By Emily Anagnostos, Jessica Lewis McFate, Jennifer
Cafarella, and Alexandra Gutowski
Introduction
Iraq could face another Sunni insurgency after ISIS
loses control of Mosul. The U.S.-led Operation Inherent Resolve has not
resolved the political conditions that originally caused Sunni Arabs to
mobilize in a non-violent protest movement in 2012-2013. Sunni
Arabs in Iraq who are liberated from ISIS’s control will not necessarily be
reconciled to the Iraqi Government. The success of anti-ISIS operations
in 2016 will open space for other Sunni anti-government actors and armed groups
to resurge in ISIS’s absence. Sunni Arabs are displaced in large numbers, which
will grow as the Coalition seizes and secures Mosul. Iranian-backed Shi’a
militias will exacerbate grievances as they move to clear Sunni-majority
villages in northern Iraq and near Tel
Afar, a
historic stronghold of Sunni insurgents and al Qaeda in Iraq west of Mosul.
Shi’a militias have alienated local Sunni Arab populations in other cities
cleared of ISIS by conducting extrajudicial killings, ethnic cleansing, and
other forms of violence against the local population. A permissive environment
is emerging for a Sunni insurgency in the vacuum of control left by ISIS, into
which other actors, including al Qaeda, could emerge in 2017.
Sunni Insurgent Groups and ISIS Before
Mosul Fell
Iraq stood on the brink of a Sunni
insurgency in late 2013 before ISIS began to seize terrain because former Iraqi
PM Nouri al-Maliki reversed the gains of the previous U.S.-led Coalition to reconcile and
reintegrate Sunni Arabs into Iraqi politics in 2008. Maliki launched a highly
sectarian policy to marginalize Sunni politicians and consolidate
control over the Iraqi military the day U.S. forces withdrew. His political
actions ignited a year-long Sunni anti-government protest movement that erupted in January 2013 after the near arrest of Rafi al-Issawi, the moderate Sunni Finance
Minister, in December 2012.
Sunni infighting crippled the Sunni political base in
2013, making it unable to channel or mitigate growing Sunni discontent away
from an insurgency. Maliki’s maneuverings compounded these internal fractures, leading to the erosion of
the Sunni political alliance, Iraqiyya, throughout 2012. Iraqiyya further split
over how to handle Maliki’s administration: Issawi led a boycott of Maliki’s cabinet
in January 2013 in solidarity with protests but several Sunni leaders broke rank and returned in March in
favor of negotiation. The Sunni political alliance was effectively dead before
the June 2013 provincial elections in Ninewa and Anbar Provinces, leaving the
protest without an effective channel to a political resolution.
Clashes between the government and
protesters kindled the growing insurgency and ultimately created the opening for
ISIS’s capture of Fallujah in January 2014. Violent government escalations
against the protest movement, such as the April 2013 massacre at the Hawija sit-in protest camp, galvanized the
movement. The mass arrest of Sunni males in Baghdad after ISIS attacked
the Abu Ghraib and Taji Base prisons in July 2013
heightened grievances.
Multiple anti-government
organizations competed to champion the Sunni cause, harness their discontent,
and facilitate a full insurgency. Chief among these competitors was ISIS,
rebranded from al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Sunni Arabs had rejected ISIS’s
predecessor, AQI, and joined the Iraqi Government to defeat it in the Sahwa, or
Awakening, movement from 2006 to 2008. ISIS resurged in parallel with the anti-government
protest movement and conducted a Vehicle-Borne IED (VBIED) wave campaign in
2012-2013 targeting Shi’a civilians to spark a sectarian civil war that would
break the Iraqi state.
ISIS’s black flags were present within the protest
camps in Ramadi starting in October 2013. AQI’s resurgence and its presence in
previously off-limits camps demonstrates that Iraq’s Sunni Arab population
became willing to tolerate ISIS’s presence in their midst despite the earlier expulsion
of AQI, indicating the virulence of their anti-government sentiment. ISIS’s
presence in the camps suggests that ISIS cooperated on some level with other
anti-government insurgent organizations that had been present in the protest
camps.
Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia
(JRTN), a neo-Baathist insurgent group, harnessed the 2013 protest movement directly
in order to stoke its own insurgency. JRTN infused the anti-government protest movement
with revolutionary rhetoric and traditional Baathist branding. ISIS likely relied
on its support to infiltrate the protest camps. Other legacy revolutionary
groups, such as the 1920 Brigades, another neo-Ba’athist group, and Ansar
al-Islam, a Kurdish Sunni insurgent group, re-emerged as well prior to December
2013. Saddam-era Iraqi Army officers made
up the core of JRTN and the 1920 Brigade’s manpower and lent military know-how and
leadership to the groups. This experience with military organization and
knowledge of the terrain made each neo-Baathist group a formidable rival to ISIS.
Maliki’s order for the Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) to clear the sit-in protest camp in December spurred the
development of an organized Sunni rebellion. The large scale clashes on December 30-31, 2013 between
protesters and the ISF in Ramadi signaled the start of an insurgency. The General Military Council of Iraqi
Revolutionaries (GMCIR) formed in January 2014 as an umbrella to
absorb recently-formed local military councils in majority Sunni areas
including Anbar, Fallujah, Mosul, Salah al-Din, Kirkuk, Baghdad, and Diyala.
The GMCIR formed as ISIS seized control of Fallujah on January 3, but it reflected the
degree of preparation by JRTN over the preceding year to cultivate a Sunni
insurgency. Another umbrella organization, the Council of Revolutionaries of
the Tribes of Anbar (CRTA), also formed in January 2014 in response to the clearing
of the Ramadi protest camp.
JRTN supported ISIS’s rise because
ISIS could further the anti-government cause. JRTN and GMCIR leader Izzat al-Douri,
a top Saddam-era deputy, acknowledged on July 17, 2014, following ISIS’s
first northern offensive, that ISIS “helped the revolutionaries achieve their
goals and were semi-[parallel] with them in facing the Iranian Safavid project
in Iraq.” These leaders, nonetheless, remained wary of ISIS’s adherence to
their brand of an anti-government but pan-Iraqi insurgency: CRTA leader, Sheikh
Ali Hatem, warned jihadists from taking advantage of the revolution in his formation statement on
January 3, 2014.
The cooperation between ISIS and JRTN
over the insurgency came to end likely by the fall of 2014 at which point ISIS
began to brutally marginalize and suppress JRTN. JRTN ceased to support ISIS’s means
of carrying out the insurgent: JRTN criticized ISIS openly in August 2014 after
ISIS targeted Yazidis in Sinjar while the GMCIR, in which JRTN played a dominant role, criticized ISIS for taking the
“revolution to a different path” and continuing north, rather than overthrowing the government in Baghdad. In turn, ISIS began to
consider JRTN a competitor, especially as JRTN frequently tried
to impose its own governance in overlapping territory. In response, ISIS began
to systematically assassinate retired Iraqi Army officers, JRTN’s
primarily recruitment pool, in Mosul in September 2014, a sign that it had
begun to eliminate organized military resistance as a solution to the dispute. ISIS's
military dominance forced JRTN to go to ground.
Increasing Sunni Unrest in Late
2016
Contemporary U.S.-led Coalition
operations to degrade and disrupt ISIS in 2016 may unlock the Sunni insurgency
that began as the GMCIR, CRTA, and other smaller groups. This outcome will
transpire if conditions are not set to help Sunni Arabs in Iraq to address
their original and mounting grievances. The Coalition has attempted to pursue Sunni
reconciliation politically in Baghdad, including through a National Guard Law aimed to provide Sunni communities with a local security
structure. These lines of effort largely failed because of efforts by Iranian
proxies and pro-Iranian political groups.
