Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter
May 22, 2025, 5:30 pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 11:45 am ET on May 22. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the May 23 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
Russian President Vladimir
Putin is fostering the formation of an informal state ideology based on
Russian nationalism that positions Russia in opposition to the West as
part of ongoing efforts to militarize and unify Russian society. Putin
stated on May 22 at a likely highly scripted award ceremony that
"strong family foundations" and "traditional values" support Russia's
"1,000-year-old statehood."[1]
Putin emphasized that Russia's "most important" task is to preserve its
people, culture, and spirituality. A Russian Orthodox priest who
received an award during the ceremony thanked Putin for protecting
Russian traditional culture, spirituality, and language. The priest
noted that Russia's celebrations of its contributions to victory in the
Second World War teach Russian youth and those in the "Russkiy Mir"
("Russian World") to defend Russia and love Russia's culture and
spiritual foundations. (The "Russian World" is a Kremlin-promoted
geopolitical concept with amorphous parameters that broadly encompass
those who live outside of Russia's borders but relate in some vague way
to Russian language, culture, Orthodoxy, and media). Russian State
Historical Museum General Director and awardee Alexei Levikin claimed
that many countries hostile to Russia are basing their policies and
ideologies on the falsification of historical events and facts. A
martial arts school director who received an award claimed that Russia
always proves that its fighters are the best on the battlefields and in
sports arenas.
Putin notably promoted Russian nationalism
by emphasizing Russia's spirituality and thousand-year history and by
giving only a Russian Orthodox priest — but no representatives of other
faiths — an award, despite the fact that the Russian state formally
regards Russian Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism as Russia's
"traditional" religions.[2]
Putin has previously highlighted ethnic and religious minorities'
contributions to Russia at high profile events and has often promoted a
civic Russian identity and nationalism.[3]
Putin's departure from this rhetoric at the highly staged event on May
22 may be an attempt to appease the increasingly pro-war Russian
ultranationalist community. Putin is also attempting to use the
awardees' statements to reinforce the creation of an informal state
ideology predicated on perpetuating the belief that the West is
determined to defeat Russia, thereby justifying a future military
conflict against the West to the Russian public.[4]
Putin declared 2025 the "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland," and
the development of an informal Russian nationalist ideology provides an
ideological foundation for the ongoing Kremlin effort to develop a new
cadre of loyal elites that includes selected veterans of Russia's
full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[5]
Putin will likely expand efforts to unify Russian society against the
perceived threat of the West and to develop an elite class of
militarized nationalists in order to ensure that any successor will
embody similarly aggressive and dangerous ideals that perpetuate eternal
conflict with the West and NATO.
Russian
Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin — one of the most
outspoken Russian ultranationalists in Putin's inner circle — expressed
support for the inclusion of an informal state ideology based on Russian
nationalism in the Russian Constitution. Russian State Duma
Deputy Speaker Pyotr Tolstoy stated on May 19 at the St. Petersburg
International Legal Forum that Russia may change its constitution in the
future.[6]
Duma Committee on State Building and Legislation Head Pavel
Krasheninnikov later stated at the forum that the Russian Constitution
"meets current realities" and does not need amending, however.[7]
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on May 19, in response to
Tolstoy, that changing the constitution is "not on the [Kremlin's]
agenda."[8] Bastrykin claimed in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS published
on May 22 that Russia is built on traditional values, such as
patriotism, citizenship, service to the Fatherland, and a strong family,
and that these traditional values should underpin Russia's "national
idea."[9]
Bastrykin further claimed that Russia should enshrine this "national
idea" in its constitution. Bastrykin emphasized Russia's need to protect
and preserve its "historical heritage" through legal frameworks.
