Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson, Nate Trotter, and George Barros
January 5, 2025, 7:30 pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on January 5. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the January 6 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
Ukrainian forces resumed
offensive operations in at least three areas within the Ukrainian
salient in Kursk Oblast and made tactical advances on January 5. Russian
sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted multiple roughly
company-sized mechanized assaults in the Berdin-Novosotnitsky direction
(northeast of Sudzha) in three waves of attack using roughly a
battalion's worth of armored vehicles.[1]
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces also intensified
offensive operations in the direction of Leonidovo (southeast of
Korenevo) and conducted a reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault
near Pushkarnoye (east of Sudzha).[2]
Geolocated footage published on January 5 indicates that Ukrainian
forces advanced in fields southwest and south of Berdin and entered the
southern part of the settlement.[3]
Russian milbloggers published updated maps of the Kursk area of
operations that indicate that Ukrainian forces also occupy Cherkasskoye
Porechnoye, Martynovka, and Mikhaylovka (all northeast of Sudzha and
southwest of Berdin) as of January 5 and reported that Ukrainian forces
recently entered Novosotnitsky (just east of Berdin); and advanced in
fields west of Yamskaya Step (immediately northwest of Berdin) and west
of Novaya Sorochina (north of Sudzha and northwest of Berdin).[4]
Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian forces also conducted
offensive operations near Nikolskiy and Alexandriya (east and southeast
of Leonidovo, respectively) and north of Russkaya Konopelka (east of
Sudzha) towards Pushkarnoye in small infantry groups but did not provide
details about the extent of any possible Ukrainian advances in these
areas.[5]
Russian milbloggers largely expressed concern that the renewed
Ukrainian effort in Kursk Oblast may be a diversionary effort and
claimed that it is too early to determine whether these operations in
Kursk could be part of a future main effort.[6]
Russian
forces also advanced southeast of Sudzha and counterattacked against
intensified Ukrainian attacks southeast of Korenevo and north of Sudzha
on January 5. Geolocated footage published on January 5 shows
that Russian forces advanced in western and southern Makhnovka (just
southeast of Sudzha).[7]
Russian milbloggers claimed that unspecified Russian airborne (VDV)
elements pushed Ukrainian forces from Makhnovka and Dmitryukov
(immediately northeast of Makhnovka).[8] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces may have advanced into Makhnovka "some time ago, however.[9]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 4 that Russian
and North Korean forces lost up to a battalion of infantry near
Makhnovka on January 3 and 4.[10]
Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced
southeast of Makhnovka and along a road into southeastern Kurilovka
(immediately southwest of Makhnovka).[11]
ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, however.
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced during
counterattacks against Ukrainian assaults east of Leonidovo towards
Nikolskiy and in the direction of Malaya Loknya (northeast of Sudzha) on
January 5.[12]
Another Russian milblogger claimed that a Russian mechanized column
unsuccessfully attempted to advance towards Malaya Loknya, however.[13]
The milblogger complained that Ukrainian forces destroy most Russian
mechanized columns in Kursk Oblast. Elements of the Russian 155th Naval
Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]),
Chechen Akhmat "Aida" Spetsnaz group, former Wagner Group personnel, and
unspecified BARS (Russian Combat Army Reserve) units reportedly
defended against the Ukrainian effort in Kursk Oblast.[14]
Russian
sources expressed concern about the Russian military's ability to react
to Ukraine's ongoing combined arms efforts to integrate electronic
warfare (EW) and long-range strike capabilities with ground operations. Several
Russian milbloggers claimed on January 5 that Ukrainian EW interference
during Ukrainian assaults in Kursk Oblast prevented Russian forces from
operating drones in the area, degrading Russian forces’ ability to
defend against Ukrainian mechanized attacks.[15]
Russian milbloggers claimed that drones with fiber optic cables are one
of the few Russian drone variants that consistently resist Ukrainian EW
countermeasures, although some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian
forces were able to use some first-person view (FPV) and Lancet drones.[16]
Russian officials claimed on January 5 that Russian forces downed three
unspecified Ukrainian missiles over Kursk Oblast, suggesting that
Ukrainian forces may be attempting to integrate longer-range strike
capabilities with ground operations and tactical EW systems.[17]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted HIMARS
strikes near Bolshoye Soldatskoye and other unspecified areas in Kursk
Oblast to prevent Russian forces from deploying reinforcements,
artillery systems, and drone operators.[18]
Widespread Russian concern over Russia's ability to respond to improved
Ukrainian EW technology and long-range strike capabilities indicates
that Russian forces may be struggling to quickly adapt to Ukrainian
battlefield innovations. Reports that Ukrainian forces are using
long-range fires to interdict Russian rear areas and EW to degrade
Russian drones in support of Ukrainian mechanized advances indicate that
Ukrainian forces operating in Kursk are employing more effective
combined arms tactics.
