Siddhant Kishore, Kelly Campa, Katherine Wells, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Avery Borens, and Brian Carter
Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET
The
Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and
the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which
provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that
undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.
Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here
to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition
offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static
maps present in this report.
We do not report in
detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in
Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are
assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of
armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity
even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Israeli
and Hamas officials appear to be optimistic after achieving a
"breakthrough” in ceasefire negotiations in Doha on January 13. Israel
and Hamas have yet to solve at least two outstanding issues, however.[1]
Two Israeli officials told Axios that mediators from
Qatar, the US, and Egypt presented Hamas with a “final draft” of the
agreement.[2] The draft stipulates that Hamas must release 33 hostages
during a 42-day ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Israel will begin
negotiations on the 16th day of the ceasefire to secure the release of
the remaining hostages in exchange for "high-profile" Hamas members,
according to details shared by an Israeli military correspondent.[3]
Negotiations
over the buffer zone and a continued IDF presence in the Gaza Strip
remain sticking points.[4] Israeli officials told an Israeli military
correspondent that the IDF will maintain its presence in the Netzarim
and Philadelphi corridors, which are two operationally significant
IDF-held areas, between the first and second phase of the ceasefire
agreement.[5] Another presumably separate Israeli official told Axios
that the IDF will “gradually withdraw” to a buffer zone along the border
and that the IDF will withdraw from the corridors.[6] The official did
not make clear when the IDF would withdraw from the corridors. A Hamas
official told CNN that negotiations regarding the buffer zone and a
permanent ceasefire are ongoing and remain “sticking points.”[7] Hamas
demands the buffer zone return to its pre-war width of 300-500 meters,
while Israel insists on a two-kilometer-wide zone along Gaza’s eastern
and northern boundaries.[8] The IDF intends to use this buffer zone to
protect Israeli communities in southern Israel. Israel will not
completely withdraw from the Gaza Strip until its war objectives are
achieved, among them the return of all the hostages, according to
Israeli officials speaking to an Israeli military correspondent.[9]
Hamas
is attempting to rebuild its military organization, but persistent IDF
pressure and the severely degraded state of Hamas’ military forces will
make this process extremely difficult and long. The Wall Street Journal reported
that senior Hamas military commander in the Gaza Strip Mohammad Sinwar
has reportedly begun operating autonomously from the main Hamas
leadership and ignored the Hamas decision to make decisions through a
leadership council.[10] Sinwar has begun recruiting Gazans by targeting
funerals and prayer gatherings and offering food, aid, and medical
assistance in return for service.[11] Hamas has obtained some of these
resources by hijacking aid convoys. The Wall Street Journal
also reported that Hamas is using unexploded ordinance to build new
improvised explosive devices.[12] New recruits are not capable of
successfully disassembling and reassembling unexploded ordinance to
build improvised explosive devices. Such efforts require relatively
experienced explosives experts. The loss of those experts due to Israeli
military action would likely have outsized effects on the nascent
reconstructed Hamas military organization, which will already need
substantial time and space to reconstitute itself.
Current
Israeli military operations are designed to prevent the successful
regeneration of Hamas by denying Hamas adequate safe areas to train new
recruits, particularly in the northern Gaza Strip. The IDF has
successfully achieved two key operational-level objectives: the
isolation of Hamas military forces in the northern Strip and the
destruction of Hamas’ military organization. Hamas fighters are now
operating as small fighting cells and not organized military units that
Hamas had in the early days of the war. Military units have
institutionalized command, recruitment, and replenishment functions that
make them resilient in the face of casualties and degradation.
