Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Kelly Campa, Ben Schmida, Andie Parry, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, Victoria Penza, and Brian Carter
Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET
The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.
Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.
We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.
The Omani Foreign Minister announced a “ceasefire” between the United States and the Houthis after the Houthis reportedly agreed to end attacks on international shipping.[1] US President Donald Trump said that the United States will stop attacks on the Houthis, and in return, the Houthis will stop targeting maritime shipping.[2] The Houthis have not targeted shipping through the Red Sea since November 2024, making it unclear what concessions the Houthis provided to the United States. The United States launched the air campaign to ensure freedom of navigation, but it is unclear how long it will take for the risk-averse shipping industry to return to transiting the Red Sea.[3] Shipping prices remain higher than before October 2023, in part because shipping has not returned to the Red Sea for fear of Houthi attacks.[4] The United States began the campaign against the Houthis because the Houthis threatened to restart their attack campaign in the Red Sea if Israel violated the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, and the air campaign sought to establish deterrence vis-a-vis the Houthis.[5]
A very senior Houthi official framed the announcement as a victory and reiterated that they will continue to “support Gaza” against Israel.[6] Mohammad Ali al Houthi, one of the senior-most Houthi officials, said that the Houthis will continue to “support Gaza,” though it is not clear if the Houthis will continue to conduct maritime attacks. Houthi Spokesperson Yahya Sarea said on May 4 that by targeting Ben Gurion International Airport, the Houthis could continue to blockade Israel.[7] This may suggest that the Houthis will attempt to “blockade” Israel by attacking other Israeli assets.
The Houthis will very likely use the end of US airstrikes to rebuild their anti-ship cruise and ballistic missile stockpiles to target shipping in the future. The Houthis have learned that they can disrupt international shipping markets at any time and for any reason of their choosing with minimal consequences. The US air campaign probably inflicted some tactical setbacks for the Houthis by targeting weapons depots, communications sites, supply chains, and command –and –control assets. A US official told CNN that the effect on Houthis' operations was “limited.”[8] But all air campaigns generate only temporary effects, and the Houthis will be able to rebuild these assets while implementing lessons learned on how to better harden and protect their facilities.
The United States reportedly deployed two B-52H bombers to Diego Garcia.[9] The deployment of two B-52Hs adds to the six B-2 Spirit stealth bombers already at Diego Garcia. The B-52H is not a stealth aircraft, though it has nearly double the payload of the B-2.[10] The United States previously increased its military presence at Diego Garcia Island in March 2025.[11] Senior Iranian military officials threatened to target Diego Garcia in response to the initial US build-up in March 2025.[12] This suggests that Iran may perceive the US deployments as a threat. The military buildup comes amid US-Iran nuclear talks and Houthi attacks on Israel.
Damascus has appointed influential armed group commanders accused of human rights abuses to Syrian army posts, which likely seeks to ameliorate influential armed groups in the short term but risks alienating minority communities over the long term. Syrian media reported on May 5 that the Syrian Defense Ministry (MoD) appointed Brigadier General Ahmad al Hais (Abu Hatem Shaqra) to lead the newly-formed 86th Division.[13] Ahrar al Sham, a once-powerful Islamist group during the civil war, expelled Shaqra for banditry and other crimes.[14] Shaqra then founded and commanded Ahrar al Sharqiya in 2016, a faction within the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) comprised of fighters from eastern Syria who were close to Shaqra.[15] The United States sanctioned Ahrar al Sharqiya and Shaqra in 2021 for committing abuses against civilians, particularly Syrian Kurds, and integrating former ISIS members into its ranks.[16] Shaqra has limited experience commanding forces in combat, and it is unclear what practical qualifications he has as a division commander.[17] Shaqra does have a large number of fighters and a ”mafia-like network” that could benefit Shara.[18] This suggests that Shara is offering concessions to a powerful warlord rather than selecting a competent combat commander.