Russian forces recently
advanced east of Pokrovsk amid renewed offensive operations in the area
likely aimed at supporting the envelopment of Pokrovsk from the
northeast. The tempo of Russian offensive operations has
remained low east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad, along the
Hrodivka-Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) line, and further east
near Novooleksandrivka and Arkhanhelske since September 2024 when
Russian military command reprioritized offensive operations aimed at
seizing Selydove (southwest of Pokrovsk), Kurakhove, and Vuhledar over
efforts to seize Pokrovsk.[19]
A Russian milblogger claimed on December 29 that Russian forces began
intensifying offensive operations east of Pokrovsk, and geolocated
footage published on January 1 indicates that Russian forces recently
seized Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk).[20]
Geolocated footage published on January 5 indicates that Russian forces
have likely also seized Svyrydonivka and Tymofiivka (both east of
Pokrovsk) in recent days and advanced into southeastern Yelyzavetivka
(south of Pokrovsk) during a platoon-sized mechanized assault.[21]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance
units consolidated positions north of Tymofiivka and along the T-0504
Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway and that Russian forces advanced north
of Vozdvyzhenka toward Baranivka, Vodyane Druhe, and Zelene Pole.[22]
ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Ukrainian
military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on January 5 that Russian
forces recently resumed attacks in the Mykolaivka-Promin and
Mykolaivka-Myrnohrad areas (both east of Pokrovsk) and reinforced the
Russian grouping in this area with elements of the 589th Motorized Rifle
Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA],
Central Military District [CMD]) and the 137 Motorized Rifle Brigade
(reportedly subordinated to the 41st CAA, CMD).[23]
The
recent intensification in the Russian 41st CAA's area of responsibility
(AoR) east of Pokrovsk indicates that the Russian military command is
still considering the envelopment of Pokrovsk as one of their key
operational objectives in this area. A Russian milblogger
claimed on January 5 that Russian forces intensified offensive
operations east of Pokrovsk over the last week (since December 29), and
ISW started observing reports of renewed Russian activity in the area on
December 27.[24]
Recent Russian advances near Vozdvyzhenka and Yelyzavetivka and claims
that Russian forces are advancing further north towards Vodyane Druhe
and Baranivka indicate that Russian forces may be forming a salient that
they intend to leverage to envelop Pokrovsk from the northeast.
Elements of the Russian 41st CAA have reportedly been regrouping and
reconstituting in this area for several months, and Mashovets assessed
in late December 2024 that the Russian military command was preparing to
activate elements of the 41st CAA east and northeast of Pokrovsk.[25]
ISW previously assessed that Russian forces will have to make
significant and rapid advances toward Novoekonomichne (northeast of
Pokrovsk) or towards and into Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) if Russian
forces intend to envelop Pokrovsk from both the northeast and southwest
in the near future.[26]
The Russian military command may assess that advancing through the
fields and small settlements along the
Vozdvyzhenka-Yelyzavetivka-Myrne-Razine line will be an easier path of
advance than attempting to fight through the more urban and heavily
defended settlements of Novoekonomichne and Myrnohrad closer to
Pokrovsk.
Russian forces may also be exploiting
comparatively weaker Ukrainian defensive positions further east and
south of Pokrovsk as part of an ongoing effort to seize any territory,
regardless of such territory’s relative tactical insignificance.
