Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Daria Novikov, Anna Harvey, and Frederick W. Kagan with William Runkel
May 11, 2025, 4:45 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15am ET on May 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian President Vladimir Putin called for Russia and Ukraine to resume bilateral negotiations based on the early 2022 Istanbul protocols that include Russian demands amounting to full Ukrainian surrender. Any agreement based on those protocols would be a capitulation document. Putin spoke to media organizations on the night of May 10 to 11, following the joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal for a general ceasefire at least 30 days long beginning on May 12.[1] Putin did not agree to the joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal and instead proposed that Russia and Ukraine "resume" the direct negotiations that he claimed "[Ukraine] interrupted" in 2022 on May 15.[2] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated that Russia will soon announce its delegation to the resumed negotiations in Istanbul and that such negotiations should account for "developments of the 2022 talks."[3]
Putin and Ushakov are referring to Russia's April 2022 Istanbul protocols draft agreement, which included terms that would have amounted to Ukraine's surrender and left Ukraine helpless to defend against potential future Russian aggression.[4] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and the New York Times (NYT) reported in March and June 2024 that both publications obtained several versions of the draft protocols from the April 2022 Ukrainian-Russian peace negotiations in Istanbul.[5] The draft protocols demanded that Ukraine forego its NATO membership aspirations and amend its constitution to add a neutrality provision that would ban Ukraine from joining any military alliances, concluding military agreements, or hosting foreign military personnel, trainers, or weapon systems in Ukraine. Russia also demanded that it, the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), the People's Republic of China (PRC), France, and Belarus serve as security guarantors of the agreement. Russia demanded that the guarantor states “terminate international treaties and agreements incompatible with the permanent neutrality [of Ukraine]," including military aid agreements. Russia demanded to limit the Ukrainian military to 85,000 soldiers, 342 tanks, and 519 artillery systems as part of the Istanbul protocols. Russia additionally demanded that Ukrainian missiles be limited to a range of 40 kilometers (25 miles), a range that would allow Russian forces to deploy critical systems and materiel close to Ukraine without fear of strikes.
Russia insisted on these terms in the first and second months of the war when Russian troops were advancing on Kyiv City and throughout northeastern, eastern, and southern Ukraine. Russia is now attempting to reiterate these same demands after three years of war, despite the fact that Ukrainian forces have since successfully forced Russia to withdraw from northern Ukraine, liberated significant swaths of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts, and blunted the Russian rate of advance across the theater. Putin is rejecting the joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal for a general ceasefire and instead continues to demand Ukrainian surrender in an attempt to secure his strategic goals by drawing out negotiations while continuing to make battlefield gains.
Putin also continues to demand that any negotiations address Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war in Ukraine. Putin stated during the press conference that the purpose of renewed bilateral Russian-Ukrainian negotiations would be to "eliminate the root causes" of the war in Ukraine.[6] Putin suggested that Russia and Ukraine could pursue a ceasefire as part of these renewed negotiations, but claimed that a "real truce" should not enable the "rearmament" and "replenishment" of the Ukrainian military. The Kremlin has repeatedly claimed that Russia must eliminate the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine, which Russian officials have defined as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into Eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[7] Kremlin officials recently claimed that any ceasefire agreement should limit Ukraine's ability to mobilize and train new troops and receive Western military aid, while failing to offer similar concessions for Russia to limit its own force generation and defense production efforts.[8] Calls for the elimination of these alleged "root causes" and limitations on Ukraine's force generation capabilities are in line with Putin's demands for Ukrainian neutrality, as well as Putin's pre-war demand that would have required NATO to roll back to its pre-1997 borders.[9]
Putin is attempting to manipulate ongoing discussions about a ceasefire and future peace in Ukraine, likely in an effort to undermine Ukrainian-US-European unity around a comprehensive 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine. Kremlin officials have recently intensified their engagement with Western media in an effort to message directly to the Trump administration and American public and portray Russia's terms for Ukraine's surrender as reasonable.[10] Putin's May 11 press conference and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov's recent interviews with Western media are part of an attempt to inject Kremlin narratives into the Western information space aimed at convincing the West that Russia is able to conquer all of Ukraine militarily and scaring Ukraine and the West into conceding to Russia's demands.[11] Putin's rhetorical posturing is an attempt to conceal limitations in the Russian military's capabilities and distract from Russia's failure to make any significant progress on the battlefield over the last two years. Putin and other Kremlin officials firmly maintain their war aims that amount to Ukraine's full capitulation and have thus far refused to consider any peace deal that does not concede to all of Russia's demands.[12] The Kremlin is falsely portraying itself as willing to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine while continuing to attack frontline Ukrainian positions and setting conditions for further military aggression against Ukraine and NATO in the coming years.