Bastrykin routinely publicly expresses interest in an informal Russian
state ideology predicated on Russian ethno-religious nationalism and
opposition to the West, in contrast to other senior Russian officials.[10] The Russian Constitution notably forbids the adoption of a formal state ideology.[11]
Peskov stated on May 22 that it is difficult to comment on proposals to
amend the Russian Constitution because the Kremlin does not have the
specifics of such proposals — a departure from his May 19 statement
apparently dismissing changes to the constitution.[12]
Kremlin officials most recently leveraged Victory Day, Russia's largest
holiday that commemorates the Soviet Union's contributions to the
Second World War, to promote a new informal state ideology based on
Russian unity in the face of opposition from the West.[13]
The Kremlin is likely accelerating its promotion of this ideology to
prepare the domestic population for a future military conflict against
the West. Bastrykin is likely spearheading efforts to formally enshrine
Russian nationalist ideology in the constitution as one of the most
powerful and influential ultranationalists within the Kremlin elite.
Russian
authorities are renewing their years-long narrative rejecting the
legality of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, possibly to
deny Ukrainian and Belarusian sovereignty and independence in the
future. Russian State Duma Committee on the Protection of the
Family, Fatherhood, Motherhood, and Childhood Head and member of the
Communist Party Central Committee Nina Ostanina stated on May 22 that
Duma deputies are ready to raise the issue of the alleged illegality of
the dissolution of the Soviet Union.[14]
Ostanina agreed with Russian Presidential Advisor Anton Kobyakov's May
21 claim that the Soviet Union's founding body was not involved in the
dissolution of the Soviet Union and that, therefore, the Soviet Union
still legally exists.[15]
Ostanina further claimed that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was
illegal because "no one gave authority" to then Belarusian Parliament
Chairperson Stanislav Shushkevich, then Russian Soviet Federative
Socialist Republic President Boris Yeltsin, and then Ukrainian President
Leonid Kravchuk to sign the December 1991 Belovezha Accords, the
internationally recognized document in which the Soviet republics of
Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus agreed to dissolve the Soviet Union.[16]
Russian authorities have intermittently revived false narratives about
the illegality of the Soviet Union's dissolution and calls to
reestablish the Soviet Union since at least 2014, and promoted this
informational effort in 2021 and 2023.[17]
The Kremlin has been pursuing its strategic effort to de facto annex
Belarus through the framework of the Union State of Russia and Belarus
and consistently denies Ukrainian sovereignty.[18]
Russian officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and
Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin, have frequently
invoked the "trinity doctrine" — the ideological concept suggesting that
Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians are a "triune" and forcibly
separated people.[19]
The Kremlin may be instructing lower-level officials to reinject the
narrative about the allegedly illegal dissolution of the Soviet Union
into the Russian information space in order to set conditions for the
Kremlin to withdraw its recognition of Ukraine and Belarus as
independent states in the future and call for a united Russian,
Belarusian, and Ukrainian state. Russian officials have notably not
acted upon past calls for the reestablishment of the Soviet Union, and
the most recent iteration of this information campaign is similarly
unlikely to have any near-term effects.
Russian
authorities and state media continue to publicly question the legitimacy
of the Ukrainian negotiating team and the Ukrainian government, likely
to further efforts to reject and delay negotiations and to set
conditions to renege on any future peace agreement with Ukraine. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Legal Department Director Maksim Musikhin claimed to Kremlin newswire TASS on
May 21 that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has "long" lost his
"internal" and "external" legitimacy so there "may be problems" with any
agreements Zelensky may sign in the future.[20]
Musikhin claimed that a person "who has the [Ukrainian] people's
mandate" should sign any future agreements and that the Ukrainian people
must choose a new leader. Musikhin claimed that the Ukrainian
Constitution may grant the head of the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada the
power to sign agreements. TASS also amplified a source
allegedly "close to the negotiations" in Istanbul claiming that Ukraine
will have to change the members of its negotiating group in order to
work on a memorandum for a future peace treaty because the Ukrainian
delegation at the recent Istanbul talks had a "shortage of politicians."[21]
The source further questioned the legitimacy of any future Ukrainian
negotiating group by claiming that the group may include "spies" working
for European states or the United States. Musikhin is reiterating the
longstanding false Kremlin claim that Zelensky is not the legitimate
leader of Ukraine and therefore cannot sign any agreements with Russia.[22]
Musikhin is also repeating Russian President Vladimir Putin's false
claim that the Verkhovna Rada is the only legitimate power in Ukraine.[23]
Kremlin officials have repeatedly claimed that Ukraine must hold