ISW previously assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin may have
instructed the Russian military command to delay the seizure of Pokrovsk
in favor of making further gains through open fields and small
settlements, particularly as Russian forces advance closer to the
Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary.[27] Russian advances east of Pokrovsk may be opportunistic,
aimed at seizing additional territory regardless of its tactical
significance, and the beginning of a concerted Russian effort to envelop
Pokrovsk from the northeast. Russian advances towards the
Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary may also be part
of an opportunistic exploitation of weaker Ukrainian positions south of
Pokrovsk, while also contributing to Russia's long-term objective of
advancing to the administrative boundaries of Luhansk and Donetsk
oblasts.[28]
The Russian military command likely intends to exploit opportunities to
advance east and south of Pokrovsk so long as such advances remain
expedient and Ukrainian forces continue to repel Russian attacks
immediately near and into Pokrovsk itself.
Elements
of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st
Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps) are reportedly split between the
Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions — Russia's two most prioritized
sectors of the frontline. Geolocated footage published on
January 5 indicates that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade
recently advanced to southeastern Yelyazavetivka and seized Svyrydonivka
and Tymofiivka (all east of Pokrovsk).[29] Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade also reportedly participated in the seizure of Vozdvyzhenka as of January 2.[30]
The 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade reportedly also participated in the
seizure of Kurakhove and the Kurakhivske Thermal Power Plant (TPP) and
is conducting clearing operations within the settlement, indicting that
elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade are currently split between
at least two sectors of the frontline.[31]
ISW has not observed reports of other elements of the Russian 51st CAA
operating east of Pokrovsk in the 41st CAA's AoR within the past month.
The Russian military's decision to split the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade
along two prioritized sectors of the frontline and reports of their
participation in the seizure of several settlements indicates that the
Russian military may be using elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle
Brigade as a tactical penetration force.
Key Takeaways:
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
See topline text for updates on Ukrainian ground operations in Kursk Oblast.
Ukrainian
forces conducted drone strikes against Taganrog and Millerovo, Rostov
Oblast on the night of January 4 to 5. Russian and Ukrainian sources
published footage of Russian air defenses activating near Taganrog and
Millerovo and reported that Ukrainian forces may have targeted nearby
airfields.[32]
Rostov Oblast Acting Governor Yuri Slyusar claimed that Russian forces
intercepted 37 Ukrainian drones over Rostov Oblast overnight and that
falling drone debris damaged residential areas.[33]
A
Russian source claimed on January 5 that a Ukrainian missile strike
near Lgov, Kursk Oblast killed Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division's
Communications Head Lieutenant Colonel Valery Tereschchenko on December
30.[34]
A Ukrainian source stated that Ukrainian forces launched an unspecified
number of Storm Shadow missiles at a 76th VDV Division command post and
killed eight senior commanders and wounded 20 personnel.[35]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Starytsya and Vovchansk on January 4 and 5.[36]
Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov
stated on January 5 that Russian forces are attacking and consolidating
positions in small groups near Vovchansk.[37]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Note:
ISW is now orienting Russian activity along the
Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line in the Kupyansk, Borova, and Lyman
directions to reflect Russian forces' priority operational goals in
these areas.
Russian forces continued
offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 5 but did not
make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian
forces advanced near Zapadne (north of Kupyansk), but ISW has not
observed confirmation of this.[38] Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on January 4 and 5.[39]
Ukrainian Kupyansk City Administration Head Andriy Besedin stated on
January 4 that Russian forces are conducting glide bomb, multiple launch
rocket system (MLRS), and drone strikes on Kupyansk and that the
frontline is approximately two kilometers from the city's center.[40]
Russian
forces recently advanced in the Borova direction amid continued
offensive operations in the area on January 5. Geolocated footage
published on January 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced
in the fields northwest of Lozova (northeast of Borova) during a roughly
company-sized mechanized assault.[41]
The Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on January 5 that
Russian forces conducted a mechanized assault of an unspecified echelon
near Zahryzove (north of Borova) and that Ukrainian forces damaged two
armored vehicles while repelling the assault.[42]
Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Zahryzove; east of Borova
near Nadiya, Pershotravneve, Novoserhiivka, Novoyehorivka, and
Tverdokhlibove; and southeast of Borova near Makiivka on January 4 and
5.[43]
Russian
forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on January
5 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian forces attacked
northwest of Kreminna near Yampolivka and Terny, west of Kreminna near
Zarichne, and southwest of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area on
January 4 and 5.[44]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Note:
ISW will be incorporating data previously reported as the Vuhledar
direction as part of the Kurakhove direction moving forward to reflect
the shifting operational situation in this area.
