Iran Update, January 8, 2025

 Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Ben Rezaei, Katherine Wells, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, Avery Borens, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) are preparing for a possible offensive into US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-controlled territory in Syria. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on January 7 that Turkey would conduct a “military operation” against the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria if the YPG does not disband and integrate into the new Syrian Defense Ministry.[1] Turkey frequently conflates the YPG with the SDF and uses the YPG to refer to the entire SDF. Fidan’s comment is one of the most explicit statements by a senior Turkish official threatening military action against the SDF. The SDF is currently negotiating the terms of its potential integration into the future Syrian armed forces with the HTS-led interim government in Damascus, but it remains unclear if Turkey would wait for these negotiations to conclude before launching an operation.[2]

SNA forces have reportedly deployed and mobilized along SDF-SNA frontlines, which suggests that the SNA is preparing to launch a potential offensive against the SDF from the SNA-controlled Peace Spring area. The Peace Spring area is an SNA-controlled enclave between Ain Issa and Tal Tamr and north of the M4 Highway. Turkish state-run media reported on January 8 that the SNA sent “heavy weapons” to SDF frontlines in the Peace Spring area.[3] A commander in the Joint Force, an SNA formation that includes the Hamza Division and Suleiman Shah Brigade, said that the SNA sent fighters, tanks, and other vehicles to the frontlines overlooking the SDF-controlled towns of Kobani in Aleppo Province, Ain Issa in Raqqa Province, and Tal Tamr in Hasakah Province.[4] The US Treasury Department has sanctioned the commanders of the Suleiman Shah Brigade and Hamza Division for human rights abuses against Kurds.[5] Syrian media circulated footage on January 7 of a small convoy of T-series tanks and vehicles moving through Ras al Ain, a city in northern SNA-controlled territory along the Syria-Turkey border.[6] CTP-ISW can neither confirm local reports about SNA deployments nor comment on their size and scale. The reports of SNA mobilization are consistent with recent Turkish and Turkish-backed airstrikes and artillery shelling targeting SDF positions and assets along the Peace Spring line of control.[7] A Kurdish journalist separately reported that the SNA sent “significant” reinforcements to Jarabulus, which is north of the Qara Qozak Bridge on the western bank of the Euphrates River.[8]

The reported SNA deployments and the current SNA axes of advance toward SDF-controlled territory on the western bank of the Euphrates River provide contours of a potential future SNA offensive. Deployments to the “frontlines” of Kobani, Ain Issa, and Tal Tamr suggest that the SNA could launch a three-pronged assault to collapse SDF defenses along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River. One objective of this advance may be to capture Kobani or fix SDF forces around Kobani while a second prong advances west and southwards from the Ain Issa area towards the rear of the Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak Bridge positions. Some interim objectives could include cutting the M4 Highway to block any SDF reinforcements to the Qara Qozak Bridge from areas to the east. The reinforcements that the SNA reportedly sent to the Tal Tamr frontlines suggest that the SNA could advance east toward al Hasakah and attempt to isolate the northernmost Kurdish-controlled territory. The reinforcements that the SNA reportedly sent to Jarabulus could advance southwards toward the SDF bridgeheads on the western bank of the Euphrates River. The timeline of a potential SNA operation from Peace Spring territory is unclear, however.

It remains unclear if Turkey will pursue a military operation into northern Syria at the same time as a potential SNA assault on the SDF. It is unlikely that the SNA’s reported deployments are happening without Turkish approval and support. Turkey is currently conducting airstrikes to interdict SDF supplies in support of SNA operations, but these efforts could also be a precursor to a wider Turkish or Turkish-backed and –approved SNA operation. Turkey has also conducted drone strikes deeper into SDF-controlled territory, which could be part of Turkish efforts to set conditions prior to a Turkish operation. Syrian media reported on January 8 that Turkey conducted a drone strike targeting a vehicle in al Malikiya, in northeast Hasakah Province.[9] The strike likely targeted an SDF commander, given that the strike targeted only one vehicle.