elections for its government to be legitimate even though Ukraine's
constitution and law explicitly prohibits elections during periods of
martial law and prohibits the Ukrainian government from lifting martial
law during invasion by a hostile country.[24]
Musikhin's statements and these Russian state media reports are part of
the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to set conditions for Russia to justify
its withdrawal from any future peace agreements with Ukraine at a time
of Russia's choosing and to support Russia's repeated demand that
Ukraine acquiesce to regime change and the installation of a pro-Russian
government.[25]
Recent
Western reporting provided additional details in a case in which
Russian forces executed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in November
2024, supporting ISW's assessment that high-level Russian military
commanders are likely involved in these executions. CNN reported
on May 21 that a Ukrainian intelligence official provided drone footage
and intercepted audio in which a Russian commander ordered the
execution of Ukrainian POWs and that the footage and audio correspond to
a credible report of a Russian execution in western Zaporizhia Oblast
in November 2024.[26] CNN reported
that it could not independently verify the radio intercept or its link
to the execution but noted that a forensic expert and an unnamed Western
intelligence official found the audio to be authentic and "consistent
with previously documented brutal executions." Ukraine's Security
Service (SBU) told CNN that elements of a "Storm" unit of the
Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division,
5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) were
responsible for the November 2024 executions and at least one other
suspected execution. ISW observed additional reporting and footage that
indicated that Russian forces captured and disarmed six Ukrainian POWs
and executed five at close range near Novodarivka (eastern Zaporizhia
Oblast) on November 23, 2024, in violation of international law.[27] UN Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial summary or arbitrary executions Morris Tidball-Binz told CNN that
Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs cannot occur at such high numbers
or frequency without the orders or consent of the highest Russian
military commanders, including Russian President Vladimir Putin. There
has been a sharp increase in credible reports and footage of Russian
forces executing Ukrainian POWs throughout 2024 and 2025, and ISW
continues to assess that Russian military commanders are either
complicit in or directly enabling their subordinates to conduct systemic
executions in direct violation of international law.[28]
Russian
Defense Minister Andrei Belousov confirmed on May 22 Colonel General
Andrei Mordvichev's appointment as Russian Ground Forces Commander.[29] ISW
continues to assess that the Kremlin likely appointed Mordvichev to
proliferate positional warfare tactics and operational concepts for
grinding marginal advances — the main tactics Russian forces used in the
Avdiivka-Pokrovsk direction — across Russia’s Ground Forces.[30]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian President Vladimir Putin is fostering the formation of an informal state ideology based on Russian nationalism that positions Russia in opposition to the West as part of ongoing efforts to militarize and unify Russian society.
- Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin — one of the most outspoken Russian ultranationalists in Putin's inner circle — expressed support for the inclusion of an informal state ideology based on Russian nationalism in the Russian Constitution.
- Russian authorities are renewing their years-long narrative rejecting the legality of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, possibly to deny Ukrainian and Belarusian sovereignty and independence in the future.
- Russian authorities and state media continue to publicly question the legitimacy of the Ukrainian negotiating team and the Ukrainian government, likely to further efforts to reject and delay negotiations and to set conditions to renege on any future peace agreement with Ukraine.
- Recent Western reporting provided additional details in a case in which Russian forces executed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in November 2024, supporting ISW's assessment that high-level Russian military commanders are likely involved in these executions.
- Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov confirmed on May 22 Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev's appointment as Russian Ground Forces Commander.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Toretsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Alleged Ceasefire Violation
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Alleged Ceasefire Violations
There are no active ceasefires in Ukraine.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Limited fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on May 22.
A
Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian
attack toward Novyi Put (southeast of Tetkino), and another milblogger
claimed that a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group attempted to
enter an unspecified area of Glushkovsky Raion (south of Rylsk along the
international border).[31]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black
Sea Fleet [BSF]) reportedly continue operating in the Kursk Oblast
border area.[32]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on May 22.
Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a munitions plant in Tula Oblast overnight on April 21 to 22. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported
on May 22 that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against
Russian state defense corporation Rostec's NPO Splav munitions plant in
Tula City.[33]
The NPO Splav plant is a leading Russian manufacturer of ammunition for
multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), air-launched missiles, and
thermobaric artillery systems.[34] Tula Oblast Governor Dmitry Milyaev claimed that Ukrainian drones struck residential areas and infrastructure.[35] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed 10 drones over Tula Oblast overnight.[36]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
(Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine
along the international border and approach to within tube artillery
range of Sumy City)
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in northern Sumy Oblast on May 22 but did not advance.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Sumy City near Loknya (northeast of Sumy City) on May 22.[37]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division and
"Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly continue
operating in the Sumy Oblast border area.[38]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)
Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Kharkiv City.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northeastern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[39]
Russian
forces continued ground attacks northeast of Kharkiv City near
Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, and Tykhe on May 21 and 22.[40]
Geolocated
footage published on May 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently
struck a Russian TOS-1A thermobaric artillery system with a first-person
view (FPV) drone southeast of Shebekino, Belgorod Oblast (southeast of
Belgorod City and north of Vovchansk).[41]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 22 but did not advance.
Russian
forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near the international border
near Kamyanke, north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka and toward Mala
Shapkivka, and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on May 21 and 22.[42]
Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on May 22 that Russian
forces attacked on eight motorcycles near Mala Shapkivka, that Ukrainian
forces destroyed five motorcycles, and that the remaining three
motorcycles unsuccessfully attacked toward Kindrashivka.[43]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 22 but did not advance.
Russian
forces attacked northeast of Borova near Nova Krukhlyakivka and
Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Novoserhiivka
and Olhivka on May 21 and 22.[44] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zahryzove.[45]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on May 22 but did not advance.
Russian
forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Novyi Mir, and Zelena
Dolyna; northwest of Lyman toward Karpivka; east of Lyman near Torske;
and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on May 21 and 22.[46]
Order
of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Rubikon" Center for Advanced
Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking targets near Rubtsi
(northwest of Lyman).[47]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on May 22 but did not advance.
Russian
forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka
and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on May 21 and 22.[48]
Order
of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 2nd Artillery Brigade (3rd
Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army
Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly
operating near Serebryanka (north of Siversk).[49]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.
Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 16 shows
artillery elements of the Russian 7th Military Base (49th CAA, SMD)
striking Ukrainian positions in southeastern Bila Hora (south of Chasiv
Yar), indicating that Ukrainian forces advanced in the area.[50] ISW assesses that this Ukrainian advance did not occur recently.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 22 that Russian forces advanced north and northwest of Chasiv Yar.[51]
Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne and Bila Hora on May 21 and 22.[52]
The
commander of a Ukrainian company operating in the Kramatorsk direction
reported on May 21 that Russian forces are using different assaults
tactics, including using heavy tracked vehicles, automobiles, and
motorcycles.[53]
Order
of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle
Brigade (14th AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly
striking Ukrainian positions near Virolyubivka (northwest of Chasiv
Yar), and elements of the 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (98th Airborne
[VDV] Division) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[54]
Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.
Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 21 indicates
that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northwest of Druzhba (east of
Toretsk).[55]
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 21 and 22
indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Dyliivka (north
of Toretsk) and southwest of Novopaske (west of Toretsk).[56]
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north
and northwest of Nova Poltavka (southwest of Toretsk).[57]
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; east of
Toretsk near Druzhba; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of
Toretsk toward Yablunivka and Popiv Yar; west of Toretsk near Romanivka
and Shcherbynivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Nova Poltavka and
toward Zorya on May 21 and 22.[58] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Dyliivka.[59]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 22 that Russian forces seized Nova Poltavka, but ISW assessed that Russian forces seized the settlement as of May 17.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are dropping at least 10 guided glide bombs on Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk) every day and that Russian first-person view (FPV) drones have fire control over all the roads into the town.[61] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Toretsk's northern outskirts near the No. 12 mine are contested "gray zones."[62]
Order
of Battle: A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian
"Dostovalov" Battalion (a volunteer battalion formed in Republic of
Bashkortostan in 2022) with seizing Nova Poltavka.[63]
Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized
Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are
reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka (Toretsk) direction.[64]
Elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly
operating near Dyliivka, and elements of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade
(3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC],
SMD) are reportedly operating near Druzhba.[65]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on May 22 but did not advance.