Damascus has also appointed several other SNA commanders accused of human rights abuses to high-level commands within the new army, including Suleiman Shah commander Abu Amsha, Hamza Division commander Sayf Abu Bakr, and Sultan Murad commander Fahim Issa.[19] Shaqra and these other SNA commanders all commanded SNA factions that retain their influence through local networks and have major international backers, like Turkey.[20] Fahim Issa, for example, is close to Turkish hardline politician and Erdogan ally Devlet Bahceli.[21] Shara likely calculates that he needs the support and cooperation of these groups to avoid infighting with powerful factions that would make it more difficult for him to extend his control over Syria. Shara recognizes that ignoring these factions or attempting to subordinate them by force is too difficult for his relatively meager armed forces, especially without Turkish assistance. The networks these individuals control could also rapidly destabilize certain areas of Syria.
These decisions will likely make integrating minority armed groups much more difficult, particularly the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Shaqra and other SNA commanders' previous abuses against minority communities in northeastern Syria, such as the Kurdish and Yazidi populations, will likely threaten Shara’s efforts to expand and legitimize central authority over Syria in the long term. Shaqra’s new 86th Division will reportedly operate in Raqqa, Deir ez Zor, and Hasakah provinces, which are sensitive commands given their large Kurdish population and the ongoing negotiations over the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)’s integration into state security services.[22] A spokeswoman for the SDF’s Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) condemned Damascus’s appointment of Shaqra on May 6 and argued that it “legitimizes impunity and perpetrates violence against women and indigenous peoples.”[23] Shara risks disrupting Damascus’s negotiations and cooperation with communities whose support it needs, such as the Kurds.
Syrian President Ahmed al Shara could use an HTS-controlled administrative supervisory department to exert control over government ministries run by “independent,” non-HTS ministers. The Central Authority for Supervision and Inspection is a department within the government that the Assad regime used to “control, rather than supervise or inspect” government departments and ministries, according to a French journalist.[24] Shara appointed Amer Namas al Ali to lead the Central Authority on May 4.[25] Ali was a member of Jabhat al Nusra and subsequently HTS.[26] He reportedly helped structure HTS’s civilian Idlib-based government, the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG).[27] Ali’s appointment suggests that Shara could use the Central Authority to exert control over government ministries controlled by non-loyalists. Shara appointed nine “independent” ministers to his cabinet on March 29, who do not have ties to HTS or the SSG and are professionals, former activists, and former Assad-era ministers who served in their positions before the civil war.[28] These "independent” ministers lead ministries that directly influence Syrian society, including education, information, communications, and religious endowments.[29] Shara made these appointments under considerable domestic and international pressure to broaden his ruling coalition, and placing loyalists or ideologues in these roles would have caused significant internal blowback and created more challenges for his effort to remove sanctions.[30] He could exert his control by using bureaucratic bodies if he used the Central Authority to control or influence decisions in the ministries, as the Assad regime did.
