Kelly Campa, Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, Johanna Moore,
Ben Schmida, and Brian Carter
Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET
The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.
Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.
We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.
The Israeli prime minister and foreign minister said that Israel would “not allow the [Syrian] Druze ... to be harmed” and threatened additional airstrikes if the violence does not stop, suggesting that Israel aims to pressure the Syrian government into stopping the violence against Druze.[1] An effort to pressure the government to respond as directed assumes that the Syrian government has control over the Sunni fighters attacking Druze communities outside Damascus. Many of these fighters are ad-hoc collections of locals who are attacking the Druze.[2] Some government forces have attacked the Druze.[3] The government deployed General Security Service (GSS) units to cordon off the Druze areas, however, and some of these forces fought alongside local Druze fighters to repulse attacks by Sunni fighters.[4] The government’s deployments alongside local fighters, while other government-linked fighters attack local Druze, suggest that the government does not exert perfect command and control over its forces. The government’s limited control over some extremist elements of its ruling coalition, as well as the localized nature of some of the attackers, indicates that it will be impossible to use airstrikes to pressure the Syrian government into stopping the attacks.
Damascus very likely already wants to stop the violence because the attacks on the Druze make it more difficult to secure the external support Damascus needs to maintain its hold on power. The government faces an extremely dire economic situation and needs external aid and economic support, particularly from the West. Many countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, have repeatedly emphasized that Syria must prevent violence and hold those responsible accountable.[5] The government will need to convince these countries that the government is deserving of their support.
The airstrikes are unlikely to pressure the Syrian government to stop extremists from conducting attacks. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) chief of staff ordered the IDF to strike Syrian government targets “if the violence against the Druze does not stop.”[6] The government’s limited ability to demand that extremists stop their attacks means that even if the airstrikes did successfully pressure the Syrian government to make demands of Sunni fighters, it is unclear that government demands would have any effect. The government also has significant capacity issues, and airstrikes targeting the Syrian government will only make government efforts to stop the violence more difficult.
It is unclear how Israel can secure the Druze population in and around Damascus if the airstrikes fail. Airstrikes—if they fail to pressure the government—cannot prevent Druze from being killed or injured by Sunni extremists. Only ground forces prepared to physically defend the Druze communities by force can protect the Druze. It is unclear if Israel is willing or able to protect the Druze in places like Sahnaya and Jaramana, which are roughly 45km and 58km from the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights, respectively. Such a ground operation would be an extremely complex military undertaking. The lack of Druze support for Israeli intervention and the destabilizing effects of a ground operation in Syria mean a ground operation would likely fail and increase the threat to Israel by empowering extremists. Some Druze have protested against Israeli interference in Syria.[7]
Only the formation of a combined Druze-Transitional Government force could successfully secure Druze locals from Sunni extremists while also sidelining pro-Regime elements in the Druze community. The ongoing violence is not solely government against Druze violence. The current violence involves pro-government Druze factions, Druze militias associated with former Assad regime networks, local Sunni fighters, and government forces that are responsive to former Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) networks, and others.[8] The Syrian Druze are a politically diverse community (see discussion on different Druze positions below). Some key Druze powerbrokers are negotiating with the government to end the ongoing violence, as GSS and Druze forces have cooperated on the ground.[9] A decision by Damascus to rely on joint Druze-government units could successfully de-escalate the situation while extending government control over well-known bastions of pro-regime sentiment in Jaramana.[10] The government has already taken steps to form joint units.[11] The government’s decision to immediately engage local leaders and cooperate with some Druze militias suggests that Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara and his allies have learned from the experiences with Alawite militias in western Syria, where the failure to engage local leaders and Alawites contributed to continued tension.
