Daria Novikov, Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter
May 24, 2025, 5:15 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:00 pm ET on May 24. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian forces conducted one of the largest combined drone and missile strikes of the war against Ukraine on the night of May 23 to 24, but used fewer missiles than in previous large-scale combined strikes. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on May 24 that Russian forces launched 14 Iskander-M ballistic missiles from the directions of Taganrog, Rostov Oblast; Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai; Bryansk City; and occupied Crimea; and 250 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down six Iskander-M missiles and 128 Shahed drones, and that 117 drones were “lost in location.” Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strike heavily targeted Kyiv City and that drones and missiles also struck Odesa, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[2] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed prior to the strike on March 23 that Russian forces would respond "adequately" to recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian positions and defense facilities.[3] Russian forces have significantly intensified their nightly attacks against Ukraine over the last five months and have conducted several of the largest strikes of the entire war since January 2025.
Russian forces appear to be reducing their use of cruise missiles, indicating that increased Russian drone production and innovations to long-range drones and related strike tactics are providing Russian forces with a cheaper alternative to cruise missiles.[4] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yurii Ihnat stated on May 24 that Ukrainian forces are struggling to use Patriot air defense systems to down modified Russian Iskander-M ballistic missiles due to recent Russian improvements, including enhancements that enable the missile to change trajectory and perform maneuvers rather than flying in a straight line.[5] Ukrainian aviation expert Anatoliy Khrapchynskyi reported on February 11 that Russian forces had reduced their use of Kh-101 and Kh-555 cruise missiles and were increasingly using Kh-59 and Kh-69 cruise missiles.[6] ISW has observed Russian forces rarely using Kh-101, Kh-55, and Kh-555 cruise missiles against Ukraine since February 2025 and infrequently using Kh-59 and Kh-69 cruise missiles since March 2025. Russian forces most recently used almost 60 cruise missiles against Ukraine on April 24, but Russia typically uses large numbers of Shahed and decoy drones to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses in nightly strikes and has recently relied on small numbers of ballistic missiles to conduct more targeted strikes against Ukrainian cities.[7] Russian forces appear to be increasing their use of long-range drones and decreasing their use of cruise missiles in strikes against Ukraine, possibly to conserve the fixed-wing airframes that Russian forces use to launch cruise missiles.
Ukraine and Russia conducted a second round of prisoner-of-war (POW) exchanges on May 24 as part of a larger 1,000-for-1,000 exchange agreed upon during recent bilateral negotiations in Istanbul. Ukrainian and Russian officials announced that Ukraine and Russia each exchanged 307 POWs.[8] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian POWs included those serving in the Ukrainian Army, Naval Forces, State Border Service, and the National Guard.[9] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted that Ukraine and Russia have each exchanged a total of 697 soldiers and civilians over the last two days. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russian authorities are transporting the Russian servicemembers to Belarus for rehabilitation.[10]
Russian officials will reportedly submit a draft document of their conditions for peace in Ukraine following the conclusion of the POW exchanges, although Russia's conditions are unlikely to be anything short of Ukraine's full surrender. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated on May 23 that Ukraine expects Russia to present a draft proposal for an unconditional ceasefire agreement after the third and final POW exchange on May 25.[11] Sybiha added that Ukraine welcomes the participation of US President Donald Trump and European leaders in future peace talks and that Ukraine has not ruled out the possibility of holding a meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated on May 23 that Russia would be ready to present Ukraine with Russia's draft document on a "long-term settlement of the crisis" as soon as the POW exchange is completed.[12] Lavrov's statement highlights the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to force Ukraine and the West to begin long-term peace negotiations without an active ceasefire in place, in contrast to US, Ukrainian, and European efforts to first secure an unconditional ceasefire agreement prior to any long-term peace talks. ISW continues to assess that Russia remains committed to pursuing demands that amount to nothing short of Ukraine's full capitulation and that Russia will continue to pursue this objective so long as Putin believes Russia can militarily defeat Ukraine.[13]