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accepted Russian President Vladimir Putin's proposal to hold bilateral negotiations in Turkey on May 15. Zelensky stated that he will personally wait for Putin in Turkey and that Ukraine is waiting for Russia to agree to the US-Ukrainian-European general ceasefire proposal.[13] Putin discussed renewing the 2022 Istanbul negotiations in a call with Erdogan on May 11, and Erdogan expressed support for resuming talks.[14] Erdogan noted during his call with Putin that a comprehensive ceasefire would "create the necessary environment" for peace talks.[15] European officials largely called on Putin to agree to a comprehensive ceasefire agreement before beginning bilateral peace negotiations with Ukraine.[16]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian President Vladimir Putin called for Russia and Ukraine to resume bilateral negotiations based on the early 2022 Istanbul protocols that include Russian demands amounting to full Ukrainian surrender. Any agreement based on those protocols would be a capitulation document.
- Putin also continues to demand that any negotiations address Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war in Ukraine.
- Putin is attempting to manipulate ongoing discussions about a ceasefire and future peace in Ukraine, likely in an effort to undermine Ukrainian-US-European unity around a comprehensive 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accepted Russian President Vladimir Putin's proposal to hold bilateral negotiations in Turkey on May 15.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in the northern Kharkiv and Novopavlivka directions.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Alleged Ceasefire Violations
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Alleged Ceasefire Violations
There are no active ceasefires in Ukraine.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks in Kursk Oblast on May 11.
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked southwest of Glushkovo along the international border near Tetkino, Volfinskiy, and Novyi Put on May 10 and 11.[17]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Tetkino.[18]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on May 11.
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in northern Sumy Oblast on May 11.
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Kharkiv City.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[19]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on May 10 and 11.[20]
Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov reported on May 11 that Russian forces recently increased the number of daily attacks in the Vovchansk direction from between one to two assaults to up to five.[21]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Anvar" Spetsnaz detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating near Vovchansk.[22]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 11 but did not make confirmed advances.
Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka and Mala Shapkivka, northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Kamyanka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Hlushkivka on May 10 and 11.[23]
Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov reported on May 11 that Russian forces operating in the Kupyansk direction are receiving older reinforcements who are less capable of conducting assaults and experiencing logistics problems that are hindering offensive operations.[24]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 11 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milbogger claimed on May 11 that Russian forces advanced southeast of Borova near Makiivka.[25]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, east of Borova near Kopanky, and southeast of Borova near Cherneshchyna on May 10 and 11.[26]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the "Black Raven" detachment (purportedly a volunteer unit) are reportedly operating near Nadiya (east of Borova).[27]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on May 11 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 11 that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Lyman near Hrekivka and east of Lyman in Torske.[28]
Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Zelena Dolyna, Nove, Olhivka, Ridkodub, and Lypove and northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka, Kolodyazi, and Hrekivka on May 10 and 11.[29]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on May 11 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka on May 10 and May 11.[30]
The commander of a Ukrainian drone platoon operating in the Siversk direction stated that Russian forces have accumulated large quantities of motorcycles for assaults near Bilohorivka.[31] The commander also stated that Russian forces continue to use fiber-optic drones almost daily in the Siversk direction.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on May 11 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, northwest of Chasiv Yar toward Mayske, north of Chasiv Yar near Novomarkove, northeast of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, southeast of Chasiv Yar toward Ozaryanivka, and south of Chasiv Yar toward Bila Hora and Predtechyne.[32]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Druzhba (northeast of Toretsk).[33]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Oleksandropil toward Zorya and near Romanivka (both southwest of Toretsk).[34]
Russian forces attacked near Toretsk; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northeast of Toretsk near Druzhba; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka, Romanivka, and Nova Poltavka; and southwest of Toretsk toward Zorya and near Stara Mykolaivka, Malynivka, Oleksandropil, and Vodyane Druhe on May 10 and 11.[35] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Toretsk and near Romanivka.[36]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the “Tserber” group of the Russian 109th Separate Rifle Regiment (1st "Slovyansk" Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st CAA)) are reportedly operating in central Toretsk.[37] Elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Yablunivka (southwest of Toretsk).[38]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on May 11 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Pokrovsk near Myrne and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne on May 10 and 11.[39]
Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on May 11 that fighting remains intense in the Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka directions.[40] A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on May 11 that Russian forces are currently concentrating on destroying infrastructure in the rear Ukrainian areas of this direction in order to facilitate future Russian advances.[41] The servicemember stated that Russian forces are trying to destroy Ukrainian reconnaissance and communications equipment in the area. A Russian milblogger claimed on May 11 that Russian forces are concentrating offensive operations near Hrodivka and attempting to advance from Myrolyubivka toward Moskovke (all east of Pokrovsk).[42]
Order of Battle: Elements of the "Vega" Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[43]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south and west of Novooleksandrivka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and likely seized the settlement during a roughly platoon-sized mechanized assault.[44]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 11 that Russian forces advanced near Novomykolaivka, west of Uspenivka, and in Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka); northwest of Nadiivka (east of Novopavlivka); and in Horikhove (southeast of Novopavlivka).[45]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novooleksandrivka and Novoserhiivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka and Preobrazhenka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Troitske.[46]
Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are attacking up to 30 times per day in the Novopavlivka direction and have assembled up to three mechanized regiments' worth of troops in this direction.[47]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on May 11 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Andriivka, Bahatyr, and Oleksiivka on May 10 and 11.[48]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on May 11 but did not advance.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[49]
Russian forces continued assaults northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele, Vilne Pole, Pryvilne, and Shevchenko; and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and Novopil on May 10 and 11.[50] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Velyka Novosilka.[51]
A Ukrainian battalion operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction reported on May 10 that Ukrainian forces repelled a multi-directional company-sized Russian mechanized assault with three tanks, eight infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and a large number of motorcycles in the area on May 9.[52]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 11 but did not advance.
Russian forces conducted ground attacks southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv towards Novodanylivka; and southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, Shcherbaky, and Kamyanske on May 10 and 11.[53]
Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on May 11 but did not advance.[54]
Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on May 11 that Russian forces are trying to land small infantry groups on the islands in the Dnipro River Delta to conduct reconnaissance on Ukrainian positions.[55]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 10 to 11. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 108 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk City; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Prymorsk, Zaporizhia Oblast; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[56] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 60 Shahed and other drones over the eastern, northern, southern, and central Ukraine; that 41 decoy drones were "lost in location,” meaning that Ukrainian forces lost sight of the drone and do not know what happened to it; and that Russian drone strikes affected Sumy Oblast.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76899 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2025
[2] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76899
[3] https://t.me/tass_agency/314561 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/23911063
[4] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-23-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/fact-sheet-istanbul-protocol-draft-document-april-15-2022
[5] https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-ukraine-peace-deal-2022-document-6e12e093 ; https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/06/15/world/europe/ukraine-russia-ceasefire-deal.html ; https://static01.nyt.com/newsgraphics/documenttools/a456d6dd8e27e830/e279a252-full.pdf
[6] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76899
[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122924 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025
[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2025
[9] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790803/?lang=ru
[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051025 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/314505 ; https://www.cnn.com/2025/05/10/world/video/russia-ceasefire-resistant-dmitry-peskov-digvid
[11] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76899
[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar04172025;
[13] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1921611690891940116 ; ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14175https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1921469464358346850 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14175
[14] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76900 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/58843 ; https://x.com/trpresidency/status/1921524395874390050
[15] https://x.com/trpresidency/status/1921524395874390050
[16] https://x.com/JanLipavsky/status/1921479272163672557 ; https://x.com/edgarsrinkevics/status/1921516658973163870 ; https://x.com/donaldtusk/status/1921515458412392937
