By Jonathan Mautner,
Genevieve Casagrande, and Christopher Kozak with Omar Kebbe, Kathleen
Weinberger, Franklin Holcomb, and Benjamin Knudsen
Key Takeaway: Russia is preparing to escalate its military operations in Syria in
order to tout its standing as a great power, reinforce its claims to be a
credible partner against violent extremism, and reinvigorate domestic support
for its continued participation in the Syrian Civil War. Russia has set
conditions for a major demonstration of its military might following the completion
of the latest in a long series of ‘humanitarian pauses’ in Aleppo City set to end
on November 4. Russia’s sole aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, is
expected to arrive off the Syrian Coast in the coming days. The arrival of the
Kuznetsov with its accompanying fleet of cruise missile-equipped submarines and
frigates signals Russia’s likely intent to conduct a new wave of strikes
against strategically significant targets in Syria. The deployment comes amidst
a recent opposition offensive to break the pro-regime siege of Aleppo City as
well as continued pro-regime gains in the Eastern Ghouta Suburbs of Damascus. Russia
will likely exploit opportunities in both Aleppo City and Damascus to highlight
its ability to project force against "terrorism" and demonstrate the
continued legitimacy of its client regime.
Russia intends to escalate its military
operations in Aleppo City and Damascus within the coming days in order to
demonstrate its force projection capabilities and bolster flagging public appeal
for its involvement in the conflict. Russia deployed
its lone aircraft carrier - the Admiral Kuznetsov – to the Eastern
Mediterranean Sea on or around October 17. The Kuznetsov is
also carrying a contingent of Su-33 and MiG-29K/KUB fighter jets that
Russian sources claim are equipped with precision-guided
munitions, as well as Ka-52
attack helicopters armed with long-range anti-tank guided missiles.[i] The
Kuznetsov is escorted by a battle group that includes as many as three
submarines likely equipped with Kalibr long-range cruise
missiles. The Kuznetsov reached
the Mediterranean Sea on November 1 and is expected to arrive off the Syrian
Coast in the coming days, where it will be joined by an additional frigate
armed with Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea Fleet.[ii]
Once the battle group arrives, it will likely not remain idle. Russia will likely
use these new assets to support pro-regime ground operations in Aleppo City or Damascus
in an attempt to improve domestic support for its military intervention in the
Syrian Civil War through a showcase of its naval and air capabilities. A recent
poll by the Levada Center indicated that support for the intervention has begun
to slip since 2015.[iii]
Russians now doubt the Syrian Civil War as a route to improving Russia’s
international image or finding common ground with the West.[iv]
Russian President Vladimir Putin will likely attempt to reinvigorate these
sentiments through a high-profile demonstration of military might and
effectiveness.
Condition Setting for Escalation in Aleppo
Russia has set conditions for a dramatic
escalation in military activity in Aleppo City following a series of ‘humanitarian
pauses’ and an overall decrease in the tempo of its air campaign. Russian
President Vladimir Putin ordered
the Russian Armed Forces to implement a ten-hour ‘humanitarian pause’ on
November 4 in order to allow civilians and opposition fighters to evacuate Eastern
Aleppo City. The temporary ceasefire follows a series of similar ‘humanitarian
pauses’ in Aleppo City on October 20 – 22. The statement follows claims
by the Russian Ministry of Defense that its warplanes have halted all air
operations in Aleppo City since mid-October 2016. The tempo of the Russian air
campaign against opposition-held areas of Eastern Aleppo City decreased
significantly from October 28 to November 1 despite concerted
opposition ground operations to break the pro-regime siege of Aleppo
City. Russia nonetheless continued to conduct heavy airstrikes
against opposition terrain on the southwestern outskirts of Aleppo
City and its surrounding countryside as recently as October 26 – 27,
according to local activist sources. The relative lull in airstrikes followed increasingly public threats
of targeted
sanctions from the U.S. and EU as well as calls for investigations
into potential war crimes committed by
pro-regime forces in Aleppo City, suggesting that Russia may aim to relieve
mounting international backlash against its attempts to depopulate Aleppo City
through an aggressive air campaign.
