Siddhant
Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braverman, Ria Reddy, Andie Parry,
Johanna Moore, Ben Rezaei, Katherine Wells, Avery Borens, and Brian
Carter
Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET
The
Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and
the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which
provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that
undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.
Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here
to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition
offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static
maps present in this report.
We do not report in
detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in
Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are
assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of
armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity
even though we do not describe them in these reports.
CTP-ISW
did not record verifiable reports of kinetic activity in the Gaza Strip
or reports of attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since the last
data cut off on January 21.


Palestinian
Islamic Jihad (PIJ) announced the formation of joint operations rooms
in the West Bank on January 22 with Hamas and al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades’
fighters.[1] The PIJ statement claimed the joint operations
rooms would coordinate and develop ”field work” and ”joint action.” The
joint operations rooms will be comprised of fighters from PIJ’s al Quds
Brigades, Hamas’ al Qassem Brigades, and al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades’
”Youth of Revenge and Liberation” branch.[2] The ”Youth of Revenge and
Liberation” branch, which is one of the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades many
branches based in various locations throughout the West Bank, was active
in Tulkarm in summer 2024.[3] It is unclear at this time where the
joint operations rooms will be based, or which subgroup or groups of the
”Youth of Revenge and Liberation” branch will be involved. Hamas, the
al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, and PIJ previously established a combined
operations room known as ”the Hornets’ Nest” that was based in Jenin and
active from 2022-2024. The Hornets’ Nest also included the military
wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, among
others.[4] PIJ, Hamas, and the “Youth of Revenge and Liberation” claimed
to fire small arms and detonate improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in a
combined operation targeting the IDF in Jenin on January 22.[5]
Iraq
may attempt to integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi
army after the withdrawal of US forces, which would not satisfy US
demands to dissolve the militias. A senior Iraqi diplomat
claimed on January 22 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will only
integrate into the Iraqi army after US forces completely withdraw from
Iraq.[6] The outgoing Biden administration reportedly
pressured the Iraqi government to dissolve the Iranian-backed Iraq
militias.[7] The integration of the militias would instead increase
their influence within the army, which is deeply problematic given the
backgrounds and loyalties of many of these groups. Many of these groups
have committed acts of sectarian cleansing dating back to the 2000s,
which would destroy the national character of the Iraqi army if the
government reflagged entire militia units as Iraqi army units.[8]
Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Hezbollah,
Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and the Badr Organization, swear allegiance
to the Iranian supreme leader, not the Iraqi state.[9] The
state-recognized wings of these groups within the Popular Mobilization
Forces (PMF) already answer to militia chains of command—not the Iraqi
prime minister—and there is no reason to believe that these groups would
adhere to an Iraqi army chain of command if reflagged as Iraqi army
units. The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds
of US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by
September 2025 and that the remaining troops would withdraw by the end
of 2026.[10] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani told Saudi
outlet al Elaph in January 2025 that the Iraqi government is actively
trying to integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias within Iraq’s legal
and institutional framework.[11]
Iranian-backed
Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba head Akram al Kaabi threatened
to resume rocket and missile attacks targeting US forces in Iraq if the
United States extends its presence past the September 2025 withdrawal
date or makes “sudden moves.”[12] Kaabi added that
Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will increase the pace of attacks
targeting US forces if the United States delays its withdrawal from Ain
al Asad airbase.[13] It is notable that US-led international coalition
forces will withdraw from some areas in Iraq, including the Ain al Asad
airbase, by September 2025 but will not withdraw completely from Iraq
until the end of 2026.[14]
Unspecified Western officials told The Financial Times
on January 22 that two Iranian cargo vessels carrying a large amount of
chemical precursor for solid missile propellant will travel from China
to Iran over the next few weeks.[15] The officials expect the
vessels to arrive at Bandar-e Abbas port in southern Iran and deliver
the material to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). The ships
are expected to carry more than 1,100 tons of sodium perchlorate, which
can be converted to slightly over 1000 tons of ammonium perchlorate,
the main component for solid propellant for missiles. Ammonium
perchlorate needs to be mixed with other components to create solid fuel
propellant for missiles. The unspecified officials estimated that 1000
tons of ammonium perchlorate can—if converted to solid fuel
propellant—fuel up to 260 mid-range Iranian ballistic missiles,
including the Kheybar Shekan and Haj Qassem. Iran used Kheybar Shekan missiles in both April and October 2024 missile attacks on [16]
Israeli
damage estimates from the IDF strikes on Iran in October 2024 suggest
that Iran’s missile production capabilities likely remain limited,
however. Unspecified Israeli sources reported that the IDF
strikes hit 12 planetary mixers used to produce solid fuel for ballistic
missiles.[17] Iran can reportedly not produce the mixers domestically
and remanufacturing the mixers could take at least a year. Iran needs
these mixers to combine various components, including ammonium
perchlorate, and create solid propellant for missiles. It is not clear
if Iran has mixing facilities at other locations but the loss of 12
mixers has likely significantly degraded Iran’s ability to produce
missiles and mount a large-scale attack on Israel soon, regardless of
Iran’s supply of ammonium perchlorate.
