Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, Grace Mappes, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and Frederick W. Kagan
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces recently cut the T-0405 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway east of Pokrovsk and the T-0406 Pokrovsk-Mezhova highway southwest of Pokrovsk as part of their efforts to envelop Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.
- Russian forces likely intend to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) into Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad in order to force Ukrainian units to withdraw from the towns in future months.
- Russian state-owned energy corporation Gazprom acknowledged that it is considering reducing the size of its central office staff by 40 percent, indicating that Gazprom may be concerned about the long-term effects that the war in Ukraine and the reduction in Russian gas exports to Europe will have on the Russian gas industry.
- Russian forces recently advanced in the Kharkiv, Borova, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka directions.
- South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) reportedly announced that North Korean casualties in Kursk Oblast total roughly 3,000 killed and wounded.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on January 13 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued northwest of Sudzha near Pogrebki and Kruglenkoye; northeast of Sudzha near Russkoye Porechnoye; and southeast of Sudzha near Makhnovka.[11] Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on January 13 that they recently repelled a North Korean infantry assault in Kursk Oblast that lasted from morning until night.[12]
Russian forces recently marginally advanced northeast of Kharkiv City amid continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on January 12 and 13. Geolocated footage published on January 12 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in a forested area on the northeastern outskirts of Tykhe (northeast of Kharkiv City).[14] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 13 that Russian forces also made unspecified advances within Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[15] Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the international border north of Kharkiv City near Kozacha Lopan and near Vovchansk on January 12 and 13.[16] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on January 13 that Russian forces are not fielding armored vehicles or buggies for assaults due to the threat of Ukrainian drones.[17] The commander reported that Russian forces conduct assaults by sending poorly-trained, ”disposable” soldiers to assault Ukrainian positions after which better trained soldiers follow. The commander added that Russian forces have roughly halved their tempo of operations in the Kharkiv direction in recent days.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 13 but did not advance. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) significantly expanded their bridgehead along the Oskil River near Dvorichna (northwest of Kupyansk), hold positions in half of Dvorichna, and are likely attempting to advance along the Dvorichna-Kupyansk P-79 road toward Kindrashivka (northwest of Kupyansk and southwest of Dvorichna).[18] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Dvorichna, Zapadne, and Kindrashivka and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on January 12 and 13.[19] The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Kupyansk direction noted on January 13 that Russian forces are attempting to leverage inclement weather conditions to cross the Oskil River on small boats and rafts and are accumulating forces in the direction of Dvorichna and Masyutivka (south of Dvorichna).[20] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating along the Kupyansk-Lyman line stated that Russian forces are using artillery, air, and drone strikes to support ground activity against Ukrainian defenses in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions.[21] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are currently not using vehicles during assaults due to softened terrain and are using up to 30 to 40 first person-view (FPV) drones to strike a single target in this area. Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[22]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on January 13 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) seized half of Pivichnyi Microraion and the fourth workshop of the Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar and that elements of the Russian 331st Airborne (VDV) Division (98th VDV Division) seized the main part of the Refractory Plant.[33] The milbloggers also claimed that elements of the Russian 299th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) and the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] AC) cleared most of the Stupky-Holubovskyi forest (south of Chasiv Yar). ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, however.[34]Russian forces conducted offensive operations within Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Bila Hora on January 12 and 13[35] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 13 that Ukrainian forces conducted infantry-led and mechanized counterattacks in Chasiv Yar.[36]
See topline for updates in the Pokrovsk direction.
Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 13. Geolocated footage published on January 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Dachne (west of Kurakhove).[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Yantarne (southwest of Kurakhove), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[46] Russian forces continued attacking near Kurakhove itself; northwest of Kurakhove near Slovyanka, Petropavlivka, and Shevchenko; west of Kurakhove near Dachne; and southwest of Kurakhove near Yantarne on January 12 and 13.[47] Elements of the Russian 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Kurakhove.[48] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 163rd Tank Regiment, 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD), and 33rd and 255th motorized rifle regiments (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are operating in the Kurakhove-Dachne-Dalne area.[49] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are attempting to advance along the Sukhi Yaly River north of Kostyantnynolske (southwest of Kurakhove) and that elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]), 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps, EMD), 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD), and 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are operating near Yantarne.[50]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 13. Geolocated footage published on January 12 and 13 indicates that Russian forces operating north of Velyka Novosilka advanced to the east (left) bank of the Mokri Yaly River southwest of Novyi Komar and that Russian forces likely seized Neskuchne (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[51] Some Russian sources claimed on January 12 and 13 that Russian forces have not yet seized Neskuchne and that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in northern Neskuchne, however.[52] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 12 Russian forces are one kilometer from the final Ukrainian logistics lines near Velyka Novosilka.[53] Mashovets stated on January 13 that Russian forces have nearly completed their envelopment of Vremivka and Velyka Novosilka from the north, south, and southeast and forecast that Russian forces may conduct a "decisive" operation to seize the settlements in the coming days.[54] Russian forces continued attacking west of Velyka Novosilka near Vremivka and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil and Neskuchne on January 12 and 13.[55] Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) continue fighting for the Velyka Novosilka – Uspenivka road between Novosilka (west of Velyka Novosilka) and Vremivka and that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) with support from elements of the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet, LMD) are fighting near Novyi Komar.[56]
Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 12 and 13 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 13 that Russian forces usually conduct reconnaissance-in-force operations in small groups in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[57]Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces reported on January 11 that Ukrainian forces successfully struck a Russian Tor-M2 air defense system on an unknown date in the past week (roughly between January 4 to 11) in the Zaporizhia direction.[58] Drone operators of the Russian “Nemets” Group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[59]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Dnipro direction on January 12 and 13 but did not make any advances.[60]
A Russian milblogger claimed on January 12 that Ukrainian forces targeted the Kerch Strait Bridge with 43 drones overnight on January 10 to 11 but that Russian forces downed all the drones.[61] The milblogger asserted that the drones attempted to strike the Kerch Strait Bridge.[62] The Crimea-based Ukrainian "Atesh" partisan organization reported on January 13 that Russian forces recently deployed additional S-400 air defense systems and radar systems to the Hvardiske Airfield in Simferopol, occupied Crimea.[63]
[1] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8097; https://t.me/osirskiy/1034
[2] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2488 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61376 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20507 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20508 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/151170 ; https://t.me/politadequate/9424; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/151228
[3] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2488
[4] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2488 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2489 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010525
[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-7-2025
