Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and Frederick W. Kagan
January 8, 2025, 5pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 12:15pm ET on January 8. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the January 9 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
Ukrainian forces struck
Russia's state-owned Kombinat Kristal oil storage facility near Engels,
Saratov Oblast on the night of January 7 to 8. The Ukrainian
General Staff reported that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence
Directorate (GUR) and the Unmanned Systems Forces struck the oil storage
facility and caused a large fire.[1]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the facility provides fuel
for the Russian military's Engels-2 Air Base and noted that strike will
create logistical issues for Russia's strategic aircraft based at the
airfield. Geolocated footage published on January 8 shows a large fire
at the storage facility, and Russian sources noted that the fire
continued to burn into the morning of January 8.[2]
Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin claimed that debris from a
falling drone struck an unspecified industrial facility near Engels but
later acknowledged that the strike caused a fire in the area.[3]
Ukrainian
forces struck a command post of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army
(CAA) (Southern Military District [SMD]) on January 8 in occupied
Khartsyzk, Donetsk Oblast.[4] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the 8th CAA used this command post to coordinate operations in Kurakhove.[5]
Russian sources amplified reports on January 8 that a Ukrainian
purported Storm Shadow strike against Lgov, Kursk Oblast on December 30
killed at least one serviceman in the Russian 104th Airborne (VDV)
Regiment (76th VDV Division) and three servicemen in the 76th VDV
Division.[6]
Key Takeaways:
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian
forces recently advanced in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast amid
continued offensive operations in the area on January 8. Geolocated
footage published on January 8 indicates that Russian forces advanced
into western Nikolaevka (northwest of Sudzha) and marginally advanced in
Makhnovka (southeast of Sudzha).[7]
Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on January 8 that
Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian roughly reinforced platoon-sized
mechanized assault in an unspecified area in Kursk Oblast.[8]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of
Sudzha near Malaya Loknya, Nikolayevka, Staraya Sorochina, Orlovka, and
Nikolayevo-Darino; northeast of Sudzha near Russkoye Porechnoye and
Cherkasskoye Porechnoye; east of Sudzha near Bondarevka; and southeast
of Sudzha near Makhnovka.[9]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Kositsa
(northeast of Sudzha) and that elements of the Russian 34th Motorized
Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District
[SMD]) are clearing Pogrebki (northwest of Sudzha).[10]
ISW has not observed visual confirmation of any of these claims,
however. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces
counterattacked near Pogrebki.[11]
Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly
operating in the direction of Sverdlikhovo (northwest of Sudzha).[12]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued limited
ground attacks northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Tykhe on
January 7 and 8 but did not make any confirmed advances.[13]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian
forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on
January 8 but did not make any confirmed advances. Ukrainian military
observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that the Russian 69th Motorized
Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military
District [LMD]) marginally advanced south of Dvorichna (northeast of
Kupyansk) and that Russian forces advanced along the Dvorichna-Kupyansk
highway towards Zapadne (southwest of Dvorichna and northwest of
Kupyansk).[14]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of
Dvorichna, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[15]
Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and northeast
of Kupyansk near Topoli (along the international border) and
Petropavlivka on January 7 and 8.[16]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian drone operators are able to
interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) near
Dvorichna.[17] The milblogger also claimed that Russian air strikes destroyed a river crossing near Kupyansk.
Russian
forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on
January 8 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers
claimed that Russian mechanized units seized two forested areas and
cleared Ukrainian forces from positions between Zahryzove and Lozova
(both northeast of Borova) and advanced west of Makiivka (southeast of
Borova).[18]
One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are five kilometers
from Borova, but ISW assesses that Russian forces have advanced roughly
12 kilometers from Borova as of January 8.[19]
Geolocated footage published on January 7 shows a lone Ukrainian
armored vehicle temporarily advancing into and then retreating from
Kolisnykivka (northeast of Borova) without encountering Russian forces,
indicating that Russian forces may not hold positions throughout the
settlement.[20]
Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle
Division and the 47th Tank Division (both of the 1st Guards Tank Army
[GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are advancing on the east (left)
bank of the Oskil River, most likely referring to the section of the
bank of the Oskil River near Kolisnykiva.[21]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove; east of
Borova near Nadiya, Kopanky, Novoyehorivka, and Pershotravneve; and
southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka, Cherneshchyna, and Makiivka on
January 7 and 8.[22]
Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General
Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Raihorodka
(east of Borova).[23]
Russian
forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on January
8 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed
on January 7 and 8 that Russian forces advanced towards Kolodyazi and
Myrne (both northeast of Lyman) along the west (right) bank of the
Zherebets River.[24]
ISW currently assesses that Russian forces are about 3.5 kilometers
from Kolodyazi and has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.
Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Lyman near
Ivanivka, Kolodyazi, Terny, and Zarichne on January 7 and 8.[25]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian
forces continued offensive operations near Bilohorivka (northeast of
Siversk) on January 7 and 8 but did not make any confirmed advances.[26]
A Russian milblogger claimed on January 8 that Russian forces are
gradually advancing south of Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk), but ISW
has not observed confirmation of this claim.[27]
The commander of a Ukrainian unit operating in the Siversk direction
reported on January 8 that Russian forces are conducting guided glide
bomb strikes against Siversk and nearby areas, sometimes striking one
street with three-to-four glide bombs at a time.[28]
The commander stated that Russian forces are conducting small infantry
assaults during periods of freezing temperatures and bad weather at dawn
and dusk. The commander added that Russian forces use motorcycles,
buggies, armored vehicles, and tanks to transport infantry to frontline
positions.
Russian forces continued offensive operations
in the Chasiv Yar direction on January 8 but did not make any confirmed
advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 217th
Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) advanced to the
intersection of Dniprovska and Kovalevskoho streets in central Chasiv
Yar and that Russian forces advanced south of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (north
of Chasiv Yar).[29]
ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian
forces continued attacking near Chasiv Yar itself; northeast of Chasiv
Yar near Vasyukivka and Bondarne; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky
and Bila Hora on January 7 and 8.[30]
Element of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps
[AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 331st VDV Regiment (98th
VDV Division) are reportedly operating near the Refractory Plant in
central Chasiv Yar.[31]
Russian
forces continued to advance in northern and northwestern Toretsk amid
ongoing offensive operations in the area on January 8. Geolocated
footage published on January 7 and 8 indicates that Russian forces
recently marginally advanced in northern and northwestern Toretsk.[32]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near the
Toretsk Mine in northern Toretsk, are clearing Ukrainian forces from
Dachne (north of Toretsk), and are attacking towards Dyliivka (north of
Toretsk) along the railway line.[33]
ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Another
Russian milblogger noted that the Ukrainian force grouping in Toretsk
has relied on drone operations and limited mobile assault groups to deny
Russian advances in large parts of the contested "gray zone" in Toretsk
in recent months but that Russian forces are now advancing more rapidly
in the settlement.[34] Russian forces continued offensive operations in Toretsk itself and north of Toretsk near Dyliivka on January 7 and 8.[35]
Elements of the Russian 1st, 9th, and 132nd motorized rifle brigades
and 80th "Sparta" Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (all 51st Combined
Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) are
reportedly operating in Toretsk.[36]
Russian
milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently interdicted the T-0504
Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway northeast of Pokrovsk amid ongoing
offensive operations near Pokrovsk on January 8. Russian milbloggers
claimed that Russian forces with armored vehicle support and elements of
an unspecified Russian airborne (VDV) unit interdicted the highway near
Malynivka (northeast of Pokrovsk) on January 7, but ISW has not
observed confirmation of this claim.[37]
Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to the
northwestern outskirts of Zvirove (south of Pokrovsk) and that the
Russian military command transferred additional forces to support
assaults on Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk) but characterized Russian
advances in this area as "crawling."[38]
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that the
Russian military command recently introduced elements of the 55th, 35th,
137th, and 74th motorized rifle brigades (41st CAA, Central Military
District [CMD]) into combat south of Pokrovsk under the command of the
90th Tank Division (41st CAA) and 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA,
CMD).[39]
Mashovets stated that Russian forces also recently introduced an
unspecified motorized rifle regiment into combat near Vozdvyzhenka (east
of Pokrovsk). The staff sergeant of a Ukrainian brigade operating in
the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces recently intensified
offensive operations south of Myrnohrad (just east of Pokrovsk),
transferred fresh forces to this area, and are using civilian vehicles
to transport infantry to frontline positions for assaults.[40]
A Ukrainian source stated that Russian forces are transferring
unspecified units from the Kurakhove direction to the vicinity of
Myrnohrad.[41]
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself;
east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Baranivka, Yelyzavetivka, Tarasivka,
and Vodyane Druhe; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar;
south of Pokrovsk near Zelene, Novyi Trud, and Zvirove; and southwest of
Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Nadezhdynka, Novovasylivka, and Yasenove on
January 7 and 8.[42]
Elements of the Russian 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized
Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD) and the 907th Reconnaissance Battalion are
reportedly operating near Pokrovsk.[43]
Russian
forces recently marginally advanced in the Kurakhove direction amid
continued offensive operations in the area on January 8. Geolocated