Iran is trying to expand security and economic ties to bolster its influence in Africa. Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan visited Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on May 6.[31] Radan signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the Ethiopian Federal Police to expand bilateral cooperation in counterterrorism, cybercrime, drug and human trafficking, and arms smuggling. Radan separately visited Burkina Faso on May 6 to advance bilateral police cooperation and share security expertise.[32] Radan has led high-level security engagements since 2023 with Iraq, Vietnam, China, Malaysia, Tajikistan, and Russia, all of which resulted in agreements focused on intelligence sharing and training programs.[33] Iranian (LEC) commanders traditionally rarely traveled abroad, but Radan started increasing his foreign engagements as part of an effort that likely aligns with Iranian strategy to professionalize and modernize the Iranian law enforcement apparatus and to export Iranian military, defense, and enforcement technologies. This cooperation likely includes the exchange of expertise on oppressive policing tactics, crowd control, digital surveillance, and methods for suppressing dissent—capabilities that the Iranian regime has honed through decades of internal security operations. Cooperation with African countries would also allow Iran to build trust while simultaneously opening new avenues for economic partnerships and revenue streams. Iran previously pursued barter-style defense deals to gain critical resources, in which Iran received roughly 9 tons of Venezuelan gold in 2020 in exchange for technical support and refinery equipment.[34] These transactions reflect the Iranian strategy to leverage security exports to access hard currency and natural resources, alongside efforts to pair arms deals with economic outreach in Africa to secure uranium, expand influence, and mitigate sanctions pressure.[35]
Iran has also intensified its economic engagement with African countries through expanded trade, investment, and infrastructure initiatives. The Third Iran-Africa Economic Cooperation Summit, held in Iran from April 27 to May 1, highlighted Iran's focus on four priority sectors, including mining, agriculture, petrochemicals, and medical equipment.[36] Iranian officials announced plans to increase annual trade with Africa to 10 billion US dollars, backed by projects such as building industrial parks, refineries, and developing shipping lines and air routes to improve logistics.[37] Iran also signed multiple commercial and investment deals with African partners during the summit and emphasized expanding joint chambers of commerce, trade centers, and financing mechanisms, including a 2 billion Euro credit line and a new Iran-Africa development fund.[38]
Key Takeaways:
- US-Houthi Ceasefire: The Omani Foreign Minister announced a “ceasefire” between the United States and the Houthis after the Houthis reportedly agreed to end attacks on international shipping. US President Donald Trump said that the United States will stop attacks on the Houthis, and in return, the Houthis will stop targeting maritime shipping. The Houthis will very likely use the end of US airstrikes to rebuild their anti-ship cruise and ballistic missile stockpiles to target shipping in the future. The Houthis have learned that they can disrupt international shipping markets at any time and for any reason of their choosing with minimal consequences.
- US Deployments to Diego Garcia: The United States reportedly deployed two B-52H bombers to Diego Garcia. The deployment of two B-52Hs adds to the six B-2 Spirit stealth bombers already at Diego Garcia. The B-52H is not a stealth aircraft, though it has nearly double the payload of the B-2.
- Syrian Army Appointments: Damascus has appointed influential armed group commanders accused of human rights abuses to Syrian army posts, which likely seeks to ameliorate influential armed groups in the short term but risks alienating minority communities over the long term.
- Iran in Africa: Iran is trying to expand security and economic ties to bolster its influence in Africa. Iran has also intensified its economic engagement with African countries through expanded trade, investment, and infrastructure initiatives.
Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy
Iran and Russia continue to coordinate on US-Iran nuclear talks. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian held a call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on May 6 to discuss the progress of US-Iran nuclear negotiations and the implementation of the January 2025 Russo-Iranian Comprehensive Strategic Agreement.[39] Putin said Russia is ready to facilitate dialogue between Iran and the United States and provide "necessary technical assistance."[40] Russia has positioned itself to mediate and store Iranian enriched uranium since March 2025.[41] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia’s role in mediating US-Iran talks is unlikely to secure US interests, given Russia’s alignment with Iran.[42] Russian Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna, Mikhail Ulyanov, echoed Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi's comments and stated on May 3 that Iran has the right to possess the "full nuclear fuel cycle," including uranium enrichment capabilities.[43] Ulyanov also previously downplayed concerns by claiming that Iranian production of 60 percent enriched uranium poses “no weapons risk.”[44]
Iranian Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi appointed Brigadier General Ali Akbar Talebzadeh as Deputy Commander of the Artesh Air Force.[45] Talebzadeh previously served as Deputy Coordinator of the Artesh Air Force. Mousavi appointed Brigadier General Masoud Jafari as the new Deputy Coordinator of the Artesh Air Force.
The Iranian rial appreciated from 842,000 rials to one US dollar on May 5 to 825,500 rials to one US dollar on May 6.[46]
Syria
The General Security Service (GSS) will ban the use of motorcycles after 7 pm in Homs City in the coming days.[47] Armed gunmen have used motorcycles to kill religious minorities and other civilians, indicating that the GSS ban is a security measure.[48] The GSS will also ban armed motorcycle riders during the day in Homs.[49] Organized groups, like the Salafi-jihadi group Saraya Ansar al Sunnah, have also conducted motorcycle assassinations. The group assassinated an Alawite shop owner in Jableh, Latakia Province, using motorcycles on May 5.[50] The transitional government is likely attempting to dampen the sectarian violence and other general insecurity in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime.