Russian forces have significantly expanded their salient southwest of Kostyantynivka in recent weeks and established sufficient positions to launch an offensive operation toward Kostyantynivka from the south or to support the envelopment of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad from the northeast in the coming weeks and months. Geolocated footage published on May 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Popiv Yar (west of Toretsk) and seized the fields southeast of the settlement.[14] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 23 that elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) participated in the advance near Popiv Yar and that Russian forces also advanced north and south of Oleksandropil (southeast of Popiv Yar).[15] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing further into Poltavka (north of Popiv Yar) and toward Rusyn Yar (northeast of Popiv Yar).[16] Another Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are advancing near Novoolenivka (east of Popiv Yar).[17] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have seized most of Romanivka (southeast of Popiv Yar) and that Russian forces are eliminating the remaining Ukrainian positions south and southeast of Zorya (southeast of Popiv Yar).[18]
The Russian salient southwest of Kostyantynivka is likely sufficient to support a future Russian offensive operation toward Kostyantynivka or Pokrovsk, but Russian forces will have to make further advances from Chasiv Yar and Toretsk and west of Pokrovsk before Russian forces will pose a significant threat to either of these towns. ISW has observed geolocated footage indicating that Russian forces have advanced roughly 14 kilometers from the southwestern outskirts of Kostyantynivka at their closest point in this salient. Russian forces will be able to leverage this salient to advance further along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway from the south toward Kostyantynivka as Russian forces contend with Ukrainian defenses west of and along the Kleban-Byk reservoir. Russian forces must eliminate the remaining Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk and force Ukrainian forces to withdraw north of the Kleban-Byk reservoir before Russian forces will be able to advance further along the H-20 Donetsk City-Kostyantynivka highway to support future advances up to the southern outskirts of Kostyantynivka.
ISW previously noted that Russian forces have struggled to break out of Chasiv Yar and Toretsk, which has likely complicated Russia’s plans for an offensive against Kostyantynivka and the wider Ukrainian fortress belt.[19] Russian advances in Chasiv Yar have been slow over the last year, and Russian forces have yet to significantly reinforce the Russian grouping in this area to facilitate further advances. Russian forces will have to break through Ukrainian defenses and advance south and southwest of Chasiv Yar before Russian forces will be able to threaten Kostyantynivka from the northeast. Russia reinforced its force grouping in Toretsk in early 2025, but Russian forces continue to struggle to advance through the contested "gray zone" that Ukrainian and Russian drone operators have created within Toretsk and immediately west of Toretsk. Russian forces must advance in the fields north, northwest, and west of Toretsk and seize positions further along the T-0516 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway before Russian forces can launch a serious offensive operation against Kostyantynivka. The Russian salient southwest of Kostyantynivka is therefore only one of the three necessary areas where Russian forces must make further advances in order to seriously threaten Kostyantynivka.
Russian forces must advance further west of Pokrovsk if they intend to envelop Pokrovsk and avoid fighting through the town's urban areas in Summer 2025. Russian forces largely abandoned efforts to expand their salient southwest of Pokrovsk when Ukrainian forces conducted a series of counterattacks south and southwest of Pokrovsk in February 2025. Russian forces have not reintensified this effort and have instead prioritized advances further southwest of Pokrovsk toward Novopavlivka in March, April, and May 2025. Russian forces must reintensify their efforts to advance west of Pokrovsk toward Hryshyne if Russian forces intend to force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Pokrovsk under threat of envelopment. Russian forces have recently intensified assaults immediately southeast and south of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, and Russian forces may be preparing to attack into the towns themselves to support the envelopment effort, as Russian forces did in Avdiivka, Vuhledar, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka over the last year. Russian forces will also have to contend with ongoing Ukrainian counterattacks and drone operations throughout the Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk directions in future offensive operations. ISW continues to assess that Russia is unlikely to have sufficient manpower, materiel, and operational planning capabilities to conduct both an envelopment of Pokrovsk and a significant offensive operation toward Kostyantynivka in the coming months and will likely have to prioritize one direction.[20]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces conducted one of the largest combined drone and missile strikes of the war against Ukraine on the night of May 23 to 24, but used fewer missiles than in previous large-scale combined strikes.
- Ukraine and Russia conducted a second round of prisoner-of-war (POW) exchanges on May 24 as part of a larger 1,000-for-1,000 exchange agreed upon during recent bilateral negotiations in Istanbul.
