Olivia Gibson, Daria Novikov, Grace Mappes, Jennie Olmsted, Jessica Sobieski, Angelica Evans, and George Barros with Nate Trotter
May 30, 2025, 5:45 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on May 30. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 31 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian officials continue to signal the Kremlin's uncompromising position ahead of proposed talks in Istanbul on June 2, suggesting that the upcoming Istanbul meeting is very unlikely to yield substantive results in support of an enduring peace in Ukraine. Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) Vasily Nebenzya claimed during a UN Security Council meeting on May 30 that Russia is prepared to fight Ukraine for as long as necessary and that Ukraine can either accept peace, presumably on Russia's terms, or face inevitable battlefield defeat.[1] Nebenzya stated that the United States recently "opened its eyes" to the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine and reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin's demands that the West stop arming Ukraine and that Ukraine cease force generation efforts as preconditions to a ceasefire.[2] CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and Presidential Special Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries Kirill Dmitriev also called for officials to eliminate the conflict‘s "root causes" in an English-language post to X on May 30.[3] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov previously defined the root causes of the war in Ukraine as NATO's eastward expansion following the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against Russian speakers and Russian culture.[4] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on May 29 that Russia’s delegation to the proposed bilateral discussion in Istanbul on June 2 will be the ”same” as Russia's delegation at previous talks held in Istanbul on May 15 and 16.[5] Russia sent a low-level delegation led by Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky and consisting of Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin, Chief of the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) Igor Kostykov, and Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin to the May 15-16 Istanbul talks.[6]
Russian officials' decision to reiterate long-standing demands and send the same low-level delegation to the next Istanbul meeting indicates that Russia remains disinterested in engaging in good-faith negotiations. ISW continues to assess that Russia remains dedicated to protracting peace negotiations to support continued offensive operations in Ukraine and extract additional concessions from Ukraine and the West.[7]
Russian officials are pocketing major US concessions and continuing to make further demands of Ukraine and the West. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on May 30 that Kremlin officials are encouraged by the Trump administration's understanding of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s concerns about further eastward expansion of NATO and that Russia has previously shared these concerns with the United States during closed-door negotiations.[8] Peskov stated that the US position on further NATO expansion is "very appealing" to Russia, given that the United States continues to play a mediating role in negotiations to end the war.
US officials previously indicated a willingness to consider Russia’s objections to Ukraine’s possible future NATO membership – a long-standing Russian demand that officials frequently claim to be a "root cause" of the war in Ukraine – in exchange for Russia making concessions on other demands.[9] Peskov’s statement indicates that Russian officials assess that the United States supports Russia's demand for NATO to alter its foundational open-door policy.[10] Such a commitment would effectively grant Russia a veto over elements of the NATO charter, disproportionally benefit Russia’s desired postwar security posture, and undermine US President Donald Trump‘s stated objectives of achieving a just and lasting peace in Ukraine. Russian officials are pocketing US concessions regarding negotiations and potential postwar security arrangements and are failing to make any comparable concessions, such as relinquishing Russia’s claim to currently unoccupied Ukrainian territory like Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts.
Key Takeaways:
- Russian officials continue to signal the Kremlin's uncompromising position ahead of proposed talks in Istanbul on June 2, suggesting that the upcoming Istanbul meeting is very unlikely to yield substantive results in support of an enduring peace in Ukraine.
- Russian officials are pocketing major US concessions and continuing to make further demands of Ukraine and the West.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Kurakhove.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on May 30 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on May 29 and 30.[11] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[12]
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian infantry assaults remain intense along the international border between Kursk and Sumy oblasts.[13]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate near the Kursk Oblast border area.[14]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on May 30.