Turkish or Turkish-backed SNA air assets struck a Kurdish government-organized civilian convoy traveling to Tishreen Dam on January 8.[10] The SDF and SNA have fought near the Tishreen Dam, east of Aleppo, since mid-December 2024. The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) which is the governing authority in northeast Syria and is affiliated with the SDF, called on January 7 for civilians to travel to the Tishreen Dam and protest Turkish-backed military operations there.[11] Local media reported that the SDF called on employees and teachers in Raqqa and Tabqa to attend the protest.[12] Videos posted on social media show that the convoy included around 100 vehicles, and a Kurdish social media user claimed that thousands of people “answered the call” to participate in the convoy.[13] Photo and video evidence from the site of the attack shows that a single strike targeted the road and a car in the convoy, causing at least two deaths.[14] The SDF said that a Turkish combat drone conducted the strike.[15]

The drone strike targeted an SDF supply line that Turkish forces have targeted since late December 2024 to try to isolate the SDF around the Tishreen Dam.[16] Turkish airstrikes reportedly killed four SDF fighters along the supply line, which flows across the dam, on January 6.[17]  Turkish backed-SNA forces continued to advance against several SDF positions on the western bank of the Euphrates River on January 8 as the civilian convoy approached the dam. The SDF reported intense fighting between the SDF Manbij Military Council and SNA forces in several villages north of Tishreen Dam.[18] The Turkish air campaign to cut off SDF resupply lines to the dam could weaken the SDF’s ability to defend against SNA attacks on the western bank.

 

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani traveled to Iran on January 8, likely to try to urge the Iranian regime to rein in Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Iranian media reported that Sudani would likely discuss “suspending the activities” of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba and Kataib Hezbollah, during his visit to Tehran.[19] Sudani’s visit to Tehran comes after Iraqi media reports that the United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[20] Iraqi National Wisdom Movement head Ammar al Hakim stated on January 4 that the incoming Trump administration has warned the Iraqi federal government that it will “target” Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[21] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes a large number of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[22] The PMF reports directly to Sudani on paper, but many of the militias that comprise the PMF answer to Iran in reality.[23] Sudani’s visit to Iraq also follows Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani’s visit to Baghdad on January 5.[24]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appears to have rejected Sudani’s request for Iran to rein in Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Khamenei stated during a meeting with Sudani that the PMF must be “further strengthened and preserved.”[25]

Sudani separately discussed decreased Iranian gas exports to Iraq.[26] Iran typically supplies approximately 40 percent of Iraq’s gas supply but has reportedly ceased gas exports to Iraq in the past two months.[27] Iran is currently facing a severe energy crisis marked by electricity and natural gas shortages, which has presumably caused it to reduce gas exports to Iraq.[28] Iraq and Turkmenistan signed an agreement in October 2024 for Iraq to import Turkmen gas via Iran to reduce Iraqi dependence on Iranian gas exports.[29] Iranian media reported on January 8 that the agreement has not come into effect, however.[30] It is unclear why Iraq and Turkmenistan have not implemented the agreement, given that there are existing gas pipelines between Iran and Turkmenistan and Iran and Iraq.

Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Baku, Azerbaijan, on January 8 to discuss strengthening political and security ties[31] Aliyev thanked Iran for supporting Azerbaijani “territorial integrity” and congratulated Azerbaijan on the “liberation of its land” after the September 2023 Azerbaijani military offensive into the Nagorno-Karabakh region.[32] Aliyev’s praise for Iran is notable given the recent tensions between Azerbaijan and Russia after Russian air defense likely shot an Azerbaijan Airlines passenger plane on December 25, causing it to crash in Kazakhstan.[33] Ahmadian separately emphasized the need to strengthen energy and transportation cooperation between Azerbaijan and Iran, including by completing the International North-South Transport Corridor.[34] Ahmadian will visit Armenia after his visit to Azerbaijan.