Iran has previously
used ammonium perchlorate for internal missile production and exported
it to members of the Axis of Resistance. Iran engaged in secret
negotiations with China and Russia in April 2023 to acquire a Chinese
supply of ammonium perchlorate for its solid-fueled missiles.[18] The US
Navy also interdicted an IRGC shipment of 70 tons of ammonium
perchlorate en route from Iran to the Houthis in November 2024. The
Houthis could use ammonium perchlorate as a precursor for solid fuel
propellant, but there is currently no evidence that the Houthis can
manufacture solid fuel. The ammonium perchlorate can also be used to
make explosives.
Key Takeaways:
- Gaza Strip: CTP-ISW
did not record verifiable reports of kinetic activity in the Gaza Strip
or reports of attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since the last
data cut off on January 21.
- West Bank: Palestinian
Islamic Jihad announced the formation of joint operations rooms in the
West Bank on January 22 with Hamas and al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades’
fighters.
- Iraq: Iraq may attempt to integrate
Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi army after the withdrawal
of US forces, which would not satisfy US demands to dissolve the
militias. The integration of the militias would instead increase their
influence within the army, which is deeply problematic given the
backgrounds and loyalties of many of these groups.
Iran: Unspecified Western officials told The Financial Times
on January 22 that two Iranian cargo vessels carrying a large amount of
chemical precursor for solid missile propellant will travel from China
to Iran over the next few weeks. Israeli damage estimates from the IDF
strikes on Iran in October 2024 suggest that Iran’s missile production
capabilities likely remain limited, however.
Syria
Axis of Resistance objectives:
Turkey
and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) concentrated attacks
around the Tishreen Dam against the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces
(SDF). The US-sanctioned Suleiman Shah Brigade, which is an SNA
formation, posted footage on January 21 in which its forces fired
artillery and rockets at SDF positions around the Tishreen Dam.[19]
Anti-SDF media circulated footage from the SNA Dawn of Freedom
Operations Room in which SNA fighters fired an anti-tank-guided munition
at an SDF position near the Tishreen Dam.[20]
Turkey and the SNA continued attacks on SDF positions along possible lines of advance.
Anti-SDF media claimed that Turkey conducted a drone strike targeting
an SDF position near the Mabaqir base in Tal Tamr, Hasakah.[21] Anti-SDF
media also claimed that Turkey conducted an airstrike on an SDF
position in Bir Hasso, south of Kobani.[22] Turkish and SNA forces have
deployed to the Turkey-Syria border at Kobani and along the line of
control near Ain Issa and Tal Tamr, which CTP-ISW assessed may be in
preparation for a three-pronged assault to collapse SDF defenses along
the eastern bank of the Euphrates River.[23]

The
HTS-led Department of Military Operations arrested at least 20 people
in Lajat, Daraa Province, on January 20 for various reasons, including
participation in drug trafficking, the former Assad regime, and Lebanese
Hezbollah.[24] Syrian media reported on January 20 that the
Department of Military Operations and Southern Operations Room launched a
large-scale security campaign in several villages in the Lajat
region.[25] Security forces seized numerous weapons in the area and
transferred the detainees to Damascus.[26]
The IDF continued to operate in southern Syria near the Golan Heights on January 22.
