Olivia Gibson, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter
May 6, 2025, 7:45 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15 am ET on May 6. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 7 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Ukrainian forces continued limited attacks across the international border near Tetkino and Novyi Put, Kursk Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed on May 6 that Russian forces repelled the Ukrainian attacks near Novyi Put and Volfino (southwest of Glushkovo) and that fighting continued near the railway station in southern Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[1] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces seized up to two streets in southwestern Tetkino, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division), and 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are defending near Tetkino.[3]
Ukrainian forces also continued drone, air, and artillery strikes aimed at isolating Russian units in and near Tetkino. Geolocated footage published on May 6 shows Ukrainian forces conducting a Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) guided munition strike on a Russian position in southwestern Tetkino, indicating that Russian forces maintain positions near the Tetkino Railway Station.[4] Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Ukrainian forces are conducting drone and artillery strikes against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to isolate Russian units near Tetkino.[5] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drones have interdicted and maintained fire control over an unspecified section of the 38K-040 Tetkino-Karyzh highway.[6] Russian milbloggers claimed on May 5 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a bridge over the Seim River between Zvannoye (northwest of Glushkovo) and Tetkino.[7]
Kremlin officials are continuing to leverage the mythos of the Soviet Union's role in the Second World War to form the basis of a new state ideology that will span generations and that Russia intends to leverage to justify a future military conflict against the West. Russian Security Council Secretary and former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu published an op-ed in the official Russian government newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta on May 6, arguing that military and political unity against a common enemy is Russia's only path to a strong and victorious future.[8] Shoigu repeatedly juxtaposed the Red Army's defeat of Nazi Germany in the Second World War (referred to as the Great Patriotic War in Russia) with Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Shoigu extolled the Soviet State Defense Committee's (an executive governing body established following Nazi Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union) "strictly centralized framework" that ensured effective coordination and implementation of orders on the frontline and the home front. Shoigu stated that Russian public consciousness experienced a national identity crisis following the fall of the Soviet Union and underscored the importance of preserving and strengthening traditional Russian spiritual and moral values to resolve this crisis and form an unofficial Russian state ideology (the Russian constitution forbids the adoption of a formal state ideology).[9] Shoigu reiterated Russian narratives designed to justify Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and accused the collective West of preparing for a direct military conflict with Russia and seeking to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia.
The Kremlin appears to be consolidating around an informal state ideology predicated on perpetuating the belief that the West is determined to encircle and defeat Russia. The Kremlin is leveraging government-wide initiatives to place veterans of the war in Ukraine in positions of power in Russia and long-term rhetorical campaigns to disseminate the belief that the world is divided into two groups (the West and the Russian-led "multipolar world") seeking to destroy one another — mirroring the Soviet Union's framing of geopolitics as an existential conflict between communism and capitalism.[10] Russia's evolving informal state ideology includes aspects of the Soviet Union's ideology, such as a strong centralized government and a unified perception of the state enemy, but lacks the greater justification for why Russia must destroy its enemies.[11] The Kremlin is attempting to unify Russian society, particularly elites, under this world view in order to ensure that any successor to Russian President Vladimir Putin will embody similarly aggressive and dangerous ideals that perpetuate eternal conflict with the West and NATO.
Putin's envisioned informal state ideology is somewhat at odds with that being developed by Russian ultranationalists — one of Putin's key constituencies. Putin is promoting an informal state ideology that supports a civic Russian identity and a multiethnic and religiously diverse population.[12] Russian ultranationalists, whose perspective is often voiced most clearly by Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin, appear more interested in an ideology predicated on a Russian state mainly led by and comprised of ethnic Russians that defends and platforms Russian Orthodoxy.[13] Putin is likely resistant to such an ideology as it risks fragmenting Russia's multiethnic and religiously-diverse population and could pose a threat to regime stability. Russian officials are struggling to balance placating the increasingly influential ultranationalist community with offsetting critical economic issues and labor shortages with migrant labor, and the war in Ukraine and a possible future conflict with the West will only exacerbate these issues.[14]
Shoigu also underscored the importance of the Kremlin's development of military-patriotic education programs — such as the Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF), Yunarmiya, and the Russian Military Historical Society — and noted that they are designed to prepare Russian citizens for military service.[15] ISW has long reported on the Kremlin's efforts to centralize control over and expand multi-generational youth programs as part of Russia's long-term force generation efforts and multi-pronged efforts to militarize Russian society.[16] The Kremlin may intend to leverage these military-patriotic education programs to workshop a future state ideology and socialize Russian citizens to this ideology from a young age.