Damascus has made serious efforts to curb confessional-motivated violence between Sunni extremists, Druze fighters, civilians, and security services. GSS units reportedly cordoned off Sahnaya and prevented additional external Sunni groups from participating in the clashes targeting Druze militants and civilians.[12] Government officials immediately ordered former Ahrar al Sham commander and 40th Division Commander Colonel Binyan al Hariri (Abu Fares Daraa) to deploy the 40th Division to Soura Kabira to secure the area after fighting between tribal fighters and Druze militiamen along the Damascus-Suwayda highway.[13] Government forces also began to deploy along the border between Suwayda and Daraa provinces on April 1.[14] These deployments follow several attacks that tribal groups launched on Druze towns along the western Suwayda border.[15] Security forces are expected to soon deploy across Suwayda Province.[16] These are tangible steps that suggest that the transitional government appears to be learning how to better contain violence targeting minorities and rebuild local trust since sectarian-motivated violence swept coastal Syria in March 2025.
CTP-ISW defines violence between the Muslim and Druze communities as “confessional” rather than “sectarian” because “sectarian violence” refers to violence between different religious denominations. “Confessional violence” refers to violence between different religions. Most Druze consider themselves a distinct religious group from Islam.[17]
Top Druze leaders continued to engage with the Syrian transitional government, even though Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri publicly denounced the government. Men of Dignity leader Laith al Balous and two prominent Druze sheikhs met with the governors of Suwayda, Daraa, and Quneitra provinces on April 30 and agreed to a ceasefire in Jaramana and Ashrafiyeh Sahnaya. Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri released a fiery statement after the meeting that compared the recent attacks on the Druze community to the massacres that targeted Alawites on the coast in early March.[18] The number of civilians killed and harmed in the recent attacks on Druze-majority areas in and around Damascus is several orders of magnitude lower than the number of civilians killed and harmed in Alawite areas along the coast.[19] Syrian and Turkish media reported that fewer than five civilians were killed in southern Syria.[20] Armed groups affiliated with the transitional government killed 420 unarmed people in western Syria in early March, including 39 children.[21] Hijri, who has consistently criticized the government, announced that he “no longer trusts a government that kills its own people” and called upon "international forces to intervene immediately.”[22] The clear fractures between Druze leaders on engaging the government did not prevent Balous and other Druze leaders from presumably negotiating the deployment of GSS forces across Suwayda Province.
Iraqi media reported on May 1 that former Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi and his Sunni rival Khamis al Khanjar formed an election-related agreement that “resembles reconciliation.”[23] Halbousi’s Progress Party and Khanjar’s Sovereignty Party will reportedly compete in the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections together or form a post-election alliance, according to a recent Iraqi media report. CTP-ISW assessed on April 28 that Halbousi may be cooperating with the Shia Coordination Framework to unseat his rival and current Parliament Speaker, Mahmoud al Mashhadani.[24] The recent report about a Khanjar-Halbousi reconciliation is inconsistent with the April 28 assessment and could suggest that Halbousi may not be cooperating with the Shia Coordination Framework. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Mashhadani, Khanjar, and Halbousi’s other historical rivals are members of the United Sunni Leadership Coalition that formed in early January 2025 and has explicitly supported long-held Sunni political demands.[25] Halbousi has also recently called for political action to achieve Sunni political demands, such as after the Federal Supreme Court suspended the implementation of a law that favored Sunnis in February 2025.[26] A Halbousi-Khanjar alliance would greatly increase Sunni electoral strength, as Halbousi’s party and Khanjar’s former party were the two highest-performing Sunni parties in the 2021 elections.[27]
The Houthis may attempt to pressure the UN into ending the UN Verifications and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM) by holding oil tankers and cargo ships in Houthi-controlled ports until the UN ends the mechanism. The United Nations implemented UNIVIM in 2016 to stop prohibited cargo, such as weapons, from being exported to Yemen, while ensuring that Yemen retained access to food and other necessary supplies.[28] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on May 1 that the Houthis are prohibiting oil tankers and cargo ships, including UNVIM cleared vessels, from leaving Ras Issa Port on the Hudaydah coastline.[29] The Houthis reportedly fired warning shots after one vessel attempted to exit, and armed Houthi fighters boarded other vessels.[30] There were at least 14 vessels anchored near Ras Issa Port on May 1, according to Maritime Traffic data. Many of these vessels travelled from Djibouti, where UNVIM officials inspect vessels transporting cargo to Yemeni ports. Houthi Foreign Minister Gamal Amer also recently called for the termination of UNIVIM in a letter to the UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, and the UN Security Council President, suggesting the Houthis may be using the vessels as hostages to renegotiate UNVIM or pressure the UN to change how the UNVIM operates.[31]