footage published on January 7 indicates that Russian forces recently
marginally advanced east of Dachne (west of Kurakhove).[44]
Russian forces continued attacking near Kurakhove itself; northwest of
Kurakhove near Shevchenko, Petropavlivka, Slovyanka, and Sribne; west of
Kurakhove near Dachne, Kostyantynopil, Andriivka, and Ulakly; and
southwest of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopolske, Yantarne, and Rozlyv on
January 7 and 8.[45]
Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 6th and 80th tank
regiments and 428th Motorized Rifle Regiment (all 90th Tank Division,
41st CAA, CMD) continue operating in the Slovyanka-Petropavlivka area.[46]
Elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment and 103rd Motorized Rifle
Regiment (both 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern
Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Kurakhove.[47]
Russian
forces continued offensive operations south of Velyka Novosilka near
Vremivka and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on January 8 but
did not make confirmed advances in the area.[48]
Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle
Brigade (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are attacking Velyka
Novosilka from the southwest and are trying to advance along the Velyka
Novosilka-Hulyaipole road.[49]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian
forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on
January 8 but did not make any confirmed advances. The spokesperson of a
Ukrainian brigade operating in the Orikhiv direction reported on
January 8 that Russian forces are conducting small infantry assaults
several times per day in an attempt to identify weaknesses in Ukrainian
defensive lines.[50]
The spokesperson added that Russian forces are largely not using
armored vehicles in assaults in this area. The Russian Ministry of
Defense (MoD) stated that elements of the Russian BARS-11 "Kuban"
Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are training in a rear area in
the Zaporizhia direction to prepare for future combat operations near
Orikhiv.[51]
Elements of the Russian BARS-Sarmat Detachment (Russian Combat Army
Reserve) and the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in
the Kamyanske direction (northwest of Robotyne).[52]
Ukrainian
and Russian sources stated on January 8 that Ukrainian forces launched a
missile strike against an empty oil storage facility near the port in
occupied Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast.[53] ISW has not observed footage of the strike.
Russian
forces continued assaults in the Dnipro direction, including near
Kozatskyi Island (northeast of Kherson City near Nova Kakhovka) and
Velykyi Potomkin Island (south of Kherson City) on January 7 and 8 but
did not make any confirmed advances in the area.[54]
Elements of the Russian 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined
Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 80th Arctic
Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military
District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Kherson Oblast.[55]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian
forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night
of January 7 to 8. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on January 8 that
Russian forces launched 64 Shahed and decoy drones from Oryol, Kursk,
and Bryansk oblasts, and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[56]
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 41 drones
over Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Zhytomyr,
Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Kirovohrad oblasts; that 22 decoy drones
were “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW)
interference; that three drones returned to Russian airspace; and that
one drone flew towards Belarusian airspace as of 0900 local time (adding
up to 67 drones). The Kyiv Oblast Military Administration reported on
January 8 that debris from downed Russian drones caused minor damage to
houses in Kyiv Oblast.[57]
Zaporizhia
Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov reported on January 8
that Russian forces conducted a glide bomb strike against an industrial
infrastructure object in Zaporizhzhia City, killing 13 people and
injuring at least 63 people.[58]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Nothing significant to report.
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Russian
forces are increasingly using drones attached to fiber optic cables in
Ukraine. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade reported on January 8
that Russian forces are increasingly using drones attached to fiber
optic cables that are resistant to electronic warfare (EW) interference
in strikes against Ukrainian forces throughout the frontline.[59]
The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are not yet systematically
employing fiber-optic drones and noted that fiber-optic drones are
slower and less maneuverable than first-person view (FPV) drones, making
fiber-optic drones more vulnerable to small-arms fire. A Russian
milblogger claimed on January 8 that Russian forces were the first to
successfully develop and integrate fiber-optic drones into combat
operations in Ukraine but cautioned that Ukrainian would soon develop
similar innovations.[60] The milbloggers added that Russian forces will need to develop new means of downing Ukrainian fiber-optic drones.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW is not reporting on activities in Russian-occupied areas today.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
The
Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced that Belarusian
territorial troops are conducting exercises from January 8 to 31.[61] ISW assess that these exercises do not threaten Ukraine.