The U.S. and Iraqi Governments are
unlikely to be able to address the grievances in 2016, as the Prime Minister
Haidar al-Abadi government faces continued pressure from sectarian political and militia
leaders to maintain the Shi’a-dominated status quo. These leaders could further
Sunni distrust in the government. The Iraqi parliament passed the controversial
Popular Mobilization Act on November
26, which institutionalizes the Popular Mobilization Units, the bulk of which
are Shi’a militias, as part of the ISF. Sunni political leaders boycotted the
vote, warning that the law hurt
national reconciliation efforts. The law, the language of which remains
open-ended, could support local Sunni security forces by ensuring that they are
equally integrated into the new structure. However, Shi’a parties already
rebuffed conditions by Sunni parties to
increase the number of Sunni units, suggesting that Shi’a militias, including
those charged with sectarian violence, will dominate the future structure of
the Popular Mobilization. Meanwhile, former PM Maliki is carving a path to
return to the premiership, which would further alienate Sunni
Arabs in Iraq from the central government. His intermediate efforts have
already resulted in changes that are marginalizing Sunnis, including his facilitation of the dismissal of Sunni Defense
Minister Khalid al-Obeidi on August 25. This dismissal highlighted the division
among Sunni parties in the government, undermining potential Sunni political
unity.
Sunni political infighting has also emerged
on the provincial level ahead of provincial elections. These elections are
scheduled for April 2017, but the financial crisis could result in its merger with the 2018 parliamentary elections. The Anbar
Provincial Government has made repeated attempts to oust its governor over allegations of corruption and
mishandling the return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The Anbar
Provincial Court also issued on October 16 an arrest
warrant for
Ahmed Abu Risha, who in 2007 succeeded his brother, who was assassinated by
AQI, as the leader of the Sunni Awakening, or Sahwa, movement in Anbar that
helped the U.S. defeat AQI. The legacy Sahwa elements subsequently resisted
ISIS’s first attempt to retake Ramadi in January 2014. A similar dynamic is
re-emerging in Salah al-Din Province: the Sunni Jubur tribe dominates local
politics, but the tribe is divided on policy, including its relations with Shi’a militias, which constitute
a large portion of the security force in Salah al-Din, and the return of IDPs. The
divide has resulted in the governorship swapping between the rival branches of
the Jubur tribe. This continuous jostling over governance and security arrangements
can lend to instability in the province. This divide also appears in federal
politics; recently, one Jubur parliamentary member called for the dismissal of Salim al-Juburi, the
parliamentary speaker. In Ninewa Province, Sunni Arabs are displaced during anti-ISIS operations, then prevented
from returning to villages that Kurdish forces have secured. Sunni Arabs could
also be shut out of the post-ISIS administration of Ninewa Province if Shi’a
and Kurdish parties dominate security. The failure to create secure, stable and
effective local governance could drive Sunni populations to seek alternative ways
to protect themselves and redress their grievances, opening avenues for
insurgent groups to infiltrate.
Sunnis also remain at odds with each
other and these intra-Sunni confrontations are already creating opportunities
for Sunni insurgents. Unidentified tribal leaders in Ramadi have reportedly
allowed the return of known ISIS militants into
the city, only months after its recapture by the ISF in January 2016. Suicide
attacks in Fallujah in November 2016 suggest that ISIS has already reconsolidated its networks in the city, which was
cleared in June, or found residents that remain tolerant to its ideology.
Meanwhile, Sunni tribes have carried out violent reprisals on other Sunni civilians who
lived in recaptured ISIS-held towns, accusing those civilians off collaborating
with ISIS. These divides within Sunni communities will prevent local, national,
and political Sunni unity, and will require the same scale of neighborhood-by-neighborhood
Sunni reconciliation efforts that U.S.
forces carried out in 2007.
JRTN and AQI After ISIS in 2017
JRTN’s rhetorical resurgence has
already begun. JRTN is seeking to demonstrate that it is the best champion for
Sunnis in Iraq over the alternatives of ISIS and the Iraqi Government. JRTN is setting
conditions to take immediate advantage of ISIS’s loss in Mosul in order to
reclaim the city and its networks. The group issued a statement on October 17, the day
Coalition forces launched operations against ISIS in Mosul, claiming to have attacked ISIS in Mosul and calling
for additional resistance against ISIS. ISIS has been systematically imprisoning
or killing civilians and retired Iraqi Army officers who refuse to act as human
shields, an indication both that resistance
to ISIS is mounting and that ISIS is attempting to decapitate it. Meanwhile,
JRTN has continued to criticize ISIS’s methods, including issuing
a statement against an ISIS attack at the Prophet’s Mosque in Saudi Arabia in
early July, in order to show itself as kinder, more reasonable champion for
Iraqi Sunnis.