Syrian sources reported that Israeli forces destroyed former Assad
regime positions in eastern and central Quneitra.[27] IDF armor also
reportedly entered and withdrew from a town in southern Quneitra.[28]

Syria
Interim Foreign Minister Asaad Shaibani called for countries to lift
sanctions on Syria at the Davos World Economic Forum in Switzerland on
January 22.[29] The US Treasury Department issued a general
license for energy sales and personal remittances to Syria on January
6.[30] The general license will last for six months and does not lift
existing sanctions on Syria.[31]

Iraq
Axis of Resistance objectives:
The
Iraqi Parliament Security and Defense Committee head told Iraqi media
on January 22 that Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani withdrew a
draft law on PMF military service and retirement submission for a vote
due to Popular Mobilization Commission objections.[32]
Mashhadani and his two deputy speakers are responsible for “jointly”
determining the parliamentary agenda.[33] The Popular Mobilization
Commission oversees a range of administrative, planning, and training
responsibilities for the PMF.[34] A Sadiqoun bloc parliamentarian called
for Mashhadani to add the draft law to the parliamentary agenda on
January 21.[35] Sadiqoun represents Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib
Ahl al Haq.[36] Multiple Asaib Ahl al Haq units are part of the PMF.
Arabian Peninsula
Axis of Resistance objectives:
- Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
- Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
- Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip
The Houthis released the 25-member crew of the British-owned and Japanese-operated Galaxy Leader to Oman on January 22. The Houthis had held the crew hostage since the group hijacked the ship in November 2023.[37]
The Houthis said that they made the decision after a meeting with Hamas
and with Omani assistance.[38] The Houthis noted that the release is a
sign of support for the ceasefire agreement. Hamas Representative to
Yemen Moaz Abu Shamala also confirmed the release of the hostages and
thanked the Houthis for their support on January 22.[39] Shamala met
with the Houthi Foreign Affairs Minister Jamal Amer at the Houthi
Defense Ministry in Sanaa on January 21.[40]
The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon
Axis of Resistance objectives:
The Gaza Strip
An
IDF official assessed that the Israel-Egypt border will likely present a
renewed but low-level security threat due to smuggling attempts.[41] The
IDF 512th Territorial Brigade (80th Division) Commander stated on
January 22 that the IDF had intercepted several weapons and drug
smuggling attempts from Egypt into Israel over the past year. Egyptian
smugglers improved their smuggling capabilities by using quadcopter
drones, adapting to the IDF’s use of lethal force along the Israel-Egypt
border. The IDF intercepted two smuggling attempts using small
quadcopters that carried small arms as the drones crossed into Israel
from Egypt in late 2024.[42]
Lebanon
The
IDF 810th Mountain Brigade (210th Division) recently destroyed
Hezbollah weapons during a raid in the Mount Dov area, in southwestern
Lebanon.[43] Israeli forces destroyed anti-tank
launchers, rocket launchers, machine guns, and missiles aimed at
Israeli territory.[44] Israeli forces have recently operated in Kfar
Chouba, Hasbaya District, adjacent to Mount Dov.[45] The IDF 810th
Mountain Brigade previously conducted a brigade-level operation in the
Syrian Mount Hermon area in early January.[46]
The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and UNIFIL backfilled IDF positions in Kfar Chouba, Hasbayah District, on January 22.[47] The
LAF reported that it deployed to ”several points” in Kfar Chouba town.
Lebanese media previously reported IDF artillery shelling in Kfar Chouba
on January 20.[48] The LAF and UNIFIL must backfill all IDF positions
south of the Litani River by 4 am local time on January 26, according to
the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement.[49] The IDF has withdrawn from
six additional areas in southern Lebanon, including Khiam and most of
its positions in southwestern Lebanon, as of January 22.[50] The LAF has
redeployed to over 50 positions across Lebanon as of January 18
according to the UN.[51]
Lebanese and Hezbollah-affiliated
media reported on January 22 that Israeli forces detonated explosives
in seven villages along the Israel-Lebanon border.[52]

An
Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on January 22 that Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, via Israeli Strategic Affairs
Minister Ron Dermer, submitted a request for the IDF to remain in
several unspecified outposts in southern Lebanon to US President Donald
Trump.[53] Israeli officials have recently indicated that the IDF will likely extend its deployment in southern Lebanon if the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement conditions are not met.[54] According
to the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement, the IDF must withdraw from
areas south of the Litani River by January 26.[55] Hezbollah Secretary
General Naim Qassem previously stated on January 4 that Hezbollah will
allow the Lebanese state to fulfill the ceasefire, but implied that
Hezbollah’s patience” may run out.”[56] Hezbollah has not explicitly
stated whether it will resume attacks on Israel or Israeli forces if the
IDF remains in southern Lebanon after January 26.