The GSS thwarted two separate rocket smuggling attempts in the central Syrian desert on May 5. The GSS intercepted a gas truck carrying a large shipment of Iranian 107mm rockets in Sukhnah, Homs Province. The truck allegedly originated from SDF territory.[51] The GSS also arrested an individual attempting to smuggle rockets into Homs Province at a checkpoint in Hribsha, south of Deir ez Zor Province.[52] It is unclear who the intended recipient of these rockets was or their final destination.
Intra-Druze community violence continued in isolated cases between Druze groups collaborating with the transitional government and those with Assad ties in Suwayda Province. Local Druze factions affiliated with Assadist Raji Falhout and Naji al Shaarani attacked GSS-affiliated Druze Men of Dignity fighters in al Dour, near the Daraa-Suwayda provincial border.[53] The Falhout faction falsely believed that transitional government forces from Daraa Province had entered the village with the Men of Dignity.[54] Raji Falhout is sanctioned by the US Treasury for leading a “gang” that smuggled Captagon with Hezbollah and Assad’s Military Intelligence Directorate.[55] At least four men died in the fighting before Druze notables, including Sheikh Hamoud al Hanawi, visited the village to restore calm.[56] Unspecified armed groups separately mortared a village five miles north of al Dour, emphasizing that violence is ongoing in isolated areas.[57] Intra-community divisions will likely continue to surface as Druze factions further integrate into the transitional government security structure. Factions that have economic incentives for opposing the government, like those affiliated with Captagon smuggling, are likely to be the fiercest resistors to transitional government integration.
The transitional government deployed to the Damascus-Suwayda road on May 6 as part of an agreement between Druze leaders and Suwayda Governor Mustafa Bakour.[58] The transitional government initially deployed the Syrian 40th Division to villages along the Damascus-Suwayda road on May 1 before passing responsibility to the GSS.[59]
Newly formed divisions within the Syrian army have continued to train new recruits across Syria in recent days. Southern Syria-based media reported on May 4 that the first class of 40th Division recruits graduated from a training course and deployed to Daraa Province.[60] The 40th Division is based in southern Syria and is expected to eventually deploy forces in Daraa and Suwayda.[61] A second class of 900 recruits is expected to graduate within days and also deploy within Daraa Province.[62] 62nd Division Commander Abu Amsha also posted photos on social media on May 5 showing 62nd Division soldiers firing rifles and rocket-propelled grenades during a training exercise.[63] The 62nd Division is currently operating in Hama Province.[64] Syrian media also reported on May 3 that recruits from the central Badia-based 42nd Division graduated from an engineering training course.[65]
Anti-government actors inside and outside of Syria are reportedly encouraging Syrians to sabotage public services, likely as part of efforts to undermine the transitional government. A Sunni activist from Latakia Province said on May 5 that actors inside and outside of Syria have encouraged Syrians to sabotage Syrian public services by stealing electricity cables, sabotaging internet service, or destroying water infrastructure.[66] The activist said unknown actors have conducted sabotage operations like these “every day and night” and that these efforts have prevented the government from successfully advancing infrastructure and public services in the area.[67] Insurgent leaders may calculate that deteriorating economic conditions and the government's inability to fix or provide basic services will weaken popular support for the government and generate momentum for the insurgency. This would be consistent with the objectives and strategies of pro-Alawite insurgents based in the coastal region, which appear motivated by an interest in restoring Assad-era power structures to address economic grievances and security concerns. That actors outside Syria are attempting to build support for the insurgency is consistent with several former Assad regime officials who have taken responsibility for or claimed to have supported the pro-Alawite coastal insurgency.[68]
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan discussed Turkish efforts to protect Syria’s territorial integrity and ensure its stability during a phone call with US President Donald Trump on May 5.[69] Erdogan asked Trump to consider easing sanctions on Syria, stating that it would contribute to Syrian and regional stability.[70]