- Russian officials will reportedly submit a draft document of their conditions for peace in Ukraine following the conclusion of the POW exchanges, although Russia's conditions are unlikely to be anything short of Ukraine's full surrender.
- Russian forces have significantly expanded their salient southwest of Kostyantynivka in recent weeks and established sufficient positions to launch an offensive operation toward Kostyantynivka from the south or to support the envelopment of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad from the northeast in the coming weeks and months.
- The Russian salient southwest of Kostyantynivka is likely sufficient to support a future Russian offensive operation toward Kostyantynivka or Pokrovsk, but Russian forces will have to make further advances from Chasiv Yar and Toretsk and west of Pokrovsk before Russian forces will pose a significant threat to either of these towns.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on May 24.[21]
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacks near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) on May 23 and 24.[22]
Order of Battle: Drone elements of the Russian 1st Specialized Motorized Rifle Regiment (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces) and 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Kursk Oblast and near the international border with Sumy Oblast.[23] Russian opposition media, citing sources familiar with the situation, reported in August 2024 that the Russian military command formed the 1st Specialized Motorized Rifle Regiment from VKS personnel in May and June 2024 and deployed the regiment to the international border several weeks before Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024.[24] Russian sources claimed that the Russian military command intended to utilize the regiment to temporarily reinforce the Russian border in Kursk Oblast, but the VKS may have formed another motorized rifle regiment in Winter 2024-2025.[25]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on May 24.
Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a chemical plant in Tula Oblast and a defense industrial plant in Lipetsk Oblast on May 24. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported on May 24 that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Azot chemical plant – one of Russia's largest chemical plants – in Novomoskovsk, Tula Oblast, and that the plant specializes in producing ammonium nitrate, methanol, and argon.[26] Geolocated footage published on May 24 showed smoke rising from the Azot plant.[27] Tula Oblast Governor Dmitry Milyaev claimed on May 24 that a Ukrainian drone strike damaged an acid container at a nearby enterprise in Novomoskovsk, but that the acid did not contaminate the air.[28] Lipetsk Oblast Governor Igor Artamonov claimed on May 24 that an unspecified number of Ukrainian drones struck the Yelets industrial zone.[29] Ukrainian forces struck the Russian Energiya chemical and weapons component plant in Yelets on May 23.[30]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on May 24 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Russian forces recently seized Loknya (northeast of Sumy City).[31] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces entered Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City), but a Russian milblogger denied this claim.[32] A senior Ukrainian officer also denied Russian claims that Russian forces have entered Yunakivka.[33]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Sumy City near Loknya, Yunakivka, and Bilovody on May 24.[34]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on May 23 and 24 but did not advance.[35]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on May 24 that Russian forces advanced in Vovchansk.[36]
A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Kharkiv direction told Sky News on May 24 that Russian forces are massing personnel along the frontline in northern Kharkiv Oblast and are preparing to attack along the international border into northern Kharkiv Oblast.[37] The Russian military command may intend to leverage some of the Russian force grouping in Kursk Oblast to intensify offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast. The force grouping includes elements of Russia's airborne (VDV) and naval infantry units, although ISW has not observed reports of redeployments to this area.[38]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 24 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on May 24 that Russian forces seized Radkivka and Kindrashivka (both north of Kupyansk).[39]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka, Dvorchina, and Dvorichanske and toward Kutkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Kolisnykivka on May 23 and 24.[40]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[41]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 24 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Nova Krukhlyakivka and Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Olhivka on May 23 and 24.[42]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 23 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in central Lypove (north of Lyman).[43]
Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Novomykhailivka, Lypove, and Zelena Dolyna and toward Karpivka; northeast of Lyman near Nove, Kolodyazi, and Yampolivka; east of Lyman near Torske and Kopanky on May 23 and 24.[44]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on May 24 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in an area up to 300 meters by 200 meters southwest of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka.[45]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk toward Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and south of Siversk near Pereizne on May 23 and 24.[46]
Order of Battle: Elements of the “Smuglyanka” Detachment are reportedly operating near Siversk.[47]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on May 24 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[48] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have not seized the settlement, however.[49]
Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechnye and Bila Hora, and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka and toward Dyliivka on May 23 and 24.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stupochky.[51]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Stupochky.[52]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: See topline text for reports of assessed Russian advances in the Toretsk direction.