Russian forces attacked in the Siversk direction on January 5 but did not advance.[45]
Ukrainian
forces recently regained positions near Chasiv Yar amid continued
Russian offensive operations in the area on January 5. Geolocated
footage published on January 2 shows that Ukrainian forces recaptured
positions along a section of the Siverskyi Donets Donbas Canal southeast
of Chasiv Yar.[46]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations within and near Chasiv
Yar itself, southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka, and south of
Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and Stupochky on January 4 and 5.[47]
A Russian milblogger claimed on January 5 that Russian forces may
intensify efforts to push Ukrainian forces from the Chasiv Yar
Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar in the coming days.[48] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate in Chasiv Yar.[49]
Russian
forces recently marginally advanced in Toretsk amid continued offensive
operations in the area on January 5. Geolocated footage published on
January 3 and 4 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally
advanced along Kutuzova Street in western Toretsk, Saratovksa Street in
northern Toretsk, and Kosmonavtiv Street in southwestern Toretsk.[50]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself,
northeast of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Krymske, and west of Toretsk near
Shcherbynivka on January 4 and 5.[51]
A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk
direction reported on January 5 that Russian forces are now attacking in
platoons of up to 20 soldiers after previously attacking in teams of
roughly five personnel.[52]
The Ukrainian officer reported that Russian forces are attempting to
attacking under fog cover and that poor weather is inhibiting Russian
logistics in the Toretsk direction.
See topline for Russian advances east of Pokrovsk.
Russian
forces continued offensive operations south of Pokrovsk on January 5. A
Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing southwest
of Pokrovsk towards Novooleksandrivka, along the Sribne-Novoandriivka
line from Novoyelyzavetivka, and towards Yasenove from Ukrainka.[53]
ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim, however.
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian
forces advanced within one kilometer of Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk)
and are attempting to interdict the T-04-06 Pokrovsk-Mezhove highway.[54]
Fighting continued near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near
Baranivka, Myrne, Yelyzavetivka, and Tymofiivka; east of Pokrovsk near
Promin, Novooleksandrivka, Vozdvyzhenka, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of
Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Zelene, Novyi Trud,
Shevchenko, and Pishchane; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Solone,
Novoolenivka, Kotlyne, Uspenivka, Novovasylivka, and Novoyelyzavetivka
on January 4 and 5.[55]
A Ukrainian intelligence officer serving in a Ukrainian National Guard
brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces
are suffering up to 400 personnel casualties per day in the Pokrovsk
direction but are not decreasing their tempo of assaults, noting that
Russian forces are conducting these assaults with personnel who received
only a few weeks of training.[56]
The Ukrainian officer stated that Russian forces are conducting heavy
artillery and air strikes against infrastructure and residential
buildings in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (immediately east of Pokrovsk).[57]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk
direction stated on January 5 that windy and snowy weather is
complicating Russian drone operations and that Russian forces are
actively using fiber optic drones in the area.[58]
Russian
forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction amid continued
offensive operations in the area on January 5. Geolocated footage
published on January 5 showing elements of the Russian 114th Motorized
Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) raising a flag in central Petropavlivka
(northwest of Kurakhove) indicates that Russian forces likely recently
seized the settlement.[59]
Additional geolocated footage published on January 5 indicates that
Russian forces advanced in the fields southeast of Dachne (west of
Kurakhove).[60]
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Kurakhove itself,
northwest of Kurakhove near Petropavlivka and Slovyanka, west of
