Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET
The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.
Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.
We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.
Iran may try to secure an interim nuclear deal before negotiating a comprehensive nuclear agreement to delay or prevent a US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities and the imposition of snapback sanctions by the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany), as CTP-ISW previously assessed.[1] The Wall Street Journal reported on May 23 that the United States and Iran are considering negotiating a framework deal, citing unspecified individuals familiar with the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.[2] An unspecified senior official familiar with the negotiations told the WSJ that the goal would be "to establish an understanding on the key points that would constitute a final agreement.”[3]
Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, the United Kingdom, China, France, Russia and Germany) reached an interim deal in 2013 that froze elements of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for temporary sanctions relief prior to further negotiations that led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015.[4] Iran agreed to eliminate its 20 percent enriched uranium stockpile, refrain from operating any inactive centrifuges, halt the production and installation of new centrifuges, cease construction of the Arak heavy water reactor, and accept new International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) oversight measures in the 2013 interim deal.[5] It is unclear what concessions Iran would be willing to make for an interim deal in the current nuclear negotiations.
The United States and Iran held their fifth round of nuclear talks in Rome on May 23.[6] US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi led the US and Iranian delegations, respectively.[7] Omani Foreign Minister and lead mediator Badr Albusaidi said the latest round of nuclear talks ended with "some but not conclusive progress."[8] Two unspecified Iranian sources separately told CNN that Iran is participating in the fifth round of talks to gauge the Trump administration's position, likely referring to the US demand for zero uranium enrichment, which continues to be the main sticking point in the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.[9] Araghchi posted on X (Twitter) on May 22 that zero enrichment means ”we do not have a deal."[10] Technical teams accompanied both the US and Iranian delegations, which suggests the talks covered technical issues such as Iranian uranium enrichment levels.[11] CTP-ISW previously assessed that disagreements between Iran and the United States about the issue of zero uranium enrichment may stall the negotiations or delay a deal.[12] Iran and the United States could agree to an interim or framework deal that does not explicitly include the US demand for zero uranium enrichment.
The Artesh Ground Forces deputy commander unveiled new tactical drones on May 22 in Sistan and Baluchistan.[13] The new drones, which were developed by the Artesh, may reflect some lessons observed from the Russian Invasion of Ukraine. The new drones will probably contribute to the development or implementation of new tactics to counter anti-regime militant groups, including the Baloch Salafi-jihadi militant group Jaish al Adl that regularly attacks Iranian security forces and infrastructure in southeastern Iran.
Deputy Commander of the Artesh Ground Forces Deputy Commander Brigadier General Nozar Nemati, unveiled three new drones: the Didban, Shahin-1, and Homa.[14] All three drones have vertical take-off and landing capability.[15] Nemati stated that the drones will be integrated into regional combat units stationed in Sistan and Baluchistan Province to “confront any [security] threat“, which is an implicit reference to Jaish al Adl.[16] The Didban is a reconnaissance drone that can reportedly fly at 6,000 feet.[17] The Shahin-1 is a high-speed first-person view (FPV) drone that is reportedly capable of striking stationary and mobile targets. The Homa can reportedly fly above 12,000 feet and operate at night. Iranian media claimed the Homa can conduct reconnaissance missions "in electronic warfare (EW) situations," suggesting it is hardened to EW disruptions.[18] The proliferation of EW capabilities on both sides has been a predominant characteristic of the war in Ukraine.[19] Both sides use EW capabilities to disrupt FPV and other drones, which have been critical for both sides in the war. Iran's development of these capabilities may reflect lessons learned in the war in Ukraine.