The fourth round of US-Iran nuclear talks in Rome on May 3 was postponed.[32] The Iranian Foreign Ministry reported on May 1 that US-Iran talks were rescheduled at the suggestion of the Omani foreign minister.[33] Omani Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad al Busaidi said the talks were rescheduled for "logistical reasons."[34] Iranian officials have repeatedly emphasized in recent months that Iran will not negotiate under military threat or economic pressure.[35] US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth threatened military action against Iran in response to Iran’s support for the Houthis in an April 30 tweet.[36] US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, who has led the US delegation in the first three rounds of US-Iran talks, retweeted Hegseth's comments. The United States separately sanctioned several entities and vessels on April 29 and 30 that were involved in Iran's ballistic missile program and Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products trade, respectively.[37] An unspecified senior Iranian official told Reuters on May 1 that US sanctions are not helping the US and Iran resolve nuclear disputes, and the next round of talks will be scheduled "depending on the US approach."[38] An Iranian expert close to the regime stated on May 1 that talks were postponed due to what unspecified Iranian sources called “contradictory US positions.“[39] The sources also said that the United States was trying to change the general framework of the talks. The Wall Street Journal reported on April 26 that one of the key disputes between Iran and the United States is whether a final agreement should address the Iranian missile program, which Iran has repeatedly indicated it is unwilling to make concessions on.[40] Iran and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) were also scheduled to hold talks in Rome on May 2 ahead of US-Iran talks.[41] It is unclear if Iran-E3 talks will also be postponed.
Iran continued to expand economic cooperation with China to undermine the US maximum pressure campaign. The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) reported on May 1 that Iran exported 1.6 million barrels per day of crude oil in April 2025.[42] United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) estimated that Iranian oil exports to China made up 97 percent of Iran's total oil exports in April.[43] Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian separately met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the BRICS security summit in Brazil on May 1.[44] Both officials emphasized the importance of expanding bilateral economic ties to "challenge unilateralism in the international arena.” Iran's participation in BRICS is part of its broader efforts to establish a parallel international order that challenges Western “dominance."[45] UANI also reported that Iran increasingly used tankers previously involved in Russian oil trades, further illustrating cooperation between major US adversaries.[46]
Key Takeaways:
- Israel in Syria: The Israeli prime minister and foreign minister said that Israel would “not allow the [Syrian] Druze...to be harmed” and threatened additional airstrikes if the violence does not stop, suggesting that Israel aims to pressure the Syrian government into stopping the violence against Druze. The airstrikes are unlikely to pressure the Syrian government to stop extremists from conducting attacks, because the government cannot order the extremists to stop. It is unclear how Israel can secure the Druze population in and around Damascus if the airstrikes fail. Airstrikes—if they fail to pressure the government—cannot prevent Druze from being killed or injured by Sunni extremists. Only the formation of a combined Druze-Transitional Government force could successfully secure Druze locals from Sunni extremists while also sidelining pro-Regime elements in the Druze community.
- Violence in Southern Syria: Damascus has made serious efforts to curb confessional-motivated violence between Sunni extremists, Druze fighters, civilians, and security services. GSS units reportedly cordoned off Sahnaya and prevented additional external Sunni groups from participating in the clashes targeting Druze militants and civilians.
- Druze-Damascus Relations: Top Druze leaders continue to engage with the Syrian transitional government, even though Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri publicly denounced the government. This demonstrates the political diversity among Syria’s Druze community.
- Iraqi Politics: Iraqi media reported on May 1 that former Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi and his Sunni rival Khamis al Khanjar formed an election-related agreement that “resembles reconciliation. The recent report about a Khanjar-Halbousi reconciliation is inconsistent with CTP-ISW’s April 28 assessment and could suggest that Halbousi may not be cooperating with the Shia Coordination Framework.
- Houthis and the UN: The Houthis may attempt to pressure the UN into ending the UN Verifications and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM) by holding oil tankers and cargo ships in Houthi-controlled ports until the UN ends the mechanism.
