Davit Gasparyan, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson, Angelica Evans, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and George Barros
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Key Takeaways:
- The Kremlin has launched an information operation that seeks to create the false impression that the Russian economy is performing well despite numerous continued indicators of macroeconomic distress.
- Russia continues long-term efforts to build out its manpower reserve with All-Russian Cossack Society organizations and create a willing and well-trained prioritized pool designed to buffer the Kremlin from potential blowback in the event of a possible future partial call up of Russian reservists.
- North Korea will reportedly deploy new military personnel to Russia by mid-March 2025, likely to maintain the current pace and intensity of attritional, infantry-led assaults in Kursk Oblast.
- These fresh North Korean forces are unlikely to decisively improve Russian operations and will likely face the same high casualty rates and complications operating with Russian forces as the current North Korean contingent, provided the Russian command continues to use North Korean forces the same way as it has thus far.
- Russian milbloggers complained and expressed concern over recent claims that the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government in Syria suspended Russian investment and financial involvement in the port of Tartus as Russia's long-term military presence in Syria remains unclear.
- A Russian state media outlet reported that Russia may resume direct gas deliveries to Transnistria despite recent discussions about sourcing non-Russian gas to the region.
- Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions near Toretsk.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
- Russia and Uzbekistan are deepening military cooperation.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on January 22 but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces reached the outskirts of Guyevo (south of Sudzha), but ISW has not observed evidence of this claim.[23] Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Sudzha near Pogrebki and south of Sudzha near Makhnovka and in and west of Kurilovka.[24] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Makhnovka and northwest of Sudzha near Kruglenkoye.[25] Elements of the Chechen "Zapad-Akhmat" Battalion are reportedly conducting reconnaissance operations near Russia's international border with Sumy Oblast.[26] Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating a TOS-1A thermobaric artillery system in Kursk Oblast.[27]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 22 but did not make confirmed advances. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 22 that Russian forces seized Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[31] Russian milbloggers claimed on January 22 that Russian forces advanced both north and south of Zapadne and south of and in central Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk).[32] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kupyansk near Dvorichna and Kutkivka and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on January 21 and 22.[33] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 22 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Vilshana (northeast of Kupyansk).[34] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on January 22 that Russian forces are attempting to cross the Oskil River near Dvorichna with small vessels - particularly small rubber boats - under the cover of night.[35] Trehubov noted that Ukrainian drones are targeting Russian forces attempting to cross the Oskil River and hiding in windbreaks. Trehubov also stated that Russian forces conduct assaults on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River, have accumulated an unspecified amount of personnel, and have not established logistics across the Oskil River as the water has not frozen. A Ukrainian drone battalion commander operating in the Kupyansk direction stated on January 22 that Russian commanders are forcing infantry to attack despite poor weather conditions preventing the proper use of drone or armored vehicle support.[36] The Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on January 22 that Russian forces used an unspecified number of armored vehicles to conduct recent assaults in the Petropavlivka direction (east of Kupyansk) and near Lozova (northeast of Borova).[37] Drone operators of the Russian Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly continue operating in the Kupyansk direction.[38]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 22 but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 22 that Russian forces advanced southwest of Lozova (northeast of Borova) and west of Nadiya (east of Borova).[39] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim, however. Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Borova near Lozova, Nova Kruhlyakivka, and Zahryzove; east of Borova near Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka and Novoserhiivka on January 21 and 22.[40]
Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on January 21 and 22 but did not advance.[44]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 22. Geolocated footage published on January 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Zaliznychna Street in northwestern Chasiv Yar and recently marginally advanced north and northwest of the Chasiv Yar Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further along Tsentralna Street in central Chasiv Yar, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[46] Russian forces continued ground attacks near Chasiv Yar itself and north of Chasiv Yar in the direction of Fedorivka on January 21 and 22.[47] Snipers of the Russian 299th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Chasiv Yar itself, and elements of the Russian 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Chasiv Yar itself.[48]
Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 22. Geolocated footage published on January 22 shows drone operators of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) striking Ukrainian forces in western Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in the area.[49] Geolocated footage published on January 11 and geolocated on January 22 indicates that Russian forces advanced along Kachalova and Puzanova streets in northern Toretsk.[50] The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Toretsk direction stated on January 22 that Ukrainian forces are defending in limited positions in Toretsk and trying to contain Russian forces in the settlement.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed on January 21 and 22 that Russian forces advanced to a field between Toretsk and Petrivka (west of Toretsk) and that Russian forces advanced east of the Toretska Mine waste heap in northern Toretsk, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[52] Russian forces continued ground attacks within Toretsk itself on January 21 and 22.[53]
Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Pokrovsk amid ongoing offensive operations near Pokrovsk on January 22. Geolocated footage published on January 22 indicate that Russian forces recently advanced in the fields northeast of Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk) and within the northeastern part of the settlement.[54] Russian milbloggers reiterated claims that Russian forces advanced near Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk), seized Baranivka (northeast of Pokrovsk and north of Vozdvyzhenka) and Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk), advanced 3.6 kilometers in depth west of Vovkove (southwest of Pokrovsk), and within Nadiivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian military command recently introduced reserve forces into combat east of Pokrovsk and that these forces participated in the supposed seizure of Baranivka.[56] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces recently introduced elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) to offensive operations south of Pokrovsk, indicating that Russian forces continue to prioritize the envelopment of Pokrovsk from the southwest.[57] Mashovets assessed that Russian advances south and east of Pokrovsk have slowed in recent weeks. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[58] Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Pokrovsk near Vodyane Druhe, Zelene Pole, Myrolyubivka, Yelyzavetivka, Promin, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novyi Trud, Zvirove, and Petropavlivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Novoserhiivka, Kotlyne, Uspenivka, and Sribne and in the direction of Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) on January 21 and 22.[59]
Russian forces recently advanced west of Kurakhove amid continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on January 22. Geolocated footage published on January 21 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the fields south of Dachne (west of Kurakhove).[60] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced along windbreaks southwest of Slovyanka (northwest of Kurakhove) and two kilometers towards Kostyantynopil (west of Kurakhove) and that Russian forces are clearing Ukrainian forces from the area west of the Kurakhivske Reservoir (west of Kurakhove).[61] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, however. Mashovets stated on January 22 that elements of the Russian 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) have struggled to advance towards Andriivka (west of Kurakhove) from the south since their last advance as of January 12 despite being reinforced with elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA).[62] Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Kurakhove near Slovyanka and Shevchenko; west of Kurakhove near Dachne, Andriivka, and Kostyantynopil; and southwest of Kurakhove near Ulakly and Yantarne on January 21 and 22.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka and Zelenivka (southwest of Kurakhove).[64]
Russian forces recently advanced near and within Velyka Novosilka amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 22. Geolocated footage published on January 21 and 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along a road west of Rozdolne (northeast of Velyka Novosilka) and along Horizhnia Street in northeastern Velyka Novosilka.[65] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Vremivka (west of Velyka Novosilka) and further within eastern Velyka Novosilka and reiterated claims that Russian forces have partially enveloped Ukrainian forces in Velyka Novosilka from the north, east, and south.[66] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA) are attacking in southeastern Velyka Novosilka and that elements of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, EMD) are attacking in the southwestern part of the settlement.[67] Mashovets noted that elements of the Russian 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are advancing near the northern outskirts of Velyka Novosilka.[68] Russian forces continued ground assaults near Velyka Novosilka and just west of Velyka Novosilka near Vremivka on January 21 and 22.[69] Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD) are reportedly operating within Velyka Novosilka.[70]
A Ukrainian drone group operating in the Zaporizhia direction posted footage on January 22 showing a Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drone strike against a Russian Buk-M3 air defense system likely in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[73]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Dnipro direction on January 21 and 22 but did not advance.[74] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have intensified drone and HIMARS strikes against the Russian rear in occupied Kherson Oblast.[75] Drone operators of the Russian 10th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Main Military Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[76]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76145
[2] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-01-21/russia-s-budget-revenue-surges-to-record-in-december-despite-sanctions
[3] https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-national-wealth-fund-38-billion-deficit/32229281.html; https://www.aa dot com dot tr/en/economy/russias-national-wealth-fund-reserves-down-117b/3452503
[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates-june-1-september-30-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-29-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-4-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-30-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2024
[5] https://vsko dot ru/ ; https://t.me/severrealii/29287
[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2024
[7] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/22/world/europe/north-korea-soldiers-ukraine.html
[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23-2024
[9] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c87djeezjxeo
[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011625
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[12] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/22/world/europe/north-korea-soldiers-ukraine.html
[13] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/22/sso-pokazaly-zapeklyj-bij-svoyih-operatoriv-bpla-z-vijskovymy-kndr/
[14] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/22/world/europe/north-korea-soldiers-ukraine.html
[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011125
[16] https://t.me/rybar/67364