Russian officials also appear to be leveraging the story of the Second World War (referred to as the Great Patriotic War in Russia) to dismiss Russia's early failures in the war in Ukraine and present the false image that Russian victory in Ukraine is as inevitable as the Soviet triumph over Germany became at the end of World War II. Shoigu noted in the May 6 article that the Soviet Union made "mistakes" when planning for a war with Nazi Germany, including failing to properly equip and manage Soviet troops, and suffered from poor strategic planning and ineffective military doctrine.[17] Shoigu claimed that Nazi Germany was able to exploit these mistakes to make significant advances early in the war (to the gates of Moscow, in fact), but that the Soviet Union was able to improve its capabilities and mobilize society to support an eventual victory. Shoigu's article notably ignores the role that the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact, which Joseph Stalin used to seize the Baltic States and part of Poland while Adolf Hitler invaded the rest of Poland in 1939, played in Stalin's unwillingness to prepare for war with Nazi Germany. Shoigu's comments are likely an attempt to use references to the Second World War to tacitly acknowledge the Russian military's shortcomings at the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, for which Shoigu was to a considerable extent responsible as Defense Minister. Shoigu's retelling of the Second World War mirrors Russia's unpreparedness for a long war at the start of the full-scale invasion and significant setbacks in 2022 when Ukraine forced the Russian military to withdraw from around Kyiv and from northern Ukraine and liberated significant swathes of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts. Shoigu is also attempting to draw parallels to the Second World War to frame the Russian military as having secured the permanent initiative on the battlefield and portray a Russian victory in Ukraine as inevitable to both the international community and the domestic Russian populace. Shoigu is likely attempting to draw on the mythos of the Second World War to signal to domestic audiences that Russian victory is near and requires united societal support, even though Russia has no significant battlefield successes to flaunt on Victory Day 2025.
Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov expressed his desire to resign from his post but acknowledged that only Russian President Vladimir Putin can approve this request. Kadyrov has helped stabilize interethnic tensions in the North Caucasus, and leaving his post without a suitable successor could threaten the stability of Putin's regime. Kadyrov told Chechen news outlet Chechnya Segodnya on May 5, in response to rumors of his resignation, that he asked to be "relieved" from his post as Chechen Republic head and hopes that his request "will be supported" but that unspecified others "will have their own initiatives, their own vision."[18] Kadyrov stated on his Telegram channel on May 6 that "many" misunderstood his May 5 statement and clarified that only Putin can decide whether Kadyrov can leave his post and that Kadyrov can only ask to leave or offer his resignation.[19] Kadyrov emphasized that he is a "team man" and will follow Putin's orders, implying that he will retain his post if that is what Putin decides.[20] It is currently unclear how serious Kadyrov is about this request, as Kadyrov has periodically expressed his desire to resign as Chechen Republic head since 2016 and has consistently walked back these statements.[21]
Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on March 27, citing a source in the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), that Kadyrov's relations with Putin have deteriorated in recent months as Putin was displeased with Kadyrov's "frequent and uncoordinated negotiations" with monarchies in Middle Eastern countries.[22] One source told investigative outlet Novaya Gazeta that Kadyrov helped Putin negotiate with Qatar about the fate of Russian military bases in Syria and that Kadyrov "carried out even more delicate orders from the Kremlin" in the Middle East, however.[23] Kadyrov has acted as a stabilizer within the Chechen Republic and elsewhere in the North Caucasus during particularly tense moments since the early 2000s, particularly moments that could pose threats to the stability of Putin's regime.[24] Kadyrov's death or departure from office, should it occur during or immediately after the war in Ukraine, could leave Putin's interests in the North Caucasus unguarded unless Kadyrov and Putin appoint a suitable successor.