The newly unveiled drones may be part of a broader Iranian effort to leverage drone warfare to confront insurgent threats in Sistan and Baluchistan Province. These drones, which are small and man-portable, could increase the amount of tactical-level intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms available to Iranian security forces operating in Sistan and Baluchistan Province. The FPV drones can provide small Iranian units with an organic precision strike capability that they currently lack. Iranian units could use the recon drones to provide targeting intelligence that can then be exploited by FPV drones without the need to coordinate with larger formations to use higher-end assets. Artesh Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Kiomars Heydari recently emphasized the importance of expanding drone capabilities in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[20] Heydari stated on May 22 that Iran has recently established three new drone bases in Sistan and Baluchistan Province as part of a broader effort to secure southeastern Iran.[21]
The United States is negotiating with the Syrian government to transfer control of detention facilities and camps holding Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) fighters and supporters to the government. This will not address the threat posed by ISIS fighters and supporters. US President Donald Trump asked Syrian transitional President Ahmed al Shara on May 13 to “assume responsibility” for detention centers holding over 9,000 ISIS fighters in northeastern Syria.[22] US Central Command Commander General Michael Kurilla has called these ISIS fighters “an ISIS army-in-waiting.”[23] The US Mission to the United Nations separately publicly requested on May 21 that Syria “assume responsibility for the detention facilities and the al Hol and Roj displaced persons camps” from the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which currently administers the camps.[24] The Trump administration has also engaged Turkey, Syria, and Iraq to form a working group to address the ISIS detention centers, according to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.[25] This working group will presumably plan a handover from the SDF to the Syrian government.
An agreement to transfer these ISIS fighters and supporters to Syrian government control would not decrease the threat they pose to the United States, however. A transfer of control to the Syrian government would not mean that these facilities and camps no longer exist or that the Syrian government could easily repatriate or integrate ISIS fighters and supporters. The United States and the SDF have been attempting to repatriate ISIS fighters and supporters in northeastern Syria, but progress in decreasing the population of detention facilities and camps has been slow.[26] The Syrian government would presumably face similar challenges as it attempts to send hardened terrorists back to their home countries.
The Syrian government would very likely require significant support to successfully secure these facilities, just like the SDF does. The United States has continually improved SDF detention facilities, while US officials have continued to emphasize that repatriation is the only solution to the ISIS detention problem in northeastern Syria.[27] The United States also supports SDF operations in al Hol IDP camp—home to over 40,000 ISIS family members and supporters—with ISR.[28] The Syrian government still lacks organic, well-developed ISR. US military capabilities have also been crucial in countering ISIS prison break operations. ISIS attacked a detention facility in southern Hasakah City in January 2022 and freed up to 300 ISIS fighters.[29] The prison break caused the US military to use M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles and ISR and close air support aircraft to suppress the ISIS attack.[30] ISIS has also recently developed the ability to conduct logistically advanced vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attacks in the Middle Euphrates River Valley and could use similar methods to free its members from the detention centers in northeastern Syria.[31]
The Syrian government expelled pro-Iran Palestinian groups from Syria, which underscores the challenges that Iran will face in rebuilding its networks in Syria. Palestinian faction leaders told Agence France-Presse on May 23 that the Syrian transitional government pressured Palestinian militia leaders in Syria to flee the country and disarm their forces.[32] Many Palestinian militias maintained a presence in Syria under Assad. The government previously formed a committee to monitor Palestinian faction activities in Syria and has detained several Palestinian militia members since April 2025.[33] The transitional government reportedly did not issue formal requests for the leaders to leave Syrian territory, but pressured them with restrictions and property confiscation.[34] A Palestinian faction leader told AFP that Palestinian leaders have evacuated to Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon after their expulsion from Syria.[35] Palestinian militias like Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) have historically maintained envoys in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen and conduct fundraising activities there to generate funds for the October 7 War.[36] This history makes the Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen a welcome place for these Palestinian militia leaders.
A Syrian armed group claimed a May 20 attack on Russian forces at Hmeimim air base and gave the Russians one month to leave Syria before it attacks again.[37] A group of fighters attacked Russian forces stationed at Hmeimim air base, Latakia Province, on May 20, and killed two Russian soldiers.[38] A group known as "Burkan al Furat” claimed the attack on May 21 and acknowledged that two of its fighters were killed, including ex-Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) military trainer Abu Jihad Masri.[39] Burkan al Furat commander Mohammad al Shami warned in a separate statement that the group will attack Russian forces again if they do not withdraw from Syrian territory within one month.[40] Burkan al Furat appears to be comprised of former FSA and Syrian National Army (SNA) fighters from northeastern Syria, according to Syrian and Lebanese media.[41] The group reportedly participated in the HTS-led offensive that toppled the regime.[42] Shami identified his fighters as former “HTS brothers“ and referred to Burkan al Furat as part of the Free Syrian Army (FSA).[43] This characterization indicates that the group did not act under Damascus’s orders when it attacked Hmeimim, despite some of its fighters’ former associations with HTS.