West Bank
Israeli
forces continued their counterterrorism “Operation Iron Wall” in Jenin
city targeting militia fighters and infrastructure on January 22.[57] The
IDF “struck” more than ten fighters in Jenin since CTP-ISW's last data
cutoff on January 21. The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting militia
infrastructure and destroyed improvised explosive devices (IEDs) planted
on the roads. The IDF instructed Palestinians to remain inside an
unspecified hospital in Jenin while it cleared IEDs planted on the roads
near the hospital but stated it did not enter the hospital.[58] Hamas
released a statement condemning the Palestinian Authority security
forces' alleged participation in the operation in Jenin.[59] PA forces
reportedly withdrew from the Jenin refugee camp area on January 21
before the IDF began its operation.[60] Hamas called on all Palestinian
militias and fighters to target the IDF across the West Bank. PIJ,
Hamas, and al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades detonated IEDs and fired small arms
targeting the IDF in Jenin on January 22.[61] The IDF previously
assessed that Hamas will likely try to conduct attacks in the West Bank
despite the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[62]
The IDF “neutralized” a drone rigged with a pipe bomb near Yitzhar settlement, south of Nablus, on January 22.[63] No militia has claimed this improvised drone attack at the time of this writing.
Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy
Iranian
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s emphasis on leveraging BRICS financial
mechanisms is part of an effort to reduce dependency on Western
economies. Khamenei praised the progress of the Iranian private
sector during a meeting with Iranian entrepreneurs, investors, and
economic activists in Tehran on January 22.[64]
Khamenei urged government agencies to amend restrictive laws and change
obstructive regulations for domestic investors. Khamenei claimed that
Iran can achieve 8% economic growth without foreign investment and urged
government officials not to argue that Iran needs foreign investment to
achieve economic growth. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian previously
stated in August 2024 that Iran must attract 200 to 250 billion US
dollars of foreign investment to address energy, banking, and budget
imbalances to reach the 8% growth target.[65] Khamenei also highlighted
Iran's participation in BRICS, urged diplomatic efforts to maximize the
benefits of BRICS, and described the BRICS financial system as a
significant opportunity that enables trade in member states’
currencies.[66] Khamenei may be trying to encourage preemptive measures
to counter sanctions, in anticipation of a second Trump "maximum
pressure“ campaign and potential E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and
Germany) snapback sanctions.[67]
Expediency
Discernment Council member and former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaei
stated that “Syrians will soon join the Axis of Resistance.”[68]
Rezaei emphasized "Iran’s commitment to Syria’s sovereignty" and the
need for "an inclusive government in Syria” during an interview with
Hezbollah-affiliated Al Mayadeen on January 22. Rezaei’s remarks echo
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s calls for Syrian youth to mobilize
against “foreign occupiers" in which Khamenei likened Syria’s present
situation to Iraq in the 2000s, when Iran-backed militias secured Iran’s
influence.[69] Khamenei and other Iranian officials have consistently
framed the post-Assad Syrian landscape as an opportunity for Iran to
shape events in Syria through grassroots mobilization.[70] CTP-ISW
previously assessed that Iran is trying to stoke sectarian tension in
Syria and exploit such tension to rebuild the Axis of Resistance in
Syria.
International Atomic Energy Agency Director
Raphael Grossi stated on January 22 that Iran is currently producing at
least 30 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% every month.[71]
Grossi previously stated in December 2024 that Iran's production of 60%
enriched uranium would increase by "seven, eight times more, maybe, or
even more" than Iran’s production levels in December 2024, which were 5
to 7 kg of 60% enriched uranium a month.[72]
The Iran
Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities
abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and
interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability
and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project
(CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the
Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional
events.
CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance”
as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle
East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This
transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state
actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran
considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran
furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and
political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control
over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly
responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which
Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance
are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding
and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East,
destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and
supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones
of Iranian regional strategy.

