Iran Update, May 27, 2025

Andie Parry, Ben Schmida, Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, and Brian Carter  

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.

Salafi-jihadi groups, such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), have increased their activity in Syria in May 2025. Syrian Interior Ministry spokesperson Noureddine al Baba said that ISIS activity has spiked in the period since the fall of the Assad regime due to ISIS cells’ seizures of former Assad regime weapons stocks.[1] ISIS cells have since attempted to “infiltrate” MoD positions and recruit regime remnants.[2] The transitional government has conducted three large-scale raids targeting ISIS cells in Aleppo, Rif Dimashq, and Deir ez Zor provinces since May 17, compared to a single counter-ISIS raid between December 2024 and early May.[3] Interior Ministry forces seized ammunition, explosive devices, man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), and suicide vests on May 25 from the ISIS cell in Rif Dimashq.[4] The ISIS cell reportedly seized this weapons stockpile during the fall of the Assad regime, which demonstrates that ISIS has the capability to rebuild and arm its cells even in areas currently under firm transitional government control in western Syria.[5] ISIS has also recently developed the ability to conduct attacks in the Middle Euphrates River Valley with vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, which require significant logistical tails and support zones.[6] ISIS announced in mid-May that it has a growing presence in the “countryside and [city] outskirts” in Syria.[7] The Islamic State has also attempted to use discontent with the Syrian transitional government among Salafi-jihadi hardliners to undermine the government and expand recruitment.

The agreement between the Syrian government and Kurdish-dominated authorities in northeastern Syria to transfer internally displaced persons (IDPs) from al Hol camp may create an opportunity for ISIS to recruit new fighters and reengage supporters.  The Syrian transitional government reached an agreement with the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) on May 26 to evacuate Syrian citizens held in ISIS prison camps in northeastern Syria, according to the Associated Press.[8] Al Jazeera reported that the government and the SDF will review detainee files for IDPs in al Hol, presumably to vet whether the IDPs can be released.[9] Kurdish authorities announced that local AANES authorities, transitional government representatives, and an international coalition delegation created a “joint mechanism” to return families from al Hol camp in Hasakah Province.[10] The Syrian transitional government lacks the capacity to effectively rehabilitate and integrate Syrian families returning from al Hol camp, some of whom are supportive of ISIS. Al Hol camp houses an estimated 37,000 people, and the majority of camp inhabitants are the family members of ISIS fighters.[11] Kurdish authorities refuted reports that the administration of the camp will be transferred to the Syrian transitional government in the near future and denied that they discussed this with the visiting delegation or with Damascus.[12] The authorities did not refute reports that some IDPs would be returned to their homes, however. These returnees will provide fertile ground in which ISIS can embed itself, if it chooses to do so.

The Syrian transitional government will likely struggle to rehabilitate and integrate ISIS-affiliated families and individuals who return from al Hol camp, which risks creating an opportunity for ISIS recruitment in Syria.  Only countries that have repatriated small numbers of fighters and possessed both the administrative and financial means and will to do so have successfully reintegrated ISIS family members.[13] Iraq began to repatriate thousands of ISIS-affiliated families and IDPs in 2021 and has faced immense challenges doing so since.[14]  The Iraqi government struggled to integrate ISIS families and IDPs into their new communities, and returnees often faced extreme isolation and suspicion from these communities, which in many cases were victims of ISIS violence.[15] The treatment of returnees by their neighbors was not dependent on whether or not the returnees were actually ISIS supporters; their neighbors usually assumed any returnee was associated with ISIS.[16]

The transitional government is still attempting to build a state with functioning institutions after Assad’s collapse, meaning it faces additional challenges that Iraq does not.  Iraq has a fully functional police force and military, despite its flaws. It also has some rudimentary resettlement organizations and a Migration Ministry.[17] Syria’s institutions are not yet fully functional. Some of the residents of al Hol remain hardened ISIS supporters, and others will face severe isolation from their communities upon their return. Isolation has historically led to recidivism and provides an opportunity for ISIS or other Salafi-jihadi groups, such as Saraya Ansar al Sunnah, to generate support networks in areas where they were not previously active.[18] ISIS remains a viable insurgency in Syria that aims to recruit fighters.