Burkan al Furat’s threat to attack Russian forces if they do not withdraw from Syrian territory within one month is unlikely to compel the Russians to withdraw. Damascus has allowed limited Russian forces to remain at Hmeimim after the majority of Russian forces withdrew from Syrian territory in December 2024.[44] Russia has sought to maintain bases that it previously held before the fall of the regime, including the port of Tartous, and is therefore unlikely to withdraw, barring direct orders from Damascus.[45] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara does not appear to have decided on the future of Russian influence in Syria. Recent and newfound high-level engagement with the United States may influence Shara’s calculations.
Key Takeaways:
- US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations: Iran may try to secure an interim nuclear deal before negotiating a comprehensive nuclear agreement to delay or prevent a US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities and the imposition of snapback sanctions by the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany), as CTP-ISW previously assessed.
- Iranian Military Learning: The Artesh Ground Forces deputy commander unveiled new tactical drones on May 22 in Sistan and Baluchistan. The new drones, which were developed by the Artesh, may reflect some lessons observed from the Russian Invasion of Ukraine. The new drones will probably contribute to the development or implementation of new tactics to counter anti-regime militant groups, including the Baloch Salafi-jihadi militant group Jaish al Adl that regularly attacks Iranian security forces and infrastructure in southeastern Iran.
- US-Syria Relations: The United States is negotiating with the Syrian government to transfer control of detention facilities and camps holding Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) fighters and supporters to the government. An agreement to transfer these ISIS fighters and supporters to Syrian government control would not decrease the threat they pose to the United States, however. The Syrian government would very likely require significant support to successfully secure these facilities, just like the SDF does.
- Syria and Palestinian Groups: The Syrian government expelled pro-Iran Palestinian groups from Syria, which underscores the challenges that Iran will face in rebuilding its networks in Syria. A Palestinian faction leader told AFP that Palestinian leaders have evacuated to Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon after their expulsion from Syria.
- Syria and Russia: A Syrian armed group claimed a May 20 attack on Russian forces at Hmeimim air base and gave the Russians one month to leave Syria before it attacks again. This group’s threat to attack Russian forces if they do not withdraw from Syrian territory within one month is unlikely to compel the Russians to withdraw.
Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy
Iran may be trying to increase its defense exports to mitigate the effects of Western sanctions. The Iranian Defense Ministry showcased missiles, warship models, naval equipment, radars, and guided bombs at the Malaysian International Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition in Langkawi, Malaysia, on May 23.[46] Iranian Ambassador to Malaysia Ali Ashgar Mohamadi and Malaysian Deputy Defense Minister Adly Zahari discussed opportunities to expand bilateral defense cooperation on the sidelines of the exhibition. The Iranian Defense Ministry has showcased Iranian defense equipment at expositions in Belarus, Brazil, and Iraq since April 2025.[47] Iranian efforts to increase its military and defense exports come amid the US “maximum pressure” campaign aimed at driving Iranian oil exports to zero.[48] Defense exports are, however, unlikely to compensate for the loss of Iranian oil revenue. The United States imposed sanctions prohibiting foreign arms sales to and from Iran in 1979.[49]
Senior Iranian officials are continuing to prepare for potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard visited the Semnan Air Defense Training Center in Semnan Province on May 23.[50] Semnan Province houses multiple critical defense industrial sites within proximity to the Semnan Air Defense Training Center. The Semnan Missile Complex, located in central Semnan Province, includes a ballistic missile production facility and an area to test missiles.[51] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) previously operated the Shahroud Missile Facility in Semnan Province. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) destroyed the facility in its October 2024 strikes on Iran.[52] The IRGC used this facility to build solid-propellant ballistic missiles and launch Space Launch Vehicles (SLV) into orbit.[53] Sabahi Fard’s visit follows a series of similar inspections at Iranian military and defense sites across Iran.