It remains unclear who might succeed Kadyrov in the event of his resignation or death. Novaya Gazeta reported on May 5, citing a Russian Telegram channel and several other sources familiar with the matter, that Kadyrov has "changed priorities" and spent a lot of time receiving health treatment and largely delegated his external engagements since February 2025.[25] Novaya Gazeta reported that Kadyrov's daughter and former Chechen Deputy Prime Minister and Culture Minister Aishat Kadyrova suddenly resigned in early February 2025 and that sources in the Chechen government reported that Kadyrov's other two daughters, Khutmat and Khadizhat Kadyrova, also stopped working in civil service positions at the same time. Novaya Gazeta reported that Aishat Kadyrova travelled to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in late February 2025 to identify investment opportunities for the Kadyrov family in the wake of Kadyrov's reportedly declining health.
Novaya Gazeta reported that only two of Kadyrov's 14 children "play a significant role" in Kadyrov's future plans: 26-year-old Aishat Kadyrova and 17-year-old Adam Kadyrov.[26] A Novaya Gazeta source reported that Kadyrov would not have "had the headache of appointing a successor" if "Aishat [Kadyrova] had been born a man," given Aishat's success in political and business roles. Novaya Gazeta reported that Kadyrov has positioned Adam Kadyrov as his obvious successor, including by instructing Chechen officials to treat Adam as Kadyrov's main heir. ISW has previously observed reports of Kadyrov giving favorable appointments to Adam, arranging meetings between Adam and Putin, and appearing to prefer him as heir over his elder son, Akhmat Kadyrov.[27] Adam Kadyrov famously stoked interethnic tensions after footage emerged in September 2023 of Adam beating a detained man accused of burning a Quran, an act which Ramzan Kadyrov praised and subsequently rewarded.[28]
Ukraine and Russia conducted a 205-for-205 prisoner of war (POW) exchange on May 6. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on May 6 that Ukrainian authorities returned 205 Ukrainian POWs, comprising members of almost all branches of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.[29] Zelensky thanked the United Arab Emirates for mediating the POW exchange with Russia. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also reported on May 6 that Russia and Ukraine conducted a 205-for-205 POW exchange.[30]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian forces continued limited attacks across the international border near Tetkino and Novyi Put, Kursk Oblast.
- Ukrainian forces also continued drone, air, and artillery strikes aimed at isolating Russian units in and near Tetkino.
- Kremlin officials are continuing to leverage the mythos of the Soviet Union's role in the Second World War to form the basis of a new state ideology that will span generations and that Russia intends to leverage to justify a future military conflict against the West.
- The Kremlin appears to be consolidating around an informal state ideology predicated on perpetuating the belief that the West is determined to encircle and defeat Russia.
- Russian officials also appear to be leveraging the story of the Second World War (referred to as the Great Patriotic War in Russia) to dismiss Russia's early failures in the war in Ukraine and present the false image that Russian victory in Ukraine is as inevitable as the Soviet triumph over Germany became at the end of World War II.
- Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov expressed his desire to resign from his post but acknowledged that only Russian President Vladimir Putin can approve this request. Kadyrov has helped stabilize interethnic tensions in the North Caucasus, and leaving his post without a suitable successor could threaten the stability of Putin's regime.
- It remains unclear who might succeed Kadyrov in the event of his resignation or death.
- Ukraine and Russia conducted a 205-for-205 prisoner of war (POW) exchange on May 6.
- Russian forces advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Alleged Ceasefire Violation
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Alleged Ceasefire Violations
There are no active ceasefires in Ukraine.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
See topline text for updates in Kursk Oblast.
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions in northwestern Belgorod Oblast near Demidovka on May 5.[31]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Demidovka.[32]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on May 6 but did not advance.
