By Michael Momayezi,
Kevin Cooper, and Staley Smith
The Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) began advancing into Mosul’s eastern and southeastern
neighborhoods on November 1-3, marking the first time the ISF has had any
presence in the city since ISIS captured it in mid-2014. The Counter Terrorism
Service (CTS) stormed Gogjali, Mosul’s
easternmost suburb, on November 1 and continued clearing operations on
November 2. The CTS then breached Mosul’s eastern city limits, entering al-Karama on November 2 and retaking the neighborhood of Samah on November 3. Units from the 9th Iraqi
Army (IA) Division and the 1st Rapid Intervention Division recaptured several villages southeast of Mosul before entering the southeastern
neighborhoods of Judaya al-Mufti on November 1 and al-Intasar on November 3. The entry into the neighborhoods marks the start of a long
operation to clear ISIS’s capital in Iraq block-by-block.
The ISF will face new
challenges as it moves beyond ISIS’s outer defenses and into the city itself. ISIS
successfully slowed the CTS advance on the eastern edge of the city, where
security forces encountered IEDs, boulders
obstructing roads, and snipers. ISIS militants had also set fire to oil trenches on the
outskirts of the city in order to obscure targets from Coalition airstrikes and
deter forces from advancing. Mosul’s urban terrain will further impede advances
as the security forces approach the more compact neighborhoods of Mosul’s old
city and industrial sectors, and ISIS’s resistance will likely increase and
intensify. The risk of civilian casualty is also high, especially among those trapped
inside by ISIS to use as human shields. The Iraqi Government
has already begun efforts to mitigate this risk, as the Iraqi Ministry of Defense reported that the ISF opened a safe
route for civilians to escape fighting on November 3, and some have been
transported in Iraqi military vehicles and buses to an Internally-Displaces
Persons (IDP) camp in
Khazar.
Security forces have
made progress recapturing terrain on Mosul’s western and southern axes. Iraqi
Shi’a militias made quick gains moving northwest towards the city of Tel Afar,
west of Mosul, recapturing many majority-Sunni
villages along the southwestern axis from November 1-3. Iranian-backed proxy militias
pushing towards Tel Afar, including the Badr Organization, Kata’ib Hezbollah and
Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), are likely to engage in sectarian violence, though
they have encountered few civilians during clearing operations thus far. Meanwhile,
the ISF advanced north toward Hammam al-Alil,
the last major city between the security forces and Mosul on the southern axis,
reaching the city’s outskirts on November 2. From Hammam al-Alil, the ISF can advance to
Mosul’s southern limits, where it will likely aim to recapture an airport and
military base to use as staging grounds for further operations into the city.
ISW now assesses that
the Peshmerga has recaptured Batnaya, a Christian town north of Mosul. Sources reported control of the city as early as October 20, but no official
statement was made and sources continued to report movement into the city. The current movement of forces
beyond Batnaya and video of Peshmerga forces celebrating inside the city, however,
suggests that Batnaya is under Peshmerga control. The recapture of Batnaya
pushes Coalition control closer to Mosul’s northern limits as the ISF and
Peshmerga continue operations to retake Tel Kayyaf and Bashiqa, respectively.
Turkey deployed additional troops on November 2 to the Turkish
town of Silopi on the Turkey-Iraq border. Turkish President Recep Erdogan’s announced
the deployment on October 29,
cautioning against Shi’a militia abuses against Turkmen populations in Tel
Afar, west of Mosul. Other senior Turkish leaders also warned against the
establishment of a Kurdistan Workers’ Party
(PKK) stronghold in Sinjar and called the build-up a “precaution,” not a threat. Turkey is unlikely to engage in a major operation
in Iraq, particularly as it is heavily
invested in Syria. However, it is possible that Turkey
deploys small units into northern Iraq in order to counter any movement by the
PKK or Shi’a militias which it deems hostile. Turkey may also use its build-up
as leverage in discussions regarding Mosul’s post-ISIS administration. The
Iraqi Government will respond to a deployment of any size as major violation of
sovereignty, escalating tensions between Iraq and Turkey and undermining the
anti-ISIS Coalition.