The Iranian rial appreciated from 843,000 rial to one US dollar on May 22 to 828,500 rial to one US dollar on May 23.[54]
Syria
Unspecified fighters likely detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) on May 22 that killed three Syrian Civil Defense volunteers in the northern Hama countryside.[55] The Syrian Civil Defense Organization, also known as the White Helmets, announced that four volunteers responded to a call about a suspicious object in Karah in the northeastern Hama countryside. One of the volunteers reported that his colleagues realized that the object was a command-initiated IED shortly before the device detonated.[56] Three volunteers were killed in the detonation.[57] The Syrian Civil Defense assessed that unspecified individuals may have “deliberately targeted” the team.[58]
No actor has claimed responsibility for this incident at the time of this writing. Two Salafi-jihadi groups that oppose the new government, Saraya Ansar al Sunnah and ISIS, are present near Karah, however. Three fighters from Saraya Ansar al Sunnah recently assassinated a former National Defense Forces (NDF) fighter in Taybat al Imam (8km southeast of Karah) on May 7.[59] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah is explicitly opposed to the new government but has not yet claimed an attack targeting government-affiliated forces.[60] General Security Service (GSS) forces arrested and executed two alleged ISIS members accused of killing a MoD officer on May 21 in the town of Kafar Sajnah, Idlib Province.[61] Kafar Sajnah is 30 kilometers northwest of Karah. ISIS has a vested interest in limiting the transitional government’s ability to reconstruct certain areas of Syria because slow reconstruction would create opportunities for ISIS recruitment. ISIS has also extensively used IEDs to conduct targeted attacks in rural areas.[62] Alawite insurgents probably did not conduct this attack because Alawite insurgents have little to no IED capability and have not conducted any attacks in recent weeks.
GSS forces arrested Assad regime militia leader Asef Rifaat Salam in Latakia Province on May 23.[63] Salam has been accused of committing war crimes in the Zabadani and Madaya areas of Rif Dimashq. Syrian state media reported that Salam led the Homeland Shield Brigade, a pro-regime, Iranian-backed militia that operated in southern Syria during the civil war.[64] Syrian state media claimed that the Homeland Shield Brigade was affiliated with Syrian businessman Rami Makhlouf.[65] Makhlouf is former Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s maternal cousin.[66] Makhlouf previously controlled several pro-government militias through his al Bustan Charitable Association.[67] Makhlouf claimed in April and May 2025 that he had “assembled forces” to defend the Syrian coastal region and Alawite communities against the transitional government.[68]
The United States appointed current US Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack as US Special Envoy to Syria.[69] Barrack is a former private equity executive and a long-time advisor to US President Trump.[70] He will serve as Special Envoy to Syria while retaining his ambassadorial appointment in Turkey. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that Barrack has worked with local Syrian officials in his role as ambassador to Turkey to understand Syrian aid needs.[71] Barrack said on X on May 23 that the cessation of US sanctions on Syria will ”give the people of Syria a chance for a better future” and preserve the integrity of the US counter-ISIS mission.[72]
Iraq
Emirati media claimed that the United States made a series of demands of Iran that are inconsistent with the nature of the ongoing US-Iran negotiations.[73] Unspecified "high-level" Iraqi sources told al Erem that Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein conveyed multiple US demands to Iranian officials during his visit to Tehran on May 19 and 20.[74] The US letter reportedly demanded that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias withdraw from Iraq within the next two weeks and that Iran allow US inspectors to inspect 31 Iranian military, nuclear, and research sites. It is highly unlikely that the Iraqi foreign minister would convey these demands instead of the US negotiators currently negotiating with Iran. The United States has previously pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve and disarm the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) as part of its maximum pressure campaign against Iran.[75] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media denied that the United States made demands for inspections or the withdrawal of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[76]
The same source separately claimed that ”high-level” Iraqi sources said on May 20 that Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) head and Badr Organization operative Hamid al Shatri and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Masrour Barzani planned to discuss potential operations against Iranian-backed Iraqi militias with US National Security Council officials in Washington, D.C., on May 22 and 23.[77] A Badr Organization operative like Shatri is highly unlikely to give intelligence on Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to the United States.[78] Unspecified diplomatic sources claimed that the United States is seeking information on militia capabilities and their presence within Baghdad.[79] CTP-ISW cannot verify that Shatri visited Washington on May 22 and 23.
Arabian Peninsula
Axis of Resistance objectives:
- Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
- Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
- Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip
The Houthis conducted a ballistic missile attack on Ben Gurion Airport in central Israel on May 23 as part of the Houthi campaign to enforce an economic blockade on Israel.[80] The IDF intercepted the missile.[81] Some international airlines have temporarily suspended flights to Israel through July 2025 due to concerns about Houthi attacks on Ben Gurion Airport.[82]
The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon
Nothing significant to report.
CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.
The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.
CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.