Russian
forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk toward Shevchenko Pershe; east of
Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Promin, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of
Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske; and southwest
of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and Udachne on May 21 and 22.[66] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novoukrainka (south of Pokrovsk).[67]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on May 22 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in
northeastern Novomykolaivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[68]
Russian milbloggers continued to claim on May 21 and 22 that Russian
forces, reportedly from the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central
Military District [CMD]), reached the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
administrative border north of Horikhove (southeast of Novopavlivka).[69]
One Russian milblogger claimed on May 21 that Ukrainian forces
destroyed the Russian forces that reached the border, however, and ISW
continues to assess that Russian forces very likely have not established
enduring positions at the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[70]
Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy
Kovalenko reported on May 21 that Russian forces have not advanced to
the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border.[71]
Russian
forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and
Novomykolaivka and southeast of Novopavlivka near Troitske and Horikhove
on May 21 and 22.[72]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on May 22 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east,
south, and southwest of Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove) and that
Russian forces occupy roughly two-thirds of the settlement.[73]
Russian
forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Andriivka, Bahatyr, and
Kostyantynopil and southwest of Kurakhove near Odradne on May 21 and 22.[74] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bahatyr and Odradne.[75]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th
CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and drone operators of the 30th
Artillery Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in Odradne.[76]
Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General
Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian
positions near Novoukrainka (west of Kurakhove).[77]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 22 indicates that
Russian forces recently advanced north of Dniproenerhiya (northwest of
Velyka Novosilka) and northwest of Novosilka (west of Velyka Novosilka).[78]
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east
of Fedorivka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), northwest of Vilne Pole
(west of Velyka Novosilka), and near the Zelene Pole-Novopil line
(southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[79]
Russian
forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Dniproenerhiya and
toward Komar; west of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and Vilne Pole;
and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil, Zelene Pole, and
Novopil on May 21 and 22.[80]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near
Burlatske (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), Zelene Pole, and Novopil.[81]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Komar direction.[82] Elements of the Russian 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Vilne Pole.[83]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
(Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas
against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of
Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces
continued offensive operations east of Hulyaipole near Vysoke (formerly
Chervone) on May 21 and 22 but did not advance.[84]
Order
of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade
(35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are
reportedly operating in the Polohy direction.[85]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Zaporizhia direction on May 22 but did not advance.
Russian
forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of
Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; southwest of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky,
Stepove, and Kamyanske; and northwest of Orikhiv towards Pavlivka on May
21 and 22.[86]
The
spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Zaporizhia
direction reported on May 22 that Russian forces conduct assault during
both the day and night but that the intensity of Russian attacks
fluctuates.[87]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[88]
Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on May 21 and 22 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near the Antonivka road and rail bridges on May 22.[89]
Order
of Battle: Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR)
reported on May 22 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a vehicle and killed
four officers from an unspecified Chechen “Akhmat” unit between occupied
Skadovsk and Antonivka (in the Russian rear along the Black Sea coast).[90]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian
forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine
on the night of May 21 to 22. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that
Russian forces launched an Iskander-M ballistic missile from near
Taganrog, Rostov Oblast and 128 Shahed and decoy drones from the
directions of Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk,
Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[91]
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 112
drones over eastern, northern, southern, and central Ukraine and that 38
drones were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW)
systems. Ukrainian officials stated that the Russian strikes affected
Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Mykolaiv oblasts.[92]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Belarus continues to increase its ties with Russian defense industrial enterprises. Belarusian
State Military Industrial Committee Chairperson Dmitry Pantus met with
the Russian United Aircraft Corporation Deputy General Director
Alexander Bobryshev on May 21 at the MILEX-2025 international exhibition
of arms and military equipment forum in Minsk, Belarus to discuss joint
Belarusian and Russian efforts to expand industrial cooperation in the
production of aircraft and aircraft equipment.[93]Pantus
and Bobryshev also met with the Russian tank manufacturer
Uralvagonzavod Director General Alexander Potapov to discuss cooperation
between Belarusian defense enterprises and Uralvagonzavod, including to
