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1920021405686546695

[10] https://amwaj.media/en/article/a-deal-in-the-shadows-how-oman-iran-helped-broker-houthi-us-understanding

[11] https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2025/5/7/%d9%85%d8%b3%d8%a4%d9%88%d9%84-%d8%a3%d9%85%d9%8a%d8%b1%d9%83%d9%8a-%d9%85%d8%a7-%d8%aa%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%88%d8%b5%d9%84-%d8%a5%d9%84%d9%8a%d9%87-%d9%85%d8%b9; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/houthis-us-deal-embarrasses-israel-attacks-will-continue/

[12] https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2025/5/7/%d9%85%d8%b3%d8%a4%d9%88%d9%84-%d8%a3%d9%85%d9%8a%d8%b1%d9%83%d9%8a-%d9%85%d8%a7-%d8%aa%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%88%d8%b5%d9%84-%d8%a5%d9%84%d9%8a%d9%87-%d9%85%d8%b9; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/houthis-us-deal-embarrasses-israel-attacks-will-continue/

[13] https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/756ca769315d4b879ca7fdd6bd4a82be

[14] https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/756ca769315d4b879ca7fdd6bd4a82be

[15] https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2025/5/7/%d9%85%d8%b3%d8%a4%d9%88%d9%84-%d8%a3%d9%85%d9%8a%d8%b1%d9%83%d9%8a-%d9%85%d8%a7-%d8%aa%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%88%d8%b5%d9%84-%d8%a5%d9%84%d9%8a%d9%87-%d9%85%d8%b9

[16] https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2025/5/7/%d9%85%d8%b3%d8%a4%d9%88%d9%84-%d8%a3%d9%85%d9%8a%d8%b1%d9%83%d9%8a-%d9%85%d8%a7-%d8%aa%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%88%d8%b5%d9%84-%d8%a5%d9%84%d9%8a%d9%87-%d9%85%d8%b9

[17] https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2025/5/7/%d9%85%d8%b3%d8%a4%d9%88%d9%84-%d8%a3%d9%85%d9%8a%d8%b1%d9%83%d9%8a-%d9%85%d8%a7-%d8%aa%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%88%d8%b5%d9%84-%d8%a5%d9%84%d9%8a%d9%87-%d9%85%d8%b9; https://x.com/abdusalamsalah/status/1919929348540248492

[18] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/06/us/politics/trump-houthis-bombing.html ; https://amwaj.media/en/article/a-deal-in-the-shadows-how-oman-iran-helped-broker-houthi-us-understanding

[19] https://x.com/KayhanLondon/status/1919379229818401077 ;

https://x.com/IranIntl/status/1919740952698118467 ;

https://x.com/IranIntl/status/1920133279660810645 ;

https://ensafnews dot com/590639 ;

https://tejaratnews dot com/اعتراض-مردم-خوزستان-به-قطع-برق-در-گرمای ;

https://www.zirnevisnews dot ir/240405

[20] https://x.com/FarsNews_Agency/status/1920150618926137686

[21] https://x.com/FarsNews_Agency/status/1920037844313096546

[22] https://www.rouydad24 dot ir/fa/amp/news/379120 ;

https://tejaratnews dot com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%B9%D8%AA-37/948603-%D8%A2%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A8-%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%AF%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B9-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B9-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86

[23] https://www.radiofarda.com/a/iran-gas-cut-protest/32225417.html ;

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-57719556 ;

[24] https://apnews.com/article/208de9a8f9e64d32b3be2d98aa95e265 ;
https://www.reuters.com/article/world/special-report-irans-leader-ordered-crackdown-on-unrest-do-whatever-it-take-idUSKBN1YR0QO/

[25] https://www.bon-bast.com/

[26] https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1919751604837711991 ; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1894139731728109813 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-13-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-6-2025 ; https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=1181914033301593&id=100044490217016

[27] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/insight-suwaydas-position-syrian-situation

[28] https://syriadirect.org/suwayda-protesters-resolute-despite-regime-military-reinforcements ; https://npasyria dot com/en/88918 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/syria-protest-update-september-12%E2%80%93september-18

[29] https://x.com/NavvarSaban/status/1918788738785673508 ; https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid02BmujXfi82eV2SPX1Tfh79rk5GfcHPhFnv37kNt972NspYuNAqPyatwnDVoZEyn4Cl