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued attacks northeast of Sumy City toward Bilovody and Loknya.[33]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) and drone operators of the 83rd VDV Brigade are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[34]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on May 5 and 6 but did not advance.[35]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces advanced in the Kupyansk direction, but this advance is likely not recent.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 5 indicates that Russian forces advanced in the fields west of Kyslivka (southeast of Kupyansk), likely in late March or early April 2025.[36]
Russian forces attacked east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Hlushkivka and toward Novoosynove on May 5 and 6.[37]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Kontora" Detachment of the 375th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[38]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 6 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka and Hrekivka on May 5 and 6.[39]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on May 6 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Olhivka, Ridkodub, Lypove, Novy Mir, Novomykhailivka, Zelena Dolyna, and Nove, and northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi, Torske, and Myrne on May 5 and 6.[40]
Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz "Shram" Group are operating in the Serebryanske forest area (southeast of Lyman).[41]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on May 6 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced north of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[42]
A Russian milblogger claimed on May 6 that Russian forces attacked southwest of Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk) and that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hryhorivka.[43]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on May 6 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar, south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora, and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka and Ozaryanivka on May 5 and 6.[44]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 78th “Sever-Akhmat” Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[45] Drone operators of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Mykolaivka (west of Chasiv Yar).[46]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Berehova Street in eastern Novospaske (formerly Petrivka, west of Toretsk).[47] Geolocated footage published on May 6 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced north of Toretsk.[48]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Tarasivka (southwest of Toretsk) and Novoolenivka (west of Toretsk).[49]
Russian forces attacked near Toretsk; north of Toretsk near Dachne, Dyliivka, and Krymske; southwest of Toretsk near Romanivka, Stara Mykolaivka, Nova Poltavka, Malynivka, Myrolyubivka, Sukha Balka, Stara Mykolaivka, Vodyane Druhe, and Kalynove; and west of Toretsk near Novoolenivka on May 5 and 6.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Tarasivka.[51]
A Russian milbloggers claimed on May 5 that Russian forces have recently intensified guided glide bomb strikes against Kostyantynivka.[52] A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor claimed that Russian forces have increased the accuracy of guided glide bomb strikes in the area, with roughly 60 percent of the glide bombs reaching their targets.[53]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on May 6 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD claimed on May 6 that Russian forces, including elements of the 137th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), seized Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[54] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Malynivka (east of Pokrovsk) and in eastern Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[55]
Russian forces attacked east of Pokrovsk near Novotoretske; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Promin; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko and Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and Udachne on May 5 and 6.[56]
The commander of a Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on May 6 that Russian forces have started driving much faster on motorcycles in off-road areas, indicating that the Russian military has likely started training its troops to use motorcycles better.[57]
Russian forces have likely recently intensified long-range Shahed drone strikes against Ukrainian near-rear areas. The Russian MoD claimed on May 6 that Russian forces conducted a Shahed-136 strike on Ukrainian forces in Volodymyrivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[58] The Russian MoD similarly claimed on May 5 that Russian forces conducted a Shahed-136 strike on a Ukrainian ammunition depot in Kramatorsk (northwest of Chasiv Yar).[59]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the Solona River south of Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[60]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Kotlyarivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[61]
Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, Uspenivka, and Novooleksandrivka and toward Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka, Sribne, and Troitske; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Bohdanivka on May 5 and 6.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novooleksandrivka.[63]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently struck a bridge over the Solona River along the T-0428 Andriivka-Mezhova highway in Novopavlivka.[64]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on May 6 but did not advance.