- Iran-US Talks: The fourth round of US-Iran nuclear talks in Rome on May 3 was postponed.
- Iran-China Cooperation: Iran continued to expand economic cooperation with China to undermine the US maximum pressure campaign.
Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy
The Iranian rial depreciated from 815,000 rials to one US dollar on April 30 to 820,000 rials to one US dollar on May 1.[47]
Senior Iranian military officials appear to be preparing for potential US or Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and energy infrastructure. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard visited the Southwestern Air Defense Zone on May 1 to inspect the site’s operational readiness and capabilities.[48] Sabahi Fard inspected radar and missile systems and stressed the zone’s critical role in protecting Iranian airspace. The site is located in Khuzestan Province, where there are many key Iranian ports and oil and gas infrastructure. Iranian Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi separately inspected the 4th Tactical Airbase in Dezful, Khuzestan Province, on May 1.[49] Artesh Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi and other senior officers accompanied Mousavi during the visit. Israel previously weighed potential strikes on Iranian oil infrastructure in October 2024, a move former US President Joe Biden opposed.[50]
Iran continues to strengthen economic ties with African countries, likely to bolster trade and mitigate the impact of Western sanctions. Iran hosted the third Iran-Africa Economic Cooperation Summit from April 27 to May 1 in Tehran.[51] This summit focused on opportunities to bolster trade in the areas of oil, gas, petrochemicals, mining, and energy. Representatives from 38 African countries and senior Iranian political officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian, attended the summit.
Syria
Turkey appears to be resuming its campaign to pressure the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to integrate into the Syrian state. An unspecified Turkish Foreign Ministry source claimed that Turkey seeks to “implement” the March 10 agreement between the Syrian transitional government and the SDF.[52] The agreement called for the representation of all Syrian communities and their participation in the political process, as well as the integration of all civil and military institutions in northeastern Syria into the Syrian state.[53] The March 10 agreement established a seven-point framework to guide future negotiations over the details of the agreement‘s implementation. Those negotiations have not occurred yet.[54] The official did not define what mechanisms Turkey would use to ”implement” the agreement. Turkey threatened to conduct a full-scale assault on SDF-held territories between December 2024 and March 2025 to compel the SDF to integrate into the Syrian state.[55] Turkish officials have consistently demanded that the SDF fully disarm and integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry.[56] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and Kurdish political parties remain at odds over Syria’s form of government, however. Neither side has made any major adjustments to their positions on Syrian centralization or military integration despite the March 10 Agreement between the two parties.
Iraq
Iran is reportedly attempting to avoid a major rift between Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in November 2025.[57] An Iraqi Dawa party member told Saudi media on May 1 that Iran would choose between Maliki and Sudani if Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr runs in the elections. Sudani and Maliki are both members of the Shia Coordination Framework. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. CTP-ISW assessed on April 30 that Iran is likely urging the Shia Coordination Framework unity ahead of the elections to improve the likelihood that Iranian-backed parties will maintain control of the Iraqi government.[58] Maliki and Sudani reportedly plan to run on opposing lists.[59] Sadr won the largest share of parliament seats in the 2021 election because his Shia National Movement ran on a single list, which would necessitate unity between Sudani and Maliki if Sadr participates in the elections.[60]
Arabian Peninsula
Axis of Resistance objectives:
- Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
- Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
- Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip
US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 10 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since 1:00 pm ET on April 30.[61] CENTCOM conducted an airstrike targeting Houthi fortifications in al Hawak District, south of Hudaydah.[62] The Houthis issued an evacuation order to residents in areas of the al Hawak District in November 2024, likely to use the land to construct these fortifications.[63] CENTCOM also conducted at least three airstrikes targeting Houthi underground facilities in Kitaf District, Saada Governorate, on April 30.[64] CENTCOM also struck Houthi infrastructure in al Khab al Shaaf District, al Jawf Governorate, on May 1 at least six times, which is approximately 50 kilometers (km) behind the frontlines in Marib Governorate.[65] A Yemeni analyst reported on April 13 that the Houthis had a training camp in Khab al Shaaf District.[66]
The Houthis claimed on April 30 that they launched an unspecified number of drones at the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier in the Arabian Sea.[67] Local sources reported on April 30 that the Houthis launched drones from the al Jawba area, south of Marib Governorate.[68]
The Houthis claimed on April 30 that they had launched two drones targeting an unspecified “vital” target in the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area and Ashkelon, southern Israel.[69] The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted a drone from Yemen on April 29.[70] Local sources reported on April 30 that the Houthis launched drones from sites in the Haradh area, Hajjah Governorate.[71]
The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon
Nothing Significant to Report.
CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks in the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.
The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.
CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.
[1] https://allisrael.com/amidst-clashes-in-syria-netanyahu-threatens-israeli-strikes-to-defend-druze-in-syria
[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-29-2025; https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1917955888352051332;
[3] https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid0SdFRSPeN9sYq4MgmqLY44H1NpFR9ExRLrS1dZUfrLMBhjyg2xWR87vFgGrMqRPi9l?__cft__[0]=AZXuWQ3OdcLnmR5SXeyvNF5fYPHeBF2bbjAxLPZxwbu1rrSEyd6iEZe5epVZ3tgRgqfDGhdyf8HTveI-tk98B1VvDxPsHGFIwqgU8TXp1_UN_Hyu7gljtWVACyUUqtfvLXPw3tBM5vB3UA3qq5HKZnwFZ3Ix0aIii9V-1t-coDCnCQ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R;
[4] https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1917946008106836318 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1917516256892141682 ; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1917404525280776500 ; https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid0AZ94tv4czygGaDS7zvfHU9HvkuNpGscrdhVhwD8wuXgDhhJYH1Nf3jjDUT1brfjnl
[5] https://x.com/SecRubio/status/1898833468441981178; https://www.reuters.com/world/uk-lifts-sanctions-against-syrias-defence-ministry-intelligence-agencies-2025-04-24/
[6] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1917566064788992133
[7] https://www.newarab.com/news/syrians-protest-against-israeli-attempts-divide-south
[8] https://x.com/sameersaboungi/status/1917435513415348358; https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1917955888352051332; https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1917946008106836318
[9] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1917516256892141682; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1917602765250965546
[10] https://x.com/sameersaboungi/status/1917435513415348358;
[11] https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid0SdFRSPeN9sYq4MgmqLY44H1NpFR9ExRLrS1dZUfrLMBhjyg2xWR87vFgGrMqRPi9l?__cft__[0]=AZUETTAmKqqsN1qeXt7N6XQzMtFKE-N3RfNkYAv3ORN8LA3x43rIh0sAv1wi38rnXjPqW6gAuysogSkJoHIEkpLCfdfbVBb_3AskQ_0MwkADI8MFmiI6cAs4rNgPjJypGTGTYqEgF1Zfh3ucfu0_Ss-ygztWLIMkB_M6lfbHzAAirOnJqmepUrjikKZyOxsR27MuW4Nw9drS938ADbbunoV_&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1917602765250965546; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1917649465143427525/photo/1
[12] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1917603572507722204
[13] https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid0SdFRSPeN9sYq4MgmqLY44H1NpFR9ExRLrS1dZUfrLMBhjyg2xWR87vFgGrMqRPi9l ; https://t.me/AjaNews/375808; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/128797
[14] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/128816
[15] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1917639052536275128; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1917662312330125701; https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/1917675308385288581
[16] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1918001746846101646; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1917988217489362964
[17] https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2016/03/21/5-facts-about-israeli-druze-a-unique-religious-and-ethnic-group/; https://www.ifcj.org/learn/resource-library/who-are-the-druze
[18] https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=1115236280646181&set=a.607854068051074
[19] https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/middle-east/16-killed-in-attacks-by-outlaw-groups-in-southern-syria-authorities-say/3553530 ; https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1917925886193442946 ; https://www.npr.org/2025/03/09/nx-s1-5322458/syria-revenge-killings-alawites-latakia
[20] https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/middle-east/16-killed-in-attacks-by-outlaw-groups-in-southern-syria-authorities-say/3553530 ; https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1917925886193442946 ; https://apnews.com/article/syria-israel-druze-clashes-sahnaya-jaramana-40f8aeec865c1d81f128b05ef21dfa59
[21] https://snhr.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/R250305E-1.pdf
[22] https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=1115236280646181&set=a.607854068051074
[23] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3-%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%89-%D8%AA%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%B6-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%AB%D9%82%D9%84%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%88%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%85-%D8%B5%D8%BA%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B3%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7
[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-28-2025
[25] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%83%D8%AA%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%AE%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%B3%D9%86-%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-18-2025
[26] https://x.com/AlHaLboosii/status/1886773790987763821 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-5-2025