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vt6otEtGTzVuA2H3HBphTHXMs7FX4NYxY4Eb9VToLMEecUhTyo6ruXqefq7pRETtl
[2] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/10909; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24425; https://x.com/kromark/status/1876891135529890183; https://t.me/astrapress/71902; https://t.me/supernova_plus/35046; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/1876820317563244883; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1876922687760519258 ; https://t.me/engels24/15281; https://t.me/bbcrussian/75078 ; https://t.me/rybar/66989
[3] https://t.me/tass_agency/295044 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/295050 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/295053
[4] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19859
[5] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19859
[6] https://www.instagram.com/news_time_ing/ ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1876744884918395062 ; https://t.me/fortangaorg/19017 ; https://t.me/astrapress/71487 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2024
[7]
https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24439; https://t.me/kryvyirih17otbr/4079;
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8055;
https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1876950494788059632;
https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1876972421204312342;
https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1876938606696185994
[8] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84125
[9] https://t.me/dva_majors/62036 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150534 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61287 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22110 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20388 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/19969
[10] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84125 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20374
[11] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22110
[12] https://t.me/rusich_army/19953
[13]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M7XWfbU75vB3BTibWpszP3BUjq9PaNG6WLDd9vkf7gY34ygNPPx2DEy7eJTLoYsbl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0244dRwChkrwDMRNLnH6CqHuUy6dz9gJ4NQzTk9bWod6f8Nosavm1FzyzViD6vbr3Tl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DGzaZcyuXtZeUTHpdD1x946pErsMe2u46i1VbsFTAscgPpRw67aGEgxVqi2u7kbil ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3965 ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/3466
[14] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2481
[15] https://t.me/notes_veterans/21345
[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M7XWfbU75vB3BTibWpszP3BUjq9PaNG6WLDd9vkf7gY34ygNPPx2DEy7eJTLoYsbl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0244dRwChkrwDMRNLnH6CqHuUy6dz9gJ4NQzTk9bWod6f8Nosavm1FzyzViD6vbr3Tl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DGzaZcyuXtZeUTHpdD1x946pErsMe2u46i1VbsFTAscgPpRw67aGEgxVqi2u7kbil; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3965
[17] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22082
[18] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22082; https://t.me/notes_veterans/21345
[19] https://t.me/yurasumy/20371
[20]
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8051; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21043 ;
https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1876971442211832203;
https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1876973081803022661;
https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1876950837689295317;
https://t.me/ngu_3027/3559
[21] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2481
[22] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M7XWfbU75vB3BTibWpszP3BUjq9PaNG6WLDd9vkf7gY34ygNPPx2DEy7eJTLoYsbl
[23] https://t.me/Secrets_of_Vinakos/4871
[24] https://t.me/dva_majors/62036; https://t.me/notes_veterans/21345; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22072; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61272; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84098
[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M7XWfbU75vB3BTibWpszP3BUjq9PaNG6WLDd9vkf7gY34ygNPPx2DEy7eJTLoYsbl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0244dRwChkrwDMRNLnH6CqHuUy6dz9gJ4NQzTk9bWod6f8Nosavm1FzyzViD6vbr3Tl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DGzaZcyuXtZeUTHpdD1x946pErsMe2u46i1VbsFTAscgPpRw67aGEgxVqi2u7kbil; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3965; https://t.me/notes_veterans/21345; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61279; https://t.me/yurasumy/20385
[26]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M7XWfbU75vB3BTibWpszP3BUjq9PaNG6WLDd9vkf7gY34ygNPPx2DEy7eJTLoYsbl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0244dRwChkrwDMRNLnH6CqHuUy6dz9gJ4NQzTk9bWod6f8Nosavm1FzyzViD6vbr3Tl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DGzaZcyuXtZeUTHpdD1x946pErsMe2u46i1VbsFTAscgPpRw67aGEgxVqi2u7kbil ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3965
[27] https://t.me/yurasumy/20384
[28]
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2025/01/08/atakuyut-yak-u-radyanski-chasy-koly-i-yak-grupy-rosiyan-nastupayut-na-siverskomu-napryamku/
; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/920351-tri-cotiri-kabi-na-odnu-vulicu-vorog-ne-zalie-aka-taktika-rosijskoi-armii-na-siverskomu-fronti/