[1] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-iran-meet-in-rome-with-nuclear-talks-under-strain-c47548f8; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-11-2025
[2] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-iran-meet-in-rome-with-nuclear-talks-under-strain-c47548f8
[3] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-iran-meet-in-rome-with-nuclear-talks-under-strain-c47548f8
[4] https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2013/11/why-the-iranian-nuclear-agreement-is-a-good-deal?lang=en ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/kerry-in-geneva-raising-hopes-for-historic-nuclear-deal-with-iran/2013/11/23/53e7bfe6-5430-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html
[5] https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2013/11/why-the-iranian-nuclear-agreement-is-a-good-deal?lang=en ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/kerry-in-geneva-raising-hopes-for-historic-nuclear-deal-with-iran/2013/11/23/53e7bfe6-5430-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html
[6] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-iran-hold-nuclear-talks-amid-clashing-red-lines-2025-05-23/
[7] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-aide-witkoff-travel-rome-iran-talks-2025-05-22/ ; https://x.com/araghchi/status/1925669240461213916
[8] https://x.com/badralbusaidi/status/1925931297945407673
[9] https://www.cnn.com/2025/05/23/middleeast/iran-doesnt-believe-a-nuclear-deal-is-likely-sources-say-intl
[10] https://x.com/araghchi/status/1925669240461213916
[11] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1404030200647/ ; https://www.axios.com/2025/05/23/iran-nuclear-talks-rome
[12] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-may-15-2025
[13] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/748562 ; https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/225141/
[14] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/748562 ; https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/225141/
[15] https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2025/05/22/748435/Iran-Army-unveils-three-new-homegrown-vertical-take-off-and-landing-drones
[16] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/748562
[17] https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2025/05/22/748435/Iran-Army-unveils-three-new-homegrown-vertical-take-off-and-landing-drones
[18] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/748562
[19]https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine%20and%20the%20Problem%20of%20Restoring%20Maneuver%20in%20Contemporary%20War_final.pdf ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/defense-taiwan-ukrainian-characteristics-lessons-war-ukraine-western-pacific
[20] https://farsnews dot ir/miladmaniee/1747906965197260815
[21] https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/2067829/
[22] https://apnews.com/article/trump-syria-saudi-arabia-sharaa-assad-sanctions-bb208f25cfedecd6446fd1626012c0fb
[23] https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Kurilla%20APQ%20responses.pdf
[24] https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-a-un-security-council-briefing-on-the-political-and-humanitarian-situations-in-syria-12/
[25] https://apnews.com/article/turkey-syria-islamic-state-prisoners-kurds-c83c9e7923c91e6dd3159a2293e9197e
[26] https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/12/15/syria-repatriations-lag-foreigners-alleged-isis-ties
[27] https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3093689/dod-to-fund-better-detention-facilities-in-syria-but-best-solution-is-detainee/
[28] https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/STATEMENTS/Statements-View/Article/3161976/statement-regarding-syrian-democratic-forces-security-operation-in-al-hol-camp/
[29] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/03/syria-hasakah-isis-prison-attack/
[30] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/03/syria-hasakah-isis-prison-attack/
[31] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-19-2025
[32] https://www.barrons.com/news/palestinian-faction-chiefs-quit-damascus-amid-pressure-faction-sources-a2a90837
[33] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-851565 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-22-2025
[34] https://www.barrons.com/news/palestinian-faction-chiefs-quit-damascus-amid-pressure-faction-sources-a2a90837
[35] https://www.barrons.com/news/palestinian-faction-chiefs-quit-damascus-amid-pressure-faction-sources-a2a90837
[36] https://www.middleeastmonitor dot com/20230617-palestine-islamic-jihad-envoy-to-yemen-meets-houthi-leaders/ ; https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/05/07/the-houthi-challenge/ ; https://www dot memri.org/jttm/houthi-ansar-allah-movement-politburo-member-photographed-hamas-official-groups-office-sanaa ; https://south24 dot net/news/newse.php?nid=3579
[37] https://t.me/almougahid313/773
[38] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1924879322877247834 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1925267030099341435; https://www.independent.co.uk/news/bashar-assad-syrian-observatory-for-human-rights-sergey-lavrov-moscow-united-states-b2755512.html
[39] https://t.me/almougahid313/773 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1925267030099341435 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1925267030099341435
[40] https://t.me/almougahid313/773
[41] https://t.me/nahermedia/46833; https://x.com/AlawiteMediaLab/status/1913527417320206649/photo/1; https://www.annahar dot com/arab-world/arabian-levant/210185/اشتباك-حي-القدم-يكشف-عن-فصيل-يريد-إسقاط-الشرع
[42] https://www.annahar dot com/arab-world/arabian-levant/210185/اشتباك-حي-القدم-يكشف-عن-فصيل-يريد-إسقاط-الشرع
[43] https://t.me/almougahid313/773
[44] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-13-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-16-2024; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cyve9prq3qjo
[45] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate032025 ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate031425 ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate012925; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-23-2025
[46] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/748680
[47] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/232141 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/13/3284410 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/31/3295068
[48] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-04-02/bessent-pushes-banks-for-help-enforcing-maximum-pressure-on-iran
[49] https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12452#:~:text=Current%20Sanctions%20Landscape,to%20or%20from%20Iran;%20and ; https://www.wsj.com/world/irans-rise-as-global-arms-supplier-vexes-u-s-and-its-allies-6f205083 ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-irans-revived-weapons-exports-could-boost-its-proxies#:~:text=Given%20Tehran's%20noncompliant%20track%20record,the%20coming%20months%20and%20years.