[1] https://t.me/sarayaps/19079
[2] https://www.longwarjournal.org/westbankterrorgroups
[3] https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/1799564116350378153
[4]
https://www.danielegarofalomonitoring.com/p/the-palestinian-joint-operations
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-21-2024
[5] https://t.me/sarayajneen/2006
[6] https://x.com/LawkGhafuri/status/1882038756351644094
[7] https://almadapaper dot net/389291/
[8] https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/badr-organization/report
[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces
[10] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-iraq-deal-would-see-hundreds-troops-withdraw-first-year-sources-say-2024-09-06/
[11] https://elaph dot com/Web/News/2025/01/1559003.html
[12] https://x.com/LawkGhafuri/status/1882041272350961875
[13] https://x.com/NujabaTv/status/1881731624632811772
[14] https://www.reuters.com/world/coalition-military-mission-iraq-end-by-sept-2025-us-iraq-say-2024-09-27/
[15] https://www.ft.com/content/f0bc9fcc-11b3-4615-bd24-163f8938f2a5
[16]
https://www.hudson.org/defense-strategy/mena-defense-intelligence-digest-assessing-political-military-scope-israels-can-kasapoglu
[17]
https://www.axios.com/2024/10/26/israel-strike-iran-missile-production ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/consequences-idf-strikes-iran
[18]
https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-ukraine-war-xi-jinping-china-russia-in-secret-talks-to-supply-iran-missile-propellant/
; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-12-2023
[19] https://x.com/abo33amsha/status/1881839548877140181
[20] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/133875
[21] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/133889
[22] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/133887
[23] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-8-2025
[24] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1881369430933852490; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1881416461719416837
[25] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1881332110356795644
[26] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1881369430933852490
[27] https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1881951683351323043
[28] https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1881971838009651426 ; https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1881987155393925447
[29]
https://www.ft.com/content/43746784-4e14-4c70-a6be-1aa849cd66ee ;
https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250122-syria-fm-says-scrapping-sanctions-key-to-country-s-stability
[30] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2770
[31] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2770
[32] https://www.ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?key=1181523
[33] https://iq.parliament dot iq/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A/
[34] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces
[35]
https://www.alsumaria dot
tv/news/politics/513662/%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86
%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%82%D8%AF
%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%85%D8%A9
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85
[36]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces
;
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-asaib-ahl-al-haq-0
[37]
https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1882097566063702132 ;
https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1882077533954564302 ;
https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1882059309070327995 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-19-2023
[38] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1882059309070327995
[39] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1882122398755115181
[40] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-21-2025
[41] https://www.zman dot co.il/556769/
[42]
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-20-2024 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-31-2024
[43] https://t dot co/7AFqFH3lhW
[44] https://t dot co/7AFqFH3lhW
[45] Iran Update, January 20, 2025 | Institute for the Study of War
[46] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-5-2025
[47] https://x.com/UNIFIL_/status/1882094582164550050 ; https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1882085831558447386
[48] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/127849
[49]
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/01/briefing-on-the-un-interim-force-in-lebanon-unifil-and-the-un-disengagement-observer-force-undof.php
[50]
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/01/19/lebanon-ceasefire-israel-destruction/
; https://www.timesofisrael dot
com/idf-confirms-withdrawal-from-southern-lebanons-khiam-in-accordance-with-ceasefire/
[51] https://unifil.unmissions.org/un-secretary-generals-press-conference-beirut-lebanon-18-january-2025
[52] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/111835; https://t.me/alichoeib1970/13145; https://t.me/alichoeib1970/13145; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/111838; https://t.me/almanarnews/191808; https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/128030; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/111874
[53] https://t.me/moriahdoron/18671
[54] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-5-2025
[55] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/full-text-of-the-hostage-ceasefire-agreement-reached-between-israel-and-hamas/
[56] https://www.almanar dot com.lb/12993917
[57] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1881984201689591980
[58]
https://www.timesofisrael dot
com/liveblog_entry/idf-tells-palestinians-in-jenin-hospital-to-stay-inside-as-it-clears-suspected-bombs/
[59] https://hamasinfo dot info/2025/01/22/5123/
[60] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-838565
[61]
https://t.me/sarayajneen/2005 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/2006 ;
https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/8185 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/2014
[62] https://t.me/moriahdoron/18598 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-19-2025
[63] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1882122082261377400 ; https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-838782
[64] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/speech-content?id=59052
[65] https://president dot ir/fa/153869
[66] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/speech-content?id=59052
[67] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-12-2024;
https://www.reuters.com/world/europeans-tell-un-ready-snap-back-iran-sanctions-if-needed-2024-12-11/
[68] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/03/3242786 ;
https://www.almayadeen
dot
net/episodes-tv/2025/1/21/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A---%D8%B9%D8%B6%D9%88-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%B6-%D9%85%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86/%D8%AA%D8%BA%D8%B7%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%A9?utm_source=mango-searchx&utm_medium=exact_title&utm_campaign=%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%86%20
[69] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-3-2025;
https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/news-content?id=58831
[70] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-11-2024;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-3-2025;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-7-2025
[71] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-has-about-200-kg-uranium-enriched-near-bomb-grade-grossi-says-2025-01-22/
[72] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-dramatically-increasing-enrichment-near-bomb-grade-iaea-chief-2024-12-06/