[27] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/en/story/386432
[28] https://vimye.org/about
[29] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1917904883648270600
[30] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1917904883648270600
[31] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1917866771086016569
[32] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-iran-talks-postponed-new-date-depends-us-approach-iranian-official-says-2025-05-01/
[33] https://t.me/MFAIran/27078
[34] https://x.com/badralbusaidi/status/1917941337736827292
[35] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/28066 ; https://x.com/araghchi/status/1898858793934467171 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/irans-president-trump-i-will-not-negotiate-do-whatever-hell-you-want-2025-03-11/
[36] https://x.com/SecDef/status/1917741093392707886
[37] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0116 ; https://www.state.gov/maximum-pressure-sanctions-on-illicit-traders-of-iranian-petroleum-and-petrochemical-products/
[38] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-iran-talks-postponed-new-date-depends-us-approach-iranian-official-says-2025-05-01/
[39] https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/status/1917961234391224733
[40] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-and-iran-divided-by-key-question-in-nuclear-talks-59b26210 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-24-2025-67e1e57f7311a ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-28-2025
[41] https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-uk-france-germany-hold-nuclear-talks-friday-2025-04-30/
[42] https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/934236/download?inline
[43] https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/blog/april-2025-iran-tanker-tracker
[44] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6453139/
[45] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-august-24-2023#_edn468e988744e943807520b659438a957122 ; https://www.irna dot ir/news/84859472
[46] https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/blog/april-2025-iran-tanker-tracker
[47] https://www.bon-bast.com/
[48] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/11/3303226
[49] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/11/3303222
[50] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/09/biden-netanyahu-call-israel-attack-iran
https://www.axios.com/2024/10/02/iran-israel-missile-attacks-response
[51] https://en.isna dot ir/photo/1404020704425/The-3rd-Iran-Africa-Economic-Cooperation-Conference ; https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6453407/
[52] https://www.cnnturk dot com/turkiye/disisleri-kaynaklari-turkiyenin-beklentisi-suriye-yonetimi-ile-sdg-arasinda-varilan-mutabakatin-uygulanmasidir-2278259
[53] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-10-2025 ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/facilitating-new-sdf-agreement-key-stabilizing-syria
[54] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-10-2025
[55] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-19-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-3-2025
[56] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2024/12/19/turkiye-refutes-us-claims-of-ceasefire-with-syrian-kurdish-fighters ; https://www dot kurdistan24.net/en/story/828282/turkish-fm-sdf-must-dissolve-before-we-launch-a-military-operation ; https://damascusv dot com/archives/66220
[57] https://aawsat dot com/%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%82/%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%B6%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A7/5138335-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC-%D9%85%D8%B7%D8%A8%D8%AE-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%83%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B2%D9%84
[58] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-30-2025
[59] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%B4-%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA
[60] https://www.mei.edu/publications/iraq-crisis-elite-consensus-based-politics-turns-deadly
[61] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1917669019672248537 ;
https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1917705935494975509 ;
https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1917902106599580118 ; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1917860097830899749
[62] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1917669019672248537; https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1917705213315788814
[63] https://yemenfuture dot net/news/27279
[64] https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1917705935494975509
[65] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1917902106599580118; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1917860097830899749
[66] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1911509908660314565
[67] https://t.me/army21ye/2899?single
[68] https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1917718160347717811
[69] https://t.me/army21ye/2899?single
[70] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1917308196181393507
[71] https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1917718160347717811