Russian forces continued assaults west of Kurakhove near Andriivka and Kostyantynopil and in the direction of Bahatyr on May 5 and 6.[65] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bahatyr.[66]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating near Oleksiivka (west of Kurakhove).[67]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and north of Novosilka (west of Velyka Novosilka) during a series of large motorcycle assaults in the area on May 3 and 4.[68] Ukrainian sources reported on May 4 that Ukrainian forces destroyed 70 motorcycles during the assaults.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) participated in the advance near Novosilka.[70]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the outskirts of Zelene Pole and Novopil (west of Velyka Novosilka).[71] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the outskirts of Odradne (north of Velyka Novosilka) and are leveraging increased cover from new foliage to make more rapid advances in the area.[72]
Russian forces continued assaults north of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele and in the direction of Odradne and Komar; northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Burlatske, Vilne Pole, Pryvilne, and Shevchenko; west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil and Novopil on May 5 and 6.[73]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) reportedly struck Ukrainian forces near Vilne Pole.[74]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Hulyaipole near Vysoke (formerly Chervone) on May 5 and 6 but did not advance.[75]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 6 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Mali Shcherbaky (west of Orikhiv).[76]
Russian forces conducted ground attacks south of Orikhiv towards Novodanylivka; southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove; and west of Orikhiv near Mali Shcherbaky and Kamyanske and towards Novoandriivka on May 5 and 6.[77]
Ukrainian sources reported on May 6 that Russian forces are conducting motorcycle assaults more frequently due to the terrain in the Zaporizhia direction and that Russian forces are using a ”wave” tactic of sending four to five motorcycles to find gaps in Ukrainian defenses and then following up with dismounted infantry to consolidate positions.[78]
Ukrainian State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate Head Oleh Korikov reported that Russian forces are blocking the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) monitoring mission at the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).[79] Korikov noted that the ZNPP lacks a reliable water supply, an external power supply, qualified personnel, proper maintenance of safety systems, and any warning, radiation monitoring, or emergency preparedness systems.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1251st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction, and drone operators of the “Nemets” drone group (291st Motorized Rifle Regiment, 42nd Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[80]
Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on May 6 but did not advance.[81]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 5 to 6. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on May 6 that Russian forces launched 136 Shahed and other drones from Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and occupied Prymorsk, Zaporizhia Oblast.[82] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 54 drones over Ukraine and that 70 drones were ”lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian sources reported that the strikes damaged civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Odesa oblasts and killed one civilian in Odesa Oblast.[83]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/wargonzo/26343 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26357 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22786 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22783 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70616 ; https://t.me/control_sigma/41532 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70647 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/23211 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/21177 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91226 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91229 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/23217
[2] https://t.me/notes_veterans/23217 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35466
[3] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35416 ; https://t.me/divannyevoini/14950 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91182 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91170 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91229 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91226
[4] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27965 ; https://t.me/soniah_hub/10365
[5] https://t.me/yurasumy/22783 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/21170 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2025
[6] https://t.me/wargonzo/26357
[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2025 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70607
[8] https://rg dot ru/2025/05/06/eto-nasha-pobeda.html
[9] http://en.kremlin dot ru/acts/news/69810 ; http://kremlin dot ru/acts/news/69810
[10] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-20-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2025 ; https://isw.pub/RussianForceGen042325 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-30-2025
[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2024-0 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2024
[12] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2024-0
[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-19-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2025
[14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-22-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2024
[15] https://rg dot ru/2025/05/06/eto-nasha-pobeda.html
[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-14-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-21-2024
[17] https://rg dot ru/2025/05/06/eto-nasha-pobeda.html ; https://t.me/tass_agency/313484
[18] https://chechnyatoday dot com/news/385072
[19] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5700
[20] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5700
[21] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/06/05/2025/6819ff4d9a7947b627111f9e; https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/2025/05/06/20993624.shtml; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2022/09/04/939111-ramzan-kadirov-zayavil-o-vozmozhnosti; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/news/2025/05/06/1108636-kadirov-poprosil
[22] https://istories dot media/news/2025/03/27/kadirov-vstupil-v-konflikt-s-kremlem-govoryat-istochniki-vazhnikh-istorii/?tztc=1
[23] https://novayagazeta dot eu/articles/2025/05/05/vozvrashchenie-molodogo-ramzana
[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2024; https://kyivindependent dot com/30-years-since-start-of-first-chechen-war-kadyrovs-chechnya-remains-one-of-most-brutal-places-on-earth/; https://neweasterneurope dot eu/2024/12/15/chechnyas-instability-implications-for-russia-and-the-eu/; https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2010/11/north-caucasus-of-the-bizarre?lang=en