A Salafi-jihadi group ideologically close to the Islamic State (IS) described its operational concept in Syria on May 21. A Saraya Ansar al Sunnah leader said that the group is building control zones in rural areas before expanding to attack zones in likely government-controlled cities.[19] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah’s operational concept may complicate the transitional government’s efforts to combat the group because the transitional government will naturally prioritize urban areas with large populations and significant economic potential over outlying rural areas. Other insurgent groups, including al Qaeda in Iraq, have used a similar strategy focused on rural areas with success. CTP-ISW has not observed an increase in attacks claimed by Saraya Ansar al Sunnah, but the group likely continues to pursue this operational strategy. Saraya Ansar al Sunnah announced on May 21 that it would cease to publish public claims of its attacks targeting minority groups due to operational security concerns.[20] Unclaimed attacks consistent with Saraya Ansar al Sunnah’s tactics have continued in western Syria since May 21.[21]

US President Donald Trump warned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu against taking any action that would potentially jeopardize US-Iran nuclear talks in a phone call on May 22, according to Axios.[22] Israeli media reported that the phone call was characterized by “heated disagreements.”[23] US Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem stated on May 25 that Trump “wants...Netanyahu to be on the same page with him” following Noem's meeting with Netanyahu in Jerusalem.[24] Noem told Fox News in an interview on May 26 that she urged Netanyahu to ”stay united and let [the US-Iran nuclear negotiations] process play out.”[25] An unspecified Israeli official told Axios on May 27 that Noem told Netanyahu to “give [the United States] a week,” likely to allow the US and Iran to continue negotiations.”[26] Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer and Mossad Director David Barnea arrived in Washington, DC, on May 26 to meet with US Vice President JD Vance, US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, and CIA Director John Ratcliffe to discuss Iran.[27] These conversations follow reports that Israel is preparing to strike Iranian nuclear facilities if the US-Iran nuclear talks collapse.[28]

Iran appears to be evaluating some Omani-mediated offers about uranium enrichment following the fourth and fifth rounds of talks with the United States. US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff reportedly proposed after the fourth round of US-Iran talks on May 11 that Iran suspend uranium enrichment for up to three years as part of a potential agreement and to build trust, according to Western media.[29] Iran and the United States subsequently held a fifth round of talks in Rome on May 23, which primarily focused on the US demand for zero enrichment.[30] Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee member Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani told Iranian media on May 26 that Oman had reportedly proposed during the fifth round of US-Iran talks that Iran suspend enrichment for six months and resume later.[31] Iran did not accept this offer, according to Ardestani. Araghchi also separately stated on May 25 that Iran is reviewing proposals from the Omani foreign minister aimed at overcoming obstacles in the recent indirect talks.[32] Ardestani is only a parliamentarian, and it is unlikely he would be privy to this sort of information about the talks. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi briefed the Iranian Parliament National Security and Foreign Policy Commission on May 25 and discussed the details of the recent US-Iran talks with its members.[33]

Pro-Assad Alawite insurgent attacks targeting the Syrian transitional government and Sunni communities have become increasingly rare compared to the height of insurgent activity in March 2025.  Insurgents have largely stopped attacks on transitional government forces in the Alawite-majority coastal Syria, though there was a high-profile attempted prison break by Assadist remnants in Latakia Province on May 20.[34] The lack of insurgent attacks in April and May 2025 contrasts sharply with insurgent activity before March 2025, when insurgents targeted government forces multiple times per week. This suggests that the insurgency has weakened significantly since March 2025.

Multiple factors, including a lack of Alawite support, government pressure, and poorly executed insurgent operations, have probably contributed to the decrease in insurgent activity. The pro-Assad Alawite insurgency portrays itself as Assadist remnants who, at minimum, seek to restore Assad-era power structures in Syria, if not Assad himself.[35] Assad relied upon his Alawite community, other minorities, and a small, select group of Sunnis to rule Syria.[36] The entire Alawite community did not support Assad, and many Alawite notables opposed him.[37] Many Syrian Alawites are unlikely to join a pro-Assad insurgency even if they remain distrustful of the Syrian transitional government. Government forces have also arrested Assad-linked insurgents, seized weapons stockpiles in insurgent support zones, and conducted community-based outreach to individual Alawite towns in coastal Syria.[38] These efforts have probably disrupted insurgent operations, though the recent prison break attempt illustrates the continued offensive capabilities among small insurgent cells. These government operations also probably benefit from poorly executed insurgent operations that have resulted in the capture of insurgents and presumably intelligence from detained fighters.[39] This could have enabled intelligence-driven operations, though it is unclear to what degree government operations are driven by intelligence.