Individual cells of fighters lack this institutionalization and are
relatively easy to destroy. A decentralized, guerrilla force like the
one Hamas employs can “wait out” the Israelis and prepare to rebuild,
however. The IDF is preventing the reconstitution of Hamas units by
isolating Hamas’ forces in the north and denying them sanctuary there by
repeatedly raiding areas where Hamas is strong.[13] These raids
gradually attrit Hamas fighters and make it impossible for Hamas to
train their new recruits to make them competent and capable against the
IDF.[14]
Sinwar has likely delegated control of day-to-day
efforts in the northern Gaza Strip to Hamas Gaza City Brigade commander
Izz al Din al Haddad, as CTP-ISW has previously assessed.[15] The
successful IDF effort to isolate the northern Gaza Strip both above and
below ground means that it is highly unlikely that Sinwar is capable of
communicating with forces in the north by runner or other physical
means. Sinwar or someone close to him could presumably communicate
electronically, but the use of electronic communications would be
extremely risky and therefore unlikely to enable Sinwar to exert
day-to-day control over Hamas’ military organization in the northern
Strip. Sinwar likely retains significant control over Hamas forces in
the central Gaza Strip and in Khan Younis, however.[16] The IDF raids
these areas only rarely and it is not permanently present close to many
of the major Gazan towns and cities in the Central Camps or Khan Younis
areas.
The IDF’s operational success in the Gaza Strip
obscures the strategic insufficiency of IDF operations if the Israeli
government desires to destroy Hamas fully. Sinwar and his close
commanders will almost certainly begin to rebuild Hamas after any IDF
withdrawal, though such an effort will take years of patient
reconstitution.[17] It is also far from clear that Sinwar would decide
to rebuild Hamas in the same way Hamas built itself from the 1990s to
2023, given the obvious failure of Hamas’ military operations in the
Gaza Strip and the inability of those operations to achieve any of
Hamas’ war aims. These war aims include the destruction of the Israeli
state by triggering a regional war or the destruction of the Abraham
Accords.
Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian
National Army (SNA) may be attempting to stretch the Syrian Democratic
Forces (SDF)’s bandwidth by threatening multiple areas simultaneously. Turkey
and the SNA continued shelling SDF positions along both the line of
control and deeper into SDF-held territory on January 13.[18] The SNA
has also reportedly deployed forces to the line of control near Tal Tamr
since at least January 8.[19] These deployments and the shelling around
Tal Tamr will almost certainly force the SDF to deploy forces to the
area to protect against any possible Turkish-SNA offensive, thus fixing
significant SDF forces far from the main fighting near the Euphrates.
Turkey and the SNA can therefore force the SDF to stretch its bandwidth
by allocating forces to Tal Tamr without an attack from Tal Tamr.
Stretching the SDF’s bandwidth would likely make Turkish or SNA
operations near Kobani or the Euphrates River much easier.
Turkey has continued to support SNA efforts to isolate and destroy SDF elements along the Euphrates River. Turkey
and the SNA are attempting to isolate the SDF forces in their
bridgeheads on the western bank of the Euphrates by striking along
supply lines and key nodes behind the front while pressuring the SDF
bridgeheads with ground attacks. Local, anti-SDF media
reported that Turkey struck an SDF barracks and two guard posts in
Sarrin, east of the Qara Qozak bridge.[20] The SDF operates from a base
in Sarrin that Russian forces evacuated after the fall of the regime,
meaning that Turkey is striking an SDF rear base that could be used to
sustain the bridgeheads.[21] Turkey also reportedly conducted several
airstrikes targeting SDF positions west of the Tishreen Dam.[22]
The SNA has followed up these airstrikes by pressuring the SDF bridgehead on the western bank of the Euphrates. Geolocated
footage posted on January 13 showed SNA-affiliated fighters firing
small arms at an unseen target in a village northwest of Tishreen Dam.[23] The
SDF posted footage on January 12 of an SDF drone strike that targeted
an SNA personnel carrier.[24] Neither the SDF nor SNA appears to have
made any significant territorial gains as of this writing, but the
pressure that the SNA has put these bridgeheads under will make it
difficult for the SDF to disengage and withdraw in good order if the SNA
or Turkey forces the SDF to contend with a threat to its rear.
Withdrawing a military force while under enemy pressure is an extremely
difficult undertaking, particularly when the withdrawing force comes
under pressure from a large military force.[25] The enemy force—if it
discovers a withdrawal is underway—will typically attempt to turn the
withdrawal into a rout to destroy the withdrawing force.[26]
Geolocated
footage posted by the commander of the Suleiman Shah Brigades—a faction
affiliated with the SNA—on January 13 showed SNA armored vehicles
traveling through a village northwest of Tishreen Dam.[27] Abu Amsha
claimed that the video showed SNA reinforcements arriving at the
frontlines.[28] The SNA may seek to move more forces to the frontline in
order to continue pressuring the SDF positions or prepare for a
large-scale assault to collapse the bridgehead.