Unconfirmed claims: See topline text for claims of Russian advance in the Toretsk direction.
Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Krymske, Dachne, and Dyliivka; northeast of Toretsk near Ozaryanivka; east of Toretsk near Druzhba; northwest of Toretsk toward Pleshchiivka; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Novospaske; south of Toretsk near Bila Hora; and southwest of Toretsk near Romanivka, Nova Poltavka, Yablunivka, Hnativka, Zorya, Stara Mykolaivka, Popiv Yar, Poltavka, and Rusyn Yar on May 23 and 24.[53]
Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on May 24 that Russian forces are increasingly relying on civilian vehicles such as the UAZ-452 in the Toretsk direction in place of armored vehicles.[54]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Toretsk direction.[55]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on May 24 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in an area up to two kilometers deep and 12.5 kilometers wide to the southern and eastern outskirts of Shevchenko Pershe (east of Pokrovsk).[56]
Russian forces attacked east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Yelyzavetivka, Shevchenko Pershe, and Malynivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne on May 23 and 24.[57]
A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are actively using fiber optic drones resistant to electronic warfare (EW) in the area.[58]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 24 indicates that Russian forces advanced in northern Bohdanivka (southeast of Novopavlivka) and likely seized the settlement.[59] Russian milbloggers credited elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), including its 80th Tank Regiment, with seizing Bohdanivka and recently seizing Troitske.[60]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on May 23 that Russian forces, including elements of the 90th Tank Division, advanced to the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border on May 22 and consolidated positions along the border.[61]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Novomykhailivka and toward Marivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Troitske and Horikhove on May 23 and 24.[62]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on May 24 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 23 that Russian forces are advancing west of Odradne toward Komar (both west of Kurakhove).[63]
Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Andriivka, Kostyantynopil, and Bahatyr and southwest of Kurakhove near Odradne on May 23 and 24.[64] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 24 that elements of the Russian 29th CAA (Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Odradne, and ISW assessed that Russian forces seized the settlement as of May 23.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bahatyr.[66]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on May 24 but did not make any confirmed advance.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) with recently seizing half of Novopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[67] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Fedorivka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and in Zelene Pole (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[68]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Velkya Novosilka near Burlatske, Komar, and Vesele; west of Velkya Novosilka near Vilne Pole; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka, Zelene Pole, and Rivnopil on May 23 and 24.[69]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Zaporizhia direction on May 24 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked south of Orikhiv in the direction of Novodanylivka and southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove and Mali Shcherbaky on May 23 and 24.[70]
Russian forces conducted assaults in the Kherson direction on May 24 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction and east of Kherson City near the Antonivka Roadway Bridge on May 23 and 24.[71]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
See topline text for reports of Russian strikes in Ukraine.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Belarus is reinforcing and modernizing its armed forces ahead of the upcoming “Zapad-2025” joint Russian and Belarusian military exercise. Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin stated on May 24 that the Belarusian forces will receive an unspecified number of Su-30SM2 aircraft, Mi-35 helicopters, BTR-82As, electronic warfare (EW) systems, and unmanned aerial systems sometime next week and that approximately 8,000 Belarusian soldiers will train on the new equipment ahead of the upcoming exercise.[72] Belarusian International Military Cooperation Department Head Valery Revenko stated on February 20 that the "Zapad-2025" exercise will occur in mid-September 2025, but it remains unclear how many total Russian and Belarusian servicemembers will participate.[73]
Belarusian Military Industrial Chairperson Dmitry Pantus reported that Belarus signed military production contracts worth over $390 million during the MILEX-2025 international exhibition of arms and military equipment forum in Minsk, Belarus, on May 21 to 24.[74]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/kpszsu/34940
[2] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14320; https://t.me/kpszsu/34940; https://t.me/synegubov/14436; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1162 ; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1164 ; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1025471-rosia-dronami-atakuvala-kiiv-so-vidomo/ ; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1179; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4664 ; https://t.me/fesykkyrylo/2751 ; https://www.facebook.com/DSNSKyiv/posts/1112753377552285?ref=embed_post; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4676; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/24/nichna-ataka-na-kyyiv-ye-postrazhdali-ulamky-vpaly-na-torgovyj-czentr/; https://t.me/gunpKyiv/9482; https://t.me/suspilnenews/50342; https://gp dot gov.ua/ua/posts/pravooxoronci-fiksuyut-naslidki-masovanoyi-ataki-voroga-na-stolicyu-15-postrazdalix-sered-yakix-dvoje-pidlitkiv; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/24/sered-postrazhdalyh-dvoye-pidlitkiv-v-ofisi-genprokurora-rozpovily-pro-naslidky-udaru-po-kyyevu/; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9304