[25] https://novayagazeta dot eu/articles/2025/05/05/vozvrashchenie-molodogo-ramzana
[26] https://novayagazeta dot eu/articles/2025/05/05/vozvrashchenie-molodogo-ramzana
[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-17-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2023; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2024
[28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2023
[29] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1919732905833599419 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1919732742004105216 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14109
[30] https://t.me/mod_russia/52193 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52189
[31] https://t.me/rybar/70153; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28107
[32] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28107
[33] https://t.me/dva_majors/70607
[34] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28106; https://t.me/rusich_army/23189
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9449
[36] https://x.com/giK1893/status/1919660584229888015; https://t.me/rubak112/245
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9449 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899
[38] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163702
[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9449 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9449 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901
[41] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5698
[42] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163685
[43] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35465
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9449 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26343 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163628
[45] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5699
[46] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163676
[47] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27935 ; https://t.me/azov_media/6790
[48] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1919639459231908009
[49] https://t.me/dva_majors/70607 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163685 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28154 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22782 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163628
[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9449 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28154 ; https://t.me/rybar/70153
[51] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28154
[52] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163628 ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/2352
[53] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2352
[54] https://t.me/mod_russia/52179 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52180 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52184
[55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28101 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163685 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28154
[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9449
[57] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/06/ye-motoczykly-z-yakyh-shhe-ne-vstygly-plivku-zderty-poblyzu-pokrovska-dronari-aktyvno-zakryvayut-vorozhyj-motosezon/
[58] https://t.me/mod_russia/52177
[59] https://t.me/mod_russia/52135
[60] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27953; https://t.me/gostrikartuzy/944
[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35440 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22779 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28157
[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9449 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91161 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35414
[63] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35414
[64] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91193 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163709
[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9449 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64022 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26343
[66] https://t.me/dva_majors/70607 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26343
[67] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13769
[68] https://t.me/AFUStratCom/29285 ; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27934
[69] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/04/minus-70-motoczykliv-za-dobu-zsu-kosyat-vidchajdushni-moto-shturmy-rf-na-shlyahu-do-dnipropetrovshhyny/ ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2747959232260454&rdid=iuAqmdX8AhTjdkr8 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/05/motoczykletnyj-bliczkryg-zahlynuvsya-syly-oborony-spalyly-blyzko-70-vorozhyh-bajkiv-pid-chas-odnogo-shturmu/
[70] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35415 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35468
[71] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64019
[72] https://t.me/yurasumy/22778
[73] https://t.me/readovkanews/95967; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9449
[74] https://t.me/voin_dv/14757
[75] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899
[76] https://t.me/dva_majors/70607
[77] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23901; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23899
[78] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/06/taktyka-hvyl-i-avos-na-pivdni-prodovzhuyetsya-masova-utylizacziya-vorozhogo-motozaliza/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/06/bajk-shou-v-zaporizkyh-stepah-vorog-jde-vpered-motoczykletnymy-nakatamy/
[79] https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1011425-vidsutni-nadijne-vodozabezpecenna-ta-stabilne-zovnisne-elektropostacanna-oleg-korikov-pro-situaciu-na-zaes/; https://snriu.gov dot ua/news/holova-derzhatomrehuliuvannia-u-onlain-formati-vziav-uchast-v-cherhovomu-zasidanni-mizhnarodnoi-asotsiatsii-iadernykh-rehuliatoriv-inra
[80] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35439 ; https://t.me/ZS42MSD/2963; https://t.me/dva_majors/70602
[81] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23951
[82] https://t.me/kpszsu/33942
[83] https://t.me/kpszsu/33942; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2494 ; https://t.me/synegubov/14152; https://x.com/SESU_UA/status/1919653735417946230; https://t.me/synegubov/14154; https://t.me/synegubov/14160 ; https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/05/06/u-harkovi-vnaslidok-udaru-po- dot ynku-barabashovo-poshkodzheno-blyzko-90-torgivelnyh-ob%ca%bcyektiv/; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/19626; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02KnP5U5sp4hCMX6w5eeEiySdC56qR6dhoRjsbtaYGgR9hQbLBArD24pe8398vMSCSl; https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/29905; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/06/na-odeshhyni-cherez-rosijski-obstrily-zagynula-lyudyna/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/9554