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on May 30 but did not advance.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces recently seized Vodolahy and advanced near Vodolahy, Volodymyrivka, Kostyantynivka, and Oleksiivka (all north of Sumy City), south of Bilovody, and north of Yunakivka (both northeast of Sumy City).[15]
Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Veselivka, Kostyatynivka, and Vodolahy and toward Oleksiivka; and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, Loknya, Basivka, and Myropillya on May 29 and 30.[16]
A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence stated that Russian offensive activity is intensifying in northern Sumy Oblast.[17] Former head of the Ukrainian Army’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) General Mykola Malomuzh (2005–2010) offered a hypothesis that Russian forces are likely concentrating forces along the Sumy Oblast border area in an attempt to create a salient between Yunakivka and Vodolahy from which Russian forces can conduct strikes against Sumy City and launch further offensive operations.[18] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian border detachment stated that Russia is leveraging the 50,000 Russian personnel who participated in retaking Kursk Oblast to attack into Sumy Oblast.[19]
Order of Battle: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade with the recent seizure of Bilovody (northeast of Sumy City).[20] Elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Sumy Oblast.[21] Drone elements of the "Anvar" Spetsnaz detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Zarichne and Sorokyne (both northwest of Sumy City).[22] Artillery elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Myropillya.[23]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on May 30 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced within Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[24]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Starytsia and Vovchansk on May 29 and 30.[25]
Order of Battle: Drone operators and artillery elements of the Russian “Anvar" Spetsnaz detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Starytsia.[26]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 30 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) seized Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk).[27]
Russian forces continued ground assaults north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka, northeast of Kupyansk close to the international border near Krasne Pershe and Kamyanka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on May 29 and 30.[28]
Order of Battle: Drone and artillery elements of the Russian “Anvar" Spetsnaz detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Milove, Chuhunivka (both north of Kupyansk along the international border), and Kolodyazne (northeast of Kupyansk along the international border).[29] Elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army (GTA), Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[30]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 30 but did not advance.
Russian forces continued ground assaults northeast of Borova near Kolisnykivka, Nova Kruhlyakivka, and Zahryzove; east of Borova near Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Olhivka on May 29 and 30.[31]
A press officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Borova direction reported that Russian forces are testing new assault tactics catered to certain weather conditions in hopes of scaling up these tactics for future assaults, and that Russian forces struggle to solve problems quickly.[32] Russian forces likely seek to conduct maneuvers during weather conditions that degrade Ukrainian forces’ ability to use drones.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on May 30 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast and west of Ridkodub and north and south of Zelena Dolyna (both north of Lyman).[33] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced within central Torske (east of Lyman) and cleared the western outskirts of Torske, but a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces still hold positions in southern Torske.[34]
Russian forces continued ground assaults north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Zelena Dolyna, and Lypove and toward Karpivka and Novyi Myr; northeast of Lyman near Hlushchenkove; and east of Lyman near Torske on May 29 and 30.[35] A Russian milblogger claimed Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Ridkodub.[36]
A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army (Central Military District [CMD]) are providing false reports of advances in the Lyman area. The milblogger claimed on May 26 that the 25th CAA command made false claims of successes near Torske and wasted manpower in efforts to make these claims of advance real, and called on Russian authorities to investigate.[37] The milblogger claimed on May 30 that the Russian MoD has since begun an investigation into the 25th CAA command but criticized the MoD's Fall 2024 investigations into the command of the Russian 3rd CAA (formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) for falsifying claims of successes in the Siversk direction (southeast of Lyman), claiming that these investigations targeted milbloggers' sources instead of battlefield commanders.[38] Russian milbloggers previously heavily criticized the command of the 3rd CAA and its subordinate brigades for exaggerating claimed advances and obfuscating the extent of Russian military issues following several failed large mechanized assaults in Fall 2024.[39] The Russian MoD reportedly arrested and replaced the 3rd CAA commander, Major General Dmitry Ovcharov, and several brigade commanders in November and December 2024, likely due to the information space outcry.[40] The milblogger's May 26 and 30 complaints suggest that Russian forces in the area continue to misinform the higher Russian military command and that exaggerating battlefield successes up the chain remains a pervasive part of the Russian military's culture.[41]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction but did not advance.
