Alexandra Braverman, Carolyn Moorman, Johanna Moore, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, and Nicholas Carl
Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET
The
Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and
the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which
provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that
undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.
Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here
to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition
offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static
maps present in this report.
We do not report in
detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in
Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are
assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of
armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity
even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Israel
announced on January 25 that it will prevent Palestinians from
returning to the northern Gaza Strip because Hamas violated the
ceasefire agreement.[1] Hamas released four female Israeli
soldiers as part of the second hostage release on January 25.[2] Israel
accused Hamas of violating the ceasefire agreement by releasing female
soldiers before female civilians.[3] Israel announced that it will only
fulfill its requirement to allow Palestinians to move to the northern
part of the strip once Hamas releases female civilian hostage Arbel
Yehud, whom Israel expected to be released on January 25.[4] An Israeli
Army Radio correspondent reported that Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
is holding Yehud in the Gaza Strip.[5] A Hamas official said that Yehud
is alive and will be released during the next hostage release on
February 1.[6] Israeli media reported that talks are underway to
expedite Yehud’s release.[7] A US National Security Council official
told Axios that the United States is ”continuing to push” for Yehud’s
release ”through negotiation channels.”[8] Israel released 200
Palestinian prisoners, including 120 who were serving life sentences for
killing Israelis, into the West Bank, Egypt, and the Gaza Strip as part
of the hostage-prisoner release on January 25.[9]
CTP-ISW
has recorded no verifiable reports of kinetic activity in the Gaza
Strip or attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since the last data cut
off on January 24.


The
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) tried to attack the Sayyidah
Zeynab shrine in Damascus, which a prominent Shia religious site, likely
in order to stoke sectarian tensions in Syria. The Washington Post, citing
informed officials, reported that the United States has shared
intelligence with Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) to thwart recent ISIS
attacks, including one targeting the Sayyidah Zeynab shrine, southeast
of Damascus.[10] Syrian state media reported on January 11 that the
General Security Department and General Intelligence Service stopped
four ISIS suicide bombers from attacking the shrine.[11] ISIS attacks
targeting Shia sites could delegitimize HTS as the primary governing
authority in Syria. Iran has similarly leveraged the shrine’s religious
significance to drive a sectarian information operation against HTS.[12]
Attacks on the shrine resonate with other Syrian minority groups
outside of the Twelver Shia sect who also appear increasingly
distrustful of the HTS-led interim Syrian government.
Key Takeaways:
Syria
Turkey
and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) continued to attack
SDF positions surrounding Qara Qozak bridge and Tishreen Dam on January
25. The SDF repelled two separate SNA attacks in Deir Hafer
and Syriatel Hill killing and wounding an unspecified number of SNA
fighters. Turkey conducted at least four airstrikes on SDF positions
east of the Qara Qozak Bridge.[13] rkey and the SNA conducted air and
artillery strikes targeting SDF positions near the Tishreen Dam.[14]
Geolocated footage posted on January 25 shows the SDF striking SNA
fighters and vehicles west of the Tishreen Dam.[15] Anti-SDF media
claimed that a Turkish drone strike targeted an SDF convoy traveling to
the Tishreen Dam, causing it to retreat.[16] The SNA and SDF reportedly
exchanged artillery fire near the M4 highway, north of Raqqa.[17]