Kurakhove near Dachne and in the direction of Kostyantynopil, south of
Kurakhove towards Yantarne, and southwest of Kurakhove near
Kostyantynopolske and Zelenivka on January 4 and 5.[61]
Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov
stated on January 5 that Russian forces are only using armored vehicles
in the Vuhledar and Kurakhove directions to transport infantry and are
not using such vehicles in assault operations or for fire support.[62]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove
direction stated that Russian forces are using fiber-optic drones in the
area.[63]
Elements of the Russian 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's
Main Directorate [GRU]) and 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are
reportedly clearing the westernmost outskirts of Kurakhove.[64]
Elements of the Russian 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized
Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are
reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction. [65]
Russian
forces continued offensive operations near Velyka Novosilka on January 5
but did not make confirmed advances. Mashovets stated that elements of
the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 218th Tank Regiment (both
of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military
District [EMD]) are attacking along the Velyka Novosilka-Hulyaipole
road.[66]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of
Velyka Novosilka near Neskuchne, but ISW has not observed confirmation
of this claim.[67] Russian forces also continued assaults north of Velyka Novosilka near Novyi Komar on January 5.[68]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian
forces continued ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January
5 but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed
that Russian forces marginally advanced near Novodanylivka (north of
Robotyne), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[69]
Russian forces also continued ground attacks near Bilohirya (northwest
of Robotyne) and Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne) on January 4 and
5.[70]
Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on
January 5 that a GUR drone strike killed Sergey Melnikov, Chief of Staff
of the North Ossetian "Storm Ossetia" volunteer battalion (reportedly
of the 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 19th Motorized Rifle Division,
58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) while
driving on the Vasylivka-Tokmak highway on December 29, 2024.[71] The Storm Ossetia volunteer battalion confirmed on December 30 that Melnikov was killed in action.[72]
Russian
forces continued limited ground attacks in the Dnipro direction near
the Zabych and Kozatskyi islands (southwest and east of Kherson City,
respectively) on January 4 and 5 but did not advance.[73]
Elements of the Russian 81st Artillery Regiment and drone elements of
the 26th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 70th Motorized Rifle
Division, 18th CAA, SMD) reportedly continue operating in the Kherson
direction.[74]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian
forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the
afternoon and evening on January 4 and overnight on January 4 to 5. The
Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 30 Shahed and
decoy drones from the northeastern direction during the afternoon and
evening on January 4.[75]
The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Ukrainian forces downed 14 drones
and that 16 drones were ”lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic
warfare (EW) interference, as of 2000 local time. The Ukrainian National
Police reported on January 5 that a Russian drone strike damaged an
infrastructure facility in Zaporizkyi Raion, Zaporizhia Oblast during
the day on January 4.[76]
The Ukrainian Air Force reported on January 5 that Russian forces
launched 103 Shahed and decoy drones from Bryansk and Oryol oblasts and
Millerovo, Rostov Oblast overnight on January 4 to 5.[77]
The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Ukrainian forces downed 61 drones
over Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk,
Zhytomyr, and Khmelnytskyi oblasts and that 42 drones were ”lost” as of
0900 local time. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that debris from
downed drones damaged several houses in Kharkiv Oblast overnight.
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Nothing significant to report.