Russian forces continued ground assaults northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on May 29 and 30.[42]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on May 30 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and Stupochky and toward Predtechyne; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka on May 29 and 30.[43]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) and drone operators of the 98th VDV Division are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[44]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of northern Dyliivka up to the O-0519 road from the Siversky Donets Donbas canal and up to the Dyliivka railway station in southern Dyliivka (both north of Toretsk).[45]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Druzhba (east of Toretsk).[46] Another Russian milblogger claimed on May 29 that Russian forces advanced to central Poltavka (northwest of Toretsk).[47]
Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; east of Toretsk near Druzhba; northwest of Toretsk toward Nelipivka; west of Toretsk near Zorya and Romanivka; and northwest of Toretsk near Yablunivka, Rusyn Yar, Popiv Yar, and Poltavka and toward Stepanivka on May 29 and 30.[48]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) in the Kostyantynivka direction.[49] Drone operators of the Russian "Typhoon" detachment of the "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction and striking targets near Ivanopillya (northwest of Toretsk).[50] Elements of the "Grachi" unit of the 346th Separate Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[51]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on May 30 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Shevchenko Pershe (northeast of Pokrovsk) and advanced north of the settlement, in northern Myrne (northeast of Pokrovsk) and south of the settlement, and northwest of Yelyzavetivka (east of Pokrovsk).[52]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka and Myrolyubivka and toward Koptieve; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and Udachne on May 29 and 30.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 29 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Yelyzavetivka.[54]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[55]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 30 shows Russian forces raising a flag in the western outskirts of Troitske (southeast of Novopavlivka), indicating that Russian forces likely seized the settlement.[56]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Novomykolaivka on May 29 and 30.[57]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly operating near Novoserhiivka.[58]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove).[59]
Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Andriivka, Oleksiivka, Kostyantynopil, Bahatyr, and Odradne on May 29 and 30.[60] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novoukrainka (northwest of Kurakhove).[61]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Separate Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Oleksiivka.[62]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on May 30 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 29 that Russian forces advanced towards Komar (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[63]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole, Shevchenko, and Komar; west of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil and Novodarivka on May 29 and 30.[64] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novopil, Komar, and Zelene Pole.[65]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Novopil; elements of the 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Regiment) are reportedly operating near Zelene Pole; elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Komar; and drone operators of the 69th Separate Cover Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[66]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on May 30.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Zelenyi Hai (east of Hulyaipole).[67]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 30 but did not advance.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and Bilohirya, south of Orikhiv toward Novodanylivka, and southwest of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky and Stepove on May 29 and 30.[68]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the BARS-32 detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly conducting reconnaissance operations in the Zaporizhia direction.[69]
Russian forces continued assaults in the Kherson direction on May 30 but did not advance.[70]
Order of Battle: Drone operators from the Russian 61st Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly striking targets in the Kherson direction, including near Tomyna Balka (west of Kherson City).[71]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 29 and 30. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast and 90 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Oryol and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast.[72] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 26 drones and that 30 were ”lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes targeted civilian infrastructure in Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Odesa oblasts.[73]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://russiaun dot ru/ru/news/29052025
[2] https://t.me/tass_agency/317525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051025
[3] https://x.com/kadmitriev/status/1928358062370263088
[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052824
[5] https://t.me/tass_agency/317415 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625
[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051525
[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar05022025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725
[8] https://t.me/tass_agency/317491; https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1028707 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/24094047
[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052825
[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051125
[11] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24944; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24919; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24916
[12] https://t.me/rusich_army/23847; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29318
[13] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29318; https://t.me/rusich_army/23847
[14] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166497
[15] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64685; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31703; https://t.me/rybar/70820
[16] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21915; https://suspilne dot media/1030169-rf-zaavila-sklad-delegacii-na-drugi-peremovini-u-stambuli-nato-provede-nove-zasidanna-ramstajnu-1192-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1748585771&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/wargonzo/26848; https://t.me/rybar/70820; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/30/vorog-ne-mozhe-zastosovuvaty-vazhku-tehniku-dlya-nastupu-na-sumshhynu-zadiyuye-motoczykly/; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31703; https://t.me/dva_majors/72273; https://t.me/rybar/70824; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64685; https://t.me/notes_veterans/23616
[17] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21915 ; https://suspilne dot media/1030169-rf-zaavila-sklad-delegacii-na-drugi-peremovini-u-stambuli-nato-provede-nove-zasidanna-ramstajnu-1192-den-vijni/
[18] https://suspilne dot media/1030169-rf-zaavila-sklad-delegacii-na-drugi-peremovini-u-stambuli-nato-provede-nove-zasidanna-ramstajnu-1192-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1748613465&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1030823-rosia-koncentrue-sili-na-sumsini-dla-stvorenna-novogo-placdarmu-mikola-malomuz/
[19] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/30/vorog-ne-mozhe-zastosovuvaty-vazhku-tehniku-dlya-nastupu-na-sumshhynu-zadiyuye-motoczykly/
[20] https://t.me/mod_russia/53285
[21] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166508; https://t.me/bella_Ciao44/8252
[22] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166580
[23] https://t.me/dva_majors/72266
[24] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29310
[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24944; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24919; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24916; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11123
[26] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166580; https://t.me/bear007/68890
