By Emily Anagnostos and Patrick Martin and the ISW Iraq Team
The campaign for Mosul
entered its second month, with current momentum indicating that the operation
will last into January 2017. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) remained
entrenched in eastern Mosul while facing fierce ISIS resistance from
November 16 to 21, and Shi’a militias are on the outskirts of Tel Afar after
seizing the nearby airbase on November 16.
The ISF has made little
progress over the past week in eastern Mosul; they remain engaged in the same
neighborhoods they have occupied since entering eastern Mosul on November 1.The
Federal Police announced on November 19 that it had completed operations on Mosul’s
southern axis and are positioning to breach the city’s southern border, where
they will face an immediate fight over the airport and military base, both of
which ISIS still occupies. The 16th Iraqi Army Division remains engaged in
operations north of Mosul and has made no indication of a timeline to move into
the city itself. Iraqi Shi’a militias advanced towards Tel Afar, west of Mosul,
after retaking the nearby airbase on November 16. Ninewa Operations Commander Maj. Gen. Najm al-Juburi stated on November 19
that the 15th Iraqi Army Division advanced alongside the militias, likely in an
effort to reduce possible backlash from multiple regional actors, including
Turkey, that have rejected any Shi’a militia presence in the majority Turkmen
town. The 15th Division’s training may also assist in the recapture of Tel
Afar, as Shi’a militias have struggled to retake urban terrain without enduring heavy
casualty.
The lack of progress in
eastern Mosul may indicate that the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) and Iraqi
Army units have paused operationally in order to wait for ISF units nearing
Mosul’s northern and southern limits. However, the CTS previously announced its pauses and has not
done so now, even though the Joint Operations Command continues to issue daily
operations reports. The CTS may also be deliberately slowing operations to
ensure that it thoroughly clears neighborhoods before advancing or to wait for
reinforcements to arrive.
More likely, the lack of
progress may indicate that operations in eastern Mosul are not going as well as
the Western or Iraqi media portrays. The CTS and Iraqi Army may be facing a
high degree of attrition because of strong ISIS resistance slowing their
advance inward. ISIS released a video on November 14 showing
numerous, successful Suicide Vehicle-Borne IEDs (SVBIEDs) striking ISF units
which tried and failed to stop the attack. The video also showed ISIS militants
utilizing captured CTS vehicles. A field report from November 11 revealed that
the CTS suffered high casualties in an effort to take
al-Samah neighborhood on November 4 and could suggest that the CTS likely
suffered similar casualties in following operations. The likely attrition of
the CTS is extremely dangerous for the Mosul operation; the CTS is the most
elite unit in the ISF and the only one with sufficient training in urban
warfare. Moreover, the CTS’s participation in Mosul follows its involvement in
Ramadi in January, Fallujah in June, and Qayyarah in August, giving the units
limited time to regroup before tackling Mosul.
The ISF will face
greater challenges as it moves into western Mosul. ISIS’s resistance in eastern
Mosul was expected to be the easier fight as the majority of Mosul’s population
is concentrated in the west, especially in the Old City where the maze-like,
narrow streets will constrict ISF movement and vision. Several of the western
neighborhoods were former areas of operation for al Qaeda, so these areas may
have lasting insurgent networks capable of contesting ISF control and a
population reluctant to trust government forces. The ISF’s struggle to clear
eastern Mosul thus raises concern for its ability to overcome greater obstacles
in the western half, especially as continued attrition will renders the force
less effective.
Other ISF units will
move into the city to assist this main effort, but they may not provide the
needed reinforcement for the CTS or a sufficient force to hold the city. The
9th and 16th Iraqi Army Divisions operating to the north and south of Mosul,
respectively, are struggling to overcome ISIS obstacles outside of the city
limits and are less effective than the CTS in urban warfare. The 9th Division,
as the only armored division, is also likely to deploy to western Anbar after
the ISF takes Mosul. The Federal Police, moving towards Mosul’s airport from
the south, are compromised by Iranian-backed Shi’a militias and have limited
training in urban warfare. The use of sectarian violence by some Federal Police
units will also undermine security and civilians’ trust in the ISF. Some
Coalition-trained units remain in western Anbar and Baghdad, however the Iraqi
Government will likely elect to keep these units in western Anbar for the
inevitable operation around al-Qa’im and in Baghdad out of wariness that ISIS will
strike in the capital in response to losses in Mosul.
ISIS will take advantage
of these limitations of the ISF and try to resurge in the city. The ISF’s
difficulty in clearing and holding a limited number of neighborhoods now indicates
that it will also struggle to hold the whole city. ISIS has already shown its
ability to reinfiltrate cleared cities, such as several suicide attacks in Fallujah on November
14 and 17. The holding operation in Mosul will require significant resources
and manpower to ensure the city remains secure and that Salafi-Jihadi groups
cannot reestablish attack capabilities in the city.