Anti-SDF media reported that the SNA separately shelled SDF positions in
Bin Hasu, south of Kobani.[18]
The SDF also said that it
conducted multiple attacks west of Qere Qokak bridge in retaliation for
SNA and Turkish attacks, killing six SNA fighters and wounding
eight.[19] Anti-SDF media claimed that an SDF strike targeting an SNA
position in Qalat al Najm caused civilian casualties.[20]

HTS-led forces deployed to Latakia Province in response to an uptick in former Assad regime member activity.[21] Syrian
security forces killed former Assad regime members who attempted to
conduct two separate attacks on HTS checkpoints in Latakia
Province.”[22] Syrian Public Security forces also arrested at least
seven former Assad regime members during clearing operations in
Jableh.[23] Former Assad regime member activity appears to be an
uncoordinated, low-level threat to HTS control in Latakia. HTS has
concentrated its clearing operations in Latakia Province, a former
regime stronghold, since the fall of the Assad regime in December
2024.[24]
The IDF continued to operate in southern Syria on January 25. Syrian
media reported that the IDF installed electricity poles in Marbah,
Daraa Province, less than a kilometer from the disengagement zone.[25]

The
HTS-led Department of Military Operations continued clearing operations
targeting former regime elements in northern and western Syria on
January 25. Syrian media reported that two Department of
Military Operations members, including a field commander, were killed in
attacks in Baniyas, Tartous Province, and Talkalekh, western Homs
countryside, on January 24.[26] It is not clear if former regime
elements perpetrated these attacks. The Department of Military
Operations has operated in western Homs and Baniyas in recent days.[27]
Syrian media reported on December 25 that Department of Military
Operations Forces seized warehouses of sarin and toxic chlorine gas in a
neighborhood of Homs City.[28] The Department of Military Operations
also reportedly withdrew heavy machinery from Inkhil, northern Daraa
Province..[29] Department of Military Operations forces deployed to
Inkhil on January 23.[30]
Syrian Foreign Affairs
Minister Assad al Shaibani, Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan
Fidan, and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi will reportedly hold talks in
Baghdad in the next two weeks.[31] Iraqi Prime Minister Fuad
Hussein, Iraqi National Intelligence Service Hamid al Shatri, and a
prominent Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) leader will also join the
meetings, according to informed sources speaking to Iraqi media on
January 25. The talks reportedly will cover a variety of issues
including the SDF-controlled prisons in northeastern Syria, and Turkish
imports of Iraqi oil. It is likely that Shaibani, Fidan, and Abdi will
also discuss the disarmament of the SDF and the Kurdistan Workers' Party
(PKK). Turkey and HTS are continuing to coordinate their efforts to
coerce the SDF into disarming and integrating into the HTS-led defense
apparatus.[32] Turkey has also reportedly made an agreement with the
imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan to disarm the PKK.[33]
Syrian
media, including SDF-affiliated media, reported on January 25 that over
500 family members of ISIS members relocated from the SDF-controlled al
Hol camp in Hasakah Province, northeastern Syria, to the al Jadaa camp
in Ninewa Province, Iraq, on January 25.[34] Iraqi media
sources have not confirmed these reports as of the time of this writing.
Iraq last repatriated Iraqi citizens from al Hol camp on January 9.[35]
The SDF continues to face bandwidth and resource constraints in Syria
and has almost certainty redirected resources away from al Hol camp.[36]
Iraqi government officials have repeatedly expressed concern over al
Hol camp’s ISIS population.[37]
Iraq
Axis of Resistance objectives:
Nothing significant to report.
Arabian Peninsula
Axis of Resistance objectives:
The Houthis released 153 prisoners of war on January 25.[38] The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) acknowledged the
release and stated that its staff visited the detainees beforehand and
provided medical checks. Houthis Committee for Prisoners Affairs Head
Abdul Qader al Murtada stated that the released individuals were
"humanitarian cases," including the sick, wounded, and elderly.