[27] https://t.me/tass_agency/317484 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64681 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/53290 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/53293 ; https://t.me/sashakots/53995
[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24944 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24944 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11123 ; https://t.me/rybar/70820
[29] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166580; https://t.me/bear007/68890
[30] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92514
[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24944 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24944 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24919 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24919 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24916 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24916 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11123 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11123
[32] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/30/vorozha-pihota-gyne-mizh-dvoma-pozycziyamy-rosiyany-testuyut-novi-shturmovi-taktyky/
[33] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31706
[34] https://t.me/tass_agency/317451 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166546 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64670
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24944 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24919 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24916 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/317446 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64670 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31706
[36] https://t.me/dva_majors/72273 ; https://t.me/rybar/70824 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64670
[37] https://t.me/yurasumy/23171
[38] https://t.me/yurasumy/23236
[39] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111624
[40] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121524; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121324; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112324; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111624
[41] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111624
[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24944; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24919; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24916; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11123
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24944; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24919; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24916; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11123; https://t.me/wargonzo/26848
[44] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29308; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166491
[45] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9264; https://t.me/ombr_28/2242; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1925547339025916068 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1928397024879112270; https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/675
[46] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31713 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64682
[47] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29297
[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24944 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24919 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24916 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11123 ; https://t.me/rybar/70820 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29297 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23225 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/72259
[49] https://t.me/dva_majors/72261
[50] https://t.me/dva_majors/72326 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/23628
[51] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13860
[52] https://t.me/wargonzo/26848 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/72273; https://t.me/rybar/70824 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64664 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29297
[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24944 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24919 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24916 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11123 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64664
[54] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29297
[55] https://t.me/wargonzo/26862
[56] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9265; https://t.me/ugra_ryadom/3112
[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24944 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24919 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24916 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11123 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64672
[58] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13861
[59] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9267; https://t.me/BlackSeaLions/52
[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24944; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24919; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24916; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11123; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0223XUZ3MAvMH9Q6SsRVRynNPAioYCLhge7VwjUVrxBY75bxwwE6cR6SWZ4sfHkw9dl;
[61] https://t.me/voin_dv/15232; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166486
[62] https://t.me/voin_dv/15224
[63] https://t.me/dva_majors/72273; https://t.me/rybar/70824; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166501
[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24944; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24919; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24916; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0223XUZ3MAvMH9Q6SsRVRynNPAioYCLhge7VwjUVrxBY75bxwwE6cR6SWZ4sfHkw9dl; https://t.me/wargonzo/26848; https://t.me/dva_majors/72273; https://t.me/rybar/70824; https://t.me/yurasumy/23226 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15232; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166486
[65] https://t.me/voin_dv/15232; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166486
[66] https://t.me/voin_dv/15232; https://t.me/voin_dv/15229; https://t.me/voin_dv/15231 https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1928483500543328691; https://t.me/voin_dv/15225
[67] https://t.me/voin_dv/15219
[68] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24944; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24919; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24916; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0223XUZ3MAvMH9Q6SsRVRynNPAioYCLhge7VwjUVrxBY75bxwwE6cR6SWZ4sfHkw9dl; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29312
[69] https://t.me/wargonzo/26859
[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24919; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24919; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24916; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0223XUZ3MAvMH9Q6SsRVRynNPAioYCLhge7VwjUVrxBY75bxwwE6cR6SWZ4sfHkw9dl
[71] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166581; https://t.me/dva_majors/72333
[72] https://t.me/kpszsu/35276
[73] https://t.me/kpszsu/35276; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14417; https://x.com/SESU_UA/status/1928370432542966265; https://t.me/Donetsk_obl_prokuratura/4002; https://t.me/synegubov/14592 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2536 ; https://t.me/synegubov/14593 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2538 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2539 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2540 ; https://t.me/synegubov/14595 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1012345-harkiv-atakuvali-rosijski-sahedi-detalno-pro-naslidki-udariv/ ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1030209-trolejbusne-depo-u-slobidskomu-rajoni-harkova-zaznalo-ataki-sahediv-poskodzeni-trolejbusi-foto-naslidkiv/; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1928384420098052597 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1928384417514320300; https://t.me/synegubov/14597; https://t.me/synegubov/14589; https://suspilne dot media/1030169-rf-zaavila-sklad-delegacii-na-drugi-peremovini-u-stambuli-nato-provede-nove-zasidanna-ramstajnu-1192-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1748580261&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://t.me/IzmailRDA/34989