The IDF recovered the body of an Israeli hostage from a tunnel in Rafah, southern Gaza Strip, on January 7.[35] The IDF also found traces of another hostage in the tunnel. The IDF could not confirm the status of the second hostage. Israeli media reported that these hostages were previously thought to be alive.[36] The IDF also located the bodies of two or three militia fighters in the tunnel who were likely the captors of the hostages.[37] The IDF launched an investigation into the death of the hostage.[38]

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Syria: Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) are preparing for a possible offensive into US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-controlled territory in Syria. An SNA commander said that the SNA deployed forces to the line of control between the SNA and SDF in northern Syria. The reported SNA deployments and the current SNA axes of advance toward SDF-controlled territory on the western bank of the Euphrates River suggest the SNA may launch a three-pronged offensive designed to collapse SDF units along the eastern bank of the Euphrates.
• Tishreen Dam Airstrike: Turkish or Turkish-backed SNA air assets struck a Kurdish government-organized civilian convoy traveling to Tishreen Dam on January 8. The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) which is the governing authority in northeast Syria and is affiliated with the SDF, called on January 7 for civilians to travel to the Tishreen Dam and protest Turkish-backed military operations there.
• Iraqi Prime Minister in Iran: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani traveled to Iran on January 8, likely to try to urge the Iranian regime to rein in Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appears to have rejected Sudani’s request for Iran to rein in Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.
• Iran-Azerbaijan Ties: Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Baku, Azerbaijan, on January 8 to discuss strengthening political and security ties.
• Hamas-Held Hostages in the Gaza Strip: The IDF recovered the body of an Israeli hostage from a tunnel in Rafah, southern Gaza Strip, on January 7.
  
  

Syria

Axis of Resistance objectives:

•  Reestablish ground lines of communication through Syria to Lebanon
• Reestablish Iranian influence in Syria
  
  

A Southern Operations Room (SOR) spokesperson stated that the SOR seeks to integrate into the new Syrian army as a “pre-organized entity.”[39] The spokesperson, Naseem Abu Orra, told AFP on January 8 that the SOR opposes HTS leader and interim head of state Ahmed al Shara’s plan to disarm and dissolve armed groups into the new Syrian armed forces.[40] Orra, like many commanders in the Southern Operations Room, was a Syrian opposition commander who later reconciled with the regime and then, as the Assad regime fell, joined the SOR.[41] Orra said that the SOR would prefer to join the HTS-led Defense Ministry as a “pre-organized entity” with its own weapons and heavy equipment. CTP-ISW has previously assessed that HTS will likely absorb the various armed groups and functionally reflag them as new Syrian army units to ameliorate concerns about losing power among local leaders.[42] HTS has not yet presented a coherent plan for how it will structure the future armed forces.

The HTS-led interim government demanded that residents of al Sanamayn, northern Daraa Province, hand over weapons to security forces on January 8.[43] Interim government forces previously negotiated a ceasefire in al Sanamayn on January 5 between the Mohsen al Haymad faction and local factions affiliated with the SOR that allowed local fighters to retain personal weapons.[44] A delegation of government security forces met with al Sanamayn officials following demonstrations demanding accountability against the Mohsen al Haymad faction on January 6.[45] The interim government later ordered all city residents to bring weapons to a designated building within 24 hours or face “harsh measures.”[46] The order did not include exemptions for the SOR-affiliated locals. The SOR spokesperson indicated on January 8 that the SOR may be unwilling to disarm, as noted above.