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[18] https://t.me/rustroyka1945/19885 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62940 ; https://t.me/Mestb_Dobroj_Voli/14188; https://t.me/dva_majors/62941 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61604
[19] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/22944889
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[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011425
[23] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31572
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[25] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61595; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22771; . https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61595
[26] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5440
[27] https://t.me/mod_russia/48135; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84939
[28] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/rozvidnyky-znyshchyly-vorozhe-suputnykove-obladnannia.html
[29]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l ; https://t.me/synegubov/12756
[30] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5439
[31] https://t.me/mod_russia/48130
[32] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84927; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30650; https://t.me/notes_veterans/21526 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22774
[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l
[34] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22774
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[37] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4309
[38] https://t.me/epoddubny/22231
[39] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30647 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30647
[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4309
[41] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30644; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30644
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[43] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18626
[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4309
[45] https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/1882013082530238489; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24878; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1882092705913930238; https://t.me/Rarog_24OMBr/392
[46] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30656 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30659
[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l; https://t.me/dva_majors/62896; https://t.me/wargonzo/24387
[48] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22735
[49] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1882076801478078537; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13287
[50] https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/582; https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/573; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8189; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1882067413816275303; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8188
[51] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/22/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-sytuacziyu-u-toreczku/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg
[52] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22724; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152093
[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/22/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-sytuacziyu-u-toreczku/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg
[54] https://t.me/ssternenko/39091; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8193
[55] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30640 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61599 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61585 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84923 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/3158 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22762 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22769 ; https://t.me/vrogov/18848 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152093
[56] https://t.me/yurasumy/20711
[57] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2508
[58] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61592
[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61599; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20709
[60] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8185; https://t.me/AFUStratCom/27774
[61] https://t.me/dva_majors/62896; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22731
[62] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2509
[63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l; https://t.me/dva_majors/62896; https://t.me/yurasumy/20706
[64] https://t.me/yurasumy/20706
[65] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24867; https://t.me/ombr_110/420; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8192
[66] https://t.me/yurasumy/20705 ; https://t.me/sashakots/51449 ; https://t.me/smotri_z/39304 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/22233 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84900 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62937 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152093
[67] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2509
[68] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2510
[69] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l
[70] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84900 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/12929
[71]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l
[72] https://t.me/dva_majors/62900
[73] https://t.me/Ronins44_65/431; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/22/zrubaly-chergovyj-buk-nashi-dronari-vidznachylysya-na-pivdni/
[74]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l
[75] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22770
[76] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1892
[77] https://t.me/kpszsu/27392
[78] https://t.me/senkevichonline/11293; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/12895; https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/924153-zagroza-bezpilotnikiv-u-mikolaevi-prolunali-vibuhi/ ; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/01/22/rossiyskiy-dron-popal-v-shestietazhnyy-dom-v-nikolaeve-chastichno-razrushen-verhniy-etazh; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/37268 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/37268
[79] https://t.me/mod_russia/48119
[80] https://t.me/mod_russia/48132
[81] https://www.rbc dot ru/society/21/01/2025/678f6f419a794753e2dea007
[82] https://www.rbc dot ru/society/14/04/2023/64399bbf9a79473c8e25e2ec ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2024
[83] https://t.me/rybar/67368