fulfill Belarusian and Russian defense orders. The Belarusian Ministry
of Defense (MoD) announced that the Belarusian military signed a
contract for small arms ammunition supplies with the Russian Imperial
Tula Armament at the MILEX-2025 forum.[94]
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76979
[2] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/17905133 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2023
[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-21-2025
[4] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2025
[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putin-unlikely-demobilize-event-ceasefire-because-he-afraid-his-veterans
[6] https://tass dot ru/politika/23982089
[7] https://tass dot ru/politika/23983189
[8] https://tass dot ru/politika/23985049
[9] https://tass dot ru/interviews/24009891
[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-21-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2024
[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2025
[12] https://tass dot ru/politika/24017377
[13] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2025
[14] https://tass dot ru/politika/24016589; https://www.pnp dot ru/state-duma/deputat-ostanina-v-gosdume-gotovy-rassledovat-vopros-o-yuridicheskom-statuse-sssr.html
[15] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-21-2025
[16] https://www.pnp dot ru/state-duma/deputat-ostanina-v-gosdume-gotovy-rassledovat-vopros-o-yuridicheskom-statuse-sssr.html; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125
[17] https://wsem dot ru/publications/vosstanovim_edinoe_otechestvo_17850/; https://ria dot ru/20211220/gosduma-1764589280.html; https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/gosdumy-rf-poprosil-proverit-zakonnost-raspada-1446624283.html; https://www.gazeta dot ru/comments/2014/04/10_e_5987901.shtml
[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-quiet-conquest-belarus; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-14-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-30-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-16-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-30-2024
[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112823; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/72863; https://vrns dot ru/forumy/rezolyutsiya-vserossiyskogo-ideologicheskogo-foruma-vsemirnogo-russkogo-narodnogo-sobora-v-sankt-pet/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2024
[20] https://tass dot ru/politika/24012527
[21] https://tass dot ru/politika/24007859
[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925
[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925
[24] https://rm.coe dot int/constitution-of-ukraine/168071f58b; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025
[25] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-17-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040725;
[26] https://archive.is/qjRgi ; https://edition.cnn.com/2025/05/21/europe/russian-forces-ukrainian-troops-radio-chatter-intl-invs
[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2024
[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022025
[29] https://t.me/mod_russia/52963
[30] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625
[31] https://t.me/wargonzo/26688; https://t.me/dva_majors/71736 ; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/222427
[32] https://t.me/mod_russia/52978
[33] https://t.me/astrapress/81668
[34] https://t.me/astrapress/81668; https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/splav-npo.html; https://заводы dot рф/factory/npo-splavv
[35] https://t.me/tass_agency/316197; https://t.me/tass_agency/316178 ; https://t.me/dmilyaev/4951; https://t.me/dmilyaev/4953 ; https://t.me/astrapress/81643
[36] https://t.me/mod_russia/52966
[37] https://t.me/wargonzo/26688
[38] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28960; https://t.me/mod_russia/52956; https://t.me/mod_russia/52973
[39] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1925095675169050904; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1925095678348333348; https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1925241898941215124; https://t.me/fakhivtsi/363
[40] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92071; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24567; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24532; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24530; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10446
[41] https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1925506337426842044; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1925519549249560823;
[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24567 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24532 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24530
[43] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10446
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24567 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24532 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24530
[45] https://t.me/tass_agency/316201
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24567 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24532 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24530 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10446
[47] https://t.me/mod_russia/52989
[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24567; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24532; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24530; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10446; https://t.me/smotri_z/43597
[49] https://t.me/mod_russia/52976
[50] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1925319018497364466 ; https://t.me/shtrihgroupgumka/281
[51] https://t.me/wargonzo/26688; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36201
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24567 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26688; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24532; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24530; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10446
[53] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/21/shturmuyut-pid-siryak-vechirnij-abo-rankovyj-na-kramatorskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-probuyut-proryvatysya/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc
[54] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36201; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28960
[55] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1925263971130777860; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1925279104082874658; https://t.me/Orki3MsbLauda/179