Key Takeaways:
- Gaza Strip Ceasefire: Israeli
and Hamas officials appear to be optimistic after achieving a
"breakthrough” in ceasefire negotiations in Doha on January 13.
Negotiations over the buffer zone and a continued IDF presence in the
Gaza Strip remain sticking points.
- Hamas Reconstitution: Hamas
is attempting to rebuild its military organization, but persistent IDF
pressure and the severely degraded state of Hamas’ military forces will
make this process extremely difficult and long. Current Israeli military
operations are designed to prevent the successful regeneration of Hamas
by denying Hamas adequate safe areas to train new recruits,
particularly in the northern Gaza Strip.
- Hamas Leadership: The Wall Street Journal reported
that senior Hamas military commander in the Gaza Strip Mohammad Sinwar
has reportedly begun operating autonomously from the main Hamas
leadership and ignored the Hamas decision to make decisions through a
leadership council. Sinwar has likely delegated control of day-to-day
efforts in the northern Gaza Strip to Hamas Gaza City Brigade commander
Izz al Din al Haddad.
- Turkish and Syrian National Army (SNA) Operations: Turkey
and the SNA may be attempting to stretch the Syrian Democratic Forces
(SDF)’s bandwidth by threatening multiple areas simultaneously. Turkey
has continued to support SNA efforts to isolate and destroy SDF elements
along the Euphrates River.
SDF Bridgeheads on the Euphrates: Neither
the SDF nor SNA appears to have made any significant territorial gains
around the bridgeheads, but the pressure that the SNA has put these
bridgeheads under will make it difficult for the SDF to disengage and
withdraw in good order if the SNA or Turkey forces the SDF to contend
with a threat to their rear. Withdrawing a military force while under
enemy pressure is an extremely difficult undertaking, particularly when
the withdrawing force comes under pressure from a large military force.
Syria
Axis of Resistance objectives:
Syrian
media reported that Free Syrian Army officers will receive “special
status” in the Syrian army suggests that HTS will continue to favor
loyalists and consolidate HTS control over Syria’s military and defense
apparatus. Syrian outlet Al Watan, citing unspecified sources,
reported on January 13 that Syrian Defense Ministry officials have
agreed upon a structure for the new volunteer-based Syrian defense
apparatus with “most” armed factions, including the SNA.[29] Al Watan
reported that officers from the Free Syrian Army (FSA) will be given
“special status” in the Defense Ministry.[30] The Free Syrian Army is an
umbrella of Syrian opposition groups that formed in 2011, and many of
the factions affiliated or formerly affiliated with the FSA are
subordinated to HTS as part of the Fateh Mubin operations room that
overthrew the Assad regime.[31] CTP-ISW cannot verify Al Watan’s
reporting, but that FSA officers would receive "special status” in the
armed services is consistent with HTS leader Ahmed al Shara and the
Syrian Defense Ministry’s treatment of factions aligned with HTS. The
Syrian Defense Ministry recently promoted 42 individuals within the
Syrian armed forces, many of whom were from FSA-affiliated factions,
including Jaysh al Izza, Harakat Nour al Din al Zenki, and the Free
Idlib Army.[32] HTS, not the FSA, has actual control over many of these
groups, however, including Jaysh al Izza and Harakat Nour al Din al
Zenki. [33] Syrian Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra has also
met with numerous leaders and representatives from these factions in
recent weeks.[34] The promotion of loyalists and possible ”special
status” given to FSA leaders would allow HTS to consolidate functional
control over the core of the Syrian military.
The HTS-led Military Operations Department deployed to southern Syria to seize weapons on January 13.