[6] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8102; https://t.me/urga_74/3182 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/47836 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/47847
[7] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TRPBfwfiAQY4xhBUguVNjBnkVKxxwQsyLXhRK3167GDXH4dEjYjPKyVca31GnQSDl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CF9hjfQNwM9nibLUwJsHYVedfNdFLJue1ruKMGJ2uPgd31TN3vkm7uUJsPs1HH4Ll ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DWktH3CKE3t2erF3PDj5q7jWLrdngPmeMC7t47jF4ReRngmmvscWR8un3tnQjpeRl ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61376 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61382 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61383 ;
[8] https://47news dot ru/articles/263385/ ; https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-gazprom-plans-cut-staff-central-office-2025-01-13/
[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010225
[10] https://t.me/tass_agency/295760
[11] https://t.me/wargonzo/24239 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62346 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22311 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62346
[12] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1628623794420170&rdid=hNDNmTxQuh9ETuRM
[13] https://t.me/mod_russia/47833
[14] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24588 ; https://t.me/osirskiy/1034
[15] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12263
[16]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CF9hjfQNwM9nibLUwJsHYVedfNdFLJue1ruKMGJ2uPgd31TN3vkm7uUJsPs1HH4Ll ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DWktH3CKE3t2erF3PDj5q7jWLrdngPmeMC7t47jF4ReRngmmvscWR8un3tnQjpeRl
[17] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/13/zsu-zmusyly-rosiyan-vidmovytys-vid-vazhkoyi-tehniky-na-harkivshhyni-zastupnyk-komandyra-43-ombr/
[18] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2492
[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TRPBfwfiAQY4xhBUguVNjBnkVKxxwQsyLXhRK3167GDXH4dEjYjPKyVca31GnQSDl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CF9hjfQNwM9nibLUwJsHYVedfNdFLJue1ruKMGJ2uPgd31TN3vkm7uUJsPs1HH4Ll ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12263 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DWktH3CKE3t2erF3PDj5q7jWLrdngPmeMC7t47jF4ReRngmmvscWR8un3tnQjpeRl
[20] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/923877-fedorenko-rozpoviv-so-vidbuvaetsa-u-dvoricnij-ta-na-kupanskomu-napramku-frontu/
[21] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KEto7vQytg4 ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/915321-armia-rf-bila-na-pokrovska-boi-v-kurahovomu-torecku-casovomu-aru-front-na-donbasi-13-sicna/?anchor=live_1736757851&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[22] https://t.me/frontline_pvt/5537 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/12766
[23] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8106 ; https://t.me/pulse_of_the_front/4436
[24] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TRPBfwfiAQY4xhBUguVNjBnkVKxxwQsyLXhRK3167GDXH4dEjYjPKyVca31GnQSDl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CF9hjfQNwM9nibLUwJsHYVedfNdFLJue1ruKMGJ2uPgd31TN3vkm7uUJsPs1HH4Ll ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DWktH3CKE3t2erF3PDj5q7jWLrdngPmeMC7t47jF4ReRngmmvscWR8un3tnQjpeRl ; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/23943
[25] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12263
[26] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22292 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20511
[27] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22292
[28] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TRPBfwfiAQY4xhBUguVNjBnkVKxxwQsyLXhRK3167GDXH4dEjYjPKyVca31GnQSDl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CF9hjfQNwM9nibLUwJsHYVedfNdFLJue1ruKMGJ2uPgd31TN3vkm7uUJsPs1HH4Ll ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DWktH3CKE3t2erF3PDj5q7jWLrdngPmeMC7t47jF4ReRngmmvscWR8un3tnQjpeRl
[29] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/919429-za-koznij-krok-vpered-voni-viddaut-desatki-zittiv-komandir-63-brigadi-rozpoviv-pro-oboronu-limana-ta-vtrati-armii-rf/
[30] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/919429-za-koznij-krok-vpered-voni-viddaut-desatki-zittiv-komandir-63-brigadi-rozpoviv-pro-oboronu-limana-ta-vtrati-armii-rf/
[31] https://t.me/sashakots/51253
[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TRPBfwfiAQY4xhBUguVNjBnkVKxxwQsyLXhRK3167GDXH4dEjYjPKyVca31GnQSDl
[33] https://t.me/rusich_army/20077; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61380
[34] https://t.me/rusich_army/20077; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61380
[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TRPBfwfiAQY4xhBUguVNjBnkVKxxwQsyLXhRK3167GDXH4dEjYjPKyVca31GnQSDl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CF9hjfQNwM9nibLUwJsHYVedfNdFLJue1ruKMGJ2uPgd31TN3vkm7uUJsPs1HH4Ll; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DWktH3CKE3t2erF3PDj5q7jWLrdngPmeMC7t47jF4ReRngmmvscWR8un3tnQjpeRl