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Nothing significant to report.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW is not reporting on activities in Russian-occupied areas today.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1]
https://t.me/yurasumy/20297; https://t.me/yurasumy/20300;
https://t.me/yurasumy/20304; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31109;
https://t.me/sashakots/51107; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61223;
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150255; https://t.me/iamsniper/9786;
https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20229; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20230;
https://t.me/dva_majors/61882 ; https://t.me/iamsniper/9792;
https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83924; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21978;
https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21980;
https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21981; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20228;
https://t.me/voenacher/76341 ; https://t.me/rybar/66918;
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61224; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150246 ;
https://t.me/iamsniper/9777; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150248;
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150262; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150257;
https://t.me/iamsniper/9788
[2]
https://t.me/yurasumy/20297; https://t.me/yurasumy/20300;
https://t.me/yurasumy/20304; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31109;
https://t.me/sashakots/51107; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61223;
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150255; https://t.me/iamsniper/9786;
https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20229; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20230;
https://t.me/dva_majors/61882 ; https://t.me/iamsniper/9792;
https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83924; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21978;
https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21980;
https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21981; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20228;
https://t.me/voenacher/76341 ; https://t.me/rybar/66918;
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61224; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150246 ;
https://t.me/iamsniper/9777; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150248;
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150262; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150257;
https://t.me/iamsniper/9788
[3] https://x.com/giK1893/status/1875880843513934279; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83924; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1875949210413224109; https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1875947064149819772; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1875987969469018405 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31123
[4] https://t.me/rybar/66922; https://t.me/dva_majors/61851; https://t.me/dva_majors/61881; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21987; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21978
[5] https://t.me/rybar/66922; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61223; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21987; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31082
[6] https://t.me/notes_veterans/21298 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/21299 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/21300; https://t.me/rusich_army/19869 ; https://t.me/rybar/66916; https://t.me/rybar/66922; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150247; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150270; https://t.me/rusich_army/19878 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18470; https://t.me/yurasumy/20297; https://t.me/yurasumy/20304; https://t.me/rybar/66929
[7]
https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24346; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8026;
https://t.me/assaultregiment33/236; https://t.me/assaultregiment33/237
[8] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31101; https://t.me/rusich_army/19882; https://t.me/rusich_army/19877
[9] https://t.me/rybar/66926
[10]
https://www.pravda.com dot ua/rus/news/2025/01/4/7492051/;
https://suspilne dot
media/917979-u-kurskij-oblasti-za-dva-dni-rf-vtratila-do-bataljonu-pihoti-zelenskij/
[11] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31104
[12] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21971; https://t.me/rybar/66922; https://t.me/yurasumy/20297; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150250; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31101 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31104
[13] https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1875873948942139747 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31099
[14] https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/47358 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/61885; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83929; https://t.me/dva_majors/61882 ; https://t.me/iamsniper/9792; https://t.me/rusich_army/19869 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18464
[15] https://t.me/rybar/66922 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83908 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/61851 ; https://t.me/Alekhin_Telega/12692 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21974 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20297 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18468 ; https://t.me/Mestb_Dobroj_Voli/14006 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61228