[30] https://www.alarabiya dot net/arab-and-world/syria/2025/05/05/%D8%B1%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B1

[31] https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1919751604837711991 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/druze-near-damascus-resist-demand-turn-arms-tensions-boil-2025-05-06

[32] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/may/02/israel-says-airstrikes-in-syria-are-message-to-protect-druze-minority ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate050225

[33] https://www.alarabiya dot net/arab-and-world/syria/2025/05/05/%D8%B1%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B1

[34] https://t.me/Sy_Defense/313

[35] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-mediating-secret-talks-between-israel-syria-sources-say-2025-05-07/

[36] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-mediating-secret-talks-between-israel-syria-sources-say-2025-05-07/ ; https://x.com/azelin/status/1920085465790554420; https://apnews.com/article/syria-uae-ahmad-alsharaa-visit-israel-bdddfd69e4ac475929f3a4133881b36a

[37] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-mediating-secret-talks-between-israel-syria-sources-say-2025-05-07/

[38] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-mediating-secret-talks-between-israel-syria-sources-say-2025-05-07/

[39] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-gave-syria-list-conditions-partial-sanctions-relief-sources-say-2025-03-25; https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/04/17/syria-us-military-withdrawal-trump/

[40] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-letter-delivers-response-us-conditions-sanctions-relief-2025-04-26/

[41] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-letter-delivers-response-us-conditions-sanctions-relief-2025-04-26; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-22-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-5-2025

[42] https://x.com/RymMomtaz/status/1920186312654471213 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-mediating-secret-talks-between-israel-syria-sources-say-2025-05-07/

[43] https://www.haaretz dot com/middle-east-news/2025-05-07/ty-article/.premium/syrian-officials-visited-israel-in-april-opening-direct-uae-mediated-contact-sources-say/00000196-aabd-d1bb-a5d6-aefd2e8a0000

[44] https://www.reuters.com/world/syrian-leader-heads-france-first-european-trip-2025-05-07/ ; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/129172

[45] https://x.com/SyPresidency/status/1920168746141753597

[46] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/142245 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/syrian-leader-heads-france-first-european-trip-2025-05-07/

[47] https://www.reuters.com/world/syrian-leader-heads-france-first-european-trip-2025-05-07/

[48] https://snhr dot org/blog/2025/05/07/syrian-and-international-organizations-call-on-eu-to-end-assad-era-sanctions-on-syria-now/

[49] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/129214

[50] https://x.com/Elysee/status/1920169532569595986

[51] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-gave-syria-list-conditions-partial-sanctions-relief-sources-say-2025-03-25/

[52] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-letter-delivers-response-us-conditions-sanctions-relief-2025-04-26/ ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/142245

[53] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1919820581614072059 ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1JAVyV68VW/

[54] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920060786812101053 ; https://x.com/AlMayadeenLive/status/1919858141816107048

[55] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-8-2025#:~:text=Syrian%20transitional%20government,insurgent%20fled.%5B44%5D ;

[56] https://t.me/alaydiat/304 ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1ALqsXqJvg/ ; https://www.facebook.com/Sewar.Sul/photos/%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%87%D9%88%D9%84%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%AB%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D9%81/3866503183601595/?_rdr ; https://x.com/Sy_intelligence/status/1920033342033940727 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920063779661816192

[57] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920063779661816192

[58] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920068907089436889 ; https://x.com/EuphratesPost/status/1920084802083967483 ; https://www.syria dot tv/%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%88%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%89-%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8

[59] https://x.com/NavvarSaban/status/1919353148726030348

[60] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-6-2025#:~:text=The%20General%20Security,the%20Assad%20regime. ; https://x.com/NavvarSaban/status/1919353148726030348

[61] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%86%D8%A7-%D8%A8-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%88%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%82-%D8%A8%D9%80-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%83

[62] https://ihec dot iq/the-results-of-the-parliament-elections-2021 ; https://alssaa dot com/post/show/7041-بيانات-بابل-الانتخابية

[63] https://almadapaper dot net/391980/

[64] https://www.aljazeera dot net/encyclopedia/2022/8/1/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a5%d8%b7%d8%a7%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%86%d8%b3%d9%8a%d9%82%d9%8a-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d8%b1%d8%a7%d9%82%d9%8a-%d8%a5%d8%b7%d8%a7%d8%b1-%d9%8a%d8%ac%d9%85%d8%b9

[65] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate043025