[50] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/748712
[51] https://www.nti.org/education-center/facilities/semnan-missile-complex/
[52] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/29/world/middleeast/israel-strikes-iran-shahroud-space-center.html
[53] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-29-2024
[54] bon-bast.com
[55] https://x.com/SyriaCivilDef/status/1925654679616139343
[56] https://x.com/SyriaCivilDef/status/1925654679616139343
[57] https://x.com/SyriaCivilDef/status/1925654679616139343
[58] https://x.com/SyriaCivilDef/status/1925654679616139343
[59] https://www.iswresearch.org/2025/05/iran-update-may-7-2025.html, GRAPHIC https://x.com/Sy_intelligence/status/1920033342033940727; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1920063779661816192
[60] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-23-2025
[61] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1925279983666151918 ; GRAPHIC: https://x.com/SyrNetworkNews/status/1925271154928795675
[62] https://icct.nl/publication/threat-islamic-states-extensive-use-improvised-explosives
[63] https://t.me/syrianmoi/24310
[64] https://www.opensanctions.org/entities/opensyr-node-2378; https://mena-monitor dot org/ميليشيات-إيران-في-سوريا-أعدادها-وأماك/
[65] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1925880855005728907; https://t.me/syrianmoi/24310
[66] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/04/assads-tycoon-cousin-rami-makhlouf-forms-militia-syrias-alawite-coast-what-we ; https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2021/06/the-dynasty-of-makhlouf-privilege-power-and-wealth/
[67] https://english dot alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2020/09/09/Charity-founded-by-Syrian-tycoon-Rami-Makhlouf-has-Facebook-page-removed ; https://www.mei.edu/publications/rami-makhlouf-saga-poses-dangerous-challenge-assad ; https://syriaaccountability.org/makhloufs-demise-is-deserved-but-not-enough/
[68]https://www.facebook.com/RamiMakhloufSY/posts/pfbid0TLDBpdBfQRnm49azYRbL1yeodY2sb9shd7ZCnYwczWkNErrXqshHYU3CYQHafNbkl?locale=ar_AR
[69] v https://x.com/USAMBTurkiye/status/1925930900417548624
[70] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-appoint-thomas-barrack-special-envoy-syria-sources-say-2025-05-21/
[71] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-appoint-thomas-barrack-special-envoy-syria-sources-say-2025-05-21/
[72] https://x.com/USAMBTurkiye/status/1925930900417548624
[73] https://www.eremnews dot com/news/arab-world/vke2si6
[74] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/03/02/3319611
[75] https://almadapaper dot net/389291/ ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B0%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-10-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B6%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA
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[77] https://www.eremnews dot com/news/arab-world/jsfd3oa
[78] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%80-%D8%AA%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A
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[80] https://t.me/army21ye/3020
[81] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1925723078815834469
[82] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/airlines-suspend-flights-israel-after-houthi-attack-airport-2025-05-06/ ; https://www.israelhayom dot com/2025/05/20/flight-cancellations-to-israel-extended-by-major-airlines/ ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/british-airways-extends-suspension-of-israel-flights-to-end-of-july/