Iraq
Iraqi National Security Advisor Qasim al Araji discussed the implementation of the March 2023 Iraq-Iran bilateral security agreement with the Iranian Ambassador to Iraq Mohammad Kazem al Sadiq on May 6.[71] Sadiq is a former member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force.[72] The security agreement requires Iraqi authorities to disarm Kurdish opposition groups and relocate their members away from the Iran-Iraq border.[73] The Iraqi federal government banned all Iranian Kurdish opposition political, military, economic, and social activity on April 24 as a part of the implementation of the agreement.[74] Iraqi Interior Minister Abdul Amir al Shammari separately said in a May 6 interview that Kurdish opposition groups withdrew from the Iran-Iraq border and that Iraqi Border Guards had backfilled Kurdish opposition positions along the border.[75]
Arabian Peninsula
Axis of Resistance objectives:
- Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
- Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
- Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip
CENTCOM conducted at least seven airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen after 1:00 pm ET on May 5.[76] All the airstrikes happened before the ceasefire. CENTCOM conducted at least four airstrikes in two sorties on unspecified Houthi facilities in al Sawad in southern Sanaa City.[77] CENTCOM also struck Houthi-controlled Ras Issa Port three times.[78]
Israel conducted at least 10 airstrikes on May 6 targeting critical Houthi infrastructure near Sanaa City, in response to the Houthis’ ballistic missile attack on Ben Gurion Airport, Israel, on May 4.[79] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) stated that they destroyed Sanaa International Airport.[80] Yemenia Airlines suspended all flights to and from Sanaa International Airport until further notice and confirmed that Israeli airstrikes demolished the airport’s passenger terminal and three Yemenia aircraft.[81] Israel separately struck Asr, Heyzaz, and Dhaban power stations near Sanaa City, which reportedly caused power shortages in the Houthi-controlled capital city.[82] Israel also struck the Amran Cement Factory west of Amran City at least four times. The IDF said that the Houthis used the factory to produce cement to build tunnels and military infrastructure.[83]
The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon
Nothing Significant to Report.
CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.
The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.
CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.
[1] https://x.com/badralbusaidi/status/1919813712791363857
[2] https://www.cnn.com/2025/05/06/politics/us-to-stop-strikes-on-houthis-in-yemen
[3] https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4167047/uscentcom-forces-continue-to-target-houthi-terrorists/
[4] See Average Global Price To Ship a 40-foot Container Graph in topline section
[5] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1901001417831150000 ;
https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1901428374486089974
[6] https://x.com/Moh_Alhouthi/status/1919822836425793889; https://x.com/Moh_Alhouthi/status/1919822557529711004
[7] http://t.me/army21ye
[8] https://www.cnn.com/2025/05/06/politics/us-to-stop-strikes-on-houthis-in-yemen
[9] https://x.com/Global_Mil_Info/status/1919580907079405936
[10] https://www.northropgrumman.com/what-we-do/air/b-2-stealth-bomber/b-2-technical-details#:~:text=Payload%3A%20%3E%2040%2C000%20lbs.,Gross%20Takeoff%20Weight%3A%20336%2C500%20lbs.; https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104465/b-52h-stratofortress/
[11] https://www.twz.com/air/signs-u-s-massing-b-2-spirit-bombers-in-diego-garcia
[12] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-31-2025#_edn062bb439c55f31096bf74dd0ac5e664a9
[13] https://x.com/ScharoMaroof/status/1919333260087153133; https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1919349934639214893
[14] https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1919374323078267247
[15] https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1919371128302100651; https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1919373420296278177; https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1919378447228362904
[16] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0292#:~:text=the%20Syrian%20GID.-,AHRAR%20AL-SHARQIYA,engaged%20in%20the%20commission%20of%20serious%20human%20rights%20abuse%20in%20Syria.,-AHMAD%20IHSAN%20FAYYAD
[17] https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1919378825957220610