Fighting in southern Syria between local Sunni fighters, Druze militias, and government forces has also largely ceased since early May 2025.  Negotiations with Druze leaders since April 30 to establish mechanisms to address the recent violence between Sunni militants, Druze militias, and government forces in Druze-majority towns and regions in southern Syria have largely halted violence and insurgent attacks in Druze-majority areas.[40] Druze leaders also remain distrustful of the government, but new security mechanisms that allowed Druze militias to retain their weapons calmed the situation.

The Houthis may be attempting to increase the speed of their drones, which decreases the flight time of the drones and gives less warning to the target.[41] The Yemeni National Resistance Forces intercepted a Houthi shipment on February 13 containing jet-propulsion engines that are likely used for jet-powered drones, according to a Yemeni think tank report on May 22.[42] Iran’s Shahed-238 jet-powered drone has a top speed of 600 km/h, though the greater engine weight has implications for fuel capacity and warhead size.[43] CTP-ISW has not yet observed jet-powered Houthi drones, but a Houthi jet-powered drone with a similar speed to the Shahed-238 could reach Eilat, Israel, from Saada in two hours and 48 minutes and the center of the Red Sea from Saada in 25 minutes. This is significantly faster than the propeller-driven Shahed-136, which has a top speed of 185 km/h and takes nine hours to reach Eilat from Saada and one hour and 20 minutes to reach the center of the Red Sea from Saada.[44] The increased speed means that friendly air defenses have less time to detect and intercept the target. Israel and its partners intercepted every drone launched from Iran during the April 2024 Iranian attack on Israel in part because of the distances and time involved. Ukraine, by comparison, finds it relatively more difficult to intercept Russian-launched, Iranian-designed Shahed drones because of the shorter distances and times involved.[45]

The increased speed of Houthi drones is unlikely to meaningfully increase the rate at which the drones penetrate Israeli air defenses, given the distance involved. The increased speed could increase the threat to maritime shipping if the Houthis resume their attack campaign, however. Israeli aircraft routinely destroyed drones launched from Iraq during the October 7 War, even though a Shahed-136 takes only roughly two hours and 10 minutes to travel from western Iraq near Rutba, Anbar Province, to the northern Israeli border.[46] The Houthis could return to targeting international shipping at any time and for any reason, however.[47] Jet-powered drones would make intercepting Houthi attacks more difficult, given the shorter distances involved. US Navy vessels have intercepted Houthi anti-ship ballistic missiles, which are far faster than jet-powered drones, however. The Houthis could also use these jet-powered drones to target or threaten to target sites in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The Houthis have previously targeted energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and the UAE during the Saudi-led coalition’s intervention in Yemen.[48] The Houthis, since they ceased attacks on the Gulf after the 2022 ceasefire agreement, have threatened attacks on both Saudi Arabia and the UAE to deter them from supporting anti-Houthi forces in Yemen.[49]

Iran is continuing to strengthen ties with revisionist actors such as Russia and North Korea. An Iranian delegation led by Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian arrived in Moscow on May 27 for the three-day 13th Moscow International Security Conference.[50] Russian state media reported that the conference will focus on strengthening global security cooperation and feature a Russian defense exhibition.[51] Delegates from over 150 countries will reportedly attend the conference, including delegations from BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member states. North Korean media reported that a delegation led by North Korea's Minister of State Security will attend the conference.[52] Iran's engagement with BRICS and the SCO is part of a broader Iranian effort to establish a parallel international order that challenges Western “dominance."[53] Ahmadian emphasized the importance of developing BRICS and the SCO upon his arrival in Moscow.[54] Ahmadian also stated that he will meet with officials on the sidelines of the summit and discuss progress on the January 2025 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty with unspecified Russian officials.[55] Iran and Russia have continued to expand ties since they signed the agreement, which covers military, economic, energy, and nuclear cooperation.[56] Iran has provided significant support to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by providing Fateh-360 ballistic missiles and launchers and Shahed drones. Iran also reportedly purchased Russian Su-35 fighter jets in January 2025, which illustrates Iran and Russia’s mutual defense cooperation, though Russia has not yet delivered the Su-35s.[57] Russia has also coordinated with Iran on the latter’s nuclear program during US-Iran negotiations.[58]