Syrian media reported that the IDF advanced eastward into Abu Ghara and al Hiran, Quneitra Province, on January 8.[47] These towns are less than two kilometers from the disengagement zone. A Syria-focused journalist reported that Israeli forces raided and bulldozed an abandoned Syrian Arab Army (SAA) base near al Hiran before withdrawing. Syrian media reported that Israeli forces and tanks simultaneously advanced into al Asha, Quneitra Province, to search former SAA barracks before withdrawing from the area.[48]

The US Embassy in Damascus announced that unspecified US officials met with HTS-led interim government officials in Damascus on January 8 to reaffirm US support for “an inclusive and representative political transition.”[49] Syrian media, citing al Jazeera, reported that HTS leader and interim government head of state Ahmed al Shara met with a US State Department delegation, including incoming Donald Trump administration officials.[50] Axios reported that the delegation included former US Special Envoy to Syria Daniel Rubinstein.[51] A US State Department spokesperson stated that the United States seeks “tangible progress” on counterterrorism efforts against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and efforts to reduce Iranian and Russian influence in Syria.[52] The US and Syrian officials also discussed easing US sanctions on Syria, which is consistent with the Syrian interim government’s repeated calls for Western nations to lift sanctions on Syria. The US Treasury Department issued a general license for energy sales and personal remittances to Syria on January 6.[53] US State Department officials previously met with Shara in Damascus on December 20.[54]

HTS-led forces continued a security operation in western Rif Dimashq targeting former Assad regime members on January 8. An Interior Ministry source told state-run media that interim government forces clashed with “remnants” of pro-Assad militias in Zabadani, western Rif Dimashq. The source reported that HTS-led forces seized over 120,000 Captagon pills and over 50 pounds of hashish from the militias in the town, which is near the Lebanon-Syria border.[55] This operation follows the interim government’s completion of a four-day-long operation against pro-Assad remnants in Homs on January 6.[56]

Iraq

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and society
• Harden the Iraqi government against internal dissent
  
  

Five notable Iraqi Sunni politicians announced the formation of the “United Sunni Leadership Coalition” on January 8.[57] The politicians include:

• Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani,
• Sovereignty Alliance leader Khamis al Khanjar,
• Azm Alliance leader Muthanna al Samarrai,
• Al Jamaheer Party leader Ahmed al Jubouri (Abu Mazen), and
• Initiative Bloc leader Ziad al Janabi.

The politicians said that the coalition will focus on humanitarian, human rights, legal, and political issues facing Iraqi Sunnis, especially in northern and western Iraq. Mashhadani notably issued a statement, along with five other Sunni politicians, in mid-December 2024 calling for a “comprehensive national dialogue” to address political and economic grievances.[58] The formation of this Sunni political coalition comes around nine months before the Iraqi Parliamentary elections take place in October 2025.

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
• Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
• Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip
  
  

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted multiple airstrikes targeting two underground Houthi weapons storage facilities in Yemen on January 8.[59] Houthi media reported that the United States and the United Kingdom conducted two airstrikes targeting unspecified sites in the Jarban area, Sanaa Governorate, and five airstrikes targeting unspecified sites in Harf Sufyan District, Amran Governorate.[60] These airstrikes come after US CENTCOM Deputy Commander Vice Admiral Brad Cooper met with Deputy IDF Chief of Staff Major General Amir Baram in Israel on January 7 to discuss efforts to address the Houthi threat.[61]

 

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip
• Rebuild and Reestablish Hezbollah in southern Lebanon
• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel
  
  

The Gaza Strip

An IDF helicopter struck a Hamas headquarters in a school in Jabalia refugee camp in the northern Gaza Strip on January 8.[62] The IDF said that Hamas used the school complex to conduct attacks targeting Israeli forces and territory.[63] Unspecified Palestinian fighters separately detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) that killed three Israeli soldiers and wounded three others in Beit Hanoun, northern Gaza Strip.[64] 

Palestinian militias mortared the IDF along the Netzarim Corridor on January 8.[65]

The IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting Hamas fighters in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip on January 8.[66] The IDF said that the fighters participated in the Hamas-led October 7 attacks.

The IDF Air Force intercepted a rocket that crossed into Israeli territory from the southern Gaza Strip on January 8.[67] No Palestinian militia has claimed the attack at the time of this writing.