[16] https://t.me/rybar/66922 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61228 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/139205
[17] https://t.me/tass_agency/294755 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/294759
[18] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18467
[19] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine
[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2024 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12188
[21] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8020 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12216
[22] https://t.me/yurasumy/20296 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20311 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61222 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21964
[23] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2473 ; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid02BgVUTVSbXTfUGwaKvwVXP97n3K6ynkBGZNAdF8tXqgKE7bWqGwrDrJoJDLgbh6dZl
[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-27-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-30-2024
[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122324
[26] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122324
[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122324
[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122324 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine
[29] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8020; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12216
[30] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2025
[31]
https://t.me/vrogov/18604 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83905 ;
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61220 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150245 ;
https://t.me/voin_dv/12627 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/22091 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-3-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2024
[32] https://t.me/andriyshTime/31623; https://t.me/andriyshTime/31623; https://t.me/andriyshTime/31634; https://t.me/andriyshTime/31641; https://t.me/andriyshTime/31633 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/31639; https://t.me/severrealii/29058; https://t.me/vchkogpu/53768 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/139173
[33]
https://t.me/tass_agency/294698 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/294699 ;
https://t.me/Yuri_Slusar/1730 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/294711
[34] https://t.me/ohliga/11154
[35] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/16372
[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023yGxSLAQ1iXkWzBRZDJPCpyEuWRjH86ygec4okqHvaVVCKGqddYTgsMb2br1zjCpl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uWvRcN9G3RFHzxoUkNTLkKwsxiVn7artgssqC9pLXyQG2vkj5ovebtuGTrJ5jCJrl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3937
[37]
https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2025/01/05/boyi-na-shodi-u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-vidminnosti-v-taktyczi-voroga-na-riznyh-napryamkah/
[38] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30400
[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uWvRcN9G3RFHzxoUkNTLkKwsxiVn7artgssqC9pLXyQG2vkj5ovebtuGTrJ5jCJrl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023yGxSLAQ1iXkWzBRZDJPCpyEuWRjH86ygec4okqHvaVVCKGqddYTgsMb2br1zjCpl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gMDVh6YMYVEYWtfnjDFgQ5US3ikdakqn5383DYvQeju6HppMaeV1ouDFf3JLXGhxl
[40]
https://www.youtube.com/live/j5TqaWCCdUg?si=91fF0E-yrfaQl69C ;
https://suspilne dot
media/kharkiv/909821-linia-frontu-prohodit-za-dva-kilometri-vid-centru-kupanska-nacalnik-mva/
[41] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24320
; https://t.me/fedorenkoys/873 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8016 ;
https://x.com/moklasen/status/1875630388774891556 ; https://armyinform
dot
com.ua/2025/01/05/zgority-pid-zagryzovym-rosiyany-dvichi-atakuvaly-na-kupyanshhyni/
[42] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3937
[43] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3937 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uWvRcN9G3RFHzxoUkNTLkKwsxiVn7artgssqC9pLXyQG2vkj5ovebtuGTrJ5jCJrl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023yGxSLAQ1iXkWzBRZDJPCpyEuWRjH86ygec4okqHvaVVCKGqddYTgsMb2br1zjCpl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gMDVh6YMYVEYWtfnjDFgQ5US3ikdakqn5383DYvQeju6HppMaeV1ouDFf3JLXGhxl
[44] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3937 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uWvRcN9G3RFHzxoUkNTLkKwsxiVn7artgssqC9pLXyQG2vkj5ovebtuGTrJ5jCJrl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023yGxSLAQ1iXkWzBRZDJPCpyEuWRjH86ygec4okqHvaVVCKGqddYTgsMb2br1zjCpl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gMDVh6YMYVEYWtfnjDFgQ5US3ikdakqn5383DYvQeju6HppMaeV1ouDFf3JLXGhxl
[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gMDVh6YMYVEYWtfnjDFgQ5US3ikdakqn5383DYvQeju6HppMaeV1ouDFf3JLXGhxl
[46] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8017; https://t.me/mobilizirovan2022/5380
[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gMDVh6YMYVEYWtfnjDFgQ5US3ikdakqn5383DYvQeju6HppMaeV1ouDFf3JLXGhxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023yGxSLAQ1iXkWzBRZDJPCpyEuWRjH86ygec4okqHvaVVCKGqddYTgsMb2br1zjCpl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uWvRcN9G3RFHzxoUkNTLkKwsxiVn7artgssqC9pLXyQG2vkj5ovebtuGTrJ5jCJrl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3937