The Shia Coordination Framework announced on May 27 that it will run in the upcoming November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections in Ninewa, Diyala, and Salah al Din provinces in “unified alliances,” likely to ensure it does not split the vote between its constituent parties.[59] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. This announcement follows Iranian pressure on Shia Coordination Framework leaders to remain unified ahead of the elections to improve the likelihood that Iranian-backed parties can remain an influential bloc in the formation of the Iraqi government.[60] The Shia Coordination Framework likely wants to run together in Ninewa, Diyala, and Salah al Din to ensure that they do not split the vote and enable more unified Kurdish or Sunni parties to win more seats. The Shia Coordination Framework would risk dividing the Shia among multiple parties. Divisions among these Shia political parties cost them many seats in the 2021 parliamentary elections.[61] The disunity of the parties that later formed the Shia Coordination Framework meant that they split votes, which enabled smaller but better-organized parties to win certain seats.

The Framework probably feels less pressure to run as a unified list in the southern, Shia-dominated provinces, because there are fewer alternatives that could beat them. Shia Coordination Framework parties have reportedly registered to run on multiple lists. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki, and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq leader Qais al Khazali will oppose each other on competing lists in most Iraqi provinces.[62] Iranian-backed Iraqi parties lost a significant number of seats in the south in the 2021 elections due to inter-party competition that enabled more unified Shia political movements, like Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr’s Sadrist Movement, to win seats against the other fractious Shia parties.[63] Sadr announced in late March 2025 that his party would not participate in the elections.[64] Sadr is a mercurial political leader and could change his mind about participating in the elections before November 2025. But Sadr’s absence in these elections means the Framework only faces a threat from small, independent parties in the south.

Key Takeaways:

• ISIS in Syria: Salafi-jihadi groups, such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), have increased their activity in Syria in May 2025. A Syrian Interior Ministry spokesperson noted the increase in activity after three recent raids targeting ISIS cells in May.
• Syrian IDP Camps and ISIS: The agreement between the Syrian government and Kurdish-dominated authorities in northeastern Syria to transfer internally displaced persons (IDPs) from al Hol camp may create an opportunity for ISIS to recruit new fighters and reengage supporters. Iraq began to repatriate thousands of ISIS-affiliated families and IDPs in 2021 and has faced immense challenges doing so since. The transitional government is still attempting to build a state with functioning institutions after Assad’s collapse, meaning it faces additional challenges that Iraq does not.
• Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Iran appears to be evaluating some offers regarding uranium enrichment following the fourth and fifth rounds of talks with the United States. US President Donald Trump warned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu against taking any action to potentially jeopardize the US-Iran nuclear talks in a phone call on May 22, according to Axios.
• Syrian Insurgencies: Pro-Assad Alawite insurgent attacks targeting the Syrian transitional government and Sunni communities have become increasingly rare compared to the height of insurgent activity in March 2025. Multiple factors, including a lack of Alawite support, government pressure, and poorly executed insurgent operations, have probably contributed to the decrease in insurgent activity.
• Houthi Drone Capabilities: The Houthis may be attempting to increase the speed of their drones, which decreases the flight time of the drones and gives less warning to the target. The increased speed of Houthi drones is unlikely to meaningfully increase the likelihood they penetrate Israeli air defenses, given the distance involved. The increased speed could increase the threat to maritime shipping if the Houthis resume their attack campaign, however.
• Iran, Russia, and North Korea: Iran is continuing to strengthen ties with revisionist actors such as Russia and North Korea. An Iranian delegation led by Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian arrived in Moscow on May 27 for the three-day 13th Moscow International Security Conference.
• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: The Shia Coordination Framework announced on May 27 that it will run in the upcoming November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections in Ninewa, Diyala, and Salah al Din provinces in “unified alliances,” likely to ensure it does not split the vote between its constituent parties. The Framework probably feels less pressure to run as a unified list in the southern, Shia-dominated provinces, because there are fewer alternatives that could beat them.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

Senior Iranian political and military officials met with a Pakistani delegation in Tehran on May 26 and 27, likely to discuss efforts to confront anti-regime Balochi groups along the Pakistan-Iran border.[65]  Pakistani Army Commander General Asim Munir separately reaffirmed Pakistan’s commitment to border security cooperation during a meeting with Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri in Tehran on May 27.[66] Bagheri stated that the two countries share a “firm resolve“ over the border issue. Iranian Interior Minister Esmail Momeni also announced plans to expand counter-smuggling and counterinsurgent efforts along the border during a meeting with Pakistani Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi in Tehran on May 27.[67] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei met with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif in Tehran on May 26 and called for greater collaboration between Iran and Pakistan to revitalize the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO).[68] These high-level meetings follow an uptick in militant activities in southeastern Iran since December 2023.[69]