[18] https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1919384460794920960; https://studies dot aljazeera.net/ar/article/5530
[19] https://x.com/HamamIssa7/status/1886753130521501747 ; https://x.com/Seyfebubekir/status/1886127717457740034; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1903768244650983866
[20] https://newlinesmag.com/reportage/syrias-new-rulers-are-working-to-unify-military-power/
[21] https://x.com/Eyupyildizlar/status/1911192322613576075
[22] https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1919365978384654383
[23] https://www dot npasyria.com/212446/
[24] https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1918960083255357548
[25] https://x.com/SyPresidency/status/1918921929429332291
[26] https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1918964911637496024
[27] https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1918964911637496024
[28] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/30/world/middleeast/syria-new-transitional-government.html
[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-31-2025
[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-31-2025
[31] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6458617/
[32] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85824720/
[33] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85290352 ;
https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/1906244 ;
https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/5996375 ;
https://www.irna dot ir/news/85480608 ;
https://www.isna dot ir/news/1402102417390 ;
https://www.irna dot ir/news/85155437
[34] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-30/iran-is-hauling-gold-bars-out-of-venezuela-s-almost-empty-vaults
[35] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-may-2-2024-iran-pursues-economic-and-military-influence
[36] https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/512591 ;
https://www.irna dot ir/news/85814587
[37] https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/512591
[38] https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/512591 ;
https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/512357
[39] https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-discussed-iran-us-talks-with-tehran-kremlin-says-2025-05-06/ ; https://www.irna dot ir/news/85825025/
[40] https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-discussed-iran-us-talks-with-tehran-kremlin-says-2025-05-06/ ; https://www.irna dot ir/news/85825025/
[41] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2011803/ ; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-03-04/iran-putin-to-help-trump-broker-nuclear-talks-with-tehran ; https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/03/04/putin-agrees-help-trump-direct-talks-with-iran/
[42] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-may-2-2025#_ednb577f185a42d90c85febe5ad70b0865335
[43] https://basirat dot ir/fa/news/375597/
[44] https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/cz7v1y7gj99o
[45] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/744168/
[46] https://www.bon-bast.com/
[47] https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1BmPM4wCJn/ ; https://x.com/NavvarSaban/status/1919353148726030348
[48] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-5-2025#:~:text=Unidentified%20gunmen%20on,on%20May%204. ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1903189886137667966
[49] https://x.com/NavvarSaban/status/1919353148726030348
[50] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1919467741204873590 ; https://t.me/alaydiat/277 ; https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=670303958966843&set=a.104872708843307&type=3
[51] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1919457007871930811
[52] https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1919465864882991360
[53] https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/1919758799335796988 ; https://x.com/SyrNetworkNews/status/1907826566471528572 ; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1919732048811425850
[54] https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/1919750451035066823
[55] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2648
[56] https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/1919792922255392845 ; https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/1919748212807602260 ; https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid0JRXszDVo49cpJrEsGrQdxV9N3nZXMH5NtVHP2H8uPFBwW1sn57P91zYFB1QBKqfrl?__cft__[0]=AZWYPHSks-Jv4jTntvS9dqNOIsA2JKAjuAc7DqZPqHS2cINWO0vcTDn9AH8G7ERxUFNjvwv4eXke45zA6eswT25SPDTQumPeO7wWLOy-pKM8MTVms02SxKk6fRgF2ZmZ_F2uCwHyKddByi2JrbP9duIBnlzFKHKYdyO0DOvKx-IYUBA8UzK0wfakNgCftqHCKPIdX0wvjl1K-8gFrmJG6WNl&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1919790766076973392 ; https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/1919750451035066823/history