[56] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1925465470846513459; https://t.me/ombr_28/2195; https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1925241888015049122; https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/1925200964589346941; https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/1925190876222939597; https://t.me/Lubart_Brigade/636; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/28336
[57] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92078; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64467; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165579
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24567; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24532 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24530; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10446; https://t.me/dva_majors/71697; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64467; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28952; https://t.me/rusich_army/23661
[59] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28952
[60] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-17-2025; https://t.me/mod_russia/52979
[61] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92078
[62] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28952
[63] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92113
[64] https://t.me/frontline_pvt/8353
[65] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165520; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13838; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1925263971130777860; https://t.me/Orki3MsbLauda/179; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1925279104082874658
[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24567 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24532 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24530 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10446
[67] https://t.me/voin_dv/15099
[68] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36174
[69] https://t.me/rybar/70583 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64472 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71697 ; https://t.me/SolovievLive/322661 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/23505 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165579
[70] https://t.me/yurasumy/23094 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125
[71] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9295
[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24567 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24532 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24530 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10446 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64491 ; https://t.me/rybar/70594
[73] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64495 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15091 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165601 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36186 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36207 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64471
[74] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24532 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0XRCbRXiWXMvWX3ZuigXQ4s7hKTNPFft4uzQXFNLhfFGWsPaQWacVr1HWHJ22YtXLl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24530 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10446 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36207 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64471 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64492 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15100
[75] https://t.me/dva_majors/71697 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64492 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26688 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15099
[76] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36207 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15098
[77] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165538
[78] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/28348; https://t.me/Poltavska_brigadeNGU/538; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9204 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9206; https://t.me/ZSU_141OMBr/1095
[79] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165579 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165588 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26688 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36188
[80] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165588 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71697 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15099
[81] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165588 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36188 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15099
[82] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165602
[83] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36188
[84] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24567; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24532 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0XRCbRXiWXMvWX3ZuigXQ4s7hKTNPFft4uzQXFNLhfFGWsPaQWacVr1HWHJ22YtXLl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24530
[85] https://t.me/voin_dv/15081 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15088
[86] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24567; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24532 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0XRCbRXiWXMvWX3ZuigXQ4s7hKTNPFft4uzQXFNLhfFGWsPaQWacVr1HWHJ22YtXLl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24530; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165588; https://t.me/wargonzo/26688
[87] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/22/robyly-propagandystskyj-moment-na-zaporizkomu-napryamku-vsi-vylazky-rosiyan-kontrolyuyut-drony/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZeLvZO1vkI8
[88] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28977
[89] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0XRCbRXiWXMvWX3ZuigXQ4s7hKTNPFft4uzQXFNLhfFGWsPaQWacVr1HWHJ22YtXLl
[90] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/chetvero-kadyrovtsiv-iz-zirochkamy-vybukhnuly-pid-skadovskom.html
[91] https://t.me/kpszsu/34808
[92] https://t.me/kpszsu/34808; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2520 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2521 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1023843-raketnogo-udaru-po-harkovu-ne-bulo-buv-povitranij-bij-sinegubov/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/14381
[93] https://belta dot by/society/view/rossija-i-belarus-rasshirjajut-sotrudnichestvo-v-aviatsionnoj-sfere-716329-2025/ ; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/313129
[94] https://www.facebook.com/mod.mil.by/posts/pfbid0xRcu1viEMmSL3zdVYFpTDzXd5aAo3NE2sKpaQU3hphLjLVTCbA99pqEajvidGYRgl ; https://t.me/modmilby/47751