The Iranian Parliament re-elected hardline Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf for a sixth term on May 27.[70]  The Parliament Speaker serves a one-year term.[71] Ghalibaf is a longtime member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and maintains close personal and political relations with the highest echelons of the IRGC that date to the Iran-Iraq War.[72] Ghalibaf also served as Iran’s police chief between 2000 and 2005.[73] The Parliament also elected Ali Nikzad as First Deputy Speaker and Hamidreza Haj Babaei as Second Deputy Speaker.[74] Nikzad previously served as the Second Deputy Speaker, and Babaei served as the First Deputy Speaker in 2024.[75] Ghalibaf previously appointed Nikzad as his campaign manager in June 2024, during Ghalibaf’s most recent unsuccessful presidential campaign, indicating that Nikzad is close to Ghalibaf.[76]

Iranian media reported that two unidentified attackers killed Shiraz Criminal Court head Ehsan Bagheri in Shiraz, Fars Province, on May 27.[77] Iranian media did not provide details on the attackers’ motives or clarify the significance of Bagheri’s judicial role beyond his title. The incident follows a recent incident in which unidentified armed men kidnapped a regime-affiliated Shia cleric in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on May 22.[78] Fars Province is in south-central Iran and is separated from Sistan and Baluchistan Province. A judiciary office employee also previously killed two senior judges at the Iranian Supreme Court in Tehran on January 18.[79] It remains unclear whether these incidents, which have all targeted members of Iran’s judiciary system, are connected. The regime may perceive Bagheri’s killing as part of a broader threat and blame foreign intelligence activity rather than treating the killing as an isolated act, however.

Iran and Iraq continue to cooperate on joint transportation projects. Iranian Roads and Urban Development Minister Farzaneh Sadigh visited Iraq on May 24 and 25 to discuss progress on bilateral transportation initiatives.[80] Sadigh met with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, Iraqi Transport Minister Razzaq Muhaibis, and Iraqi Interior Minister Abdul al Shammari.[81] Sadigh and Muhaibis discussed the importance of the Shalamcheh-Basra railroad to facilitate the movement of pilgrims during the Shia Islamic Arbaeen pilgrimage.[82] Iran and Iraq began construction on the railroad in September 2023.[83] Sadigh and Muhaibis also discussed a project to connect the Iranian city of Khosravi to the Iraqi city of Khanaqin to further facilitate the movement of pilgrims.[84] Sudani stated during his meeting with Sedigh that the main goal of these projects is to link the region with Europe.[85]

The Iranian rial depreciated from 821,500 rial to one US dollar on May 26 to 827,500 rial to one US dollar on May 27.[86]

Syria

A northern Syria-based source reported on May 27 that the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) has begun to withdraw from positions along frontlines near Tishreen Dam, Aleppo Province.[87] The Syrian army is expected to backfill the SNA in these positions.[88] The withdrawal of the SNA and deployment of the Syrian army to the dam is part of the Syrian government’s April 2025 ceasefire and de-confliction agreement with the SDF.[89] It is unclear which Syrian army units will be deployed to the dam. Some of these units consist wholly of SNA militias. The 72nd Division, which comprises five SNA factions, was recently deployed at positions near the dam as of May 19.[90]

Reuters reported on May 27 that Syrian and Israeli officials have held direct talks to calm tensions and prevent further conflict in southern Syria.[91] This direct engagement follows UAE-sponsored secret negotiations between Syria and Israel, which were originally reported on May 7.[92] The Syrian delegation has been led by the former Quneitra Province Governor Ahmad al Dalati led the Syrian delegation.[93] Damascus recently appointed Dalati to oversee the Ministry of Interior‘s security forces in Suwayda Province on May 24.[94] Unspecified sources told Reuters that meetings between Syrian and Israeli officials have been along the Syria-Israel border, including reportedly in territory controlled by Israel.[95] These talks currently only focus on preventing increased Israeli-Syrian conflict and reducing IDF incursions into Syrian villages. Two sources told Reuters that these talks may pave the way for broader political understanding between Israel and Syria, however.[96]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov invited Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani to visit Moscow after a meeting with Turkish diplomats in Moscow on May 27.[97]  Lavrov met with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and discussed the importance of maintaining Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.[98] Lavrov also referenced Russian President Vladimir Putin’s phone call on February 12 with Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara in which the two leaders discussed “trade, economic, and other relations.”[99] Lavrov’s comments and invitation to Shaibani sharply contrast with his recent statements accusing the Syrian transitional government of ethnic cleansing.[100]