JRTN and its allies are tapping into Sunni
disillusionment with the Shi’a-dominated government in order to demonstrate
that they are the best alternative for Sunnis. JRTN’s statements on October 15
and 17 rejected any Shi’a militia presence
in the city and criticized Iranian presence in Iraq, indicating that JRTN is
positioning itself to inherit ISIS’s mantle of Sunni resistance against the government.
The GMCIR, on behalf of all armed groups including JRTN, issued a similar
statement on October 16 criticizing the Iranian occupation
of Ninewa as a way to carry out a “demographic change in Iraq and the region.”
The 1920s Brigade warned on November 3 against the presence of Shi’a militias in Mosul
during anti-ISIS operations. These statements underscore that JRTN and other
insurgent groups are playing on concerns that the Iraqi Government will not be able to
protect Sunnis from the Shi’a militias or ISIS.
JRTN’s resurgence will have other
indicators. JRTN’s signature attack is a targeted assassination
from a moving vehicle. Recent reports of drive-by
shootings targeting ISIS militants in Mosul likely indicate that
JRTN is already on the rebound. Sunni insurgents, particularly JRTN, also have
run extensive IED campaigns in the past. Indicators of JRTN resurgence will therefore likely include
assassinations of Iraqi security officials, particularly Popular Mobilization
elements in charge of securing refugee camps and recaptured areas; IEDs along
major roads targeting ISF access to key terrain in northern and western Iraq;
and recruitment within the ISF. JRTN will likely recruit more successfully than
ISIS among Iraq’s Sunni Arabs in 2016-2017 because ISIS re-invigorated the
blood feud and also lost its control over Sunni Arab populations. ISIS will
attempt to limit JRTN’s opportunities to resurge by eliminating current JRTN
members and possible recruitment pools from among civilians and former ISF
officials. ISIS has already executed hundreds of former police
and army officers before withdrawing from cities south of Mosul. These efforts
will likely lead to increased violence inside Sunni majority areas and places
where Sunni IDPs are aggregating, including Kirkuk and Tikrit.
Al Qaeda in Syria is also positioning
to unify disparate Sunni Arab factions in Iraq and gain popular support in the
wake of ISIS. AQ seeks to perform the role of the silent vanguard of Sunni
insurgencies, and it will enter Iraq with a low signature to evade the
Coalition. AQ may even partner with JRTN the way ISIS did before and just after
ISIS broke from al Qaeda to build a network of Sunni insurgent groups in Iraq
to which AQ can preach. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri called on Sunnis globally
to resist the “Safavid-Crusader” occupation of Iraq in a speech released on August 25, 2016,
in which he called for Iraqi Sunnis to resume a “long guerrilla warfare” in the face
of territorial losses and urged AQ in Syria to support this rebuilding process
in Iraq, indicating al Qaeda’s intent to reinvigorate and reconstitute a Sunni
insurgency against Baghdad. Zawahiri’s call for cross-border relations also
suggests that AQ will renew efforts to maintain a unified, single organization
across Iraq and Syria, as it tried to do before it split from ISIS in 2014.
AQ will likely seek to build its networks on top of
pre-existing cells along the Euphrates River Valley in Anbar Province and in
Ninewa Province, including in Mosul. AQ will attempt to coopt remnant elements
of ISIS that escaped among the flows of IDPs. Attacks in IDP camps,
especially in the Euphrates River Valley and Diyala Province, could signal that
AQ or JRTN has infiltrated the camps and is seeking recruits. AQ will conduct outreach among ungoverned Sunni
Arab populations, by providing religious classes, infrastructure, and utilities
if possible. AQ will portray itself as a local Sunni resistance rather than use
the AQ brand, which is a liability that AQ leader Aymen al-Zawahiri has already
demonstrated he is willing to avoid. AQ’s resurgence in Iraq will therefore be
difficult to track and distinguish from active and vocal Sunni mobilization.