; https://x.com/bundeskanzler/status/1921524319286362491; https://x.com/bundeskanzler/status/1921524321945588090; https://x.com/bundeskanzler/status/1921524324487307666 ; https://suspilne dot media/1015273-evropa-hoce-buti-ucasniceu-potencijnih-peregovoriv-miz-ukrainou-ta-rosieu-mzs-francii/; https://www.radiofrance dot fr/franceinter/podcasts/questions-politiques/questions-politiques-du-dimanche-11-mai-2025-6758757 ; https://www.barrons.com/news/putin-s-proposed-ukraine-talks-a-first-step-but-not-enough-macron-a90f041c
[17] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91488; https://t.me/dva_majors/70971; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91525; https://t.me/wargonzo/26453; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28427
[18] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91509
[19] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1921240824332894710 ; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21806 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164373
[20] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/2413 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/2413 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/2413
[21] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/11/masshtabnyh-proryviv-nemaye-ale-ataky-posylyly-viktor-tregubov-pro-sytuacziyu-bilya-vovchanska/
[22] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91506
[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24108 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24106
[24] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/11/masshtabnyh-proryviv-nemaye-ale-ataky-posylyly-viktor-tregubov-pro-sytuacziyu-bilya-vovchanska/
[25] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64169
[26] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24106 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24108
[27] https://t.me/notes_veterans/23294
[28] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64169 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164373
[29]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24136 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24108 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24106 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64169
[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24136; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24108; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24106
[31] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1015195-vijska-rf-gotuut-masovanij-sturm-na-motociklah-na-siverskomu-napramku-dani-81-oaebr/
[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24136; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24108; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24106
[33] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1921577442608587184; https://t.me/prizrak_lpr/40
[34] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164367; https://t.me/yurasumy/22907
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24136; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24108; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24106; https://t.me/yurasumy/22907; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91514
[36] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164367; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91514; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91532
[37] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91514
[38] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13795
[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24136; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24108; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24106
[40] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/11/vorog-namagayetsya-perekydaty-syly-cherez-oskil-i-zherebecz-u-zsu-prokomentuvaly-sytuacziyu-na-fronti/
[41] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/11/vijskovi-rozpovily-pro-zminu-taktyky-protyvnyka-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/
[42] https://t.me/yurasumy/22906
[43] https://t.me/sashakots/53619
[44] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9118; https://t.me/fpvredrone/62; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1921474063609811318; https://t.me/skarlatop/4820
[45] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35679; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164399; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35692; https://t.me/yurasumy/22905; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164373; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35696
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24136; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24108; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24106
[47] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/11/my-zamanyuyemo-voroga-u-vognevi-mishky-ta-znyshhuyemo-sotnyamy-syly-oborony-pivdnya/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/11/vijskovi-rozpovily-pro-zminu-taktyky-protyvnyka-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/
[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24136; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24108; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24106; https://t.me/yurasumy/22904
[49] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164367
[50] https://t.me/mod_russia/52567 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24108 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24136 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24106 ;
[51] https://t.me/voin_dv/14875
[52] https://www.facebook.com/share/v/12JaCoAq1KX/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/11/dijshly-do-liniyi-zitknennya-i-zlamalysya-nashi-dronari-vidbyly-potuzhnu-ataku-okupantiv-na-novopavlivskomu-napryamku/
[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24136 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24108 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24106 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/11/desantni-diyi-na-hersonshhyni-ta-shturmy-na-zaporizhzhi-u-zsu-rozpovily-pro-ataky-okupantiv-na-pivdni/
[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24136
[55] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/11/desantni-diyi-na-hersonshhyni-ta-shturmy-na-zaporizhzhi-u-zsu-rozpovily-pro-ataky-okupantiv-na-pivdni/
[56] https://t.me/kpszsu/34173