Iraq

The Iraqi Foreign Ministry refuted a recent report that Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein conveyed a US demand for Iran to withdraw Iranian-backed Iraqi militias from Iraq to Iranian officials.[101] Unspecified “high-level” Iraqi sources told an Emirati outlet on May 23 that the United States demanded that Iranian-backed militias withdraw from Iraq within the next two weeks and that Iran allow US inspectors to inspect 31 Iranian military, nuclear, and military sites.[102] CTP-ISW noted on March 23 that these alleged US demands and the method in which the United States conveyed the supposed demands are inconsistent with the nature of the ongoing US-Iran negotiations.[103]

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
• Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
• Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

The Houthis have withheld the names of at least 15 mid-level Houthi commanders killed in US airstrikes from March to May 2025, according to a Yemeni defense outlet.[104] The defense outlet, citing unspecified sources, reported that the majority of these commanders were responsible for the Houthi drone and missile programs.

The Houthis fired ballistic missiles targeting Ben Gurion Airport and a “vital” Israeli target near Tel Aviv, central Israel, on May 27 as part of the Houthi campaign to enforce an economic blockade on Israel.[105] The IDF intercepted the two missiles.[106] Some international airlines have temporarily suspended flights to Israel through July 2025 due to concerns about Houthi attacks on Ben Gurion Airport.[107]

Explosions at two separate Houthi weapons facilities near Sanaa City on May 22 and Hudaydah Port on May 24 resulted in significant casualties and damage.[108] A Yemeni journalist reported that explosions at Houthi weapons depots north of Sanaa City killed and injured at least 50 people on May 22. The explosion also caused significant damage to nearby infrastructure.[109] A Yemen analyst reported that a fire at the weapons depot reportedly ignited other ammunition stores, creating a chain reaction of explosions.[110] The same analyst also reported separate explosions near al Hudaydah Naval Base near Hudaydah Port on May 24.[111] The analyst also noted that some local sources speculated that foreign actors, such as Israel, may have been involved in the depots’ explosions.[112] Another Yemeni journalist insinuated that these explosions occurred because of Houthi negligence.[113] The journalist added that Houthi weapons depots in residential areas have witnessed at least six similar explosions between 2017 and 2024.[114]

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.    

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

---

[1] https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/58011 ; https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1927365616312164756

[2] https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/58011 ; https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1927365616312164756

[3] https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1927399680360522066 ; https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1924725243257749932 ; https://t.me/syrianmoi/24397 ; https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1923764848527110591  ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-11-2025

[4] https://t.me/syrianmoi/24397 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1926925199603118210 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1926997838300352959

[5] https://t.me/syrianmoi/24397

[6] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-19-2025

[7] SITE Intelligence Group, ” IS Condemns Julani Sacrificing Religion and Sovereignty at Trump's "Doorstep," Mocks Search for Dead Americans in Dabiq” May 15, 2025. Available by subscription.

[8] https://apnews.com/article/syria-al-hol-camp-kurds-damascus-agreement-74b18508c1f59ce6d8072f0d459fd164

[9] https://english.enabbaladi dot net/archives/2025/05/damascus-reaches-agreement-with-aanes-regarding-a-hol-camp/

[10] https://apnews.com/article/syria-al-hol-camp-kurds-damascus-agreement-74b18508c1f59ce6d8072f0d459fd164

[11] https://apnews.com/article/syria-al-hol-camp-kurds-damascus-agreement-74b18508c1f59ce6d8072f0d459fd164 ; https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde24/7752/2024/en/  

[12] https://apnews.com/article/syria-al-hol-camp-kurds-damascus-agreement-74b18508c1f59ce6d8072f0d459fd164

[13] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=STXdnJaehSc ; https://www.hrw.org/report/2022/11/21/my-son-just-another-kid/experiences-children-repatriated-camps-isis-suspects-and  

[14] https://www.dw.com/en/what-can-iraq-do-with-alleged-is-families-returning-from-syria/a-72188536

[15] https://www.dw.com/en/what-can-iraq-do-with-alleged-is-families-returning-from-syria/a-72188536

[16] https://www.dw.com/en/what-can-iraq-do-with-alleged-is-families-returning-from-syria/a-72188536