[36] https://t.me/rusich_army/20077
[37] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61380; https://t.me/epoddubny/22148; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84352; https://t.me/notes_veterans/21407
[38] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/151167
[39] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2492
[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TRPBfwfiAQY4xhBUguVNjBnkVKxxwQsyLXhRK3167GDXH4dEjYjPKyVca31GnQSDl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CF9hjfQNwM9nibLUwJsHYVedfNdFLJue1ruKMGJ2uPgd31TN3vkm7uUJsPs1HH4Ll; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DWktH3CKE3t2erF3PDj5q7jWLrdngPmeMC7t47jF4ReRngmmvscWR8un3tnQjpeRl
[41] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2492
[42] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2492; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84369; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13254
[43] https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1878494201551401447; https://t.me/supernova_plus/35209; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1878526019201572986
[44] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-12-2025
[45] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8099; https://t.me/mechanized33/706
[46] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31291; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30503
[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TRPBfwfiAQY4xhBUguVNjBnkVKxxwQsyLXhRK3167GDXH4dEjYjPKyVca31GnQSDl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CF9hjfQNwM9nibLUwJsHYVedfNdFLJue1ruKMGJ2uPgd31TN3vkm7uUJsPs1HH4Ll ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DWktH3CKE3t2erF3PDj5q7jWLrdngPmeMC7t47jF4ReRngmmvscWR8un3tnQjpeRl ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61371
[48] https://t.me/milinfolive/139705
[49] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2490
[50] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2491
[51] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8098; https://t.me/rubpak/254; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8108; https://t.me/voin_dv/12770
[52] https://t.me/vrogov/18721 ; https://ria dot ru/20250113/spetsoperatsiya-1993414502.html?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=mobile&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fdzen.ru%2Fnews%2Fsearch; https://t.me/dva_majors/62346; https://t.me/voin_dv/12755
[53] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61373
[54] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2492
[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TRPBfwfiAQY4xhBUguVNjBnkVKxxwQsyLXhRK3167GDXH4dEjYjPKyVca31GnQSDl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CF9hjfQNwM9nibLUwJsHYVedfNdFLJue1ruKMGJ2uPgd31TN3vkm7uUJsPs1HH4Ll; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DWktH3CKE3t2erF3PDj5q7jWLrdngPmeMC7t47jF4ReRngmmvscWR8un3tnQjpeRl; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61373
[56] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2492
[57] https://t.me/wargonzo/24245
[58] https://t.me/usf_army/340
[59] https://t.me/wargonzo/24245
[60]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CF9hjfQNwM9nibLUwJsHYVedfNdFLJue1ruKMGJ2uPgd31TN3vkm7uUJsPs1HH4Ll
[61] https://t.me/rusich_army/20048
[62] https://t.me/rusich_army/20048
[63] https://t.me/atesh_ua/6159 ; https://suspilne dot media/crimea/923503-okupanti-posilili-sistemami-ppo-aerodrom-gvardijske-v-krimu-ates/
[64] https://t.me/kpszsu/26736
[65] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/923927-poluma-svidko-posiruvalos-ulamki-sahediv-spricinili-pozezu-i-rujnuvanna-u-sumah/ ; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/32865 ; https://t.me/astrapress/72279 ; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/32877 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/13/na-sumshhyni-dron-vpav-na-krytychnu-infrastrukturu-185-naselenyh-punktiv-bez-svitla/ ; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/4269
[66] https://www.yna.co dot kr/view/AKR20250113084100001
[67] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-11-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122724; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122324; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121524
[68] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2025/01/13/1085760-federalnii-byudzhet-ne-budet-finansirovat-zaschitu-aeroportov-ot-dronov; https://www.fontanka dot ru/2025/01/13/74981597/
[69] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/business/articles/2024/09/25/1064378-byudzhet-dast-ne-menee-11-mlrd-na-zaschitu-aeroportov-ot-dronov
[70] https://isw.pub/UkrWar120924
[71] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/society/news/2025/01/13/1085844-uchastniki-spetsoperatsii-smogut
[72] https://t.me/infomil_live/14007; https://t.me/rybar/67117; https://t.me/milinfolive/139686
[73] ttps://t.me/milinfolive/139686