Russia will likely use the Kuznetsov
and its extant military assets in Syria in order to intensify operations
against opposition forces in Aleppo City and its surrounding countryside, bolstering
the regime’s crippling siege on opposition-held districts of the city. The imminent arrival of the Kuznetsov to the Syrian Coast is currently set to coincide with the expiration
of the latest ‘humanitarian pause’ on November 4. Russia will likely use the
airframes and cruise missile-equipped submarines accompanying the carrier as
part of a new blitz against Eastern Aleppo City as well as core opposition-held terrain in Western
Aleppo and Idlib Provinces. Recent infighting between opposition factions may render Eastern
Aleppo City particularly vulnerable to such an escalation. Clashes erupted
between the increasingly hardline Islamist opposition group Harakat Nour al-Din
al-Zenki and current U.S.-backed TOW anti-tank missile recipient Fastaqim Kama
Umirat in Eastern Aleppo City on November 2. Russia may attempt to exploit
continued infighting by targeting these recently-exposed seams. Despite the
infighting, neither the Kuznetsov nor the vessels in its battle group
possess sufficient military capability to achieve a decisive victory for Syrian
President Bashar al-Assad in Aleppo City. An escalation will nonetheless enable
Russia to highlight its ability to project force against “terrorists” in a
major urban center, draw parallels to ongoing operations by the U.S. in Mosul, and
demonstrate its strength before a domestic audience.
Russia Prepares to Support Regime in Damascus
Russia could also leverage its renewed military intervention to
enable the regime to successfully clear opposition forces from Damascus.
Damascus holds more strategic significance to Russia than Aleppo City due to
its political importance as the seat of government as well as its military role
as the hub for military operations throughout Southern Syria. Russia currently
weights its military efforts towards Northern Syria due to the threat that
opposition groups pose to the regime in Aleppo City. However, Russia currently
faces favorable conditions for its air campaign to expand to the capital.
Pro-regime forces have set conditions for a major breakthrough in the capital
city over the past three years through a brutal siege-and-starve
campaign against the opposition-held suburbs. This campaign has now reached
a critical tipping point. Pro-regime forces forced
the surrender of the key opposition-held town of Darayya in the Western
Ghouta Suburbs of Damascus on August 25, resulting in the forced
displacement of the seven hundred opposition fighters and several thousand
civilians that remained in the town. The regime concluded similar partial
evacuations
from the nearby opposition-held suburbs of Moadamiyeh, Qudsayya, and Hamah in
October 2016 as part of ‘reconciliation agreements’ that brought the towns back
under regime control. Pro-regime forces also tightened the siege on the
remaining opposition-held pocket of Khan al-Shih in Western Ghouta after seizing the neighboring village
of Deir Khabiyah on October 14.
Meanwhile, pro-regime forces have also achieved significant gains
against the opposition-held Eastern Ghouta Suburbs of Damascus. An eruption of opposition
infighting between Salafi-Jihadist group Jaysh al-Islam and rival Islamist
group Faylaq al-Rahman in May 2016 allowed the regime to secure significant
gains in the rural farmland that serves as the breadbasket of the besieged
opposition-held region. Pro-regime forces seized a steady
string of towns over the
intervening months, most recently the villages
of Tel Kurdi and Tel Sawwan on October 29. These gains have
brought pro-regime forces within five kilometers of the opposition stronghold
of Douma near Damascus. These continued advances appear to have drawn interest
from Russia, which resumed steady air
operations
targeting both Khan al-Shih and Eastern Ghouta in Damascus beginning
in late September 2016. Russia may seek to exploit the demonstrated
vulnerability of opposition factions in Damascus as another venue to
demonstrate its military prowess and enable success for pro-regime forces on
the ground.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad appear increasingly confident in the possibility of their victory in
the Syrian Civil War. Assad has conducted a public relations blitz since
September 2016, conducting interviews with a number of media outlets in the
U.S. and Europe with an eye towards demonstrating the stability of his position
and the legitimacy of his rule. Syrian First Lady Asma al-Assad conducted a
similar interview with
state-owned ‘Rossiya 24’ in Russia on October 18 in her first public interview
since 2011. This outreach peaked in a two-day
conference held in Damascus on October 30 – 31 for several dozen
journalists and analysts from the U.S. and Britain in which Assad stated his
intent to finish his presidential term through at least 2021. These statements
suggest that Putin and Assad do not anticipate a meaningful challenge to their
position in Damascus – highlighting the likely intent of Russia to expand its
offensive combat operations in the near-future.
Implications
The Russian escalation as part of a Syrian regime offensive
in Damascus and a counter-offensive in Aleppo will accelerate the radicalization
of the opposition. Russian strikes by air and by sea will target acceptable
opposition groups as they have during previous escalations to eliminate
legitimate alternatives to the Assad regime. This continued pressure will hasten the ongoing
transformation of the opposition into a movement dominated by Salafi-Jihadist
groups such as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s
affiliate in Syria. In the absence of better options, acceptable opposition
groups will increasingly cleave to extremist factions for self-preservation in
the face of concerted pro-regime advances enabled by the Russian air campaign. Russia’s
support to the Assad regime continues to remove potential partners for the U.S.
against ISIS and al-Qaeda in Syria from the battlefield. The U.S. must therefore
be willing to counter the support that Russia is currently providing to the
Assad regime in order to achieve its national security objective in Syria.