[17] https://www.rudaw dot net/english/middleeast/iraq/140520252 ; https://momd dot gov.iq/

[18] https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/repatriating-isis-foreign-fighters-key-to-stemming-radicalization-experts-say-but-many-countries-dont-want-citizens-back/

[19] https://www.annahar dot com/arab-world/arabian-levant/217297/%D8%A3%D9%86%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%AA%D9%87-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%84-%D9%88%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%81%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A3%D9%88%D9%84%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%A7-%D9%88%D9%86%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%B7-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%AF-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86 ; https://t.me/sraia50/10

[20] https://t.me/sraia4/423

[21] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1926341246508830723 ;                     https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1926695945917382928 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1925279176485216679 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1924761447562719464

[22] https://www.axios.com/2025/05/27/trump-netanyahu-not-bomb-iran-nuclear-talks

[23] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/report-netanyahu-trump-phone-call-on-iran-was-marked-by-heated-disagreements/

[24] https://nypost.com/2025/05/26/us-news/us-homeland-security-secretary-noem-visits-middle-east/ ; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/26/us/politics/noem-israel-trump-netanyahu.html

[25] https://www.axios.com/2025/05/27/trump-netanyahu-not-bomb-iran-nuclear-talks

[26] https://www.axios.com/2025/05/27/trump-netanyahu-not-bomb-iran-nuclear-talks

[27] https://www.axios.com/2025/05/27/trump-netanyahu-not-bomb-iran-nuclear-talks ; https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-855640 ; https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1927385283651080447

[28] https://www.axios.com/2025/05/21/israel-strike-iran-nuclear-facilities

[29] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/may/15/us-has-sort-of-agreed-a-nuclear-deal-with-iran-says-donald-trump ;

[30] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-iran-hold-nuclear-talks-amid-clashing-red-lines-2025-05-23/ ;

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-23-2025

[31] https://www.asriran dot com/fa/news/1063444/ ;

https://www.tabnak dot ir/fa/news/1307908

[32] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85843607

[33] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/03/04/3321082

[34] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-20-2025

[35] https://www.aei.org/articles/alawite-insurgents-seek-to-use-sectarian-violence-to-destabilize-the-interim-government-in-syria/ ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1925882223107899864              ; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/130290 ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate040925

[36] https://www.reuters.com/article/world/assad-retrenches-into-alawite-power-base-idUSTRE7433S6/

[37] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/the-fractured-relationship-of-the-alawite-community-and-assad-regime/

[38] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1927382866649883118 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1927394444334055433 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1927300762553426308 ; https://t.me/ZainDeZ/903 ; https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1911889259793141821 ; https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1901375084146860046

[39] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1921989186669711820 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/142439 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/138228

[40] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate052225 ; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1926765621741580548 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1917602765250965546

[41] https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/jan-mar-2025/24604

[42] https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/jan-mar-2025/24604 ; https://www.alayyam dot info/news/A4712VT6-EEX71K-0B7C; https://www.marsad dot news/news/226977; https://x.com/AlJoumhouriyaTV/status/1890050247524823301

[43] https://www.uasvision.com/2024/08/06/leaked-documents-reveal-iranian-new-shahed-238-power-jet-drone-can-intercept-us-mq-9-reaper/

[44] https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-shahed-drones-israel-attack/32904882.html

[45] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran%E2%80%99s-attempt-hit-israel-russian-style-strike-package-failedfor-now

[46] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1853393994610327641

[47] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-20-2025

[48] https://acleddata.com/2023/01/17/beyond-riyadh-houthi-cross-border-aerial-warfare-2015-2022/

[49] https://www.newsweek.com/houthis-warn-saudi-arabia-uae-will-pay-price-if-they-back-new-offensive-2060728

[50] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/03/06/3322526/

[51] https://tass dot com/politics/1948579

[52] kcna dot kp/kp/article/q/5946296d67af009941dd5a3f8f955518.kcmsf 

[53] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-may-1-2025

[54] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/03/06/3322526/

[55] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/03/06/3322526/ ; https://www.didarnews dot ir/fa/news/184894/

[56] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/224132 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-send-russia-launchers-short-range-missiles-sources-say-2025-05-09/

[57] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/irans-revolutionary-guards-commander-says-iran-purchased-russian-made-sukhoi-35-2025-01-27/

[58] https://x.com/Gharibabadi/status/1906384154700218466 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-iran-russia-kick-off-talks-beijing-over-irans-nuclear-issues-2025-03-14/ 