The establishment of new organized groups of Sunni resistance fighters is a
likely indicator that an AQ resurgence is underway. AQ will target IDP
camps as well as civilians in ungoverned portions of major cities. The
Euphrates River Valley could be AQ’s main line of effort because AQ likely has latent networks there that connect to AQ
leadership in Syria.[1]
Conclusion
Preventing another Sunni insurgency, particularly one
that can be coopted by JRTN and AQ, is a necessary task for the anti-ISIS
Coalition. Both JRTN and AQ seek an outcome in Iraq that is antithetical to US
interests. Anti-ISIS operations that do not explicitly block AQ and JRTN will
instead enable them. The Coalition can prevent another Sunni insurgency if it
takes preventative measures that are both military and political. These
measures need to include three lines of effort within its current mission: the
ISF, IDPs, and Iraqi Government. The Coalition must prepare the ISF in
counterinsurgency (COIN) measures, against both the post-Mosul version of ISIS,
and resurgent insurgent groups such as JRTN and AQ. Maj. Gen. Gary Volesky, commander of Combined Joint
Force-Land Component, stated on October 24 that the ISF will start a new
training cycle on COIN to combat an insurgent-like ISIS. These efforts will
also need to inure the ISF and tribal militias against AQ and JRTN’s influence.
The Coalition will also need to ensure that the IDP camps around Mosul are
secured with proper security forces and not with Shi’a militias or compromised
ISF units, which could inflame sectarian tensions and lend weight to insurgent
ideology. Lastly, the Coalition cannot ensure the defeat of ISIS or any
insurgent group without resolving the political conditions that allow it to
take root. The Coalition must reinvigorate national reconciliation efforts that
have fallen to the wayside. ISIS found initial support from Iraq’s Sunnis
because it offered an alternative to the government which many
Sunnis saw as oppressive. JRTN and AQ will try to do the same. The Coalition
needs to ensure that its lines of effort reconcile Sunnis with the government
to the point that Sunnis will use political rather than insurgent means to
address grievances.
The U.S. will need to decide if and how it remains
involved in Iraq after Mosul’s recapture, which will likely occur after
President-elect Donald Trump takes office in January 2017. The Iraqi Government
may set conditions for the U.S.’s withdrawal
in Iraq after Mosul, but the U.S. and Coalition should not pursue an immediate
drawdown of military forces themselves. Doing so could result in similar
conditions that developed in 2012 and 2013 after the U.S. withdrew completely
in 2011. Instead, the U.S. should continue efforts to train and advise the ISF
in order to help prevent the reconstitution of insurgent groups and maintain
Iraq’s sovereignty. The U.S. and its international partners should also ensure involvement
in resettling IDPs and mediating the reconstruction of cities and their local
governing structures. Successful resettlement and reconstruction efforts that
earn the population’s trust in the Iraqi Government can prevent Salafi Jihadi
groups from finding openings to resurge. The U.S. should also help address the
underlying issues that fueled the Sunni insurgency and remain active in shaping
Iraqi’s political reconciliation efforts and encouraging inclusive governance. The
U.S. should have the expectation that it will remain involved in some capacity
in Iraq in order to ensure that anti-ISIS gains stick and that it has resolved
the conditions that allowed insurgent groups to arise in 2013.
[1] Jabhat al Nusra, al Qaeda’s
affiliate in Syria, was active along the Euphrates River Valley southeast of
Raqqa City before ISIS seized the area in late 2014. Al Qaeda likely retains
latent influence with tribes along the Euphrates River Valley that it can use
to resurge if ISIS is defeated. These tribes straddle the Iraqi-Syrian border,
which can provide al Qaeda with cross-border access to networks in western
Iraq.