Lebanon

The IDF 300th Territorial Brigade (146th Division) destroyed five Hezbollah weapons depots in southern Lebanon on January 8.[68] The weapons depots contained loaded rocket launchers and over 200 mortars.[69] Israeli forces also destroyed three medium-range missile launchers in southern Lebanon.[70]

Lebanese media reported that Israeli forces and vehicles advanced northeastward from Aita al Shaab toward Debel, Nabatieh Governorate, on January 8.[71] Lebanese media reported that Israeli forces detonated explosives targeting unspecified infrastructure in Aita al Shaab.[72] Hezbollah-affiliated media claimed that an Israeli tank shelled a house in Aita al Shaab prior to the IDF advance toward Debel.[73] The IDF has operated in Aita al Shaab since early October 2024.[74]

Geolocated footage posted on January 8 showed an IDF tank shelling a house near Bint Jbeil.[75]  Lebanese media claimed on January 8 that the IDF “retreated” from Bint Jbeil toward Maroun al Ras.[76]

West Bank

The IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike targeting three fighters who were planting improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting IDF soldiers near Tamun, Tubas Governorate, in the northern West Bank, on January 8.[77] The IDF is investigating reports that the strike killed two children.[78]

The IDF clashed with Hamas gunmen near Talluza, Nablus Governorate, on January 7.[79] The IDF killed a Hamas “leader” in close-quarters combat.[80]

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei signaled opposition to negotiations with the United States during a speech to Iranians from Qom Province on January 8. Khamenei stated that Iranian "decision-makers must focus solely on the interests of the Iranian nation...and disregard the interests of America and [Israel] entirely." Khamenei may have directed this statement toward Masoud Pezeshkian administration officials who support resuming nuclear negotiations with the West.[81] Khamenei's statement marks a slight shift from some of his previous rhetoric in which he signaled his openness to nuclear negotiations with the West.[82]

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

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[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-says-it-will-mount-offensive-against-kurdish-ypg-if-group-does-not-meet-2025-01-07/ ; https://x.com/TC_Disisleri/status/1876690246630318549

[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-2-2025

[3] https://www.aa dot com.tr/ar/دولي/الجيش-الوطني-السوري-يرسل-أسلحة-ثقيلة-لجبهات-نبع-السلام/3444283  

[4] https://www.aa dot com.tr/ar/دولي/الجيش-الوطني-السوري-يرسل-أسلحة-ثقيلة-لجبهات-نبع-السلام/3444283   

[5] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1699

[6] https://x.com/ScharoMaroof/status/1876736904655159676; https://x.com/AJA_Syria/status/1876884112784621786 

[7] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1873370931885990238 ; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1873019434060923014  ; https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1869385902985732192  ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/132402  ; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1874767828651479186 

[8] https://x.com/ScharoMaroof/status/1876736904655159676

[9] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/132354 

[10] https://x.com/andynovy/status/1877007188473852164 ; https://x.com/enhawarnews/status/1877019485728567624 ; GRAPHIC https://x.com/farhad_shami/status/1876977331174084698

[11] https://x.com/aanes__official/status/1876666423894069720

[12] https://t.me/nahermedia/43776 ; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1876956772621017568

[13] https://x.com/2_egid/status/1876929929494806709 ; https://x.com/hawarhebo99/status/1876944743755612431 ; https://x.com/enhawarnews/status/1877019485728567624

[14] https://x.com/andynovy/status/1877007188473852164 ; https://x.com/ScharoMaroof/status/1876977728366256260 ; https://x.com/enhawarnews/status/1877019485728567624 ; https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1877002550165074268

[15] GRAPHIC https://x.com/farhad_shami/status/1876977331174084698

[16] https://t.me/sohebb1993/20764 ; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1874785806705197448 ; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1874827626059309187 ; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1874785806705197448 ; https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1873285400514695276

[17] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1876539573376893239/photo/1

[18] https://x.com/farhad_shami/status/1876940146257322432 ; https://x.com/farhad_shami/status/1877021983386534208 ; https://x.com/farhad_shami/status/1877000659356070224