Interim government media reported that government forces deployed to
several towns in Quneitra Province to maintain security and seize
weapons.[35] A commander in the interim security forces announced his
forces had launched an operation in Ghabagheb, northern Daraa Province,
to search for stolen weapons and drug traffickers.[36]
Hezbollah fighters reportedly killed HTS-affiliated forces in Syria near the Lebanon border on January 10. A
Syrian source claimed that Hezbollah fighters killed five HTS fighters
in western Qusayr and subsequently wrote threatening messages on their
bodies.[37] Other Syrian sources said that the Hezbollah fighters killed
five civilians, however.[38] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the
parties involved in the engagement or that it occurred. This engagement
would be notable however, given that Qusayr lies on a key line of
communication that Hezbollah has long used to move weapons and other
equipment into Lebanon.[39] The Qusayr area has long served as a
smuggling route for other armed groups, including some hostile to
Hezbollah and Iran. HTS-led Syrian interim government officials met with
a senior Lebanese delegation in Damascus to discuss border security,
counter-smuggling efforts, and immigration on January 11, a day after
the reported engagement.[40] These border smuggling routes, including
near Qusayr, could allow Lebanese Hezbollah to reconstitute militarily.
The border policies that the HTS-led interim government and Lebanon
enact in the coming months will be one of many factors in determining
how easily Iran can revive its ground line of communication to
Hezbollah.
The Syrian Oil Ministry will begin to search for and extract oil and gas within the next month.[41] Assad
loyalists and groups such as the Iranian IRGC Quds Force-linked and US
Treasury-sanctioned al Qaterji Company previously controlled
petrochemical extraction in Syria.[42] The interim Syrian government may
be able to raise funds for its administration and alleviate energy
deficits in Syria through this oil exploration.[43] Iran previously
supplied 90 percent of Syria’s crude oil before the fall of Assad.[44]
Six
European Union (EU) member states called for the EU to temporarily lift
sanctions on various sectors in Syria on January 13, according to a
paper seen by Reuters.[45] Germany, France, the Netherlands,
Spain, Finland, and Denmark signed a document that called for the EU to
”immediately begin adjusting our sanctions regime” on Syria to
facilitate civilian flights, the trade of high-value goods, oil and gas
technology, and to reopen financial channels between Syria and the EU.
The document added that the EU should not lift other sanctions on Syria.
It also said that the EU could apply a snapback mechanism for sanctions
that have already been removed if the interim Syrian government does
not uphold EU expectations on human rights and minorities. The
signatories clarified that the EU should retain sanctions against former
Assad regime members. The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy Kaja Kallas met with Syria’s interim Foreign
Minister Assad Hassan al Sheibani in Riyadh on January 12. The EU
Foreign Ministers will meet in Brussels on January 27 to discuss
relaxing sanctions on Syria.
An Iranian media
outlet that is affiliated with a former IRGC commander continues to
publish unverified inflammatory information about HTS activity around
the Sayyidah Zeinab shrine that appears designed to enflame sectarian
tension. The first Iraqi Shiite pilgrims arrived at the shrine
peacefully on January 12.[46] Tabnak, which is affiliated with former
IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaei also reported on January 12 that one of the
HTS-led coalition leaders announced that in order to visit the Sayyidah
Zeinab shrine in Damascus pilgrims would need to pay 10,000 USD.[47]
CTP-ISW cannot confirm the veracity of this information or why precisely
Tabnak has repeatedly recirculated sectarian narratives. The HTS-led
government took responsibility for securing the shrine on December
15.[48] Tabnak has previously published footage of HTS-led coalition
members allegedly disrespecting the shrine.[49]
Iraq
Axis of Resistance objectives:
An
IRGC-affiliated media outlet said that a group of Iraqis, whom the
outlet characterized as Shias cooperating with the Axis of Resistance,
aim to restructure the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) into a
“coordination” structure from a command structure.[50] Iraqi
political groups ”opposed to the resistance” alternatively proposed that
a ”significant number” of groups within the PMF should dissolve but
that the PMF should retain its current structure.[51] The PMF is an
Iraqi state security service that includes a large number of
Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. The PMF reports directly to Sudani on
paper, but many of the militias that comprise the PMF answer to Iran in
reality. This report comes as the Iraqi federal government is
considering integrating Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi
armed forces, which would facilitate the Iranian capture of the Iraqi
security sector.[52]
The 30th Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Brigade (Badr Organization) deployed to Ninewa Province on January 13.[53]
The forces conducted searches for “terrorist presence“ and to prevent
border infiltration from Syria into Iraq.[54] The PMF and the Badr
Organization frequently deploy PMF units to Ninewa Province to search
for ISIS cells. This deployment is notable nonetheless, given the recent
increased Iraqi Army and PMF forces on the Iraq-Syria border and Badr
Organization head Hadi al Ameri’s inspection of border units due to
security concerns following the fall of the Bashar al Assad regime.[55]
The 30th Brigade is a Badr Organization unit that operates in Ninewa
Province in northern Iraq and has strong ties to other members of the
Islamic Resistance of Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi
militias—including Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba.[56]
Arabian Peninsula
Axis of Resistance objectives:
The
Houthis conducted a ballistic missile attack and separately launched
four drones targeting the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area on January 13.[57] IDF Air Force intercepted a drone and a missile from Yemen before they entered Israeli territory.[58]
Greece
and a British maritime security company said on January 13 that six
companies successfully unloaded 150,000 tons of crude oil from an oil
tanker after a Houthi attack targeting the vessel in August 2024.[59] The Houthis launched several drones and missiles targeting the 900-foot Greek-registered oil tanker Sounion
58 miles off the coast of Yemen in August 2024.[60] The European
Union’s naval force in the Red Sea, Operation Aspides, towed the tanker
to a safe location near Saudi Arabia and spent three weeks extinguishing
fires on the vessel before offloading the cargo.[61] Reuters reported
that more than 200 people and six companies were involved in the
operation.