[3] https://t.me/MID_Russia/59639; https://mid dot .ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2019580/
[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122724; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021125;
[5] https://www dot rbc.ua/rus/news/noviy-viklik-patriot-ignat-rozpoviv-k-rosiyani-1748077491.html ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/37657 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/45801
[6] https://euromaidanpress dot com/2025/02/11/russia-shifts-missile-strike-tactics-as-ukraine-deploys-f-16-jets-expert-says/; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021125
[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2025
[8] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/24037439 ; https://www.facebook.com/rustemumerov.ua/videos/2531353813875895/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/24/rustem-umyero-opublikuvav-video-zustrichi-307-ukrayinskyh-polonenyh/ ; https://t.me/Koord_shtab/12649; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/24/koordynaczijnyj-shtab-podilyvsya-podrobyczyamy-shhodo-drugogo-etapu-zvilnennya-ukrayinskyh-polonenyh/; https://t.me/DIUkraine/5976; https://t.me/DIUkraine/5986 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14321 ; https://suspilne dot media/1025697-ukraina-ta-rosia-proveli-drugij-etap-obminu-u-formati-1000-na-1000-kogo-povernuli/
[9] https://www.facebook.com/rustemumerov.ua/videos/2531353813875895/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/24/rustem-umyero-opublikuvav-video-zustrichi-307-ukrayinskyh-polonenyh/ ; https://t.me/Koord_shtab/12649; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/24/koordynaczijnyj-shtab-podilyvsya-podrobyczyamy-shhodo-drugogo-etapu-zvilnennya-ukrayinskyh-polonenyh/; https://t.me/DIUkraine/5976; https://t.me/DIUkraine/5986 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14321 ; https://suspilne dot media/1025697-ukraina-ta-rosia-proveli-drugij-etap-obminu-u-formati-1000-na-1000-kogo-povernuli/
[10] https://t.me/mod_russia/53058
[11] https://suspilne dot media/1025403-sibiga-ukraina-gotue-svoe-bacenna-peremira-ocikue-propozicij-vid-rosii/ ; https://suspilne dot media/1024465-u-mzs-zaproponuvali-bufernu-zonu-na-teritorii-rf-ukraina-peredala-spisok-na-obmin-1000-na-1000-1185-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1748020029&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[12] https://tass dot ru/politika/24033879
[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725
[14] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9219; https://t.me/proofs_dnepr/54158
[15] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92197
[16] https://t.me/yurasumy/23132
[17] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36299
[18] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92235 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29057 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23117 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23132
[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625
[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625
[21] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24684; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24633; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24630
[22] https://t.me/wargonzo/26729; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92207; https://t.me/dva_majors/71842
[23] https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/222630; https://t.me/dva_majors/71828; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92202
[24] https://istories dot media/en/news/2024/08/18/space-infantry-thrown-on-the-defense-of-the-kursk-oblast/ ; https://x.com/DefenceHQ/status/1826183862205980730
[25] https://vk dot com/wall-224543377_1629; https://dzen dot ru/b/ZvCK9d9ywWXTOEIs; https://pikabu dot ru/story/boytsyi_2go_motostrelkovogo_polka_vks_pozdravlyayut_veteranov_s_ikh_prazdnikom_pobedyi_12702733
[26] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9306 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/24/urazheno-himzavod-azot-u-tulskij-oblasti/ ; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/8264 ; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/drones-hit-the-azot-chemical-plant-in-russia/
[27] https://x.com/markito0171/status/1926162207999443013; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1926207218573078907
[28] https://t.me/tass_agency/316633
[29] https://t.me/igor_artamonov48/4435 ; https://suspilne dot media/1025541-u-rosii-povidomlaut-pro-novu-ataku-droniv-na-zavod-energia-v-lipeckij-oblasti/
[30] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-23-2025
[31] https://t.me/mod_russia/53051; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64548; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/8568; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92225
[32] https://t.me/tass_agency/316579; https://t.me/wargonzo/26729
[33] https://t.me/astrapress/81842; https://www.rbc dot ua/ukr/news/sili-oboroni-sprostuvali-chutki-rf-proriv-1748075770.html
[34] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92225; https://t.me/mod_russia/53051 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64548 ; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/8568; https://t.me/wargonzo/26729
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24684; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24633; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24630; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10626; https://t.me/dva_majors/71842; https://t.me/alehingennadiy/5494
[36] https://t.me/dva_majors/71842
[37] https://news.sky.com/story/kharkiv-why-russian-troops-are-massing-near-ukraines-fortress-city-13373348
[38] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment
[39] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13246
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24684; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24633; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24630; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10626