[19] https://irannewspaper dot ir/8649/6/110907

[20] https://almadapaper dot net/389291/

[21] https://aawsat dot com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/5097823-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%85-%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B0%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A8-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9

[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces

[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces

[24] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202501059679

[25] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/27900

[26] https://irannewspaper dot ir/8649/6/110907

[27] https://irannewspaper dot ir/8649/6/110907 ;

https://thenewregion.com/posts/1176/iraq-to-lose-5-500-mw-amid-temporary-iranian-gas-supply-shutdown

[28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-23-2024

[29] https://mfa.gov dot tm/en/news/4181

[30] https://irannewspaper dot ir/8649/6/110907

[31] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/19/3234799/

[32] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/19/3234799/

[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28-2024

[34] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/19/3234799/

[35] https://x.com/IDF/status/1877028599070335198

[36] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/bodies-of-father-and-son-hostages-youssef-and-hamza-ziyadne-found-in-strip-says-family/

[37] https://t.me/moriahdoron/18114

[38] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1877024089988022391

[39] https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250108-south-syria-fighters-reluctant-to-give-up-weapons-spokesman  

[40] https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250108-south-syria-fighters-reluctant-to-give-up-weapons-spokesman

[41] https://daraa24 dot org/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AE%D9%87-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%87-%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%87-%D9%81%D9%8A/

[42] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-29-2024

[43] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1876989516642197714; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1876995452425445750 

[44] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-5-2025; https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1875871306991951937

[45] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1876927077741367548; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-6-2025

[46] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1876989516642197714

[47] https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1876846329084666267 ; https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1876850339397157111

[48] https://t.me/damascusv011/27483 ; https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1876846329084666267 ; www dot npasyria.com/202379

[49] https://x.com/USEmbassySyria/status/1876977031939821989

[50] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1877010306934747483; https://t.me/damascusv011/27554

[51] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1877048975041376486;

https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/248960.htm

[52] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1877048975041376486

[53] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-7-2025

[54] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-20-2024; https://www.axios.com/2024/12/20/us-syria-diplomats-meet-hts-leader

[55] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/120742

[56] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1876255100160844107

[57] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%83%D8%AA%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%AE%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%B3%D9%86-%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF

[58] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-7-2025

[59] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1876956279127597185

[60] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1876964945482371103 ; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1876964901467361513

[61] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-836490

[62] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1876950279876231297

[63] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1876950282862547072

[64] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/3-idf-soldiers-killed-during-fighting-in-northern-gaza-says-idf/

[65] https://t.me/abualiajel/562

[66] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1876741573523763228

[67] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1876958670107398190

[68] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1876947254759588300

[69] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1877026273844658509; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1876946975469240396

[70] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1877026273844658509; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1876946975469240396

[71] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110822; https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/126704; https://x.com/AlakhbarNews

[72] https://x.com/AlakhbarNews/status/1877020187729211442; https://x.com/AlakhbarNews/status/1877028523245809944; https://x.com/AlakhbarNews; https://x.com/AlakhbarNews/status/1877011560683430042; https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/126704; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/110822

[73] https://t.me/almanarnews/189955

[74] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-15-2024

[75] https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/1876900807389430006 ; https://x.com/N12News/status/1876909623174631756

[76] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/126656

[77] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1876901496333201761 ; https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1876915293403922533

[78] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1876929215347441877

[79] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/katz-deadly-west-bank-terror-attack-was-act-of-war-that-will-be-answered-in-kind/

[80] https://hamasinfo dot info/2025/01/07/5010/ ; https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8391/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%8A%D8%B2%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AF-%D8%AC%D8%B9%D9%81%D8%B1-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D8%AF%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B3%D8%A9

[81] https://english.khamenei dot ir/news/11381/Why-don-t-we-negotiate-with-the-US-Since-US-has-been-defeated ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/14/3231569 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-16-2024

[82]  https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-august-27-2024