The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon
Axis of Resistance objectives:
The Gaza Strip
An
Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on January 13 that the IDF
will soon replace the 143rd Division with the 162nd Division in the
northern Gaza Strip.[62] The IDF has been rotating division-level headquarters into the Gaza Strip at regular intervals
Palestinian
militias likely detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) that
collapsed a building in Beit Hanoun, northern Gaza Strip, on January 13,
killing five Israeli soldiers from the 933rd Infantry Brigade (162nd
Division).[63] The collapse of the building also injured eight
other Israeli soldiers, according to the IDF.[64] An Israeli Army Radio
correspondent reported that Palestinian militias have killed 15 Israeli
soldiers in Beit Hanoun in the last week.[65]
Palestinian
militias claimed four mortar and rocket attacks targeting the IDF along
the Netzarim Corridor since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on January
12.[66]
Hamas claimed that it targeted
Israeli soldiers in a building with “various types of weapons” in Rafah
City, southern Gaza Strip, on January 13.[67] Hamas fighters
then detonated an IED targeting two armored personnel carriers that
arrived to rescue the Israeli soldiers. The IDF has not commented on
these claims as of this writing.
Lebanon
The
IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes on January 12 targeting Hezbollah
military sites across Lebanon and a Lebanon-Syria border crossing used
to transfer weapons and move fighters.[68] The IDF stated that
it notified the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire monitoring committee about the
threats, but that that committee failed to act.[69] The
IDF said that its targets included a Hezbollah rocket launcher, a
military site, and Syria-Lebanon border crossing previously used by
Hezbollah to transfer weapons.[70] Israeli media reported that the IDF
struck the Lebanon-Syria border crossing in Janta, northern Lebanon,
which Hezbollah has used to move weapons and fighters.[71] Israeli and
Lebanese media reported an IDF airstrike targeting Houmin el Faouqa,
north of the Litani River.[72] Lebanese media reported additional
strikes in Arab Salim, Deir El Zahrani, Roumine, Matraba, and the
Lebanon-Syria border crossing in Hermel.[73]
The Lebanese Parliament elected the current International Court of Justice Head Nawaf Salam as prime minister on January 13.[74]
Hezbollah’s preferred candidate, current interim Prime Minister Najib
Mikati, congratulated Salam on his appointment after Mikati received
only nine out of 128 votes to remain prime minister.[75] Many Lebanese
legislators have described Salam’s appointment as a ”new era” for
Lebanese politics.[76] Newly-elected Lebanese President Joseph Aoun
asked Salam to form a government on January 13.[77]
Lebanese
and Hezbollah-affiliated media claimed on January 13 that Israeli
forces conducted “large-scale” ground operations in Khiam, Marjaayoun
Province.[78] Israeli forces previously withdrew from Khiam on
December 11.[79] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify IDF's presence in
Khiam or the scale of operations there at this time.