[57] https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid0FknK7oQ3iHG4ED6MHqAZx5SFpt5isfHqrkg64ja8k3Yrpf6Nn47sQYvyygj8cUP2l?__cft__[0]=AZXBKLMmtQdqUU85_idvLj4Bd_Yq5FxadH6toignKbeMFAu4wGDM-YPG5EUmFo6L0Ao0jJr358JDZmGoHyKAJboSzt74LLMTBpCjSIKSB6xlzeEJMmC4_ytJSQfImtg7WGg42rOFXkJihBHM4PSjjvBbwNO-J5rIxn_UYRwtiuKVRyYzUDsGWtJlrbq-VLJNdHWgt66KcOWMPmauAiuBcUa_&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid0y4JgwKWVVyjgfASF8pUXbfkjB5EEKULnuSj9apmALRCvYNPzg21AsNbNcCCMhXGal?__cft__[0]=AZWLTqtOwRXWsghTetgu2yzaVL6OUkGiyJ2O8WBp_b02clw1MyAt12SY6knV1MvDF3yS9S1hPjymd5AttHJtw1vhb39_R3d7zMygetrZN_g2ysIdrFZ0OKcLrI4zA3qI5wZ6fWHb6WMKVsxH08JUyUy5dtHHEQ-41coeccyrSZtrokeAqJr8ncAoZFJXrIhJXc34f-elVkhKwueVzIBjHoSY&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
[58] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1919708026153369915 ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate050525
[59] https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid0SdFRSPeN9sYq4MgmqLY44H1NpFR9ExRLrS1dZUfrLMBhjyg2xWR87vFgGrMqRPi9l ; https://t.me/AjaNews/375808 ; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/128797 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1919708026153369915
[60] https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=691676116892449&id=100081501990851&rdid=0Ej3yx5mQAZlbUMc#
[61] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1891120055770902697 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/136009
[62] https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=691676116892449&id=100081501990851&rdid=0Ej3yx5mQAZlbUMc#
[63] https://x.com/abo33amsha/status/1919519272600011197
[64] https://twitter.com/AliAlBarghout/status/1909014781954306257 ; https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=pfbid02yvCw1ied4VZdFafdahhWrTz6AQ1Py3XtCD57qZr3q4GTZXBCpJnqKf1a6peGSa6Rl&id=61570019040908
[65] https://t.me/ALBADIA_24/4220
[66] https://www.syriarevisited.com/p/sunni-activist-from-latakia-reflects
[67] https://www.syriarevisited.com/p/sunni-activist-from-latakia-reflects
[68] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-28-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-9-2025
[69] https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-says-he-had-productive-call-with-turkeys-erdogan-visits-planned-2025-05-05/ ; https://www.aa dot com.tr/tr/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-abd-baskani-trump-ile-telefonda-gorustu/3557804
[70] https://t.me/Euphrats_post/92104, https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1919434979798339744, https://www.aa dot com.tr/tr/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-abd-baskani-trump-ile-telefonda-gorustu/3557804
[71] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/politics/525296/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A9
[72] https://shafaq dot com/en/Report/Mohammed-Al-Sadiq-the-shadow-man-on-the-Iranian-helm-in-Iraq
[73] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraq-iran-sign-deal-tighten-border-security-2023-03-19/
[74] https://x.com/KurdistanWatch/status/1918352807217803366
[75] https://www.alarabiya dot net/arab-and-world/iraq/2025/05/06/%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86
[76] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1919462821777055791 ;
https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1919496900392165504 ;
https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1919500353311064526
[77] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1919462821777055791 ;
https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1919500353311064526
[78] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1919496900392165504
[79] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1919742997958152521
https://x.com/Jamal_Atamimi/status/1919740211065393391 ; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1919795281706578212;
https://x.com/idfonline/status/1919739981553123826
[80] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1919739981553123826
[81] https://x.com/South24E/status/1919785156111487405 ; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1919761204144177518
[82] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1919750773652496684 ;
https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1919742997958152521
[83] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1919795281706578212;
https://x.com/idfonline/status/1919739981553123826