[59] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%B1-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%B6-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%88%D9%89-%D9%88%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86

[60] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%B4-%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-30-2025

[61] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate021125

[62] https://almadapaper dot net/403865/

[63] https://www.mei.edu/publications/iraq-crisis-elite-consensus-based-politics-turns-deadly

[64] https://x.com/salih_m_iraqi/status/1905319183518150830  ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%83-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%AC%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7

[65] https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/513616

[66] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/03/06/3322378

[67] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/225860/

[68] https://english.khamenei dot ir/news/11685

[69] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-19-2025 ;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-18-2025 ;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-28-2025 ;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-10-2025

[70] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/03/06/3322098

[71] https://farsnews dot ir/Qaysar/1748329359946456674/Qalibaf-Re-Elected-Parliament-Speaker-of-Iran-for-Sixth-Consecutive-Year

[72] https://www.loc.gov/item/lcwaN0019080/ ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/pdf_uploadanalysisThe_IRGC_Command_Network-1.pdf

[73] https://www.loc.gov/item/lcwaN0019080/

[74] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/03/06/3322098 ; https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/2069780/

[75] https://www.bartarinha dot ir/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B2-20/1516338-%D9%86%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%A8-%D8%B1%D8%A6%DB%8C%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%AE%D8%B5-%D8%B4%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%AF

[76] https://iranwire.com/en/news/130499-ghalibaf-appoints-azeri-ally-nikzad-as-campaign-manager/

[77] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/03/06/3322387

[78] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6473910/

[79] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/29/3240074/

[80] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85843365/

[81] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/politics/527560/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%A4%D9%83%D8%AF-%D8%B6%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B9-%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B4%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%A9 ; https://alghadeertv dot iq/archives/341724 ; https://www.iribnews dot ir/fa/news/4532785/%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%88-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B2%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D9%86%D8%AE%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82

[82] https://alghadeertv dot iq/archives/341724

[83] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2023/9/6/why-is-the-shalamcheh-basra-railroad-so-important-to-iran-and-iraq

[84] https://alghadeertv dot iq/archives/341724

[85] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/politics/527560/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%A4%D9%83%D8%AF-%D8%B6%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B9-%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B4%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%A9

[86] bon-bast.com

[87] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1927370177483554994

[88] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1927370177483554994

[89] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate050525

[90] https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/57467; https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1913640222556037589

[91] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-israel-direct-talks-focused-security-sources-say-2025-05-27/

[92] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-mediating-secret-talks-between-israel-syria-sources-say-2025-05-07/  ; https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/rks7q8illx ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-9-2025

[93] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-israel-direct-talks-focused-security-sources-say-2025-05-27/

[94] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-israel-direct-talks-focused-security-sources-say-2025-05-27/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-attacks-target-near-syrian-presidential-palace-netanyahu-says-2025-05-02/ ; https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1927346192767218110 

[95] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-israel-direct-talks-focused-security-sources-say-2025-05-27/

[96] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-israel-direct-talks-focused-security-sources-say-2025-05-27/

[97] https://tass dot ru/politika/24059345

[98] https://tass dot com/politics/1964189 ; https://x.com/Levant_24_/status/1927314924222423550

[99] https://tass dot com/politics/1964189

[100] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-may-21-2025#_edne2c3eac600185da2bf164e2b2d15fc9f20 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/23990807

[101] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%8A%D9%81%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B7%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%B4-%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9

[102] https://www.eremnews dot com/news/arab-world/vke2si6

[103] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-23-2025

[104] https://defenseliney dot net/posts/269

[105] https://t.me/army21ye/3034

[106]  https://x.com/idfonline/status/1927183569526366478 ;

 https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-military-intercepts-missile-launched-yemen-2025-05-27/

[107] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/airlines-suspend-flights-israel-after-houthi-attack-airport-2025-05-06/ ; https://www.israelhayom dot com/2025/05/20/flight-cancellations-to-israel-extended-by-major-airlines/ ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/british-airways-extends-suspension-of-israel-flights-to-end-of-july/

[108] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1926044487089815968; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1926355031072129383

[109] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1926044487089815968

[110] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1926609396760543490

[111] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1926355031072129383

[112] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1926355031072129383

[113] https://x.com/RiyadhAldubai/status/1926723058846368074

[114] https://x.com/RiyadhAldubai/status/1926723058846368074