West Bank
Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy
UK outlet the Times reported
on January 12 that Senior Adviser to the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali
Larijani has been covertly flying between Iran and Russia to meet with
unspecified senior Russian officials.[80] The Times
added that Larijani‘s trips are part of Iran’s effort to gain Russian
assistance on Iran’s nuclear program and air defense capabilities.
Israeli airstrikes on October 25 destroyed much of Iran’s advanced air
defense capabilities.[81] These meetings reportedly occurred just before
the Kremlin and Tehran both confirmed Iranian President Masoud
Pezeshkian‘s January 17 visit to Moscow to sign the new Russo-Iranian
comprehensive strategic agreement, which will cover areas of defense and
energy trade.[82] The talks will also cover Iran’s nuclear program. An
Iranian delegation is separately meeting with E3 countries — the United
Kingdom, France, and Germany — in Geneva on January 13 and 14 for the
second round of nuclear talks.”[83] The German foreign ministry told AFP
that these talks were ”consultations” and ”not negotiations.”
Iranian
Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz
Nasir Zadeh claimed on January 13 that the Iranian defense industry and
military have acquired 1,000 unspecified Iranian-made drones over an
unspecified period of time.[84] Some of these drones reportedly
have over 2,000 km range, according to Iranian media. Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces Commander Brigadier
General Mohammad Pakpour separately claimed on January 13 that the IRGC
Ground Forces had acquired an unspecified number of drones with ranges
of 40 km to 100 km.[85] IRGC-affiliated media added that the IRGC is in a
better position to ”more effectively” combat terrorist attacks with
this new drone technology, especially in Iran’s “mountainous geography.”
IRGC Ardabil Abbasid Corps Commander General Gholam Hossein Mohammadi
Asl also announced on January 13 that the Basij and IRGC forces will
conduct a large-scale combined military exercise in Ardabil
province.[86] This follows several recent IRGC and Artesh air defense
and ground drills in western Iran, which are part of the Iranian
military’s annual series of military exercises.[87]
The
Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored
activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US
forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the
stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical
Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the
Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly
based on regional events.
CTP-ISW defines the
“Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has
cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power
in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state,
and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective
interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and
its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of
financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree
of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies
that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are
partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the
Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which
include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the
Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these
objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have
become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.
[1]
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/01/13/israel-hamas-final-ceasefire-draft/
;
https://www.axios.com/2025/01/13/israel-gaza-ceasefire-hostage-final-draft-deal
;
https://edition.cnn.com/2025/01/13/middleeast/israel-hamas-deal-talks-intl/index.html
[2] https://www.axios.com/2025/01/13/israel-gaza-ceasefire-hostage-final-draft-deal
[3] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1878863467232326118
[4] https://edition.cnn.com/2025/01/13/middleeast/israel-hamas-deal-talks-intl/index.html
[5] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1878863467232326118
[6] https://www.axios.com/2025/01/13/israel-gaza-ceasefire-hostage-final-draft-deal
[7] https://edition.cnn.com/2025/01/13/middleeast/israel-hamas-deal-talks-intl/index.html
[8] https://edition.cnn.com/2025/01/13/middleeast/israel-hamas-deal-talks-intl/index.html
[9] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1878863467232326118
[10]
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/hamas-has-another-sinwar-and-hes-rebuilding-0a16031d
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/sinwar%E2%80%99s-death-will-not-end-israeli-operations-gaza-strip
[11] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/hamas-has-another-sinwar-and-hes-rebuilding-0a16031d
[12] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/hamas-has-another-sinwar-and-hes-rebuilding-0a16031d