The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon
Axis of Resistance objectives:
The Gaza Strip
The
IDF killed a Palestinian individual whom it deemed posed a threat to
IDF fighters in an unspecified location in the central Gaza Strip on
January 24.[39] The IDF separately fired shots to disperse
individuals in several areas across the Gaza Strip on January 24 and
25.[40] The IDF added that it acted in accordance with the ceasefire
agreement. The IDF warned Gazans on January 24 to avoid approaching
Israeli forces in deployed in the Gaza Strip.[41]
Reuters
reported, citing two US congressional sources, that Hamas has recruited
between 10,000 to 15,000 fighters since the start of the Israel-Hamas
war.[42] The sources revealed that the new Hamas recruits are
mainly comprised of young, untrained fighters who are performing basic
security tasks. Former US Secretary of State Antony Blinken previous
stated on January 14 that Hamas has recruited “almost as many new
militants as it has lost.”[43] Current Israeli military operations are
designed to prevent the regeneration of Hamas by denying Hamas the
sanctuary to conduct training programs, particularly in the northern
Gaza Strip. The IDF is preventing the reconstitution of Hamas units by
isolating Hamas’ forces in the north and denying them safe areas there
by conducting repeated raids.[44] This is consistent with the CTP-ISW
assessment that Hamas fighters are now operating as small fighting cells
and not organized military units that Hamas had in the early days of
the war.[45]
Lebanon
The
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) assumed control of three former Palestinian
militia centers near Tripoli, northwestern Lebanon, on January 25.[46] The
LAF took over one former Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP) center and two Fatah al Intifada centers. The LAF confiscated
weapons and surveillance devices.
The LAF backfilled IDF positions in four locations in Bint Jbeil Governorate, southeastern Lebanon, on January 25.[47]
The IDF and LAF warned Lebanese civilians against returning to their homes in southern Lebanon on January 25.[48] Lebanese
media reported on January 25 that residents attempted to return to
their homes in at least two locations in southwestern Lebanon.[49]
Lebanese media reported on January 25 that IDF vehicles blocked roads
from Wadi al Saluki to Aitaroun, Blida and Houla to prevent the
premature return of residents.[50]

West Bank
Israeli
forces continued the “Iron Wall” counterterrorism operation in Jenin
Governorate for the fifth consecutive day on January 25.[51]
Three Israeli soldiers from the Egoz Unit were injured during IDF
operations on January 25. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, Palestinian
Islamic Jihad, and Hamas targeted Israeli forces in Jenin with
improvised explosive devices (IED) and small arms on January 25.[52]
CTP-ISW did not observe any combined attacks by the newly-created joint
operations room, which is comprised of PIJ, Hamas, and the al Aqsa
Martyrs’ Brigades, on January 25.[53]
Israeli settlers set fire to a car and damaged a home in Tubas, northern West Bank, on January 25.[54] US
President Donald Trump signed an executive order on January 20 to lift
sanctions on Israeli settlers accused of committing violence against
Palestinians in the West Bank.[55]
Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy continued the “Great Prophet 19” exercise in the Persian Gulf on January 25.[56]
The IRGC Navy launched "Ghaem" and "Almas" missiles, which it claims
are AI-guided, from Mohajer-6 and Ababil-5 drones. The exercise included
the Navab air defense missile launches, ballistic missile tests, and
IRGC commandos conducting land and sea operations. The IRGC Navy also
unveiled the Kowsar-222 air defense missile, which reportedly has a 17
km range and operates on ”Ashura“ and ”Zolfaghar” vessels.[57]
The
Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored
activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US
forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the
stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical
Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the
Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly
based on regional events.