[29] https://t.me/rusich_army/19967 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20384
[30]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0244dRwChkrwDMRNLnH6CqHuUy6dz9gJ4NQzTk9bWod6f8Nosavm1FzyzViD6vbr3Tl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DGzaZcyuXtZeUTHpdD1x946pErsMe2u46i1VbsFTAscgPpRw67aGEgxVqi2u7kbil
; https://t.me/rusich_army/19967 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/19967
[31] https://t.me/rusich_army/19967
[32] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1876765731179651411; https://t.me/blackhawkteam5/12 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1876701087480066224; https://www.instagram.com/stories/asp.kr/3539302776203038428/
[33] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61292 ; https://t.me/rybar/66992
[34] https://t.me/yurasumy/20369
[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M7XWfbU75vB3BTibWpszP3BUjq9PaNG6WLDd9vkf7gY34ygNPPx2DEy7eJTLoYsbl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0244dRwChkrwDMRNLnH6CqHuUy6dz9gJ4NQzTk9bWod6f8Nosavm1FzyzViD6vbr3Tl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DGzaZcyuXtZeUTHpdD1x946pErsMe2u46i1VbsFTAscgPpRw67aGEgxVqi2u7kbil
[36] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2481 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13226 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13231
[37] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61290 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84124
[38] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61275 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61274
[39] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2479
[40] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/08/vorog-aktyvizuvavsya-v-napryamku-myrnograda-zamist-bronetehniky-obyrayut-bagi-ta-golf-kary/
[41] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21044
[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M7XWfbU75vB3BTibWpszP3BUjq9PaNG6WLDd9vkf7gY34ygNPPx2DEy7eJTLoYsbl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0244dRwChkrwDMRNLnH6CqHuUy6dz9gJ4NQzTk9bWod6f8Nosavm1FzyzViD6vbr3Tl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DGzaZcyuXtZeUTHpdD1x946pErsMe2u46i1VbsFTAscgPpRw67aGEgxVqi2u7kbil ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3965 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20378
[43] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84076
[44]
https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24432; https://t.me/MOLOT_4_46/25;
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8052;
https://x.com/giK1893/status/1876717797268414558;
https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1876916934396055691
[45]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M7XWfbU75vB3BTibWpszP3BUjq9PaNG6WLDd9vkf7gY34ygNPPx2DEy7eJTLoYsbl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0244dRwChkrwDMRNLnH6CqHuUy6dz9gJ4NQzTk9bWod6f8Nosavm1FzyzViD6vbr3Tl
; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DGzaZcyuXtZeUTHpdD1x946pErsMe2u46i1VbsFTAscgPpRw67aGEgxVqi2u7kbil ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3965 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61288 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61275
[46] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2480
[47] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84095
[48] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3965
[49] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2481
[50] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/08/u-zsu-poyasnyly-chomu-okupanty-ne-mozhut-dijty-do-robotynogo/
[51] https://t.me/mod_russia/47726
[52] https://t.me/dva_majors/62093
[53] https://t.me/tass_agency/295071 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/295072 ; https://t.me/bmvabrzo/474 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/31802 ; https://t.me/BalitskyEV/4595
[54]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0244dRwChkrwDMRNLnH6CqHuUy6dz9gJ4NQzTk9bWod6f8Nosavm1FzyzViD6vbr3Tl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DGzaZcyuXtZeUTHpdD1x946pErsMe2u46i1VbsFTAscgPpRw67aGEgxVqi2u7kbil ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02nkCnnWg6yur5fjNTXTqCHP2rk5B8s1LojAebSJyReS7xLuRK17JPRHXoiabX1JQul
[55] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31203 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/42878
[56] https://t.me/kpszsu/26447
[57] https://t.me/kyivoda/24221
[58]https://t.me/kyivoda/24221 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/37274 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/14988 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/15007 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/92360 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/12920 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/08/svidomyj-udar-po-mistu-prezydent-oprylyudnyv-vrazhayuchi-kadry-z-zaporizhzhya/ ; https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/28164 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/14979 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-strike-kills-13-ukrainian-city-zaporizhzhia-2025-01-08/#:~:text=ZAPORIZHZHIA%2C%20Ukraine%2C%20Jan%208%20(,also%20damaged%20in%20the%20strike. ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/14986
[59] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/08/letyuchi-zmiyi-vijny-u-zsu-rozpovily-yak-protydiyut-dronam-na-optyczi/
[60] https://t.me/Mestb_Dobroj_Voli/14026 ; https://t.me/rybar/66981
[61] https://t.me/modmilby/44325