[41] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92196
[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24684; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24633; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24630; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10626
[43] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1926113866070515842; https://t.me/crewruss1a/24436
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24684; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24633; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24630; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10626; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29039; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29054
[45] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165741
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24684; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24633 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24630; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165741
[47] https://t.me/dva_majors/71833
[48] https://t.me/mod_russia/53052 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64548 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92226
[49] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36305
[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24684 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24633 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24630 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26729
[51] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64553
[52] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64553
[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24684 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24633 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24630 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10626 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92197 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64553 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36299 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92235 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29056 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23117
[54] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/24/buhanky-povertayutsya-rechnyk-pro-poyavu-u-voroga-novoyi-avtotehniky-na-toreczkomu-napryamku/
[55] https://t.me/dva_majors/71839
[56] https://t.me/yurasumy/23117 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92197
[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24684 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24633 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24630
[58] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/24/pompovi-rushnyczi-ta-kulemety-rechnyk-pro-zasoby-borotby-proty-droniv-na-optovolokni-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/
[59] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9214; https://t.me/rusich_army/23701
[60] https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/54385; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36268; https://t.me/rusich_army/23701; https://t.me/yurasumy/23116 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23131
[61] https://t.me/yurasumy/23131
[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24684 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24633 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24630 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23116 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36298
[63] https://t.me/yurasumy/23130 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15142 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64538
[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24684 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24633 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02tfRD1UmfZkyxvoqFx6ykiwfF5nHvE3Q6qgM9BftHEhq6mBz2dHqYYo4cau7h7KTNl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24630 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10626
[65] https://t.me/mod_russia/53053 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/53057 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-23-2025
[66] https://t.me/pozyvnoy_leon/13542 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36286
[67] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36270
[68] https://t.me/voin_dv/15142 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64538
[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24684 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24633 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02tfRD1UmfZkyxvoqFx6ykiwfF5nHvE3Q6qgM9BftHEhq6mBz2dHqYYo4cau7h7KTNl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24630 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10626 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64538
[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24684; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24633 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02tfRD1UmfZkyxvoqFx6ykiwfF5nHvE3Q6qgM9BftHEhq6mBz2dHqYYo4cau7h7KTNl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24630
[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24633; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24630; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02tfRD1UmfZkyxvoqFx6ykiwfF5nHvE3Q6qgM9BftHEhq6mBz2dHqYYo4cau7h7KTNl
[72] https://t.me/modmilby/47807 ; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/313573 ; http://belta dot by/society/view/kogda-v-belorusskuju-armiju-postupjat-istrebiteli-su-30sm2-rasskazal-ministr-oborony-716865-2025/; https://t.me/modmilby/47801 ; https://t.me/modmilby/47808 ; https://t.me/modmilby/47835; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/313626 ; https://belta dot by/regions/view/ochen-rad-chto-popal-v-etu-chast-bolee-25-tys-novobrantsev-prinjali-voennuju-prisjagu-v-72-m-outs-716889-2025/
[73] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2025
[74] https://t.me/belta_telegramm/313661 ; https://belta dot by/economics/view/bolee-390-mln-belarus-podpisala-rekordnoe-kolichestvo-kontraktov-na-milex-2025-716919-2025/