CTP-ISW defines the
“Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has
cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power
in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state,
and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective
interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and
its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of
financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree
of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies
that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are
partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the
Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which
include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the
Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these
objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have
become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

[1]
https://t.me/moriahdoron/18701 ; https://www.timesofisrael dot
com/full-text-of-the-hostage-ceasefire-agreement-reached-between-israel-and-hamas/
[2] https://www.axios.com/2025/01/25/israeli-women-soldiers-released-hamas-ceasefire
[3] https://www.axios.com/2025/01/25/israeli-women-soldiers-released-hamas-ceasefire
[4] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/israel-blocks-palestinians-from-returning-to-north-gaza-after-hamas-breaks-truce-terms/
[5] https://t.me/moriahdoron/18705
[6]
https://t.me/moriahdoron/18704 ;
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-set-release-four-israeli-soldier-hostages-second-swap-2025-01-25/
[7]
https://t.me/moriahdoron/18712 ; https://www.timesofisrael dot
com/liveblog_entry/israel-said-to-ask-trump-administration-to-demand-qatar-egypt-push-hamas-to-release-hostage-arbel-yehud/
[8] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1883205518204006675
[9] https://www.axios.com/2025/01/25/israeli-women-soldiers-released-hamas-ceasefire
[10] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/01/24/us-syria-intelligence-hts-isis/
[11]
https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1878021979627810901 ;
https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1878021174120395123 ;
https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/132673 ;
https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1878080564999168303
[12]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-5-2025
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-16-2024
[13] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1883059538045145449
[14]
https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1883059538045145449 ;
https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/134169 ;
https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/134175 ;
https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1883127000766029933
[15] https://x.com/ghost_watcher1/status/1883204135954403650 ; https://x.com/RojavaNetwork/status/1883113459967201612
[16] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1883216747307893092
[17] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1883178389441589580
[18] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1883156642776391727
[19] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1883059538045145449
[20] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1883059538045145449 ; https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1883080154739806336
[21]
https://t.me/rda_al_adoan/2924 ; https://t.me/rda_al_adoan/2931 ;
https://t.me/rda_al_adoan/2927 ;
https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1882876850927784325
[22]
https://t.me/rda_al_adoan/2932 ;
https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1882884626299109483 ;
https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/134148
[23] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1883191839479779580 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/134220
[24] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-28-2024
[25] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1883026171384025469
[26] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1883097186357137741
[27]
https://t.me/Free_Tartous_city/475 ;
https://t.me/The_Free_City_of_Homs/888 ;
https://t.me/Free_Tartous_city/475 ;
https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1882407994677498248
[28] https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1883221275268801022
[29] https://t.me/Free_Daraa_city/808
[30] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1882474097583804435
[31]
https://shafaq dot
com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B7-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%B1%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9
[32] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate012325
[33]
https://x.com/gonultol/status/1882126703339991391;
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-pro-kurdish-party-meet-jailed-pkk-leader-again-wednesday-2025-01-22/;
https://x.com/gonultol/status/1848743755102179623?s=46&t=4RGn_HtvqC3-_Uk3TbHSRA
[34]
https://npasyria dot com/203725/ ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/134170
; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1883086935062913105 ;
https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1883202740488462710
[35] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-10-2025
[36] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-24-2025
[37]
https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Behind-the-Scenes-Details-of-Iraqi-Intelligence-Chief-s-Syria-visit
; https://shafaq dot
com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B0%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%8A-%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%84-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%B9%D9%86%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A8
[38] https://apnews.com/article/yemen-houthi-rebels-prisoner-release-war-israel-hamas-7caad980b54c6097d727febf720cb090
[39] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1882871783768092824
[40] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1882871780433608845 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1883219896395616604
[41] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1882871787207405578
[42] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-has-added-up-15000-fighters-since-start-war-us-figures-show-2025-01-24/
[43] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-14-2025
[44] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-14-2025
[45] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-19-2025
[46] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1883119725640557041
[47] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1883181580849435032
[48] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1883062709589028989 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1883105814824567195
[49] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/128221
[50] https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/128239
[51] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1883161004248555550
[52]
https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/8201 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/2038 ;
https://alqassam dot
ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8416/%D8%A5%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A9-%D8%B5%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%83%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%85-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%AC-%D8%A8%D9%85%D8%AE%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AC%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A5%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%82%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B5%D9%81%D9%88%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88
[53] https://t.me/sarayaps/19079
[54]
https://www.timesofisrael dot
com/liveblog_entry/settlers-raid-west-bank-palestinian-village-of-tuba-torching-home-vehicle-rights-group/
[55] https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-cancels-sanctions-far-right-israeli-settlers-occupied-west-bank-2025-01-21/
[56] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/721943
[57] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/721939