[48] https://t.me/wargonzo/24112
[49] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21969
[50]
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8027;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LFwAKtGYUEY;
https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1875681559061393726;
https://www.instagram.com/reel/DEYbyaqI7lP/
[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gMDVh6YMYVEYWtfnjDFgQ5US3ikdakqn5383DYvQeju6HppMaeV1ouDFf3JLXGhxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023yGxSLAQ1iXkWzBRZDJPCpyEuWRjH86ygec4okqHvaVVCKGqddYTgsMb2br1zjCpl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uWvRcN9G3RFHzxoUkNTLkKwsxiVn7artgssqC9pLXyQG2vkj5ovebtuGTrJ5jCJrl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3937; https://t.me/wargonzo/24112
[52]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc ; https://suspilne dot
media/donbas/918133-aku-taktiku-zastosovue-armia-rf-na-toreckomu-napramku/
[53] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61218
[54]
https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2473;
https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid02BgVUTVSbXTfUGwaKvwVXP97n3K6ynkBGZNAdF8tXqgKE7bWqGwrDrJoJDLgbh6dZl
[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gMDVh6YMYVEYWtfnjDFgQ5US3ikdakqn5383DYvQeju6HppMaeV1ouDFf3JLXGhxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023yGxSLAQ1iXkWzBRZDJPCpyEuWRjH86ygec4okqHvaVVCKGqddYTgsMb2br1zjCpl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uWvRcN9G3RFHzxoUkNTLkKwsxiVn7artgssqC9pLXyQG2vkj5ovebtuGTrJ5jCJrl; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61218
[56]
https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2025/01/05/shturmovyky-za-try-tyzhni-yak-rosiya-navchaye-soldat-za-prynczypom-trymaj-zbroyu-i-jdy/
[57]
https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2025/01/05/pokrovskyj-napryamok-pid-tyskom-rosiyany-shturmuyut-malymy-grupamy-j-haotychno-byut-po-mistah/
[58]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc ; https://suspilne dot
media/donbas/918061-rf-nakopicue-vijska-na-okolicah-pokrovska/;
https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2025/01/05/vorog-robyt-stavku-na-motoczyklistiv-ta-fpv-drony-sytuacziya-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/
[59] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8024; https://t.me/mo114rf/86 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83921
[60] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8028; https://t.me/mechanized33/699
[61]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gMDVh6YMYVEYWtfnjDFgQ5US3ikdakqn5383DYvQeju6HppMaeV1ouDFf3JLXGhxl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023yGxSLAQ1iXkWzBRZDJPCpyEuWRjH86ygec4okqHvaVVCKGqddYTgsMb2br1zjCpl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uWvRcN9G3RFHzxoUkNTLkKwsxiVn7artgssqC9pLXyQG2vkj5ovebtuGTrJ5jCJrl
; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3937 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61218
[62]
https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2025/01/05/boyi-na-shodi-u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-vidminnosti-v-taktyczi-voroga-na-riznyh-napryamkah/
[63]
https://suspilne dot
media/918015-ssa-tiho-peredavali-ukraini-zbrou-ataka-gur-na-rosijski-servisi-1047-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1736094340&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[64]
https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83905 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61220 ;
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150245 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/12627 ;
https://t.me/epoddubny/22091
[65] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83886 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83892 ;
[66] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2472 ; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid02BgVUTVSbXTfUGwaKvwVXP97n3K6ynkBGZNAdF8tXqgKE7bWqGwrDrJoJDLgbh6dZl
[67] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30397
[68] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gMDVh6YMYVEYWtfnjDFgQ5US3ikdakqn5383DYvQeju6HppMaeV1ouDFf3JLXGhxl
[69] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21982
[70] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023yGxSLAQ1iXkWzBRZDJPCpyEuWRjH86ygec4okqHvaVVCKGqddYTgsMb2br1zjCpl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uWvRcN9G3RFHzxoUkNTLkKwsxiVn7artgssqC9pLXyQG2vkj5ovebtuGTrJ5jCJrl; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21982; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21964;
[71]
https://gur.gov dot
ua/content/fpv-zasidka-rozvidnyky-likviduvaly-nachalnyka-shtabu-batalionu-okupantiv-shtorm-osietiia.html
; https://t.me/DIUkraine/5161
[72] https://t.me/batalyon15/5227
[73] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uWvRcN9G3RFHzxoUkNTLkKwsxiVn7artgssqC9pLXyQG2vkj5ovebtuGTrJ5jCJrl; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02mZHo4TEoyyRTpWZaLLXhtDc6fQVetbgomdPyym2PoeZkQv6omnDs1LfDr8SDFEnml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023yGxSLAQ1iXkWzBRZDJPCpyEuWRjH86ygec4okqHvaVVCKGqddYTgsMb2br1zjCpl
[74] https://t.me/dva_majors/61826; https://t.me/dva_majors/61848
[75] https://t.me/kpszsu/26239
[76]
https://suspilne dot
media/918015-ssa-tiho-peredavali-ukraini-zbrou-ataka-gur-na-rosijski-servisi-1047-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1736082659&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps;
https://t.me/police_zp_news/18707
[77] https://t.me/kpszsu/26301