[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/sinwar%E2%80%99s-death-will-not-end-israeli-operations-gaza-strip
[14]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/sinwar%E2%80%99s-death-will-not-end-israeli-operations-gaza-strip
;
https://www.army.mil/article/219390/the_fallacy_and_myth_of_reconstitution
[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/sinwar%E2%80%99s-death-will-not-end-israeli-operations-gaza-strip
[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/sinwar%E2%80%99s-death-will-not-end-israeli-operations-gaza-strip
[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/sinwar%E2%80%99s-death-will-not-end-israeli-operations-gaza-strip
[18] https://t.me/sohebb1993/21181; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/132864; https://t.me/sohebb1993/21189
[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-8-2025
[20] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1878772122299846797/history
[21]
https://www.albawaba dot
com/ar/أخبار/شاهد-انسØاب-رتل-عسكري-روسي-من-قاعدة-صرين-1596073;
https://www.skynewsarabia dot
com/middle-east/1762530-تصريØ-روسي-بشأÙ†-قاعدتيها-العسكريتين-سوريا-مصيرهما؟
[22] https://t.me/sohebb1993/21210;
https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/132927; https://t.me/sohebb1993/21193
[23] https://x.com/andynovy/status/1878858812792492043; https://x.com/NotWoofers/status/1878851833256689731
[24] https://x.com/farhad_shami/status/1878542632848089213; https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1878550633105510834
[25] https://www.moore.army.mil/infantry/DoctrineSupplement/ATP3-21.8/PDFs/fm3_90_1.pdf
[26] https://www.moore.army.mil/infantry/DoctrineSupplement/ATP3-21.8/PDFs/fm3_90_1.pdf
[27] https://x.com/andynovy/status/1878846435007013295; https://x.com/abo33amsha/status/1878823598376599666
[28] https://x.com/abo33amsha/status/1878823598376599666
[29] https://t.me/alwatan_sy/154565; https://t.me/alwatan_sy/154566; https://t.me/alwatan_sy/154569
[30] https://t.me/alwatan_sy/154568
[31]
https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The-Free-Syrian-Army-24MAR.pdf;
http://www.enabbaladi dot net/archives/76333;
https://x.com/jamelalsaleh0/status/1864719920677654776
[32] https://www.memri.org/reports/hayat-tahrir-al-sham-hts-leader-ahmed-al-sharaa-promotes-military-officers-including-senior
[33] https://www.memri.org/reports/hayat-tahrir-al-sham-hts-leader-ahmed-al-sharaa-promotes-military-officers-including-senior
[34]
https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/52 ; https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/61 ;
https://x.com/Sy_Defense/status/1875515528758129069;
https://x.com/Sy_Defense/status/1875479425862766756
[35] https://t.me/Free_Kenitra_city/201
[36] https://t.me/Free_Daraa_city/622 ; https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1878762593717760486 ; https://t.me/Free_Daraa_city/623
[37]
;
https://www.facebook.com/qatarworldfifa/posts/pfbid03bf7u1fHrzwVwkExRJeToXAhietpwTsf2bgJ4rGgWj53LWsZHJio23ksFV3RRg3Rl?__cft__[0]=AZV-2vUQWVlRFkOYjpMjXXD03nr9mbTqHh-h4X4hMCKC7sALTEwRBFM1KV-RDAr-B-jYVCPRO_CWa2ZMVMRyMDyWa0iLVift8_K3wqYe54yeoEELvOumPCX9jd5FE0BR8ZsDw_6Y7ZqxY64aPNMRpkbAii9xSLGJ2ayxNtgRMM50TQzmVrBOX9hGEO6beFSYAjg&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
[38]
https://t.me/ALBADIA_24/3469 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/132631 ;
https://x.com/Nabil_Sallam_/status/1877708234024263799 ;
https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid02DrrQ9ZhwtF8i29sTw44JtZC7tnWug6VshmQ8wha4ZzueqhWaRpz132oBx5NpDT6Tl&id=61571353055172&__cft__[0]=AZWFJgDgHC4wpKtM6wLfhwPwzbPedWR1lRcprjXKOW12KtPzbrMVxhGS76FlZzQK9CefZW4u--zn1OUJcGaok74S5QaRe7tnPknKmgWxOUcrzgnO1qcpkZZ_RrLQXPHTUmS27koqcmSf_1Epo4L4KJ5sH2bJ5poE5UWnONZRcaoaGKb28hfN6H63SfIKi8evl6HcRpONOTunelO1yXP3oN2MbwnXwqCZTE3DNRspmAgBBWP43X_UYtAFVZuAy8Cip-e6EF1LXDTIzhB200UmIPw_&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-y-R
[39] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-attack-targets-syrias-qusayr-syrian-state-media-says-2024-11-13/
[40] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-11-2025
[41] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1878709500514832615
[42] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2712 ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate111424
[43] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-receive-electricity-generating-ships-qatar-turkey-2025-01-07/
[44] https://www.ft.com/content/9d65fb40-a389-42ad-b9c5-42533a276dde
[45] https://www.reuters.com/world/six-eu-nations-call-temporary-syria-sanctions-relief-2025-01-13/
[46] https://x.com/OALD24/status/1878450856439263710
[47] https://www.tabnak dot ir/fa/news/1283029
[48] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-15-2024
[49]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-5-2025;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-14-2024
[50]
https://www.tasnimnews dot
com/fa/news/1403/10/23/3236879/4-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%87%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B4-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%BE-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%DB%8C
[51]
https://www.tasnimnews dot
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[52]
https://isw.pub/IranUpdate010925 ; https://www.shafaq dot
com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%88%D9%84%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%AC%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%AF-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9
[53]
https://t.me/teamsmediawar_1/108713 ;
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-hashd-al-shabak-30th-pmf-brigade
[54] https://t.me/teamsmediawar_1/108713
[55]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-15-2024
;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-13-2024
[56] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-1-2023
[57] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1878877165409927293
[58] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1878845765289943244
[59]
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/tanker-hit-by-houthis-salvaged-red-sea-disaster-averted-2025-01-13/#:~:text=ATHENS%2C%20Jan%2013%20(Reuters),Ambrey%20and%20Greece%20have%20said.
[60]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-22-2024 ;
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/tanker-hit-by-houthis-salvaged-red-sea-disaster-averted-2025-01-13/#:~:text=ATHENS%2C%20Jan%2013%20(Reuters),Ambrey%20and%20Greece%20have%20said.
[61]
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/tanker-hit-by-houthis-salvaged-red-sea-disaster-averted-2025-01-13/#:~:text=ATHENS%2C%20Jan%2013%20(Reuters),Ambrey%20and%20Greece%20have%20said.
[62] https://t.me/moriahdoron/18267
[63] https://t.me/moriahdoron/18279 ; https://idfanc.activetrail dot biz/ANC1301202534689
[64] https://x.com/IDFSpokesperson/status/1878849073106591997 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/18279
[65] https://t.me/moriahdoron/18281
[66] https://t.me/mojahdeenpal/5026 ; https://t.me/nedalps/4622 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/19041 ; https://t.me/darebmojahden/5462
[67]
https://alqassam dot
ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8393/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A9-%D8%B5%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%84-%D8%A3%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D9%85%D8%AE%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%AD
[68] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1878577922262655205
[69] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1878577919184019842
[70] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1878577922262655205
[71]
https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1878554913422074350 ;
https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-27-2024
[72] https://t.me/moriahdoron/18257 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/111230
[73]
https://t.me/channelnabatieh/111230 ;
https://t.me/channelnabatieh/111242 ; https://t.me/almanarnews/190516 ;
https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/127131
[74]
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanons-salam-wins-backing-enough-mps-be-named-pm-political-sources-say-2025-01-13/
[75]
https://today.lorientlejour dot
com/article/1443146/appointment-of-prime-minister-joseph-aoun-opens-parliamentary-consultations-with-berri-makhzoumi-withdraws-from-the-race-live.html
[76] https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20250113-majority-of-lebanon-lawmakers-back-icj-judge-nawaf-salam-for-pm;
[77] https://www.cnn.com/2025/01/13/middleeast/icj-judge-nawaf-salam-lebanon-prime-minister-intl/index.html
[78] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/127136; https://t.me/almanarnews/190522; https://x.com/AlakhbarNews/status/1878696899894481319
[79]
https://www.timesofisrael dot
com/idf-confirms-withdrawal-from-southern-lebanons-khiam-in-accordance-with-ceasefire;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-11-2024
[80] https://www.thetimes.com/world/middle-east/article/iran-russia-nuclear-talks-deal-lfzbdh7z7
[81] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/consequences-idf-strikes-iran
[82] https://t.me/tass_agency/295774;
https://t.me/tass_agency/295693;
https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/24/3237339
[83] https://www.barrons.com/news/iran-european-powers-to-hold-nuclear-talks-ahead-of-trump-return-ed5bea52
[84] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/24/3237369; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/24/3237267
[85] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/24/3237576
[86] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/719402
[87]https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-12-2025;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-9-2025;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-7-2025;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-4-2025
